Understanding The Southern African Development Community

Peace and security: how to fight old and new demons?

By Sophie Desmidt*

This background paper is part of a series on the Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations (PEDRO). It was prepared in March 2017. In line with ECDPM’s mission to inform and facilitate EU-Africa policy dialogue, and financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ, the studies analyse key policy areas of seventeen regional organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so they address three broad questions: What is the political traction of the organisations around different policy areas? What are the key member state interests in the regional agenda? What are the areas with most future traction for regional organisations to promote cooperation and integration around specific areas? The studies aim to advance thinking on how regional policies play out in practice, and ways to promote politically feasible and adaptive approaches to regional cooperation and integration. Further information can be found at www.ecdpm.org/pedro.

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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments 1

Table of Contents 2

Introduction 3

On assessing the political traction of SADC 4

2.1. Foundational and structural factors 4

2.2. Governance and institutions for peace and security 6

2.3. Expanding agenda and current reforms 9

2.4. External drivers and blockers 11

The political interests of SADC member states 12

Conclusion - little traction for SADC driven peace and security 18

Bibliography 22

Annexes 23
1. Introduction

This report presents a political economy analysis of regional cooperation and integration in the field of peace and security in Southern Africa. It focuses in particular on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the drivers behind peace and security efforts from SADC and SADC member states.

SADC’s broad membership, including in terms of geographical location, economic development and political systems, is underbuilt by a relatively recent and shared legacy of liberation struggles. The experiences and solidarity ethos of the former frontline states against apartheid South Africa continue, and the institutions and mechanisms set up by these states, continue to reverberate in SADC’s peace and security agenda. While the shared liberation struggle has contributed to a sense of ‘brotherhood’ among SADC member states (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015) these ‘liberation ties’ intersect increasingly with other issues (including trade, economic and reputational) to inform the approach by SADC to governance challenges and peace and security issues in the region.

Having its origins in two distinct organisations, namely the Frontline States (FLS), and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), SADC and its peace and security agenda are a continuation of those former organisations. For peace and security, this has led to an enduring level of informality and ad-hoc responses under SADC, heavily informed by national political objectives, and often driven by a limited number of SADC member states. Notably South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana have played a defining role in SADC’s peace and security agenda. Especially in the earlier years of SADC (1992–1998), SADC member states intervened frequently under the nominal banner of SADCC mechanisms.

Over the past decades, SADC has expanded its agenda and implementation mechanisms, and has drafted a number of Guidelines and Protocols as regards democracy, governance and regional security. But while some of these values were already enshrined in the SADC Treaty (1992), the adherence to these values is trumped by a strict implementation of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, supported by consensual decision-making in SADC’s main peace and security bodies, namely the Organ and the SADC summit. Moreover, in reality the member states don’t share the same values as projected in the regional treaty and other regional documents. This divergence and the sovereignty principle have impeded the emergence of an effective security regime (Nathan, 2016). The interventions of SADC, or a group of SADC member states, in crisis and conflict situations in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo over the past two decades highlight the role of South Africa as a regional hegemon1 and a military and diplomatic powerhouse, while Botswana and Zimbabwe too have been able to effectively block or drive elements of SADC’s peace and security agenda.

This report aims to answer three questions: i) What is the political traction of SADC and its mechanisms and institutions to encourage the emergence of an effective security regime in Southern Africa, and the current agenda and reforms to do so? ii) What are the interests of SADC member states for addressing governance and peace and security challenges under the banner of SADC? and iii) Which are the specific areas of traction and most potential for SADC in terms of encouraging an effective security regime?

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1 The use of the concept of ‘hegemon’ does not attach negative connotation to it in this report, and is merely in line with the use in the literature when referring to a powerful and resourceful country that stands out in comparison to its neighbours.
The report is based on desk based research of public domain material and consulted policy documents and management material of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Parts of this contribution builds upon established knowledge within ECDPM as regards the interventions of SADC in conflicts in the region for the period 2013-2016.

2. On assessing the political traction of SADC

2.1. Foundational and structural factors

SADC’s membership

SADC has 15 member states, with a relatively broad variety in terms of geographical location and economic development, ranging from member states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), located in central parts of Africa, coastal member states such as Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Angola, island states such as Madagascar, the Seychelles and Mauritius, and small kingdoms such as Lesotho and Swaziland. Throughout the SADC region, significant differences remain in the nature and status of economies of the member states. South Africa, the main economic driving force representing 70% of SADC’s GDP and 60% of its overall trade, dictates the terms for poorer and economically weaker countries. This stands in contrast with the prevalence of smaller and weaker economies in the rest of the region (Nathan, 2016). Furthermore, the region is home to a diverse number of political systems, ranging from constitutional monarchies (such as Lesotho) to semi-presidential republics (including Namibia, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo) to presidential socialist republics (Tanzania).

Many SADC member states share considerable historic commonalities through the struggles for independence and against apartheid. As Southern Africa was the last region in Africa to gain full independence, the majority of the current ruling parties and heads of state and government were directly involved in the liberation struggle. This joint, and for some quite recent, struggle against apartheid or minority rule has resulted in “a sense of brotherhood among SADC Member States, which in some ways defines the nature of regional cooperation” (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015). SADC’s broad membership, reaching into Central Africa, has had considerable implications for its peace and security agenda, notably with the membership of the Democratic Republic of Congo (joined in 1997). SADC and SADC member states have played a considerable role in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars, yet not always through a unified approach.

Shared colonial and independence experiences: SADC’s dual origins

The contemporary SADC can be traced back to the existence of two former regional organisations, namely the Frontline States (FLS) and later the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Together they respectively constitute the origins of SADC’s political and security cooperation wing, and the socio-economic cooperation wing (Hull and Derblom, 2009). Both these organisations were established within the context of decolonisation and independence struggles, while the transition to SADC took place against the background of enduring violent conflicts, notably the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-2003).

The Frontline States (FLS) was established as an informal collective security mechanism in the mid-1970 by Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana, including representatives from both national governments and liberation movements. It was set up to assist in the anti-colonial liberation struggles for states such as Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) and Namibia (South West Africa), and dealt with political and military challenges faced by newly independent governments such as Angola (Hull and...
By 1975 seven states were member of the Frontline States Coalition. \(^2\) Within the FLS, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) was established, an institutionalised yet informal forum where Ministers of Defence and Security from the frontline states would regularly meet to discuss national and collective security issues. Zimbabwe joined the FLS in 1980, with the election of Robert Mugabe, followed by Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 1994, after the end of apartheid.

Already from 1977 onwards, representatives of the FLS undertook consultations across the region towards a regional organisation focused on promoting trade and regional coordination. This culminated in a meeting of Foreign Ministries of the Frontline States in Gaborone, Botswana, in May 1979, which called for a meeting of ministers responsible for economic development. The meeting of Ministers of Economic Affairs was subsequently convened in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979, and led to the birth of the *Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)* a year later. SADCC was officially formed in April, 1980, through a *Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutions of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference*, in July 1981. SADCC comprised of all the so-called majority ruled states of Southern Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. \(^3\)

The main motive for the establishment SADCC was to tackle the economic difficulties, primarily economic destabilisation from South Africa, facing countries of Southern Africa and the FLS alliance. As Hanlon (1986) notes, while South Africa’s defence force in Namibia (1966-1989) and Angola (1975–89), and its support for proxy forces in Mozambique (1979-1990) caught headlines, its economic power was as critical. South Africa’s attacks primarily affected its neighbours’ economies. In addition to direct war damage, this included transport infrastructure, losses of production, export and revenues, amongst others (Hanlon, 1986). Countries from the region were deeply concerned about the growing marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa, and a list of socio-economic problems transcended borders and could no longer be adequately addressed at the national level (Nathan, 2004). Despite the memorandum, SADCC was a rather loose organisation seeking to promote coordination rather than regional integration, and operating without a legal framework, treaty or protocol. The aim of SADCC was primarily to reduce the economic and transportation dependency on external actors, in particular South Africa. As such, SADCC aimed to coordinate development initiatives of member states and coordinate foreign assistance and investment coming into the region, for example in the field of infrastructure development (Hull and Derblom, 2009).

In 1989, SADCC leaders agreed to formalise SADCC by replacing the memorandum with a stronger legal foundation. The main objective of SADCC, namely to reduce economic dependence of apartheid South Africa and forge economic links for regional cooperation, had started to lose traction after most of the Southern African states had attained political independence. The defining trigger for the establishment of SADC was the release of Nelson Mandela in South Africa in 1990 and the start of formal negotiations towards a post-apartheid regime, kick-started by the National Peace Accord of 1991 and talks under the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The region subsequently decided to revise the mandate of SADCC by putting more focus on political issues. During the Windhoek Summit held in 1992, SADCC was officially transformed to SADC with the signing of the SADC Declaration and Treaty. \(^4\) As such, the establishment of SADC in 1992 should be seen “as a continuation of efforts to strengthen collective self-reliance within the Southern African region” (Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva, 2014).

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\(^2\) Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.


This is also strongly reflected in the institutional origins of the organisation’s peace and security architecture and agenda. The post-colonial and post-apartheid era in Southern Africa was thought to bring renewed possibilities for cooperation in a more stable environment. The end of the Cold War had ended superpower contestation in Africa, and triggered a wave of democratisation. These developments had not taken away the need for mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution for years to come: the democratic transitions in the region remained fragile, civil war in Angola resumed in 1992, while the Great African War raged from 1996 to 2003.

**Ties that bind, to some extent**

With the democratic elections in South Africa in 1994 and the country’s membership of SADC, high expectations on the organization’s peace and security infrastructure arose among member states. But there were also concerns that South Africa, with its powerful and diversified economy, would somehow dominate the setting and implementation of SADC’s agenda (Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016). As explained in more details in Section 3, South Africa can be considered as a hegemon state within SADC, but has approached the regional peace and security agenda in a more modest way, hesitant to showcase any sign of imperialist power. Some experts have pointed to the importance of the historical affiliation and ties between the political parties in SADC member states that led the liberation movement, for example the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe. This shared legacy continues to influence SADC’s political and peace and security agenda, at times reflected in a reluctance to implement SADC’s main peace and security guidelines or protocols. But the SADC region is home to a wide variety of political systems, which intersect with other interests, such as economic and trade issues. Alliances often transcend these ‘liberation ties’, and cooperation between SADC member states are more directly informed by national political objectives, especially in the “sensitive” sector of peace and security (see section 3).

**2.2. Governance and institutions for peace and security**

The defining factors for the establishment of SADC were heavily informed by the joint experience of liberation struggles, the end of apartheid and the shared concern about the economic marginalisation of Southern Africa. The structural and institutional drivers and obstacles for cooperation in the field of peace and security are influenced by the initially more informal nature of peace and security agenda of the FLS, and the institutional struggles and internal divisions following the transformation of SADCC to SADC. Part of these internal struggles, especially in the early years of SADC (1992-1994) was based on concerns and uncertainty of the negotiations under way in post-apartheid South Africa. The establishment of SADC marked a transition from the political coalition of former frontline states to an expanded group of member states and a broader agenda of regional integration, covering issues such as trade, transport, infrastructure peace and security, corruption, governance and many others (Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016).

**Decision-making in SADC**

Rather than being monopolised by the country chairing the Summit or the Organ for Politics Defence and Security (hereafter the Organ), (SADC’s two key decision-making bodies in terms of peace and security), decision-making within SADC as regards for peace and security matters happens on the basis of consensus. This is also the case for the Ministerial Committee preparing and coordinating the work of the Organ. There are no provisions in the Treaty for breaking an impasse where a consensus cannot be reached (Saurombe, 2012). Despite SADC relatively strong protocols on security and democracy and elections, it operates on the pillars of absolute sovereignty and solidarity, principles which are also in SADC’s protocols, and member states are unwilling to surrender any measure of sovereignty (Nathan, 2016).
**SADC’s main peace and security bodies**

With the signing and ratification of the SADC Declaration and Treaty in 1992, member states departed from the SADCC Memorandum of Understanding, which had no binding obligations on the part of member states. The 1992 SADC Declaration and Treaty obliges member states legally to participate and implement SADC protocols. The institutional architecture to encourage implementation of SADC protocols includes the Summit of Heads of States or Governments, the Council of Ministers, the Standing Committee of Officials and the Secretariat. The Summit of Heads of States and Governments is SADC’s supreme institution and supreme policy making mechanism of the organisation. The Summit meets annually for two days in one of the member states and is responsible for overall policy direction and functioning of the organisation. Below the Summit is the SADC Organ Troika, made up of the newly elected chairperson, his predecessor and successor, which rotates every year. The Troika is charged with executing tasks and decisions from the Summit and provides policy direction to SADC institutions, in between regular SADC meetings (Hull and Derblom, 2009).

The **Organ (for Politics Defence and Security)** is situated under the SADC Summit and is SADC’s main mechanism regarding peace and security issues, equivalent to UN’s Security Council or AU’s Peace and Security Council. The Organ is headed by the SADC Organ Troika. The Organ is elected by the SADC summit and cannot be the same person as the SADC (summit) Troika. The Organ is mandated to deal with intrastate and interstate conflict through means such as diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and force (as a last resort). The Ministerial Committee, comprising of the Ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each Member State, is responsible for the coordination of all the work of the Organ. The Ministerial Committee meets in two configurations, i.e. the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). The ISDSC (comprising of the ministers responsible for defence, public security and state security) deals with hard security issues such as military cooperation, when the ISPDS (comprising of the ministers for foreign affairs) deals with softer issues on a diplomatic level such as human rights and good governance (Hull and Derblom, 2009).

**Competing visions on the role of the Organ**

The full integration of the Organ was only finalised in 2001, following years of disagreement as regards its position within the wider SADC structures and competing visions on its role. The political and security wings of SADC incorporated the informal structures of the FLS and at the start of SADC in 1992, foreign policy and security issues continued to be dealt with in an ad-hoc fashion, separate from the economic development tasks undertaken by SADC and its Secretariat (Hull and Derblom, 2009). With the transformation of SADCC to SADC and the institutionalisation that followed this transition, some member states and the Secretariat argued for a more permanent mechanism to deal with political and defence issues. The SADC Framework and Strategy Document of 1993, prepared by the Secretariat, called for the forging of common political values based on democratic norms, the creation of a “non-militaristic security order” and the establishment of procedures for conflict avoidance, management and resolution (Nathan, 2004). The Secretariat organised a workshop in July 1994 in Windhoek to identify these mechanisms, but FLS states were unhappy with some of the recommendations from this meeting, and unexpectedly proposed the formation of a new entity, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) to serve as the regional security body. In August 1994 the SADC Summit approved the creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security (as proposed by the Windhoek workshop) and requested foreign ministers to harmonise the proposals of the Frontline States and the Windhoek workshop.

But consensus did not emerge between the various proposals, as many states (including Zimbabwe) did not support the anti-militarist stance of the Secretariat and democratic norms enshrined in the SADC Treaty (Nathan, 2004). In 1996, the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Organ)
was established\textsuperscript{5}, but continued to be largely inoperable until 2001 due to the enduring disagreement among SADC member states about the relationship between the OPDS and rest of SADC (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015). According to observers, this was mainly due to competing pacifist and militarist visions of the Organ. One group, comprising Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, viewed the Organ as a common security regime whose primary basis for multilateral cooperation and peacemaking would be political rather than military, while the other camp, comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, favoured a mutual defence pact and prioritised military cooperation and responses to conflict (Nathan, 2004).

Other observers suggest that the disagreement among member states was based on concerns about the risk of making sensitive information available to SADC donors (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015). As SADC was heavily funded by donors, some member states advocated a partial separation between the political and security agenda and the other sectors of SADC out of fear for influence from some donors against which some of the Front Line States had fought during decolonisation struggles or against which some still held grudges (Hull and Derblom, 2009; de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015). Experts note that the disagreement was spearheaded by two leading actors and countries at the time, the President of South Africa Nelson Mandela, who had just joined SADC in 1994 and who chaired SADC, and the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, who later became the first Chairperson of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. Zimbabwe argued that this Organ should maintain the informality of the FLS and allow for more confidential and informal consultations, separate from the SADC structures. South Africa was of the opinion that the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government was the supreme policy making institution, and that the Organ should be subordinate to the decision-making of the Summit (Hull and Derblom, 2009). During the extra-ordinary summit of March 2001 in Windhoek, SADC Heads of State and Government considered the restructuring of the Organ and decided that it would be integrated into the SADC structures and coordinated at Summit level.\textsuperscript{6}

Nathan (2004) notes that the underlying issue of the failure to find consensus as regards the governance structure of SADC, in particular for peace and security, was not just one of personal antagonisms, but more fundamentally a result of the lack of common values among SADC Member States (Nathan, 2004) (see section 2.3 below). But the animosity between South Africa and Zimbabwe indeed hindered progress as regards peace and security. The intensity of the opposing views between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the Organ partly had historical roots in the dramatic changes that occurred in the southern African region immediately following the establishment of SADC. In 1994, the region’s most powerful country joined SADC almost overnight, following the end of apartheid and years of disruption and destabilization caused by Pretoria. South Africa became the darling of the international community and challenged Robert Mugabe’s regional leadership (Nathan, 2016).

**SADC legal frameworks for peace and security**

SADC’s most important legal framework for peace and security is the *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*, which was passed in August 2001, during a Summit meeting in Blantyre, Malawi. With the adoption of the Protocol it was decided that the Organ would be integrated in the overall SADC structures and placed under the authority of the Summit (Hull and Derblom, 2009). Before that, the Organ had operated without a clear legal framework. The Protocol (2001) outlines the general objective to promote peace and security in the Region, and also lists extensively specific

\textsuperscript{5} The organisational arrangements were presented as follows: the Organ will operate at summit, ministerial and technical levels; it will function independently of other SADC structures; it will incorporate the ISDSC; its Chair will rotate annually among member states; and the Chair will serve on a Troika basis, meaning that he or she must act in consultation with the outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair for the following year. The Summit appointed Mugabe as the first Chair of the Organ. See: Nathan, L. (2004)

objectives for the Organ, including: protecting against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict and aggression (Art. 2, para. 2a), promoting political cooperation among member states (Art. 2, para. 2b), promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of member states (Art. 2a, para. 2g), and prevent, contain and resolved inter-state and intra-state conflicts by peaceful means (Art. 2a, para. 2e), amongst others. The Protocol gives the Organ a quite extensive jurisdiction in terms of “types of conflict” that the Organ can address, including conflict over natural resources, acts of military aggression, large scale violence such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights, civil wars or insurgency, military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a State (Article 11). Methods include both softer types of instruments such as preventive diplomacy, negotiations, mediation and good offices, as well as enforcement as a matter of last resort. The Protocol also includes a specific article on confidentiality of information (Article 12).

The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) is another key legal document guiding SADC roles as regards peace and security. In the 2001 Protocol, Art. 2, paragraph 2h already stated as a specific objective of the OPDS to “consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats”. The MDP was signed in 2003 in Gaborone, Botswana, with the objective “to operationalise mechanisms of the SADC Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters” (Article 2). The MDP aims to guide the development of collective capabilities and collectively act in the event of an armed attack on a member state. But the relationship between the MDP (2003), and the Protocol (2001) are not clear, and the MDP has not been activated since (Söderbaum and Tavares, 2011). Nathan (2004) notes that during the disagreement as regards the role of the Organ immediately after the establishment of SADC, some SADC member states preferred a mutual defence pact, notably the camp of countries which favoured a militaristic approach, such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

2.3 Expanding agenda and current reforms

Expanding agenda
Since its establishment, SADC has expanded its agenda and governance systems to intervene in governance, peace and security issues. Beyond the provisions in the SADC treaty, this includes the establishment of guidelines and protocols to guide action in the field of peace and security, including the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (2001), the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II, revised in 2010) and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004, revised in 2015). SADC’s conflict managing and conflict preventing capacities include a dedicated decision-making body for political and peace and security issues (the Organ, see above), a regional early warning system, a regional peacekeeping centre and the SADC Standby Force (as part of the African Standby Force, ASF). Furthermore, SADC established a SADC Panel of Elders and Mediation Reference Group (MRG) in 2015. SADC has contributed a considerable amount of its proper resources to the continental training exercises to test the state of readiness of the ASF, including AMANI II which was held in Lohatla, South Africa in late 2015 (Rees, 2015; ISS 2015). The SADC Standby force is considered amongst the most mature of the ASF, and has its logistics base in Gaborone, Botswana (African Union, 2015). The expanded ‘reach’ is also reflected in the relatively wide array of ‘types’ of conflicts in which SADC has intervened, ranging from armed regional conflict (mainly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)), to political crises, such as Madagascar,
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho, and democracy and governance deficits and electoral conflicts (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015).

Assessing SADC efforts and achievement to prevent conflict in the region might give an image of a success story at first glance. SADC Member States are amongst some of the continent largest military spenders, such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa (The Economist, 2014). Opinions diverge as to whether the expanded agenda has been effectively implemented by the mechanisms in place. Some note that, including in the first decade following its establishment, “SADC was largely ineffectual in [these] situations, distinguished less by its peacemaking efforts than by its fractious internal quarrels.” (Nathan, 2004).

Identifying the factors that shape and inform SADC’s peace and security activities should preferably look beyond “the actual performance of the organisation rather than on its declarations and structures.” (Nathan, 2013). For example, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), in which South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania participated, as part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) led to the defeat of M23. Yet its military operations against other rebel groups in the same country, such as the FDLR, have been less successful (Fabricius, 2014) and the three countries have been caught up in disagreements between the UN and the government of the DRC on further military action. SADC's earlier interventions in the DRC (during the First and Second Congo Wars) has been termed ‘bipolar', as a result of ongoing disagreements between SADC member states (South Africa and Zimbabwe) in the Organ (Ancas, 2011). Mediation and interventions in political crises have been unable to find a sustainable solution to the political crises and conflicts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, despite initial successes, as some note the lack of implementation of existing tools as regards democratic elections. Despite commitments to democratic provisions in the SADC treaty, SADC has been accused of failing to take a more long-term perspective beyond election day procedures and has been criticised for rubber-stamping contested elections (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015).

The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC RPTC), based in Harare, Zimbabwe, has been criticised for only having brought about modest results. Critics say that no regional capacity was developed, and that the number of students and quality was insufficient. It is often regarded as a ‘white elephant', only costing money with no output (Daniel, Taft and Wiharta, 2008). As regards early warning, SADC has been criticized for slow implementation, reportedly based on an enduring unwillingness amongst member states to share sensitive peace and security information. As the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) notes, “since its launch in 2010, the [Regional Early Warning Centre, REWC] has been veiled in secrecy, with speculation that it exists merely as an intelligence based system to protect ruling regimes in the region” (Motsamai, 2014). Some external observers conclude that the REWC has failed to identify governance and security shortcomings in member states while it could have helped SADC to prevent conflicts in the region (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015). Given the lack of transparency it is fair to suggest that the REWC has not made any known inputs to SADC Summit or Organ decision making.

**Financing SADC’s peace and security budget**

SADC is highly reliant on external funding and financing the SADC budget is an enduring challenge. Figures on member states contributions and international donor contributions diverge. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 76% of the SADC budget was contributed by donors in 2015, while SADC Member States contributed 21% (Motsamai, 2014). While SADC member states should fund the operational budget ($37m), in 2015 member states contributed only $13m (Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016). But figures from other sources listed in the box below show a smaller dependence on international contributions. A study by BMZ puts the self-financing rate at 47% (Bartsch, 2015).
Box 1: Financial contributions to SADC budget, MS and international donors, 2014-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
<th>Contributions by member states</th>
<th>Contributions by international partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>USD 71.9 m(^{10})</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/2016</td>
<td>USD 80.8 m</td>
<td>USD 38.2 m</td>
<td>USD 42.6 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/2015</td>
<td>USD 81 m</td>
<td>USD 33 m</td>
<td>USD 48 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The budget for the SADC Secretariat and the programmes and policies that it implements are largely donor funded, but is unclear from publicly available documents how much of the SADC budget goes to peace and security. Donors supporting SADC include the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the EU, the US, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and Denmark. The EU played a significant role in the inception of SADCC, was deeply involved in the founding of SADC and has been influential in shaping SADC strategies and priorities (Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016). The United Nations too is an important partner for SADC as regards peace and security. The UN plans to open a UN Regional Office in Gaborone to work specifically with the Secretariat, the Organ and the SADC Member States on preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. A liaison officer from UN’s Department for Political Affairs (DPA) is already present in Gaborone, to implement the 2013 cooperation framework which focuses specifically on mediation, elections and gender (UN, 2015).

2.4. External drivers and blockers

External actors have influenced and shaped the processes of regional cooperation and the development of regional organisations. Portugal held on to its colonies until the dictatorship of Salazar collapsed in 1974. While the EU was instrumental in establishing and supporting SADCC, the UK under Prime Minister Thatcher refused to sanction South Africa for its destabilisation politics in the region. And the EU also provided both blueprint models and finance for the establishment of SADC. The PERIA study of SADC\(^{11}\) provides further examples of the mixed record of former colonies and the EU in regional dynamics. Hence, the unwillingness to share sensitive information with external donors can be understood as a factor in the development of the governance of the SADC’s peace and security sector, despite the SADC budget being heavily dependent on international contributions. The SADC Secretariat has called to lessen dependence on donor funding, although no alternative resource mobilisation framework has been proposed. According to some observers, this has affected the Organ’s work as regards peace and security. However, donor funding in se should not necessarily be an obstacle. As Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott (2016) note, donors and SADC agreed in 2006 to align the partnership with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which resulted in the Windhoek Declaration on a New Partnership between the SADC and donors. Twice a year a core group meets to discuss SADC ownership over regional developments and measures to deliver assistance in more transparent and sustainable ways through jointly agreed arrangements. It seems that as regards peace and security this is indeed more a point about governance of SADC and how sensitive information would be made available to donors, than about funding.


\(^{11}\) For more information see [http://www.ecdpm.org/peria](http://www.ecdpm.org/peria).
At times, different international partners and donors reportedly “pay off budget”, implying that this funding is harder to account for towards member states (Bartsch, 2015). It is not clear whether international donors earmarked contributions towards parts of SADC’s peace and security agenda. The 2010 Revised edition of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO II) notes that “the activities of the Organ will, as a matter of principle, be funded through assessed contributions from Member States, while they may also be funded through “other contributions such as special funds, endowment funds and other external sources as the Summit may decide.” The SIPO II further lists a number of areas amenable for cooperation with international partners.12

Many analysts and donors alike have applauded the formation of new structures and that there has been an obsessive focus on the SADC’s peace and security architecture since its establishment. According to Nathan (2013) this drive rests on the fallacy that a regional architecture “can somehow transcend the differences between states and promote human security” (Nathan, 2013).

Some observers note that the overlapping membership with other regional organisations and SADC have created some tension. In the field of peace and security, this has primarily been reflected in the sometimes problematic cooperation between related International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and SADC into the conflict in the DRC (Bartsch, 2015). Since the inclusion of the DRC in 1997, SADC became tied into a conflict that is more strongly related to conflict dynamics in Central Africa (Ancas, 2011). Overlapping membership is not always an obstacle however, as member states make deliberate calculations on where their interests are best catered for. For example, not all SADC countries have joined the SADC Standby Force, and The Seychelles have opted for the Eastern Standby Force where maritime security policy has received more attention.

3. The political interests of SADC member states

The three most influential states in terms of governance, peace and security issues are South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Some observers have noted a bifurcation of SADC following the emergence of so-called post-liberation parties in some member states and the emergence of two political camps: one led by so-called ‘liberation parties’ (including Zimbabwe and South Africa) and others ruled by post-liberation parties, such as Botswana (Adolfo, 2009). They argue that SADC has become a political battle ground rather than an organization driving the stated common goal of socio-economic development and political integration (ibid). According to Nathan (2016), the underlying factor is the absence of common values among SADC member states, with two key lines of division as a result: between democratic and authoritarian tendencies in the domestic policies of states, and between pacific and militarist orientations in their foreign policies. This has inhibited the development of common policies on peace and security and political and foreign affairs, and it has hampered SADC’s ability to contribute effectively to conflict prevention and resolution.

A closer look at some of the underlying drivers undermining an effective peace and security regime within SADC, suggests that many of the (limited) effective interventions have been driven more through contributions from individual SADC member states, for example, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC, than by SADC as a whole (Lins de Albuquerque, and Hull-Wiklund, 2015). The subsections aim to highlight some of the defining drivers for SADC and SADC member states interventions through three case studies: Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo

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12 These are Peace support and humanitarian operations, Disaster management, Combating organised crime including drug, trafficking, anti-money laundering and human trafficking; Post-conflict reconstruction and social reintegration programmes; Mine action programmes; HIV/AIDS programmes; Small arms and light weapons control; Drug trafficking control programmes; Joint training exercises; Food security; and specific other areas as decided by the Summit.
Violence, instability and elections in Zimbabwe and SADC interventions

Since the re-election of Robert Mugabe in 2000, state security forces have been accused of committing acts of excessive violence against civilians, mainly targeting political opponents and aid workers (ICRtoP, 2011). President Mugabe’s national economic policies have led to a economic collapse, devaluation, a land seizure policy that devastated Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector, and led to an economic crash leaving more than 80% of the population unemployed and faced with a hyper-inflation (Dzinesa and Zambara, 2011).

In May 2007, SADC mandated South African president Thabo Mbeki to mediate a political agreement between the ZANU-PF and the two factions of the opposition parties, the Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and the MDC led by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). Initially, the efforts were seen as succeeding in establishing conditions for free and fair elections. Both MDC leaders were arrested, while violence led the number of displaced people to rise to 200,000, and reports emerged of widespread abuses and irregularities (Human Rights Watch, 2008). In September 2008, all parties signed a power-sharing deal, the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which divided executive powers between ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and MDC-M. The GPA was supposed to be a roadmap to ensure free, fair and credible upcoming elections but implementing the GPA was unsuccessful. The 2013 elections were seen as marred by irregularities, including voter intimidation, duplicate voters, amongst others, while SADC, as well as the AU, endorsed the elections, as being “free, peaceful, and generally credible,” and ignoring the electoral flaws that violated SADC elections guidelines and principles (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In general, the SADC position has been interpreted by most observers as being in support of the incumbent regime, and it has been widely criticised internationally for failing to take a public stand against human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law and repression (Cawthra, 2010). The failure of SADC to enforce the implementation of the GPA is partly attributed to the ‘historical affiliation’ and a degree of respect for President Mugabe’s among some of the SADC heads of state and government, based on his involvement in establishing the organization, and his status within the liberation movement (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015).

In particular South Africa has been seen as complacent in pushing Zimbabwe to implement key electoral and human rights reforms. SADC is seen as politically dominated by South Africa and Zimbabwe, aided to some extent by Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique (Adolfo, 2009). This was on clear display in the period 2014 and 2015 when both countries chaired key SADC institutions. Observers noted that the political engagement in SADC regarding the promotion of democratic accountability of both countries during their chairmanship was guided by historic affiliation and will continue to contribute to the reluctance, for instance, of criticising undemocratic regimes such as Angola and Swaziland (Motsamai, 2014). South Africa is Zimbabwe’s largest trade partner, with large imports from South Africa. However, in the past decade, President Mugabe’s national economic policies have led to a economic collapse, devaluation, a land seizure policy that has devastated Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector, which has led to an economic crash leaving more than 80% of the population unemployed and faced with a hyper-inflation (ICRtoP, 2011). The growing poverty and ensuing chaos in Zimbabwe are considerable security concerns for South Africa, which has aimed at dominating SADC’s response to Zimbabwe almost exclusively in a bilateral manner, with the absence of enforcement mechanisms and a consensus at the level of SADC Summit. Nathan (2016) notes that SADC states are unwilling to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules and the possibility of interference in domestic affairs.

Zimbabwe plays a defining role in setting - which means often blocking - the broader agenda on peace, security and democracy. As mentioned above, it is home to the SADC Regional Peacekeeping

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13 Zimbabwe functioned as SADC Summit chair for the period 2014-2015, while South Africa chaired the Organ.
Training Centre (SADC RPTC), which operates as the training centre for SADC’s regional standby force and the region’s contribution to the African Standby Force. Zimbabwe furthermore has been able to obstruct other elements of the SADC’s intergovernmental structure, namely the SADC Tribunal. The tribunal had been operational since 2005, with its main objective to ensure adherence to the SADC Treaty and take actions against non-compliance by member states. In 2010, the tribunal had two cases arguing upon Zimbabwe’s unlawful expropriation of private land without compensation. That same year Zimbabwe contested the ruling and with immense pressure on SADC, was able to suspend the tribunal in 2010 (Bartsch, 2015).

South Africa’s position towards Zimbabwe is in contrast with the more critical position by Botswana against undemocratic regimes. Botswana is not always considered to be a major player in SADC, as far as influence and security interests are concerned. But the country was instrumental in the creation of its forerunner (SADCC), as part of the FLS core group along with Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique (Motsamai, 2015). Botswana was a strong opponent of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and heavily supported the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, implementing an ‘open door’ policy for refugees from both countries and for the liberation movements (Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008). Because of its role at the forefront of liberation, good relations across the region, and considerable financial resources, Botswana became the location for the SADCC and later SADC headquarters. Botswana chaired SADC from 2015-2016, building on much experience, as it was the SADCC chair for 16 straight years (Motsamai, 2014).

Therefore, it is seen by some observers as carrying considerable political clout within the region and SADC, and as one of ‘SADC's Big 3’, along with South Africa and Zimbabwe. The country under the current president Ian Khama, focuses more on bilateral relations. Yet Botswana’s foreign policy engagement in the SADC region still exists and is informed by the country's landlocked geography, interdependence with its regional neighbours and the imperatives of an undiversified economy. The SADC region is still seen by Botswana as the locus of its future prosperity and security, wherein it is aiming to establish itself as an industrialising state and, equally, maintaining old political alliances (Motsamai, 2014). This is not an easy balance. Together with Zambia, Botswana has been the main state to criticize Mugabe and Zanu PF (Adolfo, 2009) and under current President Khama, there has been consistency in efforts to promote democracy and the respect for standards agreed to by SADC member states (Motsamai, 2014).

Some of these antagonisms intersect with other dimensions (economic) and alliances can shift accordingly. While South Africa and Botswana have had diverging opinions as regards the situation in Zimbabwe, both countries have cooperated in Lesotho through a bilateral joint military intervention. In the next section we elaborate on these aspects in more detail.

**Violence in Lesotho and military interventions mandated by SADC**

Following the tense elections in 1998, SADC intervened militarily in Lesotho. The 1998 elections in Lesotho in 1998 were marked by tensions and animosity, stemming from long-standing dissatisfaction with the electoral system and fuelled by the fragmentation of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). While South African officials reportedly claimed the intervention was a humanitarian peacekeeping mission by SADC to prevent a coup, SADC had no role in legitimising this intervention as the necessary proposals had not been ratified by the SADC Summit (Likoti, 2007). Many observers therefore see the SADC military engagement in Lesotho as a bilateral military intervention by South Africa and Botswana. While the aim of the operation was to prevent the overthrow of the newly elected government and restore law and order, it was reportedly also driven by South Africa’s interests and valuable resource projects in Lesotho, particularly security of water supplies (Hull and Derblom, 2009; Likoti 2007). The reasons for Botswana’s participation are less apparent, and seemed to form its policy of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries (Molomo, 1999). Together with South Africa, Zimbabwe and later Mozambique, Botswana had been
part of the SADC troika guarantors for the return to democratic rule preceding the 1998 elections, the second of its kind since the end of military rule in 1993. Some, however, argue that Botswana’s intervention only served to legitimise what would otherwise have been dubbed a South African invasion of Lesotho, to pass as a SADC intervention (Molomo, 1999). Botswana’s interventions also seem to be inspired by its interests in the potential access water supplies from the Orange-Senqu basin and the Lesotho highlands, and the financial costs of political instability hampering that access.14

Despite the initial success of this SADC military intervention, political instability has continued in Lesotho for almost two decades, as a result of a deep-rooted conflict about the electoral system and the political influence of the security sector. But while SADC’s initial interventions in Lesotho had been driven by South Africa (and Botswana) efforts, their interventions in Lesotho in the last three years have been more strongly embedded in existing SADC structures. In October 2014, under the mediation of the SADC Facilitator for Lesotho, South Africa’s Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, the Maseru Security Accord was signed resulting in the leave of absence of three key officers of the police and the army. These talks stipulated the dissolution of the parliament in December 2014 in preparation of National General Elections to be held in February 2015.15 While the elections were relatively peaceful, following shooting and killing of ex-Army Commander Mahao in June 2015, a respected ex-commander of the SADC Standby Force, SADC launched a Commission of Inquiry led by Botswana judge Mphapi Phumaphi in late 2015. SADC also authorised to create an “oversight committee” to provide early warning and facilitate a new intervention if needed, an implicit acknowledgement of its failure to institutionalise such a capacity for many years (Crisis Group, 2015).

By January 2016, SADC threatened to kick Lesotho out of the organisation unless Prime Minister Mosisili’s government accepted the recommendation from Commission of Inquiry’s report. Observers have noted that SADC has been unusually assertive with Lesotho, a result of the small size and the little influence that Lesotho wields. So it is easier to dictate the terms than in a larger, more influential country. But, SADC has not been able to decisively bring about the necessary changes in governance and security sectors, and some observers see the country ready to implode again soon (Fabricius, 2016).

Similarly to other interventions under the banner of SADC, interventions in Lesotho have been driven by individual member states, most importantly South Africa, both through mediation and military means. South Africa’s geopolitical and strategic economic interests in Lesotho cannot be overlooked: Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa, and is one of South Africa’s trading partners within the five-member Southern African Customs Union (SACU), in which South Africa is the dominant player (Vhumbunu, 2015). Lesotho currently imports close to 80% of its consumer goods from South Africa, while South Africa has wider commercial interests in Lesotho, including in housing, food and beverages, construction, retail, hotels and leisure, banking, and medical services. But more strategically, both countries are engaged in Phase II of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), in addition to other standing water agreements. These are key pillars of South Africa’s water security strategy, as these agreements sustain the supply of over 700 million cubic metres of water to Gauteng province, South Africa’s economic hub. But the level of influence in Lesotho is not exclusively from within the region. Reportedly, General Kamoli was – at least officially – retired in December, under pressure, not only from SADC, but also from the United States, that used the threat of otherwise ending Lesotho’s vital export access via the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Fabricius, 2017).

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14 Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa, together with Namibia are members of the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM).
Mediation and peace operation under SADC in the Democratic Republic of Congo

South Africa can be considered as the region’s hegemon and an economic and military powerhouse compared to the rest of the region. Beyond economic and military power, South Africa is seen as the dominant diplomatic and political member state, with an institutional strength that goes beyond its fellow member states. Beyond SADC and the AU, South Africa is a member of the BRICS-group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and is the only African country that is a member of the G20. But given SADC’s history, any kind of hegemonic performance within the organization is despised, and South Africa keeps a relatively modest and low-key profile within the organization. Aware of the possible veto and opposition from within the region, South Africa has also opted to extend its efforts and influence through other channels, and has preferred to influence the regional and continental peace and security agenda at the level of the AU (Lins de Albuquerque and Hull-Wiklund, 2015). This is reflected in South Africa’s efforts towards the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), a rapid deployment force aimed at filling the gap left by the slow operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) of the African Standby Force (ASF).

Nevertheless, South Africa has taken a lead role in several of SADC interventions, ranging from military interventions (Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo) to mediation (Lesotho and Zimbabwe). When the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faced an insurgency in 2012 by the rebel group M23, the member states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) initially sought to send an international military force. The DRC government however was wary of having Rwandan and Uganda troops present on its territory (since the interventions of Rwanda and Ugandan military forces during the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars) and preferred that such a mission would be carried out by SADC, who accepted to deploy the SADC Standby Force with troops from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa. Questions over reimbursement for troops and concerns about the need to coordinate with the UN mission in the DRC, MONUSCO, led to the force being deployed as part of MONUSCO, as an unprecedented offensive Force Intervention Brigade. The establishment of the intervention brigade is a direct consequence of the political willingness of SADC member states to contribute to it. Part of the brigade’s success has been the contribution of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) battalion and its Rooivalk attack helicopters, which have played a pivotal role in the military operations (Fabricius, 2014).

The drive from South Africa (as well as Tanzania and Malawi) to commit peacekeepers in the DRC intersects with economic and reputational interests, including outside the DRC and SADC, including in Burundi. Beyond M23, other groups such as the Forces nationales de libération (FNLM), have created bases in South Kivu from which to launch attacks on Burundi. South Africa has a long history of engagement in Burundi, as one of the guarantors of the Arusha Peace Accord. It was the first major conflict in which post-apartheid South Africa led negotiations, and South Africa contributed one of the main troop contributing countries for the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, as part of the Arusha agreement, where it was the largest contingent and provided the Force Commander (Providing for Peacekeeping, 2015).

South Africa has also invested huge diplomatic capital through mediation in the First and Second Congo Wars, before the military interventions through the FIB. Following its own recent emergence from apartheid regime through relatively peaceful means of conflict resolution, South Africa aimed at ‘exporting’ this experience through external intervention in the DRC, its first major diplomatic initiative on the continent since the end of apartheid. President Nelson Mandela played a key role in the peace negotiations during the First Congo War (1996–1997), in which Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his rebel group Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) sought to overthrow President Sese Seko Mobutu. The first meeting between Mobutu’s government and the rebels took
place in Cape Town on 20 February 1997 and was brokered by the United States and South Africa. (Carayannis, 2009)

During the Second Congo War, now president Kabila turned his back on former allies Rwanda and Uganda and turned to southern Africa where it became a member of SADC in 1997. At this point, South Africa’s efforts became more embedded in SADC structures (Carayannis, 2009). In 1998, when the Second Congo War broke out, a SADC Summit was held in Pretoria (South Africa was Chair of the Summit at the time), were SADC heads of state and government were to discuss the conflict was a war of foreign aggression or whether it was an internal conflict with ethnic undertones (Tonheim and Swart, 2015). While a SADC report presented at the summit reportedly suggested otherwise (Tonheim and Swart, 2015), the Communiqué left it at “military conflict”.16

South Africa’s credibility and SADC’s decision-making was questioned during this period: Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia decided to intervene militarily and to send troops to back up Kabila, while South Africa favoured a diplomatic approach. But meanwhile, South Africa, sold weapons to Rwanda and Uganda, and intervened military in Lesotho. Thabo Mbeki, who became president in 1999, acknowledged that South Africa’s policy in the country was in need of a major overhaul. Mbeki pushed for a peace plan, urged all foreign forces to withdraw from the DRC (thus recognising that the war was one of aggression, and not an internal war as previously claimed) and decided to contribute South African troops to the UN peacekeeping forces (MONUC). SADC efforts towards the Lusaka ceasefire, and the 2002 Sun City Agreement, reached in Pretoria, were heavily driven by South Africa (Tonheim and Swart, 2015).

South Africa’s policy in the DRC has seen several shifts over the course of the past two decades. This is related to the changing nature of the conflict, but there is also a change within South Africa’s position in dealing with peace and security in the DRC. Overall South Africa’s position has shifted from a more peaceful approach focused on mediation (with first peace talks between Mobutu and rebel factions in 1996-1997 initiated and facilitated by President Mandela) towards an approach that combined military and mediation efforts that were more embedded in SADC and international structures (UN) (under Mbeki), and more explicit priority for South African economic interests (under current president Zuma) (Tonheim and Swart, 2015). Some critics have noted that South Africa’s recent efforts to stabilise the country have been more explicitly articulated as embedded in national economic interests, including mining and energy, and that economic interests have become the primary driver. However, these economic interests were already present before and during Mandela’s first mediation efforts. South Africa’s efforts in the DRC are also embedded in its willingness and political commitment to address the conflict with the risks of regional destabilisation, and build upon the considerable diplomatic capital since 1994, the end of apartheid in South Africa and its mediation and peace efforts in Burundi.

4. Conclusion - little traction for SADC driven peace and security

Since its establishment in 1994, SADC and its member states have established a peace and security architecture that has been deemed as mature; composed of an extensive range of tools to intervene in peace and security challenges. This includes a regional training centre, an early warning centre, a panel of the wise, and a regional standby force, all under the political guidance of the SADC Summit and Organ. But the answer to the question of how, beyond the institutional framework, SADC has effectively addressed peace and security challenges in the region, is less straightforward. While some observers suggest that without SADC violent conflict in southern Africa might have been more pervasive, the results from the selected case studies (see section 3) suggest that SADC member states and SADC interventions have not been able to effectively deal with political and violent crisis.

SADC’s peace and security architecture reflects the structural and foundational factors of SADC’s origins, with a strict adherence to consensus and mistrust for hegemonic decision-making. As a result, there is a strong veto position against supranational interventions. SADC peace and security interventions are not driven by an adherence to the SADC Treaty, guidelines or protocols, but by efforts of individual or coalitions of SADC member states. While in certain cases, member states have made efforts to embed their interventions more strongly in SADC structures over the course of a conflict, such as in the DRC, at other times; member states have kept this embedment more optional.

Especially South Africa, as the regional hegemon, has kept the option of acting through SADC open, depending on national interests. South Africa is the undoubtable hegemon in SADC, through a combination of military, diplomatic and economic strength which is not rivalled by other SADC member states. Given the resistance for hegemonic decision making, founded upon the strict adherence to consensual decision-making and the unwillingness amongst SADC member states to give up any measure of sovereignty, South Africa has also worked through other channels, notably the African Union, to intervene in other conflicts, including amongst others Burundi. Besides specific conflict situations, South Africa has also moved beyond SADC to influence the continental peace and security agenda, notably the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflict (ACIRC), which in turn has affected progress as regards the regional standby force.

Some observers have noted a growing dichotomy between those countries currently still led by so-called ‘liberation parties’ (including Zimbabwe and South Africa) and others ruled by post-liberation parties, such as Botswana. According to these observers, this dichotomy has undermined SADC’s ability to effectively intervene in conflict situations, as SADC member states will insulate themselves from external intervention. While these ‘liberation ties’, creating a sense of shared experience and brotherhood, continue to bind SADC member states to a certain extent, these ties intersect (increasingly) with more salient economic and political interests. It is not clear how and when exactly SADC member states balance these various objectives, and how this informs their decision-making as to embed their peace and security interventions under SADC or not. This contribution has not systematically looked at what drives decision-making as regards peace and security in other SADC member states (beyond South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana) such as Angola, Namibia and Tanzania. SADC is home to a diverse group of member state countries, in terms of governance, economic development and geographical location, and cooperation does take place between those in supposedly ‘opposing political camps’, as for example between Botswana and South Africa in Lesotho.

The lack of effective interventions in SADC seems to be a result of a more fundamental issue, namely the lack of shared political values, rather than a ‘historical reflex’ by SADC member states to insulate one another from regional intervention. While the founders of SADC aimed to underline the centrality
of common values, and enshrined it in the SADC Treaty and protocols as the glue that would bind member states together and create regional security, the events in the past two decades have shown that this aspiration has not been realised. In reality, SADC member states do not share a common interpretation of these values.

This is reflected in the more careful way in which SADC has approached political and electoral issues, as opposed to threats posed by regional instability and violent conflict. SADC and SADC member states have intervened militarily, and these interventions have been mandated either ex ante (in the DRC) or ex post (in Lesotho) by the SADC summit. In the case of Lesotho, the limited size and political influence of the country have been an additional factor for SADC’s outspoken approach towards the political and military crisis in the country.

Nathan (2016) concludes that there has been a considerable level of cooperation and convergence under SADC to undertake effective regional cooperation in a range of sectors, such as water and energy, but this has not been the case for regional security, which remains a “sensitive domain”. Despite the apparent importance of values in SADC’s Treaties and Protocols, there are effectively no sanctions for non-implementation, this aspiration has not been met in the past two decades (f.e. Lesotho was eventually not suspended despite the threat to do so by the SADC Summit) and SADC operates as a strictly intergovernmental multi-purpose regional organisation on a regime of strict respect of non-interference and sovereignty.

While observers disagree about to extent to which SADC interventions in peace and security have been effective, most of them seem to agree that inter- and intra-state conflict in southern Africa might have been more pervasive in the absence of SADC (Nathan, 2013). But given the many intersecting divergences, the lack of a common understanding of the SADC principles and the enduring mistrust of hegemonic decision-making, including from the region’s hegemon, there is little leeway for SADC to drive a regional peace and security agenda, except when major countries and their interests are aligned.
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## Annexes

### Annex 1: Military Strengths, selection of SADC member states

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