Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)

Water and security at inter-regional cross-roads

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This background paper is part of a series on the Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations (PEDRO). It was prepared in March 2017. In line with ECDPM’s mission to inform and facilitate EU-Africa policy dialogue, and financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ, the studies analyse key policy areas of seventeen regional organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so they address three broad questions: What is the political traction of the organisations around different policy areas? What are the key member state interests in the regional agenda? What are the areas with most future traction for regional organisations to promote cooperation and integration around specific areas? The studies aim to advance thinking on how regional policies play out in practice, and ways to promote politically feasible and adaptive approaches to regional cooperation and integration. Further information can be found at www.ecdpm.org/pedro.

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1. Introduction

This report gives a political economy overview of regional cooperation in the Lake Chad basin. It focuses in particular on the recent evolution of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), a basin organisation which brings together Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic and Libya. Originally set up in 1964 to coordinate access and use of the resources of Lake Chad, the region covered by the LCBC has recently been the scene of military cooperation in light of the fight against Boko Haram.

Split between the ECOWAS and ECCAS space, the Lake Chad Basin countries find themselves encompassing a region of heightened mobility and porous borders under increasing environmental and security pressure. Over the years, the LCBC seems to have largely failed in its objectives to develop the area and promote sustainable use of the basin’s resources. The main players, including the regional hegemon Nigeria have invested some political capital in the project, but favour major politically attractive interventions, such as recharging the lake from the Ubangui river, over structural interventions in the area of agricultural adaptation and environmental conservation around the basin’s effluents.

The rise of Boko Haram put the LCBC at the centre of attention, as the affected states needed a political forum to coordinate joint military efforts and cross-border cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The LCBC provided a cross-regional entry-point and the necessary legal framework to host cooperation and channel funds for a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) between Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin.

The common threat and first experiences in military cooperation to some extent reasserted the wavering relevance of the organisation and deepened political ties between the basin countries. Today, the question remains how this momentum can be harnessed to also reactivate the core mandate of the LCBC as a basin organisation.

This study addresses the following three questions: i) what is the political traction of the LCBC; ii) what are the interests of member states for strengthening the LCBC’s regional mandate and for using the organisation to address both security and water resource management; and iii) which are the specific areas or sectors with most potential for LCBC to convene member states around a common agenda and solidify its regional mandate.

This report is based on a literature analysis and a limited number of exchanges and interviews with experts.

2. Assessing the political traction of the Lake Chad Basin commission

2.1. Structural and institutional drivers and obstacles

The Lake Chad basin and countries

Lake Chad is situated in the centre of central-north Africa, in a mostly arid or semi-arid “Sahelian zone” just south of the Sahara Desert. The lake is a shallow (4 to 10 metres) body of fresh water that, since the turn of the century, has varied dramatically in surface area between 10,000 and 25,000 square kilometres, according to seasons and years. The Lake Chad Basin covers 2,434,000 km2, shared by the following riparian countries: Chad (45%), Niger (28%), CAR (9%), Nigeria (7%), Algeria...
(4%), Sudan (4%), Cameroon (2%) and Libya (0.5%). Chad and Niger are those with the largest shared territory but three quarters of the water comes from the CAR (40% of the inflow) and Cameroon (GWP 2013, p.5; Sands 1974, p.55). This is the “hydro-geographic” basin and is bigger than the “active basin” over which the LCBC has jurisdiction. The active basin is about 984,455 km² and divided among the following states: Chad (37%); Niger (16%); CAR (20%); Nigeria (21%); and Cameroon (6%) (Services du Contrôle Supérieur de l’Etat du Cameroun, et al., 2015, p.5).

Not all member states therefore have an equal stake in the Lake Chad basin. Chad is by far most dependent on the lake, with its capital and demographic centre located at ca. 120km from the lake. Nigeria in turn houses a key portion of the southern part of the basin, even if the basin is only of secondary concern for the country. Cameroon and Niger are only peripherally concerned with the basin, yet the latter is an important water producer through the Logone River. The Central African Republic does not have direct access to the river, but houses the Chari sub-basin, which is the largest source of inflow for the Lake. Libya, finally houses a negligible section of the basin.

Lake Chad is composed of two basins - north and south - separated by a zone of shallows, the “Great Barrier”. The main inflows come from the Chari and Logone rivers from the south (80-90%) while the remaining inflows are from smaller tributaries and rainfall (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014). Rainfall on the Chari-Logone rivers has an amplifying effect on the level of water of the lake - a variation of 10% of rainfall causes a variation of 30% of the water level of the river and a proportional variation of the lake. During low water periods the Great Barrier can emerge and separate the two basins - if the north basin does not benefit from the overflow of the south basin it can completely dry out (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014). Depending on wet and dry periods, and on the inflows of water, four typologies of Lake Chad have been observed throughout the times with different variations of surface water. These typologies, going from the biggest to the smallest water surface, are:

- Big Lake: appeared only a few times in the 20th century, lastly in the humid years of the 1950s.
- Medium Lake: phases of this type are interposed by phases of Small Lake, due to climatic variations, the last one having taken place in 1973.
- Small Lake: it is the prevalent phase of the lake which was in this state about two thirds of the time from 1957 to 2008.
- Small Dry Lake: it is a recent definition to identify the phases in which the north basin does not receive water from the south basin and dries out. This state has appeared several times in the 80s and 90s. Since 1995 to 2013 the north basin has always conserved some water.

The two basins are different. The southern one is better connected and has a higher population density than the northern one, which in light of the isolation and more unpredictable water levels, is less densely populated and therefore offers unexploited potential (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p. 70). The increasing human pressure on natural resources has long been managed through customary and traditional methods that prevent big conflicts, but tensions exist (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p.70). The likely increase of water consumption, due to demographic trends and irrigation and agricultural choices in the years to come, indicates the need for a participatory and inclusive reflection on the development of the lake basin area (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p. 65).

This highlights some of the fundamental aspects facing Lake Chad itself. Contrary to the perception, according to some studies the impact of irrigation and water usage on the level of water is limited (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p. 35). Another common perception is that the Chari-Logone is silting up with fluvial sediments, leading to a fall in the depth of the river and challenges for navigation, however
available data does not show any causal relation with the level of waters in the river or in the lake.¹

Lastly, the consequences of climate change on the lake, including on agriculture in the basin area, are complex and long-term trends cannot be identified at this stage (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p. 35).²

A subregion at the crossroads of integration in Africa.

Formal trade between the Lake Chad basin countries is extremely low at just 6% (Magrin, 2014). The sub-region, however is since long an area of heightened cross-border mobility, particularly for Arab and Peul shepherds, and Haussa, Ngambaye and Masa fishermen. These bottom-up exchanges nuance the sub-region's position as a regional crossroads. A more perverse effect of this historical mobility is that the Lake Chad basin is also a region that suffering from cross-border circulation of armed groups that - according to the opportunity at hand - can have either military, rebel, religious or any other affiliation. On a regional institutional level, the picture is very different. Nigeria and Niger are part of ECOWAS, while Chad and Cameroon, along with the Central African Republic are in the ECCAS area³. LCBC therefore operates in an area that is historically far more integrated from a bottom-up perspective than it is from a top-down, institutional point of view. The immense need in terms of tackling the many cross-border challenges in the area, coupled with the absence of a traditional common political forum (REC) has shaped the LCBC’s history as a basin organisation in several ways, discussed below.

¹ A possible explanation is that the lower depth is due to the dry period the region is experiencing. Nevertheless, a challenge for the fluvial navigation and transport is the vegetation growth on the rivers, which needs to be managed in consultation with local populations. See Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014).
² In terms of climate, four zones can be identified: the humid zone in the basin southern part (Cameroon’s and CAR’s territory); the dry sub-humid zone (CAR’s and Chad’s territory); the semi-arid zone in the basin central part (in Nigeria, Chad and Niger); the Northern arid and hyper arid zone (in Niger and Chad). (GWP, 2013, p. 3)
³ All Lake Chad Basin countries, with the exception of Cameroon are members of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), however this is generally perceived as the least functional and performant African REC.
All these issues provide the background in which LCBC operates, shaping both its original *raison d'être* but also its approach to some of the more recent major challenges faced. In particular, the emergence of Boko Haram has altered security interests in the Lake Chad region and therefore raises questions about the role and mandate of LCBC - as a consequence of Boko Haram's presence, the Lake Chad basin economy has been badly damaged with States targeting economic activities believed to benefit the group with several bans and trade prohibitions. In this context the LCBC is increasingly seen as having a potentially important role to play in coordinating regional security actions.

**The Lake Chad Basin Commission**

The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC - in French, Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad, CBLT) was created on 22 May 1964 by the Heads of State of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, making it one of the oldest basin organisations in Africa. The LCBC was created to promote the shared and sustainable management and exploitation of Lake Chad and other water resources - rivers - in the area. In the last decade the region has been marked by insecurity, due to the terrorist activities of the insurgent movement Boko Haram raising issues regarding its mandate in the realm of peace and security.

The organisation was created soon after the independence of the member countries in 1960. Although postcolonial, and while the colonial powers France, UK, and Germany had used the lake to

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demarcate borders,\textsuperscript{5} it was set up with the technical support of France, still interested in maintaining some influence in the basin area\textsuperscript{6}. The 1985 summit gave the LCBC the mandate to enlarge the basin organisation, notably to the Central African Republic (CAR)\textsuperscript{7}, which acceded in 1994. Libya joined the LCBC in 2008 and Sudan, Egypt\textsuperscript{8}, the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo have observer status.

Attune to the River Basin development model, the LCBC countries adopted a long-term vision and strategic action plan (PAS) in 2008 and a Water Charter in April 2012. The Water Charter's development and initial implementation was supported by the Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial (FFEM) with Nigeria having reportedly played a leading role in paving the way for its preparation (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, VI-2). The Water Charter aims to help the LCBC achieve its Vision 2025 and Strategic Action Plan with an approach inspired by the principles of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). Joint management of water resources is a crucial point in the context of increasing consumption of water throughout the basin, due to demographic trends and human activities.

Among the issues that the Charter seeks to address are:
- Water sharing rules between states and users, upstream and downstream basins;
- Wetlands and groundwater management rules;
- Criteria to review new projects which might impact on water resources;
- The division of competences and functions between national and regional authorities in water policies, planning, monitoring;
- Harmonisation of monitoring and communication tools; and
- Supporting the participation of civil society in water and natural resources management.

\textbf{2.2. Boko Haram and the development of a water-security complex in the Lake Chad Basin?}

The LCBC was created with a technical yet broad mandate to promote the common management of water and environmental resources in the area of the basin. Though water is clearly the entry point, at the same time the founding treaty can be read as wishing to promote a space of peaceful coexistence in the region. Awareness that water can be a potential driver of conflict among countries and communities, and that means of conflict prevention and peaceful conflict resolution are needed, is implicit in the 1964 Convention and Statute but was explicitly spelled out in the 2012 Water Charter which amends the previous documents and represents a binding document\textsuperscript{9}. This potentially implies a wider LCBC mandate to cover areas such as security, which is particularly relevant today, as discussed below.

\textsuperscript{7} The CAR's accession was linked to the plans for an interbasin water transfer from the Ubangui river (Magrin, 2014). See section 3 below.
\textsuperscript{9} Article 4 of the Water Charter states that an objective of the LCBC is "preventing conflict with guarantees of efficient prevention and inter-state shared water resource related dispute resolution". Lake Chad Basin Commission, Water Charter of the Lake Chad Basin, April 2011. See also http://www.cblt.org/en/themes/lake-chad-water-charter-vehicle-sub-regional-integration-and-security
Box 1: Functions of the LCBC (Article 9 of the revised statutes, 1990)

a. To prepare general regulations which shall permit the full application of the principles set forth in the present convention and its annexed Statute, and to ensure their effective application;
b. To collect, evaluate and disseminate information on projects prepared by Member States and to recommend plans for common projects and joint research programmes in the Lake Chad Basin;
c. To keep close contact between the High Contracting Parties with a view to ensuring the most efficient utilisation of the waters of the Basin;
d. To follow the progress of the execution of surveys and works in the Lake Chad Basin as envisaged in the present Convention, and to keep the Member States informed at least once a year thereon, through systematic and periodic reports which each State shall submit to it;
e. To draw up common rules regarding navigation and transport;
f. To draw up staff regulations and to ensure their application;
g. To examine complaints and to promote the settlement of disputes and the resolution of differences; and
h. To supervise the implementation of the provisions of the present Statute and the Convention to which it is annexed.

Military cooperation: The Multinational Joint Task Force

Military cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin predates the rise of Boko Haram. The fragility of the basin countries security systems and porous borders allowed for armed groups and common banditry to flourish. In 1994 at the 8th summit of the LCBC, due to smuggling and criminal activities taking place in the area, the member states decided to establish a joint security force based in Baga-Kawa in Nigeria\textsuperscript{10}, however only Nigeria committed troops at that stage (Musa, 2013). In 1998, the security force was expanded to include other member states of the LCBC by establishing the Multinational Joint Security Force (MNJSF). This formation had the “initial mandate (…) to conduct military operations in the Lake Chad Region, check banditry activities and to facilitate free movement of member states’ troops across their common border.” (Musa, 2013). While the LCBC acted as a political forum, its direct involvement in these early experiences was limited.

The aftermath of the 2009 “Boko Haram Uprising”, which left more than 1,000 dead in Northern Nigeria, inspired the reorganisation of the MNJSF. In 2012, in response to the increasingly cross-border nature of the insurgency against Nigeria and its neighbours, the MNJSF was re-launched as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). This reorganisation led to an increase in the operational capacity of the MNJTF to an estimated 10,000 troops initially driven by Nigeria (Zamfir 2017). The MNJTF was based in Baga, Nigeria until the base was overrun by Boko Haram in January 2015. Military headquarters were subsequently moved to N’Djamena, and the MNJTF was brought under the political lead of the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The AU mandated the LCBC to be the political coordinating body of the operation. Set up by the LCBC summit, the MNJTF only includes four of the six member states, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, and non-member Benin. The MNJTF members are effectively split between ECOWAS (Nigeria, Niger, and Benin) and ECCAS (Cameroon and Chad) making it difficult for an AU recognised REC, and building block of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), to take the lead. Since the majority of the countries concerned belong to the LCBC and Boko Haram’s reach had spread to the shores of the Lake Chad Basin, the organisation was seen as a suitable institutional framework for this joint effort providing a pragmatic solution for this cross-regional arrangement. The LCBC in theory provides civilian leadership of the mission but de facto has no involvement on operational activities - the LCBC has little ‘on the ground’ expertise on peace and security.

\textsuperscript{10} Huitième sommet des Chefs d’état et de gouvernement de la CBLT, Abuja, 21-23 Mars 1994. Décision 5.B.
The MNJTF is by no means an exclusive framework for cooperation, and national and bilateral deployments take place regularly. In June 2016, for example, Chad deployed 2,000 troops to Niger after Boko Haram took the town of Bosso, causing 50,000 people to flee. The MNJTF is in the first place a framework for coordinating different national military actions (Zamfir, 2017). Under the MNJTF troops are deployed within the countries’ own national boundaries, and operate within those as a matter of priority (Assanvo et al., 2016). They may however under specific circumstances operate within a limited perimeter on the territory of neighbouring states.\footnote{The right of pursuit is granted on a bilateral basis. See Assanvo 2016.}

Tensions on the mandate have occurred and are likely to increase. While the re-focusing on the original core mandate of water management is sometimes proposed as an option to institutionally strengthen the LCBC, the interest for security aspects has risen since the late 2000s due to the violence exerted by the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria, and, as of 2015, in the wider Lake Chad region. Advances in regional cooperation in security-related areas through the MNJTF could thus conceivably be coordinated under LCBC (Lemoalle & Magrin, p. 61). At the same time, however, the LCBC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its core mandate to coordinate and promote the safeguarding and development of Lake Chad, leading the 2015 joint audit to conclude that despite existing policies and legislation, the future of Lake Chad has not been sufficiently prioritised by member states, noting an absence of institutional coordination on water resource management in the basin (Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 125).

### 2.3. Current reforms and challenges

**Organisational structure and reform**

Between 2009 and 2011 an institutional reform was carried out, pushed by the then Executive Secretary to update the original 1964 charter, the latest in a series of reforms, ostensibly driven by an interest in gaining donors’ trust (Joint Environmental Audit 2015). The result was an increase in the number of directors (from 5 to 12), leading to significant increases in staffing costs without an actual increase in capacity of the organisation. LCBC member states are also known to compete over the repartition of key appointments (Magrin, 2014).
At the organisation level, the LCBC has reportedly been marked by several organisational difficulties, in particular:

- Centralisation of decisional power in the position of the Executive Secretary. The ES is de facto the only decision-making figure as power is not delegated to staff in the Secretariat. The set-up is heavily rooted on the figure of the Executive Secretary, reflecting the long presence in this position of Abubakar Bobboi Jauro who increased the discretionary powers of this role (Njeuma Martin, Z. & Malaquais, 2004).
- Weak staff skills in terms of planning, management, financial management, information management, communication, etc. (Joint Environmental Audit 2015; BMZ, 2015)
- Recruitment processes and selection criteria are not transparent, and staff is commonly recruited on a political basis (BMZ, 2015).
- Limited capacity of the LCBC staff to manage large projects, coupled with the necessity to coordinate a big number of donor-funded projects (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p. 61).
- The LCBC is not involved in all relevant programs and projects in the region, for instance road infrastructure projects in Cameroon and Chad planned to work as dikes to prevent flooding which can have an impact on water management.
- There is no evaluation of the performance of the Executive Secretariat vis-a-vis the objectives of the LCBC (Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 76).

The member states reportedly see the need for a further organisational restructuring, with reform options to have been examined at the meeting of the Council of Ministers in April 2015.

Another challenge is the ad hoc timing of the Summit of the Heads of States and Governments, which is supposed to give the political direction to the LCBC. Originally envisaged to meet biannually, in reality there have been just 14 meetings between 1964 and 2012. The 14th meeting was held in 2012, marked by the reactivation of the MNJTF to fight Boko Haram with a regional response, so was arguably on issues beyond its core mandate (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015).
Institutional links with the LCBC member states

As is common for a basin organisation, each member state has assigned a structure or individual in its administration\(^{12}\) to liaise with the LCBC. This is usually in ministries dealing with water or territory, reflecting the LCBC’s core basin management mandate. In addition each member state has national structures that are tasked with some competencies in the management of water and natural resources\(^{13}\) - the LCBC is also active in the protection of biodiversity and promotion of sustainable agro-pastoral and fisheries activities. However, in light of budgetary constraints, and reflecting member states’ limited prioritisation of sustainable water management, resources - human, financial, material - devoted to this issue are insufficient (Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 56).

Common challenges in the member states are identified as follows:\(^{14}\)

- The roles and responsibilities of ministries and bodies of Member States dealing with water and natural resources of Lake Chad are not always clearly defined, thus complicating integrated water resources management. The institutional framework for water management is often incomplete with poor coordination of activities on water management in each member state - that clearly raises a challenge for LCBC to effectively engage.
- National water management policies and strategies are often incomplete (e.g. laws, action plans, performance indicators, timelines, etc.) with poor implementation of control instruments to regulate access to water and to sanction infractions.
- Only partially functioning programmes to monitor water levels.
- Insufficient sensitisation of water users.

Operational budget and external financing

Funding for the LCBC’s operational budget is meant to be based on contributions from its member States according to the following key (CBLT 2008):

- Cameroon, 26%
- Niger, 7%
- Nigeria, 52%
- Chad, 11%
- CAR, 4%

Though information about the budget of the LCBC is patchy, the African Development Bank has arguably been the major donor for the LCBC over the last 20 years through the Lake Chad Sustainable Development Support Program (PRODEBALT), with a total cost of roughly EUR90m, involving four members States (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Central African Republic)\(^{15}\).

The 2012 budget shows that donors - AfDB, EU, GIZ, WB, UNDP, FAO, FFEM (Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial - FFEM), Global Environment Facility - are jointly responsible for financing most of the programmatic activities (CBLT, 2012). The system of financing intends for member states to pay 100% of the operational budget with 20% of programme budget also paid out of member state contributions (BMZ 2015). However, delayed payment of Member States’ contributions has been a recurrent challenge for the LCBC, leading to acute shortages of resources. Arrears were owed in particular by Niger and Chad in the 1980s when the countries were struck by droughts and civil wars (Magrin 2014). Donor contributions have filled the gap and allowed the institution to continue functioning more or less uninterruptedly (Lemoalle & Magrin 2014, p. 61). The financial model is

\(^{12}\) For a complete list, see Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 22.
\(^{13}\) For a complete list, see Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 23.
\(^{14}\) For a complete list, see Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 29.
therefore considered to be unsustainable since resources are limited, unpredictable, and difficult to mobilise (Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 117).

2.4. Limited progress in the area of sustainable (and integrated) water resource management

The assessment of the performance of the member states and the LCBC in the field of shared water management is mixed and the mechanisms and tools to control the use of water resources are not fully operational (Joint Environmental Audit 2015). There is also reportedly not enough synergy and complementarity between action between member state actions and the LCBC. This is partly due to insufficient definition of roles and competences but also a lack of genuine political interest among Member States. The LCBC is described as only very partially fulfilling the function of a transboundary basin organisation in the management of shared waters but member states are reportedly not investing enough - for instance countries are not contributing to collecting, analysing, diffusing, and archiving data on water resources usage (Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 117). According to some observers, member states are “dysfunctional” and thus not strong enough to negotiate and implement common rules.

The inter-basin water transfer project: in search of a silver bullet

Relatedly, while integrated water management systems are highly complex, a lot of energy has been directed towards the more politically attractive idea of a transfer of water from the river Ubangui, a tributary of the Congo river, to Lake Chad which is a central tenet of the LCBC and its Member States since the 1990s (Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 16). (See also the CICOS study in this series) The idea of an inter-basin water transfer from the abundantly supplied Congo river basin was first developed by an Italian company Bonifaca as ‘the idea for the Sahel’ in the 1970s, at the height of the Sahel drought. Initially, a water transfer directly from the Congo to the Chari River was proposed by the construction of a 2,400km long canal, crossing from DRC into CAR. Several studies have since examined both the original project, and the less outrageously ambitious transfer from the Ubangui to the Chari River in CAR. While technically feasible, the transfer would come at an extremely high estimated cost of USD 7 billion (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014), and is heavily criticised for the potentially adverse effects on the ecosystems of both basins as well as the possible negative effects on flow in the Congo basin, particularly on the already dramatically reduced flow of the Ubangui river. Sceptics also point out that on the receiving end of the transfer, an increase of water volumes in the Chari-Logone Rivers could cause floods due to fragile banks, with social and economic consequences (Joint Environmental Audit, p. 17). In addition, the increased availability of water would not solve the root causes of the pressure on natural resources in the basin area, which are due to human activities and failing management of resources by states and authorities. Lastly, the Commission Internationale du Bassin Congo-Oubangui-Sangha (CICOS) has raised reservations about the idea due to the concerns that the Congo basin will lose a lot of its potential water inflow.

International donors and powers have also been reluctant to fund the water transfer project, despite rhetorical support. The need to promote a constructive debate on the water transfer project has been identified already by studies (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, Magrin, 2014) but the LCBC has thus far been unable to harness this, particularly also due to the strong position of key member states in favour of the transfer project.

Water-driven development in a remote and marginalised area

One further challenge relates to how LCBC integrates in the realities of cross-border economic and social practices into its work. Though Lake Chad area has always been considered a remote area, far-away from the capital cities, consequently suffering from marginalisation and limited investments
and transport connectivity, in the context of the dry season experienced by the region in the last
decades, Lake Chad functions as an oasis in the area, attracting populations from the hinterlands,
especially after the droughts of the 70s (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p. 69). The positive balance of
migration - one of the few in the rural areas in the Sahel - is testimony to the attractiveness of Lake
Chad and has brought some economic dynamism (Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, p. 70).

Lake Chad is a multiple cross-border trading area where, due to the environment which is difficult to
control, state officials find a favourable space to levy taxes without legal authorisations (Lemoalle &
Magrin, 2014, IV 3). Macro-level trade data - which indicates that countries like China, US, or France
are the main trading partners in terms of value - potentially understates the depth of trade relations
between the LCBC countries at the local level. With three different currencies\textsuperscript{16} - the stability of the
Franc CFA thanks to parity with the Euro while the Naira fluctuates is a driver of trade in the region
(Lemoalle & Magrin, 2014, IV 3).

Agriculture, fisheries and livestock are key economic activities of the local population - families often
undertake several activities at the same time. The lands are fertile and multifunctional and can serve
three activities at different times. Estimations indicate that the lake region contributes to the food
security of 13 million people within a range of 300km, thanks to connections with regional towns. The
population density of the area is estimated at 50 inhabitants per km\textsuperscript{2} - which is higher than the
average population density of the individual countries of the CBLC with the exception of Nigeria - and
the population growth rate is 2.5\% to 3\% (Joint Environmental Audit 2015).

At the same time, LCBC does not legislate on regional trade of livestock, fish and agricultural products
(Roitman 2003) while according to some experts building regional integration from the top happens at
the expense of exchanges “from the bottom” (Magrin, 2014). This then again relates to the LCBC
mandate and how much traction it might have in extending its activities from water management to the
related aspects of trade and economic activity among its member states.

2.5. Recent involvement and difficulties in the fight against terrorism

The emergence of Boko Haram - a threat to Nigeria and the other countries surrounding the Lake
Chad area - was a main driver to reactivate and expand common security approaches by LCBC
member states. The actions of the jihadist movement have led to the disruption of communities and
livelihoods in the basin area, have created refugee flows and internal displacement, putting
populations at risk of food insecurity and creating urgent humanitarian needs (Sambe, 2016). While
the decision to re-activate the MNJTF was already taken in 2012, the fight against Boko Haram only
gained a regional sense of urgency over the course of 2014 and early 2015. The Paris summit in May
2014 gave another push to enhance regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram, by means
of coordinated patrols and border surveillance, pooling intelligence and information exchange (Zamfir
2017).

In January 2015, the African Union Assembly authorised the deployment of the MNJTF. Despite this
authorisation, the actual deployment encountered several logistical and financial setbacks, including
the attack on the military base in Baga. Engaging with LCBC member states was one of the first
foreign policy tasks of the newly elected President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, in 2015, in order to
revive the establishment of the MNJTF. President Buhari convened a summit of the LCBC in Nigeria
in June 2015, which finally approved the MNJTF concept of operations (CONOPS, which had been
prepared over some months with the support of the AU and other international partners, such as the
UN and the European Union. At this level then, LCBC can be seen as having managed to offer a
platform for issues beyond its narrow water mandate.

\textsuperscript{16} Naira in Nigeria, West African Franc CFA and Central African Franc CFA.
The command of the force was assigned to Nigeria, currently under Major General Kanudu Adeosun, signalling the drive of this country in the setting-up of the MNJTF. At the moment the MNJTF is not an integrated regional force with joint patrols and operations but focuses on coordinating national contingents which operate on their own terms and report to their own capitals. The task force also does some coordination of intelligence and joint planning. Another de facto function is to coordinate international financial and technical aid (e.g. seconded officers to the intelligence cells).

The LCBC Executive Secretary Sanusi Imran Abdullahi was designated as MNJTF’s civilian head of mission in 2015, in theory with the role of providing the political direction in collaboration with the force commander Major General Adeosun. The LCBC Secretariat plays no specific role in the MNJTF’s operations and the LCBC’s capacity to carry out and manage this type of action is questioned (Assanvo et al., 2016).

The AU is de facto the primary partner of the MNJTF, rather than the LCBC (Assanvo et al., 2016). LCBC Heads of States had sought the legal framework for the task force from the AU, which in 2015 authorised the deployment of the MNJTF comprising up to 7500 military and non-military staff for an initial period of 12 months in 2015 (Zamfir 2017). The AU’s authorisation was needed in order to acquire financial resources, for instance from international donors that already have financial mechanisms to support peace and security operations in Africa. Thus, after the official approval by the AU, the MNJTF attracted a EUR 50m from the European Union (EU) through the African Peace Facility (APF)\(^\text{17}\) - the highest donation the MNJTF has received since its formation. In addition, the AU provides logistical support to the MNJTF (transport, IT, communications equipment).

The AU’s role led to some tensions as some had wished to exploit the opportunity to strengthen the LCBC’s Executive Secretariat in the peace and security area since the LCBC had no direct experience in military operations. However, the LCBC is not a Legally Mandated Institution of the African Union, unlike ECOWAS or ECCAS, also limiting its current means of receiving funding and engaging more on peace and security issues, as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Meetings of LCBC Ministers of Defence also only recently started taking place, the 3rd one being in 2014.\(^\text{18}\)

Until now, the MNJTF has suffered from the fact that certain members of the coalition prefer national or bilateral actions (Assanvo et al., 2016). Nigeria essentially continues to approach the fight against Boko Haram in a unilateral way. Niger’s request for bilateral assistance from Chad after the attack on Bosso is another case in point. Those arrangements have probably faster reaction times and more flexibility, and could be viewed as more efficient. The MNJTF has also caused frustrations in military hierarchies. In Cameroon, soldiers were expecting salary increases to the level of UN peacekeeping missions, leading to tensions in the ranks (International Crisis Group, 2016b).


In sum, while the LCBC’s security mandate has its origins in the 1990s, it was not until the surge of Boko Haram outside Nigeria in the past few years that the LCBC started playing a security role. Officially, the Commission’s role has several dimensions:

1. A political forum: in absence of a dedicated multi-mandate regional organisation to cover the Lake Chad Basin countries, the LCBC summit level has been used to coordinate and agree on common security challenges.
2. A regional civilian body to coordinate joint operations sanctioned by the AU and with foreign funding.

In practice, however, apart from the Executive secretary himself, who coordinates with the military command, the AU’s Peace and Security Department and the MNJTF command, the LCBC as an institution is only minimally involved.

3. On the “political interests” of member states

3.1. Hydropolitics of the Lake Chad basin

Member state interests and dynamics in the commission are informed in the first place by their geographical location in the basin, and in the second place by their history of exploitation of the basin’s resources. Starting in the 1950s, the Basin was the scene of early development of water and irrigation infrastructure in several countries, that sought to transform the agricultural systems in northern Nigeria, Cameroun, Chad and Central African Republic (Magrin, 2009, 2014). Many of these works came into disarray early on, but had a profound effect on the groundwater levels of the basin as well as the local economy.
On of the key factors in the Chad Basin is that for the majority of member states only have a peripheral geopolitical interest in the basin. For Cameroon and Niger for example the basin is far from a priority, even if the former has some control over the Logone affluent, and even Nigeria, as the basin’s clear heavyweight and LCBC hegemon, the Chad Basin comes far behind the Niger Delta on the list of political priorities. Only for Chad the lake and basin are of critical concern (Magrin, 2014). Along with a long history of internal conflict and perpetual crisis in many of the basin countries has contributed to the continued marginalisation of the Commission. Against this background we can however discern a number of particular member state interests.

**Nigeria is the clear regional hegemon**, contributing to over half of the LCBC’s operating budget and is perceived to play a leading role in the policy and institutional development of the organisation. The Summit of Heads of States has always been influenced by Nigeria. All the nine Executive Secretaries of the LCBC have all come from Nigeria.

In the 1970s the country developed large scale irrigation in Northern Nigeria through the national Hadejia-Jama’are River Basin Development Authority (HJRBDA) and the Chad Basin Development Authority (CBD). These initiatives did not yield the expected results, and contributed to what Magrin (2009) calls a cemetery of ‘white elephants’ in the Chad basin. That said, Nigeria, even if the main focus of its (rentier) economy lies in the Niger delta, the North-Eastern Bornou State maintains a key stake in the basin. The development of pilot projects for the maintenance of river health in the Lake Chad Basin has been instrumental in upscaling the institutional framework, resulting in the creation of the Nigeria Integrated Water Resources Management Commission (NIWRMC) at federal level.

Nigeria is also a strong promoter of the proposed interbasin transfer from the Ubangui river. An expansion of Lake Chad to its historical boundaries would mean that Northern Nigeria regains access to the body’s shores, which would mean a return of the Fisheries industry in the north, as well as benefit the agricultural self-sufficiency of the war torn northern part of the country.

**Cameroon** holds a particular hydropolitical position in the region, as it is located between three major river basins, the Niger basin, the Congo-Ubangui-Sangha basin and the Lake Chad basin, in each of which it has a rather peripheral stake. This position leads Cameroon to invest at least some political capital in all three basin organisations. At the same time, Cameroon has not been affected by the same levels of political and economic crisis and instability as most basin countries, which means it is in a position to invest\(^\text{19}\).

The most important part of the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon is the Logone River and its vast floodplains in the northern part of the country. Interventions like the Maga dam caused a reduction of the water availability and prevented sediments from reaching the floodplains, leading to a decline in agricultural productivity. A breakdown of the dike in 2012 led to floods and devastation of agricultural land\(^\text{20}\).

Geographically, **Chad** has the strongest stake in the basin, since 50% of it the lake is located on its territory. The country’s capital and demographical centre is also located at ca. 120km from the lake. Political instability and crisis, however have prevented the country in really investing in the LCBC until the late 2000s (Magrin, 2014). Chad, and its current president Idriss Deby in particular is also a staunch supporter of the proposed interbasin transfer, as evidenced by his strong call at COP21 in Paris for the International Community to support the project.

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\(^\text{19}\) Cameroon for example is the only country where the first Commissioner in the LCBC, Mr. Yaouba Abdoulaye, the Vice-Minister of Economy Planning and Regional Development, has been in the position for more than ten years. In the other countries, Commissioners have been changed frequently.

\(^\text{20}\) There is a project to rehabilitate lands and the World Bank is supporting a project to rehabilitate damaged water infrastructure.
In the 1970s ambitious investments for agriculture and irrigation were made, leading in particular to the construction, by a parastatal company SODELAC, of basic infrastructures, “polders”. These, in combination with other strategies and techniques by farmers, have allowed farmers to obtain three types of crops per year. Recently, even though the country has oil revenue at its disposal, investments are limited. Ambiguities in land tenure laws are an impediment since farmers resist investments for fear of losing ownership of their land. The local economy around the lake basin has been suffering because of the destabilisation brought about by Boko Haram but also due to security responses. Curfews and the closing of borders have made trade difficult (International Crisis group, 2016a).

Traditionally viewed as a poor landlocked country in the Sahel, Chad has now also turned more and more into a regional security actor, not only in the immediate region but also further south in central Africa (International Crisis Group, 2016a). This stance was achieved by normalising relations with Sudan in 2010 and then deploying troops in operations in Mali, Central African Republic, and in the Lake Chad region against Boko Haram. Despite starting oil extraction, the economy of the country remains fragile since oil prices dropped leading to budget cuts and social discontent.

Niger only has a very minor hydrological stake in the Chad basin and is more concerned with the security cooperation in the basin as discussed below.

The Central African Republic is a particular hydropolitical case in the Lake Chad basin. Its hydrological point of gravity clearly lies to the South on the shores of the Ubangui river. It has no direct access to the Lake in the North, yet it controls the main affluent the Chari river and much of its sub-basin. CAR in fact joined the LCBC in 1994 as the interbasin transfer project was picking up momentum and holds a critical position in between basins. Instability and political crisis, however, meant that it does not play a strong, proactive role in the negotiations. Hydrological data on the Chari sub-basin in fact is an important hiatus, and the area remains severely underdeveloped.

Libya, finally, has no surface water link to the basin. The country joined the LCBC in 2008 under Muammar Gaddafi, moved by the interest to use the regional platform to voice the pan-Africanist ambitions of its leader, as well as the country’s constant search for freshwater from the South.21

3.2 Security cooperation and the fight against Boko Haram

The confluence of member state interests in security and military cooperation is very different from hydropolitical dynamics of the LCBC, and indeed relatively separate from dealings and negotiations on water cooperation and infrastructure development. As mentioned, the surge of Boko Haram-ISIL since 2009 called for a renewal of the initially Nigerian-led MNJTF, housed under the LCBC, acting as a sub-regional ‘umbrella’. Nigeria is the centre stage of the Boko Haram operations and both Nigeria and neighbouring countries tend to see the group as a Nigerian problem. Increasing cross-border operations of the group in recent years, however drew in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and compelled Nigeria to reach out in its struggle to contain the evasive enemy.

Unsurprisingly, Nigeria is the main powerhouse in the region. It has the biggest army of the region and one of the biggest in Africa.22 The Nigerian government had repeatedly managed the Boko Haram insurgency as a “Nigerian problem”. This limited cooperation with neighbouring countries and regional bodies such as LCBC. Problems such as Nigerian soldiers being disarmed by the

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21 Libya has historically been drawn to major freshwater transfer projects. It targeted the Congo basin directly in the past (see the CICOS case study in this series) and has developed a highly controversial “Great Man-Made River Project” to exploit deep underground desert aquifers.

22 Although other countries spend more on defence in terms of percentage of GDP. See: Chuter & Gaub, 2016.
Cameroonian armed forces after they crossed into the Cameroonian border while battling Boko Haram\textsuperscript{23} signalled a clear need for a more concerted regional approach (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015). President Goodluck Jonathan in 2014-2015 bilaterally allowed Chad and Niger troops to enter Nigerian territory to fight the insurgency. However, successes were not permanent, as Boko Haram could return to some areas since there was no permanent deployment of troops.

Since the inception of the MNJTF, Nigeria has either diplomatically boycotted the initiative or ensured it was in the driving seat of any military endeavour for instance by leading the MNJTF. This approach reflects Nigeria’s will to show regional military leadership rather and remain firmly in control of the security response in the area.\textsuperscript{24}

Engaging with LCBC member states was one of the first foreign policy tasks of the then newly elected President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, in order to revive the MNJTF after the fall of Baga. President Buhari convened a summit of Head of States and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in Nigeria in June 2015 where he reaffirmed Nigeria’s commitment to contribute $100m to the operationalisation of the MNJTF. The Nigerian authorities claim that this pledge has been fully redeemed.\textsuperscript{25}

The north of Cameroon is an operations area of Boko Haram. The populations share the cultural and linguistic identity with those of north-east Nigeria. Northern Cameroon has long been an area where weapons were smuggled, under the laissez-faire - or even physical absence - of the Cameroonian authorities (International Crisis Group, 2014, 2016b)\textsuperscript{26}.

Traditionally, Cameroon had been a reluctant regional ally (International Crisis Group, 2016b). In the 90s Cameroon was not part of the MNJTF due to strained relations with Nigeria over a border dispute, which although resolved in the middle of 2000s continued to undermine mutual trust (Assanvo et al., 2016). As such, in the earlier stages of the fight against Boko Haram in 2013 Cameroon did not grant Nigeria the “right of pursuit”.

Since 2013, terrorist activities of Boko Haram started targeting the Cameroonian establishment, including by kidnapping local personalities and clashing with the armed forces (International Crisis Group, 2014). This led to a change in the approach of the Cameroonian authorities, who had until then regarded the movement has a Nigerian problem and avoided direct confrontation. Since late 2013, Cameroon reinforced its troop deployment and instituted a number of controversial accompanying measures including curfews, a prohibition to wear a full-face veil, and closing the border with Nigeria\textsuperscript{27} (International Crisis Group, 2016b).

The government also increased its regional engagement, by taking part in the Paris summit in 2014 and meetings of LCBC, accepting joint action in principle. The direct attack on Cameroonian elites and the realisation that further complacency would harm its geostrategic and economic interests in the long run contributed to increased participation of Cameroon at the regional level (Assanvo et al. 2016). In 2015, Cameroon also carried out joint (bilateral) operations with Chad\textsuperscript{28} and has been...

\textsuperscript{23} Reuters, Nigeria troops cross into north Cameroon after Boko Haram attacks base, 26 August 2014.

\textsuperscript{24} http://pncp.net/news/regional-multinational-joint-task-force-combat-boko-haram.

\textsuperscript{25} During the summit, President Buhari also demanded that Nigeria retains the position of the Force Commander of the MNJTF. See: PM News, Buhari commits $100m to Lake Chad Basin fight against Boko Haram, 11 June 2015.

\textsuperscript{26} Links between groups of armed bandits and Boko Haram have been proven, and local tribal chiefs have also played an ambiguous role - some are accused of being accomplices of the jihadists.

\textsuperscript{27} http://www.camerpost.com/frontiere-cameroun-nigeria-activities-repprenent/.

\textsuperscript{28} While appreciated initially, the presence of Chadian troops has also caused contestations by the military hierarchy of Cameroon. The image of Chadian troops is also tainted by accusations of exactions against civilians in Nigeria. The Chadian army left the country in the end of 2015 (International Crisis Group, 2016b).
exchanging information and coordinating with Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2016b). According to some observers, the Cameroonian section of the MNJTF is the only MNJTF section that is (fully) operational (International Crisis Group, 2016b).

**Chad**’s interventions in the region are historically aimed at positioning the country as an ally of the West in the fight against terrorism (International Crisis Group, 2013). Relations with France\(^{29}\) and the US are particularly strong (Shepherd & Melly, 2016). At the same time, Chad has some potential to be a regional player since it benefits from relative internal stability, founded on the rule of President Déby, who has the support of the military (Shepherd & Melly, 2016).

In 2015, attacks by Boko Haram on Chadian territory increased, striking not only the lake basin but also its capital city N’Djamena. Chad is first and foremost interested in protecting its national security. For this reason, in an unilateral intervention, Chadian troops crossed the border with Nigeria in January 2015 to repel Boko Haram that was threatening trade connections of Chad with the sea ports. When the intervention was criticised internationally and attacks on Chadian territory intensified, Chad pulled back its troops and focused on its shore of Lake Chad. In 2016, Chad also deployed 2000 troops to Bosso in Niger (close to the border with Nigeria and the Lake).

Chadian troops however have been widely criticised for abusing civilian populations in Nigeria but also in the framework of the intervention in CAR (Shepherd & Melly, 2016).

In recent years, Niger was faced with a deteriorating security situation in neighbouring countries. The country has devoted, according to some sources, an increasing budget to military expenses (Berghezan, G., 2016b), and is highly dependent on development aid to fill in the gaps to keep the country running and stave off humanitarian crisis. In 2016, security threats on the territory of Niger increased, with jihadists from Mali carrying out several attacks in the central parts of the country.\(^{30}\) The Diffa region in the south east of the country, has seen many attacks from Boko Haram in 2016. Their number and deadly effects have led to doubts about the capacities of the Nigerien army and the operationalisation of the MNJTF in this sector (Assanvo et al., 2016). In the summer of 2016 violence escalated, requiring the abovementioned cross-border Chadian operation. Near the end of 2016 the immediate pressure from Boko Haram had decreased somewhat.\(^{31}\)

Niger is also a key country in the French response to terrorism in the Sahel and West Africa - and to some extent in the US security system in the region (Berghezan, 2016a). The French military presence is focused on the threat of Islamic jihadism in the northern part of the country, yet France also supported a joint Chadian and Nigerien operation against Boko Haram in February 2015.

**Benin**, finally, is not a member of the LCBC, as it has no direct connection to the basin. However, the country has participated in the LCBC’s coordinated efforts to fight Boko Haram. While the country’s border is 700km away from the area of operations of Boko Haram, there have been reports of Beninese nationals being recruited by the jihadist movement (Knoope & Chauzal, 2016). In addition, there are concerns about a more conservative turn among the Muslim populations in the north of the country.

Benin was initially expected to contribute to the MNJTF with around 800 troops but the number was lowered to 150 troops in April 2016.\(^{32}\) The main mission of Benin troops in the MNJTF seems to be ensuring the security of the MNJTF HQs and to escort humanitarian convoys and dignitaries. Benin

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\(^{29}\) Chad houses one of the largest French military bases in Africa.  
\(^{30}\) See ICG CrisisWatch.  
has a tradition of contributing to peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. As of August 2016 the country was providing more than 1000 troops mostly to MONUSCO and MINUSMA.\(^{33}\)

4. On the areas with most traction for regional cooperation

Late December 2016, the Nigerian president announced that Boko Haram has been defeated, yet experts warn that the threat is not fully removed.\(^ {34}\) In fact, it remains a major challenge that military efforts are not accompanied by the promotion of development and local governance. In a marginalised region such as the Lake Chad basin this means that the structural drivers of the cycle of violence and radicalisation remain firmly in place.\(^ {35}\) Thus far, the LCBC has played only a minimal role in the regional military response to the Boko Haram insurgency, except by hosting high-level discussions between Heads of State and Governments on the AU mandated joint operations.

The LCBC’s original mandate related to the development of the marginalised and environmentally challenged basin area. Real progress, however has not taken place, mainly due to political instability and near constant crisis, but also due to limited member state investment in the development of the region. Integrated approaches to water-based agricultural development and conservation have largely failed to materialise and member states tend to favour less structural, but politically more attractive solutions like the proposed inter-basin transfer from the Ubangui River.

Similarly, investment in oil exploration and exploitation, particularly in Chad, but also Northern Nigeria, presents direct economic opportunities for the basin countries, infrastructure works such as a refinery and an oil pipeline, managed by the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) present significant environmental risks to the already pressured eco-system of the basin. In addition, in increase in extractive rents risks further diminishing member state interests in structural approaches to developing the basin, and regional cooperation.

Recently, the LCBC has been at the centre of attention of the international community, and its development into a high-level platform for facilitating military cooperation and exchange has required member states to maintain the institution. Linked to this, donor support for the LCBC and its core mandate of integrated transboundary basin management remains present yet is uncertain in the long run. There may be future opportunities for LCBC as a peace related coordination platform as well as a Basin organisation, however this depends on the political interest of its member states to position it as such. The AfDB, AfD and EU have all initiated major regional initiatives around the lake in recent years, in line with the LCBC’s planning documents. Many of these major programme, however are made up by various national components. The coordinating and/or leadership role of the LCBC therefore remains to be further detailed and developed.

The fight against Boko Haram strengthened political and military cooperation between Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, with the prospect that this will be maintained and even further enhanced. The difficulties for concerted regional action through the MNJTF are significant. The LCBC summit level filled in a critical gap as an existing platform and legal framework for cooperation between the most affected countries outside the APSA building blocks of the RECs. The LCBC as an institution, however, played only a minor supportive role in coordinating joint operations. On a bilateral level,


\(^{35}\) Similarly, security sector reform and an intelligent reintegration of former fighters are urgent issues that are not being addressed sufficiently.
military cooperation has broken down walls between member states and led to a situation where countries can relatively quickly deploy troop movements in neighbouring states within a range of 50km. Whether this can be institutionalised using the LCBC framework remains to be seen, however.
Bibliography


**Annexes**

**Table 1:** Evolution of the total recommended number of staff for the MNJTF. Source: Assanvo 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff (military, police, civilian)</th>
<th>Proposed by</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7500</td>
<td>Recommendation by the AU PSC in January 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8700</td>
<td>Recommendation by meeting of experts in February 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000</td>
<td>Recommendation by the AU PSC in March 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11150</td>
<td>Announcement by LCBC countries and Benin in August 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>8500</td>
<td>Announcement by Nigeria president Buhari in May 2016</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Announced / Recommended</th>
<th>Deployed / Committed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>750-800</td>
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**Table 2:** Financial contributions to the MNJTF. Various sources

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<th>Financial contributor to MNJTF</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<td>Nigeria (to the MNJTF HQs)</td>
<td>USD 30 million</td>
<td>Disbursed (to be confirmed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU (via the AU)</td>
<td>EUR 50 million</td>
<td>Agreement signed in 2016 unblocked the aid</td>
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<td>UK (via the AU)</td>
<td>USD 3.5 million</td>
<td>Disbursed (to be confirmed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD (to Chad, Niger, Benin)</td>
<td>USD 1.5 million</td>
<td>Announced in 2015</td>
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