A new European security strategy: What for?

The European Union has adopted a growing number of strategies, roadmaps and doctrines in recent years, spanning economic security, defence, preparedness and resilience. While these initiatives reflect a shifting (and increasingly nervous) geopolitical landscape, they also risk creating fragmentation and confusion, precisely when the EU needs to project credibility and clarity on its vision. Against this backdrop, the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are preparing a new European security strategy – due by the NATO summit of July 2026 – expected to outline key threats and priorities. But does the EU need another strategy, or should it focus on implementing the ones it already has? Its relevance will depend on whether it offers a clear, integrated vision of security that connects defence, resilience, human and economic security, and societal cohesion - internally and externally.

A changing security environment

The EU faces a more volatile and contested global context than at any point in recent decades. Russia’s war against Ukraine, Trump’s threats against NATO, instability in the Middle East and intensifying geopolitical competition have exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities and limitations as a security actor. Traditionally reliant on soft power, the EU is now shifting towards a more assertive posture. This transformation is reflected in rising defence spending and a stronger focus on strategic autonomy. In 2025, military spending by European NATO members rose faster than at any time since 1953. 

At the same time, the concept of security has broadened and is used in many different contexts and domains, including in relation to economic security. Resilience, strategic autonomy, reduced vulnerability to coercion and dependencies are also very relevant objectives in a context of heightened economic competition. In this context, a new security strategy could help clarify how these different dimensions fit together. Not doing so would represent a missed opportunity.

An already contested initiative

Debates among member states highlight differing views on what the strategy should achieve. While some advocate for a broad, integrated understanding of security, others caution against an overly expansive approach that could dilute focus or duplicate existing policies. This reflects a deeper challenge: the absence of a shared European concept of security (and peace) suited to today’s environment.

Moreover, the effectiveness of any EU-level strategy ultimately depends on member states. Defence and security remain largely national competencies, and EU initiatives often follow, rather than shape, national priorities. Without political buy-in, the security strategy risks becoming another declaratory document with limited impact.

There is also scepticism about the EU’s tendency to produce new strategies instead of implementing existing ones. To be credible, the security strategy must demonstrate how it builds on and streamlines current frameworks rather than adding another layer to an already crowded landscape of white papers, doctrines, strategies and roadmaps.

Linking internal and external security

A key test for the strategy will be its ability to bridge internal and external dimensions of security. Ultimately, a new security strategy goes far beyond foreign policy and concerns all instruments of power – notably defence.  Today’s threats – ranging from cyberattacks and disinformation to energy insecurity and supply chain disruptions – do not respect institutional boundaries and require coordination across policy areas and actors.

The proposed strategy is expected to adopt a broad perspective, linking defence with energy, supply chains, cybersecurity, raw materials and other strategic sectors – what some have called a ‘360-degree approach’ to security. This approach reflects the growing emphasis on security and resilience across EU policies, from preparedness and crisis management to societal and democratic resilience, climate resilience and economic security.

Yet, while ‘resilience’ has become a central concept, no single strategy currently integrates its various dimensions (including internal-external) into a coherent vision. The security strategy could fill this gap by articulating how resilience, preparedness and security interact.

This approach will require stronger coordination and buy-in within the European Commission, as well as closer cooperation with the HRVP, EEAS and member states. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach is essential to ensure that internal and external policies reinforce each other, though this will require significant political and bureaucratic leadership. What will make or break the strategy will be its ability to encompass the various dimensions of European security in a coherent manner and in a way that makes sense, both internally and externally. For instance, reducing dependencies on critical raw materials or semiconductor supply chains would no longer be seen only as an industrial or trade issue, but also as a security imperative linked to defence readiness and crisis preparedness. In practice, this will require the EU to coordinate across defence, industrial, digital and external action instruments and tools around shared strategic objectives and risk assessments.

Towards a more coherent and proactive strategy

For the European security strategy to make a difference, it should focus on three priorities.

First, it should provide strategic clarity rather than introducing new concepts.

Second, it should strengthen coherence by integrating defence, economic security, resilience and external action on peace and security issues into a single framework.

Third, it should promote a proactive mindset. Too often, the EU is perceived as reactive, responding to crises rather than anticipating them.

Importantly, a comprehensive approach to security must go beyond military capabilities. The EU’s added value lies in its diplomatic, economic and societal tools, which are equally critical. Resilient societies, inclusive governance and social cohesion reduce vulnerabilities to external interference and internal instability. In this sense, hard and soft power should be seen as complementary rather than competing. For example, strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities will do little to enhance long-term security if societies remain vulnerable to disinformation, political polarisation or cyberattacks. Similarly, military support measures in fragile regions are unlikely to be sustainable without parallel investments in governance, conflict prevention, economic resilience and local institutions. 

Finally, the strategy should recognise that European security is closely linked to that of its partners. Cooperation with like-minded countries remains essential, whether through security and defence partnerships or broader political and economic ties. In an interconnected world, resilience cannot be built in isolation.

A new European security strategy can be useful, though its added value lies in providing a clear, integrated and forward-looking vision of security. More trickily, it also needs clear buy-in from various EU member states and different parts of the EU institutions. Rather than reinventing the wheel, this strategy should simplify, connect and prioritise. If it succeeds, it could help the EU navigate an increasingly complex security landscape with greater coherence and purpose. If not, it risks becoming just another strategy in an already crowded field.

The views are those of the authors and not necessarily those of ECDPM.