SCOPING REPORT

“Improving the perspective for regional trade and investment in West Africa: the key to food security, economic development and stability in the region”

A COLLABORATION OF

African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL)

Agro-Economic Research Institute – Wageningen University and Research (LEI-WUR)

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

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"Despite persistent barriers, intra-regional trade flows have increased. Long-distance trade flows, e.g. between Sahelian and coastal countries, have a long tradition and are often engrained in social and ethnic networks. Livestock, cereals and cowpeas are exported from the Sahel to the coast; some cereals also flow from coastal states northward; and tubers, fruits and vegetables of the Guinea savannah zone are brought into the cities in coastal areas and Sahelian countries. These trade flows have increased substantially over the last decades, driven by urbanization and migration. The real size of this trade is unknown, however, since official trade data only capture part of the actual trade flows. Major constraints to further expansion include poor road infrastructure, rules that restrict competition in the trucking industry, administrative barriers, difficulties and risks of transferring funds across countries with different monetary systems, growing insecurity and rent-seeking by police and border officials"

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INTRODUCTION

Increasing concern about instability, population pressure, migration and chronic food insecurity in West Africa and growing awareness of the potential of enhanced intraregional trade and investment to contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic development, has prompted a number of donors including The Netherlands to increase their efforts to support West African integration and cooperation.

Notwithstanding the persisted challenges to regionalism in West Africa, the momentum for support seems to have been strengthened in recent years driven by key initiatives such as the African Union Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihood and the Abuja Process, building on increasing political commitment within the region, which was followed by increased commitments through UEMOA and ECOWAS frameworks and in particular the recent conclusion of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET).

Support for regional integration and cooperation in West Africa by The Netherlands fits well within its policy framework for Aid, Trade and Investment and aligns with key Dutch policy objectives to promote sustainable and inclusive economic development and to enhance food security. Furthermore, there is increased interest of Dutch businesses to invest in and trade with West Africa and growing recognition of the opportunities for Dutch businesses, knowledge institutes and civil society to contribute to sustainable development in West Africa.

Scoping study

In order for support to regional integration and cooperation in West Africa to be effective and calibrated to the specific needs of the region, there is a need to build a more comprehensive understanding of the diverse and complex regional dynamics and to gain insight into the opportunities and challenges to regional integration in West Africa.

Commissioned by the Food & Business Knowledge Platform, the overall objective of the study underlying this scoping report was to contribute a more contextualized comprehensive picture of The Netherlands’ government ongoing cooperation with West Africa and the perspective in terms of policy options for strengthening its effectiveness and coherence by giving more emphasis to the promotion of intraregional trade and investment.

The study has been carried out by a consortium of knowledge institutes comprised of the African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL), the Agro-Economic Research Institute of the Wageningen University and Research (LEI-WUR) and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).

Apart from this report, the scoping study has so far resulted in three additional outputs: 1) Discussion Paper on trade and barriers to trade in West Africa, ‘Overview of trade and barriers to trade in West Africa. Insights into political economy dynamics, with particular focus on agricultural and food trade’ drawn up by ECDPM; 2) Annotated Bibliography based on an inventory of literature on regional integration in West Africa prepared by the ASCL;

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and 3) Scoping Conference Report, produced by the ASCL in cooperation with the other consortium members.²

This scoping report primarily builds on the following inventories:

1. Inventory of regional knowledge institutes on which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can rely on for high quality input and at the same time qualify for institutional and other support, aimed at sustaining their potential for high level research and policy support in the future.

2. Inventory of literature about trade relations (illegal and legal, agricultural and wider) useful for strengthening the knowledge base underpinning the regional policy with regard to West Africa, making use of library-, internet- and human resources.

3. Inventory of statistics about trade relations (illegal and legal, agricultural and wider) useful for strengthening the knowledge base underpinning the regional policy with regard to West Africa, making use of library-, internet- and human resources.


5. Inventory of (policy) initiatives by regional institutions in West Africa, (policy) initiatives by other development partners and donor coordination efforts in the period 2010-2015.

6. Inventory of policy options and an assessment of their possible effects, building on existing work streams and the new policy for aid, trade and entrepreneurship for development.

The structure of the scoping report logically follows these deliverables. This is complemented with a set of conclusions and (policy) recommendations, drawn from the findings of the broader scoping exercise including the discussion paper drafted by ECDPM.

Methodology

This scoping report has largely drawn on an extensive review of existing literature and statistics. It further builds on consultations with The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the network of Dutch Embassies in West Africa, the Netherlands-African Business Council (NABC) and other key organizations and experts. Furthermore, the scoping report has generously benefitted from the findings of the other outputs of the scoping study, as referred to above.

SECTION 1: INVENTORY OF REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTES

Paul Lange

Section conclusions:
- Far from being exhaustive, this inventory of regional organizations already shows that there are several that are well recognized within the region and have a proven track record as knowledge institute, through a number of knowledge generation and dissemination activities and across a wide range of thematic areas, including agriculture & food security.
- Furthermore, it also points at the possibility of considering collaboration with organizations that are traditionally not regarded as knowledge institutes, such as financial institutions like (development) banks.
- The inventory further demonstrates that there is considerable potential added value of working with regional knowledge institutes, for example in terms of their expertise, networks and linkages to policy-processes.
- It also indicates that there are a number of significant differences in comparative strengths between these institutes that need to take into consideration when assessing the potential for collaboration and identifying best placed partners, such as main geographical focus (regional versus more country/ continental-based focus), core thematic foci and primary knowledge activities. Additional parameters could help to further determine their potential and suitability for collaboration.
- The mapping however also reveals that desk research as method for assessing the potential for collaboration has limitations in terms of exposing the particular strengths and weaknesses of these knowledge institutes.

This section focuses on the pool of West African (‘regional’) institutes that could have a role as knowledge partner of The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Notwithstanding the lack of transparency and visibility that many of these institutes suffer from, it aims to discuss a selection of regional institutes in view of their role as knowledge institute. This selection is based on the author’s assessment of three main criteria: 1) geographical scope: multi-country focus on West Africa; 2) thematic focus: regional integration/ cross-border challenges (with a particular emphasis on agriculture & food security); and 3) knowledge generation and dissemination activities: policy-relevant research. The matrix presented below attempts to capture these knowledge institutes’ main features according to a number of parameters that could further help to determine their potential for collaboration (See Table 1.1).

This selection follows from a more broad-based institutional mapping of leading knowledge institutes in the West African region (See Appendix 1A for the list of the other regional knowledge institutes that came out of this mapping).³

³ In order to guide the identification process given the large pool of knowledge institutes in West Africa and the limited time available for this mapping, the selection method applied for this institutional mapping builds on three starting points: 1) the West African knowledge institutes identified in the inventory of literature that was prepared by the ASCL within the framework of this scoping study (see section 2 of this scoping report); 2) the West African participants in the Think Tank Initiative (TTI); and 3) the West African partners that have been selected as part of the Leiden African Studies Assembly (Leiden ASA), a recent initiative by the African Studies Centre Leiden in
Although the African Development Bank (AfDB) is intrinsically a financial institution, it has placed knowledge generation and sharing at the heart of the Bank’s core activities in its mission to reduce poverty and foster development on the African continent. In 2015, the AfDB launched its Knowledge Management Strategy with the aim to become the premier knowledge institution in support of its mandate. As laid down in this strategy document, it increasingly seeks to complement its role as financier with the provision of knowledge products and services and therefore considers itself uniquely placed to “lead the development of innovative solutions for the complex challenges facing Africa”. The strategic objective is to enhance its development effectiveness through providing and disseminating innovative knowledge solutions for the priority areas as defined in the Bank’s Ten Year Strategy (2013-2022): infrastructure development, private sector development, regional economic integration, skills and technology, governance and accountability, with special attention for gender, fragile states, and agriculture and food security.

In order to institutionalize the role of knowledge throughout its operations, the Bank established in 2007 the Development Research Department (EDRE). The Department’s principal activities are to design and conduct research and analysis on priority social and economic development issues, with a particular emphasis on growth, poverty reduction and accelerating the process of regional integration. In this way the EDRE support the Bank’s policy and operations agenda and helps to further build the knowledge base of its regional member countries.

More specifically, the Department’s mandate includes the following activities:

- Managing the preparation of the Bank’s flagship publications (e.g. African Economic Outlook, African Development Report, Africa Competitiveness Report) and disseminate their findings to its regional member countries, development partners, universities and research bodies, and the media;

- Identifying strategic priorities for Bank-led research on African economic and social development and regional integration issues; undertaking a selected programme of individual and collaborative research related to these strategic priorities, in close cooperation with international and regional research institutions and other stakeholders;

- Developing technical and financial cooperation arrangements with other agencies and institutions carrying out activities related to the Bank’s research and operations priorities;

- Disseminating development research findings internally and externally through the Department’s website, a wide variety of publications and economic research papers, and in collaboration with the African Development Institute, through regional and international seminars and workshops, as well as through the annual African Economic Conference;

Collaboration with Leiden University that aims to strengthen collaboration with key knowledge institutes in Africa. The author acknowledges that as a result this selection inevitably excludes a number of regional knowledge institutes that are worth considering for collaboration.

4 The African Development Bank is discussed for its role as donor in section 5 of this report.

5 The overall objective of the Bank is to promote sustainable economic development and social progress, and contribute to poverty reduction in its regional member countries, by mobilizing and allocating resources for investment and by providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

- Assisting country and sector economists throughout the Bank in developing and employing standardized economic methodologies, utilizing appropriate economic indicators in their operational work, and accessing the results of relevant economic research undertaken within and outside the Bank; and

- Undertaking economic intelligence, analysis and studies as requested by Senior Management, and preparing related papers, briefs, and statements.

In addition to its Research Department, an important pillar of the Bank’s quest for putting knowledge at the center of its operations is its Statistics Department (ESTA). This department contributes to the availability of reliable data by being involved in the production and collection of statistical data itself. The Bank’s Data Portal provides data on socio-economic indicators throughout time and across the continent and allows for comprehensive cross-country/regional analysis. The department is also engaged in the development of the statistical capacity and systems of its regional member countries.

The Bank’s West Africa Regional Department (ORWA) covers the fifteen ECOWAS countries. Its mission is to represent the Bank towards these countries, the regional economic communities, donors and others, to lead the Bank’s programming in these countries and to allocate the country resources among sector activities, country and regional lending and work programmes. It also plays a key role in terms of conducting the Bank’s Knowledge Management Strategy for West Africa and is responsible for a wide range of (knowledge) deliverables in relation to West Africa including the region’s country strategy papers, the Bank’s Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa, (the regional edition of) the African Economic Outlook, West Africa Policy Notes and the West African Monitor Quarterly.

Furthermore, as emphasized in the latest Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa the African Development Bank believes it has a particular role to play in terms of providing support to regional knowledge institutes, as part of its efforts to strengthen the knowledge base on regional integration in West Africa in areas that are relevant for its operations and policy agenda. Although not further specified, the West Africa Regional Department has most likely a strategic position in this mission.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institute</th>
<th>Knowledge activities</th>
<th>Thematic focus areas</th>
<th>Geographical focus</th>
<th>Network/partners</th>
<th>Comparative strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| AfDB      | Policy-relevant research  
Knowledge sharing & dissemination  
(statistical) data collection & production  
policy dialogue & advocacy  
capacity building & training | 1. infrastructure development  
2. private sector development  
3. regional economic integration  
4. skills and technology  
5. governance and accountability | Across the African continent, including a specific regional focus on West Africa through a dedicated department | extensive partnership portfolio: wide range of organizations and institutions including bilateral/multilateral donors, international organizations, regional bodies and others | • (co-)responsible for a number of key publications on (West) Africa (e.g. African Economic Outlook, Africa Competitiveness Report)  
• Lead financier of regional integration in Africa for a number of years  
• Well positioned to strengthen the broad knowledge base on regional (economic) integration |
| AfriHeritage | policy-relevant research  
Knowledge sharing & dissemination  
(statistical) data collection & production  
policy dialogue & advocacy  
capacity building & training | 1. trade, regional integration and competitiveness  
2. poverty, income distribution and the labour market  
3. public sector economics and management  
4. macro-economic analysis, modeling and forecasting  
5. agricultural and rural development | Particular focus on Nigeria but linked with a research emphasis on regional integration; seeks to realize its vision of greater pan-African research and policy influence | Extensive network in Nigeria, linked to a broad range of organizations and stakeholders | • Part of Think Tank Initiative  
• Well connected in Nigeria, as economic powerhouse of the region |
| UNECA     | policy-relevant research  
knowledge sharing & dissemination | 1. macro-economic policy  
2. regional integration & trade  
3. social development  
4. natural resources | Across the African continent, including a specific regional focus on West | Part of UN system  
Key component of African institutional | • (co-)responsible for a number of key publications on (West) Africa  
• Well-placed in both the international development |
| CODESRIA | (policy-relevant) research  
knowledge sharing & dissemination  
(research) capacity building & training | 1. higher education, ICT & internationalization  
2. climate change, resources & development  
3. politics & governance;  
4. gender, youth, culture and transformative social policy  
5. regional and continental integration, mobility & the African diaspora  
6. contemporary forms of African engagements with the rest of the world  
7. thinking about the future | Across the African continent | Large network of (African) knowledge institutes  
Well-connected to international development community  
Well-established linkages with ECOWAS | • leading African knowledge institute  
• continental hub for the African research community  
• widely recognized and supported within the international development community  
• eager to raise its profile among policy communities |
| CRES | policy-relevant research  
knowledge sharing & dissemination  
policy dialogue & advocacy  
capacity building & training | 1. growth, inequality & poverty  
2. information & innovation  
3. globalization, regional integration & local development  
4. human resources  
5. rural development  
6. law | Strong emphasis on Senegal, combined with specific regional focus on West Africa | Extensive and diversified network of partners  
Strongly developed linkages with both ECOWAS and UEMOA | • Part of Think Tank Initiative  
• Well-connected at the regional level (ECOWAS, UEMOA)  
• (research) track record in trade liberalization, regional integration and rural development |

- (statistical) data collection & production  
- policy dialogue & advocacy  
- capacity building & training  
- 5. innovation & technology  
- 6. gender  
- 7. governance  

Well-connected at the regional level through its regional office.  
Well-positioned to strengthen the knowledge base on regional integration  
Part of Think Tank Initiative  
Well-connected at the regional level (ECOWAS, UEMOA)  
(research) track record in trade liberalization, regional integration and rural development  
Leading African knowledge institute  
Continental hub for the African research community  
Widely recognized and supported within the international development community  
Eager to raise its profile among policy communities
| **LEHUB RURAL** | • Technical assistance  
• Knowledge sharing & dissemination  
• Policy dialogue & advocacy  
• Capacity building & training | 1. Agricultural policies  
2. Land policies  
3. Climate change  
4. Bioenergy  
5. Rural development funding | Focus on Central and West Africa, both at country and regional level  
Extensive and broad network of partners in the area of agriculture & food security | • Key and broad geographical focus on West Africa, both at country and regional level  
• Well-established linkages with both ECOWAS and UEMOA  
• Close involvement in regional integration processes in the area of agriculture & food security |}

| **IPAR** | • Policy-relevant research  
• Knowledge sharing & dissemination  
• Policy dialogue & advocacy  
• Capacity building & training | 1. Agriculture, regional integration & globalization  
2. Demography, employment & migration  
3. Education & training  
4. Food policies  
5. Fishery & aquaculture resources  
6. Land security & development  
7. Natural resources, energy & climate change  
8. Decentralization, governance and local development | Strong emphasis on Senegal, combined with a specific regional focus on West Africa  
Well-established and broad-based network in Senegal | • Part of Think Tank Initiative  
• Recognized knowledge leadership in agriculture and rural development issues  
• Strong commitment to policy dialogue and advocacy  
• Committed to exploit the potential of regionalism in West Africa for agriculture and rural development  
• High degree of strategic thinking on major challenges (e.g. migration, demography, climate change) for the region |}

| **ENDA/CACID** | • Policy-relevant research  
• Knowledge sharing & dissemination  
• Policy dialogue & advocacy  
• Capacity building & training | 1. (Bilateral/multilateral) trade negotiations  
2. Intraregional trade and integration in Africa  
3. Globalization, emerging markets and South-South trade  
4. Natural resource management in West Africa | Across the African continent, with a particular focus on West Africa  
Extensive network of a wide range of partners, particularly in the West African region; well-integrated in the African institutional landscape | • Strong institutional foothold in West Africa  
• Well-established linkages with relevant (West) African institutional in the area of (regional) integration & trade  
• Recognized knowledge leader in the area of (regional) integration & trade |}
Box 1.2: African Heritage Institution (Enugu, Nigeria)

The African Heritage Institution (AfriHeritage) is a non-profit organization devoted to (applied) economic research, modelling & analysis and data production & management. It is also involved in training & capacity building, facilitation of (evidence-based) policy and stakeholder dialogue and in knowledge dissemination and communication.

AfriHeritage produces a wide range of knowledge products including research papers, working papers, policy briefs and policy papers. Its working paper series, known as the Business Environment and Competitiveness Across Nigerian States (BECANS), is the institution’s flagship initiative. The objective of these publications is to promote evidence-based reforms of the business environment in Nigeria.

Its principal areas of research include trade, regional integration, macroeconomic analysis and forecasting, public sector economics and management, poverty analysis, income distribution, the labour market, agriculture, and rural development.

Although AfriHeritage particularly focuses on Nigeria, it aims to become a leading think tank involved in pan-African research and policy influence. It has been selected to benefit from the support provided through the Think Tank Initiative (TTI). TTI is a multi-donor programme dedicated to strengthening independent policy research institutions through enabling the institutions to attract, retain and build local talent, develop an independent research program, and invest in public outreach to ensure that research results inform and influence national and regional policy debates.

AfriHeritage particularly emphasizes the use of research for policy impact. It has for example contributed to the development of Nigeria’s National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy. In order to further enhance its impact on the national policy agenda, the institution established in 2010 the Policy Think Group. This serves as a vehicle to articulate and translate research outputs for broader use by a wide range of stakeholders, including policymakers, NGOs, the media and the private sector.

The Institution is affiliated to several international (policy) research institutions and networks, such as the African Economics Research Consortium (AERC, Kenya), Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD, US) Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE, UK). Its network lies particularly in Nigeria, where it is connected to a wide variety of partners, including Nigeria’s National Planning Commission, the Central Bank and the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency.

Box 1.3: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia/Niamey, Niger)

Established by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) is one of the five UN’s regional commissions. Its mandate is to promote the economic and social development of its 54 member states, foster intra-regional integration and enhance international cooperation for Africa’s development.

As part of a strategic refocusing process initiated in recent years, UNECA has set itself to become a premier think tank on issues that are key to Africa’s development. UNECA issued therefore in 2014 its Knowledge Management Strategy to guide this process.9

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UNECA takes a number of roles to further give content to this ambition. It seeks to strengthen the evidence base of its policy research and advocacy, promotes policy dialogue and consensus, and to provide capacity development support and advisory services. Furthermore, through its Africa Centre for Statistics UNECA seeks to be the leading source on the continent for the production and analysis of original data to inform policy decisions. It is also involved in a large number of key publications on Africa, including from a regional integration perspective, such as the Assessing Regional integration in Africa editions. The Assessing Regional integration in Africa focuses on the following key thematic areas: macro-economic policy, regional integration & trade, social development, natural resources, innovation & technology, gender and governance. Within the area of regional integration & trade, through its Regional Integration & Trade Division (RITD) UNECA undertakes policy research on the interaction between different dimensions of economic transformation – industrialization, food security, agriculture, land, investment and trade – and the broader regional integration process. The RITD, through the Division’ African Trade Policy Centre is also (co-)responsible for drawing up the Africa Regional Integration Index. In addition to its headquarters located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, UNECA has five (sub-) regional offices, including one in Niamey, Niger for the West African region (ECA/SRO-WA) covering the fifteen ECOWAS members. ECA/SRO-WA provides policy advisory services to the UNECA member states, regional economic communities and other actors in support of regional integration initiatives, serves as a facilitator of integration activities initiated by the UN system and takes part in the production of a wide range of publications on (regional integration in) West Africa.

Being part of the UN system, UNECA is well placed within the international development community and linked to a wide range of bilateral/ development donors and other development partners. Furthermore, in strong collaboration with the African Union and the African Development Bank through their Joint Secretariat Support Office, it is firmly settled in the African institutional landscape. At the regional level, its office in West Africa works in close collaboration with the regional economic communities ECOWAS and UEMOA and with a wide range of relevant actors and stakeholders including from the private sector, civil society and knowledge institutions.

Box 1.4: Consortium pour la Recherche Économique et Sociale (CRES) (Dakar, Senegal)

The Consortium pour la Recherche Économique et Sociale (CRES) is a research center linked to the Université Cheikh Anta Diop that aims to conduct and promote research.
that helps policy makers, civil society and other actors in the formulation and implementation of policies for socio-economic development in the West African region. It is also involved in capacity building, including for public institutions both at the national level and regional level, such as UEMOA and ECOWAS. CRES conducts research in the following thematic areas: growth, inequality & poverty; information & innovation; globalization, regional integration & local development; human resources; rural development; and law. Amongst others topics, it is said to have a particular track record in the conduct of research on trade liberalization, regional integration and rural development. For example, in 2014 it has been notably engaged in research for policy change and advocacy at the regional level in the tobacco sector, in collaboration with ECOWAS and UEMOA. In addition, since a number of years CRES has been strongly involved in the operationalization and implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme (PAPED) for Senegal. Its (policy) research outputs include peer-reviewed publications, policy notes, working paper series and the CRES Information Bulletin.

It has been selected to benefit from the support provided through the Think Tank Initiative (TTI). TTI is a multi-donor programme dedicated to strengthening independent policy research institutions through enabling the institutions to attract, retain and build local talent, develop an independent research program, and invest in public outreach to ensure that research results inform and influence national and regional policy debates.

CRES has an extensive and highly diversified network of (inter-)national partners. It is well-positioned within Senegal, with extensive ties with public institutions – including several ministries – and civil society. For example, it has been particularly engaged in (updating) the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategies Framework. In addition, it is linked to a number of development partners (e.g. World Bank, UN Agencies, WTO, EU) and other knowledge institutes in (West) Africa (e.g. ENDA, IPAR) and beyond (e.g. IFPRI). At the regional level, both UEMOA and ECOWAS are among its partners, with collaboration though different kinds of activities, including knowledge support, capacity building.

Box 1.5: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)(Dakar, Senegal)

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is a pan-African research organization with the aim to promote, facilitate and disseminate research within the social sciences throughout Africa and create platforms geared towards the exchange of views and information among African researchers. It seeks to be a leading knowledge producer and think tank of Africa, on African and global issues. It is the editor of a number of leading African journals (e.g. Africa Development, African Journal of International Affairs; African Sociological Review) and a major producer of a wide range of research outputs, including peer-reviewed publications, books, monographs, working and occasional papers and policy papers. It is further involved in research capacity building and training.

Although CODESRIA has its roots in the conduct of basic research, policy-relevant research has become more and more important in its programming and increasingly seeks to engage with policy communities and civil society. Furthermore, it aims to ensure that its research outputs are widely distributed and find their way to decision makers in

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government, civil society and international organizations, amongst others, through translating its outcomes in policy recommendations.

CODESRIA has the following research programmes in place: 1) Gender Research Programme; 2) Child and Youth Studies Programme; 3) Economic Research Programme; 4) Academic Freedom Programme; and 5) African Humanities Programme. As indicated in its Strategic Plan 2012-2016, in order to link up with trends and changes in knowledge needs among African policy communities, CODESRIA identified the following research themes and issues for the upcoming period: higher education, ICT & internationalization; climate change, resources & development; politics & governance; gender, youth, culture and transformative social policy; regional and continental integration, mobility & the African diaspora; contemporary forms of African engagements with the rest of the world; and thinking about the future.

CODESRIA has a wide network of partners, particularly to be found among other knowledge institutes across the African continent and beyond. In addition, it is linked to a broad range of multilateral and bilateral development partners that (financially) support its operations. As indicated in its Strategic Plan, it seeks to strengthen its relations with the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and individual African governments through launching strategic partnerships. Linkages with the African Union and ECOWAS were already well established.

Box 1.6: ENDA/ Centre Africaine pour le Commerce l’Intégration et le Développement (CACID) (Dakar, Senegal)

Part of the ENDA Third World network, the Centre Africaine pour le Commerce l’Intégration et le Développement (CACID) is a research and resource center that aims to support African governments and regional institutions to promote trade and (regional) integration, with a particular regional focus on West Africa. It provides assistance through a wide range of activities targeted at a wide range of stakeholders at the regional and international level including facilitating policy dialogue & advocacy, building strategic alliances, supporting capacity building, conducting and promoting policy-relevant research, enhancing access to information and promoting stakeholder participation.

ENDA/ CACID’s activities are structured around four programmes: 1) (bilateral/multilateral) trade negotiations; 2) intraregional trade and integration in Africa; 3) globalization, emerging markets and South-South trade; and 4) natural resource management in West Africa. In the area of research, it focuses on issues related to trade and integration. It is particular in the two first areas that ENDA/CADID has built its reputation as recognized knowledge leader, by playing a key role in knowledge generation and dissemination activities and delivering and collecting a broad range of knowledge products.

Building on a strong institutional base within the ENDA Third World network, it has come to be seen as a recognized leader of West African civil society. For example, it holds the secretariat of the West African civil society Platform on the Cotonou Agreement (‘La Plateforme des Organisations de la Société Civile de l’Afrique de l’Ouest sur l’Accord de Cotonou’, POSCAO) and the Observatory on Regional Policy Coherence and Effectiveness and the Free Movement of Goods and People in the ECOWAS member states.

35 CODESRIA (2012), CODESRIA Strategic Plan 2012-2016. Extending the frontiers of social research and bringing social research to public issues: http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/codesria_strategic-plan_2012-2016.pdf?3469/467be9a2d4cf9673045a8f0656b0e0b9fff79670
(Observatoire Regional de la Coherence des Politiques et de l’Effectivite de la Libre Circulation des Marchandises et des Personnes dans les Etats Membres de la CEDEAO’, OCPAL).

In addition, ENDA/ CACID has an extensive network of a wide range of other partners, including knowledge institutes and development partners in (West) Africa and beyond. For example, through its Embassy in Dakar (Senegal) The Netherlands already collaborates with ENDA/ CACID and is also one of the funders of the organization. Furthermore, ENDA/ CACID is well-integrated within the African institutional landscape, with linkages to the African governments, African Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and a number of regional economic communities including ECOWAS and UEMOA.

Box 1.7: Le Hub Rural (Dakar, Senegal)

Le Hub Rural is a support platform for rural development and food security focusing on West and Central Africa, both at the country and the regional level. Its aim is to assist a broad range of stakeholders (public institutions, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, development partners etc.) to promote harmonization of rural development programmes through advisory support, facilitation in (policy) dialogue, capacity building & training and by serving as an information hub for rural development and food security, amongst other activities. Please note that most of its own publications are made possible by relying on external capacity.

Its activities are centered around five thematic areas: 1) agricultural policies; 2) land policies; 3) climate change; 4) bioenergy; 5) rural development funding. More in particular, Le Hub Rural is very much engaged in the formulation and implementation of national and regional policies in West (and Central) Africa. In collaboration with ECOWAS, it plays for example a key role in facilitating the implementation of ECOWAP/ CAADP through fulfilling a wide range of roles including methodological assistance, support to stakeholder participation preparation for the implementation process, dissemination of good practices. It also very much involved in promoting regional cooperation and integration in the area of agricultural development and food security, also with regard to facilitating (policy) dialogue and coordination with external actors including development partners.

Le Hub Rural maintains an extensive and broad network of partners in the area of agriculture and food security. It is financed by a number of donors, including the European Union, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and linked to many other development partners. It has well-established linkages with organizations working at the regional level in West Africa, including civil society organizations (e.g. West African Network of Chambers of Agriculture, RECAO) and with both ECOWAS and UEMOA. It has partnership agreements in place with a number of other knowledge institutes, both in the region (e.g. West and Central African Council for Agriculture Research and Development, WECARD) as well as beyond (e.g. International Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI).
Box 1.8: Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR) (Dakar, Senegal)

The Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR) is an independent research organization with the main objective to inform and influence policymaking in Senegal and the broader West African region, particularly in the area of agriculture and rural development. Being a relatively young organization (2004), it seeks to further expand this role and aims to become a major actor in informing and shaping the debate on policymaking in agriculture and rural development in West Africa.

In addition to its role as input provider, IPAR further aims to bring together stakeholders to take part in the design, implementation and evaluation of policies and to create an enabling environment for dialogue between policymakers and researchers. It is also involved in capacity building and training, focusing on economic actors in the rural and agricultural sector and policymakers to enable them to take part in analysis and strategic thinking. It is involved in a number of research outputs, including peer-reviewed publications, policy briefs and serves as hub for information on agriculture and rural development.

IPAR’s research agenda builds on a strong strategic thinking on the challenges ahead for agriculture and rural development in Senegal and the broader region (e.g. migration, demography, climate change). It is centered around the following key areas: agriculture, regional integration & globalization; demography, employment & migration; education & training; food policies; land security & development; fishery; natural resources, energy and climate change; and decentralization, governance and local development. Regionalism is considered as to hold large potential to provide an answer to some of these challenges.

It has been selected to benefit from the support provided through the Think Tank Initiative (TTI). TTI is a multi-donor programme dedicated to strengthening independent policy research institutions through enabling the institutions to attract, retain and build local talent, develop an independent research program, and invest in public outreach to ensure that research results inform and influence national and regional policy debates.

IPAR has a well-established and broad-based network in Senegal, with linkages to public institutions, private sector organizations and other knowledge institutes. Amongst some other sources, IPAD receives funding from the EU.

REFERENCES

CODESRIA (2012), CODESRIA Strategic Plan 2012-2016. Extending the frontiers of social research and bringing social research to public issues: http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/codesria_strategic-plan_2012-2016.pdf?3469/467be9a2d4c9f673045a8f0656b0e0b9ff79670


APPENDIX 1-A: LIST OF REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTES

- African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) (Dakar, Senegal): http://www.crat-arct.org/en
- Centre d’Etudes, de Documentation, de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (CEDRES) (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso): http://www.cedres.bf/
- Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (CIRIES) (Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire): http://www.cires-ci.org/
- Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED) (Benin City, Nigeria): http://www.cpedng.org/index.php
- Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (GCDD) (Accra, Ghana): http://www.cddgh.org/
- Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) (Accra, Ghana): http://ieagh.org/
- Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA) (Dakar, Senegal): http://www.isra.sn/
- Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) (Lagos, Nigeria): http://nianet.org/
This section presents observations and conclusions following from an inventory of literature on regional trade and investment relations (published between 2000-2016), conducted by the ASCL Library with support of the network of Dutch embassies in West Africa, and with input from LEI-WUR, ECDPM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and participants at the Scoping Conference that took place in Leiden on 27 January 2016.

The inventory was mainly based on a selection from the catalogue of the ASCL library and of the University library of Leiden University, of illisAfrica, RePEc, Connecting Africa and Google Scholar. The sources can be found in the Bibliography itself. Relevant keywords were selected from the African Studies Thesaurus. When conducting an inventory of literature on trade and investment in a particular region one should look beyond the obvious keywords to identify key publications that would otherwise (easily) be overlooked. As was remarked during the scoping conference, if one realizes that trade is a spatial and social activity, with goods produced somewhere and by someone, transported...
by someone and to markets where they are sold by someone and bought by someone, this will raise more interesting issues than an abstract approach.

The literature search resulted in 354 relevant titles published between 2000 and 2016. The allocation over the years demonstrates a major increase in interest for the topic, with 70% of the titles published in the period between 2010 - 2016.

Almost half of the literature addresses West Africa as a whole, or provides evidence from various countries in the same publication. The country-specific literature shows a significant geographical/ country bias. Literature on Ghana (24% of the country-specific titles) and Nigeria (22%) account for a considerable share of the publications. Other countries for which there is some interest are Benin, Senegal (each 8%), Burkina Faso, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire (each 6%). In the country-specific studies there is more attention for the five English-speaking countries (52%), than for the eight French-speaking and for the two Portuguese speaking countries (41% resp. 7%).

The overview of the relevant literature further shows that a large majority of the titles has been published in the English language (78%) followed at great distance by the French language (20%), with a few additional publications in Portuguese and German. Even the literature on French-speaking countries in the inventory is predominantly published in English. It is interesting to note that the English dominance increased between the 2000-2009 period and the 2010-2016 period: from 65% to 84% of all titles.

Other noteworthy literature observations include the few commercial book publishers compared to the number of publications by universities, the relatively large number of publications in journals with great thematic variety, the large share of authors with African-sounding names (but mostly published outside Africa), and the limited Dutch involvement.

Based on the literature search, five major ‘domains’ can be seen, which we can further subdivide in thirteen ‘pockets of content’. Table 2.1 gives an overview, also showing the languages used in the publications.

Table 2.1: Overview of topics in the recent literature about regional integration in West Africa, and the languages used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>General</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIA</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIB</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIIA</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB</td>
<td>Monetary</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVB</td>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVC</td>
<td>Borders</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVD</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Food trade</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Specific Food Products</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>276</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. GENERAL

Here we present the country chapters of the most recent Africa Yearbook (published in Leiden) and of the Economist Intelligence Unit (published in London). These also contain useful information about regional policies and cross-border developments. The Africa Yearbook started in 2003, and each country chapter (as well as the chapter for West Africa as a whole) has a section about ‘foreign affairs’, and ‘socio-economic developments’, covering regional and cross-border issues as well. Together these are thirty titles, all in English. We also present some useful web resources.

II. HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY OPTIONS

IIA. STUDIES ABOUT THE HISTORY OF WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION

Publications focus on the historical process of the start (in 1976) and evolvement of ECOWAS, and about the development of ideas about West African regional integration as a tool for economic and regional development. It looks at the dynamics of trade liberalization, and about the differences between the UEMOA block and the larger region, bridging the French/English/Portuguese divide. It puts the trade and investment agenda in a larger framework of external relations in general, and discusses the levels of integration: West Africa, Africa and global. It does so acknowledging the dominant position of Nigeria, but also the influence of South Africa. And some publications look at the global shifts, with Africa partly looking East. There is a series of publications (produced by the French publishing company Karthala, following an initiative by UNESCO in Paris) about the nation states and the challenges of regional integration, with fifteen country cases. And some publications deal with the crisis of the state and regionalism, and with issues like identity, citizenship and conflict.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


The agencies behind these 37 publications are diverse:

- **Global agencies**: UNESCO in Paris, OECD in Paris, the UNU Institute on Comparartive Regional Integration Studies, based in Bruges, Belgium,
- **Agencies in Africa**: UNECA in Addis Ababa, CODESRIA in Dakar, the UEMOA Commission, based in Ouagadougou, ENDA in Dakar, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Monrovia, two think tanks based in Praia, Cape Verde (ISCJS and FAC), and the Development Policy Management Forum in Nairobi.
IIB STUDIES ABOUT LEGAL AND GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION

There are conceptual studies on types of ‘regionalisms’ and on the level of progress made in terms of the stages of integration, that compare legal/ institutional arrangements with actual practices indicating a significant implementation gap. There are other governance studies that address the widening integration agenda since 1993, with the addition of good governance, rule of law, food security, peace, stability, and security, migration, and criminality. It is clear that the recent attention for the 3D agenda also results in a combination of Development, Diplomacy and Defense in West Africa. Particularly the publications with specific attention for the Mano River Union show a recent emphasis on peace enforcement along borders and the impact on cross-border trade. Some studies compare the institutional arrangements of ECOWAS and UEMOA and the differences between legal heritage based on the Anglo-Saxon system and the civic law traditions of France. Part of the implementation problems of ECOWAS institutional arrangements deal with the competing competences in adjudication of the ECOWAS Court of Justice and national courts, and the same is true for the ECOWAS Parliament in its relationship with national Parliaments. But there are also higher-order competence issues: ECOWAS’s relationship to the African Union, and its conventions.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


In an introductory text we found this simple but illuminating overview:
Most studies about legal and governance aspects of West African integration can be found in academic journals and in the academic press, but in addition there are also African institutions involved and a few others.


International agencies and non-academic press: the World Bank, ODI in London, the IHK (the Industrie und Handels Kammer in Germany), and the Association of European Border Regions (based in Gronau, Germany). As well as Palabres Actuelles from France, the Great Insights Magazine, published by ECDPM in Maastricht, and the Washington Quarterly.


IIC POLICY OPTIONS, FOREIGN (DONOR) SUPPORT, AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES

This section contains specific publications about donor support to regional integration processes in West Africa, or particular countries, and literature that focuses on the empirical comparison of ECOWAS with other African trade blocks (SADC, COMESA, EAC), for example by looking at the rules and regulations, and at the impact of measures on trade volumes and directions. Some studies deal with opportunities for donor engagement, and there is specific attention for Europe-Africa linkages, e.g. the EU-West African Regional Indicative Programme, the European Partnership Agreement, and the new Accelerating Trade in West Africa initiative. Also the African Development Bank, and the World Bank published diagnostic studies, and strategic documents.
Two examples of publications in this section are:


Institutional publishers and academic publishers are both active in this field, but almost none from Africa itself.

International agencies: the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Union, the OECD, the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC/OECD), Saana Consulting in London, ODI in London, the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, the International Centre for Trade and Investment in Geneva (publishing Trade Negotiations Insights), Verein für Sozialpolitik in Germany (organizing the German Development Economics Conferences), and ECDPM in Maastricht.


III. ECONOMICS

IIIA STUDIES ABOUT TRADE AND ACTUAL ANALYSIS OF TRADE STATISTICS IN THE ECOWAS REGION, AND ABOUT THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA. INCLUDING METHODOLOGICAL STUDIES.

Studies assess the effects of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) on intra-regional trade, including the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade. There are studies about the common external tariff that was finally implemented in 2015. Various studies focus on the impact of measures and policies such as monetary cooperation, the customs union, or common economic policies. Some studies deal with the measurement problems, the ‘empirics’ of trade statistics, in a situation of the dominance of informal trade arrangements. Also transit or re-export trade gets some attention. Among the impediments to marketing the lack of market and price information is highlighted by some authors. Specific attention is given to the impact of trade liberalization or trade enhancement on energy intensity, on technology transfers, and on income (or poverty) and employment. Some authors deal with global and/versus regional trade. There is some attention for political economy issues, but not much. And the ‘real’ political economy issues (who ‘owns’ the transport and trade sector?, what connections exist between the political elite, and the security forces/police/customs on the one hand, and the actors in the cross-border (food) value chains on the other?) are hardly touched in the literature found so far.

Two examples of publications in this section are17:


17 After finalizing the annotated bibliography an important addition has been published by ECDPM, see: http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/ECDPM-2016-Political-Economy-Regional-Integration-Africa-ECOWAS-Report.pdf
Again, the lack of African agencies publishing about the economics of regional integration in West Africa is remarkable, with the exception of the African Development Bank. And again most publications come from academic sources.


Academic publishers: the University of Bonn, the University of Munich, The NAI in Uppsala, the Cornell University's Department of Applied Economics and Management, the Michigan State University, the Milwaukee Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, and the Quebec Département d'Economique de la Faculte d'Administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.

IIIB INVESTMENT ANALYSES AND MONETARY ISSUES

Studies deal with the analysis of foreign investment (including ‘impact investing’) in West Africa, and sometimes link it to domestic investments (crowding in, crowding out; impact on productivity; knowledge and technology transfers; spillover effects). There are specific studies on economic and monetary cooperation (e.g. UEMOA and WAMZ), the role of central banks, the impact of monetary integration on intraregional trade and (how to attract) different kinds of financial inflows (investments, development assistance, remittances) and their impact. Some studies deal with administrative constraints (‘red tape’) of FDI, and on the impact of tax regimes, and fiscal coordination. A few studies start to compare global companies with smaller multinationals, partly with an African background. Finally some studies compare formal financial arrangements, with informal finance and microcredit.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


The background of these studies is quite diverse, with many international academic journals participating in the debate.

African agencies: Isodec, Tamale (Ghana), and AERC (African Economic Research Consortium) Nairobi.


IV. GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY

IVA MIGRATION & REMITTANCES

There is attention for the 1979 ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol Dakar (which writers call an ‘empty promise’). The literature further discusses law & order issues, and the developmental/ economic impact of mobility, cross-border movement and remittances of the diaspora. There is some gender-specific attention for the geographical mobility of men versus women, and the development of transnational spaces of labour mobility within West Africa, partly as a response to policies, but a lot of it spontaneous.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


This is a small section in the international literature on regional integration in West Africa, and almost all publishers are academic ones, and only one based in Africa itself.

Academic publisher in Africa: Covenant University, Nigeria
Academic Journal: Insight on Africa (SAGE)

IVB GEOGRAPHY AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Studies look at the spatial patterns of trade relations and analyze the impact of infrastructural development: transport, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure. There are studies about the impact of population growth and urbanization on trade routes, and about the shifts in markets, indicating a gap between actual physical infrastructural arrangements and the many ambitious plans that have been formulated during the last few years. Studies dealing with the ‘spatiality’ of economic development highlight the importance of understanding the actual poles and axes of regional networks, but it is important to go beyond the designated ‘corridors’, as a lot of movement of goods and people does not follow these corridors.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


Also this section only has a few titles, but these cover all the important fields of physical infrastructure development. Important contributions come from international agencies, but also academic sources have contributed.

International agencies: World Bank, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency).

IVC REALITY OF CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS, AND BORDERLAND STUDIES

This part of the literature mainly deals with border zone dynamics and linkages. Studies give attention to border-zone dynamics, ‘development at the border’, and social-spatial cross-border connections, or ‘cross-border micro-regionalism’. Some of these studies make a plea for joint land use planning in border areas, and cross-border natural resource management. There are discussions about the costs of travel and (long-distance) trade, with increasing attention for the role of corruption, illicit trade, criminal networks and the link with violence and insecurity. Most studies go beyond economics, and also deal with political contexts, and next to traders also study the role of political ‘patrons’. There are studies about so-called quasi-formal forms of trading, and many about informal, unrecorded trade and smuggling. Some studies deal with the ways entrepreneurs deal with illegality. Some studies link the growing informality in trade relations with the disengagement of the state following structural adjustment measures.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


IVD SOCIOLOGY OF CROSS-BORDER LINKAGES AND GENDER DIMENSIONS

The literature pays geographically specific attention to traders (including ‘outsider’ brokers and traders), (shifts in) their trade networks, and the impact of their (ethnic/linguistic) background, with some attention for age-old traders networks (e.g. the Mourides and the Yoruba). There is a lot of literature on women traders and their relative importance. This attention for gender and trade in West Africa goes back a long time. Social network studies of cross-border traders show the empirical connections, but also issues like, what is called, adverse incorporation, and ‘laissez-faire integration’, and its impact on poverty and well-being, including attention for the high risks women traders face in terms of violence and theft, as well as their needs to have ‘patrons’.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


Most of the literature in this section comes from academic journals, and from UN sources.

African agencies: CODESRIA, UNECA

International sources: UN Women, UNIFEM, UNU CRIS in Bruges Belgium, UKAID, LISER in Luxemburg, and Women in Development/WIDTECH, Washington DC.


Academic Publishers: Karthala Paris, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag Köln, University of Southern Denmark Department of Border Studies.

V CROSS-BORDER FOOD TRADE AND FOOD & NUTRITION SECURITY

Studies focus on different dimensions of the insecurity/volatility of food trade, and the link between agricultural growth, investments and market developments across borders. Some studies take the perspective of agro-value addition and cross-border trade. Others discuss the trade in seeds and fertilizers. There is attention for ECOWAP and for CAADP programmes and their implementation. But several studies zoom in on barriers to trade flows of agricultural produce across borders in the region.
Two examples of publications in this section are:


There are relatively many African sources, as well as international agencies dealing with this topic, and some academic journals and publishers.


Academic Publishers: University of Bonn/ZEF, Michigan State University, Suffolk University Boston.

**VB REGIONAL TRADE IN SPECIFIC FOOD PRODUCTS**

This section deals with regional trade in specific food products, with most studies dealing with livestock, followed by rice and horticultural produce (mainly tomatoes), and fruits (mangoes, pineapple). There are also studies about the regional trade in millets, yam and cassava. Most studies assume a positive impact of growing regional trade. One study deals with the risks: the risk of spreading of livestock diseases. Most attention goes to the regional trade of specific agricultural products in the central trade corridor of West Africa, connecting Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo with Burkina Faso and Mali. There is much less attention for the Western and the Eastern corridors.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


Literature partly comes from Africa itself, and among the international agencies also from commercial research agencies.

African agencies: CILSS in Ouagadougou, International Institute for Tropical Agriculture in Ibadan, International Livestock Research Institute in Nairobi, the African Association of Agricultural Economics (based in Nairobi), LARES Cotonou.
VC REGIONAL TRADE AND FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY

Finally, there is some literature connecting regional integration processes with food security issues, and resilience, and one study discusses the tensions between growing regional food trade and food sovereignty. Food security can be supported by combining locally/regionally produced food and imported food. Food sovereignty puts more emphasis on the goal of local/regional food sufficiency. If Africa’s total and urban population will continue to grow, and if global competition for food available on the world market will become more tense (and both expectations are probably realistic) regions like West Africa do wise to put a lot of emphasis on feeding its own population as much as possible. In the literature there is some attention for these and related policy aspects: for instance the regional approach to food security propagated by the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and for the impact of aid and trade for the West African livestock sector for food security in the region.

During the scoping conference the relatively limited number of publications linking food trade with food security was seen by the participants as a striking conclusion in view of the important role for agricultural/food products in West African regional trade.

Two examples of publications in this section are:


Sources of information for this important topic were mainly found in publications by international agencies, with a considerable Dutch contribution here.

African agencies: CILSS, Ouagadougou

International agencies: IFPRI, FAO, the Famine Early Warning System (USAID), Wageningen University and LEI, ECDPM.

Academic Journal: Food Policy

Academic publisher: Karthala.

When one looks at the major sources of funding and initiative for the studies in the inventory it is clear that global policy organizations are quite dominant, as well as ‘western’ academic publishers of books and journals. With the exception of the African Development Bank and CILSS there are few ‘African’ think tanks involved, although internationally funded organizations like CILSS and SNV mainly work with African staff,
and many publications are written by people originating from Africa or working in Africa, but publishing in international journals and books. During the scoping conference it was remarked that in terms of identifying useful local knowledge production, disclosing publications from these kinds of local, West African, sources can be challenging as they are often not digitally available. Another local source of knowledge that is largely unexplored is the abundance of locally produced (African) master’s theses and PhD dissertations, in addition to other forms of ‘grey literature’. Although the library of the African Studies Centre in Leiden has an explicit policy to give priority to the search for books and journals from Africa itself, the budget limitations for acquiring these local sources probably means that a lot of it goes unnoticed.
INTERMEZZO 1: THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT IN WEST AFRICA IN 2050
Ton Dietz

The fifteen current ECOWAS countries have a joint population of more than 350 million inhabitants in 2016, of which half can be found in Nigeria. Since Independence around 1960 population growth has been very high, based on high fertility rates, and increasing average age figures. Although also West Africa is experiencing a demographic transition, with lowering fertility rates, demographers expect rapid further growth. The medium variant of population predictions for 2050 shows that the region will have close to 800 million people in 35 years from now. If current fertility rates would prevail (in 2016 the regional fertility rate is 5.61 live-born children per woman, on average) it would be even more than 900 million, which is unlikely.

The current urbanization rate in the region is 45% and it is likely that that will further increase to probably 60% in 2050. That would mean a total urban population in West Africa of ca 475 million people; an additional 314 million people on top of the current 161 million. This will mean that there will be a further shift to net food consumers, with changing diets, based on a more urban, and –on average- probably more prosperous lifestyle.

Among the urbanites there are already 65 million people living in agglomerations of more than a million people each. West Africa currently counts 23 of these million-plus cities, with Lagos the regional giant. In 2050 there will be more of those mega-urban spaces. The current ones by then are expected to have close to 170 million inhabitants: that is one-third of all urban people and 22% of the total predicted population. These people will probably be the most important ‘magnets’ of demand for food in the region, food that will probably predominantly be produced in their home countries (and a bit in the cities themselves, with ‘urban agriculture’), but most likely increasingly on a larger geographical scale: in the region of West Africa, through cross-border trade, and through cross-continental imports from elsewhere in the world. It can be expected that the remaining farmers in West Africa will become more commercial and will sell more of their produce to the major areas of urban demand in the region. It can also be expected that the urban diets, particularly with growing average income and a growing middle class, will show shifts in composition: with relatively less staple foods, and relatively more processed foods, more horticultural products, more meat and other livestock products, and more fish and eggs. So not only urban demand for food will grow, but also the composition of that demand will change rather dramatically. One could model the likely urban food demand in 2050 (with different scenarios), but we leave that to a later opportunity.

The current geo-political situation in the region shows three land-locked states, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all of them mainly in the Sahel region. These are the most vulnerable countries in terms of food and nutrition. For their food and other imports from outside the region, and for their exports to the world market these states depend on their coastal neighbours: Senegal, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire for Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin for Burkina Faso, and Benin and Nigeria for Niger. The three land-locked countries currently have a population of almost 60 million people. According to the mid-variant prediction there will be 160 million in 2050. Niger’s predicted population growth particularly is astonishing: it is the current world champion fertility, with a fertility rate of 7.63, and an expected population of more than 70 million in 2050. In these three land-locked countries the urbanization rate is still much lower than in the region as a whole: 38% for Mali, 30% for Burkina Faso and 18% for Niger. Most likely this will be much higher.
in 2050, particularly if the region will be hit by one or more major droughts, which is likely. Also the Sahel metropoles in these three land-locked countries will be huge: 9 million people will probably live in Bamako in 2050, 5.8 million people in Ouagadougou, and 4.6 million in Niamey. This puts very high pressure on their national governments (all three metropoles are the seat of national governments) to provide these urbanites with food (and water, and energy, etc.).

Urban populations and their political leaders and business people are generally in a better bargaining position to acquire food, than rural populations, their political leaders, and small-scale and often informal business people in the most marginal areas. Recently West Africa as a whole did experience relatively benign food situations: the famine early warning website (http://www.fews.net/) only shows a recent ‘crisis’ situation in north-eastern Nigeria (but that is mainly due to the Boko Haram threat), and a ‘stress situation’ for other parts of north-eastern Nigeria, for south-eastern Niger, and for parts of Guinea (situation October-December 2015, accessed 11/3/ 2016). For the January-March 2016 period the situation becomes a bit more problematic, with a current food crisis in not only north-eastern Nigeria, but also in south-eastern Niger, and with food stress in a contiguous band from central-north Mali to central Niger (and still in Guinea). The Sahel and northern Savannah areas are known for their climate variability, and the likelihood of occasional major droughts (and floods) is a given, and with potentially devastating effects, as we have seen before. Climate variability is not the same as climate change. Climate change scenarios for West Africa are partly contradictory. If we take Augio Dai’s 2012 study as a point of reference\(^\text{18}\), the rainfall situation in the period of the next twenty years does not yet show major reasons to worry. Most of the area’s average conditions will not change much, some of the northern Savannah areas will even get a bit more rainfall, and only Senegal and the southwestern corner are predicted to become drier. Beyond the mid-Century the calculations show deteriorating rainfall situations in much of the area, and particularly all over the northern Savannah zones of West Africa. On top of likely higher average temperatures these are reasons for major concern. What is also a major reason of concern is what the climate change calculations are for the most important regions where Africa’s imported food comes from: rice from Asia, and wheat from the United States’ mid-west. These global food baskets will partly experience worsening rainfall conditions, with probably dire consequences for their export abilities from the mid-Century onwards. And in other increasing food-stressed areas of the world (Southern China; the Middle East) greater purchasing power and geo-political muscle will mean that West Africa’s ability to continue to gain access to world food reserves and to import from food export zones will be threatened.

West Africa does wise to invest a lot of efforts in greater regional food sovereignty, and in regional food production, and in a self-evident and cheaper system of food trade across the West African borders, with extra attention for the three landlocked countries and their major cities. The major reason to do so is geo-strategic, and long-term: world demand for food will further increase, world supply of food faces structural challenges, partly because of likely negative impacts of climate change, and West African demand might not be able to compete effectively on the world market for food, whenever food demand is higher than food supply on the world market.

The table 2.2 gives the statistical evidence for the demographic data used in this intermezzo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current population in millions</th>
<th>Current yearly change in %</th>
<th>Current fertility rate</th>
<th>Current Net migration X1000</th>
<th>Current Urbanization rate</th>
<th>Agglomerations &gt; 1 million</th>
<th>Current population in millions</th>
<th>Predicted population in 2050 in millions</th>
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<td>Benin</td>
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<td>2.64</td>
<td>4.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>358.6</td>
<td>2.73*</td>
<td>5.61*</td>
<td>-215</td>
<td>45*</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* average, weighed by population

Sources:

For current population, urbanization rate, current annual population growth, current fertility rate, and current net migrants: [http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/](http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/)

For agglomeration data: [http://www.citypopulation.de/world/Agglomerations.html](http://www.citypopulation.de/world/Agglomerations.html); for Kano, Benin City and Zaria (all in Nigeria, and all city populations): [http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population/major-cities-in-nigeria/](http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population/major-cities-in-nigeria/)


For predicted urban population 2050: Own calculations based on \[\text{pop2050/pop2016}]\times1.2\times\text{aggl2016}, supposing that the agglomeration will grow 20% faster than the population as a whole. Please compare [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projections_of_population_growth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projections_of_population_growth) For the ten most populous urban areas in West Africa in 2050 they arrive at figures that are showing the same trend.

All accessed 10/3/2016
Intermezzo 2: FAO’s Food balance sheets as an indicator of shifts in food composition and origin: some notes about Burkina Faso
Ton Dietz

In ‘Digging Deeper: Inside Africa’s Agricultural, Food and Nutrition Dynamics’ (Akinyoade, A., W. Klaver, S. Soeters and D. Foeken, 2014, Leiden: Brill, ASC African Dynamics Series) the relevance of using FAO’s food balance sheets was proven for four countries in Africa, including Nigeria. Food balance sheets connect the data on food production, and food imports, with data on food exports, agro-industrial usage, usage as feed and seed, food wasted, and finally food available for human consumption in the country. In ‘Digging Deeper’ these average data were then compared with the detailed figures on child growth and malnutrition from the WHO Global Database. Both datasets can be combined to give a dynamic picture of changes in food and nutrition in the region.

Given our suggestion to particularly look at Burkina Faso (part of the Central Corridor of West Africa’s regional economy, and mainly connected to production from and imports through Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), it is revealing to see the recent shifts in this country. As the FAO food balance sheets do not specify the origin of imports (and the destination of exports), these datasets are not useful as a direct source of information on intra-regional food connectivity, but they hint at ways to look at that. We suggest that it would be good if the Netherlands government would stimulate the FAO, the AfDB, the ECOWAS Commission, and CILSS (as well as UNCTAD), to join hands in developing a more integrated dataset, in which the import and export data in the food balance sheets are specified with regard to countries of origin and destination.

For Burkina Faso we compare the year 2000 with the latest year for which there are FBS data, 2013. In average food security terms the data show a major improvement, despite impressive population growth, and in absolute terms we also see a considerable increase in the non-cereal calories in the diet (but not yet in relative terms). The importance of rice (mostly imported) has stabilized in absolute terms, but dwindled in relative terms. The relative importance of imports has increased, but especially the absolute increase in cereal and other food imports is considerable. On the other hand, Burkina Faso’s food exports also increased a lot, and partly to neighbouring countries.

Burkina Faso is a clear example of what the FAO, AfDB and ECOWAS show for West Africa as a whole in their very important study about ‘Agricultural Growth in West Africa; Market and Policy Drivers’ (Rome 2015; authors: Frank Hollinger and John Staatz): there is a clear shift in agricultural consumption patterns, and a greater regional and global integration of food trade. But a lot of it is still unknown. The much better food situation in 2013 compared to 2000 can also be shown by looking at the WHO data on child malnutrition. And although the figures are indeed showing major improvements, malnutrition is still widespread and particularly high in Burkina Faso’s Sahel region in the north of the country.
Table 2.3: Burkina Faso: Comparing Data from the Food Balance Sheets for 2000 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>11.6m</td>
<td>16.3m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kcal/day available</strong></td>
<td>2318</td>
<td>2720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of animal origin</strong></td>
<td>145 = 6%</td>
<td>159 = 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of vegetative origin</strong></td>
<td>2173 = 94%</td>
<td>2561 = 95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of which cereals</strong></td>
<td>1537 = 66%</td>
<td>1740 = 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>and of which rice</strong></td>
<td>196 = 13%</td>
<td>207 = 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-cereal Kcal/day</strong></td>
<td>781</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cereal balance sheet (kmt – 1000 metric tonnes)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Production 2252 kmt + 343 kmt imports (= 12%) – 59 kmt exports + 387 stock variation = 2923 kmt, of which 379 available for agro-manufacturing (mainly sorghum for beer brewing) + 55 kmt as seed + 216 kmt is wasted; remains 2273 kmt for human direct consumption.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Production 4768 kmt + 703 kmt imports (= 14%) – 34 kmt exports – 528 kmt stock variation = 4908 kmt, of which 693 kmt available for agro-manufacturing + 34 kmt as feed + 74 kmt as seed + 431 kmt is wasted; remains 3677 kmt for human direct consumption.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition cereal imports</strong></td>
<td>Rice: 179 kmt</td>
<td>Rice: 483 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wheat: 95 kmt</td>
<td>Wheat: 191 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other: 69 kmt</td>
<td>Other: 29 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total: 343 kmt</td>
<td>Total: 703 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other major food imports</strong></td>
<td>Milk: 53 kmt</td>
<td>Sugar: 159 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vegetable oils: 25 kmt</td>
<td>Fish: 99 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fish: 19 kmt</td>
<td>Vegetable oils: 83 kmt (mainly palm oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treenuts: 18 kmt</td>
<td>Milk: 89 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vegetables: 12 kmt</td>
<td>Vegetables: 45 kmt (mainly tomatoes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sugar: 12 kmt</td>
<td>Fruits: 37 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fruits: 11 kmt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major food exports</strong></td>
<td>Maize: 42 kmt</td>
<td>Sesame: 113 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil crops (sesame and others): 27 kmt</td>
<td>Treenuts: 111 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millet: 10</td>
<td>Maize: 34 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beans: 30 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vegetables: 28 kmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fruits 22 kmt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: Nutrition status in Burkina Faso, 2003 and 2010: severe malnutrition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of children 0-5 years with weight/age -3sd</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idem height for age -3sd</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/A for worst area (Sahel Region)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/A for worst area (Sahel)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Section 3: Inventory of Statistics on Regional Trade in West Africa

Marie-Luise Rau, with maps by Wil Hennen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Section conclusions:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The share of intra-ECOWAS trade (in terms of trade value) has been much lower than extra-ECOWAS trade, with extra-ECOWAS trade increasing rapidly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ECOWAS trade has been biased towards a few countries. Nigeria has certainly been a dominant exporter in both intra and extra-ECOWAS trade. Côte d'Ivoire and Benin with large ports follow suit, but with much lower numbers than Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Focusing on intra-ECOWAS trade, Benin, Senegal and Togo are important exporters in the region supplying products to other ECOWAS members. Burkina Faso, Mali (in particular agri-food products) and Sierra Leone much depend on supplies from ECOWAS members, with the highest share of their imports coming from the aforementioned countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Overall, almost 70% of the recorded value of intra-ECOWAS trade is attributed to trade in minerals (mainly oil trade). Manufacturing accounted for about 20% and agricultural products (edible and non-edible) made up for only about 10%, according to official statistics. For many West African countries, much trade of agri-food products has taken place with other trade partners outside the region and a large proportion of agri-food trade is believed to be informal unregistered trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Official trade statistics are considered to only capture a small proportion of intra-regional trade in West Africa. For agri-food products, for example, up to 75% could be informal trade (World Bank, 2015). It would be interesting to look into options to better account for informal trade and combining such information with an analysis about who engages in informal trade and why.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Trade diagnostic indicators are best used for evaluating trade flows within the region and other countries. Here the exports and import shares as well as the net trade position are presented for the countries in West Africa; in a second step other indicators based on economic theory of international trade could be calculated in order to derive insights about possible priorities for trade. Examples could be indicators of trade complementarity, comparative advantages and trade-related competitiveness. Note that one important task related to the trade analysis is the improvement of the trade data available, accounting for unregistered and informal trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The available trade statistics give an overview of the situation of regional trade, indicating trade linkages and integration between partner countries. Much trade and business is made in the informal sector of developing countries in general, and in West Africa in particular, and thus not recorded in the official statistics. Nevertheless, the trade statistics officially collected is the data available for a comparative analysis, giving an overview of the region as a whole, unlike the data on informal trade and business, which is collected in some projects for some trade corridors, areas and/or specific sectors. In the scoping study, the official trade data is taken as a starting point, while envisioning further investigations into the important issue of informal trade.

First, the trade indicators looked at are briefly introduced and subsequently applied to the available trade data. After the overview of trade in West Africa, we zoom in on agri-food trade, which constitutes an important issue with regard to food security, in a more
detailed analysis for five countries: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, as well as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. These countries are of particular interest being landlocked countries in the region (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) as well as specific (although different) partners for Dutch ‘aid and trade’ cooperation (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire).

INDICATORS TO POINT OUT TRADE RELATIONS

Several indicators point out trade relations between partner countries. For the comparison across countries, trade values are used in the calculation of such indicators. On the one hand, the absolute values provide information on the magnitude of trade flows, next to the direction of trade. On the other hand, however, the relative comparison in terms of trade shares much better point out trade relations and linkages between countries. In addition, other indicators, such as indicators of comparative advantages for example, investigate trade relations by closely linking them to trade theory. Combining principles of trade theory and trade statistics allows for a theoretical underpinning of trade diagnostics with the aim to explain trade across countries. Such an in-depth analysis would be interesting in order to provide insights about trade of the West African region with partners and within the region alike. For the scoping paper, the following indicators are used in order to provide an overview of the trade relations in the West African region as a first step:

- Exports from and imports to West African partners and partners elsewhere, denoted as the Rest of the World (ROW): The respective trade data are used to provide an indicator of the net trade position, also known as trade balance. The net trade position (NT) is defined as exports minus imports (X-M). Thus if NT > 0 the country is a net exporting country, if NT < 0 the country is a net importing country.
- Share of exports to partners in the region: exports to ECOWAS, UEMOA and WAMZ in total exports
- Share of exports to partners elsewhere (ROW): exports to ROW in total exports

The indicators of shares of exports to countries in the region on the one hand and to other countries not in the region points out the relative importance of intra-regional trade in West Africa. The higher the intra-regional trade, the closer the relation between countries. In the analysis of regional integration, a high level of intra-regional trade is an indicator of how integrated economies and markets are. As an example, intra-EU trade, i.e. trade within the European Union generally makes up for more than 70% of total trade.

The trade data comes from the UNCTAD trade database. In the appendix 3-A3, the details on the chapters of the SITC trade classification are provided. For the product aggregation see appendix 3-A1. It should be noted that the trade data refers to the exports to the respective partner countries or regions, i.e. the value of imports as reported by the respective partner countries. Information on imports can be considered as being more reliable since the partner country reports the information rather than the country that the product originates from. Furthermore, the value of imports represent prices with customs, insurance and freight costs (CIF prices), which gives a more realistic figure for the value of the products being sold. The trade value is provided in US dollar (USD).

With regard to the country aggregation, it is distinguished by West African countries. Note that Mauritania is included as a country although not being a member of ECOWAS. As regions, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine) with French speaking countries of West Africa, the West
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) as well as the entire region, i.e. ECOWAS plus Mauritania, are considered. For details on the country aggregation see appendix 3-A1.

ANALYSIS OF TRADE INDICATORS – OVERVIEW OF THE WEST AFRICAN REGION

Figure 3.1 presents the exports of the West African countries to ECOWAS and the rest of the world (ROW) in the time periods 1995 until 2014. It is clearly shown that countries outside the region have been playing a very important role as trade partners for the West African countries, with an increasing trend. As illustrated in figure 3.2, imports from the ROW considerably increased, mainly manufacturing and agri-food products. The latter indicates food imports from other countries in the West African regions. Overall, regional trade within ECOWAS has been rather limited, but a slightly increasing trend can also be observed.

**Figure 3.1: Exports of West African countries to ECOWAS and the ROW (million USD)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>ROW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data refers to the import values (CIF prices) of all products, as reported by the ECOWAS countries. Source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD

**Figure 3.2: Imports from ROW in West African countries, million USD, 1995-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>agrifood</th>
<th>manufacturing</th>
<th>nonedible</th>
<th>mineral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
Calculating the average for the years 2010-2014, the share of exports of the respective countries in the region to ECOWAS was only 11% of the total exports. In the same time period, the share of imports from ECOWAS in total imports was 17%. Large variations are found across countries, as expected. For the time period 1995-2014, figure 3-A3.1 and 3-A3.2 in the appendix 3-A3 provide an overview of the share of regional trade in total trade, i.e. share of the individual ECOWAS countries in total exports and the share of the individual ECOWAS countries in total imports, respectively.

Figure 3.3 illustrates the net trade positions, also referred to as trade balance, in the region for the respective countries. The net trade positions point out the trade directions, defining whether the respective countries are net exporters or net importers. Note that the net trade position refers to the exports and imports in the West African region. In general, intra-regional trade in West Africa has been dominated by a few countries that are the main exporters and importers in the West African region. Above all, Nigeria is the largest net exporting country, which is not surprising given its natural resources/oil and its role as exporter worldwide. Benin (mainly agriculture and minerals but also other goods in transit through Benin’s international port of Cotonou) and Côte d’Ivoire (mainly cocoa, coffee but more importantly minerals and manufacturing, with Abidjan port being the second biggest port in Africa) follows suit but with much smaller trade values. As illustrated in figure 3.3, Togo (mainly manufacturing) and Mauritania (mainly agri-food products) have been net exporters, with their exports to the other West African countries exceeding their imports from the region. It is interesting to note that Ghana appears to have turned a net exporter to the region in recent years, boosting its exports of manufacturing products. In contrast, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali have become more dependent on imports from the region, i.e. exporting less to the region and importing more from the region (in relative terms).

Figure 3.3: Net trade positions of the respective countries with regard to trade in ECOWAS (all products) (million USD), 1995-2014

Intra-regional trade has been higher within the UEMOA of the francophone countries during the time period 1995 to 2014 (see figure 3.4). On average, the value of trade within the UEMOA was about four times larger than intra ECOWAS trade. It is interesting to note that the UEMOA has a single currency (West African Franc, CFA, which is guaranteed by the French Treasury and whose exchange rate is tied to that of the Euro) since 1994, and
this regional integration through a common currency could have boosted trade amongst the UEMOA countries. In addition, colonial history, language, ethnic ties are also strong reasons why UEMOA countries have strong trade relations amongst each other.

Establishing a monetary union encompasses a common accounting system, reviews of member countries' macroeconomic policies (convergence criteria), a regional stock exchange as well as some kind of legal and regulatory frameworks, for example for a banking system. All these factors could be reasons for the comparatively high trade flows amongst UEMOA members. The UEMOA is known as the most advanced regional integration agreement, including implementation and enforcement, in Africa. With longer time series of the trade data and other data, it would be interesting to investigate in an econometric analysis the increase of trade in the UEMOA.

Figure 3.4: Overview of intra-regional trade in the regions with monetary unions: WAMZ, UEMOA

Which products are traded most in the region? Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the four groups of products: agri-food products, nonedible agricultural products, manufacturing products and minerals. In terms of value, mainly minerals (including oil) were traded within the West African region in the time period 2010-2014, making up for almost 70% of the intra-regional trade value. Manufacturing accounted for about 20% and agricultural products (edible and non-edible) made up for only about 10%. For many West African countries, much trade of agri-food products takes place with other trade partners outside the region. On average, the share of agri-food products within ECOWAS was about 12% of the trade with other countries (ROW); the one for non-edible agricultural products was only about 1%. For the details of the exports and imports of the four products in the individual West African countries see table 3-A3.1 and table 3-A3.2 in the appendix 3-A3. Note that agri trade does not reflect informal trade flows within the region, which concern mostly staple food products and are estimated to be rather significant.
The analysis of agri-food trade presents the corresponding trade shares with a special emphasis on the question with whom the countries mainly trade according to the official trade statistics. The trade partners seem to be particularly interesting for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger since they are landlocked countries. Furthermore, Mali and Niger have non ECOWAS countries as direct neighbours. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are also considered as they are important partners for the EU as well as the Netherlands. Zooming in on agri-food trade for the five countries in West Africa sheds light on their connectedness in the region and neighbouring countries, which is important for growth and development, including food security, especially for landlocked countries. In appendix A4, the details of the export and import linkages of the aforementioned countries are respectively given for the time period 1995 up to 2014.

Figure 3.5 presents the net trade position of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger as well as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire for ten specific groups of agri-food products, as defined in appendix 3-A1. The net trade position refers to net exports to ECOWAS, i.e. exports to ECOWAS minus imports from ECOWAS, and nicely illustrates how these countries are linked to the region.

As shown, the net trade position of the landlocked countries Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger was rather weak in the last years. These countries seem to have engaged in trade much less than for example Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire that are also presented in figure 3.5. Further Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger were mainly net exporters, such that the imports exceeded the exports of the respective agri-food products. Mali exported more nonedible agri-food products than it imported, while Burkina Faso also exported more fruits, vegetables and nuts as well as fish.

Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire exported a rather large value of traditional export products from developing countries, i.e. sugar, coffee, tea and cocoa, to the ECOWAS region. These products could be transported to ECOWAS partners and from there further to developed countries. Information about whether products are traded as trade in transit, whereby the trade partner reported is not the final destination, is usually not sufficiently covered in official trade statistics.

For Mali and Niger, trade with the adjacent countries that are not part of ECOWAS is also considered. As presented in table 3-A4.1, exports of live animals from Niger to its neighbours outside ECOWAS made up about 86% of Niger’s total live animal exports. This high share is the exception. Exports of Mali and Niger to the adjacent neighbouring countries not members of ECOWAS were limited in recent years. For imports, fruit, vegetables and nuts from neighbouring countries that were non-ECOWAS members scored 14% and 18% of the total imports of Mali and Niger, respectively.

In conclusion, for the landlocked countries Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger the ECOWAS neighbours play an important role as export destination but also for sourcing of some agri-food products. However, it should be noted that overall the ECOWAS partners appear more important for exporting agri-food products. For example, on average Burkina Faso exported about 61% of its agri-food exports to ECOWAS partners. Mali and Niger exported less to ECOWAS partners, with the average share of exports to ECOWAS amounting to 35% and 34% respectively. Concerning imports, the share of the respective agri-food products from ECOWAS partners was lower, except for Burkina Faso that on average imported about 37% of its total imports from ECOWAS partners. For the other countries, the average import share was only between 10 and 15%.
For further investigating the intra-regional trade, maps can be used to visualise the trade directions. As an example, for the five countries under review the maps of their respective export and import portfolio of the different groups of agri-food products are shown in appendix 3-A4, see figure 3-A4.1 to figure 3-A4.4, with the interactive maps made available, too. The trade flows across the region can be readily traced back and a time dimension could be added in order to make the changes in trade visible (see maps in appendix 3-A5).

**Figure 3.5: Net trade positions of the respective countries with regard to ECOWAS, detailed agri-food products, average 2010-2014, million USD**

DATA ISSUES - INFORMAL TRADE

OECD (2012) defines informal cross-border trade as “trade in legitimately produced goods and services, which escapes the regulatory framework set by the government, as such avoiding certain tax and regulatory burdens”. Informal trade thus refers to products being traded by both formal and informal firms that are not recorded on official government records and that fully or partly evade payment of official duties and charges. In the West African region, informal trade is considered to be significant, and particularly evolving in the context of trade and gender, with many women being engaged in the informal sector and trade. For agri-food trade in the West African region, ECDPM explicitly reviews the
situation of informal trade in their study. A recent approximation of informal trade in agri-food products in West Africa estimates that informal trade could be as much as 75% of intra-regional trade in West Africa (World Bank, 2015).

There are different forms of informal trade. Next to parallel trade, which occurs in addition to official trade but is not recorded, re-exporting has been practised in the West African region. Re-exporting means that products are imported legally through formal channels into countries and are then shipped to other countries under different labels and with little or no transformation through processing, except for the transport. Although some information on re-exports may officially be reported, the presence of informal trade is not covered by official trade statistics. Hence they show only part of the trade that actually takes place, thereby underestimating trade across countries where informal trade is an issue.

Other information on informal trade is not readily available. In fact, collecting information on informal trade is complex, requiring much effort and resources. Methods to collect information for example include the specific monitoring of borders and their surroundings, i.e. that people are posted to observe traders and record all products that are not officially recorded and cleared through customs. Alternatively, the movement of trucks carrying not recorded products could be tracked and subsequently recorded.

For the scoping paper, the trade statistics relied on the recorded figures officially provided by UNCTAD. Hence, informal trade cannot be specifically analysed at this stage. The trade statistics show general trends and cover the dynamics of time series, using data for 1995 up to 2014, as well as averaging the trade data over the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 for the calculation of the indicators about regional integration.

In appendix 3-A.7, products that have often been found to be informally traded are listed. A substantial proportion of informal cross-border trade is related to staple food commodities (e.g. maize, rice and cattle) and low-quality consumer goods (e.g. clothes, shoes and electronic appliances) (OECD, 2009). Yusuff (2015), for example, specifically investigates women traders engaging in informal trade in order to make a living from their very small, informal enterprises, and in fact families. Along the trade corridor informal trade of products but also services (like people in low-skill border-related services such as taxis and porterage, travel worker…) takes place, posing threats to those engaged in it but also brings possibilities of income-generation. In addition to other sources such as reports on custom monitoring or road blocks (USDA, CLISS) for example, the literature identified in this scoping study could be a good starting point to further investigate informal, unregistered trade in the ECOWAS region. According to the studies, a good overview on informal trade in the ECOWAS region is missing, and the magnitude of informal trade seems to be unclear. Furthermore, how does informal trade work? Who is engaged in informal trade and why? Such analysis could include a specific review of studies looking into the issue but also some interesting insights may be derived by for example comparing production data, consumption data and trade data.

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19 In a recent survey, Tyson (2015) looks into the role of small-scale cross-border trade on the Kenya–Uganda transcontinental trucking route, not part of ECOWAS.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX 3-A1: DETAILS ABOUT THE TRADE DATA – PRODUCT AND COUNTRY AGGREGATION

The database used is the UNCTAD trade database, Comtrade. For developing countries the data is available in the standard classification system of trade codes: Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), revision 3. The SITC provides 6 digits codes of traded products, with chapters being one level of classification with subchapters and so on. For the analysis the aggregation is presented in the tables below. The list of product groups, i.e. chapters classified in the SITC revision 3 is provided in Appendix 2-A2.

Product Aggregation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregation of broad groups of products - trade overview</th>
<th>SITC chapters/subchapters, SITC rev. 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; food</td>
<td>0, 11, 41, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inedible agriculture (cotton, wood...)</td>
<td>12, 2, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral fuels</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>5, 6, 7 and 8, 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregation of groups of agri-food products – specific country analysis</th>
<th>SITC chapters/subchapters, SITC rev. 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
<td>00, 03411 (live fish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>011, 012, 016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
<td>0021, 0222, 0224 (dairy), 025 (eggs, albumin), 0616 (honey), 0814 (animal meal/fodder), 41 (animal oil/fat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>03412-19, 0342, 0344, 0345, 035, 036, 037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FruitVegNuts</td>
<td>054, 0561, 057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cereals 4
SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices 0610-0612, 0615, 0619 (sugar), 7
OtherPlant 08 animal feed
ProcessedFood 017, 0223,023, 024 (milk processed), 0564, 0566, 0567, 058, 059 (fruit & vegetables processed), 062 (sugar confectionary), 11 (beverages), 43 (processed veg/animal fats 09 (misc. food products)
Inedible agricultural products 20, 21 (skin, hide, fur), 23-26 (animal or plant fibre, textile), 29 (crude animal material)

The trade data is by large available for time series, whereby there may be gaps for one or several years. Trade data for Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia is not available for all years. The trade data for the years 1995 to 2014 is extracted. The data for 2015 is available, but the data for 2015 is not officially declared and can still change. Hence the year 2014 is used as the latest year for the trade data approved.

Country aggregation
- UEMOA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo;
- WAMZ countries: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone;
- ECOWAS countries: WAMZ and UEMOA
- West African countries: ECOWAS and Mauritania
- Rest of the World (ROW): all other countries not part of the region, as defined.

Aggregation of the specific countries looked at with a focus on agri-food trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual country</th>
<th>Neighbour countries in the West African Region</th>
<th>Other neighbour countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Mali, Niger, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania</td>
<td>Algeria, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria</td>
<td>Chad, Algeria, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 3-A2: SITC REV.3 (STANDARD INTERNATIONAL TRADE CLASSIFICATION, REV.3)

SITC Rev.3 (Standard International Trade Classification, Rev.3)
0 - Food and live animals
- 00 - Live animals other than animals of division 03
- 01 - Meat and meat preparations
- 02 - Dairy products and birds' eggs
• 03 - Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, and preparations thereof
• 04 - Cereals and cereal preparations
• 05 - Vegetables and fruit
• 06 - Sugars, sugar preparations and honey
• 07 - Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof
• 08 - Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)
• 09 - Miscellaneous edible products and preparations

1 - Beverages and tobacco
  • 11 – Beverages
  • 12 - Tobacco and tobacco manufactures

2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
  • 21 - Hides, skins and furskins, raw
  • 22 - Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits
  • 23 - Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed)
  • 24 - Cork and wood
  • 25 - Pulp and waste paper
  • 26 - Textile fibres (other than wool tops and other combed wool) and their wastes
  • 27 - Crude fertilizers, other than those of division 56, and crude minerals (excluding coal, petroleum etc.)
  • 28 - Metalliferous ores and metal scrap
  • 29 - Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s.

3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
  • 32 - Coal, coke and briquettes
  • 33 - Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials
  • 34 - Gas, natural and manufactured
  • 35 - Electric current

4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
  • 41 - Animal oils and fats
  • 42 - Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined or fractionated
  • 43 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils, processed; waxes of animal or vegetable origin; inedible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils, n.e.s.

5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.
  • 51 - Organic chemicals
  • 52 - Inorganic chemicals
  • 53 - Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
  • 54 - Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
  • 55 - Essential oils and resinoids and perfume materials; toilet, polishing and cleansing preparations
  • 56 - Fertilizers (other than those of group 272)
  • 57 - Plastics in primary forms
  • 58 - Plastics in non-primary forms
  • 59 - Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.

6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
  • 61 - Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed furskins
  • 62 - Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.
  • 63 - Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture)
  • 64 - Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard
  • 65 - Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products
• 66 - Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s.
• 67 - Iron and steel
• 68 - Non-ferrous metals
• 69 - Manufactures of metals, n.e.s.

7 - Machinery and transport equipment

• 71 - Power-generating machinery and equipment
• 72 - Machinery specialized for particular industries
• 73 - Metalworking machinery
• 74 - General industrial machinery and equipment, n.e.s., and machine parts, n.e.s.
• 75 - Office machines and automatic data-processing machines
• 76 - Telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing apparatus and equipment
• 77 - Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof (including non-electrical counterparts, n.e.s., of electrical household-type equipment)
• 78 - Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles)
• 79 - Other transport equipment

8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles

• 81 - Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s.
• 82 - Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings
• 83 - Travel goods, handbags and similar containers
• 84 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories
• 85 - Footwear
• 86 - Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, n.e.s.
• 87 - Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks
• 88 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.
APPENDIX 3-A3: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR ECOWAS TRADE ANALYSIS

Figure 3-A3.1: Export shares of individual West African countries in total trade (million USD)

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD

Figure 3-A3.2: Import shares of individual West African countries in total imports (million USD)

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
Table 3-A3.1: Exports to ECOWAS (in 1000 USD) and share in total exports, average 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>all products average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total exports</th>
<th>agri-food average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total exports</th>
<th>nonedible agriculture average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total exports</th>
<th>manufacturin g average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total exports</th>
<th>minerals average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>477,730.3</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35,552.4</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>480.7</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28,964.9</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>412,732.3</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>64,658.3</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>24,938.7</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>559.3</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>35,172.5</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3,987.8</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>1,693.1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1,088.1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>287.7</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>311.5</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>1,055,421.9</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>285,097.7</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>28,084.8</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>272,895.5</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>469,343.9</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td>10,694.5</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5,663.3</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>152.0</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1,269.7</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>3,609.4</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>501,130.9</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>136,297.2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13,607.9</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>264,142.2</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>87,083.7</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>36,153.0</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>28,397.9</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>251.6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7,333.0</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>170.5</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>22,187.1</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>21,119.7</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>954.1</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>18,166.7</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1,331.2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8,974.8</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7,426.7</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>433.9</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>55,039.4</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4,301.5</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>427.9</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50,103.0</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>207.0</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>298,189.1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>283,451.9</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>126.7</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11,627.6</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2,982.9</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>145,908.9</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11,189.3</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>351.5</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9,051.5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>125,316.7</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,393,066.8</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29,108.9</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1,145.3</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>213,856.3</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3,148,956.3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>604,622.0</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>117,225.8</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4,339.8</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>203,920.0</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>279,136.5</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>19,728.0</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>837.0</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>17,248.7</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1,596.1</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>664,970.7</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>65,114.4</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>3,467.7</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>327,637.4</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>268,751.2</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
### Table 3-A3.2: Imports from ECOWAS (in 1000 USD) and share in total imports, average 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>all products average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total imports</th>
<th>agri-food average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total imports</th>
<th>nonedible agriculture average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total imports</th>
<th>manufacturing average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total imports</th>
<th>minerals average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</th>
<th>Share of ECOWAS in total imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>417,741.5</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38,990.9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3,447.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>133,332.3</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>241,970.8</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>937,298.9</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>122,874.4</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>5,045.1</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>347,836.8</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>461,542.6</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>5,675.2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1,394.6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1,803.9</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1,620.8</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>855.9</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2,476,974.4</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>98,649.0</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12,479.2</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>209,199.3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2,156,646.9</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td>95,711.2</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>1,990.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>866.6</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14,072.2</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>78,782.0</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>716,030.6</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>91,250.3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1,760.1</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>224,462.4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>398,557.7</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>59,997.2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10,393.6</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>33,448.8</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16,150.3</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1,541,823.2</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>135,105.4</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>5,877.1</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>357,828.0</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1,043,012.7</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>53,886.7</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8,517.3</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3,201.8</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>38,388.4</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3,779.3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>272,499.4</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>75,117.1</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5,065.4</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>142,917.3</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>49,399.5</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>448,271.2</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>173,262.9</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3,826.6</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>161,467.1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>109,714.5</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>809,043.6</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>91,528.6</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>24,664.1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>40,727.6</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>652,123.3</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>821,995.1</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>7,156.1</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>39,551.0</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>775,280.4</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>133,996.2</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>35,472.4</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1,083.6</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>53,876.0</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>43,564.2</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
APPENDIX 3–A4: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR SELECTED ECOWAS COUNTRIES

Figure 3-A4.1a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all destinations, 1995-2014 – Burkina Faso

Figure 3-A4.1b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all countries, 1995-2014 – Burkina Faso

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
Figure 3-A4.2a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all destinations, 1995-2014 – Code d’Ivoire

Figure 3-A4.2b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all countries 1995-2014 – Code d’Ivoire

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
Figure 3-A4.3a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all destinations, 1995-2014 – Ghana

Figure 3-A4.3b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all countries, 1995-2014 – Ghana

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
Figure 3-A4.4a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all destinations, 1995-2014 – Mali

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD

Figure 3-A4.4b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all countries, 1995-2014 – Mali

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
Figure 3-A4.5a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all destinations, 1995-2014 – Niger

Figure 3-A4.5b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all countries, 1995-2014 – Niger

source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>IMPORT</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Côte d'Ivoire</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
<td>share</td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
<td>share</td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
<td>3,598.86</td>
<td>3,598.74</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3,598.7</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>33.53</td>
<td>22.51</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
<td>1,128.52</td>
<td>1,128.52</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>422.0</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>195,113.37</td>
<td>3,237.22</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2,481.6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>3,408.08</td>
<td>3,255.83</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>2,903.5</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>Cereals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit/Veg/Nuts</td>
<td>41,506.27</td>
<td>9,427.62</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>9,424.7</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Fruit/Veg/Nuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar/Tea/Cocoa/Spices</td>
<td>432.30</td>
<td>221.80</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>Sugar/Tea/Cocoa/Spices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others/Plant</td>
<td>591.36</td>
<td>566.74</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>566.7</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>others/Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
<td>2,809.51</td>
<td>1,996.46</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>1,300.9</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non edible</td>
<td>378,412.57</td>
<td>559.31</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>434.7</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>non edible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>Meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
<td>1676.2</td>
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<td>71%</td>
<td>844.9</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>407.9</td>
<td>147.9</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>130.9</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>61768.6</td>
<td>39,104.2</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>31,940.4</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>Cereals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit/Veg/Nuts</td>
<td>783141.7</td>
<td>16,178.3</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5,754.2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Fruit/Veg/Nuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar/Tea/Cocoa/Spices</td>
<td>504,283.7</td>
<td>42,475.9</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>23,340.0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Sugar/Tea/Cocoa/Spices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others/Plant</td>
<td>424,085.5</td>
<td>818.4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>509.5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>others/Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
<td>65817.4</td>
<td>46,422.5</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>30,957.7</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non edible</td>
<td>1384511.9</td>
<td>28,084.8</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4,990.2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>non edible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPORTS</td>
<td>to ECOWAS</td>
<td>to ECOWAS neighbours</td>
<td>to other neighbours</td>
<td>IMPORTS</td>
<td>from ECOWAS</td>
<td>from ECOWAS neighbours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
<td>share</td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
<td>share</td>
<td>average 2010-2014, 1000 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
<td>1,022.66</td>
<td>32.4 3%</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
<td>10,543.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>351.38</td>
<td>314.7 90%</td>
<td>271.8</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>213,621.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
<td>11,226.80</td>
<td>8,942.4 80%</td>
<td>1,548.9</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
<td>81,656.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>195,113.37</td>
<td>3,237.2 2%</td>
<td>2,481.6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>233,345.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>12,284.13</td>
<td>7,221.3 59%</td>
<td>4,731.8</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>548,876.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fruitVegNuts</td>
<td>402,110.65</td>
<td>50,560.3 13%</td>
<td>442.1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>fruitVegNuts</td>
<td>31,100.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices</td>
<td>3,057,806.71</td>
<td>7,875.8 0%</td>
<td>3,008.3</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices</td>
<td>197,306.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
<td>450.5 11%</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>21.4 23%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
<td>215.2</td>
<td>129.8 60%</td>
<td>141.5</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>407.9</td>
<td>147.9 36%</td>
<td>130.9</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>2,284.2</td>
<td>1,866.0 82%</td>
<td>1,864.9</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Cereals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fruitVegNuts</td>
<td>10,442.4</td>
<td>279.9 3%</td>
<td>255.4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>fruitVegNuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices</td>
<td>536.4</td>
<td>238.0 44%</td>
<td>234.8</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>otherPlant</td>
<td>434.8 15%</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>otherPlant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
<td>4,788.3</td>
<td>1,170.3 24%</td>
<td>1,153.8</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonedible</td>
<td>327,065.5</td>
<td>427.9 0%</td>
<td>487.4</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>nonedible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LiveAnimal</td>
<td>1,588.2 4%</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1,361.5</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>23.4 34%</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
<td>630.3</td>
<td>4.5 1%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>OtherAnimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>5.5 5%</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>Fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>595.2</td>
<td>66.2 11%</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Cereals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fruitVegNuts</td>
<td>12,589.5</td>
<td>10,481.2 83%</td>
<td>762.3</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>fruitVegNuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices</td>
<td>281.9</td>
<td>104.2 37%</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>otherPlant</td>
<td>208.6 0%</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>otherPlant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
<td>1,056.4</td>
<td>309.5 29%</td>
<td>259.6</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>ProcessedFood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonedible</td>
<td>2,346.5</td>
<td>351.5 15%</td>
<td>334.7</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>nonedible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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APPENDIX 3-A5: MAPS FOR AGRI-FOOD IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE SELECTED COUNTRIES, AVERAGE TRADE VALUE 2010-2014 (SOURCE: COMTRADE)

BURKINA FASO

For interactive maps see:

http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gisdata/TradeFlow/BiPartiteECOWAS/BiPartite_BurkinaFaso.html

NIGER

For interactive maps see:

MALI

For interactive maps see:
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gisdata/TradeFlow/BiPartiteECOWAS/BiPartite_Mali.html

GHANA

For interactive maps see:
APPENDIX 3-A6: STUDIES IDENTIFIED IN THE LITERATURE SEARCH OF THE SCOPI NG STUDY


APPENDIX 3-A7: PRODUCTS IDENTIFIED AS OFTEN BEING TRADED INFORMALLY IN WEST AFRICA (Source: Yérima, ECOWAS customs tariffs and site observations, published in Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra- African Trade by the Economic Commission for Africa)

UNPROCESSED PRODUCTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS Code</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0713</td>
<td>Dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether skinned or split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0714</td>
<td>Roots and tubers incl. manioc, arrowroot, sauto, jerusalem artichokes, sweet potatoes and others with high starch or insulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, whether sliced or in the form of pellets; sago pith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0801</td>
<td>Coconuts, brazil nuts and cashews, fresh or dried, whether shelled or peeled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0802</td>
<td>Other nuts, fresh or dried, whether shelled or peeled (excl. coconuts, brazil nuts and cashews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0803</td>
<td>Bananas, plantains, fresh or dried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0804</td>
<td>Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas, mangoes and mangosteens, fresh or dried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0805</td>
<td>Citrus fruit, fresh or dried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0807</td>
<td>Melons, incl. watermelons, and papaws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0810</td>
<td>Fresh strawberries, raspberries, blackberries, black, white or red currants, gooseberries and other edible fruits (excl. nuts, bananas, dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas, mangoes, mangosteens, papaws “papayas,” citrus fruit, grapes, melons or apples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001</td>
<td>Wheat and meslin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1005</td>
<td>Maize or corn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1006</td>
<td>Rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1007</td>
<td>Sorghum grain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Code</td>
<td>Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>Live horses, asses, mules and hinnies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0102</td>
<td>Live bovine animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0103</td>
<td>Live swine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0104</td>
<td>Live sheep and goats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0105</td>
<td>Live poultry, “fowls of the species gallus domesticus”, ducks, geese, turkeys and guinea fowls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0106</td>
<td>Live animals (excl. horses, asses, mules, hinnies, bovine animals, swine, sheep, goats, poultry, fish, crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates, and micro-organic cultures etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0201</td>
<td>Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0203</td>
<td>Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0204</td>
<td>meat of sheep or goats, fresh, chilled or frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0205</td>
<td>Meat of horses, asses, mules or hinnies, fresh, chilled or frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0206</td>
<td>Edible offal of bovine animals, swine, sheep, goats, horses, asses, mules or hinnies, fresh, chilled or frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0302</td>
<td>Fish, fresh or chilled (excl. fish fillts and other fish meat of heading 0304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0304</td>
<td>Fish fillets and other fish meat, whether or not minced, fresh, chilled or frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0305</td>
<td>Fish, fit for human consumption, dried, salted or in brine; smoked fish, fit for human consumption, whether cooked before or during the smoking process; flours, meals and pellets of fish, fit for human consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0306</td>
<td>Crustaceans, fit for human consumption, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, salted or in brine, incl. crustaceans in shell cooked beforehand by steaming or by boiling in water; flours, meals and pellets of crustaceans, fit for human consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0307</td>
<td>mollusks, fit for human consumption, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, salted or in brine, incl. aquatic invertebrates other than crustaceans and mollusks; flours, meals and pellets of aquatic invertebrates other than crustaceans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701</td>
<td>Potatoes, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0702</td>
<td>Tomatoes, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0703</td>
<td>Onions, shallots, garlic, leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0704</td>
<td>Cabbages, cauliflowers, kohlrabi, kale and similar edible brassicas, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0705</td>
<td>Lettuce “lactuca sativa” and chicory “cichorium spp.,” fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0706</td>
<td>Carrots, turnips, salad beetroot, salisy, celeriac, radishes and similar edible roots, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0707</td>
<td>Cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0708</td>
<td>Leguminous vegetables, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0709</td>
<td>Other vegetables, fresh or chilled (excl. potatoes, tomatoes, alliaceous vegetables, edible brassicas, lettuce “lactuca sativa” and chicory “cichorium spp.,” carrots, turnips, salad beetroot, salisy, celeriac, radishes and similar edible roots, cucumbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0710</td>
<td>Vegetables, uncooked or cooked by steaming or boiling in water, frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Code</td>
<td>Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>Vegetable materials used primarily for plaiting, e.g., bamboo, rattans, reeds, rushes, osier, raffia, cleaned, bleached or dyed cereal straw, and lime bark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1402</td>
<td>Vegetable materials used primarily for stuffing or padding, e.g., kapok, vegetable hair and eel-grass, whether put up as a layer, with or without supporting material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1403</td>
<td>Vegetable materials, such as broomcorn, piassava, brush-grass and thistle, used primarily in brooms or in brushes, whether in hanks or bundles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1404</td>
<td>Vegetable products n.e.s. for dyeing or tanning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4101</td>
<td>Raw hides and skins of bovine or equine animals, fresh, or salted, dried, limed, pickled or otherwise preserved, but not tanned, parchment-dressed or further prepared, whether dehaired or split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4102</td>
<td>Raw skins of sheep or lambs, fresh, or salted, dried, limed, pickled or otherwise preserved, but not tanned, parchment-dressed or further prepared, whether dehaired or split (excl. those with wool, fleeces of astrakhan, caracul, persian, broadtail)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4103</td>
<td>Other raw hides and skins, fresh, or salted, dried, limed, pickled or otherwise preserved, but not tanned, parchment-dressed or further prepared, whether dehaired or split (excl. those of bovine animals, equine animals, sheep and lambs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4104</td>
<td>Bovine or equine leather, dehaired (excl. chamois leather, patent leather, patent laminated leather and metallic leather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4105</td>
<td>Sheep or lambskin leather, without wool (excl. chamois leather, patent leather, patent laminated leather and metallic leather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4106</td>
<td>Goat or kidskin leather, dehaired (excl. chamois leather, patent leather, patent laminated leather and metallic leather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4107</td>
<td>Leather of pigs, reptiles and other animals, dehaired, and leather of hairless animals (excl. leather of bovine and equine animals, sheep and lambs, goats and kids, chamois leather, patent leather and patent laminated leather and metallic leather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4108</td>
<td>Chamois leather, incl. combination chamois leather (excl. glazed, tanned leather subsequently treated with formaldehyde and leather stuffed with oil only after tanning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4109</td>
<td>Patent leather and patent laminated leather; metallic leather (excl. lacquered or metallic reconstituted leather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4112</td>
<td>Leather further prepared after tanning or crusting incl. parchment-dressed leather of sheep or lambs, without wool, whether or not split (excl. chamois leather, patent leather and patent laminated leather and metallic leather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4113</td>
<td>Leather further prepared after tanning or crusting incl. parchment-dressed leather of goats or kids, pigs, reptiles and other animals, without wool or hair, and leather of hairless animals, whether or not split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4114</td>
<td>Chamois leather, incl. combination chamois leather (excl. glacé-tanned leather subsequently treated with formaldehyde and leather stuffed with oil after tanning); patent leather and patent laminated leather; metallic leather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4115</td>
<td>Composition leather with a basis of leather or leather fibre, in slabs, sheets or strip, whether or not in rolls; parings and other waste of leather or of composition leather, not suitable for the manufacture of leather articles; leather dust, powder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4201</td>
<td>Saddlery and harness for any animal, incl. traces, leads, knee pads, muzzles, saddle cloths, saddlbags, dog coats and the like, of any material (excl. harnesses for children and adults, riding whips and other goods under heading 6602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4202</td>
<td>Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, executive bags, briefcases, spectacle cases, binocular bags, camera cases, musical instrument cases, gun-cases, holsters and similar; toilet-bags, rucksacks, handbags, school satchels, shopping-bags, wallets, purses, map case, cigarette-cases, tobacco cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Code</td>
<td>Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4203</td>
<td>Articles of clothing and accessories, of leather or composition leather (excl. footwear and headgear and parts thereof, and other goods such as shin-guards, fencing masks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4204</td>
<td>Articles for technical use, of leather or composition leather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4205</td>
<td>Articles of leather or composition leather (excl. saddlery and harness bags; cases and similar containers; apparel and accessories; articles for technical uses; whips, riding-crops and similar under heading 6602; furniture; lighting appliances; toys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4206</td>
<td>Articles of gut, goldbeater's skin, bladders or tendons (excl. silkworm gut, sterile catgut, sterile surgical suture material and strings for musical instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9701</td>
<td>Paintings, e.g., oil paintings, watercolours and pastels and drawings executed entirely by hand (excl. technical drawings and the like under heading 4906, and handpainted or hand-decorated manufactured articles); collages and similarly decorative plaques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9702</td>
<td>Original engravings, prints and lithographs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9703</td>
<td>Original sculptures and statuary, in any material</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION 4: INVENTORY OF DUTCH BILATERAL POLICIES IN WEST AFRICA

Paul Lange

Section conclusions:

- The new strategic policy agenda of The Netherlands aims to provide a response to key developments in the global economy by linking aid, trade and investment.
- One of the key elements of this agenda is the reorganization of its bilateral relations with other countries in the world. For West Africa, this means that there are three types of relationships with the 4 (partner + focus) countries in the region, with a network of Embassies in 5 countries (and a sixth forthcoming).
- The new policy agenda puts much value on trade facilitation. It considers the regional level as the most appropriate and logical framework for designing its interventions aimed at trade facilitation. West Africa is one of two regions (the other being East Africa) on the African continent where The Netherlands targets its trade facilitation efforts.
- The added value of supporting regional initiatives and/ or applying a regional approach in West Africa is generally recognized at the Embassy level, and particularly through trade promotion & facilitation and in the area of agriculture & food security.
- Despite this general acknowledgement, in practice many of the interventions in which the Embassies have been involved in recent years are country-based with little regional/ cross-border linkages and often little coordinated with other Embassies in the region.
- Ghana and to a lesser extent Benin and Senegal seems to be the cases in which a regional approach has been most developed and consistently applied by the Dutch Embassy and has resulted in supporting a number of concrete regional/ cross-border initiatives.
- Promising but only recently introduced instruments to give shape to a more coordinated Dutch regional approach in West Africa – i.e. the appointment of an ECOWAS permanent representative and the creation of the position of regional economy envoy – have yet to prove their (full) potential.

This section deals with the bilateral policies that have been pursued by The Netherlands’ government in recent years through its network of Embassies in West Africa. It primarily builds on the Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MASPs) that The Netherlands have developed for a number of countries in the region, supplemented by information from other policy documents. Where possible this information has been complemented in consultation with the Embassies themselves.

The section does not attempt to comprehensively discuss the Dutch policy framework for this region but rather aims to assess the extent to which these policies pay attention to the promotion of regional (economic) integration in West Africa and address cross-border issues. It further highlights some recent/ ongoing initiatives that have been supported and funded by the Dutch government that fit within this category, with a particular focus on efforts aimed at regional trade in the agro-food sector.

In an effort to further complement the picture of Dutch bilateral relations with the region in addition to the network of Dutch Embassies, this section will also touch upon the role of the
Netherlands African Business Council (NABC) in West Africa through its mission to strengthen business relations between Dutch businesses and the region.\(^{20}\)

**DUTCH POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR AID, TRADE AND INVESTMENT**

In 2013 the Dutch government launched its policy framework *A World to Gain. A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment*.\(^{21}\) Shaped in a context of declining availability of Official Development Assistance (ODA), this new strategic policy agenda aims to provide a response to key developments in the global economy by linking aid, trade and investment. It builds on three primary objectives: 1) to eradicate poverty; 2) sustainable, inclusive growth all over the world; and 3) success for Dutch companies abroad. There are a number of key elements of this new policy agenda that are particularly relevant for the Dutch bilateral approach towards West Africa.

The Dutch government has used this new agenda as an opportunity to reorganize its bilateral relations with other countries in the world. It now distinguishes three types of relationships: aid relationship, transitional relationship and a trade relationship. Currently The Netherlands have chosen to be engaged in a multi-year bilateral (aid) relationship with 15 countries in the world as so-called ‘partner countries’. These are countries with whom it maintains either an aid (7 countries in total) or a transitional relationship (8 countries). For the latter group, the bilateral relationship will initially shaped by both aid and trade, but the intention of the Dutch government in these countries is to gradually further strengthen the focus on trade (and investment). The countries in which the emphasis is on the promotion of trade and investment are referred to as ‘focus countries’ (26 countries).

In West Africa, The Netherlands conducts its bilateral relationships through a network of Embassies in 5 countries: Abuja (Nigeria), Accra (Ghana; also covering Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo), Bamako (Mali, also covering Burkina Faso and Niger), Cotonou (Benin) and Dakar (Senegal, also covering Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau). Recently an economic and trade consulate was opened in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.\(^{22}\) In September 2015 Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Koenders announced that the consulate in Abidjan will be upgraded to the status of full Embassy.\(^{23}\) This is currently in the process of being effectuated. All three types of bilateral relationships are present in the region. The Netherlands are engaged in an aid relationship with Mali and have a transitional relationship with Benin and Ghana. The Netherlands maintains a trade relationship with Nigeria (See Figure 4.1).

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\(^{20}\) It falls outside the scope of this section to discuss the role of all Dutch (civil society) organisations supporting regional(economic) integration in West Africa, with or without funding from the Dutch government.


Figure 4.1: Map indicating Dutch bilateral relationships with West African countries and location of Dutch Embassies in the region

An inventory made by the African Studies Centre Leiden, and published in January 2016, shows the following historical relationship between The Netherlands as provider of development assistance (in various forms) to countries in West Africa (See Table 4.1).24

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For its partner countries The Netherlands has drawn up a so-called Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) in which it sets out the details of its bilateral development cooperation policy. In the case of West Africa, this means that MASPs have been developed for Mali, Benin and Ghana but not for Nigeria. That is not to say that there are no Dutch development funds available for the non-partner countries in the region, for example in the case of Senegal where a Dutch Embassy is located.

The policy document further emphasizes regional integration and cooperation as the way forward to address transnational issues such as food security and instability, particularly within the framework of its engagement with countries with which it maintains an aid relationship. In West Africa this concerns Mali. It is indicated that The Netherlands seeks to use a regional approach where possible and where this adds value to bilateral planning. The Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa are mentioned as examples where The Netherlands have already put this into practice. For West Africa this intention has not (yet) been formulated.

In addition to reconfirming its four policy spearheads – 1) water; 2) food security 3) security & rule of law; and 4) women’s rights & sexual and reproductive health & rights (SRHR) – the policy document further reveals the Dutch policy focus on trade facilitation, as linked to support for private sector development and the business climate. This is presented as an end in itself but also as a means to support other policy objectives such as food security. This policy focus on trade facilitation includes an emphasis on the promotion of regional trade. Regional trade promotion is particularly mentioned as policy objective within the framework of its engagement with countries with whom The Netherlands maintains a transitional relationship. In West Africa this applies to Benin and Ghana. In the case of Nigeria as a country with whom The Netherlands is engaged through a trade relationship, it is particularly emphasized that it seeks to secure new free trade agreements and that through these

Table 4.1: Development relationship between the Netherlands and West African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>67-73</th>
<th>73-77</th>
<th>77-82</th>
<th>82-89</th>
<th>89-98</th>
<th>98-02</th>
<th>02-07</th>
<th>07-10</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>12-16</th>
<th>Total years</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: adapted from Kazimierczuk, 2015
countries it can promote internationalization of the Dutch private sector, particularly in sectors where The Netherlands excels, such as agrifood, water, life sciences and health.

TRADE FACILITATION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The Netherlands put much value on trade (facilitation) as part of its strategic agenda for aid, trade and investment. It considers the regional level as the most appropriate and logical framework for planning its interventions aimed at trade facilitation. Driven by experience, interventions at the regional level are considered to be easier to undertake and to be more efficient than at other levels, such as the global level.

This preference for the regional level builds on a strong belief in the added value of regional trade promotion, for example because of the large potential as regional trade is still rather limited in Africa, as larger markets provide more opportunities to (Dutch) businesses and it allows for a better alignment of supply and demand (for instance with regard to trade in agricultural and food products). It is further put forward that operating within the regional framework is supported by growing international consensus and strong political commitment on the African continent.

West Africa is one of two regions (the other being East Africa) on the African continent where The Netherlands focuses its trade facilitation efforts. Three out of fifteen Dutch development partner countries are located in the region. The focus on West Africa further builds on an increasing concern about the security and stability situation in West Africa (e.g. migration, population pressure, Ebola), the growing interest of Dutch businesses to invest in, and trade with West African countries and the various opportunities the region offers to Dutch organizations of all sorts (businesses, knowledge institutes, civil society organizations).

By working together with other donors and local actors and involving private sector and civil society actors, The Netherlands aim in West Africa for a coordinated approach, focusing on agricultural trade, and value chains of perishable products in particular. This allows The Netherlands to link up with Dutch knowledge institutes and businesses that operate in this particular area. Another particular entry point concerns the emphasis on establishing key transport and trade corridors.

Dutch interventions aimed at trade facilitation are coordinated by the Department for Sustainable Economic Development (DDE, part of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation) in collaboration with the Department for International Trade Policy and Economic Governance (IMH, part of the Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations). Among the wide range of ongoing and planned trade promotion and facilitation interventions, there are a number of initiatives funded by The Netherlands that exclusively target West Africa in various forms:

a) support to (local) capacity building to improve policy dialogue, advocacy and implementation: civil society, private sector, stakeholder groups, regional economic communities (e.g. ENDA/ CACID; ECOWAS; ROPPA27)

b) (financial) involvement in concrete programmes: Capacity Building Customs and Logistics programme (in collaboration with the World Customs Organization and

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26 Benin, Ghana and Mali.

27 Network of Farmers’ and Agricultural Producers’ Organizations of West Africa (‘Reseau des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs Agricoles de l’afrique de l’ouest’, ROPPA)
EVO); Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA, initiated by DANIDA); ‘Programme d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la gouvernance commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest’ (See Box 4.1)

c) commissioning of studies to broaden the knowledge base for regional trade initiatives in the agricultural sector: on the livestock sector (Wageningen University); on value chain perishables in Benin and Nigeria (Buck Consultants International); on livestock and fresh produce in West Africa (Wageningen University/ Buck Consultants International).

Box 4.1: Programme d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la gouvernance commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest

Launched in 2014, the ‘Programme d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la gouvernance commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest’ aims to mobilize non-state actors (private sector, traders, civil society, trade union organizations, farmers’ organizations, Chambers of Commerce) to increase and improve regional trade through better implementation of regional protocols issued by ECOWAS. The programme is implemented by ENDA/ CACID together with the Platform of West African Civil Society on the Cotonou Agreement (‘Plateforme des Organisations de la Société Civile de l’Afrique de l’Ouest sur l’Accord de Cotonou’, POSCAO) for which ENDA/ CACID holds the secretariat. The programme aims to build upon existing initiatives and to undertake (complementary) actions on the local, national and regional level, covering the whole ECOWAS region. It is projected to run until the end of 2016.

The programme seeks to: 1) create a critical mass of informed and skilled actors capable of carrying out strategic advocacy for integration and effective implementation of the protocols, policies and regulations to strengthen intra-regional trade; 2) ensure the mobilization and effective involvement of West African actors, including local elected officials, community-based organizations, civil society, in the monitoring and implementation of protocols in regulations and policies concerning the free movement of goods and people; 3) disseminate the protocols, regulations and other legal instruments of ECOWAS with non-state actors for effective ownership; and 4) substantially increase regional trade through awareness and advocacy campaigns on the barriers to the development of intra-regional trade.

A wide range of activities are carried out to achieve these objectives including development of research and analytical capacities, training and capacity building, facilitation of consultation and multi-stakeholder dialogue and creation and operationalization of multi-stakeholder platforms.

Among a wide range of beneficiaries including private sector actors, the media, civil society actors and various national ministries, the programme particularly targets youth through building regional citizenship and enhanced leadership for West African integration and development, and women by building on their role, interests and specific constraints in informal cross-border trade in West Africa.

DUTCH EMBASSIES’ BILATERAL POLICIES AND INITIATIVES IN WEST AFRICA

BENIN

The current Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014-2017 continues to a large extent on the path set in motion by the ‘Meerjarig Strategisch Plan’ drawn up for the period 2012-2015. Although The Netherlands officially maintains a transitional relationship with Benin as

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28 ENDA/ CADID (2014), Programme d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la gouvernance commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest [undisclosed document].
30 NL MFA (2011), Meerjarig Strategisch Plan 2012-2015 Nederlandse Ambassade te Cotonou, Benin:
indicated in *A World to Gain*, for Benin it is pointed out in the current MASP that the relationship is to a large extent mainly based on aid cooperation but actively seeks to bring about this transformation.

The Embassy indicates that it will (continue to) prioritize the three spearheads water & sanitation, food & nutrition security and Sexual and Reproductive Health & Rights (SRHR), and that it aims to intensify its focus on private sector development together with economic diplomacy. Within the last area, particular policy objectives are increasing the involvement of Dutch businesses such as in the agricultural sector and improving of the business climate, in which support for improvement of the functioning of the port of Cotonou plays an important role.

In the area of agriculture and food security, the Embassy builds on its full-fledged sector strategy that was initiated in 2012. It emphasizes the need to move beyond a sole focus on agricultural production and to adopt a market-based model that seeks to further the sustainability and profitability of the agricultural sector. The MASP particularly stresses the regional setting in which Benin operates and the “obvious” need to address food security issues at the regional level. For example, it is indicated that Benin has a significant comparative advantage in terms of transit trade of commodities and in local processing of agricultural products, particularly thanks to the port of the country’s capital Cotonou and the presence of a large hinterland including Niger and Nigeria, and to a lesser extent Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad. It is further concluded that the country’s economic future particularly depends on trade with the economic powerhouse of the region Nigeria, which is until now limited by logistical difficulties and as a result of a broad range of trade barriers heavily dominated by illicit and informal trade. Although the Embassy specifically refers to the regional scope through which it seeks to enable Benin to benefit from the proximity of the Nigerian market and use the Port of Cotonou to provide for larger trade flows between Benin and its hinterland, it concludes at the same time that “solutions are likely to be country-specific”. That seems to refer to an approach in which interventions are in-country based but (implicitly) built on regional linkages.

A number of initiatives supported by the Embassy within the area of agriculture and food security in recent years seem to fit within this line of thinking. For example, in the area of rural transport infrastructure the Embassy provided financial support to the national and local government to enable them to improve feeder roads. In the area of agro-business development it was financially involved in a project executed by SNV that supports the establishment of an agri-business service centre assisting Beninese agro-businesses. It also applies to its support to initiatives in particular value chains (e.g. cotton, maize, jatropha) and to enhance access to agricultural inputs and to rural credit, and its efforts to promote private sector development more broadly.

An example of a major initiative in the area of agriculture and food security where the regional focus seem to be more explicit is the ‘Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin’ (ACMA) that aims to increase food security and develop agricultural markets in Benin (See Box 4.2).
Box 4.2: Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin (ACMA)\(^3\)

Launched in 2014, The ‘Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin (ACMA)’ (‘Communal Approach to Agricultural Market Access in Benin’) is a project funded by the Dutch Embassy in Benin that aims to improve food security and increase agricultural incomes of small-holder farmers and rural entrepreneurs. More in particular, the projects seeks to strengthen the power of local stakeholders involved in trade, to increase trade within local markets in Benin and cross-border transactions with Nigeria, and to enhance the local supply of targeted commodities (i.e. palm oil, cassava, chili pepper, fish and maize). The project is projected to run until 2017.

The project is implemented in three regions in south-eastern Benin – Ouémé, Plateau and Zoo – by a consortium of organizations led by the International Fertilizer Development Centre (IFDC) and further supported by Sahel Capital, CARE International, the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and the Benin Consulting Group (BeCG).

Its demand-driven intervention strategy builds on six axes: 1) market intelligence; 2) competitive supply; 3) multi-stakeholder interaction; 4) access to finance; 5) inclusion of vulnerable groups; and 6) facilitation of value chain logistics.

Some of the challenges encountered by the programme are the cumbersome import procedures at the Nigerian border due to the involvement of several organizations, the persistence of a number of transport barriers (e.g. expensive professional transporters), various constraints related to the need to conduct cross-border payments (e.g. impossibility for a Beninese organization to open a bank account in Nigeria) and the incongruence of national policies on trade in agricultural products among ECOWAS countries and between Benin and Nigeria in particular.\(^3\)

Notwithstanding these difficulties, a number of results have been achieved such as in the area of market intelligence through the identification of buyers, transporters and export costs, in the area of multi-stakeholder interaction by means of the installation of a so-called Intercommunal Consultation Framework and in the area of access to finance through the creation of a ACMA/ 2SCALE Guarantee Fund for the benefit of direct economic actors.

With regard to other policy areas, it is mentioned that the Embassy aims to promote a regional approach to security and human rights, building on recognition of the international/transnational character of various sources of instability in the region (e.g. Boko Haram, piracy, drugs trade). Joint and concerted actions with other embassies (and donors) in the region are considered where possible, thereby making use of available central funds. This has resulted in (albeit modest) support to a number of initiatives that have given substance to this approach.

**GHANA**

The Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014-2017 is grounded in the recognition that Ghana’s status as lower middle income country and consistent economic growth in recent years will allow The Netherlands to build and strengthen its trade and investment agenda for the country.\(^3\) The projection is that development funds for Ghana will be phased out by

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\(^3\) ‘Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin’, presentation by IDFC, September 2015 [undisclosed document].

\(^3\) ‘Trade Policies on Agricultural Products: opportunities and constraints’, Presentation at the Borderless Conference, May 2015:


\(^3\) NL MFA (2014), *Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014-2017 - Ghana*:


However, whereas in the previous MASP the embassy still indicated that the bilateral relationship with Ghana builds heavily on development assistance for its three spearheads – water, agricultural modernization and sexual and reproductive health and rights – in the current MASP the Embassy points out that it has shifted even more to private sector driven growth particularly focusing on sectors where The Netherlands has particular comparative advantages (e.g. expertise, networks, business opportunities) beyond financial means and which are relevant for Ghana’s development, such as in water, health and agriculture. In 2012 the Embassy finalized its programmes that were implemented under its budget support and public-sector oriented policies.

The current MASP emphasizes the strategic position of Ghana as regional hub for business and trade, and its critical role in the provision of regional stability. Based on this, the Embassy indicates that it is well positioned to support initiatives that have regional impact and include the other countries that are covered by the Embassy – Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo – particularly in the area of trade promotion, in agriculture and food security programmes and through the provision of (regional trade) services to Dutch businesses that have ambitions beyond Ghana only. An example of a regional initiative supported by the Dutch Embassy in Ghana is the West African Port Development Partnership (See Box 4.3). Although it seeks to expand its regional (trade) service delivery throughout the countries that this Embassy covers, it is indicated that in the case of Côte d’Ivoire and Togo service provision has so far been limited to consular and migration affairs and the maintenance of a relevant network and knowledge base for trade requests.

Box 4.3: West African Port Development Partnership\footnote{Port Development Partnership Africa – Netherlands: \url{http://portdevelopmentafrica.com/en}}

Launched in 2013, the West African Port Development Partnership is a collaboration between the Dutch Embassy in Accra and a group of Dutch businesses and knowledge institutes that operate in the area of port development. The programme ended in 2015 and is followed-up by the African Corridors platform initiative (See also Box 4.5).

The initiative builds on the recognition that ports play a critical role in both the development of markets and economies of countries as well as the broader West African region but that West African ports at the same time increasingly face (capacity) pressures.

The PDP aims to support port development in the region by providing knowledge and expertise as part of a comprehensive and sustainable approach towards port development in three critical areas: management, infrastructure & development and transport & logistics. Activities that are undertaken as part of this initiative include high-level meetings, on the job training, business-to-business collaboration and company presentations.

The initiative is part of the broader Port Development Partnership (PDP) Africa-Netherlands and is coordinated by the Netherlands-African Business Council (NABC). As the Partnership was founded thanks to support of the Dutch Embassy in Accra, the initial activities of this Partnership therefore focus on ports in West Africa in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Togo.

In the MASP it is announced that after years of political instability the head office of the African Development Bank (AfDB) will move back to Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, as has been
effectuated in 2014. It is further mentioned that the Dutch representative at the AfDB is to be supported from Accra.\textsuperscript{36} This return is presented by the Embassy as an opportunity to enhance its regional presence as well as to strengthen the Dutch network and knowledge base for regional business opportunities. It is stressed that this will require the Embassy to carefully consider how to best promote the Dutch interests (government, businesses and others) at the African Development Bank.

In line with the strategic position of Ghana as a regional hub for business and trade, the Embassy identifies (extra-)regional trade facilitation and promotion as a key policy objective in the area of agriculture and food security. This seems to apply to not only intra-regional trade but also extra-regional trade, considering the particular focus of the Embassy on cocoa, palm oil and vegetables as commodities for which there are also significant Dutch interests. In the case of cocoa, in collaboration with other Embassies in the region, the Embassy in Accra encourages its implementing partners to connect with other cocoa producing countries in West Africa. The Embassy plans to expand its regional service delivery including for Dutch businesses to support them in their regional objectives. It further indicates to actively collaborate with Ghanaian trade associations and the national government to address trade facilitation issues such as customs operations and standardization and classification procedures.

Peace and security is presented as another area where the Embassy applies a regional focus, for example through the support it provides to the Marine Trade Sharing Information Centre which is particularly involved in addressing the regional impact of piracy, for example through data collection and analysis.

\textit{Mali}

Through the Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014-2017 for Mali the Embassy indicates that its work in recent years has been particularly dominated by a series of events since early 2012 that have severely aggravated the level of insecurity and instability in the country.\textsuperscript{37} This made a significant revision of the previous ‘Meerjaren Strategisch Plan’ for the period 2012-2015 necessary, although enhancing resilience and countering exclusion were already identified as the main elements and the structural development goals that were set at the time are still considered to be valid – security & rule of law, sexual and reproductive health and rights and water management & food security.\textsuperscript{38}

This has forced the Embassy to rapidly adjust its development programme in the transition period until the elections and the installation of a new democratic government. Where possible and thanks to coordination with other donors, the Embassy has attempted to continue to work on structural (development) issues, like support to macro-economic and budgetary stability. Interventions were mainly undertaken in the area of security & rule of law, such as support to political and civil dialogue, and to the protection of human rights and religious tolerance. In other areas the Embassy was forced to take a pragmatic stance, by

\textsuperscript{36} It is not clear how the relatively recent decision to upgrade the Dutch consulate in Abidjan to full Embassy will affect this arrangement.


focusing on the facilitation of a minimum level of basic services (health, education, agriculture) at the local level.

It is mentioned that the end of the transition period has allowed the Embassy to resume programming in its three priority areas – security & rule of law, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and water management & food security. In the area of security & rule of law, although deemed much needed, it is indicated that regional institutional conditions have not allowed for designing and implementing a coherent regional approach in order to tackle transnational security issues such as cross-border crime and jihadism.

In the area of water management & food security, it is mentioned that the Embassy will also be involved in initiatives that aim to address water resource management at the regional level. An example of a major regional initiative funded by the Embassy is the PCA-GIRE programme, an integrated water resource management programme focusing on the Niger River Basin (See Box 4.4).

**Box 4.4: Programme Conjoint d’Appui (PCA) – Gestion Intégrée des Resources en Eau (GIRE)**

Launched in 2015, the ‘Programme Conjoint d’Appui (PCA) – Gestion Intégrée des Resources en Eau (GIRE)’ is an initiative funded by The Netherlands in conjunction with Sweden aimed at supporting the implementation of the National Action Plan for Integrated Management of Water Resources (‘Plan d’Action de Gestion Intégrée des Resources en Eau’, PAGIRE) initiated by the Malinese national government in 2008.

The programme consists of two support pillars each supported by one donor, which were merged to create synergies in terms of the programmes’ implementation. While PCA-GIRE as a whole particularly targets the Niger river basin in Mali, the support pillar which is funded by The Netherlands – ‘Renforcer la Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau au Mali’ – includes a cross-border component encompassing Guinea as well, as to provide a more comprehensive approach to the water management challenges experienced in Mali. This support pillar is designed to last until 2019. The support pillar funded by Sweden – ‘Projet d’Appui à l’Amélioration de la Connaissance et de la Gestion des Ressources en Eau’ – already started in 2014 and is projected to run until 2016.

PCA-GIRE is structured around the following objectives: 1) create an enabling environment (financial, legislative, political, regulatory) that facilitates the implementation of PAGIRE; 2) build a coordinated, transboundary approach aimed at enhancing food security, energy reliability and sustainable water management that takes into account the interests of the countries concerned (Mali, Guinea as well as Burkina Faso); 3) strengthen knowledge and monitoring to better inform decision-making on water management; 4) promote more efficient use of water and land by stakeholders to improve food security and raise rural incomes; and 5) ensure the inclusion of cross-cutting issues (gender, governance, climate change adaption, capacity building) into sectoral strategies and planning.

As a land-locked country Mali very much depends on its neighbouring countries for the supply of (basic) commodities. In the case of trade (facilitation), dealt with under ‘other instruments of international cooperation’, it is mentioned that the intention is that this will be coordinated as much as possible with the Dutch consul in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). However, apart from joint trade missions in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, it is indicated by the Embassy in Bamako that regional trade promotion has received little attention in recent years.

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As Senegal is no longer a partner country for a number of years already, there is – apart from possible other development funding streams such as for the private sector instruments – in principle no structural development budget available for this country. That also means that there is no Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for this country. The Netherlands has been in the process of phasing out its bilateral development programme since 2012. In the transition phase (2012-2014) the Embassy has particularly provided support to environmental conservation, including two regional initiatives. However, it is indicated that this support role will be gradually transferred to the European Union’s mission, based in Dakar, Senegal.

One is through its collaboration with the ‘Organisation pour La Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Sénégal’ (OMVS), which dates back to 2006. OMVS is an intergovernmental organization – comprising Guinee, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal – aimed at the sustainable development of the Senegal River Basin in the areas of energy, transport/navigation and agriculture/food security. A particular example of a programme funded by the Embassy is the ‘Projet de Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau et de Développement des usages à buts multiples’ (PGIRE II), the second stage of a programme that aims to strengthen regional integration and cooperation between the four countries in the area of water (resources) management.40

The second concerns its support for the ‘Partenariat Régional pour la Conservation de la zone côtière et Marine en Afrique l’Ouest’ (PRCM). The PCRM is a broad-based partnership that aims to provide a common approach to promote conservation and sustainable development in the coastal area encompassing Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone.41 The partnership is involved in wide range of activities to support this overall objective, including capacity building, resource mobilization, policy advocacy & harmonization.

Since the bilateral development programme has come to an end, The Netherlands is particularly involved in Senegal through the number of policy instruments it has its disposal to support private sector development and through its support to civil society organizations.

In addition, there a number of other recent/upcoming activities that initiated and supported by the Embassy that target regional integration and cooperation:

- Planning to finance a feasibility study commissioned by Senegal on the maritime linkages between Senegal and Cape Verde, building on an agreement between the two countries to enhance trade of goods and services by sea.42
- Financial support for the creation of a ECOWAS Citizen House, initiated by ENDA/CACID and located in Ziguinchor, Senegal. This is a center for information and documentation on regional integration and development, serving Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia in particular.43 Planned activities include training workshops and capacity building for stakeholders in regional trade and awareness-raising campaigns on ECOWAS legal instruments.44

41 PRCM: http://www.prcmarine.org/fr/node/155
42 Dutch Embassy Senegal – Newsletter February 2016: http://us4.campaign-archive1.com/?u=3dd6bc815d2259dbabf12bce2&id=3a3ffbb99f
43 Dutch Embassy Senegal – Newsletter September 2015: http://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=3dd6bc815d2259dbabf12bce2&id=3c44efef8b9
44 ENDA/ CACID, ‘First ECOWAS Citizen House opens in Ziguinchor, Southern Senegal, neighboring the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau’:
As The Netherlands maintains a trade relationship with Nigeria, there is in principle no development budget (delegated funds) available for this country. That also means that there is no Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for this country.

In recent years, the bilateral relationship with Nigeria has been primarily shaped by the focus on human rights, made possible through the Embassy’s Human Rights Fund. Furthermore, representing The Netherlands in one of the Dutch focus countries, the Embassy in Nigeria has been particularly involved in efforts aimed at strengthening trade and investment relations between The Netherlands and Nigeria and promoting the interests of Dutch businesses, amongst others through its various policy instruments for private sector development.

The Dutch Embassy in Nigeria (potentially) takes a strategic position in efforts to promote regionalism and to apply a regional approach in West Africa from within the region, because of the position of Nigeria as economic powerhouse of the region and given the fact that the headquarters of ECOWAS is located in the country’s capital Abuja. This has very recently been given an impetus through 1) the appointment of a Dutch permanent representative at ECOWAS based at the Embassy in Abuja, and 2) the creation of the position of regional economic envoy (or ‘regional business manager’) for West Africa who resides in the Embassy’s Lagos office. In the case of the former, the emphasis has been put on peace & security issues, reflected by the fact that The Netherlands is member of the ECOWAS working group for political affairs, peace & security. The Netherlands generally follows the EU line with regard to ECOWAS affairs.

Regarding the latter, being a creation of the Ministry’s International Enterprise Department (DIO) – which is part of the Directorate for Foreign Economic Relations – the position of regional economic envoy is largely meant to enhance economic diplomacy, in order to promote the Dutch business interests in the region. As this is a relatively new position that needs time to take further shape, the regional dimension has been largely unaddressed and efforts until now have mainly focused on Nigeria only and consisted of looking into private sector development initiatives within Nigeria in which Dutch (and international) businesses could play a role, for example in transport infrastructure development, the energy sector and the poultry sector.

OTHER BILATERAL ACTORS: NETHERLANDS AFRICAN BUSINESS COUNCIL (NABC)

Box 4.5: Netherlands African Business Council (NABC) in West Africa

The role of the Netherlands African Business Council (NABC) is to foster the trade and investment dialogue between the Netherlands and West African countries. NABC uses both a regional and national approach to improve trade and business relations between the Netherlands and African countries. With regard to West Africa, NABC especially focuses on overcoming barriers and enhancing trade and investment relations. Additionally, NABC is working towards increased public-private sector cooperation.

Trade

Trade dominates the business relations between the Netherlands and West African countries. From NABC’s experiences in organising trade missions towards countries (e.g. Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and other countries), trade related to the agribusiness sector is apparent. Trade from West Africa to the Netherlands comprises commodities, cocoa, (sesame) seeds, cashew, and fruits. Fertilizers, agri-machinery, and onions travel from the Netherlands to West African countries, mostly

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45 This profile has been prepared by Jan Maas and Marina Diboma (NABC).
the countries along the coast. In addition, Dutch companies active in the transport & logistics sector also do business in West Africa, in both landlocked and coastal countries. From NABC’s experiences, Dutch companies export machinery, trucks, specialised digging, dredging and transport equipment to West Africa. Lastly, energy related business are increasingly interested in doing business in West Africa, particularly renewable energy.

Agribusiness

In the GhanaVeg program NABC works together with the Dutch Embassy Ghana, the Centre for Development Innovation of the Wageningen University and the IFTC. The GhanaVeg program focuses on development of the Ghanaian vegetable sector. In this program, NABC is responsible for linking Dutch horticulture companies to Ghanaian business partners through personal business support and the organization of four trade missions to and from Ghana, 2 business seminars and press releases. This has resulted in over 15 Dutch companies traveling to Ghana in the last two years, and more than five GhanaVeg subsidized projects being developed with Dutch input from the seed, fertilizer, logistics & trade sectors.

Port Development – African Corridors

The Ports Development Partnership (PDP) aims to put the expertise of the Dutch ports sector at the disposal of West African ports. West African ports find themselves operating in an increasingly complex environment influenced by factors like sustainability, safety and economies of scale. With the Port Development Partnership NABC united a consortium of Dutch companies and organisations active in sectors directly related to port development, focusing at: 1) Port management; 2) Infrastructure & development; and 3) Transport & logistics. The PDP program ended in 2015.

As a follow-up, NABC is building on the insights in both opportunities and barriers of the PDP program by creating a African Corridors platform, which unites the Dutch companies active/ interested in further development of corridors. In connecting landlocked countries like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and the hinterland of other West African countries with ports on the West African coast (from Senegal to Nigeria), the Dutch private sector has expertise, knowledge and the right equipment in developing these corridors and contribute to regional integration and trade.

NABC’s activities with regard to West Africa:

- Informational sessions on doing business in the Netherlands, Dutch economic instrument exploration to the local public and private sector in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
- Business seminar (West African Business Seminar) and country/ sector specific knowledge sessions.

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SECTION 5: INVENTORY OF EXISTING (POLICY) INITIATIVES

Paul Lange

**Section conclusions:**
- ECOWAS and UEMOA are generally recognized as the two key regional organizations in West Africa that have moved the integration agenda in West Africa forward.
- Both have developed many initiatives in a wide range of sectors and areas to further regional (economic) integration and cooperation, including around trade, agriculture, industrial development and infrastructure.
- Looking at these particular initiatives, the overall level of progress on regional integration in West Africa has been below expectations. The gap between regional agreement and implementation/enforcement on the ground is a major concern for many of these initiatives.
- The most engaged bilateral and multilateral development partners around the promotion of regional integration in West Africa are the African Development Bank; World Bank; European Commission; Germany/ GIZ; United Kingdom/ DFID; United States/ USAID; Japan/JICA; The Netherlands, Spain/ AECID and France/ AFD.
- There is a multitude of (policy) initiatives by a wide range of development partners aimed at regional (economic) integration in West Africa. Many of these initiatives target trade promotion & facilitation, what appears to be an important dimension of regional integration for several development partners. In addition, many of these initiatives build on agriculture & food security as a major area of attention.
- Despite the rise of institutional frameworks to coordinate their initiatives and increasing multi-donor programmes, the engagement of development partners in West Africa is still to a large extent fragmented and donor coordination is largely regarded as insufficient.

INITIATIVES BY REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN WEST AFRICA

This sub-section summarizes some of the major initiatives aimed at regional integration taken by regional organizations in West Africa, with an emphasis on economic integration. The main focus is on ECOWAS and UEMOA as these are generally recognized as the two key regional organizations in West Africa who have moved the integration agenda in West Africa forward (See Figure 5.1). In recent years, there have been a very large number of initiatives taken by ECOWAS and UEMOA across a wide range of thematic areas. This section zooms in on some major (policy) initiatives and programmes by ECOWAS and UEMOA in four key areas of economic integration: trade, agriculture, industrial development and infrastructure. When discussing these initiatives, this section particularly attempts to highlight some of the main challenges brought forward by the literature that account for the (potential) gap between agreement and the insufficient implementation and limited progress that many of these initiatives have generally encountered.

This sub-section concludes with highlighting the role of the sub-regional institution Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (‘Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel’, CILSS). In addition to ECOWAS and UEMOA, CILSS is considered to be among the frontrunners in West Africa in terms of driving regional integration and plays a key role in the (technical) implementation of ECOWAS and UEMOA initiatives, particularly in the area of agriculture & food security.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES

West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (‘Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine’, UEMOA) was founded in 1994 to promote the economic and monetary integration among the Francophone West African countries. Its existence can be traced back to the creation of the West African Monetary Union (‘Union Monétaire Ouest-Africaine’, UMOA). Established in 1962, UMOA was particularly rooted in monetary integration and cooperation between the West African Francophone countries that share the West African CFA franc as common currency. Many of the UEMOA members have been member of a regional organization since their independence and therefore share a history of regionalism.

The creation of UEMOA was a result of the need felt by its member states to reinforce and complement its advancement in the area of monetary affairs with stronger economic integration and cooperation, including the creation of a customs union. Its focus on economic integration is reflected in its 1994 founding Treaty that was grounded in the following five broad objectives: 1) greater economic competitiveness; 2) convergence of macroeconomic policies and indicators; 3) creation of common market; 4) coordination of sectorial policies; and 5) harmonization of fiscal policies. The need to strengthen economic integration and

46 Former Portuguese colony Guinea-Bissau became the eight member of UEMOA in 1997.
cooperation among its members has been reiterated by UEMOA in subsequent strategic policy frameworks including the more recent ones, such as its Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and its Vision 2020.

It has been generally concluded that UEMOA since its establishment has fared relatively well, for example in terms of progress made regarding the establishment of a free trade area, the establishment of macro-economic convergence criteria, and monetary integration thanks to its historical legacy of a common currency.\(^47\) It has gone through a significant institutional transformation, through the establishment of a number of Community institutions and the creation of specialized institutions such as the Central Bank of West African States (‘Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest’, BCEAO) and the West African Development Bank (‘Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement’, BOAD). It also initiated a number of common general and sectoral policies and programmes in a wide range of thematic areas (e.g. agriculture, industrial development, energy, environment) and in some cases at an earlier stage than ECOWAS, for example in the case of its agricultural policy (‘Politique Agricole de l’UEMOA’, PAU), industrial policy (‘Politique Industrielle Commune’, PIC) and its common external tariff. Notwithstanding these achievements, it is however indicated that its successes in terms of economic integration compare unfavorably with the monetary dimension.\(^48\) Furthermore, it is concluded that many of the policies it has introduced in the course of the years are hampered by implementation challenges, for example in the area of the free movement of people.\(^49\)

**Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**

Regional integration is at the heart of the existence of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as set forth in its founding Treaty of 1975. From the very beginning as laid down in its founding objectives, the Community has put major emphasis on strengthening economic integration and cooperation, as a means to promote accelerated and sustained economic development of its Member States. In order to give the integration process real meaning, a key ECOWAS objective from the start has been to establish a West-African-wide customs union, through creating a free-trade zone among the ECOWAS member countries and developing a common external tariff for trade with non-member countries. Since the 1994 revised Treaty the focus of the Community has gone well beyond economic matters, most notably in terms of cooperation around political, legal and security issues.

Notwithstanding this gradual broadening of its scope, the focus on economic integration has been to a large extent preserved by ECOWAS, demonstrated by its central role in subsequent ECOWAS general regional development strategies, including the most recent ones. In 2007, ECOWAS launched its Vision 2020\(^50\), its current main regional development strategy in which it aims to move from a ‘ECOWAS of states’ to a ‘ECOWAS of people’. In this document, ECOWAS reaffirmed its commitment to improve the West African integration process and to enhance its effectiveness, in which economic (and monetary) integration is one of the

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building blocks. In 2010 ECOWAS issued its Regional Strategic Plan 2011-2015. It identified deepening socio-economic (and monetary) integration as one of its strategic priorities and referred to it as the main mission of the ECOWAS institutions, needed in order to raise the living standards of its people. In 2013, ECOWAS adopted the Community Development Programme (CDP) which has been set up to implement its Vision 2020 and to draw up a coherent programme of activities needed to realize this vision. Implementation of the CDP is planned for 2014-2018 and builds on four priority areas, including the ‘consolidation of economic integration’.

Since its establishment there have been numerous ECOWAS initiatives aimed at moving the regional integration process forward. The institutional arrangements of ECOWAS have evolved significantly, through erecting a Community institutional architecture and the establishment of several specialized sub-agencies, such as the West African Health Organization (WAHO) and the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI). In 2007 the ECOWAS Secretariat was restructured into a Commission. It has set up and articulated various common policies and programmes in all sectors mentioned in the revised 1994 Treaty, such as in agriculture, industry, mining, education and legal matters.

As a result, there are a number of areas in which ECOWAS has made significant headway and in which it is regarded a frontrunner on the African continent, for example in the area of free movement of people, regional peace & security issues and political governance. However, despite the fact that its founding objectives were essentially economic, real progress in terms of regional economic integration has generally been slow. Lack of funding, capacity and (political) will in the Member States are generally put forward as the main reasons for the limited advancement in this dimension of integration.

TRADE

UEMOA Customs Union

The UEMOA customs union was put in place in two steps. With regard to an internal free trade area, its member countries decided in 1996 to remove tariffs on intraregional trade, starting with unprocessed goods of local origin and traditional handicraft products. The breakdown of tariffs on trade in industrial products – subject to certain eligibility criteria –

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53 The 2015 UNECA/ECOWAS publication An Assessment of Progress Towards Regional Integration in the Economic Community of West African States since its Inception provides an overview of ECOWAS’ main sectoral policies: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/int_progr_ri_inceptionecowaseng.pdf
56 This section draws heavily on: Goretti and Weisfeld (2008), Trade in the WAEMU: Developments and Reform Opportunities, IMF Working Paper; Coulibaly and Plunkett (2006), Lessons from the implementation of the WAEMU/UEMOA Common External Tariff since 2000 for the implementation of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff by the end of 2007, GREAT and USAID.
were phased out over four years. Alongside tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions on intraregional trade for these products were also gradually eliminated.

Concerning the common external tariff, its introduction was already arranged for in its 1994 founding Treaty. The CET establishment benefited greatly from the fact that the differences in tariffs were already minor, as all of the member countries belonged to the West African Economic Community (‘Communauté Economique de l’Afrique Ouest’, CEAO) which had a Community Regional Tax, the predecessor of the UEMOA CET. Amongst others things, the UEMOA CET provided for the harmonization of custom duty through a four-band tariff structure based on a product classification, ranging from a 0% tariff rate for basic social goods, to a 20% tariff rate for finished consumption goods. To address the impact of the UEMOA CET in terms of changing market circumstances and the interests of local producers, its establishment was complemented by a number of accompanying measures, including common safeguard measures. One is the Decreasing Protection Tax (‘Taxe Dégressive de Protection’, DTP) which is a community mechanism that can be applied at the national level to provide protection to certain products and industries, in the case of UEMOA for agro-industrial products in particular.

Although the creation of the UEMOA customs union has been generally considered to be successful – for example in terms of the gradual increase of products and businesses that were approved for duty exemption – it is at the same time concluded that the persistence of non-tariff barriers and administrative weaknesses in the region has hampered its implementation.57 Most non-tariff barriers result from (ad hoc) national trade regulations that conflict with the UEMOA trade rules. In addition, it was mentioned that despite their common trade regime, after their introduction member states have continued to dispute on the tariff rates.58

**ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS)**59

The ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) is the main ECOWAS framework for creating a free trade area by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers (such as customs duties, quotas and prohibitions) among the ECOWAS countries. It is an important pillar of its aim to establish a common market, as already included in the 1975 ECOWAS founding Treaty. It particularly aims to encourage entrepreneurial development in the region; increase intraregional trade and boost economic activity; enhance West African competitiveness on the global market; and improve GDP of the ECOWAS member states, thus better welfare for citizens.

Although the Scheme was already adopted in 1979, and its implementation should have started the same year, it only came into force in 1990. The Scheme covers three groups of products: unprocessed goods, traditional handicraft products and industrial products. Under the ETLS only goods that adhere to a number of conditions – for example the ECOWAS Rules of Origin as only products that originate within the region qualify – are allowed to move duty-free and quota-free across the region, whereby approval is required on a product-to-product and enterprise-to-enterprise basis. While the start of the implementation period

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57 Goretti and Weisfeld (2008), p. 6-10.
resulted in an immediate and full liberalization of trade in unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts, there was planned for a phased liberalization for trade in industrial products in a maximum period of ten years, according to the level of economic strength of three groups of ECOWAS member countries (See Figure 5.2). Trade liberalization for these products was to be implemented alongside the gradual establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) to fully realize the aim of a customs union.

However, despite the agreed implementation schedule, total elimination of all trade barriers did not happen in the course of the 10-year time period and has still not yet fully materialized. There has been a number of attempts to speed up implementation of the ETLS. As one of the more recent efforts, during the ECOWAS Summit of July 2013 the so-called Authority of Heads of State and Government (AHOSG) agreed on a roadmap which provided for a set of initiatives to fast-track ETLS implementation, including the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and computerization of the approval process.

**Figure 5.2: Implementation of ETLS for industrial products**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Period within which tariffs are to be eliminated</th>
<th>Rate of reduction of Customs duties and taxes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1: Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger.</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>10% reduction each year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2: Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>12.5% reduction each year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>16.6% reduction each year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large number of reasons have been brought forward to account for the poor implementation of the ETLS to date. Examples include member states’ (in)actions that impede or even go against the trade liberalization provisions (e.g. the imposition of periodic export bans and levying of taxes on products of ECOWAS origin), ongoing bureaucratic bottlenecks for example in the form of approval delays, the persistence of both non-tariff (e.g. interstate differences in standards and weights, non-mutual recognition of quality certificates issues by national structures) and tariff barriers (e.g. different kinds of taxes and fees), lack of awareness of ETLS rules and procedures among a wide range of stakeholders, and the incidence of corruption among law enforcement agents at borders (e.g. extortions, intimidation and harassment).  

**ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET)**

A second important pillar in the establishment of a customs union by ECOWAS is the setting of a common external tariff. In 2006, the ECOWAS member states decided to use the four-band tariff structure of the UEMOA Common External Tariff that had already been in use

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since 2000 and approved its extension to cover the whole ECOWAS region. Negotiations between the UEMOA and non-UEMOA countries that followed particularly revolved around a fifth tariff band and the designation of agricultural products in particular, as to underline the importance of agriculture for the ECOWAS region. In October 2013 the member countries authorized the final adoption of the ECOWAS CET. The member countries reached agreement on a five-band structure, with more than half of the agricultural tariff lines distributed in the two highest bands (See Figure 5.3 and 5.4).

**Figure 5.3: Structure of the ECOWAS CET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Average duty rate</th>
<th>Number of tariff lines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Essential social Goods</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Goods of primary necessity, raw materials and specific inputs</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inputs and Intermediate goods.</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Final Consumption goods</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Specific goods for economic development</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.4: Distribution of agricultural tariff lines between the five bands**

Alongside the adoption of the CET, the member states also agreed on a number of supplementary protection or safeguard measures available for ECOWAS countries during a transition period to help adjust to the new tariff structure (also because many ECOWAS countries are heavily reliant on import taxes as a source of income) and to deal with the market volatility of agricultural products in particular, such as the Import Adjustment Tax and the Complementary Protection Tax. It is indicated that implementation and enforcement of these measures may become very challenging because it will involve careful monitoring of prices and volumes and efficient decision-making to ensure their effectiveness.62

The CET was to become operational on January 1, 2015. However, the actual implementation date has varied between the member countries and many of them have missed the deadline.

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due to delayed national ratification and the required training and capacity building of customs officials. Furthermore, it is indicated that CET implementation may also be challenged and vary among member states because of possible violations of the states’ WTO commitments due to incongruencies between their so-called bound tariffs and the CET rates. At the time of their accession to the WTO, each member state has individually negotiated their bound tariffs, with the result that some have relatively low bound tariffs compared to the CET tariff bands while other member states work with relatively higher tariff rates at the WTO. {63}

AGRICULTURE

**UEMOA Common Agricultural Policy (PAU)***

The UEMOA Common Agricultural Policy (‘Politique Agricole de l’UEMOA’, PAU) was initiated in 2001, and predates the adoption of ECOWAP by four years. The Policy’s overall aim is to contribute to the food security of the population, the economic and social development of its Member States and rural poverty reduction. It is built around three axes: 1) improving the competitiveness and production of key agricultural value chains – rice, maize, livestock, meat, poultry and cotton – and the enabling environment; 2) deepening the common market for the agricultural sector and improving the management of shared resources; and 3) integrating the agricultural market of the UEMOA countries into the regional and international markets.

There have been a number of activities undertaken to support the implementation of PAU, particularly in the first two axes. One is the establishment by UEMOA in 2006 of the Regional Agricultural Development Fund (‘Fonds Régional de Développement Agricole’, FRDA) to finance UEMOA’s agricultural development through developing agricultural finance systems, by supporting capacity building and by promoting regional institutional investments. Another is the creation of a Regional Agricultural Information System (‘Système d’Information Agricole Régionale’, SIAR) to strengthen the availability of statistical information that can help to inform the design and implementation of agricultural strategies in the region. In addition, there have been efforts to further policy and legislation harmonization, for example around seeds & pesticides and veterinary pharmaceuticals.

The PAU is implemented in parallel to and in coordination with ECOWAP. However, its implementation that started in 2002 has taken much longer than originally planned as it has been confronted with a number of obstacles. Some of the implementation challenges that have been identified are a strong dependence on funding by external development partners which is said to have compromised the independence of UEMOA in designing the programme and which has affected the speed of implementation; the inadequate implementation at the national level of regional harmonization processes - such as with regard to input standards - due to lack of financial resources and (human) capacities; the insufficient and ineffective consultation with stakeholders, such as farmers’ organizations; the policy incongruence

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between the PAU mission to promote agricultural growth and the UEMOA Common External Tariff that resulted in decreased protection for the agricultural sector through lower tariff rates in several member states; and lack of a formal monitoring and evaluation system that limits the ability to measure the impact and to make adjustments when needed.

**ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)**

In order to develop an integrated and region-wide approach to agricultural development as to underline the importance of agriculture for West Africa, ECOWAS adopted in 2005 its regional agricultural policy ECOWAP. With its adoption, ECOWAP merged with the existing Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) initiated by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001 as a African-wide approach to promote agriculture-led development. West Africa was through ECOWAP the first region in Africa that developed a regional approach to the CAADP.

ECOWAP/ CAADP provides a common framework for agricultural development, focusing on three key areas: 1) increasing the productivity and competitiveness of West African agriculture; 2) implementing a free trade area within West Africa for agricultural goods and services; and 3) adopting a common trade regime for agricultural goods and services towards countries outside of the ECOWAS region. The overall objective of ECOWAP/ CAADP is to address the fundamental structural and policy problems that obstruct agricultural growth and competitiveness in the region. More in particular, the regional policy seeks to achieve the following objectives: a) food security for people in the region; b) reducing food dependence and achieving food sovereignty; d) involving producers in markets; e) creating jobs with guaranteed incomes in order to improve living conditions and services in rural areas; f) intensifying production systems in a sustainable manner; g) reducing the vulnerability of West African economies by limiting factors of instability and regional insecurity; h) adopting appropriate funding mechanisms.

ECOWAP/ CAADP builds on three particular components: 1) investment programs at the national (National Agricultural Investment Plan, NAIP) and the regional level (Regional Agricultural Investment Plan, RAIP) backing the national/ regional sector-wide approach to agricultural development (‘Compacts’) developed as part of the CAADP framework; 2) introducing a complementary set of policy and regulatory reforms that enable implementation, for example in the area of taxation and investment policies; and 3) setting up the institutional framework required to implement the regional policy framework, including the creation of the ECOWAS Development Fund (ECOWADF) and the Regional Agency for Food and Agriculture.

Although agreement took some time after the adoption of ECOWAP – apart from Guinea-Bissau who reached agreement in 2011, the national compacts of all ECOWAS countries and the regional compact were signed in 2009 – the ECOWAS region is in terms of the ECOWAP/ CAADP process ahead of other regions on the continent. However, the implementation

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process has been ongoing for a number of years. Some of the (potential) challenges to implementation that have been raised are the insufficient buy-in of both signatory stakeholders to the Compact (e.g. farmers’ organizations, donors) as well as non-signatory stakeholders (e.g. emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India that increasingly play an important role with regard to agricultural development in West Africa); lack of policy constancy needed to effectuate broad-based and significant agricultural transformation; inadequate alignment of the regional component with the national component of ECOWAP/CAADP and with incentives/interests of the many stakeholders involved to ensure coherence and coordination of efforts; and the trade-off between financing and ownership of efforts as many of the programmes undertaken within the framework of ECOWAP/CAADP are to a large extent funded by external actors.\(^66\)

In 2015 ECOWAS organized the ECOWAP+10 Conference to take stock of 10 years of implementation and to examine perspectives for the future. Some of the implementation challenges raised earlier were confirmed at this occasion. It was generally agreed that ECOWAP continues to be “a patchwork of embryonic donor-driven programmes” as it has suffered from a lack of (financial) resources and leadership within ECOWAS and has been undermined by uneven implementation and inconsistent enforcement.\(^67\)

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

**UEMOA Common Industrial Policy (PIC)**\(^68\)

The Common Industrial Policy ('Politique Industrielle Commune', PIC) was created in 1999 to enhance industrial development in the UEMOA region. It builds on the following six focus areas: 1) development of structures and programmes aimed at quality promotion; 2) upgrading of businesses and their enabling environment; 3) promotion of information networks; 4) promotion of investments and exports; 5) development of SMEs/SMLs; and 6) strengthening of consultation processes at the regional level.

One of the few (visible) concrete initiatives taken within the PIC framework is the West Africa Quality Programme (WAQM)\(^69\), set up in 2001 and implemented by the United Nations Industrial Development Programme (UNIDO). This programme aimed at improving the (regional) quality infrastructure in the UEMOA region and promoting a regional approach towards metrology, accreditation and standardization. When the programme provisionally came to an end in 2005, it had resulted in the creation of a Regional Coordination Committee on Quality, and three permanent regional structures, namely the West African Accreditation System, the Regional Secretariat of Standardization, Certification and Quality Promotion, and the West African Secretariat for Metrology. These practical achievements in this initial phase


led to the continuation of the programme that is still ongoing and currently covers the whole ECOWAS region.

Another initiative is the Restructuring and Upgrading Programme (‘Programme de Restructuration et de Mise à Niveau’, PRMN) that was introduced in 2006. The programme focused on reviving industrial production, promoting investment and employment and strengthening the industries’ competitiveness at the regional and international level. More in particular, the programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of business to implement technological change according to the demands of regional and international markets, and building a supportive environment capable of providing these businesses with the skills and capacities to become more competitive. Although the pilot phase of the programme (2007-2012) was generally considered to be rather successful in terms of its efficiency and impact, some of the challenges that were identified related to the lack of consideration of business constraints – (unfair) competition from imports, particularly agri-business products, the weak transport infrastructure, the lack of access to certain industrial raw materials – over-centralization of the programme management at the regional level and insufficient integration of existing business support structures at the national level.

West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP)\textsuperscript{,} In an effort to promote industrial development in the West African region, ECOWAS adopted in 2010 the West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP). The vision of the Policy is to “maintain a solid industrial structure, which is globally competitive, environment-friendly and capable of significantly improving the living standards of the people by 2030.”\textsuperscript{,} It is envisioned that WACIP will be implemented over a 20-year time period, and that measures will be taken to promote alignment with other sector policies such as ECOWAP and comprehensive trade policy frameworks like CET and ETLS.

The Policy aims to diversify and broaden the region’s industrial base and has set a number of quantitative targets that relate to raising the share of West African manufacturing industry in raw material processing, regional GDP, in intraregional trade and in the volume of exports to the world market. A cross-cutting objective of the Policy is also to use industrial development as a means to further increase the level of intraregional trade within the ECOWAS region.

Implementation of the Policy is divided into ten programmes that together aim to provide for a coherent approach towards industrial development in the region: 1) development of microenterprises, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises/Industries (SMEs/ SMIs) and major industries; 2) industrial research and development programme (IR&D); 3) development of regional intellectual property rights (IPRs); 4) development of regional financing; 5) development of a Business Opportunity Information Management System (ECO-BIZ);

6) creation of the regional industrial partnership network; 7) infrastructure development; 8) Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology Programme (SQAM); 9) Managerial capacity and skills development programme; and 10) industry restructuring and rehabilitation programme.

Since its adoption, there have been a number of initiatives to take the implementation of WACIP forward, including sensitization workshops, identification of support assessments and capacity development/ skills development programmes. The Standardization, Quality assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM) programme has been mentioned as an area where concrete results have been achieved, particular in terms of capacity building and harmonization, by building on progress made by the West Africa Quality Programme (WAQP). At the same time it is indicated that overall programme implementation has been very limited as the other nine programmes were not yet operational. This has been attributed to a lack of disincentives within the framework of WACIP to prevent non-compliance by ECOWAS member states. WACIP also does not provide protection mechanisms that allow local industries to develop. For example, it has been indicated that WACIP does not prevent member countries to export raw material without prior local processing, driven by suppressive customs tariffs. Furthermore, it has also been brought forward that implementation of national industrial policies developed within the framework of WACIP has been inefficient and has not (yet) produced the desired results – for example in terms of increasing value added exports – or even counterproductive outcomes such as competing production facilities.

INFRASTRUCTURE

UEMOA Road Infrastructure and Transport Programme (PACITR)

The UEMOA Road Infrastructure and Transport Community Action Programme (‘Programme d’Actions Communautaires des Infrastructures et de Transports Routiers’, PACITR) was adopted in 2001 and was to cover a ten-year period. It has four general objectives: 1) to ensure convergence of national policies and regional coordination of road sector actions; 2) to improve competitiveness of UEMOA member States’ economies through the free movement of goods and services and the reduction of road transport costs; 3) to alleviate poverty; and 4) to reduce the social costs of road insecurity.

PACITR further builds on the following components: 1) interstate road infrastructure, involving periodic maintenance and rehabilitation of asphalted roads, development and asphalting of missing road links and engineering works particularly between the region’s capital cities; 2) trans-border rural road pilot programme; 3) facilitation of interstate road transportation and transit, focusing on the harmonization of procedures and regulations, establishing juxtaposed border checkpoints and setting up an observatory that monitors and redresses abnormal practices on interstate roads; and 4) road safety. Figure 5.5 provides a map indicating the planned road infrastructure projects within the framework of PACITR.

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75 OECD, AfDB, UNDP (2015), p. 84.
Although according to official planning PACITR was due to expire in 2010, it was indicated in a 2013 UEMOA evaluation report that implementation was still ongoing.\(^77\)

**Figure 5.5: PACITR planned road infrastructure projects**

ECOWAS infrastructure initiatives\(^78\)

In terms of infrastructure, ECOWAS has been working so far mainly in three key areas: transport, telecommunications and energy. There is a series of ongoing multi-country and regional projects and programmes that further infrastructural development in West Africa. These initiatives are to a large extent undertaken within the framework of the Programme for Infrastructure Development (PIDA). PIDA serves as an African-wide strategic framework for both continental and regional infrastructural development in energy, transport, information & communication technology and cross-border water resources, and is developed in 2012 by the African Union, the African Development Bank and NEPAD. ECOWAS was selected as lead regional economic community for the implementation of a number of infrastructural projects that were identified as part of the first round of PIDA priority projects (2012-2020) in West Africa (See Table 5.1).


\(^78\) This section draws heavily on: OECD/ WTO (2015), Aid for trade at a glance. Reducing trade costs for inclusive, sustainable growth: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4trade15_e.pdf
Table 5.1: List of PIDA projects in West Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Costs (US$ millions)</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sambagalou</td>
<td>128 MW of hydropower capacity, 930 km from the mouth of the Gambia River to supply Senegal, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Gambia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Senegal, OMVG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa Power Transmission Corridor</td>
<td>2,000 km line along the coast connecting with the existing Ghana–Nigeria line with a capacity of 1,000 MW</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaleta</td>
<td>Hydropower generation of 117 MW</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>Guinea – OMVG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria–Algeria Pipeline</td>
<td>4,100 km gas pipeline from Warri to Hassi R’Mel in Algeria for export to Europe</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Nigeria, Niger, Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan-Lagos Coastal Corridor</td>
<td>Modernization ARTIN corridor in West Africa</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakar-Niamey Multimodal Corridor</td>
<td>Modernization ARTIN corridor in West Africa</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praia-Dakar-Abidjan Multimodal Corridor</td>
<td>Marine transport improvement; maritime service creation between island and mainland; modern information system that links the maritime service with ports and road corridor in the Dakar-Abidjan Corridor; modernization ARTIN corridor</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan-Ouagadougou/Bamako</td>
<td>Modernization/rehabilitation multimodal corridor</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa Hub Port and Rail Programme</td>
<td>Regional hub port and rail linkage master plan; port expansion</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>ECOWAS countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa Air Transport</td>
<td>Transport service level increase</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>ECOWAS region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fomi</td>
<td>Hydropower station; water supply irrigation and regulation of the Niger River (nine countries)</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>Niger River Basin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourbassy</td>
<td>Multipurpose dam</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Senegal River Basin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noumbiel</td>
<td>Multipurpose dam with hydropower generation</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Volta River Basin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AfDB/ AU/ NEPAD, 2012
In order to come a more comprehensive regional approach towards infrastructure development, ECOWAS is in the process of drafting a regional infrastructure development master plan targeting energy, transport, cross-border water resources and communication technologies.\(^79\)

In the area of transport there are projects that mainly involve construction work (‘hard’ infrastructure) as well as projects that focus on transport and trade facilitation (‘soft’ infrastructure), to address the existence of numerous checkpoints and non-tariff barriers following from uncoordinated procedures that guide the movement of goods and persons.

In the case of the former category, there are many corridor and infrastructure development interventions across the region, targeting road transport in particular – the West Africa road network is referred to as one of the areas where ECOWAS has made significant progress\(^80\) – and to a lesser extent railway infrastructure. Examples include the Abidjan – Lagos Corridor Highway Development project, the Trans-Gambia transport corridor project and the Dakar – Bamako railway line project. Progress in the area of air and water-based transportation is particularly to be found in regulatory and institutional reforms.

With regard to transport and trade facilitation, one of the key ECOWAS initiative is the Interstate Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme for West Africa (ISRTTFP-WA) developed in collaboration with UEMOA. The programme includes the following components: 1) simplification and harmonization of road transport regulations, procedures and documents; 2) establishment of joint border posts along interstate corridors; and 3) establishment of observatories to identify and analyze abnormal practices which impede traffic fluidity on road corridors.\(^81\) Another example is the ECOWAS Joint Border Posts programme, which involves the construction of and installation of equipment for a number of posts across the region. Despite high expectations it is indicated that programme implementation has been lacking due to lack of funding and limited availability of capacity and knowledge within the member states to assist ECOWAS in carrying out the programme.\(^82\)

Notwithstanding the large number of infrastructural works and the practical achievements of some of these projects, there are a number of factors identified that have obstructed effective implementation of transport facilitation programmes, including limited conversion of ETLS protocols into national laws and insufficient sensitization with rules and procedures which makes that numerous checkpoints and non-tariff barriers continue to exist.\(^83\)

**Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS)**
Following the severe drought that hit the Sahel in the 1970s, the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (‘Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel’, CILSS) was founded in 1973. It comprises thirteen member states including a large number of ECOWAS countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) plus Mauritania and Chad.

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\(^81\) ECOWAS – Aid for Trade, ‘Transport Facilitation Project’: [http://www.aidfortrade.ecowas.int/programmes/transport-facilitation-project](http://www.aidfortrade.ecowas.int/programmes/transport-facilitation-project)


\(^83\) Ibid.
Its mission is to invest in research for food security and the fight against the effects of drought and desertification. CILSS is involved in a number of activities to achieve this mission, including the formulation, harmonization and implementation of (national and regional) strategies/ policies/ programmes, capacity building & training, and research & analysis, particularly in the areas of food security, fight against desertification, management of natural resources, regional market access for agriculture/ food products and population/ demography issues. It has been increasingly recognized as the technical branch responsible for implementation for policies initiated by ECOWAS and UEMOA in the area of agriculture/ food security, such as within the framework of ECOWAP and PAU.

CILSS is involved in a number of major regional initiatives. One example is the Regional Support Programme for Market Access (‘Programme Régional d’Appui Accès aux Marchés’, PRA/ Accès aux Marchés) that aims to strengthen intraregional trade in agriculture/ food products. Made possible by the financial support provided by USAID, this programme aims to redress (non-)tariff barriers to trade, amongst others, by collecting and disseminating (market) information (data on trade flows along corridors; surveys on road harassment), facilitating implementation of (regional) trade policies, capacity building to enhance national (market) information systems and helping to enhance local marketing and (health) standards compliance. Although the programme was already launched in 2005, it is an ongoing CILSS initiative.

A second example is the Regional Support Programme for Pastoralism in the Sahel (‘Programme Régional d’Appui du Pastoralisme au Sahel, PRAPS), launched in 2015 and will run until 2021. CILSS coordinates the programme implementation at the regional level under the political leadership of the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions. Funded by the World Bank, this programme seeks to improve the access to agricultural inputs and services for (agro-)pastoralist in the six Sahelian countries Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad. It builds on four particular pillars: 1) animal health; 2) natural resource management; 3) market access; and 4) pastoral crisis management.

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84 CILSS adopted in April 2015 its ‘Programme de Travail 2015-2019’ as a strategic framework to guide its operations. This document however does not (yet) seem to be digitally available.
INITIATIVES BY OTHER DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

This sub-section discusses the initiatives taken by the international development community aimed at supporting regional integration in West Africa. With regard to current efforts, it is generally recognized that there are many development partners operating in West Africa and that there is a complex and dense network of initiatives in a wide range of sectors, including agriculture, infrastructure, trade and peace & security. As an indication, Appendix 5A provides an overview of donor interventions aimed at regional integration that was compiled by the African Development Bank as part of its Regional integration Strategy Paper 2011-2015.

Drawing on a recent donor mapping prepared as part of a scoping study conducted by consultancy agency Saana in support of the Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA) initiative by DANIDA (more recently joined by The Netherlands), the most engaged bilateral and multilateral development partners around the promotion of regional integration in West Africa identified are: African Development Bank; World Bank; European Commission; Germany/ GIZ; United Kingdom/ DfID; United States/ USAID; Japan/JICA; and The Netherlands. Based on their proven track record in spurring regionalism in West Africa, it was decided to add Spain/ AECID and France/ AFD to this selection.

This section discusses each of these development partners and their profile in regional integration in West, together with a brief description of some of their major initiatives. The role of The Netherlands has already been touched upon in a previous section. The remainder of this section zooms in on a few examples where development partners have made an attempt to coordinate their engagement in West Africa and highlights a number of multi-donor initiatives aimed at regional integration that have been launched in recent years.

Based on the author’s assessment, the next page presents a matrix that attempts to capture these development partners’ engagement around regional integration in West Africa according to specific focus areas (See Table 5.2).

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89 The report refers to the World Bank and the African Development Bank as “the major international financial institutions” and to the other actors mentioned as “the biggest players”. To be exact, this selection is based on their engagement in the area of regional integration in West Africa with the addition of the sub-areas “trade” and “transport issues”.
90 The ATWA report also identifies China as important actor in the region but particularly for its role as major investor and trading partner.
91 This scoping study does not look into the engagement around regional integration in West Africa of ‘non-traditional’ development partners such as China, Brazil, Turkey and India. Given their growing influence on the African continent including West Africa, an interesting area for further research would be to look into their specific role in the region.
### Table 5.2 Development partners matrix: regional integration focus areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPMENT PARTNER</th>
<th>Institutional development</th>
<th>Governance/ peace &amp; security</th>
<th>Monetary integration</th>
<th>Infrastructure development ('hard infrastructure')</th>
<th>Transport &amp; Trade facilitation ('soft infrastructure')</th>
<th>Cross-border agriculture &amp; food security issues</th>
<th>Key (ongoing) initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| African Development Bank | ++ | + | 0 | ++ | ++ | ++ | - Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinee (CLSG) Electricity Networks Interconnection Project  
- Multinational assistance Ebola project to strengthen West Africa’s public Health systems |
| World Bank | ++ | 0 | 0 | ++ | ++ | + | - Abidjan-Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation project (ALTTFP)  
- Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support project |
| European Commission | ++ | ++ | 0 | ++ | ++ | ++ | - Regional Transport Facilitation project  
- Support to Regional Economic Integration and Trade |
| Germany: GIZ | ++ | ++ | 0 | + | ++ | ++ | - Support programme to the ECOWAS Commission  
- Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme (WATIP) |
| United Kingdom: DfID | + | ++ | 0 | ++ | ++ | ++ | - West Africa Food Markets (WAFM) Pilot Programme  
- Support to West Africa Regional Integration Programme (SWARIP) |
| United States: USAID | ++ | ++ | 0 | + | ++ | ++ | - Food Across Border Programme (ProFab)  
- West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (WATIH) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country: AECID</th>
<th>++</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>++</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>++</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France: AFD</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- West Africa Growth Ring
- Programme to support food and nutritional security in West Africa- Réserve regionale de sécurité alimentaire CEDEAO
- Le Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle en Afrique de l'Ouest (PASANAO)
- Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin

++ Key focus area
+ Focus area
0 No focus area
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AFDB)

The African Development Bank (AfDB) has identified promotion of regional integration in Africa as one of its key operational priorities as part of its mandate to enhance socio-economic development and contribute to poverty reduction in Africa. Since its establishment it has been at the forefront of providing assistance to its regional member countries through different forms of support (e.g. technical assistance, policy advice, investments). Since 2006 it has a separate department responsible for regional integration. In 2011 the AfDB drafted its first regional policy for West Africa, the Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa 2011-2015. This document also includes AfDB’s indicative programme of regional projects as was planned for in the period 2011-2015.

The Bank’s Strategy for supporting regional integration in West Africa aims to link up with the strategic priorities of ECOWAS, for example as laid down in its Vision 2020 and its Regional Strategic Plan. It rests on two main pillars, namely 1) linking regional markets and 2) capacity building.

Through the first pillar the AfDB will support investments in regional transport infrastructure, transport and trade facilitation measures and regional energy and markets integration. With regard to transport infrastructure development, the Bank is involved in a number of multi-country initiatives. This includes flagship projects such as the Trans-Sahelian highway and Trans-West African (coastal) highway and its missing links (road construction & rehabilitation, bridges, border posts), which are prioritized under the ECOWAS Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Program for West Africa. In the area of energy, the Bank aims to link up with key regional initiatives such as the West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) and seeks to collaborate with the ECOWAS Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE).

In the second pillar, the AfDB builds on three key areas: 1) strengthen the capacity of ECOWAS, UEMOA, other regional organizations and national entities for effective policy and project implementation in key integration areas, infrastructure in particular; 2) financial sector integration to promote cross-border trade and investment, and to enhance access to finance, by providing assistance to financial institutions, making investments in the integration of payment systems and facilitating feasibility studies and dialogue between financial regulators; and 3) support for regional research and knowledge centers that are relevant for the region’s integration agenda.

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91 Please note that the African Development Bank is discussed for its role as knowledge institute in section 1 of this report.
93 Although the time span that this Strategy covers has already expired, it seems that there is not yet a new version (or update) (digitally) available, judged on AfDB’s website section on West Africa: [http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/](http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/) AfDB did publish in 2014 its Bank Group Regional Integration Policy and Strategy 2014-2023, which describes its longer-term continental approach to supporting economic integration.
The World Bank has been a champion of regional integration in Africa for a number of years, both through lending as well as non-lending programmes (e.g. capacity building, technical assistance, knowledge support). It has a dedicated Africa Regional Integration Department since 2004. In 2008 the World Bank launched its first Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, with the objective of providing a coherent and focused framework to guide the Bank’s support to regional integration. The Strategy builds on a specific focus on West Africa as one of four regions differentiated within Sub-Saharan Africa (in addition to East Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa).

The Strategy is organized around three main pillars of assistance: 1) regional infrastructure; 2) institutional cooperation for economic integration; and 3) coordinated interventions to provide regional public goods. The first pillar includes both support for physical infrastructure linked to key trade corridors, energy and (tele)communications as well as assistance to enable effective use of physical infrastructure through harmonization of (common) regulations, procedures and standards. West African examples of initiatives backed by the World Bank that fall in this category are the Abidjan-Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (ALTTFP) and its support to the West African Power Pool (WAPP).

For the second pillar, the Bank’s assistance to institutional integration focuses on six main areas: reducing external tariffs to the rest of Africa and the rest of the world; (b) reducing tariff and nontariff barriers to intraregional trade; (c) implementing and harmonizing customs unions and free trade agreements, including ongoing WTO-led trade negotiations; (d) improving regional environments for business, investment and industrial cooperation; (e) strengthening regional financial markets and related institutions; and (f) assisting regional initiatives to improve governance.

In the third pillar the World Bank provides support to the following regional solutions and regional public goods: a) improved management of shared water resources; b) raising agricultural productivity; c) (sub)regional programmes to address cross-border dimensions of malaria prevention and treatment; d) increasing access to HIV/AIDS prevention methods along main transport corridors, and improving preparedness to respond to transboundary pandemics, other infectious diseases, and pests; e) regional rationalization of research and tertiary education to strengthen regional knowledge assets and technical capacity. The Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support project is a major initiative funded by the World Bank under this pillar.

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95 World Bank – Regional Integration in Africa:
96 World Bank (2008), Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGINICOO/Resources/1587517-1271810608103/RIAS-Paper-Final-Approved-Oct2010.pdf Despite the fact that a considerable number of years have passed since the RIAS launch, it does seem to be the most recent one – that is digitally available – judged on the World Bank’s website section on regional integration in Africa. There is a RIAS Progress Report available, published in 2011:
97 However, although the Strategy refers to upcoming specific Regional Implementation Plans for these four regions, it is indicated in the 2011 Progress Report that its preparation has been delayed. Furthermore, while it is announced that the one for West Africa will be the first finalized and will follow shortly, this Implementation Plan does not seem to be digitally available.
In addition to these pillars, a cross-cutting issue addressed through World Bank assistance is strengthening regional strategic planning and connections with national development plans. This includes a focus on capacity development of pan-African institutions – African Union, NEPAD – and RECs including ECOWAS and UEMOA, particularly through strengthening the policy functionality of regional economic communities in trade policy, regional infrastructure and trade facilitation and by improving alignment and harmonization of regional programming.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC)

The European Commission (EC) identifies support for regional integration as one of its policy priorities in the area of international cooperation and development. West Africa is an important partner among the regions the EC collaborates with. Since many years it maintains a development relationship with West Africa. Furthermore, the European Union is for West Africa the primary trade partner and a major provider of development aid to the region. It supports for regional integration in West Africa is mainly shaped through three particular components: the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the West Africa’s Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme (‘Programme de l’Accord de Partenariat Economique pour le Développement’, PAPED) as developed within EPA framework.

The Regional Indicative Programme for West Africa describes the EC’s development strategy for the region and is funded under the European Development Fund (EDF). While initiatives funded as part of the previous 10th EDF RIP (2008-2013) are still ongoing, the EU also provides support as part of the current RIP (2014-2020) funded under the 11th EDF. In this RIP it focuses on three areas of cooperation: 1) peace, security & regional stability: including support to ECOWAS in its regional peace and security mandate and funding for peace and security initiatives, including the ones dealing with migration; 2) regional economic integration & trade: to strengthen trade, the private sector and regional integration and support infrastructure; and 3) sustainable development of natural resources & biodiversity: which covers support to resilience, food security and nutrition as well as environmental protection, biodiversity and climate change mitigation and adaptation. In addition, as fourth priority area – a so-called non-focal sector – the programme also entails institutional support to the regional organizations ECOWAS and UEMOA.

In 2014 the European Union concluded the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 16 West African countries and both ECOWAS and UEMOA. The EPA is a development and a trade agreement. As to the trade dimension of the agreement, EPA aims to promote trade between West Africa and the European market through increasing reciprocal market access. Trade promotion between the two regions is not only targeted as an end in itself but is also regarded as a means to enhance socio-economic development in West Africa. The development assistance provided within the EPA framework is to facilitate trade promotion, for example through support for West African farmers to meet the EU’s sanitary and

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99 The EDF is the main EU financial instrument for development assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and sub-regions.
101 This group comprises all ECOWAS countries, together with Mauritania.
phytosanitary (SPS) standards. Such support will be provided through EU member states’ bilateral programmes and the EU level. As regards the latter, it is mainly channeled through the Regional Indicative Programme.

At the same time, although this view is far from undisputed, the EPA has also been presented as an important building block of West African regional integration.\textsuperscript{103} This follows not least from the agreement process itself as it has spurred cooperation between the West African countries and the two regional economic communities to reach an agreement on the ECOWAS Common External Tariff. Furthermore, the EPA has also been put forward as a means to enhance intraregional trade, because efforts to enhance market access and promote trade between Europe and West Africa (e.g. easing customs procedures) would also benefit trade within the region.

As developed by the ECOWAS and UEMOA within the framework of the Economic Partnership Agreement, the overall aim of PAPED is to facilitate the implementation of EPA. In particular, it aims to build a competitive regional economy by maximizing the opportunities offered by the Economic Partnership Agreement and minimizing its negative effects. In line with the current PAPED (2014-2020) the EU and its member states provides support to infrastructure (energy, transport), agriculture, regional economic integration, trade & private sector development and the civil society, by drawing on a number of bilateral and EU financial instruments, including the Regional Indicative Programme.

Specific examples of ongoing initiatives (co-)funded by the European Union to support regional integration are the Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa (FMM West Africa, 2013-2018), Support to Regional Economic Integration and Trade programme (2014-2018), the Regional Transport Facilitation Project (I and II), the Support to ECOWAS Public Finance Management Reforms programme (2013-2018) and the West Africa Quality Programme (See Box 5.1) as part of the West Africa Competitiveness Support Programme (2014-2018).

\textbf{Box 5.1: West Africa Quality Programme (WAQP)}\textsuperscript{104}

Originally launched in 2001, the West Africa Quality Programme has the overall objective to strengthen regional economic integration and trade by creating an environment that facilitates compliance with international trade rules and technical regulations. It thereby builds on and supports the implementation of the regional quality policy of ECOWAS, ECOQUAL. The Programme is currently in its third phase (2014-2018) and has been largely funded by the EU. It initially focused on the eight UEMOA members in collaboration with UEMOA but since the second phase (2007-2013) it has included the remaining seven ECOWAS members and Mauritania as well. From phase 3 onwards the programme is officially referred to as the West Africa Quality System Programme and is implemented by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

In order to build the regional quality infrastructure, the programme in particular aims to achieve the following four objectives: 1) to enable relevant stakeholders in countries to make use of the regional quality infrastructure and harmonized legal framework; 2) to facilitate regional and international trade by providing the private sector access to strategically prioritized and harmonized standards; 3) to enable the private and public sectors gain access to a network of accredited and competitive conformity assessment services provided in the region; and 4) to entrench quality consciousness within the private sector. The main beneficiaries of the programme are the ECOWAS and UEMOA


Commissions, and a number of stakeholders at the national level including national authorities and trade and consumer associations.

As some of the tangible outcomes of this initiative, the West Africa Quality Programme has resulted in the development and adoption of the regional quality policy ECOQUAL, the establishment of a regional quality infrastructure scheme and the initiation of a standards harmonization programme with the approval and adoption of a number of regional standards, for example in the area of food and agriculture. In the current third phase the emphasis is on further strengthening national quality infrastructure systems in order to improve intraregional market access for businesses in the ECOWAS region.

**GERMANY: GIZ**

The German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (‘German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit’, GIZ) has been notably involved in the promotion of political and economic integration at the regional level throughout Africa.\(^{105}\) Its programmes are strongly aligned to the priorities set by the African Union, particularly focusing on peace & security, good governance, infrastructure and agriculture. Through its regional projects and programmes GIZ is further involved in a number of other areas, including social development, environment & climate change and economic development & employment.

GIZ is particularly engaged in institutional capacity development and support for transnational (trade) policy dialogue. Examples include its ongoing support to the Niger Basin Authority\(^{106}\) and its involvement in regional resource governance in the extractive sector in partnership with public institutions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. Other examples of regional initiatives by GIZ in West Africa are its project on the promotion of a climate-friendly interconnected power system in West Africa focusing on creating the conditions for sustainable energy generation and distribution across the region, and the African Cashew Initiative aimed at increasing the competitiveness and incomes of smallholder cashew farmers and other value chain actors in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Ghana.

One of GIZ’s key initiatives aimed at regional integration in West Africa concerns its Support Programme to the ECOWAS Commission, which focuses on strengthening its sector-specific expertise and management structures and capacities. German institutional support to the Commission dates back to 2006. This programme includes the Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme (WATIP), the component that targets trade and customs issues (See Box 5.2). Another key area of the Support Programme is peace & security, aimed at improving the Commission’s capacities for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the region.

**Box 5.2: Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme (WATIP)**\(^{107}\)

Initiated in 2010, the Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme (WATIP) is an initiative implemented by GIZ. It is officially part of the EU-funded programme ‘Support to Regional Economic Integration and Trade’ programme and is linked to GIZ’s overall institutional support programme to ECOWAS. The programme targets the capacities of the ECOWAS Commission to design and implement

\(^{105}\) GIZ – Regional cooperation in Africa: [https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/9984.html](https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/9984.html)

\(^{106}\) The Niger Basin Authority is an intergovernmental organization that aims to support cooperation in the resource management and development of the Niger River basin. Among its members are a large number of ECOWAS countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Nigeria), complemented with Chad and Cameroon.

its trade policy and to promote trade, both within West Africa as well as with the rest of the world. It is expected to run until 2019.

Through WATIP, GIZ supports the ECOWAS Commission – more particularly its Directorates of Trade and Customs – as well as the UEMOA Commission to build their capacity to accelerate the process of achieving an effective customs union, in order to increase intra- and interregional trade. The programme acts in the following areas of intervention: a) implementation of the ECOWAS CET & Customs procedures; b) dismantling of non-tariff barriers to trade; c) common trade & policy statistics; d) support to structures: Joint Technical Secretariat and Trade Information System; and e) fiscal reform programme.

In each of these areas GIZ provides support through competence building, organizational development, development of cooperation partnerships and of enabling frameworks. As a result, the programme has helped to raise awareness around the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), to finalize the Common External Tariff (CET) and contributed to its implementation and monitoring.

UNITED KINGDOM: DFID

Since a number of years the UK Department for International Development (DfID) is notably committed to regional integration across Africa, including the West African region. It collaborates at both the pan-African and regional level with a wide range of partners to further regional integration in Africa, including regional organizations such as ECOWAS. It works across a number of areas, including regional health, peace & security, transboundary water management, climate change issues and agriculture & food security. In West Africa an example of a key initiative by DfID in this last area is its West Africa Food Markets (WAFM) Pilot Programme (See Box 5.3).

Box: 5.3: West Africa Food Markets (WAFM)

Instigated in 2014, the West Africa Food Market (WAFM) is a five-year pilot programme funded by DfID that seeks to increase the availability of staple foods and purchasing power of farmers and consumers in food-insecure regions of the Sahel as well as to increase their resilience to hunger and malnutrition during the regular hungry seasons and periodic shocks. It aims to increase food production and cross-border trade in maize, millet, sorghum and cassava/gari along the Ghana-Burkina Faso and Niger-Nigeria trade corridors as a means to lower seasonal price volatility.

WAFM operates as a broker and facilitator of staple food markets by building on two main pillars. Through its Challenge Fund the programme aims to invest in business models that will help to strengthen national and regional trade in the targeted staple foods. The Policy Facility focuses on improving the enabling environment by funding analysis and advocacy linked to policy, and to regulatory and market constraints that impede regional trade. These constraints are to be identified through political economy analysis and stakeholder interest mapping, and will be addressed through interventions dependent on the feasibility given the programme’s life span, potential to generate incremental positive change and likeliness to gain support and buy-in from key stakeholders. While in the case of the Fund only (for-profit) businesses are eligible, the Facility is open to a wide range of organizations.

DfID is particularly involved in regional economic integration by focusing on trade facilitation through regional programmes that aim to further infrastructural development, simplify

108 The Joint Technical Secretariat is a unit created by ECOWAS and UEMOA in 2004 to deepen cooperation and coordination of their activities.
109 West Africa Food Markets: http://www.westafricafoodmarkets.org/
export/import procedures and develop customs institutions and processes. DfID’s interventions in this area are designed to complement its bilateral and global programmes, and aim to enhance progress on a number of issues such as removing barriers to intra-regional trade by building required infrastructure, reforming cross-border management, and improving the business and investment climate. To support the African Union in its plan to set up a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017, DfID introduced in 2011 the Africa Free Trade Initiative (AFTI). This Initiative helps to shape its regional programming across the continent and particularly focuses on harmonizing trade policies and lifting trade barriers between African countries. As one of its key regional programmes focusing on trade facilitation in Africa, the Support to West Africa Regional Integration Program (SWARIP) forms an integral part of DfID’s AFTI (See Box 5.4).

Box 5.4: Support to West Africa Regional Integration Program (SWARIP)

Launched in 2010 by DfID in conjunction with ECOWAS, the Support to West Africa Regional Integration Program (SWARIP) has the objective to support the development of knowledge and analysis on regional and pan-African integration that should result in better informed policy making in the region. Building on a five-year time-frame, the program aims to improve West Africa’s regional trade performance and competitiveness and to contribute to the finalization of establishing an ECOWAS Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2015, as building block for the broader Continental Free Trade Area.

Following its redesign in 2012, SWARIP initially rested on three components. First, the World Bank SWARIP window of the Umbrella Trade and Development Facility. This is a multi-donor trust fund launched in early 2013 with the objective to generate and disseminate new evidence on the impact of current trade and investment policies to inform and support (policy) dialogue between policymakers and stakeholders in West Africa and to influence programs of the World Bank and other donors. Through the Facility, SWARIP has resulted in a wide range of analytical activities covering a broad range of issues, including regional trade in food staples, trade and transport facilitation, regional cooperation in higher education and the impact of regional integration on poverty. Evidence has been brought forward that rapid analytical support provided through this Fund has played a significant role in persuading Nigeria not to withdraw from the EU EPA negotiations.

The two other SWARIP components proved to be short-lived initiatives or never came into operation at all. The Regional Policy Fund was put in place in 2014 as a quick response mechanism aimed at providing small grants to the ECOWAS Commission, West African governments, civil society and private sector actors to enable their engagement in integration processes, for example with regard to the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). Short of a year in operation DfID suspended new grant applications due a lack of confidence in the additionality of support and the significance of expected benefits. The third component initially consisted of a scoping study that was to identify three large-scale trade facilitation projects that could be funded by DfID. However, DfID decided not to proceed with this study at all due to the Ebola outbreak and uncertainty whether it could support large-scale trade facilitation interventions.

In 2010, part of SWARIP funding was used to contribute to capacity building for the ECOWAS Commission, as part of joint donor Pool Fund. However, there was no follow-up due to concerns about the fund’s management by ECOWAS.

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110 DfID (2011), United Kingdom’s Support to Trade Facilitation: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/case_studies_e/ta_gbr_e.doc
112 An example of a study funded through the Facility is: John Keyser (2013), Regional Trade of Food Staples and Crop Inputs in West Africa, Africa Trade Policy Note No. 36, World Bank: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGTOPTRADE/Resources/PN36_WA_food_staples_trade_FINAL.pdf
As of August 2015, SWARIP is in the process of being closed early, ahead of its official closure in December 2015. In fact, the only component that is currently still operational is the one managed by the World Bank but which is in the process of being terminated. Apart from disappointing results, an important argument put forward by DFID in support of this decision has been the strained relationship with ECOWAS as key partner, following from persistent failure to meet its financial reporting commitments.

**UNITED STATES: USAID**

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is regarded as a long-time supporter of regional integration in West Africa. Since 2001 it has a regional office in West Africa, initially located in Bamako (Mali) and from 2003 onwards in Accra (Ghana). In 2015 USAID’s regional office in West Africa issued its regional policy towards West Africa, the *Regional Development Cooperation Strategy 2015-2019*. It focuses on transnational issues in the region in a number of areas: a) agriculture & food security; b) clean and efficient energy; c) democracy, human rights & governance; d) economic growth & trade; e) environment; f) global health; and g) promoting peaceful political transitions.

Under this *Strategy* USAID initiates and supports a number of regional initiatives in the region, by directly engaging with regional partners such as ECOWAS and its sub-agencies (e.g. West African Power Pool (WAPP), West African Health Organization (WAHO), ECOWAS Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE)) and with UEMOA. These interventions are to provide regional solutions for shared West African challenges, to complement and enhance USAID’s country-specific interventions and to cover the countries where there is no USAID mission.

USAID has been particularly engaged in the area of agriculture and food security. As part of its global Feed the Future initiative, USAID has developed a regional Feed the Future strategy for West Africa which focuses on three core areas: increased agriculture productivity, improved regional trade and enhanced institutional capacity. Regarding agricultural productivity, USAID has supported programmes such as the West Africa Seed Programme and the West Africa Fertilizer Programme. In the area of improved regional trade, USAID has funded large projects such as the Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP/E-ATP) and the West African Trade Hub. One of USAID’s major current initiatives in the area of regional trade promotion is the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (See Box 5.5). Concerning institutional capacity building, USAID has been notably involved in strengthening regional institutions that play a key role in West Africa’s agricultural development, such as the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control (‘Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel’, CILSS) and the West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development (‘Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la Recherche et le Développement Agricoles’, CORAF).

**Box 5.5: - West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (WATIH)**

Launched in 2014 by USAID, the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (or: West Africa Trade Hub and African Partners Network, ‘Trade Hub’) aims to enhance food security and reduce poverty by expanding trade through value-added exports (e.g. cashews, mango, shea, apparel) and regional trade in key agricultural commodities (e.g. maize, livestock and rice).

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113 The definition of West Africa used by USAID includes all ECOWAS countries, plus Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania, São Tome and Príncipe.
Being the successor to the West Africa Trade Hub (WATH I and II, 2004-2013), Trade Hub builds on a decade of USAID’s trade-related assistance and complements the work of trade hubs in East and Southern Africa. It works throughout West Africa in 12 West African countries and has physical presence in Accra (Ghana) with satellite offices in Dakar (Senegal) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). It is projected to run until 2019 (including two option years).

The project targets West African farmers and businesses to enable them to become more competitive, to attract investment and to boost their regional and global trade. It works through and in close coordination with a network of West African advocacy groups and industry partners like the Borderless Alliance and the African Cashew Alliance (regional private sector platforms that were born out of the West Africa Trade Hub), and regional organizations such as ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS.

The Trade Hub applies a multi-tiered approach, by working on several fronts to assist farmers and businesses: a) improving value chain performance by enabling them to meet product quality standards, by connecting producers to value chain leaders and by improving access to market information systems; b) access to finance and investment, by increasing agriculture investment and trade finance transactions through strategic partnerships with financial institutions; and c) trade and transport enabling environment, by supporting transport efficiency particularly in five major regional corridors (See Figure 5.7) and by addressing key trade barriers. Furthermore, the project provides financial support and helps to build the capacity of its regional partners across a wide range of competency areas, with a particular focus on so-called gender-forward programming.

**Figure 5.6: Key regional corridors targeted through the Trade Hub**

*source: USAID, 2014*

**JAPAN: JICA**

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been a long-time supporter of regional organizations in West Africa, UEMOA in particular. It has a dedicated Regional Strategy Unit for Africa, located in Nairobi, Kenya. Since 2007 JICA has been extending assistance in West Africa in areas such as the establishment of regional large-scale infrastructure both through physical infrastructure development (transportation, energy) as well as capacity building (maintenance management, operations), streamlining customs
administration, training of custom officials and promotion of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP) across Africa. For example, JICA provides technical support to the OSBP at the Cinkansé border between Burkina Faso and Togo. Customs development has been in particular an issue on which JICA has been engaged through its collaboration with UEMOA.

Figure 5.7: JICA Corridor Development for West Africa Growth Ring

In order to facilitate regional infrastructure development, more recently JICA has identified the development of growth corridors as one of its priority activities in Africa, as part of its Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V, 2013-2017). It has selected the West Africa Growth Ring (See Figure 5.8) as one of the five major growth corridors in Africa for which it will provide support. For each of these growth corridors JICA draws up a master plan outlining a long-term policy (20-30 years) and identifying short-term projects aimed at linking corridor (infrastructure) development with comprehensive and inclusive economic development and investment promotion.

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118 JICA (2016), Corridor Development Approach: [http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/brochures/c8h0vm000000k9k0-att/japan_brand_07.pdf](http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/brochures/c8h0vm000000k9k0-att/japan_brand_07.pdf)
Spain: AECID

Support for regional integration has been an important component of Spain development cooperation and its Agency for International Cooperation and Development (‘Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo’, AECID) for a number of years.

In its current Spanish Development Cooperation Master Plan (2013-2016) used by AECID to redesign its development approach, it indicates that its attention for regional cooperation and integration will get even more emphasis in future years, particularly in its geographical focus areas, which includes West Africa. AECID points out that the regional level and its support to regional organizations (including ECOWAS) is crucial to achieve its objectives in the key thematic areas in which it operates, such as agriculture & food security, renewable energy & power connectivity and infrastructure. As part of its renewed profile, it is further mentioned that Spain plans to shut down a number of country offices, whereby in some cases these are merged into regional offices, such as in the case of West Africa. One of the main tasks of these offices are managing its support programmes for regional cooperation.

The West African region has been a geographical focus area for a number of years for Spain, as laid down in both its previous Master Plan (2009-2012)120 as well as in the current one. The collaboration between Spain and ECOWAS dates back to 2005 when the two signed a memorandum of understanding. Since then the cooperation has been further consolidated through a number of regional programmes in different sectors, the creation of the Spain-ECOWAS Fund for Migration & Development in 2007121 and Spain’s decision in 2008 to open a satellite office at its embassy in Abuja, Nigeria to facilitation collaboration with ECOWAS.122

In 2009 Spain signed a Joint Declaration with ECOWAS after which their cooperation intensified. In this agreement they identified the following priority areas: 1) democratic governance and institutional development; 2) public policies to reach the MDGs (including support to the regional agricultural policy, gender equality and public health); 3) infrastructure & energy; and 4) investment, trade & tourism.

In recent years Spain has been particularly committed to the area of agricultural & food security, by aligning its bilateral efforts with regional initiatives and working through multilateral channels (e.g. World Bank, FAO). For example, it has provided much support to the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP), the Regional Offensive for Food Production and Against Hunger and the ECOWAS Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food Security (RAAF). In addition, in the area of infrastructure it has provided support to the ECOWAS Project Planning and Development Unit (PPDU) and the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE).

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121 The Spain-ECOWAS Fund for Migration & Development aims to support the ECOWAS Commission and its member states by financing activities that help to enhance development and implementation of the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration, and to strengthen the link between migration and development. Both public institutions (ECOWAS Commission, member states) and civil society are eligible for financial support. The Fund was due to be closed in 2015.

France has a strong presence in West Africa and maintains extensive ties with several countries in the region. It has traditionally played an important role in spurring regionalism in West Africa, dating back to its historical role as colonizer. Many of the countries in the region are former French colonies and were member of the ‘Afrique-Occidentale Française’ (AOF). The creation of UEMOA can be traced back to AOF as historical regional grouping under French guardianship. In addition to its strong engagement with individual UEMOA members, France is also particularly involved with UEMOA as regional organization.

In 2014, the French Development Agency (‘Agence Française de Développement’, AFD) issued its Africa Regional Intervention Framework 2014-2016 (‘Le Cadre d’Intervention Afrique’). In this framework, AFD sets out its strategy for its operations in Sub-Saharan Africa to promote sustainable development and reduce poverty. Although this strategic framework lacks a specific (sub-)regional focus including for West Africa, there are a few priority areas identified in which AFD refers to regional integration as an important means and outcome of its operations. This applies to the areas of (transport) infrastructure and food security & rural development, which are also the two most important sectors for AFD in terms of allocation of its financial resources for the period 2014-2016. Concerning its engagement in West Africa, AFD further indicates in this strategic document that in the past period it has strengthened its action in favor of working with regional organizations, whereby the majority of its activities were directed at West Africa, UEMOA, BOAD and a number of intergovernmental basin agencies in particular. However, at the same time it is mentioned that AFD has worked towards rebalancing this approach by focusing more on collaboration with ECOWAS and its sub-agencies, particularly in the area of agriculture and food security.

AFD has initiated a number of (ongoing) regional initiatives in West Africa across a number of thematic areas. A major regional initiative in the area of food security & rural development is its programme to support food and nutritional security in West Africa (‘Le projet entend contribuer à améliorer les capacités des dispositifs nationaux et régionaux à assurer la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle des populations ouest-africaines’, See Box 5.6).

**Box 5.6: Programme to support food and nutritional security in West Africa**

Launched in 2010, the Programme to support food and nutritional security in West Africa (‘Le Programme d’Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle en Afrique de l’Ouest’, PASANAO) is an initiative funded by AFD. Its main objective is to contribute to improving the capacities of national and regional systems to ensure food and nutritional security for the West African population. It is implemented by ECOWAS in conjunction with CISS across three sub-areas in West Africa: the West (Guinea, Senegal and neighbouring countries); Centre (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali) and East (Benin, Niger, Nigeria). The selection of these focus areas is mainly shaped by the countries’ trade linkages but also their interdependencies in terms of the labour market and incomes. The main

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123 AOF was a federation of eight French colonial territories (1895-1960): Mauritania, Senegal, Mali (former French Sudan), Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta), Benin (former Dahomey) and Niger.


focus is on the Centre sub-area and the East sub-area to a lesser extent. However, certain activities – studies, capacity building – will benefit all ECOWAS member countries.

In particular, the programmes seeks to achieve the following objectives: 1) strengthen and accelerate the development of information systems on food security in order to take better account of the aspects relating to markets, household incomes and nutrition, in the context of a regional approach; 2) support the definition and implementation of the public intervention instruments of States and ECOWAS to reduce food insecurity and respond to crises; and 3) implement innovative operations that improve the food and nutritional situation of the most vulnerable populations in the region.

In order to achieve these objectives, it builds on the three pillars: a) support for the implementation of a new approach to food security; b) support for the definition and implementation of the public intervention instruments of member states and ECOWAS; and c) promotion of innovative operations in response to the different forms of food security. Alongside these three support components, the programme also entails assistance to capacity building for ECOWAS, its Department for Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources in particular.
DONOR COORDINATION EFFORTS AND MULTI-DONOR INITIATIVES

It has been put forward that when looking at the initiatives aimed at regional integration undertaken by development partners operating in West Africa, one could recognize some sort of de facto division of labour between these actors. At the same time it is generally concluded that actual coordination between development partners in West Africa at the regional level has been deficient. Recent years has however seen the creation of a number of institutional frameworks to improve dialogue and coordinate efforts between development partners. A prime example are the several thematic donor coordination working groups created within the framework of ECOWAS to discuss regional integration and development issues between the ECOWAS Commission and the development partners. Among the thematic donor coordination working groups that have been created (e.g. Agriculture, Regional Economic Integration and Capacity Development), one of the more celebrated examples is the ECOWAP Technical and Financial Partners Coordination Group (See Box 5.7). Another example of an initiative aimed at enhancing donor coordination but in a different framework is the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) in the Sahel and West Africa (See Box 5.8). It seems however that many of these frameworks struggle to overcome (generic) challenges to donor coordination and are far from reaching their full potential.

Box 5.7: ECOWAP Technical and Financial Partners Coordination Group

The ECOWAP Technical and Financial Partners Coordination Group ('ECOWAP Group') is an institutional coordination platform created within the framework of ECOWAS. It consists of more than twenty development partners. Spain chaired the group for a number of years, but handed over this role in November 2015 to USAID. Its main purpose is to coordinate support to the implementation of the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy and achieve the related objectives. It became operational in 2010, five years after the adoption of ECOWAP.

The ECOWAP Group has been celebrated by some – including the ECOWAS Commission and development partners – as an important step forward in terms of donor coordination with regard to the implementation of ECOWAP. This particularly relates to its achievements in terms of information exchange, for example through developing of a database featuring all the projects and programmes financed at the regional level in the agriculture, food security and nutrition sector. However, there are number of deficiencies and challenges identified, including the lack of participation of some development partners, both the traditional ones as well as the more non-traditional ones (e.g. China); lack of engagement by those who are among the participants; insufficient linkages between the ECOWAP Group and support provided by development partners outside the ECOWAS framework (also because this has in some cases generated parallel donor coordination structures combined with insufficient ECOWAS oversight).

131 This sub-section builds on: Van Seters, Sylla and Cisse (2014), EU support to the ECOWAP/ CAADP: Case Study for the joint progress report on the implementation of the EU food security policy framework, ECDPM, ROPPA and Landell Mills, Report commissioned by the European Commission.
Box 5.8: Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) in the Sahel and West Africa

Launched in 2012, the Global Alliance for Resilience (‘Alliance Globale pour la Résilience’, AGIR) in the Sahel and West Africa is a framework that aims to enhance coherence and effectiveness in support of resilience initiatives in West African and Sahelian countries. Referred to as a policy tool, the overall objective of the Alliance is to structurally reduce food and nutritional vulnerability in a sustainable manner by supporting the implementation of West African and Sahelian policies. The Alliance is expected to run until 2032 to reach the “Zero Hunger” target.

The Alliance brings together (national) governments, regional organizations, the international donor community and local stakeholders (agricultural producers, civil society, the private sector). It is placed under the political and technical leadership of ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS. AGIR is further supported by the Platform of Technical and Financial Partners (PTFP), a coordination platform that is established by development partners with the goal to sustain the political commitment of these partners and to facilitate the dialogue between the international (donor) community and the policymakers in the target countries.

AGIR is structured around the following strategic objectives: 1) improve social protection for the most vulnerable households and communities in order to secure their livelihoods; 2) strengthen the nutrition of vulnerable households; 3) sustainably improve agricultural and food production, the incomes of vulnerable households and their access to food; and 4) strengthen governance in food and nutritional security. The Alliance aims to conduct complementary actions at three levels: at the local level: by supporting local communities and endogenous initiatives and mechanisms; at the national level: by supporting investment programmes and existing consensus-building mechanisms; and the regional level: by supporting regional plans and mechanisms put in place by the three regional organizations ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS. It particularly focuses on small-scale vulnerable agricultural households, agro-pastoralist and pastoralist households and poor workers in the informal sector.

The Alliance has drawn up a Regional Roadmap (2013) that serves as a reference framework for its members. As part of this Roadmap, the target countries are in the process of developing their so-called national resilience priorities (NRPs) in consultation with a broad range of local stakeholders. This is considered to be a first step of an inclusive dialogue process needed to come to a regional, multi-sector approach towards food and nutritional security. As of 2015, a number of countries have validated their NRPs.

Furthermore, in addition to these institutional platforms for donor coordination and dialogue, there have been a number of multi-donor programmes launched in recent years. Some examples are summarized below.

Box 5.9: Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA)

Launched in 2015 by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA) is an initiative with the objective to create a multi-donor vehicle focusing on regional integration, trade expansion and cost reduction along the key trade routes in West Africa. Its aim to seek to collaboration with other development partners within this initiative has already borne fruit as more recently DANIDA has been joined by The Netherlands.

ATWA builds on the recognition that current donor support aimed at regional trade and integration in the region is substantial but fragmented and calls for a more integrated approach. It takes its

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133 This includes all ECOWAS member countries, plus Chad and Mauritania.
134 The PTFP is led by the European Union and is further composed of USAID, France, Spain, Canada, Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg UN agencies (FAO, UNICEF, OCHA, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNESCO, WFP, UNDP), World Bank and the African Development Bank.
inspiration from regional donor efforts to pool resources and coordinate action undertaken in East Africa. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), a non-profit organization created by a group of bilateral donors to further the trade integration agenda in this region, acts as technical partner of ATWA. By drawing on the experience of TMEA, it has initially established the following strategic objectives: 1) reduction of trade costs on focus trade routes; 2) improvement of the trading environment; and 3) increased private sector competitiveness.

The programme aims to address “soft” policies and trade facilitation issues as well as “hard” infrastructural constraints, in partnership with regional organizations, national governments and the private sector. In order to have meaningful in-country presence and impact, the intention is to initially focus on a maximum of 2-3 trade routes and 3-5 countries. The possible interventions that are considered by ATWA might be corridor or country-specific focus (e.g. development of Joint Border Posts, professionalization of the transport industry) but could also not necessarily be linked to a specified geographical area (e.g. development of a transport observatory, promotion of the ECOWAS CET).

Box 5.10: - Regional programme on fruit flies control in West Africa (PLMF)\(^\text{136}\)

Initiated in 2013, the regional support programme on fruit flies control (‘Plan regional de Lutte et de contrôle des Mouches des Fruits, PLMF) in West Africa is an initiative of ECOWAS in partnership with UEMOA, and funded by European Union and the French Development Agency (‘Agence Française de Développement’, AFD). The programme aims to enhance food security and increase rural incomes by addressing the infestation by fruit flies of agricultural and food products that results in the loss of production and non-compliance with international phytosanitary standards, thereby curtailing exports. This affects producers in a number of West African countries, particularly in the mango sector. The programme is projected to operate for five years.

The initiative comprises a number of activities including setting up of systems at the national and regional level to monitor fruit fly infestation, coordinating and assisting control actions, strengthening the capacity of public and private actors and supporting applied research (and its implementation) for the development of effective control mechanisms.

Box 5.11: Food Across Borders Programme (ProFab)\(^\text{137}\)

Launched in 2015, the Food Across Border Programme (ProFab) is a programme that aims at increasing the volume and value of intraregional trade in agricultural and food products across the West African region. It is initiated by ECOWAS and UEMOA, with implementation led by the Permanent Intergovernmental Committee for Drought Control (CILSS) in cooperation with a large number of regional organizations including Le Hub Rural, ENDA/ CACID and the Borderless Alliance. The programme has been made possible through funding provided by USAID, later joined by the Government of Canada. More donors may follow. The programme is projected to run until 2020.

More in particular, the programme seeks to improve the economic and regulatory environment for trade in agricultural and food products by building on the following three main objectives: 1) contribute to a better understanding of intraregional trade in agricultural and food products; 2) improve the effective implementation of agreements on the free movement of agricultural & food products and people; and 3) contribute to the formulation and implementation of regional policies and strategies for promoting trade in agricultural and food products. In order to achieve these objectives, a large number of activities targeted at a wide range of stakeholders are conducted and planned for,

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including the creation of multi-stakeholder monitoring platforms, development of databases and border information centers, information/data collection and dissemination and capacity building activities in a number of areas such as for policy formulation and advocacy.

It notably emphasizes the need to draw on the experiences and lessons learnt of (ongoing) programmes and initiatives developed by regional actors and donors over the past years, and seeks to align with key regional trade and sectoral policies, such as the ETLS, ECOWAP and PAU.

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Section conclusions:

- ECOWAS members are very heterogeneous. This may explain the difficulty in finding agreement on common policies in the first place as well as the lack of the implementation of what has eventually been agreed upon. National objectives dominate trade-related policy options. Commitments to the WTO have for example been used as a pretext for refusing or postponing the implementation of the common external tariff (CET).

- Asymmetric effects across the ECOWAS members but also within a country have justified some kind of national support measures, e.g. infant industry protection for not yet established and/or vulnerable sectors from the increased competition following tariff liberalisation or other trade policy measures that open up markets. Support measures also comprise exceptions of exemptions from common policies, import and export bans implemented as “beggar thy neighbour” policies. The compensation, e.g. through income support or introduction of a “safety net”, of high food prices that particular hurt the poor in small ECOWAS member states is less often granted.

- The enormous lack of implementation impinges on the creation of an economic union and has, amongst other factors, encouraged informal trade and smuggling, both of which benefit from different prices and business costs across borders. The focus of policy makers should be on the effective implementation and monitoring. Transposing the agreements to the local level, by making them practical and accessible for businesses and traders is paramount. This could involve dissemination of information/communication and training, but some degree of flexibility to allow a country’s individual way of application, as this has proven to work best not only the African context but also in the EU for example.

- In general, the ECOWAS member states follow the principle of harmonisation in order to align regulations, including tariffs and non-tariff measures. Given the difficulties of common agreement and the absence of unity in the region, the principle of mutual recognition may however be a promising means to foster intra-ECOWAS trade (like in the EU integration process).

- Trade-related policies should specifically tackle non-tariff measures that cause unnecessary trade costs and thereby hamper cross-border trade. Poor infrastructure, inefficient customs and other issues hamper trade flows within the region, despite the positive impact of proximity of countries. The costs of trade clearly seem to be a significant obstacle not only for integration or rather participating in global trade but also for integration within the ECOWAS region. Trade facilitation measures could particularly target the aspects which cause the higher trade costs in the ECOWAS region. Complaints reported in business surveys or dispute could help identify the priority issues to be solved.

- Regional value chains appear to be key for promoting ECOWAS integration. This calls for adding value to unprocessed products through stronger value chains. Note that creating value chains goes beyond adding value. For example value chains require the functioning of infrastructure, i.e. hard and soft infrastructure, the latter including standards, quality control and conformity assessment. A way forward in ECOWAS integration could thus be building regional value chains, committed to West African product quality at prices affordable to those with increased incomes, likely being expanding urban population in the cities of the ECOWAS countries.
INTRODUCTION

Regional integration is widely known to foster competitiveness, access to wider markets (via trade), larger and diversified investment and production as well as to encourage socio-economic stability and security through cooperation and economic prosperity. Despite these positive outcomes associated with regional integration, the gains of regional integration are diverse and do not evenly occur for all partners of agreements or treaties of regional integration. In the light of losses of some partner countries or drawbacks for specific entities, such as small and medium size (SME) firms that may be left out from the benefits of regional integration, in some partner countries the real gains have been questioned. Disputes of the losing and winning partners take place in order to achieve agreement on sharing the benefits and possibly compensation to those who will lose out from regional integration. Overall, regional integration requires full commitment, with partner countries losing national sovereignty.

In West Africa, national sovereignty seems to be paramount. National policy objectives have dominated the integration process, making it difficult to find agreements and compromise on common policies and decisions. National policy objectives are seemingly more important than agreements made with ECOWAS members. This underlines the difficulties of communality, or lack thereof, and limited commitment of the members. It could also explain the low level and incomplete implementation of the ECOWAS agreements. The ratification of the ECOWAS agreement by its members has been lagging behind.

Given the theory of change applied to trade corridors in West Africa, the focus of the trade policy options considered in the inventory are 1) the ECOWAS common external tariff while free trade under the ETLS amongst the members, 2) trade facilitation and 3) standards and regulations, commonly referred to as non-tariff measures which constitute behind-the-border measures. The latter relate to trade-related policies, such as the alignment of standards and regulations in order to overcome obstacles due to regulatory heterogeneity. The three aforementioned trade-related policy options are elaborated in this section by making the link to the ECOWAS region. In Appendix 6-A1 a list of selected studies dealing with these trade-related policy options is provided, which is a selection from the literature search undertaken within the scoping study.

ECOWAS COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF (CET)

In January 2015, the ECOWAS members adopted a common external tariff (CET) in the region, thereby forming a customs union. With the CET, the same duties, import quotas, preferences or other import requirements apply to all goods entering ECOWAS member countries, while free trade is established amongst the members. The CET will be implemented in phases, with the first phase stretching over five years from 2015 to 2019. The CET aims to establish a system where once an importer brings goods into the ECOWAS region the tariff is paid at the country of entry into the region. Furthermore, importers face the same import requirements for supplying their products in any of the ECOWAS members and hence there would not be any incentives of entering ECOWAS through other countries, which may have had more lenient requirements or lower tariffs without the CET.

The introduction of a CET affects trade, i.e. creating and diverting trade of members. Trade creation means better regional integration, and specifically with the introduction of the CET, leads to an efficiency gain since in addition to the reduction of the prices of the products traded across the respective members (due to tariff liberalisation across members) new trade flows occur in the region. At the same time, the CET can divert trade from more efficient exporters outside the region towards less efficient local exporters in the region. Trade diversion refers to the inhibition of imports from countries outside the customs union. As
such the consumer choices as well as the product variety or quality are potentially reduced and industries in the member states are supported since the production is protected against foreign imports that may not enter the region due to the CET. The trade creation effect is important for the members of a customs union since this common external trade policy allows for an increased specialization and economies of scale for those sectors or firms that have comparative advantages for the respective products.

While benefiting some firms or sectors, the CET introduction has had negative effects on others. These asymmetric effects of the CET introduction call for some kind of support measures, e.g. infant industry protection that protects not yet established and/or vulnerable sectors from the increased competition within the customs union. Such support measures also comprise lists of exceptions for products that can be subject to tariff rates higher than the CET. In the ECOWAS region, the agreement of the CET includes the option of exceptions. De Melo and Laski (2015) report about an ECOWAS exceptions list, which contains about 300 products eligible for being excluded from the CET. This list allows ECOWAS members to impose their own tariffs on imports from outside the region. Furthermore they also refer to a list of special protection measures. One of these measures is the import adjustment tax that allows ECOWAS members to impose a tax on imports from outside the region, thereby adding to the CET.

The ECOWAS CET is described in more detail in section 5 of this report. In the cases where the CET rates are higher than the previous tariff rates of the respective ECOWAS member, the CET rates could not conform to their WTO commitments. De Roquefeuil et al. (2014) elaborate on this issue. Indeed it turned out that some ECOWAS members have had to compensate for breaching their WTO commitment on tariffs. Unless they are granted a special waiver by the WTO, ECOWAS members should not use the CET as a pretext to exceed their bound commitments made. This example of the CET points towards the difficulty of establishing coherent policy options for the entire ECOWAS region together. The trade-related policy options for the ECOWAS region should somehow fit the very different situations of the members, or allow for flexibility in the implementation. With regard to the CET, the exceptions help the individual member to commit to the agreement but of course it impinges on the creation of a strong economic union.

The effects of the CET crucially depend on the level of tariff rates that the ECOWAS member previously applied. De Roquefeuil et al. (2014) provide a detailed analysis about the CET structure in comparison to the earlier average tariff structure of the ECOWAS members. In summary, for agricultural products the tariffs of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) used to be relatively low and thus they increased with the implementation of the CET. This potentially resulted in much higher tariffs for these ECOWAS members, with the consequence of breaching the WTO commitments already mentioned. As an indication, with CET importers were expected to pay about 12% more than without the CET (according to the simple weighted average rate) (Echenin, 2015).

In particular, for agri-food products, ECOWAS members generally had higher WTO bound rates, and thus the CET meant a reduction of tariffs. This was not true for Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire where CET led to higher tariffs for agri-food products and thus consumers lose due to increased prices as a consequence of higher tariffs. World Bank (2015) provides a detailed analysis of the market for food staples in the context of the ECOWAS regional integration. De Melo et al. (2014 and 2015) find that in Liberia price changes due to CET are expected to make the cost of living of rural and urban households 6% and 3% more expensive, respectively. The difference between household costs reflects the greater share of non-tradable expenses (like services) in urban household consumption. In a CGE simulation, Fiamohe et al (2016) conduct an in-depth analysis of the effects of the CET in the ECOWAS
region. Their results show that urban households seem more affected than rural households, especially in Nigeria and Guinea.

For manufacturing industrial products, the ECOWAS members’ individual tariff rates were mainly lower, and thus tariff rates have increased due to the introduction of the CET. Given the CET bound for the specific product groups, CET overall meant an increase of tariffs for Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Guinea, Mali and Mauritania (on average bound rates between 9 and 15.5 percent) as well as Senegal (30 percent) and Ghana (34.7 percent) (Echenin, 2015).

According to most studies, applying the CET (and in fact also the Economic Partnership agreements, EPAs with the EU) will lead to a significant decline of government revenue. In general, tariff reductions leads to revenue losses for the government. This is known to be problematic for developing countries since their government budget relies on these tariff revenues. The loss of tariff revenue for governments is aggravated and in fact also pertains to increased tariffs since in an incomplete customs union importers are likely to enter a country through the ports with cheapest import duties or other taxes.¹³⁸

The CET aims to end re-exports and informal trade, tackling incentives for informal trade, if every member applies the CET in its full version. Less trade through informal channels would increase revenue-generating formal trade. The World Bank (2015) elaborates on the example of arbitrage imports of poultry meat to Nigeria, which imposed a ban on imports, but nevertheless markets supply imported poultry meat. The poultry meat enters in the neighbouring countries, specifically Ghana, where the imports are trans-shipped to Nigeria. These imports do not appear in the trade statistics of Nigeria.

The effects of the CET hit some countries more than others and consumers are sometimes affected more than producers or vice versa. In general, smaller ECOWAS members are expected to be affected more than others since they tend to import more manufacturing products, mainly from outside the region. Given the CET bounds, tariffs for manufacturing and for raw materials are higher for example. This will lead to trade diversion. Channeling products previously imported from outside the region to members, and with the manufacturing not necessarily being cheaper or of equal quality, small ECOWAS members lose out. As mentioned for the case of Liberia above, higher prices due to the CET could result in a large negative effect on welfare, especially for small countries and there especially for the poor when the products they consume are subject to the higher tariff rates of the customs union.

In contrast, Kareem (2015) found a positive effect of the CET on households in Nigeria. He considers that households on the one hand are consumers but are on the other hand also producers. The CET effect is caused by the transmission or pass-through of changes in the tariff rates to domestic prices. The estimation results by Kareem (2015) show that domestic prices declined in Nigeria due to the higher tariff pass-through, whereby the decline was geographically unevenly distributed. The CET has had an overall positive effect on the welfare of households; with the lower prices outweighing the losses incurred due to a lower purchasing power through lower incomes. Based on these results domestic policies (like tax exemption or support payments) or a social safety net may be considered to compensate

¹³⁸ In Ghana, for example, one is aware of the fact that importers are likely to clear their goods through neighbouring countries rather than through Ghana in case of the higher import duty regime, higher costs of credits and so on. For this reason, Ghana has been refusing the CET which would increase Ghana’s import tariffs (new item on business news for Africa: http://footprint2africa.com/ghana-refuses-ecowas-common-tariff/CITA, 2016).
small producers, in particular households in rural areas or SMEs for the income forgone due to the lower prices caused by the CET.

TRADE FACILITATION POLICIES IN THE ECOWAS REGION

Trade facilitation has been widely discussed, officially catching momentum at the WTO Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013. Policy measures that fall under trade facilitation in the wider sense aim to improve procedures and controls that govern trade across national borders so as to reduce the trade costs associated and maximise efficiency while safeguarding legitimate regulatory objectives. OECD provides a comprehensive list of indicators that measure trade facilitation, as listed below; for details see OECD (2015). Figure 6-A1.1 in Appendix 6-A1 shows the OECD evaluation of trade facilitation performance for the ECOWAS region.

Categories of OECD trade facilitation indicators:

a. Information availability
b. Involvement of the trade community
c. Advance rulings
d. Appeal procedures
e. Fees and charges
f. Formalities, Documents
g. Formalities, Automation
h. Formalities, Procedures
i. Border agency cooperation - internal
j. Border agency cooperation - external
k. Governance and impartiality

Trade facilitation comprises a large number of measures and reforms, ranging from customs and border procedures to road network and quality infrastructure such as laboratories, storage facilities and so on. Due to the potential gain for trade and increasing inclusion in trade agreements, trade facilitation is of utmost importance for successful regional integration, which aims to promote trade amongst members and foster economic development.

However, trade theory differentiates between two different situations, as the gains from regional integration occur by trade creation and trade diversion, and thus in essence through discrimination against countries outside the region. Trade facilitation in contrast stipulates improved market access and procedures for all. Improving customs and border procedures, for example simplifying and/or modernizing them or making them more transparent, will lead to lower trade costs for all importers and exporters that engage in the respective cross-border trade. Note that achievements of trade facilitation often exhibit characteristics of public goods, i.e. once provided all trading partners benefit.

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139 In December 2013, WTO members concluded the Trade Facilitation Agreement at the Bali Ministerial Conference, as part of the so-called Bali package. Hence, trade facilitation has gained considerable momentum and is currently being implemented in developing countries, in cooperation with international institutions and donors. As defined by the WTO: “The Trade Facilitation Agreement contains provisions for expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. It also sets out measures for effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate authorities on trade facilitation and customs compliance issues. It further contains provisions for technical assistance and capacity building in this area”.

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Trade facilitation fosters competition, improves the business environment and, due to resulting reduction of trade costs, trade can be expected to increase. Trade costs not only comprise tangible costs such as fees, costs for transport and freight but also refer to aspects that are usually not measured in monetary terms. For measuring the benefit of trade facilitation, trade costs are expressed as ad valorem tariff equivalents, which present trade costs as a percentage of the value of the products cleared through customs. The reduction of trade costs is estimated econometrically (estimation of the ad valorem tariff equivalent) and subsequently used in models in order to gauge the possible quantitative impact.

The impact of trade facilitation is two-fold: price effects and efficiency effects. The price effects comprise the direct costs, such as fees at customs, ports or rents for corrupt officials, and the indirect costs of time delays and unreliable customs clearance for example. Removing these trade costs lower the price of products, thereby increasing trade. Efficiency effects are gains since the market distortions are released, leading to an efficient allocation of resources with countries/firms producing and trading the products for which they have a comparative competitive advantage.

It is beyond the scope of this section to evaluate the ECOWAS trade facilitation measures. Some highlights should however be given. The indicator “trading across borders”, for example, essentially counts the document requirements, time and monetary costs associated with exporting/importing a standardized cargo of goods from a country’s largest business city to the closest port, regardless of their final destination. Trade facilitation indicators generally focus on the performance in the region, rather than at the border or elsewhere.

To provide an indication about the current situation, figure 6.1 presents the overall doing business indicator, calculated by the World Bank data (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). As shown, in all years covered Guinea-Bissau scored highest in the doing business environment, also being more successful than the average. Nigeria achieved the second highest score, closely followed by Mauritania and Guinea.

In Appendix 6-A3, information about the underlying components of the Ease of Doing Business indicator are provided. With regard to the component of trade across borders, for which the detailed information is provided in the appendix, Nigeria also has the highest score, followed by Ghana and Sierra Leone. Mali and Burkina Faso score lowest with regard to trading across borders. This may not be surprising as they are land-locked countries with potential difficulties in logistics and long ways to the next port.

Using the World Bank Trade Costs Database, Valensisi et al. (2015) calculated trade costs in terms of ad valorem equivalents for the ECOWAS members (figure 6.2). As shown, the trade costs imply a varying performance of trading across borders. For Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana costs of trading within the ECOWAS region appear lowest whereas they are the highest in The Gambia and Cape Verde. For Cape Verde, for example, trade costs amounted to about 4.5 times the value of the products traded. For Côte d’Ivoire, the trade costs were about double the value of the products traded. Ackah et al. (2013) also calculate trade costs, which are in the same range as those by Valensisi et al. (2015). Ackah et al. (2013) report that on average ECOWAS members traded with their trading partners at a tariff equivalent trade cost of 268.2 percent. This is about twice as high as the trade costs of high-income OECD countries.

Interestingly, for all ECOWAS members the costs for trading within Africa tend to be higher than the costs for trading with other regions worldwide. This is very surprising and serious, given the proximity of neighbouring countries in the ECOWAS region and African countries, which are located further way but closer than the rest of the world.
Figure 6.1: Doing Business indicators for the ECOWAS members by the World Bank, 2016

Source: Own complication using the World Bank doing business database.
In an econometric analysis, Freud et al. (2010) focus on transit delays in Sub-Saharan Africa which according to their results have the most significant effect on exports: a one percent reduction in transit delays leads to 1.5% more trade and reducing inland travel by one day increases exports by 7%. Furthermore, Coulibaly et al. (2005) find for UEMOA trade that if all interstate roads would be paved, the countries would trade 2.87 times more, implying a great potential for road pavement projects. Using 1998-2011 panel data for eight ECOWAS members (the other seven ECOWAS members had to be skipped from the panel due to lack of data) Shuaibu (2015) investigates the impact of improved governance and institutions on ECOWAS trade, in addition to infrastructure. The gravity estimation conducted reveals that better institutional quality has a significant and positive effect on intra-ECOWAS trade.

Overall, the evidence reviewed in this section points towards the trade costs for intra-ECOWAS trade and the so-called “proximity gap”. In the literature, the “proximity gap” means that poor infrastructure, inefficient customs and other issues hamper trade flows within the region, despite the positive impact of proximity of countries. The costs of trade clearly seem to be a significant obstacle not only for integration or rather participating in global trade but also for integration within the ECOWAS region. Trade facilitation measures can particularly target the aspects which cause the higher trade costs in the ECOWAS region, thereby fostering intra-ECOWAS and extra-ECOWAS trade.

PRODUCT STANDARDS AND TECHNICAL REGULATIONS IN THE ECOWAS REGION

Standards and technical regulations are one category of non-tariff measures (NTMs) that have been widely discussed in the context of international trade between developing and developed countries, but also in the context of trade amongst developing countries (South-South trade). For the international classification of NTMs see Appendix 6-A2.

NTMs are special in the sense that some of them, specifically sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures are related to the provision of public goods. They are used for legitimate goals of public policy, although they have also been used for protectionist reasons. SPS measures target animal, plant and human health,
whereas TBT measures are about technical specification, compatibility, quality and consumer information. As such, SPS and TBT measures have benefits, in addition to costs, and there is common agreement that international trade would not be possible without such measures in place.

Differences in standards and regulations cause obstacles (due to trade costs) and therefore have a bearing on trade. In order to overcome the trade obstacles, regulatory differences are usually covered in regional trade agreements or agreements on economic integration. On the one hand, agreements comprise the alignment of regulations, thereby harmonizing regulations across the respective partners in order to establish common standards. On the other hand, the principle of mutual recognition can be applied so that products produced by one member are accepted by the other member without demanding that products meet own requirements. The underlying principle says that if food for example is safe for consumption in one country it would also be safe for consumption in another country. While some basic minimum requirements and a basic understand of each other’s regulatory system is needed, mutual recognition allows for greater flexibility for countries and businesses to adapt to requirements in the most suitable and efficient way.

Acknowledging the heterogeneity across and within the ECOWAS countries, mutual recognition (as opposed to harmonisation) may be a promising way forward to accelerate trade. However, a common understanding of appropriate business practices and procedures and most importantly functioning institutions, which are able to reliably and trustworthy verify compliance with the minimum requirements, are a prerequisite for mutual recognition. This minimum could be achieved by agreement on common trade-related rules and regulations as well as cooperation that ECOWAS members may agree upon in their own interest to benefit from market access, despite or in fact because of their diverse production possibilities.

Although prominent in the discussion, sound empirical evidence on the effects of NTMs in ECOWAS is scarce. Most studies are scattered, looking at specific interesting cases and applying different methodologies. Often the main analysis relies on anecdotal evidence. Due to the case study work with the different methodologies and different levels of rigour, general conclusions and syntheses are difficult to draw. In general, it can be differentiated between the effects of the measure, i.e. the introduction of a new measure on the one hand and the abolishment of the measure on the other hand. Both effects are relevant in the context of regional integration.

As mentioned, studies on NTMs take various methodological approaches. One approach is the application of surveys in order to directly ask businesses about their difficulties due to the respective measures. International Trade Centre (ITC) conducted NTM surveys in many developing countries, amongst them some of the ECOWAS members; for a summary see ITC (2015). Using the detailed results of the ITC NTM surveys, in combination with complaint registers by the ECOWAS Commission, for example, would be useful to provide insights on the NTM issues at hand. Documentation on complaints or disputes would help to concentrate on those measures that seem to matter. With this kind of information, the scope and magnitude of the effect of the respective measure could be revealed in an analysis. Note that since there are often specific interests behind measures, explaining why they cause problems for some but not for other for example, the interpretation of NTMs has to include a qualitative approach to better understand the measures under review. Thus a combination of a quantitative and qualitative analyses would be most suited for analysing NTMs in the context of West African integration.

In addition to the measures themselves, procedural obstacles have received much attention in the trade-related policy debate. For example, although the ECOWAS trade liberalisation
scheme does not demand a certificate of origin (found under Chapter 0 of the NTM classification, see Appendix A-6.2) for some products, e.g. for staple food, asking for such a certificate remains common practice at the border (World Bank, 2015). Similarly, some trade-related documents, e.g. veterinary or other certificates, may not be accepted for many reasons. Customs procedures or other services, including information services, are not always up-to-date. Note that in these cases the respective measure is not the problem but the border procedure. Procedural obstacles have been frequently reported by traders since they cause costs of paper work, costs in terms of time to issue certificates and costs of custom clearance; in the extreme case they may lead to customs not clearing a product at all. Procedural obstacles could be resolved by training and capacity building to make the necessary procedures as efficient as possible.

According to the World Bank (2015), nearly every country in West Africa fails to respect the equivalence of the national certificate of the exporting country. Cooperation between national technical institutions, which for example issue certificates, are responsible for texting and inspections of compliance but also engage in standard setting, is crucial for building trust between partner countries. As mentioned, if the system of the partner is trustworthy and reliable, leading to the same product qualities as desired, mutual recognition can be applied, which would contribute to establishing a common market and to regional integration.\textsuperscript{140}

Furthermore, cooperation and collaboration between national technical institutions in the ECOWAS region would also help to operationalize common practices and metrology, standardized and testing methods approved as good practices, as well as quality standards. Documents and guidelines for the practical application that would be common in the region could be developed, too. These aspects are part of the quality infrastructure and play an important role in regional integration. However, it should be noted that the quality infrastructure needs to be decentralized and spread into the region as well as embrace informal institutions at the local level. As such, they may deliver their service to businesses and in fact ensure the implementation on agreed standards and regulations, which is not the case in the current situation. However, some flexibility, rather than top-down bureaucracy, should be granted. The World Bank (2015) gives a nice example of a practical way of building capacity: Graduate students studying topics like chemistry, biology and other relevant subjects have become engaged in certification in Nigeria.

Looking at intra and extra-ECOWAS trade, ECOWAS members do not export the same products to their neighbours and the rest of the world. Furthermore, it seems that high quality, high value-added products are usually imported, while less processed products are exported to neighbours. The latter indicates issues in value chains in the ECOWAS region. In fact, a successful regional integration calls for value-added for unprocessed products through stronger value chains. Standards and technical regulations that govern the value chains will have to emerge as a prerequisite in the coordination of the chain. That is, common quality definitions, product specification as well as improved production and processing strategies will follow suit, next to quality controls and conformity assessment. The importance of the links between improved/localized value chains and regional integration has been showcased in Asia and elsewhere. For the ECOWAS members, it could be the key to bring forward the regional integration across the members, while promoting intra-ECOWAS trade to the benefit of the region.

\textsuperscript{140} Note that in the European process of integration, it was only after the famous case of “Cassis de Dijon” that mutual recognition became common practice amongst the EU members. Thanks to applying the principle of mutual recognition, the common EU market could eventually be achieved.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The trade-related policy options to foster trade in the ECOWAS region are diverse. Some of them are already in place but not implemented. Implementation should thus be a priority in the region since without implementing the policies agreed upon the desired regional integration, which will be beneficial for the region as a whole, cannot be achieved. Trade will help achieve the economic integration but also goes beyond economic goals, since trade also involves, for instance, cultural and social exchange.

The benefit of regional integration in the ECOWAS region crucially depends on the ECOWAS members’ ability to look beyond their national interests while tapping into their potentials, developing business and trade relations within the region and also with third countries.

This calls for the focus on trade facilitation, improving the business and trading environment, including infrastructure. However, improvement in the quality of infrastructure should go further than roads and customs and encompasses institutions. At the same token, building regional value chains would integrate the region, as they would commit to West African product quality at prices affordable, particular for those with increased incomes, likely being the new urban population in the cities of the ECOWAS countries.

Trade policy in the ECOWAS region does not take place in isolation but in the international sphere. Therefore, policies of other countries and regions may impact the outcomes for the ECOWAS region. Thus any analysis on trade-related policies needs to take other factors outside the ECOWAS region into account. Of course, the changes in the ECOWAS region itself for example are to be covered in scenarios that consider drivers such as population growth, the movement of people (urbanization), changes in diets due to changes in lifestyle and different products offered and so on.

The analysis of trade-related options for the ECOWAS region should involve both qualitative and quantitative approaches in order to provide insights on the effects of the trade-related policy option. The quantitative analysis could make use of the computable general equilibrium model “Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET), which has been developed at LEI. The general aim of a CGE analysis is to provide indications of effects in a consistent, economically sound framework by taking into account linkages across countries as well as sectors, while allowing for specific features such as nutrition and food security, types of households, financial transfers (international aid, remittances) and trade costs.

Clearly, the debate is not only economic but exhibits political economy dynamics, with different stakeholders’ capacity to defend their interests. The political economy angle could provide the understanding of the realities, which is necessary for evaluating policies and finding solutions that mitigate the trade-offs between those that lose and those that gain from policy reform.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX 6-A1: OECD TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS

Figure 6-A1.1a: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators – results for the ECOWAS region

source: OECD - http://compareyourcountry.org/trade-facilitation

Figure 6-A1.1b: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators – details for Burkina Faso and Benin

source: OECD - http://compareyourcountry.org/trade-facilitation
Technical measures

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), refers to laws, decrees, regulations, requirements, standards and procedures to protect human, animal or plant life or health from certain risks such as the establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; risks from additives, contaminants, toxins, disease causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs. Hygienic requirements, fumigation requirements or quarantine are examples. The chapter is also known as SPS.</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>on technical barriers to trade (TBT), contains measures referring to the technical specification of products or production processes and conformity assessment systems thereof. They exclude SPS, but a TBT measure may be applied to food products, if the measure is not for food safety. Product identity or quality requirements are examples.</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>on pre-shipment inspection and other formalities, refers to the practice of checking, consigning, monitoring and controlling the shipment of goods before or at entry into the destination country.</td>
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Non-technical measures

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<th>Chapter</th>
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<td>D</td>
<td>on price control measures, implemented to control the prices of imported articles in order to: support the domestic price of certain products when the import price of these goods is lower; establish the domestic price of certain products because of price fluctuation in domestic markets or price instability in a foreign market; and counteract the damage resulting from the occurrence of ‘unfair’ foreign trade practices.</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>on licences, quotas, prohibitions and other quantity control measures, measures that restrain the quantity of goods that can be imported, regardless of whether they come from different sources or from one specific supplier. These measures can take the form of restrictive licensing, fixing of a predetermined quota or through prohibitions.</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>on charges, taxes and other para-tariff measures, refers to measures other than tariffs that increase the cost of imports in a similar manner, i.e. by a fixed percentage or by a fixed amount. They are also known as para-tariff measures. Customs surcharges and general sales taxes are examples.</td>
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<td>G</td>
<td>on finance measures, refers to measures that are intended to regulate the access to and cost of foreign exchange for imports and define the terms of payment. They may increase import costs in the same manner as tariff measures</td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>on anti-competitive measures, intended to grant exclusive or special preferences or privileges to one or more limited groups of economic operators.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>on trade-related investment measures, by requesting local content or requesting that investment be related to export to balance imports.</td>
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<td>J</td>
<td>on distribution restrictions, related to the internal distribution of imports.</td>
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<td>K</td>
<td>on restrictions on post-sales services, measures restricting the provision of post-sales services in the importing country by producers of exported goods.</td>
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<td>L</td>
<td>on subsidies, includes measures related to financial contributions by a government or government body to a production structure, be it a particular industry or company, such as direct or potential transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, equity infusions), payments to a funding mechanism and income or price support.</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>on government procurement restrictions, refers to measures controlling the purchase of goods by government agencies, generally by preferring national providers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>on intellectual property, measures related to intellectual property rights in trade. Intellectual property legislation covers patents, trademarks, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated circuits, copyright, geographical indications and trade secrets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter O, on rules of origin, covers laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied by the governments of importing countries.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter P,</strong> on export-related measures, encompasses all measures that countries apply to their exports. It includes export taxes, export quotas or export prohibitions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*source: UNCTAD (2013)*
## APPENDIX 6-A3: COMPONENTS OF THE WORLD BANK DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS FOR THE ECOWAS MEMBERS, 2016 (SOURCE: WORLD BANK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Overall Indicator</th>
<th>Starting Business</th>
<th>Construction Permits</th>
<th>Getting Electricity</th>
<th>Registering Property</th>
<th>Getting Credit</th>
<th>Protecting Minority Investors</th>
<th>Paying Taxes</th>
<th>Trading Across Borders</th>
<th>Enforcing Contracts</th>
<th>Resolving Insolvency</th>
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<td>Distance to the rank of other countries</td>
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<td>Cost to export: Border compliance (USD)</td>
<td>Time to export: Documentary compliance (hours)</td>
<td>Cost to export: Documentary compliance (USD)</td>
<td>Time to import: Border compliance (hours)</td>
<td>Cost to import: Border compliance (USD)</td>
<td>Time to import: Documentary compliance (hours)</td>
<td>Cost to import: Documentary compliance (USD)</td>
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APPENDIX 6-A4: SELECTED ADDITIONAL LITERATURE ON TRADE-RELATED POLICY OPTIONS IN THE ECOWAS REGION


CONCLUSIONS & (POLICY) RECOMMENDATIONS

Paul Lange, Ton Dietz (both ASCL) Marie-Luise Rau (LEI-WUR), Jeske van Seters and Carmen Torres (both ECDPM)

With input from Ruerd Ruben (LEI-WUR)

CONCLUSIONS – SCOPING REPORT

SECTION 1:

- Far from being exhaustive, this inventory of regional organizations already shows that there are several that are well recognized within the region and have a proven track record as knowledge institute, through a number of knowledge generation and dissemination activities and across a wide range of thematic areas, including agriculture & food security.
- Furthermore, it also points at the possibility of considering collaboration with organizations that are traditionally not regarded as knowledge institutes, such as financial institutions like (development) banks.
- The inventory further demonstrates that there is considerable potential added value of working with regional knowledge institutes, for example in terms of their expertise, networks and linkages to policy-processes.
- It also indicates that there are a number of significant differences in comparative strengths between these institutes that need to take into consideration when assessing the potential for collaboration and identifying best placed partners, such as main geographical focus (regional versus more country/continental-based focus), core thematic foci and primary knowledge activities. Additional parameters could help to further determine their potential and suitability for collaboration.
- The mapping however also reveals that desk research as method for assessing the potential for collaboration has limitations in terms of exposing the particular strengths and weaknesses of these knowledge institutes.

SECTION 2:

- The analysis of the relevant literature shows a growing dominance of English-language sources, and a limited involvement of African knowledge agencies. The literature shows four major domains, with twelve subdomains:
- History, governance and policy options: Studies about the history of West African integration; studies about legal and governance aspects of West African regional integration; and studies with policy options, about foreign (donor) support, and comparative studies.
- Economics: studies about trade and actual analysis of trade statistics in the ECOWAS region, and about the economics and political economy of regional integration in West Africa, including methodological studies; and studies about investment analyses and monetary issues.
- Geography and sociology: studies about migration and remittances; about geography and physical infrastructure; about the reality of cross-border relations, and borderland studies; and sociological studies of cross-border linkages and gender dimensions; and
- Cross-border food trade, and food and nutrition security; regional trade in specific food products; and regional trade and food and nutrition security.
In an intermezzo it was suggested to position the Dutch involvement in regional integration in West Africa in a perspective of expected rapid overall population growth towards 2050, and even more rapid urbanization processes.

Based on the literature survey and the long-term analysis it was suggested to take the strengthening of regional food sovereignty very serious.

SECTION 3:

- The share of intra-ECOWAS trade (in terms of trade value) has been much lower than extra-ECOWAS trade, with extra-ECOWAS trade increasing rapidly.
- ECOWAS trade has been biased towards a few countries. Nigeria has certainly been a dominant exporter in both intra and extra-ECOWAS trade. Côte d’Ivoire and Benin with large ports follow suit, but with much lower numbers than Nigeria.
- Focusing on intra-ECOWAS trade, Benin, Senegal and Togo are important exporters in the region supplying products to other ECOWAS members. Burkina Faso, Mali (in particular agri-food products) and Sierra Leone much depend on supplies from ECOWAS members, with the highest share of their imports coming from the aforementioned countries.
- Overall, almost 70% of the recorded value of intra-ECOWAS trade is attributed to trade in minerals (mainly oil trade). Manufacturing accounted for about 20% and agricultural products (edible and non-edible) made up for only about 10%, according to official statistics. For many West African countries, much trade of agri-food products has taken place with other trade partners outside the region and a large proportion of agri-food trade is believed to be informal unregistered trade.
- Official trade statistics are considered to only capture a small proportion of intra-regional trade in West Africa. For agri-food products, for example, up to 75% could be informal trade (World Bank, 2015). It would be interesting to look into options to better account for informal trade and combining such information with an analysis about who engages in informal trade and why.
- Trade diagnostic indicators are best used for evaluating trade flows within the region and other countries. Here the exports and import shares as well as the net trade position are presented for the countries in West Africa; in a second step other indicators based on economic theory of international trade could be calculated in order to derive insights about possible priorities for trade. Examples could be indicators of trade complementarity, comparative advantages and trade-related competitiveness. Note that one important task related to the trade analysis is the improvement of the trade data available, accounting for unregistered and informal trade.

SECTION 4:

- The (new) strategic policy agenda of The Netherlands aims to provide a response to key developments in the global economy by linking aid, trade and investment.
- One of the key elements of this agenda is the reorganization of its bilateral relations with other countries in the world. For West Africa, this means that there are three types of relationships with the 4 (partner + focus) countries in the region, working through a network of Embassies in 5 countries (and a sixth forthcoming).
- The strategic agenda puts much value on trade promotion and facilitation. It considers the regional level as the most appropriate and logical framework for its interventions aimed at trade facilitation. West Africa is one of two regions (the other...
being East Africa) on the African continent where The Netherlands targets its trade facilitation efforts.

- The added value of supporting regional initiatives and/or applying a regional approach in West Africa is generally recognized at the Embassy level, and particularly through trade promotion & facilitation and in the area of agriculture & food security.

- Despite this general acknowledgement, in practice many of the interventions in which the Embassies have been involved in recent years are country-based with little regional/cross-border linkages and often little coordinated with other Embassies in the region.

- Ghana and to a lesser extent Benin and Senegal seems to be the cases in which a regional approach has been most developed and consistently applied by the Dutch Embassy and has resulted in supporting a number of concrete regional/cross-border initiatives.

- Promising but only recently introduced instruments to give shape to a more coordinated Dutch regional approach in West Africa – i.e. the appointment of an ECOWAS permanent representative and the creation of the position of regional economy envoy – have yet to prove their (full) potential.

SECTION 5:

- ECOWAS and UEMOA are generally recognized as the two key regional organizations in West Africa that have moved the regional integration agenda in West Africa forward.

- Both have developed many (policy) initiatives in a wide range of sectors and areas to further regional (economic) integration and cooperation, including around trade, agriculture, industrial development and infrastructure.

- Looking at these particular (policy) initiatives, the overall level of progress on regional integration in West Africa has been below expectations. The gap between regional agreement and implementation/enforcement on the ground is a major concern for many of these initiatives.

- West Africa is a region of particular concern to the international development community. The most engaged bilateral and multilateral development partners around the promotion of regional integration in West Africa are the African Development Bank, World Bank, European Commission, Germany/ GIZ, United Kingdom/ DfID, United States/ USAID, Japan/JICA, The Netherlands, Spain/ AECID and France/ AFD.

- There is a multitude of (policy) initiatives undertaken by a wide range of development partners aimed at regional (economic) integration in West Africa. Many of these initiatives target trade promotion & facilitation, what appears to be an important dimension of regional integration for various development partners. In addition, a major area of attention for several of them is agriculture & food security.

- Despite the rise of institutional frameworks to coordinate their interventions and increasing multi-donor programmes in the region, the engagement of development partners in West Africa is still to a large extent fragmented and donor coordination in the region is generally regarded as insufficient.
SECTION 6:

- ECOWAS members are very heterogeneous. This may explain the difficulty in finding agreement on common policies in the first place as well as the lack of the implementation of what has eventually been agreed upon. National objectives dominate trade-related policy options. Commitments to the WTO have for example been used as a pretext for refusing or postponing the implementation of the common external tariff (CET).

- Asymmetric effects across the ECOWAS members but also within a country have justified some kind of national support measures, e.g. infant industry protection for not yet established and/or vulnerable sectors from the increased competition following tariff liberalisation or other trade policy measures that open up markets. Support measures also comprise exceptions of exemptions from common policies, import and export bans implemented as “beggar thy neighbour” policies. The compensation, e.g. through income support or introduction of a “safety net”, of high food prices that particular hurt the poor in small ECOWAS member states is less often granted.

- The enormous lack of implementation impinges on the creation of an economic union and has, amongst other factors, encouraged informal trade and smuggling, both of which benefit from different prices and business costs across borders. The focus of policy makers should be on the effective implementation and monitoring. Transposing the agreements to the local level, by making them practical and accessible for businesses and traders is paramount. This could involve dissemination of information/communication and training, but some degree of flexibility to allow a country’s individual way of application, as this has proven to work best not only in the African context but also in the EU for example.

- In general, the ECOWAS member states follow the principle of harmonisation in order to align regulations, including tariffs and non-tariff measures. Given the difficulties of common agreement and the absence of unity in the region, the principle of mutual recognition may however be a promising means to foster intra-ECOWAS trade (like in the EU integration process).

- Trade-related policies should specifically tackle non-tariff measures that cause unnecessary trade costs and thereby hamper cross-border trade. Poor infrastructure, inefficient customs and other issues hamper trade flows within the region, despite the positive impact of proximity of countries. The costs of trade clearly seem to be a significant obstacle not only for integration or rather participating in global trade but also for integration within the ECOWAS region. Trade facilitation measures could particularly target the aspects which cause the higher trade costs in the ECOWAS region. Complaints reported in business surveys or dispute could help identify the priority issues to be solved.

- Regional value chains appear to be key for promoting ECOWAS integration. This calls for adding value to unprocessed products through stronger value chains. Note that creating value chains goes beyond adding value. For example value chains require the functioning of infrastructure, i.e. hard and soft infrastructure, the latter including standards, quality control and conformity assessment. A way forward in ECOWAS integration could thus be building regional value chains, committed to West African product quality at prices affordable to those with increased incomes, likely being expanding urban population in the cities of the ECOWAS countries.
CONCLUSIONS – ECDPM DISCUSSION PAPER

ECOWAS exports show little product diversity, with a heavy reliance on extractive products (petroleum, natural gas) and a few agricultural commodities (cocoa, rubber, cotton). ECOWAS imports are more diversified, with a high share of industrialised products (refined petroleum, vehicles, ships, telecommunications equipment) and food products (e.g. rice, wheat), with a fast deteriorating food trade balance. Food demand in West Africa is expected to continue to grow dramatically in the coming decades, with a great risk of further deteriorating the food trade balance. This is particularly problematic in light of the collapse of international oil prices that affect the region’s purchasing power, in particular in Nigeria (by far the main economy in the region).

Intra-regional trade in ECOWAS represents 8 to 11% of total ECOWAS trade according to official data, but it is estimated that approximately 75% of intra-regional trade is not accounted for in official statistics, as it takes place on an informal basis. Informal intra-regional trade mainly concerns food staples. Evidence further suggests that intra-regional trade has considerable room to grow further. This fits the ambitions of the region to step up intra-regional trade and value chain development (through increased production and value addition), with particular emphasis on agricultural and food products, for wealth creation and food security.

It is impossible to get a comprehensive overview of spatial dimensions of intra-regional trade from existing statistics and literature, not least because of its informality, but a limited set of studies indicate that part of intra-regional trade flows through main regional corridors. However, studies also indicate that considerable intra-regional trade flows outside these main regional corridors. This applies to trade that occurs around border areas. Furthermore, production basins of intra-regionally traded goods are not always in the direct vicinity of a corridor, as corridors were conceived to connect port cities with the hinterland (and not production basins with cities/markets). Therefore, policies and programmes seeking to support intra-regional trade and food value chain development will need to take that broader perspective into account, in order to achieve objectives related to poverty reduction, food security and inclusive development.

This overview paper provided insights in key dynamics, drivers and obstacles of this intra-regional trade in West Africa, particularly in agriculture and food products. Political economy considerations that were brought forward included the following, structured in table 7.1., according to the ‘five political economy lenses’ presented earlier.

Such political economy factors will need to be taken into account when designing and implementing policies to promote intra-regional trade and value chain development. However, they necessarily remain quite general at this level, since regional trade differs considerably depending on the value chain concerned, with regard to the direction and size of flows, actors involved and incentives, potential impact of policy change and/or formalization of the value chain for different value chain actors etc. Therefore, a deeper understanding of strategic/relevant value chains would be important to inform policy dialogue and guide effective policy interventions.

141 These findings are drawn from: C. Torres and J. van Seters (2016), Overview of trade and barriers to trade in West Africa: insights in political economy dynamics, with particular focus on agricultural and food trade, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 195: www.ecdpm.org/dp195 (forthcoming).
Table 7.1: Overview of political economy factors affecting intra-regional trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Economy Lenses</th>
<th>Examples of key issues at play</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1. Structural or foundational factors                         | - Different agro-climatic conditions between and within countries
- Fast population growth, urbanization trend and growing middle class, dealing to increased food demand and changing consumption patterns
- Economic heterogeneity of ECOWAS, with Nigeria being the hegemon (large consumer base; relatively well developed agro-industry)
- Cross-border historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties (e.g. Anglophone versus Francophone members of ECOWAS; informal trade driven by social networks based on shared ethnicity, geographical origin etc) |
| 2. Formal and informal rules of the game                      | - Strong regional ambitions and policy frameworks to facilitate intra-regional trade and strengthen regional value chains, including processing for value addition (e.g. ETLS, CET, ECOWAP, WACIP)
- Implementation of regional commitments at national level lags behind, so that many tariff and non-tariff barriers remain, including both formal and informal trade restrictive methods
- Lack of ECOWAS enforcement mechanisms for the application of regional commitments by member states |
| 3. Actors, agency and incentives                               | - Ruling elites pursue short-term national interests seeking to obtain or maintain votes, rather than implementing regional commitments (e.g. install export bans, import quotas, etc.)
- Powerful private sector actors block key reforms and regional initiatives (e.g. extra-regional food importers of for example rice; trucking cartels)
- Rent-seeking by officials (e.g. custom officers, police) through roadblocks and border bribes, leading to long and costly delays;
- Weakest actors in the value chain stay in the informal sector due to high costs of formalization (e.g. smallholders, SMEs, traders, many of whom are women)
- Public and private stakeholders lack information about regional policies, customs and trade |
| 4. Subsector specific technical and political characteristics  | - Development of specific value chains constrained by issues such as poor access to key inputs, land tenure, weak production technologies, fragmentation of smallholder producers and limited credit and markets access
- Value chain-specific trade routes, as well as infrastructure and transport needs (e.g. cold chains)
- Value chain-specific actors, with different characteristics and interests |
| 5. Exogenous factors                                           | - Climate change
- Price fluctuations of commodities (e.g. petroleum)
- Diseases outbreaks (e.g. Ebola)                                |

To contribute to this, ECDPM together with its partners will conduct further value-chain specific analytical work and facilitate multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, with due attention for political economy factors. Through this work, we seek to contribute to on-going policy processes and vast array of initiatives. We specifically aim to assist West African key (state and non-state) actors and development partners to enhance synergies across sectors (e.g. trade, agriculture, corridor development, and industrialization) and design and implement political economy-sensitive interventions.
For this purpose, value chains to be selected for a deeper analysis of trade and political economy factors in West Africa, and subsequent discussions on what interventions/policies are required, should have the following characteristics: i) together form a diverse set of value chains in terms of trade flows, by including food products currently mostly imported from outside the region, mostly exported out of the region and considerably traded within the region; (ii) be critical for wealth creation and food security; (iii) have been identified as strategic value chains in ECOWAS policies; and (iv) represent different types of food products, with distinct trade challenges (e.g. perishable versus non-perishable products).

Therefore, based on the overview presented in this paper, the following selection is proposed for further analysis, as presented in Table 7.2.

**Table 7.2: Preliminary selection of value chains for further work of ECDPM and its partners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of food product</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Horticulture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade flow</td>
<td>Mainly imported</td>
<td>Mainly traded intra-regionally</td>
<td>Mainly exported, while others imported and/or traded intra-regionally (major differences between horticultural products)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance for wealth creation and food security</td>
<td>Widely consumed throughout the region and demand is spurring; many smallholder farmers involved, women particularly involved in rice processing and marketing; many new PPP initiatives in the region (Senegal, Ivory Coast, etc.)</td>
<td>Widely consumed throughout the region and demand is spurring; vulnerable group of pastoralists; high potential for value addition in livestock-derived products (milk, milk products, etc.); key source of animal protein for the region (nutrition security); key for resilience of nomad population (“cattle stock is the money in the bank for pastoralists”</td>
<td>High vitamins, minerals and fiber content (nutrition security); many women involved in production and processing; production in combination with other crops; export/income potential still under-exploited; high potential for processing (dried fruits, juices etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional priority</td>
<td>Prioritized in ECOWAP (and regional rice offensive adopted in the region)</td>
<td>Prioritized in ECOWAP &amp; WACIP (meat) and foreseen ‘milk offensive’ and ‘livestock plan’ in ECOWAP</td>
<td>Prioritized in ECOWAP and WACIP (mango)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of food product</td>
<td>Staple food (carbohydrates)</td>
<td>Staple food (protein/animal products)</td>
<td>Perishable product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can be traded in bulk/simple storage</td>
<td>Relatively simple logistics for live animal trade, versus technology/cooling storage for processed goods (see horticulture)</td>
<td>Very complex post harvest logistics/technology required for proper storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relatively short value chain</td>
<td>“Medium” long value chain</td>
<td>Medium to long value chain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Some horticultural products are being increasingly exported internationally (e.g. pineapples, mangoes) and others being imported from outside of the region in certain periods and countries (e.g. onions, tomato products).
b. While not among the ‘priority value chains’ for immediate action listed in the ECOWAP/RAIP, horticulture features in the ECOWAP Compact as a key regional value chain to be strengthened, including for employment generation purposes.
1. DO NOT OVERSTRETCH AND FOCUS

A small country like The Netherlands is recommended not to overstretch its abilities to support regional integration of trade and investments in West Africa as a whole; it should focus on areas and domains where The Netherlands have a clear added value, and an acknowledged track record of past performance and proven innovative abilities, like in agro-logistics.

2. ALIGN WITH EXISTING COMMITMENTS

West Africa currently shows growing regional commitment to further regional integration. It is recommended that the Netherlands aligns to these regional commitments, taking them as a starting point and supporting their implementation.

3. STRENGTHEN SYNERGIES BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLICY ARENAS AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

The Netherlands is well placed to strengthen the synergies between different policy areas/actors to effectively support regional trade and investments for inclusive and sustainable development in West Africa: trade and customs, private sector development and (agro) industrialisation, agricultural support services, infrastructure development, agro-logistics, etcetera, to which the Netherlands could (and already does) contribute, with public and private agencies, as well as public-private partnerships.

4. REGIONAL FOCUS: THE CENTRAL REGION

It is recommended that The Netherlands focus their own aid and trade support to West Africa’s regionalization agenda initially on the Central Region, targeting trade in food products (imported and regionally produced), with a focus on North-South and South-North linkages between Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Burkina Faso. The so-called Central Corridor also connects Togo with Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire with (Eastern) Mali, and Ghana/Togo/Benin with Niamey in Niger. The choice of the Central Region would acknowledge the growing economic importance of Côte d’Ivoire; and would make proper use of the new Netherlands’ Embassy there. It crosses the English-French divide and the South-North divide and reconnects the Netherlands and Burkina Faso. It can make use of an extensive network of Dutch expertise in the private sector and in knowledge agencies, and their (former) partners in the region. The Netherlands can build on the preliminary work being done for ATWA.

5. THEMATIC FOCUS: FOOD VALUE CHAINS TO THE MAJOR CITIES

The Netherlands could give special attention to the provision of food the major food markets in the area, and particularly of Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso as the major inland cities in the Central Region. In addition, the trade in animals and livestock products (mainly North-
South) to the major cities in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire [and maybe Togo and Benin] deserves attention, as well as cross-border food linkages between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, including trade in fish. Also the provision of food to Niamey via the Central Corridor may get attention, as well as the provision of cities in Mali, as far as they are [partly] connected to the Central Corridor. The Netherlands could support value addition and quality enhancement of food products in the region (agro-food industrialization).

6. FOCUS ON THE MAJOR FORMAL AND INFORMAL ACTORS AND USE A POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE WITH HISTORICAL DEPTH

Attention for trade routes and transport and other trade barriers along those routes (including the major ports, and border posts) should include attention for formal and informal transactions and value chains. A vital area for further research consists of looking more carefully into the major actors within chosen agro-food value chains, and the political economy of those actors (also in historical perspective) as an important prerequisite for understanding opportunities and threats, risks and chances, both for local/regional entrepreneurs and for foreign (including Dutch) businesses.

7. INCLUDE A FOCUS ON WOMEN PRODUCERS AND TRADERS

The importance of informal food trade and its linkages to food security in the region calls for a focus on women producers and traders, and The Netherlands should go beyond corridor development and formal trade (with mainly men involved).

8. FOCUS ON A SELECTIVE GROUP OF AGRO-FOOD PRODUCTS: HORTICULTURE, LIVESTOCK/DAIRY AND RICE. AND DO SO IN CONSULTATION WITH ECOWAS, THE AfDB, AND OTHER PARTNERS.

If the Netherlands indeed decides to focus on cross-border food trade and investments to stimulate regional trade and regional value-chain development in the years to come, it would be wise to further concentrate the major areas of intervention (in consultation with the ECOWAS Commission and Member States, and the African Development Bank, and with other selected development partners) to a selection of agricultural products. Given the growing importance for the urban consumers, we recommend that the Netherlands will focus on horticulture and livestock/dairy as niches where West African countries have competitive advantages, and also that the Netherlands explores ways to further assist rice production and cross-border rice trade in the region. To further add to these niches’ competitiveness, The Netherlands could stimulate local sourcing by private agro-industries and facilitate different forms of agro-support.

9. BUT DO NOT FORGET TO LOOK AT FOOD SECURITY CONSEQUENCES AND BE A CATALYST OF IMPROVING STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND BETTER DATA COLLECTION

A focus on the big metropolitan areas should however go together with supporting ‘vigilance systems’ for food security in the more marginal areas and secondary and tertiary cities, by continuing to involve and support CILSS and the Sahel and West Africa Club, and work together with the USAID systems in place.

In the area of agriculture/food security there are a few areas in particular where The Netherlands could act as a broker to bring relevant actors together. For example, we suggest that it would be good if The Netherlands would stimulate the FAO, the African Development
Bank, the ECOWAS Commission, and CILSS/Club du Sahel, to join hands in developing a more integrated and more dependable dataset on food production, trade, and investment.

10. YES, TRADEMARK EAST AFRICA CAN BE A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION, BUT: WEST AFRICA IS DIFFERENT!

It is recommended that The Netherlands formulates as its ambition to be a catalyst of (donor) coordination efforts and multi-donor initiatives comparable to TradeMark East Africa. However, with regard to using TradeMark East Africa as an inspiration, one should not disregard the significant differences in conditions and circumstances between the two regions. Two of these aspects deserve notable attention and offer an opportunity to The Netherlands to play a particular role. One relates to the language barriers in West Africa. The Netherlands could help to bridge the language gap by stimulating the spread of bilingualism (English and French/Portuguese) in policy documents, and among local universities and other knowledge institutes. Second is the lower infrastructural development in the region. And of course a major difference is that TMEA only covers five countries so far, while the ECOWAS region covers fifteen countries, for us one of the reasons to suggest an initial focus on the Central Region only.

11. GIVE THE REGIONAL ORGANISATIONAL MANDATE TO THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN ABIDJAN

It is recommended that the new Embassy of The Netherlands in Côte d’Ivoire gets the mandate to develop a sub-regional policy of sustainable diplomacy, and to include Burkina Faso in the Embassy’s activities related to trade, investment and aid. Of course this should be done in close collaboration with the Netherlands Embassy in Accra, and also with The Netherlands Embassy in Abuja, with regard to connections with the overall ECOWAS approach (given that the ECOWAS Commission is headquartered in Abuja). It is also recommended that there will be regular meetings and exchanges about regional trade, aid and investment between the relevant Netherlands’ Embassies in the region. Promising but only recently introduced instruments to give shape to a more coordinated regional approach in West Africa by the Netherlands Government – i.e. the appointment of an ECOWAS permanent representative and the creation of the position of regional economic envoy – should be seized as an opportunity to (co-) drive this process.

12. TAKE THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AS THE CENTRAL KNOWLEDGE PARTNER AND LINK UP WITH ITS ‘HIGH FIVES FOR AFRICA STRATEGY’.

We recommend to take the African Development Bank as a central knowledge partner for Dutch support for regional integration processes in West Africa, and to give them a role in engaging other knowledge partners in the region, and connect those to collaborating knowledge partners in the Netherlands.

The African Development Bank has recently announced its ‘High Fives for Africa’ Strategy.
‘Integrate Africa’ is in the middle, but that goal is linked to ‘Feed Africa’, and ‘Industrialise Africa’ (linked to ‘Light up and Power Africa’) and to the ultimate goal ‘Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa’. By linking its regional integration support to these major goals, formulated by the leading African actor in the region, the Netherlands is demand driven, and integrates its approach with the actor that will probably make a difference in the years to come, both as a major investor, and as an important knowledge broker.

13. BUT DO INVOLVE THE KNOWLEDGE CENTRES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR FROM THE START

It is recommended that The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant Embassies in the region not only involve local policymakers and knowledge centres (and supporting institutions in the Netherlands), but also representatives of the private sector in the region (the Borderless Alliance can be a good example to follow; and a support agency like the Netherlands African Business Council, linking Dutch and local entrepreneurs, could play a role as well;) It is also recommended to connect to Dutch agencies with a long presence in the area, and with relevant expertise and networks, like SNV and AgriProFocus. A particular area of attention in this regard concerns the opportunities (and challenges) related to regional value-chains development and in particular to agro-industrial value addition, that needs to be further explored.

14. AND BE BOLD; TRY TO CONNECT TO EMERGING PARTNERS

In order to have a better understanding of the broader playing field, it is good to be more aware of the role of ‘non-traditional’ development partners such as emerging economies like China, Brazil, Turkey, and India. These kinds of players become increasingly important in West Africa but manifest themselves in other ways than the more traditional development partners. This has not yet been part of the scoping study. Therefore an interesting and important area for further research is to look into their specific role and impact in order to identify possible areas for cooperation and alignment.

15. BUT ALSO: DON’T BE NAÏVE

The literature and policy documents concerning regional integration in West Africa generally strongly assume that increased intra-regional trade will indeed result in regional economic development, better food security, increased resilience, and also better stability (also in a political and military sense). However, a more political economy approach questions some of the naïve assumptions that all is well with growing regional trade and integration if that could (and should) be stimulated. Lower cross-border transaction costs and lower transport costs, as well as a likely more powerful position of larger food traders, and the formal food industry, will mean that the people (and agencies) that currently profit from high transaction costs, expensive transport, and that currently organize the bulk of informal food trade (mainly
women), might lose their positions and part of their income. And within the food production and trade sectors the rewards of better integration at a much higher level of scale, might be very unequally divided between owners and workers, smallholders and large agricultural producers, etc. If ignored, these political economy aspects might result in more inequality, more instability, more food insecurity for relatively powerless people and areas, and threats to economic development in the region, instead of overall benefits. An additional impact of more integration should also not be ignored. More trade in seeds, livestock and food products over a larger region increases the risks of livestock and plant epidemics (and related human disease epidemics, plus human disease risks related to greater mobility), so the epidemiological, plant-health and veterinary services – which are first and foremost provided by public institutions – need special care, at the level of the Central Region or West Africa as a whole.