Key questions for the EU following al-Assad’s fall in Syria

For the EU, this is yet another surprise development that will have ramifications for its foreign policy and international cooperation – well beyond relations with Syria itself. The EU will face a difficult balancing act in its relations with the new authorities in Syria and with other international actors in the region. Meanwhile, at home, EU member states risk falling victim to populist reflexes of curbing migration based on wishful thinking.

Navigating the new situation 

HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (or Ahmed al-Sharaa) has been allied with both ISIS and al-Qaeda in the past, and HTS is designated a terrorist organisation by the EU, the US and the UN Security Council. In a CNN interview, al-Jolani appears to have moderated his views, promising a regime based on Islamic values that would respect (religious and ethnic) minorities. He strongly emphasised rebuilding institutions. Following the regime’s overthrow, Mohammed al-Bashir, an engineer and politician affiliated with the HTS-linked group Salvation Government, was appointed as Syria’s transitional prime minister.

Western politicians will have to navigate the alliance of armed groups led by al-Jolani. In other places, notably the Sahel, the EU and its member states have refused to engage with military regimes that have overthrown governments. In Syria, the EU is faced with a political transition of a leadership composed, at least in part, of terrorist organisations listed on the EU sanctions list. Other countries, such as the UK, have already said that it is too early to change the status of HTS.

New EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas avoided directly addressing the engagement with Syria’s new leadership in a first statement, and focused on calling for the avoidance of further violence, respect for international law and the protection of minorities. On X, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said that “Europe is ready to support safeguarding national unity and rebuilding a Syrian state that protects all minorities."

Wider questions of regional geopolitics will also be vital in the coming weeks. Various external actors, including Turkey but also the United States and Israel, have launched strikes on Syrian territory to protect their interests. The EU will have to think about how it can support de-escalation. A key concern will be how Turkey deals with Kurdish groups in northern Syria, as Syria’s Kurds, already abandoned by Western allies in 2018 following their central role in the defeat of ISIS, stand to lose the most.

Meanwhile, the Israeli Defence Forces have launched military campaigns into southern Syria, bombing weapon depots and moving beyond a UN-patrolled buffer zone around the Golan Heights. Egypt has strongly condemned these operations, viewing them as a breach of the 1974 armistice agreement that governs much of the Israel-Syria frontier.

The weakening of Russia and Iran as a result of al-Assad’s fall potentially has wider global ramifications, including for the EU’s interests in Ukraine, the Sahel and further afield. Russia might potentially lose the Tartus naval base and its Hmeimim air base, which were its only Mediterranean bases, used to shadow NATO forces in the Mediterranean and as the launchpad for some of Russia’s African operations. However, Russian sources are hopeful of retaining them. Syria’s other key ally, Iran, already weakened by Israel’s wars against regional allies in Lebanon and Gaza, will now need to rethink its security and regional foreign policy strategy.

Syria’s economy has been shattered by 13 years of civil war and sanctions, and its population is in dire need of stability and access to essential humanitarian aid. The EU and its member states should offer unanimous support to Geir Otto Pedersen, the UN special envoy for Syria, as he works with Syrian and regional actors in support of a peaceful transition. An immediate question is whether the EU will be able to provide humanitarian aid regardless of who is in charge now, and gradually work with other partners to offer sanctions relief. In the longer term, the EU will need to work with Gulf states and other regional powers to support rebuilding the country.

All this unfolds at a time when the EU is about to start the tough negotiations for its new seven-year budget. This may lead to major cuts to the EU’s external action budget and priority shifts more in line with European economic and political interests, including around migration. A number of EU member states have already cut their aid budgets, shifting their focus to private-sector investment and migration prevention. Yet, the EU now faces the prospect of supporting reconstruction efforts in three major conflicts on its frontiers.

Syrian refugee returns: politics, challenges and EU dynamics

As of November 2024, there are approximately 5.7 million registered Syrian refugees dispersed across the Levant, Turkey and Europe. Some have already started making visits across the border from Turkey to Syria – to reunite with family, check on their communities or explore the current situation. However, the broader pattern of voluntary returns heavily depends on Syria’s political future and stability. Voluntary return is shaped by refugees’ socio-economic conditions, legal status and ability to secure re-entry, with flexible return options potentially enhancing diaspora contributions to rebuilding efforts.

Even before Bashar al-Assad’s fall, some EU governments, with Italy in the lead, were easing relations with the Syrian regime to facilitate the deportation of Syrian migrants in the EU. Despite a call for patience and vigilance by the chief of UN refugee agency UNHCR, some member states have taken a rather cynical turn, with politicians suggesting the possibility of a swift return of Syrians just days after the ousting of al-Assad, playing on populist and anti-immigration sentiments in the hope of political gains.

Given the uncertainty of Syria’s political future, asylum agencies in several EU member states (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden), but also the UK, have halted the processing of current asylum requests of Syrians. Should the situation stabilise, individual reviews will also likely be conducted to re-assess the status of those who have already been granted refugee protection. 

The Austrian government has gone further and already announced plans to prepare for return and deportation. If Syria achieves long-term stability, the refugee situation could significantly change, with fewer refugees needing to seek asylum. In the longer term, this shift could address some of the concerns played up and fueled by political leaders in Europe.

What next?

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime opens a new chapter in Syria’s tragic history, with profound implications for Syria’s people, but also for the wider region and for Europe. The future of Syria will depend on the new authorities’ ability to forge a stable, inclusive government, rebuild the country’s shattered infrastructure, and manage the delicate balancing act of regional and international relations.

It goes without saying that the question of the return of Syrian refugees will feature high on the European political agenda. However, European leaders should adopt a more long-term perspective. They should prioritise respectful and innovative domestic and foreign policy solutions that would pave the way for Syria’s reconstruction, support returnees and recognise the integration successes and contributions of the Syrian diaspora within the EU.

This is a moment of great uncertainty, but also of opportunity. The evolving situation in Syria will most likely be discussed during next week’s European leaders summit – the first under the leadership of António Costa. Europe must act with foresight and coherence, ensuring that its response is measured and aligned with long-term peace and stability.

The views are those of the authors and not necessarily those of ECDPM.