Understanding economic integration and peace and security in IGAD

*High-level summitry and pragmatism in a region of “persistent turbulence”*

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This background paper is part of a series on the Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations (PEDRO) and builds on an earlier paper conducted under the Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa (PERIA) project. It was prepared in March 2017. In line with ECDPM's mission to inform and facilitate EU-Africa policy dialogue, and financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ, the studies analyse key policy areas of seventeen regional organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so they address three broad questions: What is the political traction of the organisations around different policy areas? What are the key member state interests in the regional agenda? What are the areas with most future traction for regional organisations to promote cooperation and integration around specific areas? The studies aim to advance thinking on how regional policies play out in practice, and ways to promote politically feasible and adaptive approaches to regional cooperation and integration. Further information can be found at www.ecdpm.org/pedro.

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1. Introduction/broad context

This study presents a brief political economy study of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and its role in promoting economic integration and conflict prevention and resolution in the Horn of Africa. Both areas are explicit objectives of IGAD (IGAD, 2010), are potentially mutually dependent, and are important for addressing other regional challenges such as food security, gender equality and the effects of climate change, also core elements of the IGAD mandate discussed in a separate study.

Starting out with a relatively narrow agenda, IGAD was established in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya as Member States. With Eritrea joining in 1993, IGAD was re-launched in 1994, its mandate expanding to focus on development more broadly. The origins of the current IGAD therefore lie in severe drought and famine, most infamously in Ethiopia in 1984-85, during a period characterised by changing Cold War relations, economic crisis and upheaval in Sub-Saharan Africa.

As one of the eight AU-recognised regional economic communities (RECs), IGAD is a pillar of the African Union’s various continental architectures. However, in spite of a wide array of institutions and activities, critics express frustration at the limited progress in regional market integration, conflict prevention and low capacity in IGAD institutions. Some even question the relevance of IGAD as a basis for regional integration, not least given that all IGAD members except Somalia are also members of other RECs. Though IGAD had a strong hand in mediating the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a robust regional Peace and Security Architecture is not yet in place and violent conflict has continued in South Sudan since December 2013.

Nonetheless, some point to IGAD’s “unique experiments in managing diversity, state formation and governance, and forms of engagement with outside cultures and influences” (Obi, 2013). Others suggest that “The [Horn of Africa] demands not only a multilateral approach, but also an approach of multiple and overlapping multilateralisms” (de Waal and Ibreck, 2016) to address the “persistent turbulence” created by long-running, inter and intra-state conflicts, rivalries, alliances and anti-alliances, all among states with widely varying capacities to govern. This suggests the need for an organisation such as IGAD.

This report aims to analyse these different influences on the role of IGAD, focusing on three key questions relating to i) the political traction of IGAD in shaping and ensuring implementation of the regional agenda among member states; ii) the political interests of member states in engaging with and complying with IGAD initiatives; and iii) the areas or sectors with most potential future traction. These are addressed in terms of economic integration and peace and security.

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1 This study draws on a larger study carried out for the ECDPM PERIA project on the Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa. For more information see http://www.ecdpm.org/peria
2 According to their Mission Statement “The IGAD mission is to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation: i) Food Security and environmental protection ii) Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and, iii) Economic cooperation and integration.”
3 The study does not analyse IGAD’s full range of operations in peace and security but has potential relevance for interesting work also taking place in Somalia, for example.
2. On assessing the political traction of IGAD

Though tempting to compare IGAD with other regional economic communities (RECs), a less normative indication of political traction relates to whether or not IGAD has enabled decision making around regional agendas or agreements and their implementation at national and/or regional level. By looking at these issues and their evolution, this section aims to understand, in particular, how the organisation has evolved and gained legitimacy (or not).

2.1. Structural and institutional drivers of IGAD

Cooperating regionally

The origins of IGAD set it apart from other African regional economic communities. IGAD started out as IGADD, which as its name suggests was created to combat drought. Successive years of drought in the late 1970s led to UN resolution 35/90 in 1980 recommending that the countries of the region establish an intergovernmental body to coordinate and support efforts to combat the effects of drought “and other natural disasters” and build up capabilities to “mitigate the effects of future droughts and promote sustained economic and social development” (UN, 1980). The UN’s Environmental Program (UNEP) was given the role of guiding this process (Adar, 2000).

Most accounts of the origins of IGAD therefore point to the common physical factors affecting member countries when it was formed as IGADD, particularly the similar agro-climatic and environmental challenges and regular droughts. In addition, the region is characterised by high levels of informal economic activity and trade, particularly relating to pastoralism; and the high proportion of the population that is landlocked - particularly in Ethiopia, but also Uganda, (now) South Sudan, and the hinterlands of Kenya. All of these contextual features provide an apparent logic for greater regional cooperation and integration, underpinning the potential role of IGAD.

Nonetheless, some suggest IGAD owes its existence less to a recognition of the benefits of regional cooperation than to the influence of external factors and international agencies (e.g. Woodward, 2013; El-Affendi, 2009; Young, 2007). USSR-aligned Ethiopia was discussed in a separate UN Resolution 35/91, with the establishment of IGADD allowing it to engage with the then clear Western allies Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya around the relatively uncontroversial topic of drought, as Cold War politics required (Woodward, 2013).

The relaunch of IGAD in 1996, dropping the explicit focus on drought, is often described as an evolution, driven by the realisation among member states that IGADD summits were increasingly addressing regional security issues as well as drought and development (e.g. Dersso, 2014). But the context was also changing, with the end of the Cold War, the fall of Ethiopia’s Derg, the end of Somalia’s Biarre regime, and Eritrean independence in 1991, all of which briefly raised the willingness of countries to cooperate, particularly around the Sudan peace process, and thus requiring a more broadly focused regional organisation.

The original political traction of IGAD therefore stemmed from a combination of physical, geographical and political factors as well as international concern and support, within the wider context of Cold War

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4 This was to draw on the apparent success of the Sahelian interstate committee to tackle drought - CILSS (Comité Permanent Inter État de la Lutte Contre la Sècheresse) - a West African (non-REC) intergovernmental body in West Africa.

5 In the IGAD establishing document it states that it became “increasingly apparent” that the Authority provided a regular forum where leaders of the Eastern African countries were able to tackle other political and socioeconomic issues.
dynamics. Its inclusion as one of the eight AU-recognised RECs cemented its role as a key regional organisation, providing it with continental legitimacy but also raising the bar on the role it should play.

**Institutions and governance**

From a relatively narrow IGADD agenda, IGAD has therefore expanded its mandate to promote regional cooperation and integration across a broad range of areas. The 1996 IGAD Establishing Agreement refers to joint development strategies on a long list of topics, including: cooperation on macroeconomic policies; free movement of goods, services, and people; regional food security; drought resilience; complementary infrastructures; peace and stability in the subregion; programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; and the objectives of COMESA.6

The four pillars of both the 2011-2015 and recently completed 2016-2020 IGAD strategy are as follows:

1. Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment - to promote attainment of food security and sustainable management of the environment and natural resources;
2. Economic Cooperation and Integration and Social Development - to promote regional economic cooperation, integration and social development;
3. Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs - to promote good governance, peace and security, and to address humanitarian crises;
4. Corporate Development Services - to enhance the corporate capacity of IGAD to effectively deliver its mandate.

The Secretariat is made up of four Divisions corresponding to the four pillars, and charged with implementing policies and programmes, designing new programmes and proposals, and implementing decisions of the Assembly and Council, with advice from the Committee of Ambassadors. Within the IGAD Secretariat, heads of division are political appointees by Member States with each country holding a specific post.7 Although political appointments are criticised by some, many interlocutors see this as a pragmatic means of ensuring member state ownership of IGAD and its institutional processes.

Figures vary on the actual number of IGAD staff. Some sources suggest there may be only forty-four permanent staff (Dersso, 2014) while interviewees refer to 100 Secretariat staff and 400 IGAD staff overall including contract staff and those employed in the many IGAD-related organisations and specialist institutions (see below). Staff numbers are said to have grown rapidly over recent years, partly reflecting IGAD’s success in raising funding to meet the challenge of its expanded mandate. Such high numbers also reflect a wide and somewhat fragmented organisational structure, discussed further below, as well as the high number of staff on temporary or consultancy-type contracts.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments stands out as the main IGAD body with political traction across thematic areas. Formally, it has a mandate to make policy, direct and control the functions of IGAD, set guidelines, monitor political issues related to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and appoint the Executive Secretary (IGAD, 1996).8 It is supported by the Council of Ministers (of Foreign Affairs), Committee of Ambassadors and the IGAD Secretariat. While all have their specific roles and duties, decision-making power remains very much in the hands of national leaders through the Assembly. The IGAD Executive Secretary is a political appointment and is

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6 See the IGAD Establishing Document.
7 Djibouti holds agriculture; Sudan economy; Uganda finance; Ethiopia peace and security; while the Executive Secretary is from Kenya and the Head of Planning is Somali.
8 Article 9 in IGAD, 1996, Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi.
currently held by a Kenyan, perceived by some as a way to balance Ethiopia’s long-run chairmanship and domination of IGAD.

Formally, chairmanship of the Assembly should rotate with each ordinary summit. However, with no ordinary summits since the 12th Ordinary Summit in Addis Ababa on 14th of June 2008, Ethiopia has chaired both the Heads of State Assembly and the Council of Ministers since then, leading Eritrea and some critics to charge that “IGAD has become a rubberstamp of Ethiopia” (Bereketeab, 2012). Nonetheless, interviews suggest other member states including Sudan, the next intended chair, support Ethiopia’s extended chairmanship given its perceived neutrality, particularly in Sudan-South Sudan disputes.

Though the lack of Ordinary Summits is criticised by some, an example of where formal rules are not being followed, one of the cited strengths of IGAD is precisely its ability to organise Extraordinary Summits of Heads of State at short notice (Mahboub, Chatham House, 2014). This is an important strength for an organisation operating in such a volatile region. Further, given that both the Assembly and Council of Ministers take decisions by consensus, this in principle avoids any one country wielding a veto. Nonetheless, this way of working is said by some to create difficulties and detachment from the work of the Secretariat in implementing its longer-term agenda, implying a gap between political traction at the Heads of State level, and at the more technical level.

An IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IGAD-IPU) was established in 2004, four years after the decision to establish it. This aims to enhance cooperation and experience-sharing between member state parliaments, with the implicit aim of further increasing country ownership over the IGAD agenda. As Bereketeab (2012) notes, this has the potential to move IGAD “from an executive-centred organisation to a more balanced or legislative-tilted one”, making IGAD “popularly based and a genuinely representative organisation”. However, most agree that this remains a distant objective, while current decision-making in IGAD at the discretion of the Assembly of Heads of State and the Council, with accountability primarily oriented to domestic political systems, paymasters and technical appointments (Bereketeab, 2012).

The IGAD setup further aims to makes room for non-governmental participation with an IGAD-NGO/CSOs Forum, an IGAD Business Forum (IBF) and an IGAD Women and Peace Forum. While these additional bodies aim at providing further accountability mechanisms and legitimacy to the IGAD project, in reality, many people do not see these as functioning effectively in engaging with the IGAD agenda beyond specific events and workshops. Meru and El-Fassi (2015) cite comments that the CSOs Forum was ‘stillborn’ when GIZ stopped providing funding, with little momentum or alternative sources of funding to carry on. Further, they point to the backlash from states to stifle what were seen as externally supported CSOs, for example in Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan, where states have often increased their oversight of CSOs and NGOs through membership selection criteria that heavily depend on state approval (Nukawora, 2011). This means that there is little real demand and

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9 See, for example: [http://www.tesfanews.net/ethiopia-refuses-to-abdicate-igad-chairmanship/#Db5dm1ofAMKdZVxp.99.](http://www.tesfanews.net/ethiopia-refuses-to-abdicate-igad-chairmanship/#Db5dm1ofAMKdZVxp.99)

10 The move to allow majority decisions in the Council came with the 1996 reforms as part of attempts to streamline decision-making (El-Affendi, 2009).


12 Chaired by the Speaker of Sudan’s National Assembly, the seat of the IGAD-IPU was established in Addis Ababa in 2007 with an Executive Council that has met every year since 2008.

13 The IBF is an apex body of the national chambers of commerce and industries in the IGAD member states, based in Kampala, Uganda, but is not yet a statutory organ of IGAD although the 2015 IGAD Business Forum in Djibouti recommended that this happen. The position of the IBF in Uganda is unclear due to difficulties in establishing a legal basis for the organisation.
pressure from CSOs and the private sector for IGAD or its member states to deliver on regional integration, something that is recognised as a challenge in the Strategy for 2016-2020.\(^\text{14}\)

While Djibouti played host to the founding meeting of IGADD and hosts the IGAD Secretariat today, no individual country took leadership for the regional organisation (Dersso, 2015).\(^\text{15}\) Indeed having its HQ in Djibouti is seen by some as isolated from the real action taking place in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, sometimes challenging IGAD partners in determining who and where their main interlocutor is. This is further underlined by the fact that eight of IGAD’s 15 different offices and specialised institutions are shared between Ethiopia and Kenya, indicating their substantial influence on this regional organisation.

The proliferation of Member State proposals for Specialised Institutions and other offices is a growing concern to some, reflecting an “instruments approach rather than a systems approach” (Interview).\(^\text{16}\) Member States generally request IGAD to entirely fund these, while it has proven politically sensitive for the Executive Secretary and other Member States to oppose proposals. The institutions have substantial autonomy that can undermine regional coordination but also lead to parallel fundraising with donors, leading to confusion, overlap and at least inefficiencies in the use of funds - the IGAD Conflict Early Warning System CEWARN is given as an example of one IGAD institution that essentially “has its own relationship with donors” (Interview).\(^\text{17}\)

**Member states and partner funding**

One way of judging IGAD political traction is through its finances. Critics say IGADD went operational “with limited objectives and a high dependence on donors” with “serious implications for its independence” (Bereketeab, 2012). Donor finance remains a key component of the IGAD budget.

The average annual IGAD budget is reportedly around USD115m, of which approximately 10% is raised from member state contributions. Half of this is spent on peace and security (Interviewee). While concrete information on member state contributions was not obtained, interviewees recount that Ethiopia is the best performer on making timely contributions, followed by Kenya. This then also gives Ethiopia additional leverage in regional agenda-setting.

The remaining IGAD budget comes from development partners, discussed below.\(^\text{18}\) The average contribution of international partners to IGAD over 2009-2012 was 27.5% from the EU institutions and 34.5% from EU member states. This then combines with 21% from the World Bank, and the remainder from USAID (8%), the UN (3%), the African Development Bank (1%), Canada (1%), Norway (1%) and 3% through the Joint Financing Arrangement (IRCC MTR, 2012), (Helly, D). To put this in perspective, the EU’s Regional Indicative Programme for IGAD foresees EUR80m for IGAD over the period from 2014 to 2020 (compared to EUR85m each for COMESA and the EAC, EUR90m for SADC and EUR50m for the IOC).

IGAD member state contributions are therefore said to cover salaries and recurrent costs, while donors cover programmes and projects. Nonetheless, IGAD also relies on donor-funded contracts to

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\(^{15}\)Addis Ababa hosts five on security-related issues while Nairobi hosts climate and pastoral focused institutions. IGAD also has country offices in Sudan, and South Sudan, while Uganda hosts the IGAD Regional HIV and AIDS Partnership Programme (IRAPP) and Somaliland the IGAD Sheikh Technical Veterinary School and Reference Centre. While widely dispersed around the region, there is a clear concentration in Ethiopia on peace and security institutions, and climate and pastoral institutions in Kenya.

\(^{16}\)Donor interview, Addis Ababa.

\(^{17}\)IGAD Liaison, Addis Ababa.

\(^{18}\)Source: Interviewee.
staff key functions within the current organisation structure. According to the EC’s programming document for the region, “the greatest risk to the implementation of programmes designed to address the challenges described above is lack of financial support from IGAD member states” (EC, 2015).

This has implications for power relations between donors, IGAD Member Countries and IGAD governing institutions, as well as for agenda setting and the incentives created for the IGAD Secretariat. The Executive Secretary submits IGAD’s budgetary plans for approval to the Committee of Ambassadors and Council of Ministers, but in practice much of the financial allocation is determined by external partners.

Although considerable frustration is expressed by some donors regarding the coordination mechanisms in place between IGAD and donors, some external partners informally admit that very little has been done to coordinate among themselves. Anecdotally, this is not helped by the division in IGAD representatives around the Specialised Institutions, with few key meetings and personnel in Djibouti, where IGAD-focused donor staff are based, but rather in Addis Ababa and Nairobi.

An IGAD Partners’ Forum was set up for discussions with partner countries, building on the “Friends of IGADD group” established with 26 states and four international organisations in 1998. However, it is not clear what impact this has on the day to day operations of the IGAD Secretariat, given its more political nature. There are also working groups around the key pillars of work of IGAD, with regular meetings during the year to discuss plans and execution, but critics feel that donors do not get a chance to get a full overview of activities and the links between different areas, while discussions focus on reporting rather than strategy.

Analysing IGAD’s institutional forms gives an overall impression of donor-fuelled fast growth, carried out through a range of different regional institutions dispersed widely throughout the region. Allied with somewhat weak administrative capacity, and taking account of the foundational factors discussed above, the challenge for IGAD is apparent.

2.2. Expanding agenda and implementation challenges

Though anecdotally ‘never originally meant to be a REC’, IGAD signed the Protocols on Relations between the AEC and AU in 1998 and 2007, respectively. This brings a commitment to establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA), regional infrastructure and transport development, while also making it a part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), as well as the African Governance Architecture (AGA). This commits IGAD to a far wider regional agenda than its original purpose of addressing drought and development. Though a source of pride to be “the leading REC on the African continent in terms of the number of running programmes”, tensions also exist between the different agendas, making progress a challenge.

**Peace and Security agenda and implementation**

As a ‘building block’ of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with peace, security and humanitarian affairs one of IGAD’s three main pillars of work. It hosts one of Africa’s most elaborate Conflict Early Warning Systems and is recognised for its role in conflict mediation, particularly Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and the subsequent referendum.

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19 These include the head of procurement, the system accountant and the Project Preparation and Management Unit (PPMU) officers. Due to limited numbers of personnel, there is reportedly inadequate segregation of duties amongst the major functions such as authorising transactions, recording transactions, reconciling information and maintaining custody of assets.

Nonetheless, the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 is regarded as one of the few bright notes in the region’s recent history (e.g. Berhanu, 2013) where IGAD is recognised for its important role. While IGAD successfully facilitated that process, followed by the referendum in southern Sudan and South Sudan independence in 2011, a number of issues were left unattended with the result that violent conflict broke out in South Sudan in December 2013.

The CPA process illustrates a pragmatic but also personalised rather than formalistic approach to regional peace mediation. In 1993 an IGADD Standing Committee on Peace in Sudan was established, chaired by then Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia (Meles Zenawi), and Presidents of Eritrea (Issaias Afwerki) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni). This emerged from a proposal from Ethiopia and Eritrea for IGADD to replace Uganda in mediating the Sudanese conflict as a more neutral partner, amid fears of spillovers of such a major conflict occurring just next door in Sudan (El-Affendi, 2009). This then was the basis for extending IGADD’s mandate to incorporate peace and security under the new IGAD in 1996.

While the conflicts and tensions of the late 1990s led to growing mistrust among countries and their ambassadors, IGAD was seen as a neutral player guiding a neutral platform. Further, it was an African initiative, and the only group the SPLM would accept (Young, 2007). By neutralising potentially strong outside influence and balancing interests within the region, IGAD therefore succeeded in bringing the two parties together to negotiate towards the CPA. When war broke out in South Sudan in 2013 the speed of IGAD’s response and frequency of IGAD Heads of State summits were testimony to the war’s regional importance (ICG 2015) but also to IGAD’s ability to convene.

At the same time, though IGAD has had a lead role in marshalling different actors behind a defined strategy, there have been multiple, overlapping and at times contradictory processes. These include the IGAD Mediation, the AU Heads of State ad hoc committee, the Tanzanian led process to re-unite the competing factions of the SPLM, Chinese hosted meetings with the SPLM/iO in Sudan, a Kenyan effort, and dialogue between the Ugandans and the parties in Kampala, among other ad hoc initiatives. In addition, Qatar has been a major actor in the partly related Darfur peace process. The AU and IGAD are both operating in the same territory. But the interplay between IGAD and the AU goes beyond the APSA. According to most, IGAD has a very close and complementary relationship to the AU. They understand each other very well, partly as a result of physical proximity, and in particular jointly collaborate on AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) and UNAMID United Nations- African Union Mission in Darfur. Further, most IGAD member states form part of the East African Standby Force, one of the five regional brigades of the African Standby Force.

Some (e.g. ICG, 2015) suggest that the absence of strong IGAD leadership allowed international influence to play a stronger role, and also allow for forum shopping among the different initiatives. In March 2015, IGAD mediators proposed to strengthen the mediation effort to a so-called IGAD Plus formula, which would include five countries from the region, the UN, the AU and the Troika. As such, the role and effectiveness of IGAD in its role in peace and security continues to fluctuate though as the quote in the introduction suggested, the complexity of the problems may require multiple overlapping efforts.

Although the bulk of IGAD finance is dedicated to mediation and peace and security, IGAD has reportedly not fully implemented provisions of its 1996 Agreement. It has no body comparable to that of the AU Peace and Security Council to take decisions on peace and security matters in the region, and no indication that it will have any similar structure. In practice, this responsibility is undertaken by the IGAD Summit with support from the Council of Ministers. This reliance on Heads of State may appear cumbersome, but there is also a shared belief among IGAD proponents that “At the political level, regular summits create trust, and personal relationships ... are said to be good” (Verhoeven, 2011). This relates back to country-level interests discussed in the later sections and is an important
theme running through discussions of IGAD’s approach to peace and security in the region, with interviewees pointing to the fact that both Mengistu and Biarre, and Meles and Isaias were able to meet and talk through IGAD even when their countries were at war (Interviewee).

Economic integration

In contrast to IGAD’s perceived role on conflict mediation, its progress on economic integration has been described as ‘dismal’ by IGAD itself (IGAD, 2012). Nonetheless, market integration and broad regional economic integration remain key IGAD objectives while its role as one of Africa’s eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) gives it a formal mandate to create a free trade area, customs unions and eventually a common market - creating an IGAD FTA remains part of the new IGAD Strategy 2016-2020. Economic integration and market access also underpin IGAD’s approaches to its third pillar of food security and drought and disaster reduction, reflecting the fundamental place economic integration takes in its regional vision.\(^{21}\)

While IGAD was deemed to be a “strong and viable” Regional Economic Community by the Assembly of the African Union held in Banjul in July 2006 (Abdi and Seid, 2013), this was reaffirmed in the 2008 protocol on the relationship between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities. The African Union had rejected a high level audit panel recommendation to relegate IGAD to an organisation for only peace and security and desertification matters (Abdi and Seid, 2013) given a perceived need for a REC in the Horn of Africa to balance with Eastern, Southern, Western and Central Africa. While most IGAD members are part of COMESA, some speculate that IGAD’s trade mandate reflects Ethiopian desire to limit trade liberalisation in its neighbourhood, discussed below.

The IGAD Vision has as an explicit objective to “Promote and realise the objectives of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Economic Community”. COMESA is commonly seen by member states and officials as the REC that specialises in trade, with all IGAD except Somalia members, while Kenya and Uganda are advancing on their own regional economic integration through the EAC. All IGAD COMESA members reportedly have desks or divisions dedicated to COMESA relations but this is not the case for IGAD (IGAD, 2012), further suggesting COMESA’s more established role. Although the recent launch of the Tripartite FTA between COMESA, EAC and SADC potentially annuls questions about IGAD’s relevance in promoting trade, its new strategy commits IGAD to “continue pushing ahead with its regional integration agenda by developing an IGAD FTA, taking into account existing harmonised frameworks such as the Tri-Partite Agreement and the continental FTA to be achieved by end of 2017”\(^{22}\)

Revisiting the IGAD mandate

As part of the review process leading to its new strategy 2016-2020, IGAD lays out its perceived successes. These include the following:\(^{23}\)

- much more positive engagement of member states
- working together and development of successful partnerships
- awareness raising in the regional community and on targeted sectors e.g. drought risk management
- signing of a joint financing agreement (JFA) with donors
- working towards better monitoring, evaluation and reporting for improvement
- enhancement of capacity within the secretariat

\(^{21}\) The donor-funded Horn of Africa Initiative (HoAI), designed in consultation with but not operated through IGAD, further supports the linkages between these with a large pool of external funding targeted at vulnerability and resilience, and economic opportunity and integration (World Bank, 2014).


adoption of the Minimum Integration Plan (MIP)
Development and harmonisation of regional sector policies and strategies such as the IGAD Environment Policy, IGAD Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Policy Framework, the IGAD EIA Protocol, etc.
preparation, adoption and implementation of the IGAD Sustainable Tourism Master Plan
development and approval of an IGAD water policy
continued IGAD led peace processes in member states such as Sudan and Somalia.

As this reflects, IGAD is active on a very wide range of issues, representing a high level of activity and initiative. But the breadth of IGAD’s mandate raises questions about the demand for this broad agenda that continues to expand, something that is also acknowledged in the IGAD strategy in terms of the need to move “from norm-setting to norm implementation”. The main challenges identified by IGAD from the previous strategic period were:

- a lack of progress towards ratification of the IGAD treaty
- irregular meetings of the key IGAD organs particularly the Ordinary Summit Meeting of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State that has not been convened for a very long time
- high reliance on donor funding and delay in transfer of committed funds to IGAD
- slow domestication of protocols and policies
- difficulties in monitoring progress and impacts from the previous strategy

The reliance on donor funds and slow domestication of protocols and policies as well as monitoring are fundamental challenges to advancing the regional agenda. Without instruments to enforce regional agreements or sanction member states, critics state that IGAD remains quite weak.

As part of efforts to continually strengthen its role, an IGAD Treaty has been drafted and validated by legal experts of the Member states, awaiting adoption by the Council of Ministers. Presented in late 2016 after eight years of discussion and “inspired by our sister organisations’ treaties” the treaty aims to ensure that “the only Regional Economic Community on this continent that does not have a Treaty yet, is endowed with a strong one”.24 One of the aims of the draft Treaty is to transform the ‘implied mandates’ of IGAD into ‘expressed full-fledged’ authority to engage on its mandate areas (Meru and El-Fassi, 2015). The revised treaty is presented by the IGAD secretariat as a review of the Agreement Establishing IGAD in the hope that member states will have to implement agreements. But as the following sections underline, much depends on the way that member states and other key actors and external factors interact around the regional agenda.

### 2.3. External drivers and blockers

Although the interconnected nature of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa suggest the need for a regional approach, the allegiances and alliances with outside actors can also undermine this.25

IGAD did manage to formally broker a Sudanese peace deal in 2005, but the more decisive role was arguably that of the US, UK, Italy and Norway (El-Affendi, 2009). IGAD’s administrative and political weakness reportedly led to domination of the peace process by the US and close allies, operating through Kenya. With financing largely channeled through the Government of Kenya and GTZ, the appointed Special Envoy reported to Nairobi with IGAD having limited control over him. Secretariat staff reported to the Special Envoy, and observers were responsible for their respective countries, as were the ambassadorial Envoys. The IGAD Council of Ministers rarely questioned the Kenya led

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25 The Clinton Administration also supported the cause of southern rebels [domestic political agenda] and provided US$20m in military support to countries in the region. Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia needed minimal encouragement to enhance their own military support to SPLA/M (Healy, 2011).
mediation. There is a suggestion that IGAD had no capacity to structure the peace process, or influence its course or objectives, and in one interpretation was not even permitted under the CPA to play a role in the post-conflict era (Young, 2007).

At the same time, donors have failed to engage strategically on the South Sudan conflict, as witnessed in the 2014 push for a “multi-stakeholder” process by the Troika. In an attempt to avoid the mistakes of a more exclusionary CPA process, the EU and the Troika aimed to establish a process to bring together representatives from opposition political parties, faith based groups and civil society. But as experts noted, IGAD is ill-equipped to manage this type of process, as political debate in member states is largely held within the ruling parties.

**Geopolitical interests**

The IGAD region’s proximity to the Middle East also influences the context in which it works, with several relations that divide rather than unite member countries. Saudi Arabia serves as a key market for livestock from the Horn of Africa, and numerous Arab countries host migrant workers from IGAD countries, while the proximity of IGAD countries to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are key to the region’s Cold War and present strategic relevance. Where Israel saw Ethiopia as a non-Muslim ally in the region, Saudi Arabia has long seen its Yemen-related security concerns as linked to the Horn of Africa, not least Somalia, with fears that state collapse in Yemen might allow Iran-backed Houthi rebels to gain indirect control over shipping through the Gulf of Aden.

The complexity of relations goes further: IGAD has a memorandum of understanding with Iran, while Iran also engages with numerous IGAD member countries to offset Arab influences. these relations lead the Arab League to engage with IGAD more frequently than the AU (El-Fassi and Meru, 2015). IGAD also has Memoranda of Understanding with Turkey and India, reflecting their rising roles in world economic and political affairs and their interest in the region.

While all this suggests that IGAD is therefore seen as a legitimate partner for countries and regional organisations in the wider region, it nonetheless highlights the network of alliances in the region between both member states and IGAD with other countries and organisations in the region, affecting country national politics and, by extension, how IGAD sets its agenda and the room for manoeuvre it has in implementing it.

**Summary**

Although IGAD has many of the formal trappings of a REC, so ‘looks like a REC’, in terms of forms, and while it has played an important role in the South Sudanese independence process with a rapidly expanding mandate across other areas, it nonetheless has had limited ability to drive what integration is taking place. As the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy itself states, IGAD’s efforts “have been reactive [and] lack continuity and institutional memory due to the ad hoc approach [...] pursued so far. Further, the selection of cases for IGAD intervention depends on national interests and the ability of IGAD to be seen to be neutral, which is not the case for Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions. While this suggests that IGAD is adapting to Member State interests rather than driving an agenda, this more ‘informal’ or

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26 For example, in March 1998, Egypt and the Arab League jointly hosted Somali reconciliation talks, which undermined the Ethiopia led Sodere peace process. IGAD called for an end to ‘the proliferation of competing initiatives’ (Healy, 2009). In 2006, on the other hand, the Arab League joined with the AU and IGAD to call for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and renewed dialogue in Somalia (Healy, 2009). El-Fassi and Meru (2015) cite sources stating that “IGAD receives funding for each activity the Arab League would like jointly coordinate with IGAD.”

27 Turkish companies in particular are reported as investing $3bn in Ethiopia (of $7bn to the continent as a whole while their government recently announced plans to finance development of an industrial zone by Turkish investors in Djibouti. http://newbusinessethiopia.com/index.php/resources/10-governance/195/turkey-vow-to-serve-as-africa-s-voice-at-g20#sthash.iOp1YRes.dpuf
'ad-hoc' approach may be the most appropriate at present and provide a basis for more institutionalised regional integration in the future.

While some hope a new IGAD treaty will add legal weight to the IGAD construction, unless regional initiatives can be aligned with the interests and incentives of member states and groups within them, the subject of the next section, it is not clear that such a top-down, formal approach will necessarily have additional traction.

3. On the “political interests” of member states

Much of IGAD’s work is underpinned but also undermined by tensions between Member States. Møller (2013) highlights three “relations of enmity [that] have been particularly venomous”. These are:

1. **Ethiopia and Somalia** - mainly because of Somalia’s irredentist ambitions of uniting all Somali nationals in one state, now also involving Kenya28
2. **Sudan and Uganda** - through a protracted proxy war between the Uganda-supported Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan and the Sudan-supported Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda29
3. **Ethiopia and Eritrea** - dating back to the struggle for Eritrean independence which, despite aligning the two leaders against the Ethiopian Derg regime, still led to full-scale war in 1998-2000 over the border territory around Badme.30 Eritrea is routinely suspected of supporting Somali irredentism to destabilise Ethiopia in particular, partially explaining Eritrea’s decision to suspend its IGAD membership in 2007, although it is now reported to seek readmission, with muted response.31

These are somewhat offset by close alliances between Ethiopia and Djibouti, for example, while shifting interests around the Nile River are also bringing Ethiopia and Sudan together. As the case study above suggests, Kenya is often seen as a neutral partner though with a key interest in limiting negative externalities from Somalia.

Many of the economic and security dynamics in the region relate to shared identities across borders, underpinned by nomadic livelihoods and informal trade in livestock that have persevered despite the persistent conflict situation in the region, but which so far have remained largely outside formal regional processes. While this growing ‘invisible integration’ may be a source of empowerment and freedom from state control (Kibreab, 2012), it is also a source of vulnerability and marginalisation and can be instrumentalised to feed ongoing regional conflicts: the current South Sudan conflict has sent South Sudanese Nuer to join their Ethiopian brethren across the border, altering the ethnic balance in

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28 The Somali peninsula was carved up into five colonial territories at the Berlin Conference of 1884. Britain took over two areas (British Somaliland and the Northern Frontier Districts of the Kenya Colony), the third went to France (French Somaliland). Southern Somalia became an Italian colony (Italian Somaliland) and Ethiopia seized western Somaliland – Haud and Reserve Area, and Ogaden (Drysdale, 1964). Three of these territories gained independence to form two countries, the Somali Republic (British and Italian Somalilands) in 1960, and the French colony became the Republic of Djibouti in 1977 (Samatar, 2013).

29 Uganda replaced Ethiopia as foreign patron, with the SPLA originally formed in Ethiopia in 1983. Meanwhile, the Lord’s Resistance Army has been chased from northern Uganda and has spread into other countries in the region.

30 After Eritrean independence there was a territorial dispute with Ethiopia around Badme. Despite international arbitration in Eritrean favour, and acceptance in principle by Ethiopia, this has not been implemented. (e.g. El-Affendi, 2009).

Gambella and creating tensions there (e.g. Feyissa, 2014). Although these informal cross-border relations suggest that regional economic integration is taking place at an informal level - the challenge is for IGAD to somehow adapt its formal approach to these informal practices and groups of actors.

3.1. Ethiopia, the swing state in the region

Looking across key IGAD member state interests and actions, Ethiopia is pivotal to IGAD policy choice and implementation. Bordering all other IGAD members except Uganda and representing approximately 40% of the IGAD region’s population, Ethiopia’s reliance on its neighbours for access to imports and exports implies it has much to gain and lose through its regional relations.

The specific nature of Ethiopian federal politics and their ‘developmental state’ approach to government also affect their approach to regional economic and security cooperation, with power in the Ethiopian government highly centralised (Woodward, 2013). There is deep scepticism about Ethiopia’s interest in regional economic integration: “economic nationalism is a much stronger thread than regionalism and Ethiopia’s main regional aspiration is to displace Kenya as the strongest IGAD economy” (Healy, 2011). By way of illustration, while Ethiopia is ostensibly building its role in the COMESA region, was a founding member of COMESA, recently took over chairmanship and hosted the most recent COMESA Heads of State Summit, it has yet to sign the Free Trade Agreement, with doubts about when and even whether it will. Makonnen and Lulie (2014) point in particular to studies suggesting joining the FTA would increase unemployment, undermining their national objectives, as discussed further below. Sceptics dispute that Ethiopia is interested in trade liberalisation, even suggesting that slowly advancing IGAD FTA might be in Ethiopian interests in order to limit the speed at which it takes place and avoid competition from the likes of Egypt and other COMESA members.

This is not to say that Ethiopia is closed: “the Ethiopian government re-embraced huge regional ambitions under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who governed Ethiopia from 1991 until his death in 2012” (Verhoeven, 2015). This was to fulfil a vision of a Great Ethiopia “finally” fulfilling its historical destiny. As such, Meles, his successor Hailemariam Desalegn, and the party’s powerful politburo “cast their vision of a Great Ethiopia in terms of benign regional hegemony: What is good for Ethiopia is good for the Horn of Africa” (Verhoeven, 2015). This has meant that Ethiopia increasingly projects itself through the regional organisations that Addis Ababa dominates.

Beyond its role in formal regional processes, plans are also underway to tie the region to Ethiopia by exporting thousands of megawatts of electricity from dams on the Blue Nile and Ethiopian rivers. This would shift the regional balance of power away from Nairobi, Khartoum, and Cairo to Addis Ababa through economic interdependence, “but very much on Ethiopia’s terms” (Verhoeven, 2015). At the same time, its security agenda aims to set itself apart from its troublesome neighbours through ‘responsible international behaviour’ (Verhoeven, 2011).

Ethiopia also figures strongly in IGAD-AU relations. While Addis Ababa is the seat of AU Headquarters for the Peace and Security Council, Permanent Representatives Committee and AUC, other Pan African diplomats, high-ranking officials with the mandate to make decisions on funding are also located in Addis Ababa. As well as chairing IGAD since 2008, it has been elected three times as member of the Peace and Security Council and has influence on the AU organs and on the permanent representatives of AU Member States in Addis Ababa.

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32 “The unhappy scenario that unfolded during the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war is a case in point. The Ethiopians of Eritrean extraction born and raised in Ethiopia and the Eritreans of Ethiopian origin that were fully integrated into the two countries were subjected not only to state control but also to arbitrary expulsion” (Kibreab, 2012). See also Scott, J.C., 2010 The Art of Not Being Governed.
Though some criticise the dominance of Ethiopia in the region, but this is not to say that IGAD is at the mercy of Ethiopian policy. Further, Ethiopia is arguably the most-affected by the regional instability and relies on IGAD legitimacy for resolving regional conflicts. In some respects, it also needs IGAD to legitimise Ethiopian policy, for example on trade where it maintains IGAD as a potential vehicle for trade liberalisation rather than COMESA. This serves to underline the importance of regional powers, but also the political priorities within these.

3.2. Member State Interests in IGAD Peace & Security

IGAD has adopted a policy of ‘non-indifference’ rather than ‘non-interference’, which is – at least superficially – in line with the AU Charter. Meetings of the IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government jointly address peace and security challenges at the highest level of decision-making. But regional structures for peace and security can only work to the degree that there is a shared security concern and agreement to coordinate responses among the states in that region (e.g. Berhe, 2014). Though IGAD’s peace and security architecture is primarily a political compromise between national interests, the individual interventions and decisions of the regional leaders reflect their narrow national interests, which in turn can undermine the credibility of IGAD processes (Astill-Brown, 2014).

Conflicting Peace and Security interests?

While IGAD can point to positive achievements and is building its capacity to respond to conflict in the region, “the suspicion has been that improving regional relations has not been a necessary step for the regimes of the Horn, so much as the fulfilment of an agenda encouraged from outside at several levels of the international community” (Woodward, 2013).

Regional integration and cooperation in peace and security has fluctuated. For example, according to some, IGAD used to be stronger: after the 2005 Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement “it went into hibernation”. Ethiopia remains the strongest member of IGAD, and has been spearheading the IGAD mediation process for South Sudan since violence broke out in December 2013. “Previously, Uganda (unofficially) withdrew from IGAD because Ethiopia was “abusing IGAD to this extent (2006-2010)” (Interview), while according to another interviewee, Uganda now uses IGAD to legitimise its presence in South Sudan.

Some suggest that progress in Sudan was the result of shifting regional alliances and relations around regional conflicts (Healy 2011; Murithi 2009). These opened up new opportunities of a role for IGAD. For the Sudan-South Sudan case, security interests appear to have aligned for independence for Southern Sudan through a shared understanding of Khartoum’s aggressive policy and Nile water policy (see NBI study). This is in contrast with Somalia, where concerns were linked to regime security (Ethiopia), economic issues (Kenya) and international diplomacy (Uganda) (Fisher, 2014). The main actors, interests and dynamics around Sudan and South Sudan and their impact on how IGAD has been able to engage can be summarised as follows:

- Sudan’s President Bashir sought assistance to begin a peace process to pre-empt any UN initiative or more US involvement, particularly given the precedent of US military involvement in Somalia.
- The overthrow of Mengistu in 1991 had also given the Sudanese government hope for better relations with the new Ethiopian governments.
- Sudan therefore requested IGAD to assist in its peace process, viewing IGAD as the only vehicle that could prevent external actors from infringing on its internal affairs (Adar, 2000).
- Further, Sudan wanted to counterbalance Eritrea and Ethiopia, and assumed Uganda would continue to support the SPLM/A. Kenya thus became the obvious regional candidate to lead the process. Djibouti was not a member of the Peace Committee.
Kenya had strongest links and influence with the UK and US while its officials had less knowledge of the conflict than Ethiopian and Eritrean counterparts.

Ethiopia has therefore been instrumental in IGAD mediation efforts and is a key broker of improved Sudan-South Sudan relations. Ethiopia has an incentive for peaceful resolution to the conflict given the links between its own restive and rival Nuer and Anyuak populations and the potential involvement of Eritrea (ICG, 2014). Ethiopia’s mediation efforts were also shaped by rivalry with Kenya; some Ethiopian officials believe Nairobi gained too much economically and diplomatically from its role in helping secure the 2005 agreement that led to South Sudan’s eventual secession (IRIN, 2014).

Tensions with Uganda over management of the crisis became public after it deployed its national army in Juba and other parts of South Sudan. Uganda also confirmed its troops were fighting alongside South Sudan’s government against ‘rebels’ in a position informed by a long history of animosity towards Sudan and a deep dislike of former Vice President and current head of SPLM/A-IO, Riek Machar (ICG, 2015). Even if South Sudan has six neighbouring countries, it is only Uganda that deployed her army in Juba unilaterally. Uganda also has economic interests in South Sudan, with over one million Ugandans working and living in the country (Fisher, 2014). While there are allegations that senior Ugandan and South Sudanese officials are benefitting from their army’s involvement in the war, Ugandan businesses are losing from the instability (ICG, 2015).

In the background of all of this, several IGAD member state leaders come from security backgrounds and have close personal relations (Interview). The common independence history and past allegiances offer some opportunities for trust that might be used for furthering regional integration. At the same time, it creates a focus on security issues and brings similar challenges of moving from liberation movement to government (e.g. Clapham, 2012). As Berhe (2014) summarises, changes in the domestic politics of most member countries, improved relationship among member states, and the coming of a coalition of leaders pursuing an agenda for regional security cooperation supported by the favourable international support together brought the revitalisation of IGAD.

3.3. Member State Interests in IGAD Economic Integration

Many of the above factors also impact on the way Member States engage in IGAD economic integration. Only Somalia-Ethiopia, Kenya-Uganda, and Sudan-Uganda (here aggregating Sudan and South Sudan) rank in each other’s top five import and export partners. In the neighbouring region, Saudi Arabia is among the top five trade partners (exports or imports) for four countries, Egypt for three, Yemen for two and Oman for one, surpassing IGAD trade shares for all but Kenya and Uganda. Strikingly, both India and China rank in the top five import partner countries for all except Eritrea for whom India is not a key partner. China is also among the top five export destinations for Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea, while the G8 countries also feature as key trade partners for all IGAD members. Notably, in his address to the 18th COMESA Summit, the Prime Minister of Egypt noted that “Egyptian exports to the COMESA region are immense, and that the country is the biggest importer of tea from Kenya, and beef from Sudan and Ethiopia” – all three IGAD countries.

Regional resources and infrastructure provide an additional key foundational factor affecting IGAD’s role on economic integration. While current intra-regional trade in goods is relatively low, varying access to water, hydroelectric energy, oil and related infrastructures across member states is raising

33 The 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia war unravelled an alliance that until then had kept Khartoum at the negotiating table. The threat of either side then using Sudanese territory to their advantage meant that both countries moved quickly to improve their relations with Khartoum. This meant that Uganda alone maintained an aggressive stance against the Sudanese regime. But the growing LRA insurgency in Northern Uganda and failed policies in Rwanda and Congo led Museveni to give more attention to domestic security issues, setting the stage for compromise on his long-term support to SPLM/A for an agreement with Khartoum on ending its assistance to LRA.
levels of economic interdependence among IGAD states with potential opportunities for greater coordination through IGAD and/or other regional organisations. As mentioned above, Ethiopia has already begun supplying neighbouring countries with energy from hydroelectric power, gaining the moniker the 'water tower of East Africa' with its seven major drainage basins and related potential for hydroelectric power generation. Transmission lines are being planned to regional markets while a power trade agreement “will ensure that the Ethiopian people receive a good financial return on their investment” (Plaut, 2015). This then underlines the potential importance to Ethiopia of an East African Power Pool (EAPP), a separate regional initiative currently underway (see COMESA study), though separate from IGAD processes, while Ethiopia hosts the EAPP secretariat.

Though not explicitly framed in terms of IGAD, a further factor driving economic interdependence and trade is the need for access to ports for landlocked Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan, not to mention the hinterlands of the coastal member countries. The loss of Ethiopia's access to Eritrea’s Assab port provided the economic rationale for substantial investment from Dubai that has transformed Djibouti port into a major international transport hub (Healy, 2011). But after years of distrust and hostility, and while port access has been affected by conflicts in Somalia and spillovers of the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, more attention is being paid to alternative routes using Port Sudan and Berbera in Somaliland, and to Kenya’s Port of Lamu through the so-called LAPSSET Corridor (Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport Corridor). Sudan has started to supply petroleum products to Ethiopia, and Port Sudan has become an outlet for Ethiopian agricultural exports (Healy, 2011).

Kenya is also central to many key regional economic initiatives as it seeks integration and cooperation as a way to advance its own economic prosperity - Kenya’s Medium Term Plan to implement Vision 2013 contains 16 mentions of Ethiopia (GoK, 2012) compared to zero mentions of Kenya in Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GoE, 2010).

These realities offer possibilities for regional coordination through IGAD although that also depends on its ability to build on and harness these widely varying sectoral topics. Further, most IGAD Member States seek to achieve their regional ambitions through other regional organisations.

**Different RECs for different purposes**

While IGAD’s status as a REC gives it some legitimacy, the wide variation in economic policy approaches among member states, their limited economic complementarity, and the fragile peace in the region all imply that IGAD has limited political traction in the economic sphere. Further, most states are also pursuing economic integration through the EAC (Kenya, Uganda and now South Sudan are members of the East African Community) and COMESA (all except Somalia are in the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, COMESA). This then raises questions about the potential role and specific added value of IGAD’s economic agenda and who is driving it.

Regional organisations serve different purposes for different states that may also vary through time (e.g. Gathii, 2011). Although economic integration is a mandated area for IGAD, Kenya and Uganda favour the EAC for economic integration, with the EAC quite advanced among African RECs. South Sudan and Somalia have applied to join the EAC, while Kenya is also a member of CEN-SAD, along with Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. All IGAD members except Somalia and South Sudan are members of COMESA though Ethiopia has yet to accede to the COMESA Free Trade Area and Uganda is still in the process of implementation it (COMESA, 2015). Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia are also members of the 22-country Arab League with Eritrea an observer, while Sudan, South-Sudan, Uganda and Kenya are also members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

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Similarly, IGAD is not the only peace and security organisation operating in the region. At least for Kenya and Uganda, IGAD is accompanied by the security role played by the East African Community (EAC) and the East African Standby Force, formed in 2004. While the EAC focuses primarily on economic cooperation, according to Jacobsen and Nordby (2013) the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture allowed both IGAD and the EAC to expand their security ambitions, leading to overlap and competition, for example in the area of early warning systems. Several IGAD member states are major contributors to both AU and UN peacekeeping missions, with Ethiopia the largest African contributor in Africa to UN peacekeeping operations, while Kenya and Uganda have major troop participation in both. However, this can also be seen as testimony to the huge capacity and potential within each Member State that has not been translated into institutional regional capacity under IGAD (Interview, December 2014).

The dominance of Ethiopia and Kenya lead relatively small countries like Uganda – a member of IGAD, the East African Community, the East African Standby Force and the Great Lakes Initiative – to use multiple membership “to maximise Uganda’s regional influence”, leading to overlaps and duplication, and reluctance to fully engage in one regional process (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013). Different national and sub-national interests determine the interactions states then have with different regional organisations and their activities, a key element in understanding their interest in IGAD.

For non-EAC members of IGAD, COMESA is often seen as the trade REC, again ostensibly lowering the added value of IGAD in promoting regional markets and an IGAD FTA. The agreement establishing IGAD indeed states that IGAD will support the goal of COMESA integration. However, national interests may be harder to achieve through such a large configuration of 19 countries, leading some countries, particularly Ethiopia, to maintain interest in IGAD’s economic integration agenda which it can potentially also better align with its own development strategy - “Why should Ethiopia have to listen to some small island state like Mauritius”, one interviewee said. Other interviewees point to the fact that countries complain of having “no voice in COMESA”, offsetting some of its benefits, but also potentially raising the attractiveness of addressing trade through IGAD.

4. On the areas with most traction for IGAD cooperation

Sub-regional agreements: building blocks or stumbling blocks?

Overall, the above discussions suggest that the combination of IGAD’s original circumstances, donor finance, evolving member state interests and continental objectives create pressure for IGAD to ‘look like a REC’. But despite having many of the institutional forms that go with that, largely due to member state interests their function is often secondary to more ad hoc processes involving frequent, personalised involvement of Heads of State, with more limited use of systematic, institutionalised approaches to addressing regional common interests. So while IGAD has been set up “to reflect comparable regional developments elsewhere in Africa, such as ECOWAS and SADC” (Woodward, 2013), it is quite different from other RECs in the way it operates. The research implies that plans to replace the current establishment agreement with a treaty are unlikely to alter this.

IGAD must therefore be understood as a regional organisation operating in an extremely complex environment, where member state and particularly Heads of State primarily shape the agenda. All of the above issues raise questions about the potential role and specific added value of IGAD’s regional approach and who is driving it.

Given this, and the important role and approach of Ethiopia in particular, much of the progress in both market and broader economic integration in the IGAD region relates to bilateral agreements and joint Ministerial arrangements outside the IGAD framework and/or at a sub-regional level, particularly involving Ethiopia. While cited by some as a potential basis for greater future regionalisation, the fear is more that this (further) undermines progress through IGAD.\(^\text{36}\)

Conflict resolution and management is the one area where IGAD has managed to build on common interests among neighbouring countries, partly due to the politically cost of cross-border conflict spillovers. However, steps to further institutionalise the peace and security architecture are seen as potentially restricting Heads of State, who may prefer the current \textit{ad-hoc} approaches to conflict resolution and management. While political appointments to the IGAD Secretariat and the distribution of IGAD specialised institutions among Member States is criticised as inefficient, this reflects the reality of inter-state bargaining and can be seen as raising member state ownership of the IGAD agenda. IGAD has managed to play an important role in neutralising ‘national interests’ from any one country that might have come to dominate regional security relations. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains instrumental, hosting all Peace and Security related institutions, chairing IGAD since 2008, and playing a key role in South Sudan mediation efforts.

Further progress in IGAD integration must rely on a combination of support for top-down, state-led processes and building on bilateral, national, informal and \textit{ad hoc} processes. This is in line with Healy (2011), who argues for a less state-centric approach to regional integration that could capitalise on the strengths of informal cross-border relationships. This latter possibility is also referred to by the EU (EC, 2011) and the World Bank (2014).

Fisher (2014) suggests international actors should fund more regular, high-level summits at the regional level, rather than the everyday activities of the IGAD secretariat and other bureaucratic organs, “as there is widespread sentiment that these bodies lack independent authority and are highly vulnerable to capture from regional hegemons”. The analysis here also underlines the role such high-level summits seem to have played, particularly in conflict mediation. The challenge may be how a formal regional institution can more proactively engage with such informal dynamics.

Other ways of adapting to current incentive structures might relate to the political traction around corridors as vehicles for promoting wider, regional reforms in the IGAD region. Though it is not clear that IGAD can play such a role, focusing attention on infrastructure corridors and ports, regional policy-makers and donor supporters might build on and promote growing economic interdependency, but also encourage private sector investment around key transport routes, potentially through business and trade fora that link with donor private sector engagement strategies, simultaneously creating a constituency with an interest in furthering the economic integration agenda. Ethiopia is clearly at the centre of any such efforts in the IGAD region while coordination with COMESA would also need to be made more explicit.\(^\text{37}\)

The report also highlights the great difference in political salience between IGAD peace and security and regional economic concerns. At root seems to be the clear and present danger of cross-border spillover of conflicts, with clear costs to inaction, that stand in contrast to the far more opaque, aspired to objectives of trade or economic integration. Infrastructures appear to offer more visible political

\(^{36}\) The challenge of operating regionally is regularly mentioned in presentations of a range of different programmes, e.g. Kabayo, 2014. \url{http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/8.%20Partnerships%20to%20implement%20IDDRSI.pdf}.

\(^{37}\) The latest COMESA Summit made note of the implementation of the cross border infrastructure projects in the Horn of Africa and endorsed the COMESA Council decisions on establishing the Djibouti Corridor Authority and the implementation of One Stop Border Post along the corridor. While not necessarily undermining IGAD in its role, the issue of overlapping mandates nonetheless remains.
gains, giving these political traction, at least at the sub-regional level. If indeed the strength of current IGAD systems are their adaptability, this then should be recognised as a strength, with support to build policies around that.
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