Beyond ‘seized of the matter’: The new AU leadership’s continental and global challenges

The number of conflicts in Africa has doubled compared to ten years ago. Sudan continues to grapple with a civil war and the looming threat of famine, while the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains unresolved despite a recent summit of African leaders to address the crisis. Of the seven Sahelian and Central African countries that experienced military takeovers in the past four years, only Chad has held (controversial) elections. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have since left ECOWAS. Protracted conflicts in Mozambique and northern Nigeria continue to claim thousands of lives and displace many more, while Ethiopia’s stability remains elusive.

More than ever, global politics is deeply intertwined with all these crises. Geopolitical competition has increased interest but also the transactionalism of great powers, and African states have a wide offer of potential mediators and war economy investors to pick from.

Addressing the dearth of continental leadership

The AU has struggled to do more than stay ‘seized of the matter’ in the face of severe conflicts and crises on the continent. It often finds itself on the sidelines rather than leading negotiations, partly due to the growing influence of big external players, but also because its ability to exert political weight to conflict resolution depends on the political empowerment it receives from its own member states.

Indeed, the era of influential African leaders like Thabo Mbeki, Meles Zenawi, Abdoulaye Wade and Olusegun Obasanjo, who articulated continental goals and lent their personal and political weight to the Union's efforts, is over. There's now a dearth of continental leadership, and many 'swing states' are mired in serious domestic issues. Political will for norm enforcement by the AU is low.

Without the backing of key member states and revered African statesmen and women who can mediate conflicts, weigh in on coercive measures and provide visionary leadership, the AU risks becoming a technical intergovernmental organisation, distant from its citizens and with fewer accomplishments in peace and security.

To garner member states’ support, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf will need to leverage not only the authority of his office but also the political support of his home country Djibouti, his personal charisma and drive, and his networks. Peaceful democratic transitions across the continent offer an opportunity to start afresh with new leaders in Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Zambia and other nations who came to power promising change.

Relationships are an indispensable diplomatic tool, and Mahmoud Ali Youssouf should deploy them to solicit support and authority. This includes restoring the AU’s credibility with African citizens, which will not only help achieve the most elusive goal of making the AU a ‘Union of the people’, but also add to the chairperson’s diplomatic arsenal.

Are crisis prevention tools fit for Africa’s state of statehood?

Born from a period of wars, atrocities and coups in the 80s and 90s, the AU emerged in 2002 with a mandate to reject coups, prevent conflicts and uphold peace and security. It created a Peace and Security Council and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which includes an early warning system (CEWARN), a mediation body (PoW) and the African Standby Force (ASF), among other tools.

Even if the AU’s record in early response is not perfect, it has played a crucial role – alongside relevant regional economic communities (RECs) – in preventing violent conflict, mediating and deploying regional or continental forces. But the nature of conflicts on the continent is changing in two ways.

First, conflicts – whether interstate or intrastate – are increasingly internationalised. From Libya to Sudan, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, both actors and factors have multiplied, taking on increasingly global dimensions. The same is true with terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, who have expanded their regional reach and even formed international alliances with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

While diverging interests among the AU’s member states have always complicated conflict resolution, continental initiatives managed to bring conflicting parties together for dialogue and even resort to collective coercive action when needed. International actors directly compete with AU instruments for crisis prevention, which are not designed to conduct preventative diplomacy in high-stake conflicts involving the United Arab Emirates, Russia, France and other key players.

Secondly, state fragility and countries’ inability to maintain territorial control, control arms and provide basic state operations is increasingly driving instability and humanitarian crises. While unconstitutional changes of government have taken the AU’s no-tolerance policy to coups by storm, the ‘state of statehood’ in Africa is much less discussed.

Indeed, the AU cannot escape a conversation on the ‘state of statehood’. The nature of domestic crises affects the AU’s ability to prevent and mediate conflicts. In Sudan, Ethiopia, the DRC and Mali, among other cases, deep contestations of statehood or state power, existing political settlements, identity, representation and governance models were evident long before the outbreak of violent conflict.

The question therefore is: how can the AU support member states in political transition, or those that can benefit from constitutional review or national dialogue? With UN peacekeeping missions in decline, the AU should identify more practical ways of assuring the protection of civilians in conflicts and transitions. While this may seem to be an erosion of the principle of sovereignty, the idea that the AU can only respond when bullets have been fired is disconnected from political realities. The new AU leadership will have to emphasise the very African definition of sovereignty as responsibility and responsible governance.

These developments should trigger a continental discussion on the AU’s role in addressing a crisis of statehood and the internationalisation of conflict in Africa. This should build on ongoing discussions about peace enforcement, the AU’s relations with the RECs, and the definitions and management of unconstitutional changes of government. But it should also go beyond these stand-alone discussions and look at the bigger picture: how can the AU adapt the instruments and conceptual frameworks to deal with current peace and security challenges?

Geopolitics and Africa’s place in the world

The third major factor that will shape the AU’s performance and task its new leadership is the broader global context. The AU has always played a dual role of addressing challenges within Africa while also coordinating continental positions and diplomatic action on global issues.

Africa as a continent and key African states are repositioning themselves in the emerging global order. From strengthening the role of the A3 in the United Nations Security Council and advocating for global financial reforms as a full G20 member to increasing African interest in alternative fora like the BRICS, Africa’s demand for more and effective multilateralism is clear. Aligning this ambition with great power politics presents a significant challenge for the new AU leadership.

Yet, the future of multilateralism – particularly the financing of key institutions like the United Nations and the International Criminal Court – is threatened by the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw funding. Similarly, budgetary pressures in Europe and the growing electoral support for right-wing parties – skeptical of both multilateral institutions and Africa alike – will have far-reaching consequences for development cooperation. Newly-elected AU Commission deputy chair Selma Malika Haddadi will have to manage sudden shortfalls in an AU budget which, despite considerable efforts and some progress, still heavily relies on external funding.

However, the gravest risk is political. Hypernationalism, divestment from multilateral institutions and disregard for global governance risk upending AU and member state efforts to shape global discourse, reform global norms and institutions, and usher in a global system that values equity. It forces countries in Africa and beyond to divert resources toward managing the fallout from disastrous shifts rather than investing in building the future they envision.

At the same time, as African states have come to appreciate multiple, geopolitically diverse partnerships, the new AU leadership will need new narratives to incentivise continental coordination in which the AU can play more than a logistical role. Aside from steering collective thinking and action on issues of continental concern, the AU can play a role in strengthening international partnerships and building alliances with actors in the global north or south.

A radical gear shift for more AU leadership 

The new AU leadership takes office at a time of profound continental and global fragmentation, requiring a bold recalibration of its tools and strategic posture. Strengthening African leadership in conflict resolution, revitalising the AU’s security mechanisms and asserting African agency in a shifting geopolitical order must be at the forefront of its agenda. Without a decisive course correction, the AU risks being sidelined into irrelevance. Both in addressing Africa’s pressing security challenges and in shaping the global governance structures that will define the continent’s future, the AU leadership has a formidable task ahead. 

The views are those of the authors and not necessarily those of ECDPM.