The geopolitics of satellite connectivity and the Africa-Europe digital partnership

Connectivity as a geopolitical tool

LEO satellites are not only bridging connectivity gaps, but they are also evolving from offering commercial services to being strategic assets of national security and geopolitical interest. The case of Starlink illustrates how swiftly tech companies can gain influence in political and military spheres. Initially hailed for supporting the Ukrainian military with battlefield communications, drone coordination and naval drone strikes, Starlink later came under scrutiny for allegedly threatening to cut off its services while the conflict still raged, claims which its CEO, Elon Musk, denies. 

Adding another layer to this evolving geopolitical landscape, the ongoing conflict in Sudan has seen reports emerge of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) using unauthorised Starlink terminals. In a country where traditional communication infrastructure has been severely disrupted by the fighting, it is alleged that this option is offering RSF a vital network for coordinating military operations and logistics, potentially enhancing their capabilities and prolonging the devastating conflict, prompting a reported ban on the technology by the Sudanese government. This shows how satellite technology is increasingly entangled with conflict and presents complex challenges for governance and stability in volatile regions.

Europe’s drive for strategic autonomy

The second Trump Administration has spurred growing concerns amongst European policymakers about Europe’s strategic autonomy in the areas of defence and technology (and their intersection). This includes the imperative for resilient communication networks, notably in light of anxieties about the potential disruption of Starlink services in Ukraine. Consequently, Europe is exploring funding homegrown solutions, mentioned in the recent defence white paper in March 2025. This comes against the backdrop of wider Europe-wide discussions about increased defence spending, including a European Commission proposal for a €150 billion defence package to bolster regional security. 

The reliance of Ukraine on Starlink for critical communications, and the potential for that service to be disrupted, has heightened the sense of urgency in Europe to develop homegrown alternatives. Yet, it is unlikely that any one European player could fill this gap alone, and several prominent European satellite companies have been in talks to bridge the gap in Ukraine, including Eutelsat/OneWeb (France), SES (Luxembourg), Hisdesat (Spain) and Inmarsat (UK). Other significant aerospace manufacturers like Thales Alenia Space and Airbus are also considering how to build on their expertise and capacity to contribute to a competitive European offering.

What is Africa’s position on the uptake of LEO satellites?

Unlike in Europe, Starlink’s popularity is rising in Africa, where it is seen as a leapfrogging solution for infrastructure gaps and a healthy source of competition for local telcos. Currently, Starlink’s service is available in Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Madagascar, Nigeria, South Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with more on the waiting list.

Despite its controversial role in European geopolitics, Starlink's path in Africa presents a nuanced picture. A key factor behind Starlink’s growth in Africa is the lack of competition — even China, despite its strong digital infrastructure presence in Africa, has not yet really entered the LEO market. China is planning to rival Starlink through its SpaceSail, which will offer a LEO satellite network, and hopes to leverage its existing presence to scale its satellite connectivity operations.

Some governments may even view its presence as a diplomatic hedge, hoping Musk’s ties to Trump could safeguard their interests, drawing potential parallels with the case in India. Starlink initially met with resistance from major Indian telecommunication companies wary of its potential market disruption, but secured deals with two of India's largest telcos earlier this year.

On the other hand, Starlink’s rollout in Africa is not without hiccups. In South Africa, Starlink’s entry has stalled due to the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, which requires 30% Black ownership for telecom licenses to promote inclusive economic participation. Musk’s claim that the license was denied because he is “not Black” has sparked debate over the balance between empowerment policies and technological progress. Meanwhile, an illegal market for Starlink is reportedly growing, with schools, farms, and businesses bypassing restrictions to get connected.

European actors are also active, particularly in last-mile solutions and satellite services beyond internet access. Notable collaborations include Italy supporting Kenya’s Earth observation initiatives, Rwanda partnering with OneWeb to launch its ‘Icyerekezo’ satellite and Botswana launching a satellite with Bulgaria’s EnduroSat. Eutelsat recently announced that it has achieved its Partner2Connect Digital Coalition pledge ahead of schedule. This will connect one million underserved people in sub-Saharan Africa. Many African countries also leverage Sentinel-1, part of the EU Copernicus program, for environmental monitoring and there is potential for much wider usage.

However, LEO satellite internet remains costly and often inaccessible. For example, Starlink’s monthly subscription is $50, and the setup kit is $389, which prices out many low-income users. Additionally, payment systems rely on Visa and Mastercard, excluding much of Africa’s unbanked population. Government intervention, encompassing strategic subsidies and support for diverse payment methods, is essential to realise the transformative potential of satellite internet across Africa, fostering inclusive growth and bridging the digital divide. Market forces alone are insufficient to ensure accessibility for low-income populations and the unbanked.

Future of Africa-Europe satellite partnership

LEO satellite connectivity presents a unique opportunity for Africa and Europe to deepen strategic cooperation. The LEO market still has huge growth potential, giving African and European players a rare chance to shape this emerging space. As already mentioned, European actors are already present, and the EU’s Global Gateway strategy aims to expand connectivity, including satellite connectivity.

To build on this foundation, as European actors work to develop a competitive and secure satellite offering in Ukraine, they should also consider how such an offering can be scaled up in Africa. European actors should invest in partnerships with African-owned companies, co-develop LEO infrastructure, and expand access to underserved areas. 

African governments, in turn, could accelerate market development by looking into granting cross-border operating licenses that are operational across national borders, contributing to the African Continental Free Trade Area. This would enable local-African-European ventures to scale rapidly, strengthen regional digital sovereignty by increasing competition, and create shared economic value.

Conclusion

As Africa’s LEO satellite ecosystem expands, governments must adopt a strategic, security-conscious approach to partnerships. While services like Starlink offer transformative potential, they also raise political, economic, and sovereignty risks, including surveillance and external control, as Ukraine’s over-reliance on one provider demonstrates. To safeguard digital sovereignty, African nations should prioritise balanced partnerships with different external partners which can offer more equitable, long-term collaboration in building Africa’s digital future.