How the next MFF could reshape EU migration financing

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Photo by ‪Salah Darwish via Unsplash

Authors

Migration-related debates on the EU’s next long-term budget 2028-2034 have so far largely focused on questions around the allocation of funds, whether migration spending targets should remain and how far external funding should be tied to migration conditionality. Yet some of the most consequential battles will ultimately be on governance: who controls programming, how migration priorities are operationalised and what role implementation frameworks and partnerships will play in shaping migration financing after 2027.

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    Migration remains one of the most politically contentious issues within the next MFF negotiations. But the intensity of political debates should not be mistaken for migration dominating the wider budget architecture. In several files, politically sensitive questions such as migration conditionality are still being left deliberately open amid divisions across institutions and political groups, while broader pressures for simplification, flexibility and strategic steering continue to shape the negotiations more structurally.

    For migration, the debate spans both the revised EU’s external and internal financing architecture: externally through the proposed Global Europe Instrument, where discussions increasingly focus on flexibility, conditionality and strategic programming, and internally through a significantly expanded Home Affairs budget covering asylum, migration, border management and internal security within the broader National and Regional Partnership Plan (NRPP) architecture. As we’ve pointed out recently, the broader direction of the next MFF points toward a more flexible and strategically steered EU budget architecture shaped by geopolitical priorities, crisis responsiveness and stronger links between internal and external policy objectives.

    Migration may become more politically important within EU external action while becoming financially less visible, harder to track and potentially more strategically fragmented.

    Flexibility, conditionality and the politics of external migration programming

    One of the clearest tensions emerging in the negotiations concerns the balance between flexibility, visibility and strategic coherence in external migration financing. While migration remains politically central to EU external action, particularly around returns, readmission and broader migration cooperation, the Commission’s proposed Global Europe architecture moves away from rigid earmarks and spending targets, including the current indicative 10% migration benchmark under NDICI. Several member state foreign affairs officials have reportedly sought to retain or reintroduce migration targets to preserve political visibility and influence over allocations. Yet these efforts have so far struggled to gain traction amid a broader push, driven largely by finance ministries and EU budget actors, toward a more flexible and simplified budget architecture with fewer earmarks across the board, including in politically sensitive areas such as migration. The result is a paradox at the centre of the debate: migration may become more politically important within EU external action while becoming financially less visible, harder to track and potentially more strategically fragmented.

    Conditionality is likely to remain one of the most politically charged questions in the Global Europe negotiations. While the current EU external instrument (NDICI) already allows for a “flexible incitative approach” linking cooperation and funding, the new proposals and emerging Council discussions point toward a harder leverage logic, particularly around returns and readmission. Still the evidence suggests caution. Negative aid conditionality has rarely been used in practice. Its effects are difficult to isolate from other diplomatic or visa levers, and its effectiveness depends heavily on whether partner governments see cooperation as serving their own interests. It also raises questions around Official Development Aid eligibility under OECD DAC rules, especially if the EU maintains the proposed 90% ODA target under Global Europe, where migration leverage instruments may increasingly compete with other strategic priorities for limited non-ODA space.

    How migration ultimately features within the future Global Europe instrument spending may depend as much on the separate Commission and EEAS-issued internal programming guidelines and strategic choices currently being developed as on the final legislative wording itself. Important questions to watch will be to what extent migration priorities are integrated into broader Global Gateway and investment objectives, how strongly programming prioritises returns, border management and anti-smuggling cooperation, whether migration becomes more systematically embedded across other thematic and geographic priorities and, ultimately, how competing objectives are balanced in practice between long-term partnership approaches, geopolitical interests and short-term political migration pressures.

    National plans and the governance of internal migration financing

    Internally, the Commission has proposed integrating migration, asylum, border management and internal security funding into a broader governance architecture centred around the controversial National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPPs), performance frameworks and implementation dialogues between member states and the Commission. Here too, one of the key battle lines may concern how to ensure a comprehensive approach across migration priorities, including asylum, integration and labour migration, in the absence of stronger earmarks or spending targets. While some actors may seek to reintroduce clearer benchmarks (as was the case in the current Asylum Migration and Integration Fund), others are likely to focus on governance arrangements, programming guidance and partnership approaches to shape priorities in practice.

    For migration actors seeking to preserve a broader and more balanced approach, engagement with the underlying logic of finance ministries, national reform planning and performance-based budgeting may therefore become increasingly important.

    This also means that some of the more consequential debates may increasingly take place outside traditional migration policy circles. Discussions around reform agendas, performance frameworks and budget governance will ultimately shape how migration priorities are operationalised across the next MFF. This implies greater political weight for negotiations between member states and the Commission themselves, as priorities are increasingly shaped through national plans and implementation dialogues. For migration actors seeking to preserve a broader and more balanced approach, engagement with the underlying logic of finance ministries, national reform planning and performance-based budgeting may therefore become increasingly important. The same applies to the partnership dimension of the NRPPs: ensuring meaningful involvement of local authorities, social partners and civil society in programming discussions may be critical for maintaining attention to integration, labour migration and longer-term governance objectives alongside more immediate operational and security priorities.

    Next steps

    In the next negotiating phase, including on migration, the challenge will be getting a ‘compromise’ text within the various regulations so that they can make their way to the finish line. But finding language acceptable to all will not be easy on such a contentious issue.

    Ultimately, the current negotiations may show that the future of EU migration financing is shaped not only by funding levels or political language, but increasingly by the governance systems, programming choices and implementation processes through which priorities are translated into practice. As negotiations move forward, the challenge will be not only to ensure flexibility and political responsiveness, but also to maintain coherent long-term partnerships and a balanced approach across the EU’s wider migration objectives. This, rather than the text of the regulations, is the real challenge.

    The views are those of the author and not necessarily those of ECDPM.