Focus on Migration
Moving backward, moving forward?

Forced displacement and mixed migration in the IGAD region
Caroline Njuki, Senior Programme Coordinator, Woldamlak Ahera, Forced Displacement Officer, IGAD

Migration and development: A virtuous circle
Louise Arbour, UN Special Representative for International Migration

Helping refugees become self-reliant: the Ugandan model
Muhumed Hussein & Leeam Azoulay, Norwegian Refugee Council

Storm in the Central Mediterranean: European priorities, Libyan realities
Daniel Howden, Senior editor at Refugees Deeply
The migration situation has monopolized the agenda of European leaders during past years. The EU’s external policies have been focusing on addressing the ‘root causes’ of migration, and utilising the EU toolbox to establish partnerships on border governance, management of migration, security, and development. In an attempt to jointly address issues of migration governance, UN Member States will adopt in 2018 the two first-ever global agreements aimed at addressing migration and at providing durable solutions for refugees: the global compacts on migration and refugees. Fostering the economic and social benefits of migration, also through the commitments made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, constitutes an important aspect of the negotiations leading to the compact for safe, orderly and regular migration.

To contribute to these debates, we dedicated this GREAT Insight’s Winter issue to the relationship between migration and development processes and their implications for policies. We invited authors from different spheres of work - intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, academia, media, and the private sector - to reflect on drivers of migration, mobility and displacement, explore their interaction with socio-economic development processes and give insights on how policies and programmes can and should address these links.

The first four articles introduce current policy frameworks and approaches, at the global, European and African levels. The aim of these frameworks in their distinct ways is to govern migration processes, enforce laws, ensure rights and support the economic transformation potential of migration and displacement. As such they often have to balance a fine line and navigate tensions between different objectives. This section gives an overview over the negotiations for the UN Global Compacts, explores EU-Africa cooperation on migration after the recent Summit, provides insights into African regional migration governance and presents some critical reflection on associating EU development cooperation with migration control.

The articles in the second section investigate how policies land on the ground. The various articles uncover a snapshot of how policy processes and frameworks influence realities of displaced persons, irregular migrants and refugees in different geographic contexts in Africa. The different perspectives shed light on some of the challenges and opportunities that policy-makers, those working on the ground, migrants and refugees face. They examine how livelihoods are supported, threatened and changed through migration processes.

The last section presents existing practical initiatives and ideas to improve migration governance and enhance its development potential through programmes and projects. It offers an illustration through exploring current initiatives of various organisations.

This issue of GREAT Insights highlights the complexities around migration and mobility as well as the growing need for comprehensive migration governance that is embedded in sustainable development strategies. We very much hope you will enjoy reading the various articles and as always welcome comments and suggestions for our work.

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Noemi Cascone and Anna Knoll, Migration Programme, ECDPM
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Migration is an overwhelmingly positive story, with significant social, economic and cultural benefits for all involved. The global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration is a unique opportunity to remove barriers that are hindering the development contribution of migration.

By Louise Arbour

Viewed globally, migration is overwhelmingly positive for migrants and their communities, both origin and destination. It is a potent motor of development and a life-changing experience for all involved.

In fact, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015 recognises the positive contribution migrants make to inclusive growth and sustainable development. It is worth stressing that facilitating safe, orderly, and regular migration is a specific target within Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10, to reduce inequality within and among countries. In other words, the 2030 Agenda frames migration as an instrument of prosperity, not as a failure of development.

Subsequently, in 2016 at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, Heads of State and Government committed themselves to develop a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration, to be grounded in the 2030 Agenda. These two important developments are inextricably linked: the forthcoming global compact can truly help realise and implement the 2030 Agenda, and therefore presents us with an opportunity we cannot afford to miss. To fail would leave
us unequipped both to harvest the potential of migration for the benefit of so many migrants and communities, and risk perpetuating the downfalls of ill-managed migration. In other words, migration and development can be mutually reinforcing, through a virtuous circle.

**Migrants contribute to development**

Migrants contribute to development in many ways. The US $429 billion in remittances sent back to developing countries in 2016 is one of the most tangible contributions migrants make to achieving the SDGs in their countries of origin. However, remittances alone cannot achieve their intended result if the conditions of those sending and those receiving these moneys are not conducive to development. In particular, the impact of remittances can be leveraged through greater financial inclusion and protection of remittance recipients, including through advice, goal setting, strategies to build savings, and even help in opening a savings account.

Migrants’ contributions to the development of their countries of origin go far beyond financial remittances. They include transfers and circulation of ideas, skills, and knowledge. Migrants bring entrepreneurship and building of investment networks, and they help break down gender stereotypes.

For their new communities, migrants also bring substantial development benefits allowing economies to grow more rapidly. Moreover, while many migrants send home remittances, these account for, on average, 15% of their earnings with 85% remaining in their new communities. These funds go towards payment of taxes, housing, goods, and services, thus promoting growth and prosperity.

These positive impacts are maximised when restrictive and discriminatory policies, laws, and social norms that hinder contributions of migrants are eliminated. Migrant women in particular face multiple and intersecting layers of discrimination: as migrants, as women, and often as irregular workers because many are employed in the informal sector. Even highly-skilled women experience discrimination, for example, by visa regulations that do not allow them to work part-time or to take a career break.

**Development aid and migration**

Inclusive development may, in time, change the configuration of migratory patterns. As people are lifted out of poverty, their life choices improve, including the choice of whether to migrate, either to improve their skills or to seek greater economic opportunities abroad. Their departure then opens work opportunities for others in their country of origin, thereby accelerating their development potential. As long as their migration takes place in a well-regulated environment, it benefits countries of destination as well. Development progress provides more opportunities at home and may in time reduce the impetus to leave. It may also serve as an incentive to return for the many who by then have lived and worked abroad and see opportunities to apply their skills back home. Some may wish to return in retirement, particularly if they may carry with them the accrued benefits – such as pension or medical insurance – that they have earned abroad. In short, development facilitates migration by choice, rather than by necessity. But development is not designed to curtail migration, nor should it be. The global compact that member states have agreed to establish in the context of the 2030 Agenda is meant to facilitate safe, orderly, and regular migration, not to stop it. Rather, migration and development must be managed in ways that maximise the benefits of both, for the greater good.

In this context, the impact of development aid on migration is time- and context-specific. What matters is that migration be managed in such a way as to maximise its development and other positive economic impacts, among other objectives, some personal to the migrants themselves.

**The Global Compact on Migration**

While maximising the benefits of migration for development is a central issue for the global compact, there is much more behind the pressing need for this global agreement than migration’s undoubted development potential. It will have to deal with the challenge of large movements of population, often mixed groups of refugees and migrants. It will have to anticipate more keenly some of the likely adverse effects of climate change, acknowledge the need for greater efforts to uphold labour standards, and recognise that the needs of host communities, too, must be addressed in managing the integration of long-term migrants.

The need for a global framework for international cooperation on human mobility is self-evident and its establishment long overdue. A successful compact will provide a unique opportunity to change the discourse on migration, from a perception-base to an evidence-base, mobilising open-minded citizens everywhere towards harnessing the benefits of human mobility for the greater good. And still, the global compact will need actionable commitments to have a meaningful impact on the lives of migrants and their new and old communities.

While it is too soon to say what the global compact will contain, as it will be the result of many months of governmental negotiations in 2018, to be formally adopted at an intergovernmental conference in December 2018, I do believe the global compact should be built upon three core principles.
First, it should be people-centred, with human well-being paramount. For the global compact to have meaning, it must include the perspective of the migrants and of the communities in which they live. Migration is foremost about people’s lives. It can bring renewed vitality to host communities only if we foster a two-way exchange that allows both migrants and host communities to thrive and benefit collectively. At the same time, we must take seriously concerns of host communities about the impact of migration and migrants, particularly when these concerns are ill-founded and misguided. They are best addressed by a responsible, accurate narrative about migrants and migration.

Second, the compact should emphasise the role of international cooperation, recognising well-managed migration as a matter of both state sovereignty and interdependence among states. States must recognise that international cooperation in facilitating safe and regular migration channels strengthens state sovereignty through trust and collaboration, as national migration policies cannot be enforced in a vacuum.

Third, the compact should be forward-looking, able to respond to today’s challenges, as well as those of tomorrow. Addressing current challenges necessitates a longer-term and holistic perspective on migration, so that decisions today will not have negative repercussions – intentional or otherwise – in the future. For example, for states to address irregular migration and limit numbers of returns, they must provide legal pathways that are practical and accessible. At the same time, we must recognise that while all human beings have a right to leave their country, the choice to enter another country is not unilateral, but rather one that should match available legal channels.

The global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration is a unique opportunity to remove barriers hindering the development contribution of migrants. State cooperation should be a triple win: for the state of origin, for the state of destination, and for all people involved in the process.

About the author

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For her full bio, see the article on our website.
The way migration and mobility will be managed politically and accommodated economically will be a defining factor for the future of Africa and of Europe. This article looks at the AU-EU Summit held in November 2017.

By Birgitte Markussen

"...migration can only be managed effectively through cooperation and partnership. There are forces all around the world pushing for a totally different approach: an approach based on confrontation instead of cooperation; on building walls instead of building partnerships. On closures and bans rather than dialogue. This is not the European way and I believe this is not the African way." (Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission, Valletta Senior Officials Meeting, 2017)

When approaching migration and mobility the challenge is broad and calls for comprehensive responses that will enable saving lives, fighting criminal networks as well as creating 18 million new jobs every year to absorb new labour market entrants in Africa. It is about continuing to strike the right balance between long and short term policies and instruments. And it is, obviously, also about the importance of youth when defining the future migration and mobility policies of Europe and Africa.

European and African leaders are very conscious that their response to the challenges of migration and youth unemployment may well define their legacy and the future of their own country. They, therefore, engaged closely in the AU-EU Summit in Abidjan and worked hard to iron out the differences of approach that inevitably exist.

#AUEU #AUEUyouth #BeTheFutureToday

The AU-EU Abidjan Political Declaration shapes a political agenda committing to the jointly defined main theme of the Summit:
FACTS ON MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS

This will become one of the most significant structural changes in the 21st century.

- **2.4 billion**
  - The predicted population of Africa by 2050. It will be made up predominantly of young people.

- **18 million**
  - The number of new jobs Sub-Saharan Africa needs to generate every year up to 2035 to absorb new labour market entrants. Today only 3 million formal jobs are created annually.

MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

The vast majority of migration and mobility takes place inside Africa.

- **20%**
  - The percentage of the total migration flow heading towards Europe.

- **80%**
  - The percentage of African migrants and refugees moving inside Africa.

REMITTANCES

Money transfers

- **€21 billion**
  - The money earned in Europe in 2015 by Africans and sent back to families on the African continent, the so-called remittances.

VOLUNTARY RETURNS OF MIGRANTS

- **13,000**
  - The number of voluntary returns of stranded migrants in Libya to their countries of origin assisted by UN agencies, African countries of origin and EU.

- **15,000**
  - The number of possible additional returns by February 2018.

Sources: Joint Communication for a renewed impetus of Africa-EU Partnership (4 May 2017); Commission contribution to the EU Leaders’ thematic debate on a way forward on the external and the internal dimension of migration policy (7 December 2017); UN World population prospects (2015); IMF Regional economic outlook (2015); OECD and the World Bank.

Graphic Design: Yaseena Chiu-van’t Hoff, ECDPM
“Investing in Youth for Accelerated Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development”. As youth represents the main group of individuals migrating, this is a very pertinent agenda, not only for the future – but starting right now.

Three overall deliverables of the AU-EU Summit are crucial for migration and mobility and for our work ahead.

Firstly, the Summit Declaration consolidates the focus on youth and reflects that a broad-based and balanced approach to migration and mobility is the right approach – also when working towards the UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees. The Declaration obviously pays special attention to the involvement of young migrants in all our efforts. It stresses the political commitment to address root causes of irregular migration. The need to prevent hazardous journeys and save lives. It emphasises that more needs to be done to further develop pathways for regular migration. Agrees to give preference to voluntary return and reaffirms that all returns must be carried out in full respect for human rights and human dignity. Finally, the Declaration restates a shared commitment to provide assistance to people fleeing conflict, including Internally Displaced People (IDPs), and support to the African Institute for Remittances.

Secondly, the Declaration commits to deepening the partnership and dialogue on migration and mobility by developing a joint framework for a strengthened continental dialogue between the EU and the AU. This is important as it is foreseen to complement the existing and more regionally specialised dialogues, including the Joint Valletta Action Plan, Rabat and Khartoum Processes, and the AU Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants.

Thirdly, the Summit provided a framework for ground breaking cooperation between AU, UN, EU, the Libyan government, and countries of origin and transit to take the necessary means and actions to improve the conditions for migrants and refugees in Libya. The cooperation is showing immediate results, assisting thousands of migrants out of Libya and back to their countries of origin. A task force has been established to oversee the ongoing repatriation out of Libya. The return of hundreds of Nigerian migrants already in January demonstrate that this commitment is not mere words.

**Valletta and the EU Partnership Framework**

The Declaration in Abidjan built on the approach agreed at the EU-Africa Summit on Migration in Valletta in November 2015. This identified five essential pillars for a balanced approach to migration: (1) Support to development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, (2) Legal migration and mobility, (3) Protection and asylum, (4) Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and (5) Return, readmission and reintegration.

The EU Partnership Framework approach agreed in 2016 builds on these five pillars, and is implemented in close partnership between the EU, its member states and specific African Union member states. In West Africa and the Sahel, work underway targets the creation of 114,000 jobs and supports 10,000 micro, small and medium enterprises. In Niger, the fight against smuggling along one of the main routes towards Libya has been stepped up by the government. The fight includes strengthening of the legal framework, and law enforcement. In the Horn of Africa, EU-financed projects under way will create more than 44,000 jobs across Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, and directly finance a further 30,000 jobs in South Sudan.

The main lesson learned from working with the Valletta Political Declaration and Action Plan, as well as the EU Partnership Framework approach, is that maintaining the broad-based approach envisaged under the five Valletta pillars is fundamental – and this includes making full use of the entire range of instruments. The common and comprehensive approach has also underlined that success lies in maintaining the momentum of action on all fronts. Furthermore, the incremental challenges call for a common approach, by pooling of resources and coordinated work towards joint objectives – with EU member states, as well as with external partners including the UN, the AU and its member states. Finally, experiences show the importance of integrating migration and mobility issues as part of the EU policies towards third countries. Placing diplomacy at the heart of the efforts in terms of political analysis and building platforms for dialogue helps to solve some of the difficult issues that need complex solutions.

**Continuing to get the balance right**

It is important to say that there have been differences. The final negotiations of the Valletta Summit took almost 24 hours of continuous talks, and the migration paragraphs of the Abidjan Declaration were only finalised at the very last minutes of the
closing ceremony. But most importantly, the approach agreed in Valletta and Abidjan put us in a position to balance the differences and to tackle the essential policy discussions of how best to continue to strike the right balance between short term immediate responses to crisis situations and longer term investments in jobs and economic development on the African continent. Knowing what we know about the conditions in many of the countries of origin on the African continent, the same individuals who are involved in criminal activities related to migration and mobility would in most cases prefer a job in the formal sector, if they were given the choice. It is obviously not an either/or, it is all about continuing to get this particular balance right in our policy approaches and concrete instruments.

The future policy responses to migration and mobility will continuously have to pass the litmus test of providing a short term response to saving lives, tackling the fight against irregular and illegal networks, while ensuring that the migration and mobility within and between Europe and Africa make the most of the economic and wider political potential of an orderly migration policy. The way these challenges will be managed politically and accommodated economically will help define the future of both Africa and of Europe. And it will impact more than anyone on the youth in both continents, so it is essential their voice is included in both our upstream dialogues and downstream initiatives.

The statement by the European leaders on the occasion of the International Migrant Day last December underlined the broader political and economic importance of migration and mobility for Europe itself over the last centuries: 
"On International Migrant Day we remember all those who live outside their country of birth and are on the move – either by choice or forcibly. We remember that our continent, Europe, is built on migration. Our common history is marked by millions of people fleeing from persecution, war, or dictatorship (...). Today, our European Union allows people across the continent to freely travel, to study and work in other countries. This has made Europe one of the richest places in the world – in terms of culture, of economy, of opportunities and in terms of liberties."

**About the author**

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This article looks at the dynamics and trends of forced displacement and mixed migration from a practitioner’s point of view at the IGAD level. It highlights key focus areas and issues in the region.

By Caroline Njuki and Woldamlak Abera

Migration has become a defining national and regional political issue, as it touches on powerful underlying concerns relating to human rights, international economics, labour demands, security, governance, and a globalised but increasingly unequal world. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) covers a diverse region with a population of over 230 million, comprising areas of economic growth and investment and areas prone to violent conflict, political instability, and humanitarian crises (IGAD Regional Strategy, 2016). The IGAD region is one of the world’s largest refugee producing and hosting areas, with up to 11 million forcefully displaced persons (RMMS, 2017).

Most of the displacement in the region is protracted, lasting 10 years on average, as for refugees from Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan. In line with trends in global displacement, forced displacement and mixed migration in the Horn of Africa has become more complex over the last five years. It has increased in volume too, fuelled by political, socio-economic, and environmental factors.

While displacement has clear negative impacts on the countries of origin, it also has spill-over effects throughout a much larger area. For example, Somali and South Sudanese refugees are found throughout the IGAD region. Most refugees in the Horn of Africa live in camps though some are housed in settlements, as in Uganda. These camps and settlements tend to be in underdeveloped and marginalised areas, compared to the rest of the host country. Many refugee hosting communities already face precarious socio-economic conditions, marked by food insecurity, limited access to basic services, poor livelihood opportunities, and degraded natural resources. Protracted displacement of refugees further exacerbates their situation. The result can be competition for scarce resources and pressure on the environment, sometimes leading to conflicts and clashes (Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration, 2015).
World Bank and UNHCR). Migration flows in the IGAD region are mixed, that is, they include persons with various different profiles and levels of vulnerabilities: migrant workers (both regular and irregular), refugees, smuggled migrants, trafficked persons, unaccompanied children, environmental migrants, stranded migrants, and victims of exploitation and abuse. Some use irregular channels to flee political unrest, persecution, and conflict, while others seek to escape situations of extreme resource scarcity, including drought, crop failure, food insecurity, and severe poverty. In the host and transit countries, migrants have less protection than others. They are also more subject to exploitation, and less tolerated.

**IGAD’s role in addressing forced displacement and mixed migration**

As a regional actor, IGAD recognises the need to respond to forced displacement and mixed migration flows in a way that addresses the structural causes. In pursuing a holistic approach, it supports programmes to build the capacity of governance structures at the national, sub-national, and local levels for improved development. At the same time, it works to mitigate the economic, social, and environmental impacts of migration on the host communities. These efforts are guided by the IGAD Migration Action Plan (MAP) 2015-2020, developed to operationalise the overarching Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF).

**Addressing mixed migration**

IGAD has established a number of initiatives to address mixed migration. Its aim is to maximise protection and save lives, while working towards sustainability and increased government ownership and capacity to respond to needs by reinforcing governments’ migration management capacities.

For better regional and national coordination, it has established platforms for dialogue and information sharing. In 2008, IGAD launched a regional consultative process on migration, and set up the IGAD Regional Migration Coordination Committee (RMCC). These provide a framework for discussing and following up on progress in implementing the RMPF and MAP.

Through national coordination mechanisms and a ‘whole of government approach’ to migration management, IGAD supports member states, especially in strengthening cooperation and coordination on migration management at the national level. Since 2014 it has established national coordination mechanisms (NCMs) for this. Currently Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan have fully operational NCMs, with the remaining countries formalising their own NCMs. IGAD is also in the process of negotiating a free movement of persons regime. This protocol would harmonise policies and procedures on free movement of persons, regulations, and the rights of trade and labour migrants across the IGAD region, while promoting transhumance mobility. Facilitating movements is the objective envisaged.

**Development response to displacement**

IGAD has adopted a development response to forced displacement. This is a strategic shift from a purely humanitarian approach that leaves out the host communities towards a comprehensive response to the social, economic, and environmental implications of displacement for both the persons displaced and the host communities.

Real improvements for those living in situations of protracted displacement and for the affected host populations can be achieved only by addressing issues of housing, livelihoods and jobs, access to services, inclusion, and governance in ways that benefit all. The goal is to ensure that displaced people are more self-reliant rather than needing continued humanitarian aid. Development actors in the region have been called to work comprehensively and scale up their efforts to counter the impacts of forced displacement on fragile and conflict-affected countries and regions. In this regard, IGAD has developed two main responses: the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) and the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali refugees and reintegration of returnees in Somalia.

**Solutions for Somali refugees and reintegration of returnees in Somalia.**

DRDIP aims to improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management for communities hosting refugees. IGAD will use knowledge and insights generated from the project to showcase good practices in integrated service delivery in refugee hosting areas. Benefits in terms of economic inclusion and sustainable management of the environment will also be documented and shared. Through generation of evidence supporting innovative development approaches, DRDIP hopes to bring about a shift in mind-set among IGAD member states and partners working on displacement. To effectively coordinate this response IGAD has established the Regional Secretariat on Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration, based in Nairobi with the support of the World Bank.

Regarding the Nairobi Declaration, IGAD convened a special summit on durable solutions for Somali refugees and reintegration of returnees in Somalia. At that gathering, in March 2017, member states agreed on a comprehensive regional approach to address the Somali refugees’ situation, while maintaining protection and promoting self-reliance in the countries of asylum, consistent with international responsibility-sharing as outlined in the New York Declaration’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

**The Nairobi Declaration and its prospects in the IGAD region**

IGAD appreciates that a coherent and comprehensive set of policies is essential to move towards solutions. However, these alone are not sufficient. Common objectives and goals are also needed,
alongside agreed actions, a clear delivery framework, dedicated resources, a robust monitoring system, and a targeted communication strategy. Only by pooling resources and efforts and translating them into concrete joint actions will it be possible to make tangible progress for refugees and host communities on the ground.

With the adoption of the Nairobi Declaration and its accompanying action plan, IGAD member states committed to respond collectively to one of the world’s most prolonged displacement crises. Now in its third decade, there are over a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and nearly 900,000 refugees in the region.

Member states have set strategic objectives, outcomes, indicators, and milestones for implementation of the Nairobi Declaration. The framework provides the means to track progress in delivery on the commitments and the results achieved. In line with this, countries are developing national action plans (NAPs) defining policy changes, investments, and other actions required to deliver on the commitments made. Resource mobilisation will be undertaken on a rolling basis using biannual meetings of IGAD member states and key donors and international financial institutions. These gatherings will also provide opportunities to take stock of progress made across the region. To support the process a set of regional thematic meetings will be convened on specific issues, such as education for refugees and host communities, self-reliance, and third-country resettlement. These will provide opportunities to share experiences and best practices and address bottlenecks and challenges.

The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and the Nairobi Declaration

The UN General Assembly has called for a global response and international support to ensure that forced displacement and migration challenges are addressed in a coherent, comprehensive, and balanced manner backed by international responsibility-sharing to support hosting countries. The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), led by the UN Refugee Agency, provides an imperative to overcome the outdated view of refugees and migrants as burdens on societies. The Declaration urges governments to come up with a fresh and more realistic view of refugees and migrants as active contributors to development and welfare in the societies that host them.

Countries in the IGAD region have expressed a need for increased responsibility-sharing by the international community, while committing to reform various aspects of refugee protection. Key among these commitments were those made during the Leaders’ Summit, held during the 71st UN General Assembly in September 2016. It is in this context that the IGAD summit adopted the Nairobi Declaration, further reinforcing the commitments made by member states at the Leaders’ Summit. The Nairobi Declaration can be viewed as the regional application of CRRF, which pursues a multi-sectoral response to displacement that considers the development impacts of displacement on host communities and governments. Five IGAD member states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somali and Djibouti) have become CRRF pilot countries. The Nairobi Declaration will be part and parcel of this process.

National action plans are to be part of the overall CRRF implementation strategy. Each country will come up with a consolidated national plan of action. DRDIP will complement the CRRF objectives too, for example, through initiatives to ease pressure on host countries. This approach is a game changer for the communities that have long relied on humanitarian support. It holds real potential to leave them more empowered and with a greater sense of dignity.

To deliver on these commitments, there is growing international recognition that development actors must engage earlier than they have been doing and adopt a longer-term planning approach at the onset of a displacement crisis. Furthermore, they need to work in collaboration with displacement-affected governments including those at the local level, host communities, and international humanitarian partners.

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Most international migration in Africa is intracontinental, essentially occurring between proximate states in the same regional bloc. It is mixed, but semi-skilled and unskilled labour migration, and mobility involving informal cross-border traders and service providers merit special attention.

By Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

The push for continental integration
African leaders seem determined to realise the longstanding goal of continental socio-economic integration. This is in keeping with the provisions of the 1991 Abuja Treaty for Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. That treaty actualised the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the FinalAct of Lagos, both of which were preceded by a decades-long aspiration of Africa’s founding fathers for continental unity. A step in that direction is the process that has so far seen over five rounds of negotiation between state parties, to establish a continental free trade area (CFTA). The negotiations, which began in 2015, follow a decision adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) in 2012. A CFTA agreement could be signed by 2018.

This first phase of negotiations has centred on tariff liberalisation, trade in goods and services, rules of origin, non-tariff barriers, and quantitative restrictions on trade. Issues like intellectual property rights and competition policy will be negotiated in the second phase, after the CFTA agreement is signed. Negotiations on mobility of what the AU terms businesspersons started in parallel with the trade negotiations, and will be completed in the second phase. This relegation of human mobility to a parallel or second phase of the CFTA negotiations is telling. Actually, it reflects the sensitivity in Africa to the issue of human mobility and free movement of persons across the “open” borders of the continent’s states.
The basis of continental integration

Some literature acknowledges the porosity of the artificial borders that serve as markers of the respective territories of the 55 AU member countries. Yet, policymakers generally seem oblivious to or conveniently ignore the fact that mobility is so characteristic of African populations, especially in border areas. Motivations for movements vary, as do the kinds of people moving. They move for work, business or trade, research or study, kinship, and indeed, because they are forcefully displaced by war and conflict or by sociocultural, natural, and climate-related factors, among other reasons.

Strict enforcement of nation-state borders, especially at official border posts, raises concerns about free movement and international migration. With regard to the latter, a country or region is considered to be pro free movement if a foreign national requires no special permit, or work visa, to enter and work in its territory. Free movement bestows on immigrants the right to reside and establish in the host country.

This distinction of terms has important implications for policy, especially in Africa, where mixed migration coexists with informal cross-border mobility and claims of asylum (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). Discussions of African human mobility all too often emphasise migration of Africans to other continents. In reality, most international migration occurs within Africa. Migration between proximate states belonging to the same REC is especially prominent. Thus, more migration occurs between the neighbouring countries of and within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) than to Europe, for instance.

Because of this, the singling out of businesspersons (and exclusion of all other categories of mobile persons) for free movement in the CFTA negotiations clearly seems deliberate. It is revealing of the way AU countries sensitively approach intracontinental mobility and their understanding of its implications. Concerns – particularly in the few more economically developed countries towards which migration is directed – relate to immigrants flooding job markets and stealing jobs from citizens (Oucho and Crush, 2001). Other issues relate to security, informed by narrow national interests (Segatti and Landau, 2011). Human mobility is then seen as a threat to national stability and prosperity.

Migration phobia: Policy and legislative guarantees

Yet, if Africa and the RECs are to advance on integration, these fears must be allayed. To do that, serious consideration needs to be given to the role of free movement in integration. A fundamental question concerning economic integration in Africa is whether the state parties aspire to progress beyond a customs union. Will they agree to allow capital, goods, services, and labour to move freely across borders (Oucho and Crush, 2001), leading to a common market and economic union? Despite some AU members’ reservations, the Abuja Treaty to which all 55 AU members are signatories, makes provision for free movement. But a point that is often missed is that free movement connotes free movement of workers, not people in general (Nita 2013). Understanding this will help allay fears of “tidal waves” and “floods” of “illegal” migrants eroding the economic, sociocultural, and moral fabric of immigrant host countries (Crush et al., 2005; Oucho, 2007; Adepoju, 2009; Nyamnjoh, 2010; Adeniran, 2014; Moyo, 2017).

But, Africa indeed has a position on migration and the role of migration in development. That position is contained in Africa’s legal and policy frameworks and those of the eight RECs recognised by the AU as pillars of the AEC. Thus, the Abuja Treaty contains a provision for free continental movement of Africans, to be legally enshrined in an African free movement protocol:

[AU] Member States agree to adopt, individually, at bilateral or regional levels, the necessary measures, in order to achieve progressively the free movement of persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and the right of establishment by their nationals within the [African Economic] Community.

For this purpose, Member States agree to conclude a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (Abuja Treaty, 1991, Chapter 6, Article 43).

Elsewhere in the treaty, member states undertake to

Adopt employment policies that shall allow the free movement of persons within the [African Economic] Community by strengthening and establishing labour exchanges aimed at facilitating the employment of available skilled manpower of one Member State in other Member States where there are shortages of skilled manpower (Abuja Treaty, 1991, Chapter 13, Article 71).

Together, these articles underline that provisions are in place for continental and interstate free movement and international migration. They also tie migration to the development and utilisation of Africa’s human resources, including across AU member states’ borders. Two key continental instruments subsequently formulated by AU states express the contribution of migration to development explicitly: the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD) (AU, 2006) and the Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018-2027) (AU,
2017). These reveal a completely different approach to migration than the fearful one exhibited by some member states. In these instruments, African states encourage each other and plan to, among other things, adopt pro free movement employment policies in the envisaged AEC. Thus, Africa through its instruments provides an environment that potentially facilitates intracontinental labour mobility, along with the exchange and development of skilled human resources, and the coordination and integration of labour markets. This, along with facilitation of movement for trade, is essential to development.

Besides legislation and policies, the AU, through the AU Commission and international partners including the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) is running a four-year Joint Labour Migration Governance Programme (JLMP). That programme seeks to promote regional integration and development.

Among the RECs, some expressly encourage human mobility, while others grapple with the basic idea and practice of integration. The former have either drawn up or are implementing regional protocols on free movement of persons and migration policies. The latter struggle in establishment of regional migration governance regimes, for various reasons. These range from socio-economic and security-related objections to migration, to difficulties in appreciating that regionalism is a state-led project supportive of growth and development.

At one end of this apparent regional migration governance regime spectrum is ECOWAS (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). ECOWAS has the most comprehensive, advanced, and well-implemented human mobility governance regime in Africa. Early on, ECOWAS set free regional movement as a target. This is reflected in the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty and the protocol relating to free movement of persons, and its four supplementary protocols. The protocol guarantees the right of entry, residence, and establishment for citizens of ECOWAS member states (ECOWAS Commission, 1993: ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Article 3.2.d.iii). When the ECOWAS Treaty was revised in 1979, the region maintained the goal of free movement. In the revised treaty, it undertake to remove all restrictions on free movement and reiterates the commitment to establish the right of entry, residence, and establishment. Based on the treaty, ECOWAS authorities have adopted a migration policy and two other measures to facilitate movement across member states’ borders. These are a uniform ECOWAS passport and a standardised ECOWAS travel certificate. The passport, which is already in use, would eventually replace the national passports of respective member states by 2010. ECOWAS has abolished visas for citizens of member states.

At the other end of the spectrum are regions such as the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Here, regionalism has not taken root, being derailed by deep political differences between the state parties. The contention specifically revolves around the Western Sahara, and whether the territory should participate in the AMU as a sovereign independent state. This has broken efforts to establish the area as a functioning REC.

In between, are regions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), another AU-recognised REC. Though fully functional and progressing (having achieved free trade area status in 2008, for instance), SADC member states have shied away from formalising a regional migration governance mechanism for over 20 years. This is due partly to systematic opposition by the countries that are the most preferred destinations of migrants in the region (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013). Such an attitude at the regional level contradicts and frustrates the AU’s use of the RECs as pillars or building blocks of the AEC, and its broader goal of African unity and development.

However, some countries in Southern Africa, as well as West and Eastern Africa, are running a voluntary labour migration initiative: the Intra-African Talent Mobility Partnership Programme (TMP). It aims to create Schengen-type mechanisms for skilled labour migration and skills development in these regions. This programme, along with the AU-led JLMP, demonstrates the importance Africa attaches to labour mobility and its potential contribution to development.

Efficient regular migration and labour mobility frameworks could foster development in Africa. Giving professionals the freedom to move from labour surplus to labour scarce areas, for instance, would help balance requirements in sending and receiving countries across Africa and the RECs (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2016). Areas of scarcity would additionally benefit from skills transfer.

The practice of integration

Despite the sensitivity, the age-old mobility of various kinds of people for various reasons across Africa will continue. Recent history shows that stringent immigration measures will fail to curb migration in Africa. A case in point is the deportation of foreign workers, especially during economic downturns in host
In conclusion, three observations summarise the current Africa's integration dream and humane mobility

Africa's integration dream and humane mobility
In conclusion, three observations summarise the current situation regarding human mobility in Africa. First, effort is needed to stem security approaches to migration, expressed in some countries in attempts to enforce or move towards stricter border control. Inevitably such approaches will be frustrated by the porous artificial borders that separate the AU’s 55 member states. Secondly, there exist policies and practices of restricted entry designed to filter out people with no skills in favour of skilled professionals. These too, however, are undermined by border porosity, along with the demand for cheap labour and informally traded goods and services in more advanced economies within RECs and across Africa. Thirdly, ad hoc interventions, such as the occasional amnesties granted to, especially, undocumented and semi-skilled and unskilled labour migrants, though welcome, are diluted by regular massive deportations conducted by the same state authorities. These fan hostilities towards foreign African nationals at local and community level.

Both the deportations and negative attitudes towards foreign nationals are an antithesis to regional and continental integration. The deportations are costly, especially considering that most deportees eventually return to the countries they were deported from. The resources deployed for such operations could achieve more and better outcomes if channelled to areas where the need is greater.

Hostilities towards foreign African nationals undermine the noble ideals of Africa's founding fathers and generations of Pan-Africanists determined to promote cooperation, cohesion, and unity among the peoples of Africa, as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU as well as the respective treaties of the eight RECs that are to establish the AEC.

Thus, the key to effective responses and to realising the existing continental and regional human mobility instruments lies primarily in changing policymakers’ attitudes and allaying their fears of migration.

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For the full list of references see the article on our website

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The EU should work to unlock its potential for sustainable development. Migration is becoming central in EU development policy. A host of measures have been announced and instruments set up to use development funds to address migration’s ‘root causes’. These bring the risk of an EU development cooperation increasingly driven by short-term and EU-centric political needs. What we need, instead, is an EU migration policy aligned with the historic commitments of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

By Elly Schlein

EU development cooperation hijacked?
Migration has become a central part of the EU’s development and foreign policy, with multiple measures announced at the highest level. In 2015, a new European Agenda on Migration was launched. The following year, the EU adopted the new Partnership Framework to speed up implementation of the Valletta Action Plan, which set several domains of cooperation between the EU and African partners. From the outset, it was clear that these agreements focused disproportionately on preventing and fighting irregular migration through border control, returns and readmission compacts. The Communication on Establishing a New Partnership clearly underlines how conditionality should be integrated into EU development policies, rewarding or punishing countries in line with their cooperation in managing migratory flows.

To address the so-called ‘root causes of migration’, to use the jargon in vogue, the development-migration nexus has evolved to embrace a dangerous paradigm, which could lead to the diversion of development aid to the management of migratory flows. I consider any tying of development cooperation to migration control to be disturbing. EU development cooperation, as stated in Art. 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, should address long-term global issues, particularly poverty eradication and sustainable economic growth. It should not serve short-sighted and EU-driven political needs, such as preventing migrants from reaching European shores. Moreover, research has shown that the assumption that more development aid will reduce immigration is flawed.
Are the new funding instruments genuine development tools?

To tackle the ‘migratory emergency situation’, the EU funding landscape has undergone a major transformation. New financial instruments have been established, most notably the EU emergency trust fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa. Framed as an emergency instrument and covering 26 African countries, it has now become the main financial instrument for EU political engagement with African partners in the field of migration, with most of its resources drawn from the European Development Fund.

Despite the trust fund’s potentials (more flexibility and political visibility, along with the possibility of pooling huge volumes of aid from different sources), this instrument lies outside the EU budget, giving the European Parliament a very limited role of scrutiny. Moreover, as the money pooled also comes from non-aid budgets which do not have to comply with DAC rules, there is a real risk of development funds being diverted to securitisation and border management activities aimed solely at curbing migratory flows.

A scrutiny working group has been set up within the European Parliament’s Committee on Development (DEVE), to establish a more institutionalised context for oversight of the new migration-related instruments affecting development aid policies and financing. In particular, it is of utmost importance to ensure that new funding choices are compatible with EU legal bases and principles, and that funds allocated from development policy budgetary instruments fulfil ODA criteria, without deviating from development objectives. Among the issues raised, I consider particularly worrisome the limited engagement of African countries and civil society in the design of the trust fund and the selection of projects.

An EU migration policy in line with the 2030 Agenda

Serious doubts can therefore be raised on the EU’s strategy to address migration, which has evolved fast in the last few years. Indeed, it seems driven by a securitisation approach, in stark contrast to the commitments made in the 2030 Agenda. Rather than pursuing sustainable development through facilitation of orderly, safe and responsible migration policy, sustainable development seems to be used as leverage for stemming migration. The politicisation of aid and the call to make development aid conditional on third countries’ commitments on migration is particularly troubling. We are setting up an ad hoc regime, which could cost the EU its credibility as a global actor.

Moreover, by bending our external policies to conditionality on border management, we risk undermining relationships with African partners. This approach could weaken the EU’s soft power. In economic terms, the securitisation-driven obsession of EU governments with stemming migratory flows towards Europe could dramatically impact African economies in the medium and long term, as they also rely on intra-regional free movement. After all, migratory movements from Africa to Europe represent only a minor part of the overall flows within Africa.

Without global credibility and strong intercontinental partnerships, migration from Africa would constitute a much greater longer-term challenge. There can be no quick fixes. Any EU strategy should be properly elaborated in real cooperation with all relevant partners. Similarly, projects funded through ODA should respond to partner countries’ development needs, not donors’ political objectives. Considering development as a short-term solution to the challenge of migration is fundamentally flawed. It risks subordinating our development policy to short-term and security-driven objectives. Migration is an opportunity for both Europe and Africa, to be dealt with in cooperation and on the basis of true equality. On a more general note, we should delink EU development cooperation from stability and security programmes, which might serve development but do not represent appropriate use of ODA.

The politically-driven establishment of new funding instruments, allowing for a partial relabelling, reorganisation and reprioritisation of EU aid budgets towards migration control, raises important questions about the principles of effectiveness and ownership underlying EU development cooperation. It is important to keep track of the geographical allocation of aid, which must continue to be guided by development needs and not focus solely on countries invested by migration flows. We must not pass the bill to the poorest in the world.

The biggest gap in the EU’s migration agenda is the lack of any safe and legal channel. We need long-term solutions based on policy coherence for development and alignment of EU policies to the goals of the 2030 Agenda. The migration challenge requires forward-looking solutions that serve recipients’ needs, without side-lining genuine development aims and the principle of freedom of movement outside of our borders.

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GENDERED EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION ON THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

Corruption plays a prominent role in shaping migration decisions and experiences along the Central Mediterranean route. It is also a highly gendered phenomenon, as men are more likely to pay with money and women with their bodies.

By Vittorio Bruni and Ortrun Merkle

The journey from Libya to Italy, the so-called Central Mediterranean route, has achieved infamy for the violence and dire conditions migrants face every day. Yet, little is known about the prominent role of corruption, i.e. the abuse of power for illicit gain, in shaping the migration decisions and experiences of men and women along this route.

Drawing on semi-structured interviews with migrants and experts, we studied corruption experiences of Nigerian migrants travelling to Italy through Niger and Libya. Our research found that corruption is a constant throughout the journey for all, but these experiences are highly gendered as well. Men typically face demands for money and goods, while women often have to pay with sexual acts (“sextortion”). This has been confirmed throughout at all stages of migration, from the country of origin to the destination country.

Shaping the migration path

While various factors play a role in shaping the migration path, recent research shows the substantial effect, direct and indirect, of corruption on decisions to migrate (Merkle et al., 2017a). This is especially true in countries where corruption is pervasive, such as Nigeria. Our interviewees identified corruption in education, law enforcement and health care as particularly influential in their migration decisions.

The women in our study spoke of experiencing corruption in schools, where requests for money and sexual favours in return for grades were daily fare. This left them without an education and in search of opportunities elsewhere. Many interviewees said that corruption within the police and judiciary had, directly or indirectly, influenced their decision to migrate, by increasing inequalities, tensions and frustrations. As
one migrant reported, “They [the police] should be the ones protecting people but they are the ones that kill people. They are the ones that kill.” Arbitrary arrests and violence, coupled with high rates of corruption, gave many no other choice than to leave Nigeria. Corruption within the healthcare system reduces access to medical attention for the poorest, but it also has an unexpected direct impact on migration paths. Hospital staff often demand bribes for issuing a birth certificate, leaving those unable to pay without identification documents. Regular migration paths are closed to people without documents. This forces them to migrate irregularly or depend on smugglers and criminal organisations for forged documents.

**Crossing the desert**

The visa-free regime of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) allows most migrants to travel regularly from Nigeria to Agadez in Niger to start the journey across the Sahara to Libya. Crossing the desert is treacherous. The trip, lasting four to five days, is almost always facilitated by smugglers. As 22-year-old Lima told us, “Without water, without food, you are just under the sun for three days. That is how it is in the desert. [...] Someone can just die and they just leave you there. After you are dead the journey continues. Nobody is going to take a dead body to Europe.” This part of the journey is also where corruption becomes central in ensuring survival.

The strip of desert dividing Niger and Libya is covered with checkpoints manned by government officials and militia groups demanding bribes to let migrants pass. Gianu, a 20-year-old man, told us of his experiences in the desert, “At any blockade by the military you have to pay. They ask you for money before you can cross. Then if you do not have the money, if you are a lady they will demand sex, if you are a guy they beat you. [...] One of my girls [...] paid about 50 Libyan dinars [around US$ 36 or € 31] at a soldier blockade, but they still asked her for sex. We spent almost an hour waiting for the girl to come back. We do not know how many boys slept with her there, just that we waited for her to come back to continue our journey.”

Our study found two consistent patterns: for one, men pay for corruption with goods and money and women with their bodies. Secondly, men who do not comply with demands for bribes are severely beaten, while women who do not comply face sexual violence and abuse. Beyond the dramatic, long-term physical and psychological effects, corruption during the desert crossing depletes migrants’ financial resources as well. Thus, a ‘cumulative effect of corruption’ sets in, making migrants even more vulnerable to future violence and sexual abuse.

**From Libya to Italy**

Upon their arrival in Libya most migrants are captured and brought to detention centres. These are well known as inhuman prisons where migrants of all ages are exploited and abused (OHCHR, 2016). Yet, their experiences are fundamentally different. Where men are typically tortured, forced into forced labour and held for ransom, women are concussed into prostitution and sexual slavery.

Gianu told us about his time in Libya: “They flogged us every day. [...] After beating us they locked us in and asked us to call our families. But I did not really have anyone to call because I lost my contacts on the way.” This is another example of what we call the “cumulative effect of corruption”. Paying multiple bribes drains travellers’ resources, leaving no money for the next demand. Migrants are thus even more exposed to the next threat of violence and sexual abuse.
A major problem identified by all migrants in Libya is the impossibility of distinguishing state officials from armed groups. Multiple government forces and militias are active along the route. The system of corruption and abuse all of these groups perpetuate is highly organised and socially entrenched. Migrants have nowhere to turn. Even if they escape those holding them captive, entities tasked to protect migrants, such as the police and other state officials, frequently are complicit in migrant exploitation. Multiple migrants interviewed for this study said that after escaping, or being released, they were captured by another uniformed group.

Our study found that migrants in Libya often had little choice over their destiny after being captured. They were transported from one prison to the next and often put on a boat to Italy by the same networks that had captured them. Twenty-year-old Emma said that she managed to collect enough money to buy her freedom, but was blocked from returning home to Nigeria: “I told him [the smuggler] that I wanted to go back to Nigeria, but he said that he would only get me to Italy.” Without anywhere to turn, she ended up on a boat on the Mediterranean. Migrants captured in Libya usually have only two options: stay in the abusive system of forced labour, ransom seeking and prostitution in Libya or get on a boat to Italy.

What’s next?
It is essential that authorities in Europe better understand the corruption experienced by migrants during their journey. They also need to become more sensitive to corruption’s gendered forms and effects.

‘Sextortion’, in particular, has long-term psychological and health effects, such as trauma, pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. It is also connected with extreme stigma and shame. Aid measures during transit and in destination countries must give special consideration to the different forms of violence experienced by women and men. Psychological trauma associated with (sexual) violence can often not be understood and therefore treated without a deeper understanding of the individual experiences and the cultural background of the migrant. More ethnographic research is required in this area and should be included in training for therapists and doctors.

**The systematic and engrained corruption in Northern Niger and Libya leaves migrants extremely vulnerable.**
Due to the vast array of state and non-state actors involved, no cooperation on migration management is possible without addressing anti-corruption and rule of law issues. Any reforms should also include more women in key positions within the police and among border authorities.

Corruption and violence involving state authorities (or those appearing to be state authorities) creates a deep-seated mistrust of state officials, especially those in uniform. This often blocks migrants from seeking help or reporting continued threats and abuse from smugglers and traffickers in transit countries, and at the destination. More training of public officials and law enforcement in destination countries could help them understand these experiences better and react appropriately. Although governance reforms in the transit countries are desirable in the long term, migrants’ current situation in these countries is dire, and no quick improvement is likely. As our research found irregular migrants are especially vulnerable to corruption and sexual violence and abuse, swift establishment of more legal migration channels, especially for women and children, would be a interim humanitarian measure.

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Migration policies and development: The dilemma of Agadez

Migration policies can only contribute to the stability and development of transit regions if they are founded on an understanding of the links between migration, economic development, governance and security.

By Fransje Molenaar

The region of Agadez in Niger has become a focal point of European migration policies. Located on the main route that connects West Africa and the Sahel to more affluent countries, such as Algeria and Libya, Agadez is a vibrant epicentre of intra-African migration. An estimated 30 percent of migrants travelling this route eventually end up on a boat to Europe. Given the lack of a unified government in Libya, collaboration to stop boat departures from the Libyan coast have been largely ineffective. EU policymakers recently turned to Agadez to help stem the migration flow. Policies have mainly taken the form of technical assistance for formulating Nigerien migration action plans, alongside provision of police training to counter human smuggling. Both have resulted in a wave of arrests of smugglers and confiscation of their vehicles.

Formal data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) now show a 75 per cent decline in northbound migration flows on monitored routes for 2017 compared to 2016. The bus companies transporting migrants between Niamey and Agadez confirm a large drop in passengers. Many smugglers now circumvent the established routes to avoid arrest.

Those migrants who still undertake the journey face prices up to five times higher than a year ago. However, human rights abuses have become more frequent in the Agadez ghettos where migrants stay and where they have now gone underground. More are abandoned in the desert too, as smugglers have resorted to routes less travelled. Moreover,
given the migration industry’s economic importance to the region, the EU-supported policies have had detrimental consequences for the Agadez population.

**The downside of countering irregular migration**

Many of Agadez’s important economic sectors have fallen into decline over the past decade. Tourism has suffered multiple blows: unrest due to the Tuareg rebellions, the extremist threat and the labelling of Agadez as a ‘red zone’. Uranium mining was hit by a drop in world uranium prices. To make matters worse, the government recently closed informal gold mining sites, after selling concessions to big foreign companies and to address the security threat posed by armed Sudanese and Chadian gold miners. Agricultural earnings fluctuate, but by no means can they constitute a reliable income source due to recurring periods of drought. Historically, the migration industry has provided an economic buffer. Agadez residents have supplemented their income by providing travellers goods and services, such as food, water, call shops and errand boys. Indeed, in our research, one third of respondents noted that they had earned some form of income from the migration industry.

The current migration policies overlook the vital economic importance of the migration industry to the region. They have been implemented without providing any significant economic alternatives. The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) does reserve a large sum for long-term socio-economic development, for example, through agricultural projects. Yet, to date, no such projects have been implemented, leaving the Agadez population worse off than before the migration policies were in place. Two thirds of the respondents in our research said that the Agadez community did not benefit at all from the measures being taken to mitigate migration. However, a similar proportion observed that the Agadez community did benefit a lot from migration. The question then arises of how sustainable these policies can be, if they undermine an important economic sector in the region, without putting any real alternatives in place.

Furthermore, the EU-supported migration policies could have serious consequences for the legitimacy of regional security authorities. Our research indicated that trust in Agadez state authorities was already low. Officials were not generally seen as helpful in times of need, especially compared to more traditional authorities, such as community elders, chiefs and imams. The authorities themselves note that the EU-supported migration policies, which are coordinated with Niamey rather than the region, have pitted them to a greater extent against their local populations: “They ask us why we work for the EU rather than for them, the people who got us elected.”

Amidst such concerns, there is nonetheless little evidence of any national or international efforts to strengthen the local authorities’ legitimacy. Given the history of armed rebellion in the region, combined with the fact that Agadez’s current stability relies largely on appeasement of ethnic elites with strong ties to the transnational smuggling industry, such efforts are crucial investments to maintain the region’s stability.

**Migration’s impacts on stability and local development**

From the above, it follows that the drive to stop migration has resulted in implementation of policies that are not context-
and conflict-sensitive and may therefore undermine local stability and development. A related problem is that due to the EU-dominated focus on stopping migration, the reduction of migrant numbers has become the sole indicator of policy effectiveness. This unilateral focus bypasses many of the larger challenges that migration poses for regional stability and local development.

For example, increasing migration has strained local infrastructure. Agadez authorities have responded by imposing visitors’ taxes on migrants transiting their communities. These resources, combined with the larger customer base for goods and services, have helped the region develop health clinics and other local services and infrastructure. Nonetheless, migratory flows have overburdened the water supply, the electricity network and garbage collection services. These kinds of strains impact the daily lives of Agadez residents, sometimes creating tensions that require monitoring and tailored interventions.

In addition, it must be recognised that the migration industry that existed before the EU-supported interventions was not entirely benign. Many migrants did not survive the harsh journey through the desert or were delivered into the hands of Libyan smugglers, who take human exploitation and mistreatment to new levels. Smuggling has empowered lawless gangs. These have increasingly come into conflict with the Agadez population, at times targeting members of particular ethnic groups.

Regulation of migration and creation of safe, legal pathways to alternate, chiefly African destinations are important tools for addressing such concerns. Unfortunately, the dominant paradigm of criminalising irregular migration without putting alternatives in place has fuelled the shady side of the migration industry. This makes it much harder to monitor what is happening, and exposes migrants to even worse human rights abuses.

The irregular migration industry creates obstructions to good governance too. Criminal transnational smuggling rings often exist by the grace of local and national political authorities — who in return benefit directly or indirectly from the smuggling activities. In Niger, for example, clear financial links are visible between smuggling kingpins and the president, such as through campaign contributions. At a more local level, security forces have benefited financially from taxation of irregular migration, demanding payments at roadblocks along the main migration routes. The current investments in police training seem to have exacerbated this problem, as the price of bribes has risen in step with the police crackdown on human smugglers. A major concern among Agadez authorities is that police corruption has risen, further undermining the local population’s trust in law enforcement.

A conflict-sensitive approach to migration management
The case of Agadez presents several important lessons for the development of migration policies that target transit and origin countries.

First, it is important to adopt a holistic approach towards migration and to consider the context in which these policies are implemented. For Agadez, the EU-supported policies are unsustainable in the long run, for multiple reasons: their failure to address police corruption, low state legitimacy, the larger backdrop of economic decline and the fact that regional stability depends on elites’ complicity in the cross-border smuggling trade. While short-term securitised fixes may seem convenient, to be sustainable, migration policies must be driven by a holistic and long-term agenda that works towards inclusive regional development and stability. At the very least, local populations should be better off because of their government’s collaboration with the EU migration agenda.

Second, for there to be any hope of long-term sustainability, the EU migration agenda has to move beyond the goal of bringing migration down to zero today. Migration management has to be founded on an analysis of the positive and negative consequences of migration for origin and transit regions, and policies must be designed to foster the former while addressing the latter. This means zooming in on locations where the migration industry shows signs of becoming particularly criminal and abusive and using EU ‘sticks and carrots’ to press for change. In this sense, the failure to connect police training in Agadez to a larger process of security sector reform aimed at addressing police corruption and insecurity in the region is a missed opportunity. Sustainable migration management also requires investing in migration’s further regularisation and normalisation, focusing on places where intra-African migration has clear benefits for host, transit and origin countries. For this a paradigm shift is needed. Migration can no longer be seen as an absolute negative phenomenon but should be valued for its merits as well.

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Libya finds itself at the nexus of strident efforts by the EU to put a short-term brake on inward migration. A veil of humanitarian language conceals deals that sacrifice basic human rights and regional stability. The consequences include trapped refugees and migrants and a weakened system of international law.

By Daniel Howden

The European agenda
At the Ramada Plaza hotel in Tunis, the descent into lawlessness in neighbouring Libya is discussed over pressed white tablecloths, under brass chandeliers, in a cavernous banquet hall. After the international community’s evacuation from Tripoli in 2014 much of the business of government switched to venues like this in the capital of Tunisia.

Embassies and international aid agencies have arrived like luxury squatters, but the failure of their Libya-related conferences to deliver meaningful progress in the country itself has bred cynicism among organisers and delegates. After one recent event, an international agency official shared a picture of a human rights training session for bored-looking commanders of Libya’s notorious migrant detention centres. It was captioned: “Do you think they’re listening?”

Mustafa Al-Baroni, the mayor of Zintan, a mountain city in western Libya whose fighters were influential in toppling Gadhafi, wonders whether the conferences are really the best use of EU money: “This money could be used on projects in Libya... I heard the EU gave Libya millions but I don’t see it.”

Focus shifts to central Mediterranean
Traditionally, EU foreign policy has been hard to discern. But the arrival of large numbers of refugees and migrants on European shores has brought rare clarity to EU institutions. Turkey was handed billions in development aid as well as political concessions to halt the flows into Greece in March 2016. This deal, in effect, exported the EU’s external border to the protection of Turkey, a country sliding towards autocracy, with a regime accused of widespread human rights abuses. Since then the EU focus has shifted to the central Mediterranean.

“Tens of thousands of migrants [are] in Libya today, looking for ways to enter the EU, with the number of arrivals increasing every day”, warned a June 2016 communiqué from the European Commission.

There has been a re-gearing of all EU institutions to the single purpose of reducing inward migration under its Agenda on Migration. From the Horn of Africa to Nigeria and north through Niger to Libya, countries willing to contain migration flows and take back their own migrants receive security sector support and development aid from the EU, regardless of whether they had previously been international pariahs, such as Sudan or Eritrea.

Giulia Lagana, EU migration and asylum analyst at the Open Society European Policy Institute, says the impact is felt in “relations with countries in Africa and elsewhere, where development targets, democracy and human rights, and even security in fragile areas are being sidelined in the search for quick fixes to stem arrivals or step up migrant returns”.

EUROPEAN PRIORITIES, LIBYAN REALITIES
The crossroads of all these efforts is Libya. The departure point for 95 per cent of refugees and migrants on the central Mediterranean, it is a country in turmoil and without legitimate national institutions.

While returning refugees and migrants to Turkey has been challenged unsuccessfully in Greece’s highest court, returns to Libya are a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement, under which no person can be returned to a country where they are at risk of persecution. The country has three main centres of power and countless armed groups. The UN and the EU chose to recognise the Government of National Accord (GNA), which has little support in eastern or southern Libya and relies on loosely-aligned militias even in the capital, Tripoli. Its prime minister, Fayez al-Serraj, governs from a naval base for fear of being attacked in the city itself.

Some priorities are more equal than others

Three main priorities emerged for the EU in Libya in 2017: a reduction in sea crossings, improvement of conditions for migrants in Libya, and development that provides alternatives to smuggling. Officially these priorities are equal, but as one EU diplomat said, lip service is paid to stabilising Libya, but “migration is the biggest concern of all for EU politicians”.

At the centre of the EU’s insistence that it wants to do more than just trap migrants in Libya is the $3.5 billion Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which includes $108 million announced in April 2017 for local development projects in Libya and improved protection for refugees and migrants. Six months on from its announcement, not a single development project has begun in the country.

The EU and UN operate via remote control from Tunis. For security reasons, UN agencies are allowed a rotation of between three and five international staff on the ground in Libya each week. Local staff, who are relied on for most of the work, face routine threats and intimidation from armed groups. With nothing yet to show for its development priority, the EU has attempted to show progress on improving conditions for migrants stuck in Libyan detention. The lion’s share of the money allocated for that effort, some $57 million, is going to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), to run its Assisted Voluntary Return and Repatriation programme.

Meanwhile the reality of conditions inside Libya’s migrant gulags is horrific with abuses ranging from rape and torture to forced labour. The UN’s refugee and migration agencies have limited access to detention centres and must apply in writing before visiting – they cannot conduct spot inspections.

The migrant prisons are under the notional control of Libya’s department to counter illegal migration (DCIM). Inmates are routinely rented out to local employers, with DCIM officials or local militia profiting. Detainees are also bought and sold by militias, which extort ransom payments from their families. The arrival of international funding into the prison system has created additional incentives for armed groups to seize control of DCIM centres in pursuit of money and legitimacy.

Mohamed Sifaw has a better idea than most what goes on inside the detention centres. For the past 13 years he has been a volunteer with the Libyan Red Crescent in Zawiya, a port city west of Tripoli. This has been one of the key departure points for smuggling networks. He says that the al-Nasr prison in Zawiya, run by a militia linked to smuggling networks but recognised by the DCIM since 2016, makes inmates survive on one meal a day. The nearby Surman prison was closed in August after human traffickers repeatedly entered and seized inmates, Sifaw said.

For the past three years, collecting corpses of migrants drowned at sea and washed up along the shoreline has been part of Sifaw’s weekly routine. The 32-year-old engineer has recovered 385 bodies from the beach in Zawiya. Since August, however, not a single body has come ashore. Locals speak of a “strict new force” bringing back migrants from the boats.

Italy and the parallel process

Helen’s first sight of the Mediterranean came after weeks of clandestine travel. From her home in Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, she journeyed to a refugee camp in Ethiopia, across the vastness of Sudan and the deserts of southern Libya. It cost the 23-year-old’s family $6,000: $4,000 paid to a network of Eritrean and Sudanese smugglers and another $2,000 for the Libyans who supplied the rubber boat she was meant to climb into one night in May with another 70 women and children.

The boat did not make it off the beach. A truckload of armed men took her group into custody and delivered them to what appeared to be a prison nearby. At the gates some of the women were told they were being set free while others, including Helen, were ushered into the crowded facility. She would later discover her companions were not freed. They were sold.

In the months that followed both sets of women were traded among armed groups who demanded ransoms from their families in frantic phone calls, while inebriated guards took turns raping some of the women. If the women resisted, their children were taken away until they cooperated. By August enough money had been paid and most of the women were returned to the custody of Eritrean smugglers who took them to a “connection house” in Bani Walid, one of the hubs in Libya’s human traffic trade. After a nightmare tour of the miserable options for migrants in Libya – from official detention centres to warehouse dungeons and connection houses – Helen was no closer to escape. New forces on the coast had begun to stop all migrant boats from leaving.
While the EU conducted policy on a grand scale, with naval missions, summits, and development aid, a covert, parallel process to stop the migrant boats leaving for Europe got under way, led by Italy.

In June, a group of elders in the Libyan coastal city of Sabratha, one of the main departure points for migrants, was called to a meeting with representatives of the Italian government. According to one of those present, they were asked to pass a message to the main smugglers: “Tell them the golden age is over.” Those who heeded the warning would be allowed to keep the illicit fortunes they had made, the Italians told the elders, and would be given the chance to launder their reputations with seemingly legitimate roles in Libya’s security services and avoid potential prosecution by the International Criminal Court.

In early July, Mario Morcone, the chief of staff of Italy’s Interior Minister Marco Minniti, met with officials from the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) in Rome. According to someone present at the meeting, Morcone told the group the dramatic drop in sea crossings would continue, crediting successful talks with Libyan municipalities.

On the ground in Libya, the “municipal strategy” involved a handful of Libya’s smuggling kingpins widely known to Europe’s intelligence agencies. One is 28-year-old Abdurahman al-Milad, the head of the coast guard in Zawiya, cousin of the Khushla brothers, Mohamed and Ibrahaim, who control the main Zawiya militias, the refinery, and the port. He took over the Zawiya coast guard from another officer who was transferred to Tripoli after death threats.

In the neighbouring port city of Sabratha, Ahmed Dabbashi is the smuggling kingpin. A UN panel of experts named him one of two “main facilitators” of migrant smuggling and human trafficking on the Libyan coast. He and his family are well known to Italian authorities.

The Anas al-Dabbashi brigade was hired in 2015 to provide external security at the Mellitah oil and gas compound, which is co-owned by the Italian oil company ENI and the Libyan National Oil Corporation. It used the income from Mellitah to establish itself as the leading military force in the port city. After entreaties from the Italians his brigade took possession of an abandoned prison 3 kilometres from Mellitah and has since operated the facility as a migrant detention centre. It was later handed to him officially by the GNA.

The mayor of Sabratha, Hussein al-Thawadi, said the murky deals were months in the making. “It was a mutual agreement between Italy, the EU, Serraj, and the smugglers themselves.” The mayor said he met with Italian officials twice in August, once in Tripoli and once in Rome, and said $20 million was promised to fund development projects in the cities affected by smuggling. Thawadi denies knowledge of any payments to the militias or smugglers by either the GNA or the Italian government. Italy’s foreign ministry insists the country does not do deals with traffickers. “The foreign ministry firmly denies that there is an agreement between Libyan traffickers and the Italian government”, a spokesperson said.

Aref Ali Nayed, who was part of one of the first of several ill-fated efforts to govern the former dictatorship, is critical of Italy’s dealings. He argues that EU and Italian actions on migration are making a durable peace harder to achieve. Europe’s rush to recognise the Serraj administration, he said, saddled Libya with a government of “questionable legitimacy” in order to combat migration flows. “What we’re seeing is a shifting of Europe’s problems to become Libya’s problems”, he said. “Europe can do it now because we’re weak, but it risks creating real bitterness”, said Nayed, who until recently was Libya’s ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

Far from questioning Italy’s methods, EU officials have assigned $55 million from the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to Italy’s interior ministry to manage Libya’s borders. In a speech to the European Parliament, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, saluted Italy’s “tireless and noble” efforts.

Meanwhile, there has been no noticeable increase in the number of people held in official detention centres in Libya. A senior UN official said that many refugees and migrants were being sent to illegal warehouses run by smugglers. He specifically cited Zawiya, where international agencies have no access. “The question is, where are the people?” he said.

Marwa Mohamed, a Libyan researcher with Amnesty International said they were in makeshift dungeons without any kind of oversight. “By focusing solely on detention centres we’re missing the point”, she said. “People are trapped in a country where there is no protection and no way out.”

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About the author
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Helping Refugees Become Self-Reliant: The Ugandan Model

Sarah Nyakek is one of the trainees from Norwegian Refugee Council’s Vocational skills training centre in Rhino camp. She crossed the border into Uganda coming from Malakal in the Upper Nile state of South Sudan. She is a mother of three children. “I look forward to a fruitful business,” she says. Date: May, 2017 Photo: NRC/Nashon Tado

Uganda’s refugee policies should serve as a model, but challenges remain in helping refugees become self-reliant. The case of Uganda invites us to recognise that solutions to displacement are all about policies – those of host countries and those of the international community regarding responsibility sharing.

By Muhumed Hussein and Leeam Azoulay

Uganda hosts the largest number of refugees in Africa, with 1.35 million displaced persons residing in settlements and cities. Refugees have come to Uganda from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Somalia – but especially from South Sudan. Between July 2016, when a new round of fighting broke out in the South Sudanese capital, and October 2017, Uganda received an unprecedented 790,000 new arrivals from its northern neighbour. In 2016, Uganda welcomed more refugees than the total number of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean into Europe.

In a joint statement released in March 2017, the Government of Uganda and UNHCR said the situation was reaching a “breaking point”. Sixty-one per cent of South Sudanese refugees are children under the age of 18. Women and children make up 82 per cent of Uganda’s total refugee population.

The response of the Ugandan people and government has been remarkable. Settlement after settlement has been opened, reached rapidly full capacity and closed to new arrivals. New settlements opened soon after that. Until mid-2017, it was not unusual for 14,000 people to cross the border every week. Yet in Europe this crisis has been underreported. Humanitarian agencies have tried to scale up assistance - with limited resources - to provide water, sanitation, food and emergency shelter.
for the growing population, particularly in the remote West Nile region.

Uganda is exceptional not only in its commitment to an open door policy for refugees, but also in having some of the most progressive refugee policies in the region, if not the world. Refugees in Uganda can choose where to settle, they have considerable freedom of movement and they have the right to work, as well as access to public services. The government aims to provide land for settlement-based refugee families, so they can set up a home and cultivate crops. Unlike some of its East African neighbours, Uganda does not have an encampment policy. Refugees in Ugandan ‘settlements’ live, receive government-run services and trade side by side with the Ugandan communities that host them. Cultural, linguistic and ethnic ties between Ugandans and the South Sudanese have strengthened host communities’ sympathy for their neighbours’ plight, and refugees have been largely well received. Uganda’s refugee strategy is part and parcel of its National Development Plan (NDP II), which also provides incentives for areas hosting refugees.

It is no wonder, then, that Uganda was selected as the first country to pilot the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) as part of a global process to define how the international community should change its approach to refugee response. The CRRF was launched in September 2016 with the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants. Refugee self-reliance is a core element of the CRRF, as in Uganda’s own refugee strategy. The aim is to see refugees, especially those in situations of protracted displacement, move towards economic self-sufficiency and away from aid dependence.

Stress and challenges
And yet, the situation of refugees in Uganda cannot be described as rosy. The refugee influx has strained natural resources and services for refugees and host communities alike, particularly in West Nile. Already, there is a dwindling availability of land, pressure on water resources, environmental degradation and overstretched educational systems. This strain on scarce resources may well translate into increased tensions between refugee populations and their host communities, and threaten their peaceful co-existence. Despite the government’s best efforts, land for subsistence farming is available for only 55% of settlement-based refugee households. Even those who have been able to settle on a plot of land – whether because it was allocated to them or because they managed to lease it – continue to face stumbling blocks. They often lack the documents they need to secure their tenure, plot measurements and boundaries tend to be sketchy and land transactions often go unregulated. As time goes by, these kinds of problems will only exacerbate the challenges refugees face in Uganda.

Another challenge is that self-reliance is difficult to realise in practice. Self-reliance requires both a robust rights and rule-of-law environment and a dynamic economic climate. The legal right to work is one thing, but the ability to find and hold a job is something else entirely. This is doubly true in Uganda, one of the 30 least developed countries in the world. Uganda’s annual GDP per capita was just US $615 in 2016. Despite the difficulties, encouraging self-reliance among refugees remains critical, as a way to boost their economic contributions and participation, and because the skills they cultivate will continue to serve them if and when they return to their country of origin. Lost time is a major avoidable tragedy facing refugees. This is part of what needs to change in refugee responses. Using an approach sometimes called ‘early solutions planning’, humanitarian and development actors should be considering at the outset of an emergency how to design programmes to help refugees achieve lasting solutions to their displacement.

Reaching for self-reliance
A central element in contributing to self-reliance and ‘early solutions’ is programmes supporting access to livelihoods and education. As NGOs we need to be much more sophisticated in our provision of livelihood and vocational skills training. We need to offer diversified skills training, based on the gaps and needs in local markets rather than the menu of training options we have been providing for decades. Refugees’ capacities should be nurtured by offering economic opportunities, creating new linkages, building skills in non-traditional livelihoods, providing access to microcredit and financial services and strengthening engagement with and investments in host markets, alongside business incubation and improved internet access.

Increasing access to education at all levels is key. Today the average student-teacher ratio is 120:1, and 46 per cent of South Sudanese children are not in school. This is unacceptable. Teenagers need support and accelerated learning programmes to catch up on the school they missed due to their displacement. Education is a life-saving form of aid in multiple ways. For one thing, hygiene and sanitation lessons taught in schools save lives by halting the spread of disease. Tertiary and adult education has to be covered as well, especially given the large proportion of illiterate adults among South Sudanese refugees. Illiteracy makes it harder for refugees to integrate and become financially independent.

A precondition to economic inclusion is the ability to be recognised as a refugee and to obtain legal documentation. While South Sudanese receive prima facie refugee status in Uganda, several
other refugee groups do not, including those from Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Eritrea. Urban refugees face particular challenges in accessing the refugee status determination process. Their lack of status can lead to involvement in unregulated business activities that many times end in exploitation. Urban refugees also lack access to services.

But even more than practical changes, it is critical to change mind-sets – among refugees, among host communities and within the international community. It is not helpful to talk about refugees as a ‘burden’, as refugees have ample capacities and motivation to better their own lives. In an influential 2014 report and subsequent book, researcher Alexander Betts and colleagues examined ‘refugee economies’ and showed that refugees in Uganda often make positive contributions to the host state economy. Refugees are economically diverse, they have or can create transnational networks, and they often are not dependent on humanitarian assistance. While the huge influx of South Sudanese refugees complicates this picture in Uganda, the analysis is still highly relevant.

Sharing responsibility for refugees
What is the international community doing for the 1.35 million refugees in Uganda? Far less than its fair share. When UN member states began in 2016 discussing the Global Compact on Refugees (an agreement that is coming up for states’ negotiation in 2018), their intention was to better define what it means to share responsibility for refugees. Broadly, sharing responsibility means either increased refugee resettlements or more massive financial support for countries hosting refugees. However, with the turn-around in the international rhetoric on refugees since the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump, countries like Uganda, which host large numbers of refugees, have been all but abandoned.

In June 2017, Uganda convened the ‘Solidarity Summit on Refugees’ to request international support for a refugee response that goes beyond humanitarian funding, to better link humanitarian and longer-term development efforts. Although the Summit successfully highlighted the plight of refugees in Uganda, it fell far short of meeting its US $2 billion financial target. Donors have somewhat increased funding for longer-term programmes, but resources are still inadequate in scale and duration.

There are new opportunities to be seized. The European Commission’s proposal to resettle 50,000 African refugees is a welcome one. CRRF implementation in Uganda provides a significant opportunity to bring representatives of the government, donors, humanitarian and development organisations, the private sector and other actors to the table to discuss, plan and jointly implement programming that moves away from an emergency response approach towards an approach that emphasises long-term development goals that benefit refugees and Ugandans alike. This vision can only be realised with sufficient resources to support it.

Finally, it is important to remember that there is more that Uganda and its allies can do, politically speaking. The number of South Sudanese in Uganda is expected to continue to rise, and refugees are unlikely to return home until a political solution is found to the South Sudan crisis. The conditions and vulnerability of refugees are ultimately a result of the failure of the international community to act jointly to preserve peace and security and prevent people from becoming displaced in the first place. Uganda and its neighbours in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD – the regional body tasked with brokering peace in South Sudan – as well as the whole international community must step up their efforts to bring the crisis to a resolution.

About the authors
Muhumed Hussein and Leeam Azoulay are Uganda Country Director and East-Africa Advocacy and Policy Adviser for the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Mary Kiden fled from Yei in South Sudan last October, together with her brother and sisters. Now they are living in the Bidibidi refugee settlement in Uganda. “It is good to be in Uganda. They allocated us a piece of land, we have free access to medical services and we feel safe. People were killed in South Sudan. It made me afraid. Here we no longer need to listen to the sound of the guns,” she says. January, 2017 Photo: NRC/Tiril Skarstein
As part of the EU response to migration, the European Investment Bank (EIB) is stepping up its investment support, including a new Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) to enhance growth prospects and create opportunities in neighbouring countries.

By Dario Scannapieco
The refugee crisis and migration are among the greatest challenges of our time. The EIB is particularly well placed to implement long-term development solutions that tackle both the effects of migration and its root causes. We help the countries where migration starts, but also assist the transit nations and those where migrants settle.

The Syrian refugee crisis is a stark example of how a shock emanating from forced migration can have a destabilising effect, not only in the immediate vicinity, but also across Europe. The scale and severity of migration since this crisis began demonstrates the need to move beyond humanitarian support, to improve countries’ abilities to adapt to new populations and to address some of the causes of migration. EIB financing and support improves prospects for everyone, not just migrants.

### Preparedness is critical for migration

When well managed, migration can benefit both countries of origin and countries of destination. For example, it can increase the labour supply and boost remittances sent back to the home countries. However, an influx of migrants can have negative impacts, at least in the short term, if for example, receiving countries’ schools, hospitals, or labour markets cannot cope, or if falling wages for local low-skilled workers kindles social tension. Preparedness is critical to cope effectively with shocks, such as the Syrian refugee crisis. To be better prepared when shocks do occur and to mitigate their impact, it is important to strengthen vital social and economic infrastructure and support private sector-led growth and job creation. Sustainable employment opportunities, particularly for young people and women, are crucial to improve living standards, maintain stability, and preserve social cohesion. Economic growth directly addresses one of the primary drivers of migration, the search for economic opportunities not available in the countries of origin.

This is where the EIB’s new Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) plays a role: helping to reduce the vulnerability of economies to crises and enhancing their capacity to absorb and overcome shocks. The ERI aims to promote economic growth and private-sector development, generating jobs that provide prospects for a better future. The ERI was introduced at the request of EU member states to assist the Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans. It is a comprehensive support package not only for dealing with the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis, but also to prepare better for other shocks, such as economic downturn, political crisis, drought, flooding, or earthquake.

The EIB, as the EU bank, follows the policies outlined by the European Union, such as the European Agenda on Migration and the new European Consensus on Development. In support of these policies, the EIB’s goal is to improve infrastructure while making countries better prepared and more resilient to shocks. As part of a joint EU approach, we aim to provide new opportunities for development that will build and sustain our partner countries, just like we do in countries across the Union.

### A financing agent for development

Decades of experience in financing investment across the world have given the EIB a solid understanding of the needs of specific regions and the actions required to address investment challenges. We have developed an efficient and effective set of products for clients and policymakers. We can apply, for example, the risk-sharing knowhow gained under the Investment Plan for Europe to projects outside the EU. Similarly, we can use the insights we have gathered on impact financing in Africa to strengthen operations in the EU Neighbourhood. One of the EIB’s mandates is to act as a financing agent to support the medium and long-term development of regions in the EU Neighbourhood and to address other economic and growth challenges in these countries.

Over the last few years, the EIB as part of the group of multilateral development banks has suggested viewing development more broadly, expanding beyond traditional aid to the public sector. This implies shifting the debate from “billions to trillions”. Recognition of the private sector’s key role implies shifting from grants to loans and guarantees. This is another area where EIB can make a big difference.

We are injecting new rigour and effectiveness into the way we operate and the way we work with partners. We are striving to deploy the full range of EU tools, expertise, and resources, with a strong focus on impact and efficiency. In doing so, we are increasing Europe’s ability to deploy financial instruments capable of increasing private investment. This is essential to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). But it is also important for meeting the objectives of key EU policy frameworks, such as the European Consensus on Development and European economic diplomacy strategy.

### A comprehensive EIB response

In Africa, the EIB’s ACP Migration Package offers high-impact financing to help poorer communities advance more rapidly and deal with a range of challenges, with migration among them. Economic and social impact is achieved through investments like the construction of 1,000 new solar-powered communication towers that provide mobile Internet access to 4 million people in rural Africa. The EIB is increasing the capacity of the ACP Impact Financing Envelope and turning it into a revolving fund, with €300 million dedicated to dealing with migration directly by supporting private-sector initiatives. The EIB will also make €500 million available under the ACP Investment Facility to target public sector projects with a migration focus.
By partnering with the European Commission and member states on targeted initiatives like this, the EIB provides a comprehensive toolkit to support public and private counterparts, utilising grants and interest subsidies, high-impact risk-sharing instruments, and technical assistance.

Supporting economic resilience in the EU Neighbourhood
The ERI aims to rapidly mobilise additional EIB financing in support of growth, vital infrastructure, and social cohesion in the Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans regions. Under the ERI, the EBI is increasing financing in these two regions by €6 billion during the 2016-2020 period, mobilising additional investment of €15 billion. The ERI EIB financing comes on top of the €75 billion already planned.

The ERI maximises development impact by mobilising additional funds from donors and the private sector, next to an EIB own contribution. To underline its commitment, the EIB is leading the way with a substantial own contribution of €90 million for technical assistance and a targeted contribution of over €100 million in impact investments, as well as in staffing, including an expansion of its local presence. Recently, Poland, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Luxembourg became the first EU member states to pledge contributions for the ERI trust fund set up by the EIB worth €98 million. The next round of donor contributions is under way and others are expected to follow. Naturally, greater availability of grant resources also increases the scale and scope of our activities.

One year into ERI implementation, 13 projects have been approved, representing financing of more than €1 billion. Lending through partner banks alone is set to benefit more than 600 smaller businesses and midcaps, helping to sustain more than 40,000 jobs. Other operations include water, sewerage, transport, and energy infrastructure, as well as health and industry projects. These span from Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Palestine [this designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the member states on this issue] to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Among the operations being appraised are vital infrastructure support efforts, such as in Jordan, where a project will help provide households running water three days per week, instead of the current eight hours every two weeks. Others are an equity support programme for start-ups and high-growth innovative firms, regional microfinance in the Southern Mediterranean countries, and upgrading healthcare services and rehabilitating urban infrastructures impacted by the consequences of the refugee crisis in the Western Balkans. Other products to foster private sector development and mobilise additional funds are being developed.

More efforts needed
More needs to be done to address root causes of migration and achieve the SDGs. The population in partner countries needs economic opportunities, clean water, better health services, and functioning infrastructure, alongside improved framework conditions for economic activities. The EIB is therefore in discussions with EU member states and development institutions on how to further improve the delivery and bundle activities to boost impact. Productive investments and private sector mobilisation are at the core of the EU bank’s mission. Together with our partners, we make innovative solutions work to address global challenges.

About the author
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ERI will help unlock opportunities in the Southern Neighbourhood, particularly for young people and women. Photo: EIB
THE EU’S MIGRATION AGENDA: WHAT ABOUT LEGAL MIGRATION PATHWAYS?

Legal migration is often noted as one of the ways to counter smuggling and irregular migration. With the European Commission’s recent political roadmap for a sustainable migration policy, pathways for legal economic migration seem to emerge from oblivion. The article highlights a number of issues with regards to the EU’s legal migration agenda.

By Anna Knoll and Noemi Cascone
**Innovation in a global context**

Legal channels recognised as way to reduce irregular migration

On paper, the EU has recognised that the absence of legal channels for migration contributes to a market for irregular migration. Yet, the coordination of creating pathways for legal economic migration to the EU have not taken a prominent place in the EU’s response to the migration situation to date - despite several agreements in the past to do so (e.g. the Joint Valletta Action Plan between Africa and Europe). In December 2017, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a political roadmap which foresees the adoption of a comprehensive and sustainable migration and asylum policy by June 2018 (European Commission, 2017a). It identifies opening further legal avenues to Europe as one important objective to counter irregular migration (European Commission, 2017b).

**Political Roadmap for a sustainable migration policy**

Beyond the EU’s resettlement scheme for refugees, the EU roadmap envisages three legal pathways: attracting talent, a new Blue Card and EU coordinated pilot projects with specific partner countries. For the latter, the Commission notes that it is ready to support financially and coordinate pilot projects for legal migration to EU member states who would agree to receive economic migrants from partner countries. In addition, the EU Commission suggests each EU member state to appoint Sherpas to work on all aspects of the EU migration agenda.

**Legal channels, for whom?**

The new EC roadmap for a comprehensive migration package puts a stronger focus on skilled migrants yet does not stipulate which skill-level of migrants would be included in the envisaged pilot schemes with partner countries (European Commission, 2017b). Would these pilot projects expand the scope and be open to lower-skilled economic migrants or would they be yet another scheme targeting the upper end of the skills spectrum?

This is a crucial question if the aim in part is to help address the market for irregular migration, smuggling and to offer credible alternatives to a considerable part of today’s irregular migrants towards Europe. The group of irregular migrants moving due to hardships into the EU but not qualifying for refugee status (typically referred to as ‘economic migrants’) have relatively low education levels since they often come from countries with lower average levels of education and are willing to move irregularly for lower skilled jobs in the informal sector (Aggarwal et al., 2016). For this group, the EU’s response has to date been to use EU development tools with a focus on providing alternatives to (irregular) migration and to facilitate return and reintegration.

A number of articles in this edition have noted that the EU and partner countries should go beyond this and take more concrete steps in following up on commitments made on legal migration for all skill-levels embedded in a longer-term EU external migration strategy. This idea seems politically unpopular for many EU member states. The politics around migration and mobility will be one of the key challenges in the coming years for the EU.

**Legal Migration as leverage in Migration partnerships?**

Pooled efforts in the area of legal migration avenues and access to labour markets have also been said to be a good bargaining chip and provide positive incentives for mutually beneficial and resilient migration partnerships (incl. return and readmission). For example both in the Valletta Action Plan as well as in the fourth progress report on the Partnership Framework on Migration (European Commission, 2017c), visa facilitation and legal migration are considered as levers to negotiate with countries of origin on issues of return and readmission. Similarly, the legal migration pilot projects proposed in the roadmap are meant to encourage member states to receive migrants from “selected partner countries which have shown political engagement to work in partnership with the EU on migration”(European Commission, 2017b).

To be palatable to partners, such offers would need to be substantial. EU’s partners may be less interested in smaller offers and schemes of a couple of 100 people. They would also need to target skill-levels and experience that match the offers and requirements of European labour markets (Weinar, 2017). In the context of an ageing society, certain sectors continue to need low- to medium skilled workers (cleaning, catering, agriculture, construction) (Ghimis, 2016; Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2014; European Parliament, 2015). Yet, given that the job prospects for low-skilled workers in Europe have become more volatile and may further decrease in the wake of automatization and technological change, partnerships on labour mobility with origin countries of irregular migration would need to go hand in hand with education and human capital strategies in partner countries - not only to match demands but also to counter possible ‘brain drain’. It could be built into EU’s longer-term geographic strategic partnerships and its development policies. But it may not be an approach that can be pursued for all countries from where irregular migrants to Europe may originate. Moreover, if mobility channels are used as a lever for enforcing return, the human rights of those on the move should be a key consideration - an aspect that is particularly salient in a context in which current readmission and return practices have raised concerns (UN, 2017).

**Simplifying existing legal mechanisms**

Even when options for legal migration exist, cumbersome procedures or complicated administrative hurdles can effectively hinder the utilisation of such opportunities. Prospective migrants may revert to irregular shortcuts as a result. A strong message from non-EU nationals wanting to migrate or already residing in the EU in the recent EC public consultation on its migration...
policy has been that current conditions to enter, live and work in EU countries are an obstacle when migrating to the EU. Making progress on streamlining and simplifying procedures may be a less controversial element of the EU’s migration policy than is expanding channels and should be addressed in the way forward.

Focus on re-balancing narratives through addressing concerns of groups that miss out

Another role for the EU is to help normalise the narrative around migration and to highlight also its positive sides through providing good examples and stories of well-managed migration. Changing narratives can only be successful if conditions are favourable for them to be taken up. This is why the focus should not only be on migrants but also on economic concerns of host communities. Numerous studies have been carried out on the effects of (authorised) migration on development for migrants and host countries (Ruhs, Vargas-Silva, 2015; OECD, 2014). While findings suggest several positive impacts, results diverge and studies show that migration tend to impact native workers unequally, with lower-skilled workers in some occasions facing increased competition from a cheaper and more flexible labour force. Creating fertile grounds for different narratives may also mean identifying winners and losers of immigration, providing assistance to the latter and EU support to member states to better absorb potential shocks. The principle to target host communities and arriving migrants jointly is well enshrined in the EU’s external development cooperation but could be a stronger guidance also within Europe. Measures targeting disadvantaged groups can help native workers develop skills in areas where migrants may have a lower comparative advantage (e.g. strong language and communication skills) (Somerville & Sumption, 2009).

Balance between rights and admission?

Progress still needs to be made in finding a good balance between migrants’ rights that facilitate integration and migrants’ contributions and the urge of EU member states to reduce perceived ‘pull factors’ through restricting rights. Supporting the adequate implementation of existing European Directives by EU member states in the area of migrants’ rights is part of this. EU member states such as Belgium fail to fully implement a common set of rights for non-EU workers in the area of working conditions, pensions, social security and access to public services (agreed through the Single Permit Directive 2011/98/EU). Moreover, in the last years the trend has been to limit migrants’ rights in the EU (i.e. several EU member states have restricted the rights of refugees to family reunification, against the backdrop of larger inflows). While there may be a trade-off in high-income countries between the openness to admitting migrant workers and the rights granted after admission (Ruhs, 2013), restrictive policies are unlikely to reduce push factors of migration flows and can have negative impacts on integration outcomes and on facilitating development contributions of migrants in countries of origin (Council of Europe, 2016).

Support a positive migration agenda externally

Also externally, the EU, through its development cooperation, trade and investment policies, can support a positive migration agenda that helps facilitate connectivity and support mobility channels so that shorter-distance for labour migration can take place in safer manner without the need to rely on irregular means provided by smugglers. This does not only include the creation of better living conditions (i.e. through the ‘root causes’ agenda) but considering migration and mobility as integral part of development processes and integrating relevant dimensions into development planning and programming. Innovative schemes, such as the ‘No Lean Season’ project of in Bangladesh, which support mobility of farmers in the lean season to improve food security and livelihoods (Evidence Action, 2018) or a reinforced support to bilateral and regional mobility agendas abroad could be part of it. The EU is currently developing guidelines for integrating migration into several thematic development cooperation areas. The full implementation of such efforts could help to ensure that positive migration aspects can be better identified.

The spectrum for action on legal migration within Europe, with partners and abroad, is wide and many political interests need to be navigated and weighed in the coming years. Yet, making progress on the legal migration agenda would meaningfully substantiate the EU’s ambition to play a constructive role globally and in the context of the UN Global Migration Compact negotiations in 2018. operate is not yet well defined, and a lot of learning needs to happen.

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For a full list of references see the article on our website.

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The aid system is not only broke, it’s breaking apart. It is now little more than a humanitarian relief industry. The aid system has failed in its stated goals to save lives and provide basic assistance with dignity to those in crisis at the scale needed.

This failure is due to a lack of political will and dysfunctional multilateral peace-building structures (Is there still a UN Security Council?). The system is unable to advance beyond the postwar charity narrative driven by a bipolar world, in the continuation of neocolonialist relationships that hold countries and communities hostage, and in the perseverance of unfair trade policies and extraction of resources.

A ridiculously small amount of taxpayer and private donor money (currently some US $25 billion per annum) is not the answer to the emergency needs of the more than hundred million people in crisis at any given moment. Even US $200 billion in overseas development assistance per year could not fix the world, or achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. So something has to be done to avoid the worst; other approaches need to come into play.

Humanitarian aid has not managed to link with what is considered development aid, and development aid has largely failed to enable people and communities to become independent, resilient and responsible for their own lives. Aid has become largely disconnected from the realities of economy and social cohesion too, as it is delivered through disjointed silos. It has often exacerbated dependency and greed. What larger community or region has ever moved away from poverty
and desperation thanks to aid? Partial exceptions only emphasise the rule, and the inability to scale up gains to meet the wider challenge. Where poverty has been reduced, the explanation can usually be found in leadership coupled with better governance and investment in services, infrastructure and jobs. It took more than 1.5 million people making their way to Europe to finally spark a real discussion on what is going on in the world. There is a dawning realisation of what aid cannot do and what it means for hundreds of millions of people to be on the move and for billions to be poor. While nationalist and xenophobic thinking is on the rise, mass migration has provided the shock therapy that wealthy and sluggish Europe needs to begin to rethink itself and reflect on how to fix global challenges. The events of the past three years have exposed an utter failure to receive newcomers with decency and deliver a common policy on asylum and immigration. Europe has failed to deliver on the simplest basics of assistance and protection. Its attempt to pass on and block out the problem of borders is bound to fail, and the resulting deficit of trust among our neighbours will haunt us for generations.

We are blocked by our obsession for categorising humans and adjudicating who has the right to do what: 22 million refugees, 45 million internally displaced people have acquired somewhat of a moral right to move. They have a convention which, though largely disregarded, is still in place. Insecurity, bad and terrible governance, increasingly uninhabitable and overpopulated environments, exploitation, no access to basic services and no hope of change are not considered reason enough for us to grant ‘permission’ for the others to move on. The continuing efforts under the UN Compacts on Migration and Refugees will unfortunately further the divide, as the chance was missed to address “desperate migration” in its entirely and deal with people on the move in a holistic manner for once.

**The right to stay**

This is a call to shift the paradigm from a current logic of return to a logic of social and economic integration, regardless of the circumstances of displacement. To overcome the reluctance of receiving populations resentful of competition for scarce resources, demographic changes can be used as the trigger for investment in infrastructure and services.

We are blocked by the mantra that displaced people or migrants, especially refugees, should be going back to the place they were displaced from: the idea of the voluntary return ‘home’. The conviction that the “preferred durable solution is voluntary return” and only if all options are exhausted should local integration be pursued is preventing receiving communities from undertaking the right measures to provide services, build infrastructure and ensure economic and social integration. The idea that return is the best solution is based on the post-WWII human rights architecture, predicated on the urge to reduce incidence of ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity through multilateral action. It was also driven by the East-West divide. While this significant and laudable effort was initially driven by the dream of building peace following the horrors of WWII, it has led to the current state of affairs, which leaves millions in limbo for decades while pursuing the ideological goal of recovery of lost rights.

Looking at history, there have always been population movements, most of them hostile or driven by violence. Cities developed as people sought protection and opportunities near a castle, a mosque, a temple or a church. Cities have always been sanctuaries, an expression of multiculturalism and the result of migration. Before the concept of return emerged as the ultimate goal, newcomers were, with difficulties, accepted and became settlers in their new environments. By no means should we accept the tragedy of forced displacement, nor can we spare the perpetrators, but we must place the interests of those most concerned central in our action.

**Special development zones and urban development**

Imagine if Bangladesh were enabled to develop new special development zones (SDZs), combining settlement, work and multi-stakeholder governance structures. If these provided proper housing, services and employment for its own population in need, then the integration of up to one million Rohingya would not be an issue. They would blend into such a scheme. It is highly unlikely that they will ever return to Myanmar. Are they better off in refugee camps for decades, or as part of a new drive for economic prosperity? Which fate would strengthen their position to recover their rights and dignity?

As a reminder, rising sea levels will force millions of Bangladeshis to relocate away from the coastline. This will not happen without risk of destabilisation. Considerable capital investment will be required for the needed development but could be secured in combination with investment guarantees. New city development throughout the world, from China to Latin America, has had few difficulties in attracting the required resources. Islamic financing sources is one realistic option for building and developing new spaces for 20 to 30 million people in Bangladesh. A win for everyone!

Had Germany relaunched its social and affordable housing development at scale, invested in better care for the elderly and addressed its massive poverty issues, absorption of even more newcomers would have been easier. The economy
would be stronger as well. Greece is struggling to cope with 65,000 refugees, as its own economy is suffering. Its small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can’t hire and can’t expand, as there is no liquidity in the market. Refugees have become scapegoats for systemic failure. This same country in 2003 legalised its more than 800,000 undocumented Albanian migrants, as it was strong and dependent on their labour. Financing tools are available, but funding for the municipalities taking the brunt of these demographic changes needs to be enhanced.

The European Union, the development banks but also pension funds and others have a role to play. They should be moving to provide the financing and risk insurance needed, at the right scale to leverage investment for SDZ development and support of municipalities.

**Small and medium enterprises**

SMEs are the backbone of an economy. They employ 60 to 80 per cent of all private sector labour and generate 60 to 70 per cent of GDP. SMEs are thus key for financial inclusion, development and job creation, as well as for the fast integration of migrants and refugees into host communities.

Healthy SMEs operate with gross margins of 25 to 45 per cent and can therefore afford credit financing. Yet, SMEs tend to be financially underserved. They generally hold little interest for systemic banks, which are reluctant to finance working capital requirements. This is not because the SMEs cannot afford or do not need such credit (evidenced by their gross margins) but for efficiency reasons. Because the transactions are small the management and overhead burden is relatively large. They therefore deliver a smaller margin for the banks than services like derivative trading and infrastructure investment banking.

Creating financing facilities and easy access to finance for SMEs would contribute to society by creating livelihoods as well as tremendously facilitate absorption and integration of newcomers.

**The role of tech and digitalisation**

The hype surrounding technological developments for tracking refugee movements and providing assistance has now shifted to a far more interesting discussion on how digital and blockchain solutions can help populations on the move leapfrog traditional systems.

Digital banking and mobile finance applications allow anyone to access and transfer money regardless of social and economic status. Loans can be provided based simply on identity. Digital services can reach hitherto inaccessible segments of the world’s population. Combining these with cloud facilities completely disconnected from nation states – such as BITNATION, which seeks to create a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) allowing for self-governance in the ‘crypto space’ – could bring Utopia closer. Regardless of location and status suddenly everyone can access identity documents, obtain legal support, conduct transactions and other key services.

With all its pitfalls and dangers, global connectivity, networks and digitalisation provide a real chance for a radical shift and more equal sharing of global resources. In this interconnected world the nation state becomes secondary, local communities and municipalities regain their primacy, individuals can make choices to an extent never before possible. Where you live becomes increasingly irrelevant as long as you have connectivity. That current privilege of the smart and wealthy will gradually shift to a broader population and ultimately enhance the ability of the globe’s three billion poor to access services and resources differently. Paradigms must shift.

The story of displacement must be rewritten!

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Debates on migration are seldom grounded in the real complexities that shape the phenomenon. Even conceptually, useful typologies and distinctions are hard to find. Rarely are the motivations that underlie mobility clear-cut. Analysts generally distinguish two main categories: displacement as a result of an immediate hazard or danger and mobility to pursue livelihood strategies. Even here, however, oversimplification is all too easy. For instance, while sudden-onset events may force relatively short-distance movements (Drabo & Mbaye, 2011), these are often a precursor to subsequent longer term and more voluntary movements. On the flip side, slower-onset events, like environmental degradation and social and political unrest, can encourage rural farm households to pursue new economic strategies outside of agriculture. These many times involve migration. Overall, migration and mobility tend to be the result of multiple factors. It is this complexity that makes definition, classification, and generalisation extremely difficult.

Lack of data is another problem, especially regarding internal migration (Vargas-Lundius, forthcoming). Mobility within national borders is much more prevalent than international migration. Generally this means migrating from a rural area to a larger town or city. People are drawn to city life by economic, social, and environmental factors. Primary among these are the non-agricultural opportunities created by increasingly diversified national economies, improved connectivity and information flows, and the rise of intermediate towns that serve as stepping stones (Suttie & Vargas-Lundius, 2016; IFAD & FAO, 2008; Ratha, 2013; Hussein & Suttie, 2016). Conflict and fragility can
play a role in mobility too. If institutions, policies, investment frameworks, and norms give rise to economic processes that are neither inclusive nor sustainable, the outcome may be civil strife, social and political instability, and conflicts over natural resources (in some places exacerbated by climate change). These all can provide a trigger for population movements.

Push and pull factors intersect in mobility decisions. Some of these dynamics are “pull” factors, as they provide a potential path for accessing better and more diversified livelihood opportunities. Others are “push” factors, such as when lack of viable living conditions in an area drives people to move. Yet, in reality, different “push” and “pull” factors often overlap in influencing people’s mobility decisions.

Given this complexity, attempts to frame debates on migration in terms of any imperative to “address root causes” is unlikely to be realistic or productive. Particularly, the assumption that migration can be stemmed by economic development is generally not borne out by reality (Labarde et al., 2017). Evidence suggests in fact that development may increase migration, at least in the short term (De Haas, 2011). This is not entirely unsurprising considering the human and financial resources needed to migrate. The poverty-reduction impact of mobility is well documented, and often especially evident in connection with internal movements (Ferré, 2011; O购房, O购房 and Ochieng, 2014; McKay and Deshingkar, 2014; Vargas-Lundius and Suttie, 2016, Vargas-Lundius, forthcoming).

**Embracing mobility for inclusive development**

A more constructive approach is possible. First, however, we have to abandon the faulty assumption that sedentary livelihoods are the norm — especially in rural areas. Mobility has long been a key livelihood strategy, and it will continue to be so (Krätli & Swift, 2014; Catley, Lind & Scoones, 2014). Moreover, under the right conditions, mobility could strengthen advancement towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example, it could provide greater access to employment, markets, and education. Second, support is needed for livelihood strategies that involve mobility – the goal being to improve migration’s social and economic returns to the communities of origin and destination, and to the migrants themselves.

We still have very little understanding of the needs and realities of migrant workers and the challenges they face. What we do have is an abundance of poorly informed and polarised political debates, which not infrequently end in proposals that ultimately undermine the opportunities and general living conditions of mobile workers. Barriers to mobility are erected, for instance, in the form of policies that discriminate against migrants’ access to social services, employment, and housing.

It is important to note that such barriers have an especially stark impact on women. Not least, barred access to social services and infrastructure affect women disproportionately because of their duties in the household. Gender discrimination in the labour market is also persistent (Chant, 2013).

**Giving migrants a voice and building policies to support their choices**

Development agencies, supported by governments, have a constructive role to play in facilitating migrant organisation. Collectively, migrants could have a stronger voice and ability to represent their interests in political fora. With the right training and organisations, mobile workers could develop the capacity to articulate their needs and to link up with institutional structures that allow their political voice to be heard. Supported by civil society, they could advocate for policies that open doors to opportunities or, at least, remove rules and regulations that discriminate against their interests (Suttie, forthcoming).

Country case studies show that where human capital development and mobility intersect, enhanced national productivity and well-being can result (Vargas-Lundius, forthcoming).

**Mobile services for mobile people**

When it comes to serving migrants, advisory and support services adapted to contexts of mobility offer particular scope, though this has been underused thus far. To share knowledge and information, mobile people need access to information and communication technologies (ICTs). ICT-related applications and tools – including mobile phones, social media, e-learning platforms, web portals, and community radio – could provide a growing spectrum of services to migrants (Suttie, forthcoming).

Already, mobile money transfer tools are increasing efficiency and reducing the costs associated with remittance transfers (IFAD, 2017). Such technologies could also play a role in facilitating investment in both rural and urban areas. This could help stimulate economic activity outside the big cities, in turn helping rural households overcome the financial constraints associated with the seasonality of rural and especially agricultural incomes.

Mobile technology has developed rapidly in recent years. Subscription rates in developing countries increased from 22 per 100 inhabitants in 2005 to 91.8 per 100 inhabitants in 2015 (Saravanan & Suchiradipta, 2015). Crucially, mobile technology breaks down barriers, offering a compelling platform for expanded services to people on the move at a relatively low cost. To further expand these services’ reach and interactivity, awareness-raising programmes are needed. They also need...
to be adapted to the requirements of mobile populations – especially those coming from remote rural areas. For this, public and private actors will need to be brought on board and partnerships developed between service providers, migrant organisations, and telecommunication companies (Suttie, forthcoming).

**Targeted support for young migrants**

Focusing on the needs of heterogeneous sub-groups is important to ensure inclusive outcomes. Evidence shows that youths are more likely to migrate than older adults (UN-Habitat, 2010; World Bank, 2006). This fact becomes particularly relevant in light of the expanding shares of people under the age of 25 in many regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, South Asia (Filmer & Fox, 2014; cited in World Bank & IFAD, 2017: pp. 5-6). Migrant youths therefore need to be included in relevant dialogues and institutions, and training and service provision needs to be linked to the aspirations of the modern youth. This could be done in various ways, for example, through engagement with entrepreneurship-related forums, secondary and higher education events, and mentorship programmes.

Adapting approaches to the gendered realities of mobility

Women too are becoming ever more prevalent among those migrating (Tacoli & Mabala, 2010). Nonetheless, access to services and training is generally skewed towards men (Colverson, 2015; Petrics et al, 2015). Flexible ICT-based modalities of service delivery can help respond to this reality. To serve women effectively, services have to be sensitive to the different workloads of household members, including the extent that some are engaged in different forms of mobility. In addition to women who themselves migrate, rural women whose husbands migrate need targeted support, as they have an added workload to manage (FAO, IFAD & ILO, 2010).

**Changing mind-sets for a brighter future**

Overall, there is a strong need for policies, institutions, and investments that respond to and enable people’s mobility – rather than erect barriers. Certainly there is scope for policies aiming to enhance communities’ resilience and foster inclusive and shared prosperity. Furthermore, efforts are doubtless needed to reduce social instability and the drivers of the conflicts that fuel displacement. At the same time, however, mobility needs to be recognised as a legitimate household strategy. With the support of governments, development agencies, and civil society, as well as private actors, migration and mobility can be leveraged for progress towards the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda.

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For a full list of references see the article on our website.

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For their full bios see the article on our website.
Migration is one powerful way out of poverty and has great potential for sustainable development. Flows of remittances exceed development aid, playing an important role in poverty reduction, relief and development. The opening of labour markets for international migrants can bring considerable economic gains for both sending and recipient countries as well as migrants themselves.

Yet migration and mobility – especially in the form of displacement or in the context of conflict and crisis – can put great pressure on governance systems and host communities. Today, there are more than 65 million forcibly displaced people worldwide of which one third are refugees. Developing regions host 84% of the world’s refugees. 10.3 million people were newly displaced by conflict or persecution in 2016. Conflict, violence and disasters also caused 31.1 million new displacements in 2016. This has made migration a top priority on the international agenda.

In this dossier, we look at how policymakers and other relevant actors are addressing migration and mobility issues. We try to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the complex phenomenon, acknowledging that Africa and Europe have different narratives, approaches and perceptions of migration – and the important links it shares with development processes.