The world is not on track to meet Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2. Hunger has risen for the fourth year in a row, fuelled particularly by growing food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Achieving SDG 2 requires urgent action at country level, but also a more effective food and agriculture global institutional landscape. This paper describes this landscape and its challenges and looks at ongoing reform efforts and their shortcomings.

Considering the large SDG 2 financing gap, we explore how the institutional landscape is funded, suggesting thematic priorities to close this gap and short-term opportunities for donors to dedicate additional resources to SDG 2 in a more coordinated way. The paper also identifies the ‘Big Seven’ food and agricultural institutions key to achieving SDG 2 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and puts forward principles and ideas for a reformed food and agriculture global landscape.

An inclusive consultative process is urgently needed to streamline SDG 2 actions, which could culminate in an SDG 2 Leaders Alliance, for stronger global accountability and support at country level. But there is also a need for a longer-term strategy beyond SDG 2, as food systems become increasingly complex and link with issues beyond the traditional purview of food and agricultural institutions, such as climate change or trade. We propose a process that aims at delivering stronger food governance through a well-built global institutional architecture, by building consensus on funding and roles (including its relationships with trade and climate institutions such as the WTO and UNFCCC), and through further reforms based on political and financial feasibility.
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The authors, Francesco Rampa and Koen Dekeyser from ECDPM and Robyn Alders and Osman Dar from Chatham House, are grateful for the substantial input received from various experts (who were asked to speak confidentially and as individual experts rather than on behalf of their institutions): the participants of an event organised by Chatham House and ECDPM on 22-24 May 2019, at the Rockefeller Foundation Centre in Bellagio (Italy); and senior representatives interviewed from the following institutions: FAO; IFAD; WB; CGIAR; WFP; GAFSP; UNHLTF; WHO; CFS HLPE; Ministries of Foreign Affairs of France, Italy, and the Netherlands; B&MGF; European Commission; IPES-food; several universities and NGOs. The paper also benefited from the very useful comments and suggestions by Guy Evers.

Acronyms

ADB  Asian Development Bank
AfDB  African Development Bank
AU  African Union
CAADP  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CFS  Committee on World Food Security
CGIAR  Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
ECDPM  European Centre for Development Policy Management
F&A  Food & Agriculture
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization
GACSA  Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture
GAFSP  Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
GAIN  Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
HLPE  High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the CFS
HLTF  High Level Task Force
IADB  Inter-American Development Bank
IDA  International Development Association
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC  International Finance Corporation
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NAIP  National Agricultural Investment Plan
NARS  National Agricultural Research System
ODA  Official Development Assistance
R&D  Research & Development
RBAs  Rome-Based Agencies
SDG  Sustainable Development Goals
SME  Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa
UN  United Nations
1. Introduction

The number of hungry people in the world rose for the fourth year in a row to 821 million in 2019, countering decades of progress (FAO et al, 2019). Hunger projections for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are particularly troubling. With the 2030 SDG deadline just a decade away, the achievement of SDG 2 – which aims to end hunger, malnutrition and to sustainably double the incomes and productivity of smallholder farmers (see Annex 1 for details) – is at risk, with many countries off track, particularly low-income countries. Business as usual will not reverse this trend. Tackling this challenge will require strong political will and focused national development plans together with private sector engagement and investment. While national governments must lead the achievement of global food security, a fit-for-purpose, well-functioning system of global institutions that provide tailored country support for SDG 2 is also important.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the global Food and Agriculture (F&A) institutional landscape. Special focus is given to low-income countries, ongoing F&A institutional reforms, and financing, with a view to contributing to international dialogue on reforms of the F&A landscape to achieve SDG 2. This paper opens key issues for further discussion rather than providing a comprehensive description of the F&A landscape and proposing detailed solutions. A combination of desk-based literature review and key-informant interviews were conducted for this paper.

Section 2 maps the global F&A institutional landscape, while Section 3 provides preliminary analysis into current reforms and Section 4 explores how such landscape is financed. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks and discusses the way forward.

2. The food and agriculture global institutional landscape

2.1. Overviewing the landscape

The F&A global institutional landscape (hereafter ‘F&A landscape’) comprises of multilateral organizations and fora, international institutions and partnerships, together with their various members such as governments, NGOs, companies and donor agencies. Each institution plays one or more roles: to provide funds; research and data; implement programmes, projects, and technical assistance; set binding or voluntary norms and guidelines; and advocate and campaign for improved efforts, targets and policies.

While Figure 1 summarises key institutions in the F&A landscape according to profile and level of operations, Annex 2 presents a more comprehensive mapping of the landscape, categorising institutions according to their public, private or public-private nature. Annex 2 also includes institutions (WTO and UNFCCC) with mandates on global issues beyond F&A that have a fundamental impact on F&A worldwide, such as trade and climate (and others such as the protection of ecosystems and biodiversity that however have more explicitly and traditionally been part of the mandates of F&A organizations such as FAO, CGIAR, etc.).

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1 For this paper, F&A encompasses food and nutrition security, agriculture and all other global and national objectives of the food system.
2 While this paper focuses on low-income countries, it is important to recognize that there are global systems and policies affecting F&A more broadly that impact on farmers and producers in all countries, including high-income ones.
3 SDG 2.4 also aims to “implement resilient agricultural practices that help maintain ecosystems...”.
2.2. Challenges of the landscape

Figure 1 shows the fragmentation of the current F&A global institutional landscape: a plethora of actors with overlapping mandates and strong competition for scarce financial resources, which adds to the fragmentation. The fragmentation is both horizontal – as many themes and sectors need coordination and synergy at the same level of intervention (national, regional, global) - and vertical, in terms of overlaps and competition between different levels of intervention. Indeed, with such degree of complexity, risks are high for duplicating efforts, uncoordinated initiatives, and a failure to specialize and achieve economies of scale at international and national levels. Annexes 3 and 4 present another way of categorising global organizations and mechanisms with relevance for F&A and provide a summary of the challenges of coordination, complementarity and coherence within a landscape that comprises: specialized F&A sector organizations; development organizations and international financial organizations with agricultural programmes; specialized organizations focused on other sectors relevant to F&A; governance bodies in charge of UN conventions relevant to F&A; general global governance bodies with coordination functions.

Another challenge of the current F&A landscape is the need to work towards food and nutrition security and agricultural development, in particular SDG 2, while taking into account other global challenges and worsening threats, such as concentration in global food chains, climate change, conflicts and deteriorating natural resources. This requires coordinated global public action with other sectors and actors, and places an additional urgency on the F&A institutions to further evolve and become fit for purpose. Annex 4 illustrates the main gaps in addressing such key global challenges that affect the F&A sector and in the associated global public goods. Climate change, for example, in most regions of the world is leading to increased weather variability and extremes that are in turn key forces driving the recent rise in global hunger. Africa, though less responsible for creating this global challenge, is more vulnerable than other regions to both food insecurity and also climate change.4

The current financing model is an additional weakness of the F&A landscape. First, public and private commitments are insufficient for the financial investments and global public goods needed to achieve SDG 2 and other F&A goals. Funding gaps exist in both basic agriculture-related activities, such as research and

4 Africa contributes less than 4% to global greenhouse gas emissions, but 27 of the 33 countries most at risk from climate change are in Africa.
development, and in responding to more recently emerging threats such as climate change. Second, funding fragmentation has led to institutional fragmentation.

These problems are not unique to the global institutions and processes targeting SDG 2 but characterise the whole multilevel governance system that aims to deliver on all SDGs. A recent FAO and ECDPM study (2019) showed that both state and non-state actors responded positively to the SDG framework. There is high-level political support for the new vision on sustainable development that permeates both official international declarations and national strategies, in addition to the state-led design of new SDG ‘governance arrangements’ that formally link development planning to SDGs. However, response on the ‘means of implementation’ has been weak, as broad high-level political support for the SDGs has not translated into sufficient actionable implementation plans, adequate resources, and effective new governance arrangements, both globally and locally. In section 3 and 4, we discuss ongoing reforms that address the aforementioned governance bottlenecks and the financing gaps in the F&A landscape.

2.3. Towards the identification of key institutions for SDG2

Solving the full range of problems besetting the F&A landscape is without doubt a daunting challenge due to the large thematic coverage and number of institutions involved, and is therefore a long-term aim and ambition. However, focusing on achieving SDG 2 (as a thematic boundary) and concentrating efforts on a limited set of institutions may yield faster results. It is therefore useful to highlight several institutions based on one or more of the following criteria:

- A focus on Sub-Saharan Africa where progress towards SDG 2 is slowest, using best practice examples of SDG 2 action from around the world;
- Devotes significant resources of grants or concessional finance to F&A;
- Repositories of technical expertise on F&A and sharing of best practice;
- Setting data standards and helping to monitor progress towards SDGs;
- Capable of translating global and national policy guidance to country-specific actionable implementation plans, via binding or voluntary norms and/or guidelines;
- Implement programmes, projects, and technical assistance in the F&A sector.

Given these criteria, at least seven international institutions are particularly relevant. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the key forum for creating and sharing knowledge and data on F&A. This is due to FAO’s data collection capacity, monitoring mandate, and normative work to help members analyse trends, areas of improvement, and paths to policy change. The World Food Programme (WFP), the world’s largest humanitarian agency, provides food aid for emergencies and refugees. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a collective funding body dedicated specifically to rural poverty and agricultural transformation projects, with a smallholder focus. In addition to these three Rome-based-

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5 Continuing with the same example, Africa faces significant costs to avoid the consequences of climate change: interventions to adapt to climate change will cost $7-15 billion a year by 2020 (Schaeffer et al, 2015), and could reach (in a ‘below 2°C’ scenario) $35 billion by 2050 and $200 billion by 2070 (Granoff et al, 2015).

6 Getting “real” about the SDGs: the political economy of eradicating poverty and ending hunger (FAO & ECDPM, 2019).

7 There is no international consensus on such list and this paper by no means suggests that these seven are the only institutions worthy of donor support or the ones with the strongest influence on food security conditions at the country level. It could be argued, for instance, that the WTO has a stronger influence than some of these seven institutions on food security in specific countries. On the other hand, the WTO does not match some of the above-mentioned criteria such as provision of grants or programmes in the F&A sector. Similarly, the WHO may have stronger influence on health policies and therefore on nutrition outcomes, but this organisation does not focus on the F&A sector, nor matches some of the other criteria.
agencies (RBAs), the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is the primary international network for agricultural research for development. The World Bank (WB) is a vast institution that strengthens local and global markets, funds projects, and advocates policy reforms to improve F&A business climates. These five institutions are sometimes referred to as F&A’s “Big Five”, but at least two more are worth highlighting. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) is a specialised F&A financing vehicle recognized for strong ownership by recipient countries, alignment with national priorities, results orientation and mutual accountability, thanks to its funding requirement to have a CAADP-like country plan in place as well as its inclusive governance model. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is one of the largest finance providers in Africa and its new strategy focuses on food security and agricultural growth for the first time. Table 1 overviews the key characteristics, functions, strengths and weaknesses of these “Big Seven”, while Annex 8 portrays the institutions’ vision statements or mandates.

Table 1: Key characteristics of the ‘Big Seven’ food and agricultural institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Focus areas in food and agriculture</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Perceived areas of improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>Eradicate poverty and hunger. Rural transformation. Financial and technical assistance to member states.</td>
<td>Evaluations showed projects reduced rural poverty. Moderately satisfactory or better impact in 87% of projects assessed between 2011-13.</td>
<td>Non-lending activities, such as policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership building. Operational efficiency?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Providing grants to countries’ governments via the Public Sector Window and financing packages to private sector enterprises and agribusinesses through the Private Sector Window.
### Organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus areas in food and agriculture</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Perceived areas of improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Productivity, infrastructure and value addition. Large-scale loans.</td>
<td>President’s proposal to quadruple agri-spending in next decade. Disbursement time halved between 2007-14 (from 2 years to 10 months).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled by the authors based on literature and interviews (see footnote 3).

#### 2.4. SDG 2 and the Big Seven

Exploring better finance options and cooperation opportunities for the Big Seven could aid SDG 2 achievement by: exploiting their SSA knowledge; significant financial resources and technical expertise in the F&A sector; opportunities to effectively share best practices and policy guidance; and modalities to implement F&A programmes and monitor progress. This would however require further research on, and strategic dialogue with, these institutions, including to understand what a stronger focus on SDG 2, or part of it, would mean for the agencies. For instance, some donors have recently signalled that SDGs 2.3 and 2.4 are a possible area for increased financing. However, none of the “Big Seven” has an exclusive focus on SDGs 2.3 and 2.4. Most do not even focus on SDG 2, as many believe that achieving SDG 2 requires working on many different additional aspects, including those related to climate, trade, nutrition, education and rural development (e.g. roads, electricity, internet).

For instance, FAO indicates in its strategic documents the need to embrace the 2030 Agenda going beyond SDG 2; engage stakeholders in cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary dialogue on all SDGs; integrate SDGs in policies, programmes and action plans; and engage sustainable food and agriculture with the broader SDG process in the country (FAO, 2018). On the other hand, GAFSP strategic discussions recently underlined the need to close the SDG 2 financing gap, the time pressure to deliver GAFSP’s vision, and the associated need for GAFSP to evolve to be fully oriented to SDG 2 (including a more explicit contribution to SDG 2 in its Theory of Change, but also “with additional impacts expected on other SDGs”). IFAD, even if currently aiming to contribute to most SDGs, seems to be the only institution among the “Big Seven” that signalled a future leading role in achieving SDGs 2.3 and 2.4 in recent internal strategic discussions.

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3. Ongoing reforms within the global institutional landscape

3.1. Current reform efforts

Any effort to make the F&A landscape more ‘outcome-oriented’ towards achievement of SDG 2 would need to be based on an understanding of, and possible synergies with, ongoing reform efforts.\(^\text{12}\) The overall reform of the UN development system, which aims to improve country-level coordination, is important for many international F&A organisations as they are part of the UN family. This UN reform, currently under preparation, is centred around the idea that the 2030 Agenda requires bold changes for a new generation of country teams to emerge. These changes should include a strategic UN Development Assistance Framework and be led by an impartial, independent and empowered resident coordinator.\(^\text{13}\)

The \textit{RBAs} are always under review and reform and recently bolder efforts have been made at improving coordination between IFAD, FAO and WFP. The chiefs of staff now meet monthly; annual joint meetings of the three Boards are organized\(^\text{14}\); and a senior consultative group with top-level RBAs managers regularly meet with membership.\(^\text{15}\) These meetings are likely to diminish, but not overcome, the challenges of duplication and competition. Further improvements require broader reform instead of increased coordination only.

The \textit{CFS} reform started in 2009, but progress has been slow and the CFS is still criticized for limited relevance and effectiveness. The CFS Independent Evaluation took place in 2016-17 with the objective of revitalizing particular elements of the reform to make the CFS more effective, through: stimulating the potential of CFS policy products and recommendations; strategic direction and demand-driven approach; more funding; better prioritizing; more evidence-based. Many believe the CFS offers a useful “bazaar”-type format where key actors gather via inclusive governance. But the CFS is also seen as too slow and cumbersome to drive a specific agenda that can trickle down to country level and influence operations of member agencies such as the RBAs.

\textbf{Individual F&A agencies are currently under reform.} IFAD is completing a decentralization process and preparing to shift from a project-based model to a comprehensive financial, policy-oriented and programmatic package that delivers results in a synergistic manner to foster systemic change. FAO recently reformed its structures and strives to be more outcome-oriented through its regular Strategic Framework Revisions. The CGIAR has a long history of reforms to respond to new challenges and meet donor expectations, such as the 2019 CIFOR-ICRAF merger. GAFSP’s ongoing reform aims to increase coordination and ensure coherence across all workstreams, particularly between the Public and Private Sector Windows and among its supervising entities that include the RBAs and AfDB.

There is no shortage of \textbf{recent collaborative initiatives} aiming to make the F&A landscape more effective. Noteworthy examples include the ‘Nutrition Decade of Action’ led by the FAO and WHO (SDG 2.2), the

\(^{12}\) For a deeper analysis of important reform initiatives in this area, see for instance ICTSD. (2011). Improving the International Governance of Food Security and Trade: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/133976/ahmad_web_13.pdf

\(^{13}\) This reform is mandated by the UN General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/72/279 of 31 May 2018. See e.g. “UN Development System Reform FAQ” (https://reform.un.org/content/un-development-system-reform-101) for more information, including on costs (e.g. the reinvigorated Resident Coordinator system will cost USD281 million annually, which is roughly 1% of contributions to UN operational activities for development).

\(^{14}\) The third one was in 2019, and e.g. members requested a Joint Action Plan for the Sahel as part of this process.

\(^{15}\) Moreover, an MoU for RBA collaboration was formally adopted in 2018, and leadership change at the FAO in 2019 would be the next significant opportunity for its reorientation.
‘Decade of Family Farming’ led by IFAD and FAO, the Global Soil Partnership (secretariat at FAO), and the ‘Scaling up Agroecology Initiative’ which seeks to coordinate the RBAs, WHO, UNDP, and UNEP. The WB recently led the Africa Food Security Leadership Dialogues, which aims to better coordinate development partners and regional efforts to address the food security situation in Africa, with the RBAs, AfDB, GAFSP, and the AU. Meanwhile, the Sustainable Food Systems Programme of the One Planet network - which is co-led by South Africa, Switzerland, Hivos, WWF, and features many members from government, NGOs, UN agencies and other international organizations - promotes sustainable consumption and production patterns in the area of F&A. The WB, FAO, and IFAD recently partnered in the 50x2030 initiative to generate agricultural statistics in 50 countries by 2030. Many observers and stakeholders indicate that, to accelerate progress for SDG 2 and related goals, a reform of the global architecture is not needed. Rather, progress could be made by bringing the F&A agenda to other policy processes and agencies, including the WTO and UNFCCC, via these international coordination initiatives and multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Finally, donors need to coordinate more and better align funding vis-a-vis the F&A landscape. Despite some attempts at reforming the financing of international F&A institutions, donors should more effectively identify and implement ways for achieving more coherence and complementarity around high impact approaches, untied aid, and better targeted assistance.

In sum, there are plentiful initiatives within and between F&A institutions that aim to improve their effectiveness as well as increase coordination. Each of these initiatives and reforms come with their own considerable transaction costs, including monetary and personnel time. However, the impacts of such initiatives often fall below expectations. But why?

### 3.2. Why are current reforms not meeting expectations?

Despite all the above-mentioned efforts, much remains to be done. Most interviewed experts believe current reforms underperform because F&A international organizations have no strong incentives to follow through nor incentives for cross-institutional coordination, collaboration and action. On the contrary, perverse incentives often drive competition for scarce resources and raise project finance, rather than following a systematic and comprehensive framework approach such as mandated by the SDGs.

Some insiders believe responsibility for slow progress is on their member states, not the agencies: while at a national level agriculture, and other sectoral ministries, must compromise within cabinet discussions on a comprehensive approach, government officials when they are making decisions at an international level frequently defend their sectoral turf exclusively, without considering trade-offs. National representatives that are sent to different international organisations, with minimal prior coordination, may partly drive the lack of coordination and coherence in the F&A landscape. However, some efforts have been made by several national governments to address these issues. For example, several RBAs permanent representatives are staffed with multidisciplinary teams – not solely agricultural expertise, but also foreign affairs and environmental sciences.

The political economy of aid allocation and receipt, as in other sectors, interferes with its optimal distribution in the case of the international F&A institutions, thus also limiting the effectiveness of the F&A

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16 ‘A shared vision enables our partners to collaborate on joint initiatives, which range from normative, advocacy and policy support activities, to research and development projects as well as on-the-ground implementation activities that address our food systems challenges’ (https://www.oneplanetnetwork.org/sustainable-food-system).
landscape reforms. For example, over time most donors have increasingly channelled funding to UN and other global institutions for specific purposes in line with their own internal and strategic interests. This ‘earmarked contributions’ trend produced fragmentation, increased transaction costs and fostered unhelpful competition between agencies (Gulrajani 2016; Reinsberg 2017). In the case of FAO around 60% of the total budget comes from such contributions which according to some interviewed experts leads also to more opaque data on FAO’s priority budget allocations. Another example is the possible merger of IFAD and GAFSP: even if this may have advantages in terms of more coherent and complementarity use of international grants and loans to support SDG 2 actions, some experts believe that certain donors would block such possible reform because different ministries in the same donor country are responsible for these two institutions and would not want to lose their influence.17

Finally, international institutions have not yet optimized the design and effective implementation of the multi-level governance needed to make real progress, and this contributes to underperforming reforms of the F&A landscape. Some experts contend that improved coordination needs to happen at the regional and country levels rather than HQs level, with local ministries of finance taking much stronger ownership of national F&A efforts that involve international organisations. Better options are thus needed to help institutions adapt to the subsidiarity principles, which defines the roles of global organizations relative to those of regional, sub-regional and country organizations. This approach can inform new financing priorities, support the discussion of trade-offs more explicitly, and ensure global, regional and national governance move together in pursuit of SDG 2 targets.

4. Financing the food and agriculture institutional landscape

4.1. The ‘big picture’

Development assistance for agriculture has fallen over the past three decades: flows to low-income countries comprised a mere 6% of sector-allocable aid in 2016 against nearly 20% in the mid-1980s. Cost estimates to achieve SDG 2 vary widely, ranging from $7 billion to $265 billion per year18, but there is consensus on the large financing gaps. The total resources available to help low-income countries are a fraction of what is needed and showed virtually no growth, even if donors differ substantially in the size of their support and in their disbursement trends (for instance, average figures hide that the top three donors increased F&A ODA more than 15% between 2013-14). Gross disbursements of aid and publicly sourced non-concessional lending for food and nutrition security totalled $13 billion in 2017, evenly split between bilateral and multilateral institutions.

The top 10 donors (see Annex 5) provided $5.7 billion in total to the agri-development sector in 2013, making up 76% of total agricultural ODA for that year. Furthermore, multilateral institutions account for 37% of total agri-ODA and almost all the official lending in this sector (since few bilateral donors make any loans in F&A).

17 In some donor countries, GAFSP is financed by the ministry of agriculture while IFAD by the ministries of finance or development cooperation.
18 For details, see IFPRI (2018): “The differences among these estimates are largely attributable to the different targeted objectives and policy questions of each modelling exercise, different investment strategies considered, and varying assumptions about the role of different sectors in reducing hunger” (http://www.ifpri.org/publication/quantifying-cost-and-benefits-ending-hunger-and-undernutrition-examining-differences). The top figure, $265 billion, is an estimate by FAO, IFAD and WFP: “Achieving Zero Hunger: The critical role of investments in social protection and agriculture” (2015).
Despite the fact that higher levels of development finance do not necessarily translate into better outcomes, these figures underline the continuing importance of the top ten largest donors and multilateral partners in achieving SDG 2. Further research, moreover, should aim to understand the impacts of tied aid in the F&A sector as well as the role of new actors such as China, India, and Brazil as they emerge as F&A finance providers.

Considering this ‘big picture’ and the urgency of accelerating progress towards SDG 2, bold action is needed to attract additional resources for, and better coordinate donors around, SDG 2 targets. Box 1 outlines short term opportunities for this.

### Box 1 Opportunities for donors in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensive reform of the F&amp;A landscape is a long-term endeavour while the urgency of SDG 2 requires increased short-term donor commitments. The donor community has ample opportunities in 2020 to commit additional resources to SDG 2 and to more effectively coordinate the related financing decisions, including:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(a)</strong> The governing bodies of IFAD and GAFSP, like other agencies, seek financial replenishment aimed at launching “GAFSP 2.0” and “IFAD 2.0”. These drives propose, in particular, further private sector windows to crowd-in private sector investments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(b)</strong> The CGIAR, a key global public good institution with high-impact investments, faces perennial resource concerns. Lele (2019), for instance, states that CGIAR needs to double their budget to reach its ambitious targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(c)</strong> Given the urgency of generating more resources to support smallholder farmers’ adaptation to climate change, particularly in Africa, coordinated decisions by the European Union and its member states could help dedicating adequate and predictable funding from climate finance mechanisms (Europe is collectively the largest contributor to such mechanisms) for agriculture adaptation activities (including using a fixed share of the Green Climate Fund) (Tietjen et al., 2019);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(d)</strong> Within the WB, capital increases and IDA 19 replenishment offer new opportunities to allocate IDA resources for SDG 2 in IDA-eligible countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(e)</strong> Despite little appetite for a new vertical fund, the Lancet Commission on Obesity, an international panel convened by the London-based medical journal, recently proposed a Framework Convention on Food Systems. This framework, modelled on the UN conventions on tobacco and climate change, called for a $1 billion global fund “to support countries to implement food and nutrition policies”;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(f)</strong> Blended public and private finance could help mobilise capital for new business models that incorporate globally agreed norms, standards, and policy guidance (e.g. VGGT). For instance, FAO recently discussed a new private sector engagement strategy centred on scaled-up investment, including for, and by, small producers. This process would feed into the FAO Council in March 2020 and could include an agreement on targets for increasing “SDG-compliant” private investments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2. The ‘Big Seven’

The WB Group, as shown in Annex 6, is the largest single source of development finance in agriculture (IFC and non-concessional finance have grown the most in the whole Group), though agriculture accounts for just 5 to 10% of WB’s total activities. Moreover, the WB and regional development banks, such as AfDB, tend to focus on larger projects, including large-scale infrastructure and sector-wide approaches, and not the much smaller projects that inclusive and sustainable rural transformation needs.
IFAD investments in F&A are the second largest for an international finance institution. In contrast, only a small share of FAO’s budget goes to development assistance as operations (e.g. FAO’s normative and knowledge work) take the largest share. This reflects FAO’s fundamentally different role compared to funds or banks such as IFAD or WB: its mandate to ‘lead international efforts to defeat hunger’ is translated more into policy dialogue, technical assistance and statistical work than investments.

WFP is also a significant player with an annual average budget of around $4 billion between 2007-14, but its budget is categorized differently as emergency relief. GAFSP has disbursed $114 million annually between 2007-14. With its new strategy, AfDB’s annual investments in F&A (both public and private) are envisaged to quadruple from $612 million to $2.4 billion in the next decade.

Further research should be devoted to the Big Seven, in two areas. First, the political economy of funding the Big Seven, including researching the institutions’ relationships with their donors and their priorities, since increasing competition for resources is expected in the coming years. The aid replenishments calendar of various funds and agencies is concentrated between 2019 and 2020: at least nine agencies that received $65 billion in funding in their last cycle will seek renewed donor contributions in the next two years. The funding-weight of thematic areas corresponding to SDG 2-targets should also be analysed per organization. Finally, in light of the discussed multi-level governance framework – where coordination for local impact is the key objective – the relationships between each Big Seven and the local Ministries of Finance should be assessed: strong local decision-makers are crucial for impact.

Second, further research is needed on the use of different financing instruments by each of the Big Seven: projects, programmes, and budget support; as well as grants, concessional and non-concessional loans. For most F&A institutions, the main instruments seem to be ‘projects’, which are not the easiest to manage at country level, given that each project has its own, separate, management unit; each F&A institution has its own disbursement rules, monitoring and evaluation systems, etc. This results in unnecessary transaction costs (for IFIs, with funds generally borrowed by countries), while attempts to move away from a project approach have unfortunately rarely been successful. Analysing the use, and the results, of different financing instruments by the Big Seven would help adoption of the most efficient instruments, thus facilitating the effective implementation of SDG 2 action and the improvement of absorption capacity of local institutions.

4.3. Priority financing gaps

Both public and private financing, as well as the quality and quantity of finance, are crucial to achieving SDG 2. Much-needed private-sector investment and more effective use of ODA can be spurred by an improved governance of the F&A sector. Private flows and blended finance instruments can potentially complement increased ODA for SDG 2 and contribute to accelerated progress. Here we suggest several important SDG 2 public and private financing gaps that could be prioritised:

1. With limited external private flows to agriculture, especially in SSA, public investment should incentivize the private sector, particularly SME financing. Businesses too small for commercial private development finance but too big for traditional public rural finance and private micro-finance are often underserved, and therefore, unable to fulfil their potential. Financing SMEs would allow farmers to shift from a subsistence/non-commercial scale to a commercial scale (with increased output, quality, and market linkages). F&A development finance institutions are not at a scale equipped to support this “missing middle” and investments are made at limited scale through private sector and non-profit
partners. The work by IFAD\(^{19}\) and the GAFSP Missing Middle Window tend to be considered a good start but not at a scalable level yet.

2. Public investment in Agricultural R&D contributes to a global public good with strong evidence base that investment yields economic growth, reduces poverty and hunger and improves nutritional outcomes. However, the current F&A landscape has insufficient finance to support the necessary R&D, as well as insufficient uptake of research results. More public investment in agri-R&D is warranted given the high returns and challenges facing F&A, such as achieving SDG 2 and climate change. These public investments can culminate in a reformed CGIAR system, with stronger links to NARS, that spearhead sufficient agri-R&D and better up-take.

3. Another area often mentioned by experts and stakeholders is supporting employment in the food economy and fair pricing, especially for youth and women, and along a continuum of territories and value chain actors from rural to urban areas.\(^{20}\)

4. Current resources are clearly insufficient to support climate change mitigation practices in agriculture, smallholder farmers’ adaptation to climate change, and other parts of the environmental sustainability agenda. This adaptation is especially needed considering the damaged productive potential of natural resources around the globe, which will be exacerbated by climate change, and which compromises the planet’s fertility, particularly in Africa.

5. National efforts to adequately resource agricultural investment are a critical contribution towards the achievement of the SDG targets. Well-prepared and costed country plans under a common framework, such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), represent good practice for a country-led and -owned vision for agricultural development (as in Ethiopia and Ghana). Unfortunately, most national budgets consistently failed to meet relevant F&A targets, such as the Maputo and Malabo targets, and international institutions similarly failed to fill the gaps. Gaps between costed NAIPs and resources needed can be substantial – up to 60% in some cases. Donors repeatedly commit to finance country-led plans but in doing so they often only select the parts of those plans that they prefer, which leaves other parts unfunded. GAFSP has targeted this gap but the scale of available GAFSP’s funds has decreased.

6. Global coordination around implementation of F&A actions at country and regional economic community levels is costly and is often mentioned as another financing gap. The resulting lack of coordination and sharing of best practices in the F&A landscape inhibits countries learning from each other. For example, this gap hampers the implementation of globally agreed guidelines such as the VGGT at country level, while good examples of VGGT piloting were not systematically upscaled.

\(^{19}\) Currently, 70% of all IFAD projects focus on developing value chains, and the local private sector is already identified as a partner in over 50% of IFAD’s loans and grants. Moreover, the Agri-Business Capital (ABC) Fund, a blended finance fund launched early 2019, wants to help meeting the growing demand for thousands of small farmers and rural agribusinesses that face structural challenges in attracting the financial services necessary to develop their activities.

\(^{20}\) For a comprehensive overview of expert recommendations on how to increase employment in the food economy in Africa, and what donors can do better to assist, see the recent report of the EU’s Task Force Rural Africa: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/report-africa-europe-agenda-rural-transformation-task-force-rural-africa_en
5. Further reforming the F&A landscape: a possible way forward

Establishing an outcome-oriented F&A institutional landscape for faster progress on SDG 2 is clearly a complicated endeavour and plenty of options and opinions exist. Further research and dialogue are needed to build on existing best practice, embed good ideas and create innovative solutions. This section discusses new reform ideas currently under discussion, proposes some basic principles for further reforming the F&A landscape, and proposes an inclusive consultative process to help harmonise the F&A institutional landscape towards SDG 2.

5.1. Proposals for new reforms

A non-exhaustive summary of current proposals for new reforms include:

1. **Revitalize the experience of the UN Secretary-General’s ‘High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis’ (UNHLTF),** which is currently dormant.21 The UNHLTF seems widely accepted as a successful case of global coordination within and beyond the UN, and could be institutionalized by, for example, a merger between the CFS and UNHLTF (Manzoor, 2011). Alternatively, the UNHLTF could link to the UN Economic and Social Council, which has the mandate to coordinate the specialized agencies of the UN. However, other experts stress that the UNHLTF worked due to the very specific momentum of the 2008 food price crisis – a momentum that no longer exist;

2. **Strengthening the CFS.** The CFS is perceived as the most inclusive place for dialogue between national governments, private sector, and farmer and civil society organizations. The CFS can be strengthened to become a coordination platform with a clear vision and a better defined scope to ensure a coherent agenda between the RBAs, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR and other relevant UN agencies and research institutions, such as the CGIAR. Experts frequently highlight the importance of coherent and functional multilateral food security governance structures, with the CFS considered the pivotal institution to coordinate global food and nutrition security initiatives. Therefore, an independent CFS could be a legitimate platform to fulfil this coordination objective, provided the CFS is organised with strict separation from political decision-making and building on a science-based assessment mechanism. Some experts doubt this option given the many weaknesses still characterizing the CFS despite several attempts at reforming it.

3. If these types of proposals for strengthening or revamping existing institutions or fora fail to enact the necessary changes, then a new **Governing Platform** could act as the overarching F&A global governance mechanism (von Braun, 2018, see Annex 7). Von Braun designs a global “Governing Platform” for intergovernmental coordination, decision-making, participation by government-to-government networks, the private sector, and NGOs; building on the governance bodies of related technical agencies, thus linking, not duplicating, governance mechanisms; and reforming the complete institutional landscape of existing organizations by adjusting their role and mandate to the new governance platform. Many experts think the proposal in its entirety is not realistic – too costly, both financially and politically, and time consuming to create a unifying platform (given every institution has its own governing mechanisms and would be complicated to merge what in some cases are very different

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21 *My High-Level Task Force is working to ensure that the UN system, international financial institutions and the WTO are ready to provide robust and consistent support to countries struggling to cope with food insecurity. This is a long-term effort and it will require a comprehensive push to back solid partnerships, strong strategies and well-financed actions that empower communities to become food secure* (Ban, 2009, p. 1). The Task Force was chaired by the UN Secretary-General and vice-chaired by the FAO Director-General.
organizations in nature and procedural rules). However, some elements of the proposal appeal to many experts and warrant further consideration (as explained in the next point);

4. Another, partly related, proposal presents an ‘IPCC of F&A’ that would serve the Governing Platform. This idea tends to be more widely accepted than the creation of a new Platform itself, especially if such a Panel would be aimed at focusing global attention to the F&A agenda; properly funded; composed of scientific representatives from different parts of the world; linked to UN HLPF (currently fed separately by different Agencies) or even a higher-level political decision-making body. However, other experts say this ‘IPCC of F&A’ is not needed, since FAO, CGIAR and the CFS HLPE already play such a role - albeit all agree those also must be strengthened, including funding and quantity of staff.

Many other reform options for a more outcome-oriented F&A landscape likely exist. Moving forward, each option should be assessed for its (a) potential benefits in terms of increased legitimacy and credibility, accountability, and effectiveness; (b) transaction costs; and (c) political feasibility.

5.2. Principles for further reforms

Any reform of F&A’s institutional governance should pay particular attention to:

a) **Agency**: inclusive partnerships should underpin a reformed F&A landscape, to more effectively involve civil society organizations and private sector together with UN agencies, the public sector and donors. This would capacitate such non-state actors to act more successfully within the F&A governance mechanisms;

b) **Political will** to support a reformed landscape. Political leadership is the crucial factor for successful experiences of both international coordination- and country-plans like CAADP. Any reformed F&A landscape needs to capture the imagination of policy-makers and voters and to elevate important F&A-related issues higher up the political agenda;

c) **Incentives** for cross-institutional coordination and action in a reformed landscape should be stronger than they are today, ranging from the Heads of Agency to country-level staff;

d) Careful design of both vertical and horizontal coherence with focus on ground-level outcomes. This coherence should be achieved by combining effective country operations and partnerships with a supporting role for regional and sub-regional multi-stakeholder partnerships; and

e) Be wary of creating new institutions and instead use ongoing coordination dynamics or rally behind an existing coordination initiative. New challenges and new political priorities tend to lead to new institutions and funds, such as the GAFSP following the 2008 food price crisis. With the SDGs and a changing political and development finance landscape, new proposals emerge which can lead to “institutional entropy”. This entropy is often an outcome of political dynamics in donor countries and result in high costs and inefficiencies. For example, regularly adding institutions and initiatives at global, regional and sub-regional levels result in more coordination needs, and more meetings with high-level participants that are then less available to do their ‘core work’.

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22 FAO and ECDPM (2019) suggests that SDG implementation requires a change in gear to adopt an innovative approach also with respect to “SDG agency”. SDG governance arrangements should put “new” actors at the centre: in a territorial sense, local authorities, SMEs, informal service providers (and not only smallholder farmers that e.g. remain the near exclusive focus of good part of the F&A donor community); and in a food system sense, the organisations of consumers and the food entrepreneurs.
5.3. Next steps - an inclusive consultative process

Achieving SDG 2 requires urgent action, including attracting much needed additional resources. Donors have ample opportunities in 2020 to contribute towards SDG 2 including through better coordinated financing decisions (see Box 1 above). Besides increased funding, there is an urgent need to make the F&A landscape more conducive to achieve SDG 2. As such, we propose to quickly start an inclusive consultative process that should aim at maximising SDG2-outcomes given prevailing time and funding constraints.

Such a process envisages three immediate next steps. Firstly, build an international group of experts, including civil society and private sector representatives, that can support a consultative process and undertake the further research advocated in this paper (see Box 2 below). Secondly, urgently reach out to the management of key F&A institutions to understand better their ongoing reforms and other similar initiatives planned, as well as to discuss their potential contribution to this consultative process. Finally, disseminate the results of consultations with the wider group of F&A stakeholders during meetings including the CFS, HLPF, and other relevant international events.

These consultations could result in a roadmap to streamline SDG 2 actions across committed F&A institutions and other stakeholders. Such a roadmap could include a dedicated ‘SDG 2 Leaders Alliance’ comprising the heads of the main F&A institutions such as the ‘Big Seven’, a few key bilateral donors and the leaders from different regions of the world (particularly those like SSA with the highest total numbers of undernourished people). Key aims of the Alliance could be to review progress, increase the accountability and sense of urgency around the SDG 2 process, and to improve delivery of support by the F&A landscape at the country level, in response to countries' needs and demands. Furthermore, given SDG 2’s connections with other SDGs (FAO, 2018), a more ambitious next phase of the consultative process advocated in this paper could focus on increasing coherence, coordination, and accountability between the SDG 2 Alliance, other F&A institutions, and the main institutions involved with the other SDGs.

The aim and scope of this inclusive consultative process is connected to the SDG agenda. However, there is a need for strategic thinking beyond the SDG framework that incorporates the rapidly changing nature of food systems. For example, the upcoming Food System Summit in 2021 (to be convened by the UN Secretary General as a comprehensive endeavour of all F&A multi-stakeholder partnerships) builds as much on SDG 2 as on the interactions of food with climate change, trade, etc. Acknowledging and exploring systematically the many interlinkages of food with other domains is a first step. This then raises the question of whether or not current systems for F&A governance are still able to coordinate sufficiently in an increasingly complex and interlinked world.

Box 2 Recommendations for further research on the F&A institutional landscape and SDG 2

| Further research needs to analyse the comparative advantages, areas of duplication and thematic gaps within and between the key international F&A institutions as well as their respective mandates and initiatives towards different SDG 2 targets. A political economy analysis can help to understand the options and possibilities for improving the effectiveness and outcomes of these institutions, and would provide greater insight into their structures, actors and interests. Looking at structures would help to report key features of internal governance of each organization and explore how respective governing bodies could better fit together and improve coordination of SDG 2-related activity. Studying the actors would enable an assessment of their respective country/regional operations and level of engagement in |

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23 This idea emerged from an event organised by Chatham House and ECDPM in May 2019, and that informed this paper more broadly, as captured in the Meeting Summary: https://chathamhouse.soutron.net/Portal/DownloadImageFile.ashx?objectId=3429
inclusive multi-stakeholder platforms, thus suggesting improvements in the application of the subsidiarity principle. Analysing interests would lead to important political economy insights, for example in relation to F&A organisational fund raising and usage and their donor relations (e.g. as many of the Big Seven budgets are 70% or more sponsored by voluntary member’s contributions, the funders heavily influence the choice of priorities and projects of the Big Seven).

Other recommendations for further research on SDG 2 and the F&A landscape include: (i) assessing agricultural development grants and concessional loans, trends in their funding and distribution, and how they are/are not connected to other critical institutions in the global F&A landscape; (ii) analysing the synergies and potential overlaps between the key donor institutions working at the humanitarian–development nexus and the F&A landscape; (iii) reviewing multilateral and bilateral climate adaptation plans in agriculture, and assessing how to better support countries to develop and fund bankable F&A adaptation plans (Chatham House & ECDPM, 2019).

5.4. Future visions – towards a stronger global F&A landscape

Besides the short-term urgency of achieving SDG 2, the challenges facing F&A become increasingly complex and interdependent with other sustainable development issues (Dekeyser et al., 2019). With increased complexity comes the need for increased coordination. As such, the F&A landscape faces the longer-term need for stronger F&A governance that can coordinate the increased complexity of the global food system and its challenges, in particular the need to improve simultaneously the economic, social and environmental sustainability of the food and agriculture sector.

Rather than envisioning solely structural solutions, such as an inclusive supra-institutional platform, we propose a process towards stronger global food governance, that could also feed its results into the preparations of the multi-stakeholder Food System Summit in 2021. First, organise a legitimate international group of experts to conduct stakeholder consultations and research on the needed institutional architecture for F&A. This would include governance principles, scope, and relations with countries, and would reach out to key institutions and governments to discuss their engagement.

Second, build consensus on the F&A architecture, its roles, its funding, and its relationships with institutions such as the WTO, the WHO, and the UNFCCC. Third, build capacity within existing institutions and stakeholders to contribute to the architecture. Fourth, reform F&A institutions based on the principles of subsidiarity, legitimacy and political and financial feasibility; and in light of the new architecture to support its coordination role.

Ideally, this new F&A architecture overcomes the fragmentation of the current F&A landscape, better delivers support at the country level, and links F&A with other challenges, such as global health, trade and climate change, in a systematic manner. A complete absence of incoherence might be impossible given the complexity of food systems (Candel & Pereira, 2017). However, governance structures built to recognise the multidimensionality of F&A could improve coherence and optimise synergies with other domains, without losing sight of food security and smallholder farmers as respectively the key objective and the central actors of future processes towards more sustainable food systems.
6. Conclusion

The F&A institutional landscape grew over the past decades as a reaction to crises, identified needs, funding priorities, strategic considerations, humanitarian goals, and individual visions, to become the patchwork of interconnected institutions that it is today. In addition to longstanding concerns - such as energy or protein gaps, adequate micronutrition, or productivity per worker – come more recent issues such as climate change and the obesity crisis. One key feature today is the wide recognition that food is intrinsically linked, accompanied with a dizzying level of complexity, to many of humanities’ biggest challenges. Food, thus straddles almost all SDGs, yet it remains unclear whether or not the current fragmented F&A landscape can effectively coordinate across the whole spectrum of interrelated issues and goals.

Renewed effort is urgently needed to curb rising undernourishment and achieve SDG 2, but progress is hampered by high fragmentation, overlapping mandates, and budget shortages of the current F&A landscape. Achieving SDG 2 requires stronger reform momentum and larger budgets, supported also by increased coordination across the F&A landscape. In the short term, we proposed to increase coordination through an inclusive consultative process to streamline SDG 2 actions across committed F&A institutions, which could culminate in an SDG 2 Leaders Alliance. A next phase of this consultative process could increase coherence, coordination, and accountability between the SDG 2 Alliance, other F&A institutions, and the main institutions involved with the other SDGs.

But the urgency of attaining SDG 2 should not deflect from the need to strategize about the long-term reforms necessary to address the challenge of increasingly complex food systems beyond 2030. For this, we propose a process aimed at delivering stronger food governance through a well-built institutional architecture. Current and upcoming challenges now necessitate a wider debate on the state of food security and the purpose of F&A governance, especially given its impact on the many related global issues outside the traditional purview of F&A institutions.
Annex 1: SDG 2 description

SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, promote sustainable Agriculture

2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round

2.2 By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving by 2025 the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under five years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and older persons

2.3 By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and the incomes of small-scale food producers, particularly women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets, and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment

2.4 By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters, and that progressively improve land and soil quality

2.5 By 2020, maintain genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants, farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at national, regional and international levels, and ensure access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge as internationally agreed

2.a. Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development, and plant and livestock gene banks to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular in least developed countries

2.b. Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets including by the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round

2.c. Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives, and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility
Annex 2: Food and agriculture landscape overview

Public

- The United Nations (UN) ‘Rome-based agencies’:
  - The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
  - The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
  - The World Food Programme (WFP)
- The World Bank Group
- CGIAR (formerly the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research)
- International finance institutions such as:
  - The African Development Bank (AfDB)
  - The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
  - The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
  - GAFSP
  - The Islamic Development Bank
  - The New Development Bank (formerly the BRICS Development Bank)
- Coordinating bodies such as the UN Secretary General’s High Level Task Force (UN HLTF) on the Global Food Security Crisis and the CFS employs an inclusive multi-stakeholder process to give legitimacy to its non-binding guidelines and consensus documents.
- International fora such as the G7 and G20

These are also key for SDG 2 targets such as agricultural productivity, which may be impacted by trade issues or climate change (as highlighted for instance by the CFS HLPE\(^24\)):

- The **World Trade Organization** (WTO) is the only body capable of legally binding the agricultural policy of its members. The WTO, also a member of the UN HLTF, explicitly recognizes the importance of reducing trade restrictions for global food security. SDG 2.b also aims to “correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets... in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round”.
- The **United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)** - A number of mitigation and adaptation priorities in agriculture will require collective action across borders. These include setting agreed international targets for lowering emissions, providing better weather forecasting, developing drought and flood-resistant crops, sharing experiences with mitigation and adaptation techniques, and, in the extreme, better help during food emergencies. SDG 2.4 also aims to “implement resilient agricultural practices that ...strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change”

Private

In recent years, engaging the private sector in the fight against hunger has emerged as a key priority. This trend has been driven by a growing recognition that building better-functioning agricultural markets forms a key driver of food security. Moreover, companies, especially large ones, have put in place their own (global corporate) initiatives and coalitions for “development” and to contribute to SDGs, including the fight against hunger and malnutrition (e.g. the Consumer Goods Forum, a global network of some 400 companies recently promised to halve food waste within their operations by 2025). Also international coalitions and networks of NGOs are an important private component of the Architecture.

Public-private

The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) is a particularly important component of the F&A landscape as it includes the formal participation of (and membership of the Board for) not only national governments, but also the private sector and the farmer/civil society organisations, defining itself “the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for all stakeholders to work together on food and nutrition

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\(^24\) The HLPE 2017 Report identified trade as one of the key nine “critical and emerging issues for food security"
security”. Especially in recent years, alongside and with the active participation of the traditional multilateral institutions, a plethora of new partnerships, initiatives, and committees has emerged to help spur collective action on food security. These include private businesses also as they are a promising source of additional investments that will be needed in many low-income countries, as the demand for funds far outstrips what donors and governments are likely to provide in the near future. **New “public-private partnership” initiatives include:** the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA), Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), Scaling up Nutrition, Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH), The World Economic Forum (Grow Africa; Grow Asia), etc. Figure 2 **maps these institutions** and initiatives, grouping them in four key thematic areas of work relevant to F&A.

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**Figure 2. New forums for collective action. Source: Kharas et al., 2015**
Annex 3: Global organizations and mechanisms with relevance for agriculture, food, and nutrition (source: von Braun, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/Specialization</th>
<th>Intergovernmental organizations and mechanisms</th>
<th>Other organizations by type</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AGRICULTURE, FOOD, AND NUTRITION SECTOR</strong></td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Committee on World Food Security (CFS) International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
<td>Global networks of farmers’ organizations (such as World Farmers Organization, La Via Campesina) Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) CGIAR Organizations of multinational agribusiness enterprises (such as New Vision for Agriculture, Global Harvest Initiative) Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS</strong></td>
<td>World Bank Group United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Regional development banks</td>
<td>NGOs with some focus on food and agriculture (such as Oxfam, CARE, Welthungerhilfe, Concern) Private foundations (such as Rockefeller Foundation, Bill &amp; Melinda Gates Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS FOCUSED ON OTHER SECTORS RELEVANT TO AGRICULTURE, FOOD, AND NUTRITION</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) International Labour Organization (ILO) Global Environment Facility (GEF) World Health Organization (WHO) UNICEF World Trade Organization (WTO) United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)</td>
<td>Environmental NGOs (such as World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF], Greenpeace) NGOs with watchdog function over global organizations (such as Global Policy Forum) International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE BODIES IN CHARGE OF UN CONVENTIONS RELEVANT TO FOOD AND AGRICULTURE</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Green Climate Fund Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture</td>
<td>NGOs and their networks, some having observer status Business organizations and their networks, some having observer status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE BODIES WITH COORDINATION FUNCTIONS</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Secretariat, Assembly, and Security Council, UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) G7, G20</td>
<td>NGOs and their networks, some having observer status Business organizations and their networks, some having observer status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**
- Global NGOs and nonprofit networks
- Foundations primarily focused on funding
- Global organizations receiving public funds
- Global private sector organizations and networks of for-profit organizations
- Global networks of different types of organizations


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<tr>
<th>International Public Goods (IPGs) to be addressed for food and nutrition security</th>
<th>Action areas and examples of current deficiencies</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EFFECTIVELY PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO FOOD AND NUTRITION EMERGENCIES AND TO MIGRATION CRISIS</td>
<td>Nutrition as a global problem (including undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, and obesity) has no well-defined organizational home. Food assistance in failed states and war-affected regions remains a tremendous challenge. A more comprehensive emergency aid mechanism is called for in which the World Food Programme (WFP) is essential and where nongovernmental actors find improved ways to effectively engage in a coordinated manner. Global diplomacy and security action capability need to be strengthened and support this function. The UN Security Council rarely addresses hunger crises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. TRADE REGIMES, FOOD RESERVES, AND RELATED GLOBAL INFORMATION</td>
<td>Rule-based and fair trade is an essential IPG for food security. Of importance at the global level are regimes that reduce food price volatility and extreme price spikes. There is an institutional vacuum in terms of addressing these matters. An essential basic element is reliable information on markets, production, and stocks at national levels, which is shared internationally. The Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) was an important step in this direction, but needs strengthening.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. COMPETITION POLICY AND STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)</td>
<td>Recent mega-mergers among agricultural industries need appropriate scrutiny from a perspective of competitive market functioning, including impacts on markets in low-income countries, which typically are not included in related assessments. An important IPG for FDI is appropriate and transparent rules for assuring efficiency as well as fairness for both investors and countries invested in, including prevention of corruption on both sides. For investments in land and other agricultural resources, voluntary guidelines exist but have limited reach.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT RELATED TO BIO-DIVERSITY, WATER, AND SOILS</td>
<td>A more comprehensive approach is needed to provide management guidelines and information bases for these resources as public goods, such as world soil degradation mapping, transboundary water systems monitoring, air pollution monitoring, and biodiversity tracking, including respective standards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION RELATED TO FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>Agriculture is both a contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and part of the solution for reducing GHG emissions related to land use change and animal (ruminant) production. In view of the complex linkages of climate policy relevant to agriculture and food security, a more prominent and integral positioning of agriculture in global climate policies is called for; this is partly governed by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), but other actors should be involved more, such as those related to health (World Health Organization (WHO)) and land use (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TRANSBOUNDARY FOOD SAFETY AND HEALTH-RELATED INVESTMENTS AND STANDARDS</td>
<td>Food safety cannot be left to national control and enforcement; international food trade and the demands by consumers for sound standards are an essential IPG. Early detection of transboundary food and agriculture-related health risks, such as livestock-originated human diseases, seems to have improved, and WHO and FAO must play important roles in that. Emergency measures to address the root causes of agriculture-linked infection risks remain too ad hoc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>The backbone of technological change is research, and for developing countries, international agricultural research in particular is a public good, vital for food security. Current investments in this IPG are too low, and research capacities of middle- and high-income countries are not drawn on enough for global food and nutrition security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 5: Largest donors for the agriculture sector, 2014. Source: Development Initiatives and OECD CRS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>2014 Agriculture sector ODA (dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>AsDB Special Funds</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill and Melinda</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gates Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 6: Disbursements by ‘multilaterals’ for food and nutrition security

Table 6.1. FNS disbursements by multilateral institutions, 2009-2013 average (constant 2013 dollars millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Concessional Finance (ODA)</th>
<th>Non-Concessional Finance (ODF)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1,598.5</td>
<td>2,657.3</td>
<td>4,355.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAO)</td>
<td>722.0</td>
<td>340.3</td>
<td>1,062.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)</td>
<td>575.1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>575.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGIAR Fund</td>
<td>614.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>614.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank (AfDB)</td>
<td>736.6</td>
<td>256.8</td>
<td>993.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Agencies</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Fund (AFESD)</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>181.0</td>
<td>285.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank (AsDB)</td>
<td>172.8</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>172.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDFC Fund for International Development (OFID)</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Development Corporation (CAF)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>114.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Multilateral Institutions</td>
<td>204.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>243.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,579.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,650.02</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,229.07</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD CRS, CGIAR budget documents, FAO Audited Accounts
Annex 7: Proposal for a governing platform (Source: von Braun, 2018)

GOVERNING PLATFORM FOR INTERNATIONAL FOOD, NUTRITION, AND AGRICULTURE
A governing coordination and funding mechanism that facilitates global action as well as government-to-government networks, with inclusion of private and civil society actors

CLUSTER 1: FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY AND FOOD SAFETY
- Trade regimes, food reserves, and related global information
- Responding to and preventing food and nutrition emergencies
- Investments and standards related to transboundary food safety and health

CLUSTER 2: PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
- Natural resource management related to biodiversity, transboundary water, and land and soils
- Climate change adaptation and mitigation
- Rural energy
- Oceans

CLUSTER 3: ENHANCED SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND FOOD SYSTEMS
- Sound competition policy and standards for FDI
- Sharing international knowledge on transformation of smallholder farming and related services
- Food waste and loss reduction
- International research and innovation in food and agriculture

INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON FOOD, NUTRITION, AND AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
Annex 8: Selected vision statement or mandate of the ‘Big Seven’ food and agricultural institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Selected vision statement or mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Specialized agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger. Our goal is to achieve food security for all and make sure that people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>Eradicate poverty and hunger by investing in poor rural people through financial and technical assistance to agriculture and rural development projects in developing member states. The objective of the Fund shall be to mobilize additional resources to be made available on concessional terms to Member States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGIAR</td>
<td>We work to advance agricultural science and innovation to enable poor people, especially women, to better nourish their families, and improve productivity and resilience so they can share in economic growth and manage natural resources in the face of climate change and other challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>The core policies and strategies that govern WFP activities are to provide food aid: a) to save lives in refugee and other emergency situations; b) to improve the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives; and c) to help build assets and promote the self-reliance of poor people and communities, particularly through labour-intensive works programmes. Use food aid to support economic and social development; meet refugee and other emergency food needs, and associated logistics support; and promote world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and FAO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
<td>To fight poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results. To help people help themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity, and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>The overarching objective of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAFSP</td>
<td>The Global Agriculture &amp; Food Security Program (GAFSP) is a demand-led and recipient-owned global partnership and a cost-effective and flexible multilateral financing mechanism dedicated to fighting hunger, malnutrition and poverty in developing countries. In line with Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG2), GAFSP supports resilient and sustainable agriculture that benefits and empowers poor and vulnerable smallholder farmers, particularly women and youth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled by the authors based on the organisation’s websites.
Bibliography


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