Hard truths of a more restrictive EU migration approach
Authors
Given the anticipated rightward shift at the upcoming European elections, we can expect a more restrictive migration policy agenda. In this commentary for our series ‘To the new leaders of Europe’, Jamie Slater explains why this will have major drawbacks, and advocates for protecting migrants' rights, addressing labour shortages and investing in strong partnerships with non-EU countries as a better alternative.
The jury is out on whether migration will play a decisive role in the upcoming EU parliamentary elections. Given the success of hard-right, anti-immigrant parties across Europe in the past year, we might assume that migration currently weighs heavily on the minds of European voters. However, a growing number of sources suggest that there are more important issues to voters than migration, such as poverty and the cost of living. In fact, Germany is the only European country in which migration is currently the top priority for voters, according to an ECFR survey.
Nevertheless, migration is likely to crop up more and more in parties’ political campaigns and in the media as we draw closer to the vote. Migration has long been one of the most heavily politicised issues, with politicians repeatedly trying to gain votes by appealing to voters’ fears, and resorting to disinformation in a bid to boost their chances.
In the upcoming elections, it is forecast that there will be a major shift to the right, with hard-right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU. Such changes will have major implications for a range of policy areas, particularly on migration.
Migration has long been one of the most heavily politicised issues, with politicians repeatedly trying to gain votes by appealing to voters’ fears, and resorting to disinformation in a bid to boost their chances.
What would a rightward shift on migration look like in practice?
By cross-examining election forecasts and political parties’ plans for migration as set out in their manifestos, we can have an idea of what the EU migration agenda might look like for the next five years. The outlook for migrants’ rights, particularly those of asylum seekers, is quite bleak.
- The European People’s Party (EPP), which is projected to remain the largest party in parliament, aims to strengthen the EU’s external borders, beef up Frontex – the EU’s border and coast guard agency, process asylum applications outside of the bloc, and continue the practice of making EU policies, including development and aid, conditional on the cooperation of third countries in taking back migrants. The EPP also offers no solutions at the EU level for labour migration and defers this to the member states.
- Further to the right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which are expected to see the largest increase in seats of any political group, want even more draconian measures. They aim to control all possible entries to Europe through a heavily fortified border (even envisioning a naval blockade around Europe), to process the majority of asylum applications outside of Europe and further increase the externalisation of EU borders into third countries.
- Even further to the right is the Identity and Democracy Group (ID), which until recently was made up of far-right parties such as Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and France’s National Rally, but which has regrouped after the National Rally’s break with AfD. There is no manifesto planned for the ID Group, and while parties’ positions differ, one can imagine an even more restrictive, hostile and inhumane version of the previous two manifestos.
Aside from the astronomical costs of operationalising such a border regime, there is very little proof that border restrictions actually reduce immigration.
What would the drawbacks of a more restrictive approach be?
Aside from the astronomical costs of operationalising such a border regime, one of the crucial flaws to this approach is that there is very little proof that border restrictions actually reduce immigration. Some research even shows that border closures increase migration, since migrants who used to perform temporary work abroad are forced to move permanently to the country that is implementing the restrictions.
Moreover, evidence shows that tighter borders merely shifts the influx of migrants to other countries, causing new routes to spring up, therefore offering no long-term ‘solution’. The main impact of stricter borders is therefore to cause more deaths at the border and create more irregularity and precarious conditions for migrants in Europe.
Another problem is that a more restrictive approach to migration may mean that EU member states are less able to fill labour shortages. In 2022, all 27 EU countries experienced labour shortages, and analysis of long-term data trends show that most shortages have existed for the past five years or more, meaning they are structural and persistent. If EU countries cannot free themselves from this 'need-hate’ relationship with migrants, there are serious concerns that labour shortages will slow down economic growth considerably in the future.
Third, continuing the practice of making aid and development packages conditional on third countries taking back migrants (called ‘negative conditionality’) will only damage the EU’s relationships with its partner countries. The negative conditionality approach is harmful because it does not give partner countries an equal seat at the table in the design of partnerships. It undermines the partnership nature of the agreement, as well as the EU’s commitment to the principle of local ownership of development policies.
The conditionality approach can also backfire if partner countries instrumentalise migration in pursuit of their own interests. This has become increasingly common in recent years, and the EU has struggled to find an effective way to respond. A notable example was in 2020, when Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suspended the EU-Turkey agreement and sent 20,000 migrants to the border with Greece, accompanied by demands for increased EU funding.
So how can the EU build a better agenda on migration?
First, while some border control is necessary, the EU should divert its focus away from attention-grabbing border infrastructures and participate in the global international protection system by offering adequate legal pathways for refugees, as well as upholding the rights of migrants in Europe.
Second, given the scale and structural nature of labour shortages, Europe must have a plan for facilitating labour migration from non-EU countries. Recruiting foreign labour is not a silver bullet for addressing labour shortages, but it is definitely an important part of the puzzle. Disappointingly, none of the political groups mentioned above have any proposals for how to make this work at the EU level.
Some countries, such as Italy, may try to find a middle way, by trying to act tough on irregular migration on the one hand but actively recruiting labour migrants on the other. Not only is Italian prime minister’s Giorgia Meloni’s plan ridden with flaws, it is also in denial of the fact that to fully support its dwindling working age population, creating a welcoming environment for foreigners is essential in promoting their labour market participation.
Given the scale and structural nature of labour shortages, Europe must have a plan for facilitating labour migration from non-EU countries.
Finally, the EU will need to build healthy partnerships on migration with third countries, which means finding agreements that are of mutual benefit for both sides. Doing this requires taking partner countries’ social and economic interests into account, and moving beyond conditionality by negotiating agreements on an equal footing, as I have written about here. Moving beyond conditionality also guards against the instrumentalisation of migration, as partner countries will be more trusting.
Given the anticipated rightward shift at the upcoming elections, we can expect a more restrictive migration policy agenda for the next parliamentary term. However, such an approach will have major drawbacks for the EU and its member states. European leaders will have to be honest with their citizens about the need for foreign labour to address domestic labour shortages and acknowledge that investing heavily in borders will not only prove ineffective, but also lead to more deaths. Finally, healthy partnerships with third countries will be essential to strengthen the EU’s bilateral ties and maintain its global diplomatic position.
The views are those of the author and not necessarily those of ECDPM.