The EU must reclaim its climate leadership
Authors
Election polls indicating a rightward shift, leaked EU strategy documents with little mention of the climate crisis, and new political priorities that require budget shifts – none of it bodes well for the EU’s climate leadership. In the fourth commentary of our series ‘To the new leaders of Europe', Hanne Knaepen explains why and how the EU should change this course of direction.
After the success of Green parties in the European elections in 2019, the European Commission impressed friends and foes with the announcement of the EU Green Deal to decarbonise Europe by 2050, with a significant international dimension. Five years later, the EU’s commitment to the climate agenda seems to falter. Decelerating or reversing years of progress will have dire consequences for Europe’s security and jeopardise its global climate leadership.
More inward-looking and less green, but how strategic?
While the EU’s strategic agenda for 2019-2024 considered climate change an “existential threat”, a leaked EU priority list designed to guide the European Commission's agenda until 2029 gives scant attention to climate change, ecological transition and biodiversity. It does emphasise issues like defence, foreign policy, enlargement and illegal migration. Interestingly, the links between climate impacts and the EU’s own security and stability are overlooked.
Projections for the European elections predict large gains for the eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR Group) and the far-right Identity and Democracy Group (ID Group). This potential shift to the right may result in a more inward-looking, reactive and defensive European policy.
The ID Group explicitly criticises the Green Deal, blaming it for higher energy prices and growing social inequality in Europe. However, the cost-of-living crisis primarily stems from soaring energy and food prices due to the Russian conflict in Ukraine and Europe’s reliance on Russian energy imports. Furthermore, the right-wing groups are vehemently opposing agricultural reforms, leveraging a pro-poor narrative despite its shortsightedness and lack of factual basis. This will have repercussions for climate adaptation, public health and other areas.
While the Green Deal’s target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, known as the EU Climate Law, is legally binding, the intermediate objective of reducing emissions by 2040 has not yet been agreed upon. This means that even if it will be difficult to reverse the legislation, delaying or dismantling its implementation can seriously damage the EU’s green transition.
As we approach the end of the current political cycle, even the centre-right political groups seem more reluctant to back the implementation of the Green Deal, opting instead to align with their traditional voter base.
As we approach the end of the current political cycle, even the centre-right political groups seem more reluctant to back the implementation of the Green Deal, opting instead to align with their traditional voter base. This shift is particularly noteworthy considering these are the same groups that initially rallied behind Ursula von der Leyen as head of the European Commission in 2019 and supported the Green Deal until recently.
For decades, non-EU countries have criticised the EU for having an incoherent climate policy and blamed the EU for “regulatory imperialism”. Next year, the new EU Deforestation Regulation will take effect, with stringent due diligence requirements for exporters from countries like Indonesia or Brazil. At the same time, several European countries are pushing back on implementing stricter standards in the EU, including on deforestation or nitrogen, to spare the agricultural and forestry sectors. This may come across as Europe being tough on developing and emerging economies but reluctant to enforce similar standards at home.
These shifting priorities are also reflected in EU financial reallocations. On paper, the EU and its member states are the world’s largest climate finance providers, mobilising €28.5 billion in 2022 alone. But amidst growing geopolitical tensions and security concerns, the external climate and development budget is increasingly under pressure. EU leaders recently approved a revision of the EU’s budget for 2021-2027 that entails increased resources for Ukraine, migration and defence research while diverting funds meant for international cooperation.
Climate-related budgets may suffer a similar fate, which is not something Europe or the world’s poorest countries can afford. These countries need an estimated $1.8 trillion a year by 2023 to adapt to climate change and transition their economies. The lack of climate finance has severely undermined trust between developed and developing countries at UN climate negotiations. In the case of Europe, it has put a significant strain on its relations with Africa.
Why – and how – to turn the tide?
Neglecting or downplaying the Green Deal could come at a cost for the EU. Instead, EU leaders should look at it as a key piece in making the EU an influential and trusted global player, essential for safeguarding European security and prosperity. They should also consider it part and parcel of a more comprehensive EU economic modernisation strategy and competitiveness. Concretely, what should be the next steps for the EU leadership?
First, the EU must pursue an interest-driven climate policy, as Europe will be hard hit by climate change. Recently, the European Environment Agency warned of Europe’s unpreparedness for climate threats. The impacts of climate change on water – rising droughts and floods – are pivotal in all future scenarios. By 2030, Europe will require over €1.5 trillion annually solely for purging fossil fuel emissions from its energy and transportation infrastructures. The costs of adapting to climate change in Europe (and Central Asia) could go up to €18 billion annually by 2030. Clearly, European citizens’ livelihoods – from food supply to property safety to health – will be severely affected if no action is taken.
Any rollback on the EU’s green, climate and development agendas will harm Europe’s global standing and weaken its influence in climate negotiations, undermining its regulatory power and economic diplomacy model.
Second, the EU must speed up its green transition to safeguard its geopolitical position. The EU’s global climate leadership shines through initiatives like the EU’s emission trading system (2005), the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities (2020) and, of course, the Green Deal (2019) – which have inspired global action. During last week’s Maastricht Debate 2024, Ursula von der Leyen highlighted Europe’s cleantech leadership and emphasised that decarbonisation will increase its competitive position vis-à-vis China, the US and the Gulf States. Any rollback on the EU’s green, climate and development agendas will harm Europe’s global standing and weaken its influence in climate negotiations, undermining its regulatory power and economic diplomacy model.
Third, the EU should prioritise climate security and justice in African countries to prevent a boomerang effect on Europe. Africa’s rapidly increasing climate risks can have a destabilising effect on Europe, including (unsafe) climate-related displacement. That means climate adaptation and resilience-building, especially in the Southern Mediterranean and hotspots such as the Sahel, are essentially a European security concern. However, recent EU migration deals with countries such as Egypt or Tunisia demonstrate a rather symptomatic approach to migration, and they lack climate provisions.
Moreover, a leaked briefing by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) reflects the EU’s trend of moving away from aid and neglecting long-term support to least-developed countries for sustainable development. Instead, the EU seems driven by short-term economic interests in middle-income countries. Moving forward, the EU should consider an integrated approach to ensure climate security in regions surrounding Europe while upholding climate justice.
The views are those of the author and not necessarily those of ECDPM.