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Thematic Focus:

A new impetus for Africa-Europe relations

With contributions by J.M. Barroso, N. Dlamini-Zuma, J. Chissano and C. Lopes

As Africa celebrates the 50th anniversary of the foundation of African unity, it is appropriate to reflect on Africa's achievements and ways forward. The world is changing, so is Africa... and so is Europe. The relations of Africa with its partners, including the European Union (EU), should thus also evolve, to better reflect new interests and geo-strategic dynamics at play. The next few months, culminating with the 4th EU-Africa Summit of April 2014 in Brussels, provide an excellent opportunity to that end.

Taking advantage of the commodity boom, Africa has been able to achieve sustained growth - over 5% - over the last decade, and has so far exhibited significant resilience to the economic and financial crisis that has plagued economies in the North. Poverty is falling while governance and democratic accountability is improving in many countries. But numerous challenges remain, notably in terms of peace and stability, job creation (in particular for the youth population), and social development. The effective pursuit of new African strategies for the structural transformation of their economies, building on and diversifying away from raw commodities towards greater value addition through industrialisation and services, will be critical to ensure sustainable and equitable development over time. This will also require an improved capacity to mobilize and better manage domestic and international resources, most notably to finance its large infrastructure needs.

In this process, integration and cooperation dynamics, from an economic, political and security perspective, should also be strengthened and when appropriate reconsidered, at the regional as well as at the international level.

As a new emerging continent, Africa needs to reposition itself towards its traditional partners - moving away from an aid recipient approach to a more assertive and balanced relation - as well as towards other emerging and Southern partners.

By the same token, Europe should frame its relation with Africa in a renewed paradigm.



It should no longer be dominated by a donors-recipient framework, which is still too often perceived as tainted with reminiscent paternalism. Instead, the European approach should more explicitly acknowledge and reflect its own economic and political interests in Africa, while maintaining the strong principle-based and value-driven approach that characterize EU international relations.

It is only by building on their common interests and objectives, with clearly defined priorities for action, while recognizing their differences, that truly effective strategic relations between Africa and Europe can flourish, away from some of the technocratic modalities that have too often dominated the Joint Africa-EU Strategy so far.

The economic partnership agreements (EPAs) are a case in point. The EU has too often failed to recognise the political dimension of these new economic agreements, apparently more concerned about avoiding that EPAs "capture" the Summit (like in 2007), than trying to understand the concerns expressed by some African capitals. Instead, the political and strategic dimension of the EPA dossier would be better addressed head-on, so as to jointly identify differentiated solutions reflecting the diversity of situations and interests in Africa.

This issue of GREAT Insights brings together a number of key contributions, from the heads of the European Union and African Union, respectively, as well as eminent personalities and experts, providing useful insights on achievements, new parameters and future directions that could come to shape strategic relations between Africa and Europe.

San Bilal

A Common Future for EU-Africa: Towards a dynamic partnership

José Manuel Barroso

Africa and Europe are bound by their history, their geography, their interests and even more by a common future.



The first transcontinental summit between the EU and Africa was held in Cairo in 2000, 14 years ago. Since then, our relationship has grown stronger, in a close institutional partnership based on a shared political vision and tighter cooperation in all areas. In 2007, the Joint EU-Africa Strategy further deepened this community of values and interests in the fields of peace and security, energy, mobility, governance, the fight against climate change, scientific cooperation, and social as well as human development.

Implemented for over five years now, this strategic partnership has already produced significant results in many of these areas. They should encourage us to pursue the path of our mutual commitment, to deepen our political dialogue and cooperation while taking up the developments that we have seen on both sides.

Europe and Africa have a common interest in maintaining a balanced and dynamic global partnership

Since the Lisbon Summit in 2007, the world has experienced profound changes. The emergence of new economic powers, the globalization of the financial crisis, and the revolutions of the “Arab Spring” are factors that have had a major impact on both continents. The EU has deepened its integration and a new Treaty has been adopted, bringing significant changes both institutionally and politically. Only eight kilometers from our shores, Africa has also changed with unprecedented speed. Democratic consolidation progresses, economic growth is sustained, domestic and foreign investment is rising sharply, and the development of a continental architecture for peace and security is in progress. All this shows that a positive momentum exists despite the persistence of crises and conflicts, notably in Mali, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, and in spite of the challenges that lie ahead in terms of governance and a vulnerability that still

affects part of the population. If Africa is changing, the relationship of the world to Africa is also changing due to the new economic and geopolitical reality of a multipolar world in constant motion. Africa has moved from a forgotten continent to a coveted one. This new interest in Africa is primarily based on three types of issues: economic, security, and environmental. Today more than ever, Europe and Africa have a common interest in maintaining a balanced and dynamic global partnership in order to take full advantage of new opportunities of today’s world and to meet its challenges.

Europe and Africa, despite their different situations, have to face the same challenge: promoting a model of economic growth that is both sustainable, inclusive and generates jobs. On the European side, the agenda “Europe 2020” sets out our growth strategy for 2020. The “Agenda for Change” strengthens the European development policy, focusing on sustainable growth, governance and the private sector while recalling the priority for Africa in EU cooperation. Africa has embarked for its part on the development of a strategic framework for the long term. It can also rely on a number of programs and policies in major sectors vital to its development, such as the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), or even in the area of governance, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), to name but a few.

In the light of security issues on the African continent, joint efforts, both on the regional and on the continental level, to strengthen African capacities for conflict prevention and peacekeeping have to be pursued. Peace and stability in Africa are also fundamental to help Europe fight against trafficking, piracy and terrorism. African conflicts cause, among other things, internal displacement and migration, which primarily affect neighboring countries but also Europe. It is for these reasons that the EU supports the efforts of our partners politically and financially, notably through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), but also the African Governance Architecture (AGA).

In order to have a real impact on the international agenda, Europe and Africa share the same major interest to better

coordinate our positions on the long list of our common interests in the light of global challenges such as peace, climate change, environment and biodiversity, trade and human rights. This joint work has begun, but it must be reinforced significantly. In this regard, the debates around the post-2015 global development agenda will give us another opportunity to strengthen common positions to influence the global debate. To meet these challenges, the EU-Africa partnership enables us to develop frameworks for coordinated action.

Europe and Africa, despite their different situations, have to face the same challenge: promoting a model of economic growth that is both sustainable, inclusive and generates jobs.

Dialogue and the exchange of experiences are essential on the political and institutional level, but they are even more important between civil society and the private sector. The EU intends to play an active role in this partnership, including through the implementation of financial cooperation instruments under the 2014-

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Pan-Africanism is More Important than Ever

Interview with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission

The continent cannot wait until the African standby force becomes operational in 2015 to be able to resolve conflicts like Mali, says the AU Commission chair. Inequality - at the root of these crises – must also be addressed.



Three issues - pan-Africanism, sustainable development and the empowerment of women - loom the largest in Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma plans for the African Union. Like many South African activists, Dlamini-Zuma's attachment to pan-Africanism is more practical than ideological. It was the African National Congress's ability to mobilise diplomatic and military support across the continent that enabled it to pressure the nationalist government in South Africa. The pan-African spirit, says Dlamini-Zuma, started as a means to define Africa's identity and fight against racial oppression. It then assumed a vital organisational function. It got Africans to speak with one voice during the anti-colonial struggle and in subsequent diplomatic and economic negotiations.

"Now pan-Africanism is even more important, we've got a huge population, over a billion. But if you divide us into individual countries, we are not significant," Dlamini-Zuma argues. "You can't ignore a billion plus people, but you can ignore five million people."

For her, the founding vision of a borderless Africa with a single market, freedom of movement for labour and capital must underpin the continent's development strategy. The struggle has now moved on, she says, to organising the ports, the continental highways and power plants that will change people's lives but require unprecedented cooperation.

In all this, it is Dlamini-Zuma's determination that women should play a leading role in the African Union's development, diplomacy and security work. It was the women's rights activists that pressured the authors of the AU's constitutive act to include "the effective participation of women in decision-making" as one of the central objectives of the AU. Now at least 50% of the AU commissioners must be women. Those provisions helped women's organisations such as Binta Diop's Femmes Africa Solidarité to lobby more effectively for Dlamini-Zuma's election as chair of the AU Commission last July.

TAR: Is pan-Africanism relevant in the 21st century?*

NKOSAZANA DLAMINI-ZUMA: Pan-

Africanism is still very relevant and even more important in a way. We have reserves of arable land. We have natural resources that - if we are able to turn them into wealth - can make a very prosperous continent. But if you divide us into individual countries, we are not significant. So it's very important that we integrate, and integration is an expression of pan-Africanism.

Will Africa have abolished all national borders within 50 years?

I am quite sure that by 2063 there should be free movement of people within our continent. The free movement of people plus goods and capital is critical. We should be able to drive from Cape to Cairo, go by train from Djibouti to Dakar. Even if you're borderless, if you can't drive from one place to another it means nothing.

How can the African Union (AU) help make the current economic upturn into sustained development?

I think the AU should be a catalyst. The AU should work with member states, finding partnerships within the continent and externally. We should be able to mobilise resources within the continent and diversify our partnerships. We've had partnerships with Europe and that should continue, but there are other partners in the Americas and Asia. With the African Development Bank and with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa we should look at an audit of the continent to see which skills are critical to implement the priorities. We should look at [African renaissance] as a process not as an event. It had to start with liberation because you can't have a renaissance of people who are repressed. Now it has to be liberation in terms of human development, sustainable development and modernization.

What about liberation from aid dependency?

This is very important. If you look at the important documents like the Lagos Plan of Action, part of the reason we've not been able to implement all these great initiatives was because we thought we could

implement them through aid. No country can have donor aid as the mainstay of its development. Donor aid is welcome, but it should be contributing to what we are already doing. We cannot wait for the first dollar to come from outside. Our mindset needs to change.

How can Africa tackle its own security crisis without the need for foreign intervention in places such as Mali and Libya?

We should first be looking at why are these crises taking place. If we were to address truly the issue of inclusive development and participative democracy, we will get fewer of these crises. The equitable distribution of wealth, participative democracy and inclusive economic development are going to be key to sustainable peace and stability. We also have to look at what can we do in the short term as Africans to be able to have a rapid response to these crises. If you recall in my opening [statement] at the [January] summit, I did say that we need to look at that because this issue of the standby force - which is going to be operationalized in 2015 - does not help [in the] problems [we are having] now. As we celebrate the 50th anniversary [of the Organisation of African Unity/AU], we should be reflecting on that.

Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is the Chairperson of the African Union Commission


**The African Report (TAR). This article is a reprint of Jobson, Kantai, 2013. Pan-Africanism is more important than ever-Dlamini-Zuma, The Africa Report No 50, 20 May 2013. Reprinted in this GREAT issue with the kind permission of TAR.*

The article can also be found here: <http://www.theafricareport.com/North-Africa/pan-africanism-is-more-important-than-ever-dlamini-zuma.html>

The Current Geopolitical Dynamics in Africa and the Role of Partners like the EU: Towards a shift in Africa-Europe strategic relations in the 21st century and beyond

Joaquim Chissano

The interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other. The political, economic and social well-being of present and future generations depends more than ever on cooperation between all members of the international community.



Africa's strategic relations with the European Union are guided by a number of declarations and pronouncements elaborated at the level of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subsequently the African Union (AU). These include among others the African Charter on Human and People's Right (Nairobi 1981) the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) 1985, the OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World (1990), as well as the Charter on Popular Participation in Development adopted in Arusha, Tanzania (1990). Additionally, the leadership on the Continent adopted the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (1991), the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (1993), the Cairo Agenda for Action (1995), and the African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis (1997). To these, we must also include the Algiers decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000), the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (2001). While all the issues enumerated in the various declarations and pronouncements remain, by and large, relevant in Africa's contemporary international relations, this paper argues for a new strategic shift in Africa-Europe relations in the 21st Century and beyond.

There is therefore critical need for a strategic shift from supply driven to demand driven approaches to development assistance....

The need for a strategic shift in the relations between Africa and Europe is informed by the fact that the political and economic landscapes in Africa are changing. The nature and orientation of the change is largely influenced by new geo-political dynamics on the continent as well as the embracement of new political and social dispensation based on democratic values systems. There is, therefore, no doubt that these new reality calls for a new configuration of relations with Africa's strategic partners, particularly the European Union (EU). Consequently, there is an emerging consensus that the traditional system of North-South relations, which also characterised relations between Europe and Africa, has lost its relevance. It has increasingly become moribund as a result of the profound social, political and economic changes taking place in Africa. Currently, the discernible trend is that the traditional system is giving way to new forms of international cooperation largely influenced by the dynamics of globalization. New actors have emerged with the new configuration of power in the world and the move from a bipolar to a multipolar world is increasingly influencing development thinking in the contemporary international economic relations. To this end, there is also a general consensus that what is required, given the fundamental changes that have taken place in the world, is the imperative of a new paradigm that seeks to address the profound global challenges in a more holistic way.

Against this background and from an African perspective, relations between Africa and Europe both in the context of international economic relations and development thinking have entered a new phase which requires, of necessity, a post-bipolar framework for addressing the inequalities of the past towards the establishment of a more equitable international economic order. It goes without saying that if the certainties of the past are being questioned it is legitimate to work towards a new development

paradigm. For example, it is increasingly clear that the traditional aid system of donor-recipient relations is being replaced by a new system of international cooperation that reserves a key role for the collective management of global challenges and the pursuit of common interests in a multipolar world. There is therefore critical need for a strategic shift from supply driven to demand driven approaches to development assistance, especially in the context of Africa-Europe relations.

The new strategic partnership between Africa and Europe must take into account the necessity for a win-win situation in a globalized world.

Within this perspective, the world must now, of necessity, resort to new ways and methods for restructuring the system of multilateral development assistance and explore new tools for managing the emerging new regional and global challenges. These include managing the environment, the optimal and rational use of natural resources as well as the promotion of sustainable development that is predicated upon advancing inclusive growth to bring about a fairer distribution of resources, social justice, democracy and respect for human rights. There is also the drive to safeguard human security, to provide global public goods and to restructure international system and mechanisms to create a new framework of global governance. Indeed, from an African perspective, the drive towards addressing the asymmetries of the current international

system in a new equitable world order requires new responses at all levels.

Consequently, the desired strategic shift must take cognizant of the imperative need to move from supply side to demand side support in development assistance with full ownership of policy and tools for addressing and managing the contemporary discernible institutional conundrum in the relationship between the African Union and the European Union. It is not so much about budgetary support but rather about a more holistic approach to development assistance that has the capacity and intrinsic political will to address the multiple social and economic challenges facing the continent in the interest of both Africa and Europe. This provides the justification for the required strategic shift in Africa-Europe relations in the 21 Century and beyond. The new strategic partnership between Africa and Europe must take into account the necessity for a win-win situation in a globalized world.

....the interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other....

In this perspective of Africa-EU relations it is therefore important to take cognizant of the decisions and declaration of the Twenty-Six Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 9 to 11 July 1990. The Twenty-Six Ordinary Session of the OAU undertook a critical review of the political, social and economic situation of the African Continent in the light of the rapid changes that were taking place in the world and their impact on Africa. In particular, the Assembly took note of the changing East-West relations from confrontation to cooperation, the socio-economic and political changes in Eastern Europe, the steady move towards the political monetary union of Western Europe, the increasing global tendency towards regional integration and the establishment of trading and economic blocks, as well as the advances in science and technology.

In conclusion it is important to emphasise that any new perspective on Africa EU Relations must draw inspirations and be grounded on the understanding of the first Africa-Europe Summit which was convened

under the aegis of the OAU and the EU, in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt from 3-4 April 2000. At that summit it was solemnly declared that “over the centuries, ties have existed between Africa and Europe, which have led to many areas of cooperation, covering political, economic, social, as well as culture and linguistic domains. There was unanimous recognition that these relations have developed on the basis of shared values of strengthening representative and participatory democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, pluralism, international peace and security, political stability and confidence among nations. The summit also recognized that, in the light of the rapid globalisation trends, it was imperative to strengthen cooperation between Africa and Europe in the mutually enlighten interests of all.

It was the common understanding of the summit that in order to give a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe for the Twenty-first Century, in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance, and cooperation between the two regions, it was necessary to renew the commitment to the basic objective of strengthening the already existing links of political, economic, and cultural understanding through the creation of an environment and an effective framework for promoting a constructive dialogue on economic, political, social and development issues. In this regard, the summit stressed the importance of regional economic cooperation and integration as an efficient strategy for the orderly and coordinated development of the African continent. This was a clear recognition of the important correlation between political stability, peace and security on one hand and regional integration on the other.

The Summit recalled that Africa and the European Union have traditionally been important trade partners and therefore reaffirmed commitment to strengthen partnership by progressively removing barriers to trade between both sides, including non-tariff barriers and enhancing cooperation in all trade related areas. In other words, the Summit reaffirmed commitment to trade liberalisation in the framework of a rules-based multilateral trading system which all nations should benefit from. This obviously is in line with the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) adopted by the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in May 1974. The Declaration for a New International Economic Order represented a new determination of the international community to correct the asymmetry that exists between the North and South. It was a solemn proclamation of

global determination to work urgently for the establishment of a NIEO based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations.

....the political, economic and social well-being of present and future generations depends more than ever on cooperation between all members of the international community....

Significantly, current events have brought into sharp focus the realization that the interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other; that the close interrelationship between the prosperity of the developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries; and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent parts. International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries. Thus the political, economic and social well-being of present and future generations depends more than ever on cooperation between all members of the international community on the basis of sovereign equality and the removal of the disequilibrium that exists between them.

Author

Joaquim Chissano is the Former President of the Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of the Joaquim Chissano Foundation.

The EU and Africa in the XXIst Century: Time for a new deal

Daniel Bach

It is not too late for the EU to adjust its policies to a rising African continent. This should involve the definition of a more pragmatic set of priorities, based on the clarification of European interests.



The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was launched nearly a decade and a half ago, yet the pending negotiations of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and regions still show no sign of significant progress in most cases. The issue has been a bone of contention in EU-Africa relations and is about to become a textbook illustration of Europe's limited ability to impose its views, a sharp contrast with the post-cold war decade. Brussels seems to be belatedly discovering that African states have recovered margins of negotiation, an unprecedented situation since the early 1970s.

The long shadow of Lomé...

The Lomé Convention, with its initial ambition to become a model for the treatment of the North-South divide, is now history, yet its institutional and ideational impact on current EU-Africa relations lingers on. Lomé was born out of a strategic and federating concern among Europeans: the quest for secure access to energy resources and minerals. This resulted in an unprecedented round of negotiation with the ACPs, emboldened by a favourable international context.¹ The outcome was a holistic approach to development that, in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo (and in the context of cold war rivalries) was expected to offer a model for the re-ordering of North-South relations in exchange for dependable access to oil and other strategic minerals. This trade-off was soon to lose much of its substance as energy and commodities renewed with their boom and bust cycles. The enthusiasm that had surrounded the conclusion of Lomé was also dampened by the failure of the Paris and Cancun conferences on the New International Economic Order (NIEO): the Lomé Convention kept being renewed, but it was increasingly associated with unfulfilled ambitions and an outdated conception of development.² By the early 1990s, preferential access given to ACP exports had not prevented these from losing ground on the EU market due to competition from South-East Asian and Latin American producers. More generally, if one excludes Mauritius (due to its skilful management of the resources drawn from the Sugar protocol), the ACP's aid and trade regime failed to stimulate a diversification of African economies away from commodities.

What remains from the golden years of Lomé's generous trade-off is the elaborate (and costly) architecture of the joint EU-ACP Assemblies and Councils. They still formally preserve the illusion of a dynamic and

intense web of 'partnerships' and shared interest, a sharp contrast with their lack of substantive achievements beyond public diplomacy events and the reconduction of the institutional *status quo*.

Streamlining at work: Cotonou, the EPAs and the JAES

The unimpressive record of the joint institutions echoes Europe's downgraded representations of Africa as a "distant abroad" since the end of the cold war.³ The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), also reflects, in its own way, EU perceptions of Africa as a region too close to be ignored, but now devoid of much strategic or economic significance.

It is therefore high time for the EU to operate a Copernician revolution. This should involve the definition of a more pragmatic set of priorities...

Against such a backstage, the Brussels EU-Africa Summit of April 2014, will find it difficult to convince Africans that the 'strategic partnership' launched in 2007 is more than a placebo. The Summit may be conceived as a mere exercise in public diplomacy, but in such a case the 'aura' of the EU is likely to be dimmed by demonstrations and public protests, as was the case during the Lisbon summit of 2007. It is therefore high time for the EU to operate a Copernician revolution. This should involve the definition of a more pragmatic set of priorities, based on the identification of what European interests are (or could be) in Africa, and a departure from the assumption that sub-Saharan Africa is still Europe's backyard.

The impact of the EPA negotiations on region-building in Africa has been disastrous and this deserves urgent attention in Brussels.

The CPA was signed in 2000, following half a decade of negotiations that revolved around two overlapping bullet points: streamlining and *banalisation*. Cotonou initially took its cue from the agreements concluded with the post-communist states of East and Central Europe. As a substitute to the end of the WTO waivers that allowed Lomé's non-reciprocal trade preferences system, a generic offer was also made to all the LDCs - the famous Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, granting duty-free and quota-free market access to all LDCs exports to the EU except arms. Cotonou purported to provide the roadmap towards a new and

original inter-hemispheric partnership based on trade liberalisation. In effect, the CPA rested on a deeply flawed assumption. While the prospects of joining the EU conferred legitimacy to the succession of drastic reforms imposed on the East and Central European candidates, in the case of the ACPs, it is the lure of 'partnership', as enshrined in EPAs, requiring reciprocal free trade, that was meant to be the driving force.

Africa's loss of strategic significance was further highlighted by its transformation into a middle ground for consensus building among Europeans and with the United States. By the time the G-8 summit met in Gleneagles in July 2005, Africa's ongoing depiction as "as a scar on the conscience of the world"⁴ had turned it into the perfect continent for consensus building over normative concerns.⁵ Characteristically, while images of a benign West being undermined by a ruthless and unscrupulous China kept flourishing in the Western media, whether or not to engage with China in Africa was not on the agendas - in Britain, the subject was ignored by the contributors to the Commission for Africa report (Blair report); in Brussels, the new strategy for EU-Africa relations released in October 2005 by the European Commission carefully avoided the issue.⁶

By 2007, the mood seemed about to change as the EU Commissioner for Development publicly stigmatized the dissemination of moralising representations of Africa, while expressing the EU's commitment to a new and strategic partnership with Africa. Launched with fanfare in the aftermath of the EU-Africa Lisbon summit, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) carried the ambition to promote a rejuvenation of EU-Africa relations that, we were repeatedly told, should involve a radical departure from the past. Six years later an impressive array of meetings has taken place, but no tangible results have been achieved. The JAES has instead, due to the sheer number of priority areas, highlighted the lack of any strategic focus in the conduct of the EU's Africa 'policy'. Yet, throughout the past decade, European 'foreign policy' towards Africa has increasingly revolved around concerns at the porosity and securitization of the EU's Southern frontiers. Such concerns have also exercised a pervasive and insidious influence on interactions with Africa.⁷

The EU and Africa: back to the future...

The stalled EPA negotiations and the EU's failure to instil strategic relevance into the JAES invite to draw lessons from the pragmatic, proactive and holistic engagement of the Chinese, Indians, South

Koreans, Brazilians or Turks, lured by the resources and markets of Africa, but also by fresh opportunities for coalition-building within international institutions. The EU's narrow interpretation of WTO compatibility bears the mark of a period during which African states had a limited capacity to negotiate internationally. This is no longer

The JAES has, due to the sheer number of priority areas, highlighted the lack of any strategic focus in the conduct of the EU's Africa 'policy'.

the case, even though growth rates remain closely linked to favorable terms of trade for their commodities and ongoing growth in the large emerging economies. Such a nexus generates opportunities for accumulation and entrepreneurship that no longer exclusively revolve around 'capturing' the state or seeking its protection. At the same time, the spectre of growth without (socially inclusive and ecologically sustainable) development still looms at large and this is where the experience of Europe remains highly relevant.

Largely spared by the 2008-9 financial crisis, sub-Saharan Africa is currently offering to investors, traders and immigrants opportunities that have kept being upgraded due to the 'high risk [with] low returns' equation associated with the Eurozone.⁸ The impact of the EPA negotiations on region-building in Africa has been disastrous and this deserves urgent attention in Brussels. Failing to do so will result in the dissemination of images of bureaucratic arrogance and 'provincialism' vis a vis sub-Saharan Africa. Within a few months of the Brussels EU-Africa Summit, it is high time for the EU to take advantage of the current momentum to reset its priorities and prepare the ground for the future.

Notes

1. See for instance the testimony of Nigeria's former Minister of Economic Reconstruction and Development Adebayo Adedeji, "The travails of Regional Integration in Africa", in Adekeye Adebajo & Kaye Whiteman, eds., *The EU and Africa; from Eurafrique to Afro-Europa*, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012, pp. 89-90.
2. Anna Dickson, "The Unimportance of

Trade Preferences', in Karin Arts and Anna Dickson (eds), *EU Development Co-operation: From Model to Symbol*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press & Palgrave, pp 42-59; Daniel Bach, "Un ancrage à la dérive: la Convention de Lomé", *Revue Tiers Monde*, XXXIV, no 136, October-December 1993, pp. 749-758; also John Ravenhill, *Collective Clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

3. Daniel Bach, "The frontier as concept and metaphor" in *Emerging Africa: critical transitions* (special issue) *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 20, no 1 (April 2013), p. 3 ff.
4. British Prime Minister Tony Blair as quoted in BBC News, 2 October 2001; T. Blair during a visit to South Africa in 2006 declared in a similar vein: 'The world must judge us on Africa', cited in *The Independent*, 12 February 2006.
5. As the "year of Africa" came to close, a rare dissenting call originated from a US bipartisan report released in November; Anthony Lake et al., *More than Humanitarianism, A Strategic US approach towards Africa*, New York: US Council on Foreign Relations, Task force report 56, 2005.
6. The communication merely acknowledged China's rising importance to Africa, observing that "China merits special attention given its economic weight and political influence"; Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Brussels: EC, 12 October 2005.
7. Daniel Bach, "The European Union and Africa: Trade liberalisation, constructive disengagement and the securitization of Europe's External frontiers", *Africa Review*, vol 3, 1, 2011, p. 33 ff; also Damien Helly, "The EU and Africa since the Lisbon summit of 2007: Continental drift or widening cracks?" *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 20, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 137-157.
8. Invest AD, *Into Africa, Institutional Investor Intentions to 2016*, Invest AD & Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), January 2012 at <http://investad.com/reports/intoafrica.html> (accessed 12 July 2013); See also Ernst & Young, *Looking beyond the obvious: globalization and new opportunities for growth*, London, 2013.

Author

Professor Daniel C. Bach is Director of Research (CNRS) at the Emile Durkheim Centre, Sciences Po Bordeaux.

Towards a 4G for Africa-Europe Relations

Faten Aggad-Clerx and Isabelle Ramdoo

The relationship between Africa and Europe is centuries old. There are three generations of relationship, which evolved as the economic and political realities on both continents, and more globally, as the centre of political gravity changed with time. Now it is time for a 4th G.



The *first generation* that followed independence was largely focused on creating new rules to guide the new relationship between former colonial powers and their former colonies. It was under this phase that frameworks such as the Yaounde Convention were launched, essentially to manage trade and development relations. It was mostly unilateral, based on trade preferences with special treatment for few commodities and had a strong aid component. The *second generation* came with the end of the Cold War: it warranted the revision of relations in order to adapt to the new international realities of a multipolar world. New concepts were introduced in the Africa – Europe relationship, such as political dialogue. This generation saw the move from Lomé to the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 and a subsequent launch of the Europe Strategy for Africa in 2005.

Continuing shifts in the international balance of power post-2000 as well as changes within Africa itself have compelled Europe and Africa to, once again, look more critically at their partnership. They both agreed that a more 'political' partnership that moves beyond a relationship of aid was a necessity. This spirit resulted in the birth of the *third generation* relationship, which was marked by the launch of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in Lisbon in 2007. The JAES was quite innovative in the sense that it was the first *joint* partnership, where an attempt was made to level the balance of dialogue for mutual benefits between the two partners. However, several observers and policy-makers, including within the relevant European and African institutions, largely agree that results are mixed, at best: this *third generation* partnership fell short of delivering a new type of relationship and did not manage to contribute to the establishment of a true political partnership, between equals.¹ All agree that the basis was laid but that more needs to be done, and that in order to improve the relationship, both partners will have to be bold, ambitious and realistic.

Today, the reshuffling in geopolitical power relations again calls for a renewal. More than ever, both Africa and Europe are multiplying and deepening new forms of relationships with their respective strategic partners. While

it is not new for Africa to conjugate with Europe's foreign policy, on the European side, the reverse is however not usual. This new situation therefore calls for profound strategic rethinking of the essence of the Africa-Europe partnership. A fourth generation (4G) relationship, based on the spirit of the Lisbon Summit of 2007, is now necessary to transform the relationship and move towards a more ambitious deal, where the value added of each partner is well underscored.

What does it take to make a change?

There are *two fundamental questions* Africa and Europe need to address in order to steer the partnership towards a mutually satisfying framework.

The *first* relates to their respective strategies towards one another. What does Europe expect of its engagement with Africa and where does Africa see Europe fitting in the new constellation of international partners? What are they prepared to do differently, and how far are they willing to go? For instance, in a crisis-stricken Europe, the 'East' seems to be a more attractive commercial partner to Africa, as illustrated by the stagnating share of Africa in Europe's external trade and the declining share of the EU in Africa's trade (see comparative graphs below). How does Europe adapt its economic and trade strategy so that the later fits Africa's own interests and agenda while at the same time continuing to capture new markets that Africa is and will increasingly be providing in the upcoming years? The same applies to Africa – how does the continent reconcile its own economic transformation with engaging with Europe as a privileged partner? Similarly, as many African countries' decrease their dependency on aid, and as Europe increasingly is engaged into a "beyond aid" debate, how will both partners address the financial issues in their relationship?

The *second* relates to the added-value of the partnership. Europe – Africa relationship is characterized by what looks like big noodle-bowl of competing and not-always-coherent partnerships, making it complex to understand. These frameworks have been developed in specific historical contexts and

have evolved with changing international and continental dynamics. They continue today to co-exist and have varying degrees of ambitions and different objectives and agendas that sometimes seem competing or conflicting. However, despite the Joint-Africa EU Partnership (JAES), which is the overall framework for common policy orientation between the two continents, little effort has been done so far by either side to harmonise all these different frameworks. It shows the underlying complexities of such grand projects. This will have to be addressed if the *4G partnership* aspires at delivering more ambitious results.

A realistic approach to improving the partnership

How to go about it? Certainly instilling 4G into the relationship is a necessity to redynamise and rejuvenate the relationship between the two partners, beyond the current scope, which seems to be running out of steam. But then, which route to take? Should a 4G Africa-EU relations completely break with the past or should it adopt a softer approach to embrace and consolidate existing frameworks to make them more effective and adaptable to the new geopolitics?

Option 1: Kicking over the anthill

One could be tempted to say that Europe and Africa should be bold enough to make a complete U-turn in their relationship to reinitiate a partnership on new grounds. While this is possible, it requires a profound and radical change in the nature, scale and scope of the relationship on several fronts: mindset, economic and political. In addition, a partnership of equal has costs: it means assuming all what comes with the notion of equality, including financial, economic and political equality. But how far is each partner ready and capable of cutting old habits of (inter)dependency? While it seems that Africa has largely benefited from unilateral trade preferences and aid support from Europe, on the other hand, this type of relationship was very convenient for Europe to drive its own political agenda, interests and values in Africa in return.

Today, although many African countries are performing well economically, many still remain heavily reliant on development support from Europe. And Europe needs Africa more than ever, at least to maintain its presence in Africa, and as geopolitical power shifts East and South. It is therefore doubtful whether this could be a feasible option. So although both are seeking a new partnership, there are obviously limits as to how far they are politically willing to go to make this happen.

Option 2: Fixing the current relationship

The second option is to fix the current relationship by strengthening certain components of the current partnership. While this is a more politically acceptable option, it


may actually require more political courage to fix the current relationship because the legacy will tend to stand in the way, raising expectations for the future, on both sides. For this to be meaningful, it needs innovative, out-of-the box tools and methods as well as strategic refocusing on fewer, but mutually agreed priorities where both have a real desire to deepen the relationship and are equally committed to and capable of delivering promptly. Both need to identify areas where, as continental institutions, they have a real value added in working together. But the risk of building on the existing construction is that the edifice is likely to have weak foundations and therefore potentially prone to more fractures should there be another contextual change in future.

The way forward

In any case, Africa and Europe have no choice but to step up their relationship beyond political rhetoric and grand declarations. To be meaningful and deliver on results it will require mutual respect and trust, strong two-way commitments, ownership, willingness to compromise, reciprocity (win-win give and take) and shared responsibility. These must be well rooted in focused priorities, shared by both parties.

Shared responsibility and two-way commitments will require some significant paradigm shifts in the way of engagement on both sides. It will require bold decisions to narrow down the scope of the relationship to focus on few but achievable priorities in order to step up ambitions to deliver on a relationship that has a real value added. Too many will spread efforts and resources too thinly and lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Perhaps EU and Africa need to build upon these existing frameworks and establish the principle of subsidiarity, whereby the continent-to-continent partnership focuses only on those areas that can be best addressed at the highest political level and leave the rest to those frameworks.

Graphs 1 and 2: Africa external trade 2000 and 2012²



Notes

1. Jean Bossuyt and Andrew Sherriff, 2010, *What's Next for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy?* Perspectives on Revitalising and Innovative Framework
2. Data extracted from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) see: <http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/>


Authors

Faten Aggad-Clerx is the Manager of ECDPM's Africa's Change Dynamics Program.

Isabelle Ramdoo is the Deputy Head of ECDPM's Economic Transformation and Trade Program.

Visuals in this article were prepared by Sahara El Fassi, Junior Policy Officer in the Africa's Change Dynamics Program.

Graphs 3 and 4: EU external trade 2000 and 2012²



How can African Countries Capitalise on the current Geopolitical Changes?

Carlos Lopes

In the new landscape of multipolar partnerships, Africa needs a coherent strategy so that its development is not compromised by competition amongst potential partners.



This year Africa celebrates fifty years since the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); never before has the continent been so poised to reap the benefit of its enormous resources. Sweeping political and economic changes over half a century have reformed global power structures, reconfigured international relations and led to serious rethinking of development paradigms.

With the abundance of resources and the rising global demand for them, Africa must manage its resources carefully.

It is only befitting to recognise the significance of the African Union's role in this transition. The OAU established in 1963, laid the foundation for the unity of the African continent. It aimed to rid the continent of remnants of colonialism and restore Africa's dignity and pride after centuries under domination; promote the integration of the continent; and defend its interest in a Cold War arena. As the continent evolved, the OAU, heralded as the most notable result of Pan-Africanism, was replaced by the Africa Union in 2002. The African Union symbolised a new era for the continent aiming at accelerating the process of economic integration, resolving socio-political problems and intensifying continental unity, to enable Africa to play a more meaningful role in the global economy.

In just over a decade, Africa has experienced growth from only 2.1% in the 1990's to 5% in the past decade. The future outlook remains promising as Africa's economy is projected to continue growing, despite global financial

market turmoil. Investor confidence has also been revived, brought about by drivers such as an increased prevalence of peace, democratic elections and improved governance. As a result, Africa has attracted more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). By 2011, FDI projects in Africa grew by as much as 27%. In the first quarter of 2012 FDI inflows stood at USD80 billion and are projected to reach over USD150 billion by 2015. How then can Africa capitalise on the current trends?

Africans can take control of their natural resources.

Africa's industrial potential had been stifled by the legacies of Africa's colonialism, which left behind weak institutions and an infrastructure designed to enhance extraction of its resources. Structural adjustment Programmes had particularly negative effects on technological accumulation, human capital development and export performance. However, Africa's resources wealth, account for approximately three quarters of the world's platinum supply; half of its diamonds and chromium; one fifth of gold and uranium supplies; just over half of the world's uncultivated arable land, with the potential to become the breadbasket for the world; and it is home to gas and oil production in over thirty countries. With the abundance of resources and the rising global demand for them, Africa must manage its resources carefully.

Currently, there are far too many economies in Africa that are dependent on the production and export of primary commodities. These are generating prosperity and development in other regions instead of in Africa, exporting jobs and opportunities. The continent runs the risk of marginalising its own role in international trade if it does not add value to its commodities. Commodity-based industrialisation therefore offers the scope for value addition as well as forward and

backward linkages. Ethiopia's leather industry and Nigeria's oil supply industry provide good, yet random, examples of linkages that are not only developing, but also deepening into high value added activities. Such initiatives must become the norm.

Africa's economic future will be determined by how it designs and implements effective policies to promote industrialisation. There is an urgent need to address infrastructure constraints and bottlenecks; facilitate the development of the commodity sector and linkages, boost availability of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, provide job training in higher artisanal skills and deploy data driven evidence to inform planning. These all-present opportunities for Africa and its partners to better collaborate without depriving Africa of the benefits of its resource boom.

Interest in Africa from a larger pool of partners is favorable to the continent and is creating choice.

Africa's demographic dividend

Africa's population is projected to double, attaining close to 2.3 billion people over the next forty years. This will represent about half of the globe's total population growth. Africa is also the only continent with a significantly growing youth population. Projections suggest that in less than three generations, 41% of the world's youth will be African. By 2050, Africa's youth will constitute over a quarter of the world's labor force. By the end of the century, the continent will have the lowest dependency ratio in the world.

In addition, Africa is experiencing an unprecedented rate of urban growth. Projections indicate that between 2010 and 2025, some African cities will account for up to 85% of the population. This will mean a transition from a rural to a predominantly urban society, with the largest cities on the

The once dominant influence of the West is diminishing and it will have to metamorphose a new relationship with Africa. India, China and new players, have increased their engagement in Africa in rather dramatic ways transforming Africa's traditional trade and investment relations.

continent, Lagos and Kinshasa, growing to 15 million people by 2025, and others such as Dar-es-Salaam reaching 7 million. Cities in Africa generate approximately 55% of the continent's total GDP relative to developed countries cities that generate approximately 90% of their GDP. Being cognisant of the related challenges, such as the need to ensure essential services to cater for this phenomenon, the opportunities for economic growth, poverty reduction and human development are profound. Approximately 54% of Africa's youth is currently unemployed and more than three-quarter live on less than 2 dollar (US\$) a day. A correlation and lessons to learn can be drawn from Asian emerging markets, where 40% of its rapid economic growth between 1965 and 1990 was attributable to an increase in the working age population.

However, a youth population of such magnitude also indicates that the real challenge of the 21st century is the ability to address this demographic imbalance in a manner that will preserve the interests of future generations. A demographic dividend is needed. Inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's seminal work on the Social Contract, there is need for a new intergenerational social contract that is driven by the necessity to balance the needs of the current and future generations; between a young Africa and an aging population elsewhere in the world.

African partnerships with new emerging economies

The once dominant influence of the West is diminishing and it will have to metamorphose a new relationship with Africa. India, China and new players, have increased their engagement in Africa in rather dramatic ways transforming Africa's traditional trade and investment relations. The largest increases in foreign direct investment to Africa in recent years have come from the BRICS, targeting Africa's natural resources, from oil in Angola, Algeria, Nigeria and Sudan to mining in Niger, Mauritania, Zambia and Liberia. It is however a very partial view of what is going on. There is significant diversification of investments. For example, India is investing in social services, textiles and medium sized enterprises as well as technology and China is investing heavily in Africa's infrastructure and services. Ways of doing business have been revolutionised accompanied by advances in technology.

This new paradigm of engagement reflects cooperation in which partners see themselves as peers in mutually beneficial relationships. Interest in Africa from a larger pool of partners is favorable to the continent and is creating choice. Africa in turn, is well positioned to be a more assertive player in the global arena and to capitalise from the different development models and comparative advantages offered by the array of partners. To benefit fully, Africa must strengthen its institutions, take the lead in negotiating, designing and implementing strategies with partners to leverage their comparative advantages as well as broker good deals. Africa must transform from being perceived as a price taker to a price maker.

The Africa – EU future

Europe and Africa have been important to each other with ties stemming from their history and geography and the fact that their relationship connects two continents. Europe has been more of a trade, development and investment partner while Africa has been a crucial source of hard and soft commodities for Europe, such as strategic metals and minerals and captive market. Having said this, perhaps the most successful area in its long partnership has been in the thematic area of peace and security.

The EU-Africa partnership over the last decade has evolved under framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy from one that was criticised for being an unbalanced donor-recipient relationship to one that promised a profound change in its approach to Africa. In 2007, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was

premised on principles of equal participation and representation, as well as to treat Africa as one. However, development and political cooperation between the two continents has not resulted in any fundamental transformation; instead the gap has only become wider. This is attributable to factors such as dwindling development budgets that have been impacted by the Euro zone's sovereign debt crisis; in turn the financial expectations under the Joint Strategy have not been delivered. The emergence of new economies, rivals Europe's historic role and style of development aid cooperation in Africa. Several partnership agreements have also mushroomed since such as the Cotonou Agreement, fragmenting the strategy.

Africa must transform from being perceived as a price taker to a price maker.

The 4th Africa – EU summit therefore comes at an opportune time for both continents to develop consensus on what they want and how to transform the Africa –EU relationship. In the new landscape of multipolar partnerships, Africa needs a coherent strategy so that its development is not compromised by competition amongst potential partners. In doing so, mutual accountability, mechanisms of enforcement, mechanisms that foster compliance of multinational firms to international norms and standards should be indispensable features for the future partnerships. It is time for Africa to capitalise on the geopolitical changes but by driving and owning the process.

Author

Dr. Carlos Lopes is the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

Integrating Mauritius in Sub-Saharan Africa: A private sector perspective

Raj Makoond

In Mauritius, over the last 5 years, policymakers and the corporate sector felt that an 'Africa agenda' had to be built and pursued. Consequently, an Africa agenda is under construction and, as such, Mauritius is poised for a very long and meaningful partnership with Africa. This agenda will be pursued in collaboration with other partner countries that share common interests.



In Mauritius, the time 'to think' of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa is past. Today, as economic opportunities increase and as foreign partners find their way in Africa, the time is to 'act' and 'to do' business in the region. In this context, both policymakers and the business community have developed a shared understanding on the urgency for an accelerated economic integration with Africa and have therefore embarked on a wide range of actions, meant to improve the business environment and market access conditions.

This paradigm shift has taken place because of a convergence of both the 'push' and 'pull' effects towards Africa. The global financial crisis, the Euro zone recession and the Chindia context drove the 'push' effect while the growing business opportunities in Africa formed the basis of the 'pull' effect. At the same time, the reforms undertaken over the recent years in Mauritius with respect to fiscal harmonisation, business facilitation and labour environment have gradually enabled it to position itself as a platform between Asia and Africa.

Mauritius' initiatives to access opportunities in Africa

At present, around over 75 local companies have invested in some 20 countries in Africa. In 2012, 58% of total outward investment from Mauritius went to Africa. For the first five months of 2013, the outward investment to Africa had reached 68% of total outward foreign direct investment. The private sector launched the Mauritius Africa Business Club (MABC) in October 2012 with the main objective of networking business interests into Africa.

The Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) is active in internationalising the stock market and moving up the value chain of products listed and traded. It has reviewed its legal framework to enable the listing of global companies and the trading and settlement of products in US dollars, Euro, and Pounds

Sterling to position Mauritius as a prominent gateway linking Europe/USA/Asia to Africa. The SEM is also accredited to the African Securities Exchanges Association (ASEA) and the Committee of SADC Stock Exchange (COSSE). Financial institutions including banks are developing financial instruments for the region.

Pro-Africa policies pursued by the Mauritian authorities are significantly on the rise. In 2012, the Board of Investment (BOI), the investment promotion agency of Mauritius, launched the Africa Centre of Excellence (ACE) with the main objective of encouraging and supporting outward investment to Africa. The BOI has signed a Memorandum

...as economic opportunities increase and as foreign partners find their way in Africa, the time is to 'act' and 'to do' business in the region.

of Understanding with investment promotion agencies in 20 countries already with a view to facilitating information and joint ventures for Mauritian investors with businesses in these countries. In the same vein, the Government of Mauritius has expanded its network of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAAs) and Investment Protection Promotion Agreement (IPPAs), and, at present, Mauritius has signed 18 DTAAs and 19 IPPAs. The country is presently negotiating 6 new DTAAs and 2 new IPPAs.

Manufacturing companies currently operating in the Mauritius Freeport, which export 85% of their production to Africa, enjoy favourable

fiscal incentives: they are exempted from the corporate tax of 15%. Enterprise Mauritius (EM), the export promotion agency has organised around 15 road shows in selected African countries during the last 12 months. EM is focusing its annual trade fair, Maitex on Africa and last year, the fair attracted over 500 participants from the Africa region.

What strategy to increase the presence of Mauritius in the region?

In order to enhance the regional integration strategy, Mauritius is applying the interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) with EU together with Seychelles, Madagascar and Zimbabwe. The latter is based on the already agreed COMESA Common External Tariff. Although mostly driven towards maintaining market access in Europe, the IEPA allows countries to source their inputs from the region through 'cumulation' provisions, and therefore is expected to encourage regional value chains.

Mauritius firmly believes in the virtue of deep regional economic integration as a vector integration in the global market and more importantly, as a means to foster scale economies of small fragmented economies. In this context, it is an active member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and is fully implementing their respective free trade areas. It is also active in negotiations in trade in services, increasingly viewed as essential element for business operations and for the movement of professionals. Furthermore, Mauritius is also very active in the tripartite Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations between the EAC, SADC and COMESA, meant to address the practical challenges of regional overlapping memberships and to facilitate the movement of goods and services among the three regional economic communities and to harmonise regulations and standards.

Moreover, in an effort to promote even greater and faster trade and investment, the Governments of Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles and Zambia, launched an Accelerated Program for Economic Integration (APEI) at a Ministerial meeting held in Seychelles, in September 2012. The participating countries emphasised that implementing an accelerated program for economic integration is necessary to improve competitiveness, enhance growth and create jobs in the region. The purpose of the APEI is to support countries that are willing and able to advance their economic reforms at a faster pace to do so. It is viewed a complementary element to the existing regional economic initiatives (SADC, COMESA, Tripartite) and as an initiative for a group of fast-movers to champion the dynamics in few priority sectors. Closer collaboration among such a group of reform-oriented but diverse countries will also create more scope for peer-to-peer learning and knowledge sharing. The countries agreed to accelerate reforms and pursue closer collaboration through:

- Elimination of barriers to trade in goods;
- Promotion of trade in services;
- Improvement of business regulatory environment;
- Improvement in trade facilitation; and
- Peer-to-peer learning and knowledge sharing.

The approach of APEI is a very pragmatic one with the participating countries agreeing

on measures to implement the five pillars identified at the first Ministerial meeting on an agreed timeframe against measurable performance indicators. Each of the five countries has already established their National Coordinating Working Group (NCWG), which will coordinate their respective activities at the national level.

...implementing an accelerated program for economic integration is necessary to improve competitiveness, enhance growth and create jobs in the region.

The NCWGs will then harmonise their respective activities at the level of the Regional Coordinating Committee, which will monitor progress with respect to the time bound commitments undertaken by the participating countries. Regular video conferences and technical meetings are being organised on a regular basis to discuss and clarify the activities of the APEI. The APEI, which is an innovative approach, may well become a model for accelerated regional integration. It is open to any other countries willing to speed up their integration process.

Way forward

In Mauritius, over the last 5 years, policymakers and the corporate sector felt that the 'push' and 'pull' effects towards Africa were so strong that an 'Africa agenda' had to be built and pursued. Furthermore, there was a quasi-unanimity that despite the systemic constraints, in particular related to the infrastructure deficits and governance challenges, and the challenges of investing in Africa for a small country like Mauritius, the latter had a clear competitive advantage because of its history of doing business with mainland Africa and its geo-strategic location as a pathway between Asia and Africa. Consequently, an Africa agenda is under construction and, as such, Mauritius is poised for a very long and meaningful partnership with Africa. This agenda will be pursued in collaboration with other partner countries that share common interests. We are at the very dawn of this journey which will re-design the economic model of Mauritius and Africa will be a key component in this new model.

Author

Raj Makoond is the Director of the Joint Economic Council in Mauritius and a Board Member of ECDPM.

Continued from page 2....

2020 fiscal years.

The European Development Fund will allow a continued financial commitment to Africa. It will be supplemented by a Pan African Programme to develop a real continental approach. We can also count on the sectoral programmes of the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), which will ensure complementarity, enhancing cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities by initiating actions focused on democratic governance and by concretizing the European contribution to global public goods.

Our working and cooperation methods will also be amended. This should ensure both greater consistency of interventions by the Commission and Member States, as well as an efficiency reinforced by an effort of concentration. Under the new 2014-2020 programming cycle, joint programming will take place. Innovative financing instruments will be launched, allowing the mix of grants and loans in order to maximize our potential funding.

Beyond our financial commitment that remains important despite the crisis in several EU countries, our aim is to go beyond the traditional donor-recipient relationship

by enhancing exchanges on various topics of common interests such as peace and security, agriculture, regional integration, research and energy. In this endeavor our institutional cooperation with the African Union remains critical. The 6th meeting of the

Together, we will re-define our joint strategy to make our political dialogue and our cooperation more effective, to cope with rapid changes and the common challenges of the world around us.

More cooperation, or regional integration, is also a key to the future success of Africa. Europe has always supported this process and it was a great honour for me to speak on behalf of the European Union during the recent commemoration in Addis Ababa of 50 years of the Organization of the African Union. This integration must continue.

In April 2014, the EU and Africa will hold their 4th continental summit in Brussels. At that point we can both take stock of what has already been achieved and provide the necessary impetus for the future. Together, we will re-define our joint strategy to make our political dialogue and our cooperation more effective, to cope with rapid changes and the common challenges of the world around us. We will encourage civil society organizations, the private sector and youth organizations to get involved in the success of the summit, and to deepen their partnership relations.

This summit will give us another opportunity to reaffirm that the alliance between Africa and Europe remains an indispensable alliance.

Author

José Manuel Barroso is the President of the European Commission.

The Role of the AU and Africa-EU Partnership in Dealing with the Peace and Security Situation in Africa

Mary Chinery-Hesse

Effective as the European Union - African Union Partnership has proven, time has come to modify the current top-down approach and co-opt local constituencies into the process for even greater impact.



For those of us who had the privilege of being part of the Midwifery Team, which superintended the birth of the deepening cooperation between the European Union and Africa in the mid 1970's, it has been intriguing to witness how the relationship has evolved over time. From the original focus on largely trade and economic cooperation, we have a relationship that currently is more and more absorbed as well by issues of security and conflict resolution. This change has been driven by the realisation that peace and security are a sine qua non for sustainable development; and there is no gainsaying that Africa has had more than its fair share of conflicts.

The structure of the partnership

The principal structure established by the African Union (AU) in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECS) in 2000 is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with the responsibility to deal with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, and to give space for Africa to take control of resolving its own crises in response to changing global realities. The expansion of the remit has also demanded the creation of partnerships with those who can assist with discharge of the onerous responsibilities entailed. This has informed the increased collaboration between the AU and the European Union (EU) in areas of tackling security, democratic, humanitarian and human rights situations on the Continent. As Africa has sought to strengthen its regional security mechanisms in order to stem conflicts and sustain the democratic culture that is now being embraced on the continent, the EU has extended assistance through a multi-dimensional approach encompassing political, institutional and financial aspects, through the Joint Africa-European Union Strategy. This comprehensive policy framework has peace, security, democratic governance and human rights as principal objectives. The main thrust of the Strategy has been enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security, mediating peace, directing APSA and funding AU-led peace support operations.

for continued cooperation between the two parties to work towards achievement of the common goals of ensuring peace and security and promoting democratic governance, respect for human rights, the rule of law, protection of civilians and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The objective should be to strengthen institutions in Member States in order to inculcate a sustainable democratic culture for peace.

How effective has the Partnership been?

A core objective of the collaboration was to accelerate decision-making and coordination processes, and also to improve synergies built between the African Union Peace and Security Council and regional entities dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution. There are many instances of success I can quote. I limit myself however to the recent creation of the Continental Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise); an outfit that brings together the AU Panel of the Wise and similar institutions from the RECs, as well as other institutions and individuals involved in mediation activities. PanWise provides a preliminary framework for the operationalisation of peacemaking on the Continent. It will meet regularly to discuss peacemaking initiatives and ensure coordinated approaches to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

The EU has been acknowledged as the source of major financial support for APSA. It is

...the recent joint consultative meeting between the AU and EC underlined the need for continued cooperation between the two parties...

The nature and intensity of many of the conflicts have learnt themselves better to resolution through sub-regional and regional interventions because it is evident that the security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other countries in the sub-regions, and indeed to the continent as a whole. As a matter of fact, some conflicts in Africa have not been confined to the borders of individual nation states, with serious regional implications. That is why the Continental Organisation has been bold to move from the original principle of non-interference, to that of non-indifference in affairs of Member States, especially in cases of human tragedies such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or massive violations of human rights in Member Countries.

The natural partner within the AU Commission for the collaboration has been the Peace and Security Council, the core organ of APSA. EU resources have been applied, through the African Peace Facility (APF) among other things in promotion of the agenda. As APSA has evolved with the creation of new mechanisms such as the Panel of the Wise and the Early Warning System, EU has contributed to support them for their optimal functioning. There is also EU commitment to provide support to the operational capability of the African Standby Force. It is gratifying that the recent joint consultative meeting between the AU and EC underlined the need

important that Africa in the shortest possible time shoulders greater responsibility, in this regard, to demonstrate commitments to the peace imperative. It is welcome news therefore that at the last AU/EU Strategy Consultations, the AU undertook to deploy its efforts even more vigorously to mobilise resources especially from within the continent, but also from other international partners to better support ongoing peace initiatives in the continent, including support towards Africa-led peace efforts.

...local knowledge could enrich processes towards the building of national infrastructure for peace.

Attention has to be drawn at the same time to the fact that, impressive as APSA and the array of mechanisms and instruments for promotion of peace can be judged to be, their approaches to interventions in times of crisis can be described as top-down. The inadequacies of these mechanisms are becoming increasingly glaring when one considers the challenges confronting the continental and regional organisations in places like Libya, Egypt, Mali, parts of Nigeria, and Guinea. These weaknesses are the more poignant when one accepts that more often than not conflicts on the continent reflect the weakness of African States. Unless the structural causes of the democratic and governance deficits at the level of countries are addressed, the spiral of conflicts will persist. It is imperative therefore that steps be taken to ensure that domestic political institutions are strengthened, as the first line of conflict prevention. The effectiveness of EU support for APSA would be considerably enhanced if the capacity of relevant national security apparatus of African States is simultaneously improved. The objective should be to strengthen institutions in Member States in order to inculcate a sustainable democratic culture for peace.

It is also a fact that there is a nexus between governance, development and security. The lack of socio-economic development contributes substantially to insecurity and instability; but security and stability are a prerequisite to sustainable development. Conversely, sustainable development can only be nurtured in an enabling environment of responsive, open and participatory

governance. At the same time, there is no doubt that government structures and processes tend to falter and atrophy in the constricting conditions of unattended poverty and the accompanying insecurity. In other words, the objectives of APSA risk being undermined if they have to operate in an environment marked with deep socio-economic and political systemic inadequacies. Given this interrelationship of governance, development and security, the challenges they present have to be confronted simultaneously as the most efficient preventive process against the conflicts in Africa.

The structural sources of conflict include the unequal and unfair burden of poverty on different social and ethnic groups within the community, bad governance and the denial of human rights and the rule of law. They also include endemic corruption, a lack of probity and accountability in political and natural resource governance, exclusion or marginalisation of social and ethnic groups. These must be attended to.

On the socio-economic front, there is a major youth crisis plaguing the continent, with many countries unable to adequately feed, educate and facilitate employment opportunities for their youth. Consequently, countries are confronted with unemployed and unemployable youth that constitute an endless festering pool of frustrated and willing potential foot soldiers from which warlords and other adventurers may recruit to pursue conflict agendas. Success can only come out of a holistic and comprehensive strategy, which would take all these dimensions into account.

It is important that Africa in the shortest possible time....shoulders greater responsibility to demonstrate commitments to the peace imperative

What would it take to move forward?

The existing APSA approaches themselves would need to be reassessed to modify the current top down thrust in favour of more bottom-up approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Local constituencies organised for the promotion of peace in communities would need to be more vigorously co-opted for this purpose as an essential link in the chain, and domestic allies of APSA. Their capacity building therefore

deserves support. Additionally their local knowledge could enrich processes towards the building of national infrastructure for peace, dialogue and non-violence appropriate to the culture of each country.

It should not be assumed that resources channeled to the AU by EU would filter down to the national level for the essential capacity building activities referred to above. Dedicated earmarked funds should be ring-fenced to this end. This might have implications for the modalities used by individual EU member states for assistance to African Countries. Better consultations and greater coherence should be encouraged among European Countries for maximum effectiveness.

The EU has been a faithful partner of the AU in the fight against instability and conflict....

The EU has been a faithful partner of the AU in the fight against instability and conflict, which is commendable. Together, efforts should continue to be made by both parties to identify the best strategies for maximum impact of resources, in pursuit of the shared agendas and interests.

Author

Dr. Mary Chinery-Hesse is a member of the African Union Panel of the Wise.

Peace and Security: The head and shoulders of EU-Africa relationship

José Costa Pereira

Peace and security is a key area of the relationship between Africa and the EU. Progress so far in defining an African-owned P&S architecture deserves to be highlighted though challenges remain.



There is little or no doubt that Peace and Security is one of the key areas in the co-operation between Africa and Europe. It could not be otherwise, having in mind the geographic closeness, the strong historical links and the web of mutual interests in fighting some of the nastier scourges of our times like terrorism or all kinds of traffics, from people to drugs, just to mention a few examples.

Still, common interests and proximity were not enough by themselves to achieve the type of effective collaboration corresponding to the size of the tasks. It was clear, and both sides understood it, that we needed to have a sound structural base to steer this co-operation in such a way that it could ensure its sustainability, predictability and effectiveness. The machinery, if I can use the word, is now in existence through different but complementary dimensions. It is not a closed process, far from it, but a few strands are already in place to help achieve the target.

The pivotal role of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) should be considered head and shoulders above the rest in my view. Why? Because it reflects a conscious effort from Africa to define its own destiny, provide its own tools, determine its own configuration, present solutions to address challenges. Furthermore, it understands that Peace and Security is hardly just a matter of military activities, rather it explores an inclusive approach that factors the need to tackle the root causes of conflict. Finally, because it sends a clear message to the international community about the priorities that Africa is privileging in this realm. It might not be perfect, it is surely evolving as we have seen with the announcement of CARIC, but is a fundamental step to let Africa exercise the African ownership Africa wants and merits.

Secondly, the existence on the European side of a mechanism which can provide continuous financial support in the guise of the African

Peace Facility, allowing the partner Europe to stand by the partner Africa as much in operations (AMISOM, MICOPAX, AFISMA, etc.) as in long-term projects in areas like training or mediation that are essential to prepare the future.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)... explores an inclusive approach that factors the need to tackle the root causes of conflict.

The political willingness should not be overlooked, though. In the wider space of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), Peace and Security is the first partnership and certainly not by chance, as I am sure the original drafters understood, perhaps even intuitively, its pivotal role in ensuring the conditions for all other areas to flourish. The JAES architecture tried to build several different layers of exchange, associating the then-created Informal Joint Expert Groups (iJEGs) to the work of the Joint Coordination Committee of the Africa Peace Facility, the dialogue between the Peace and Security Councils of the two sides and, up in the scale, the Ministerial meetings and of course, the annual meetings of the Commissions of the two Unions, not to mention at the very end of the pyramid the Summits where every three years in average the issues of Peace and Security receive the attention they deserve from the Heads of State or Government.

In parallel, a huge number of contacts are taking place with assiduous frequency between Europeans and Africans interested in Peace and Security. Be it Commissioners, Senior Officials,

Middle Managers or just experts, at national or regional level, belonging to Member states or institutions, the number of face-to-face meetings, video- or tele-conferences or written contacts is too broad to detail here. Honestly, I even suspect that no one has actually a full and comprehensive list, although as you will notice below we make a strong attempt to circulate and treat information.

As it can be seen, we have thus political will, reasonably-working structures, financial and human resources, clear objectives. Is that enough? Is everything delivering properly? Is there room for improvement? I would offer two “nos” and a “yes” to these three questions. As I wrote above, we are speaking about a process more than about sacred and immutable “truths” that the dynamics of reality would surely prove wrong easily. Therefore, constant evaluations and revisions are naturally needed and welcome, while the thinking of independent voices, in Africa and Europe, is also playing a preeminent and healthy role in pointing out weaknesses and in suggesting how it can be done better or more accurately.

...constant evaluations and revisions are naturally needed and welcome....

Meeting the remaining challenges

I would like to mention a few of what I (and surely not only me) perceive as current shortcomings. I will start with the issue of funding. EU and its member-states have been the main providers of financial support to the African-led Peace and Security Operations

which is not only not sustainable for ever but is also detrimental to the implementation of the concept of African ownership. Africa and African countries could and should upgrade their support. The African Peace Fund, managed by the AU, has not really fulfilled its potential so far, it would be important to revitalise it and transform it in key instrument for the use of pooled resources. The AU contribution to AFISMA and the announced full responsibility for the first 30 days of operation of CARIC are encouraging signals that Africa thinking is very much on the same wavelength.

EU and its member-states have been the main providers of financial support to the African-led Peace and Security Operations which is not only not sustainable for ever but is also detrimental to the implementation of the concept of African ownership.

Then, we have the issue of absorption. African structures have been looking for building capabilities for years without achieving yet an optimal point. This causes considerable frustration amongst the international donors and certainly no less disenchantment amongst African people when allocated resources are not spent due to the impossibility of finding the right capacities to make projects a reality. By no means a problem restricted to Peace and Security but nevertheless a problem that needs a better and more balanced approach and a sensible evaluation about what is feasible and what is desirable but not immediately possible. In a nutshell, the levels of ambition should match the means at its disposal.

Institutional and working relations between AU and the Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) have improved considerably in the last few years.

The role of the Liaison Officers in Addis and in the capitals of the countries hosting the RECs/RMs - which the EU supports - has been instrumental in increasing mutual trust and provide deeper exchanges of information. Again, though, more work is necessary since differences of philosophy about the respective roles are lingering. As APSA is anchored by the umbilical cord linking the two camps, it is paramount that there will be clarity in this relationship, that each side will know exactly what are its tasks with no sign of ambiguity being present. I am certainly confident it will not take much longer to register progress in this particular area.

Another field where we could improve is maybe a little more theological but no less important. Our levels of co-operation, as mentioned before, are pretty good but sometimes one has the feeling we could still raise the bar to reach an environment that could translate in a stronger way the partnership enshrined in the framework document approved in the Lisbon Summit back in 2007 (the JAES). It is not that we are not doing it - the Amani Africa I and II exercise cycles are a good example about what we can achieve working hand in hand - only that we are not doing it as systematically as we could and, perhaps, should. Nevertheless, we try harder everyday to achieve this goal. A special reference should be made, in this context, to the first-rate work of the Peace and Security Sector of the EU Delegation to the Africa Union. Its role in advising, informing and coordinating input in Peace and Security matters from the international community present in the Ethiopian capital deserves to be publicly acknowledged.

...we shall not rest on any type of laurels, rather continuously adjusting to a moving reality.

In the last two years, I have been the European co-chair of the iJEG Peace and Security of the JAES. A stimulating experience that allowed me to have a better insight of the current challenges and those ahead of us. The group has the merit of trying to be a sort of a

clearinghouse on the European side, focusing on identifying what the EU institutions and the EU Member States are currently doing in this domain and as such helping to define a more complete picture of what is happening in our corner of the co-operation with Africa. Naturally the information is provided on a volunteer basis and by those who choose to attend. The iJEG has been a layer of dialogue in between meetings at a higher level, an outlet for free-flow discussions (as it should be for a non-decision making body) where ideas can be tested and messages spread. It monitors the implementation of the Action Programme decided in the Summit and can produce suggestions to the Institutions. It has been a useful tool, albeit its importance should not be over-exaggerated. By that, I mean Peace and Security dialogue between Africa and EU can survive in many other guises and take advantage of other existing offers/spaces/fora to keep the good momentum flowing.

Conclusion

The EU will keep investing in Peace and Security as an essential condition for Africa to achieve prosperity. We know Africans share this opinion and are keen that we remain at their side as reliable partners. It is a success story, notwithstanding all the caveats that can be read above and whose role, in my modest view, serve as reminders that we shall not rest on any type of laurels, rather continuously adjusting to a moving reality. Crisis in Sahel, in the Horn, in the Great Lakes, to name a few, are there as grim evidence that it is not at all a matter closed.

Author

José Costa Pereira is Head of the Pan-African Division of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily of the institution he works for.

South Africa-EU Strategic Partnership in the Context of a Changing North-South Power Dynamics

Siphamandla Zondi

Shifts in global power have led to shift in the meaning of the EU-South Africa partnership, complicating South Africa principle of balancing its dialogue with the north and its growing relations with the south.



South Africa's relationship with the European Union is one of the EU's most stable and exemplary strategic partnerships. It is built on a long history, stretching over 300 years of imperialism, colonialism and cooperation under globalisation. It is based on a carefully negotiated Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, which laid the basis for a mutually-defined relationship. It escalated over eight years into a strategic partnership. This coincided with shifts in global power especially with the rise of the global south and Asian economic giants; changes that have impacted on foreign policies of both the EU and South Africa in ways that we are yet to fully understand. The effect of these tectonic shifts in global power on the partnership are less obvious than what is thought, but are significant enough that they need to be factored into the process of establishing a full partnership between South Africa and the EU.

South Africa and the North-South Balance

South Africa's formal foreign policy is based on the principle of balance between south-south cooperation and north-south relations. Other key principles/pillars are African integration, global reform and economic diplomacy. Central to South Africa's approach to foreign policy is the attempt to balance competing demands: - values and interests, politics and economic imperatives, domestic and external exigencies; interests in the north and south; stability of the global system and its reform, and so forth. One often repeated statement in Nelson Mandela's speeches, which can be found in speeches by Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma's also is best quoted from the speech Mandela made at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Durban in 1998 where he said:

*"We are determined to find practical ways in which to increase mutually beneficial cooperation among the countries of the South, in all spheres of human activity and informed by a spirit of solidarity, shared interests and a common destiny. At the same time, we seek closer cooperation with the countries of the North, on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of all countries, equality among the nations ad mutually beneficial cooperation."*¹

On this basis, South Africa sees its relations with the EU as crucial for resource flows and as platforms through which South Africa seeks to influence what remains the centre of the Euro-American dominated world system. It has been enthusiastic about also representing the interests of the smaller African and south countries in its special dialogues with the EU.

Speaking after the first SA-EU Summit in 2007, President Mbeki described the escalation of the relationship into a strategic dialogue as follows:

"...it was the EU that took the initiative that we should further escalate the relations between South Africa and the European Union, and therefore proposed that we should establish this strategic partnership ... what is clear is that the EU does indeed take SA as a very, very important partner, so you can see that in the agenda that was agreed, because in reality that agenda included not just matters of bilateral relations between South Africa and the EU, but some of the major global issues, issues like the WTO negotiations, that are going on now in Geneva, this big issue about climate change, there are other issues which we did not necessarily discuss today, but which are important like scientific research and development, issues about further developments and co-operation in areas of Information Communications and Technology."

Implications for the South Africa- EU Strategic Dialogue

This latter point makes the rethinking of the balancing act in South Africa foreign policy calculus important as well as the urgent need to strengthen the EU-SA partnership. In line with Mandela's undertaking in 1993 that the new South Africa would seek ways of enhancing relations with the European Community "with a view to gaining preferential access to European markets,"² successive governments from 1994 pursued stronger relations with the European Union with a particular emphasis on trade, investment and development cooperation. As a result, notwithstanding changing patterns in South Africa's foreign trade relations, the EU

The sense that the EU comes to the table with its mind made up is a common suspicion in relations with both small and big south countries.

remains South Africa's largest trade partner, the main foreign investor and the biggest source of development assistance.³ The signing in 1999 of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and South Africa set off a period of growth in trade, investment and development cooperation.

The EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership launched in 2007 represented an escalation of relations, recognising the value derived for eight years of success. The high-level

dialogues have provided a crucial opportunity for the two to manage their deep political differences, especially over neo-colonial tendencies such as the French-led intervention in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, and the EU's divide-and-rule approach to negotiations with African countries on Economic Partnership Agreements. In this way, the two parties get to maintain and enhance their warm economic relations, notwithstanding the heat over the historical baggage in the political relations between former colonial powers and former colonies. There is a mutual self-interest in improving trade, given the EU's financial crisis and South Africa's triple challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

One subject that is generating a bit of heat on the agenda of the dialogue right now is the EU intention to reset the relations because it views South Africa as a middle-income country due for reduced development assistance and a hike on trade and investment relations. Coached in the language of "departing from history", "breaking with the nanny behaviour" or "aid as paternalism", this move masks the sense that the EU still sees it as its responsibility to define the stature of its partners, decide what they deserve in the relationship and define the nature of new relations. The EU initiates and the partner responds. While this reflects failure on the part of emerging powers to initiate the redefinition of relations, it still does not sit down well with them, receiving it as a benign form of paternalism. The sense that the EU comes to the table with its mind made up is a common suspicion in relations with both small and big south countries. The EU decided that South Africa is a high middle-income country as if this "middle-income countries" doctrine is universally acceptable; whether South Africa sees itself in similar terms seems not to have been discussed. The power to define the other can be seen as hegemonic in nature for it casts the other as an object in the process.

Over 300 years of separate development between mainly white and mainly black parts of the population, a process in which European countries abetted, led to a country of two nations: one middle-income and the other under-developed. Therefore, the EU policy might as well factor this in the negotiations and remains open to agreeing with South Africa on joint targeted assistance for the under-developed nation, while leaving the more developed one to its own devices. The aid flows are not the real issue here – although NGOs that receive the bulk external aid are really worried - but the issue is essentially about defining power dynamics in the hope of building equal partnership.

It seems, from what one can glean from the high-level dialogues in the past three years, that there is growing understanding of how to

manage the impending end of development assistance. South Africa is maturing in subjecting its concerns to dialogue rather than public criticism. The EU seems to also understand that there is going to be a need for some significant aid flowing into a part of South Africa for a while, until the political economy of South Africa is decolonised fully. This is historical responsibility it cannot shirk in the name of "new" partnership models.

The challenge going forward is how the two parties can move beyond managing the deep-seated tensions inherent in the change of power relations, a hoped-for shift from paternalistic partnership towards an equal partnership.

As a result, the last three ministerial dialogues have resulted in statements to the effect that despite its middle income status, South Africa will continue to need EU support to promote social inclusion, skills development, improved education, technological innovation and institutional capacity in order to enable it to become fully self-reliant.⁴ The July 2013 SA-EU Summit concentrated on how the combination of trade and aid could enable South Africa to promote economic growth, job creation and skills development, while enabling the EU to expand trade and investment opportunities in South Africa and Africa.⁵

The challenge going forward is how the two parties can move beyond managing the deep-seated tensions inherent in the change of power relations, a hoped-for shift from paternalistic partnership towards an equal partnership. On the one side, whatever undertakings Baroness Catherine Ashton makes on behalf of the EU in the dialogue must be treated with caution as foreign policy decisions still rest with EU member states, which may very well proceed as originally planned. On the other side, heading to general elections in 2014 the South African government may not be that incentivised to make major compromises in the high-level dialogue.

Conclusion

The EU handling of the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations and the restrictions on citrus imports from South Africa as part of the growing protectionism in the EU will conspire with unclear links between national and regional interests in South Africa's foreign policy towards the EU, to make the process of decolonising the partnership a little more complex.

The redefinition of the partnership between the EU and its former colonies - ACP Countries – after the end of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 has a bearing on the SA-EU dialogues and the outcomes of the difficult EPAs negotiations will have a bearing on the hope for a partnership between the EU and ACP others. These developments ought to be paramount in SA-EU dialogue as they have a bearing on its success in the long run. Assertive foreign policy on either sides should actually be harnessed for historically-honest and forward-looking negotiations, leading to a truly mutually beneficial long-term relationship.

Notes

1. Speech of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, at the Closing Session of the Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. Durban, September 3, 1998. Available at <http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/speeches/1998/sp0903.html>
2. 'South Africa's Future Foreign Policy', <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/insights-mandela039s-reign>
3. 'Zuma attends SA-EU summit'. Available at <http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/zuma-attends-sa-eu-summit> (accessed on 2 July 2013).
4. See, for instance, the 'Joint Press Statement by EU HR Ashton and South African Minister Maite Nkoana Mashabane at Ministerial Political Dialogue'. Available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_13621_en.htm (accessed on 31 June 2013).
5. Ibid.

Author

Dr. Siphamandla Zondi is director of the Institute for Global Dialogue, a foreign policy think tank based in South Africa, and an honorary professor of politics at University of South Africa. This opinion piece draws from his on-going research on EU-Africa/SA relations in the context of global power shifts. In June 2013, he conducted fieldwork to the EU institutions in Brussels, Belgium, generously funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Joint Africa – EU Strategy : Two continents, one civil society movement

Joseph Chilengi and Gérard Karlshausen

Representatives of the African and the European CSO steering committees for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, summarize in this article the way Civil Society Organizations are trying to enhance citizen voices and participation within the Strategy.

In December 2007, at the second Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, the Heads of State and Government of the 53 African countries and of the 27 members of the European Union (EU) adopted the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), outlining key elements of their partnership, based on principles such as equality, the unity of the African continent, and interdependence.

It is essential that the civil society on both continents is associated with the reform strategy.

To implement the policy commitments as stated in the JAES, Africa and the EU adopted a first Action Plan (2008-2010) that focused on eight thematic partnerships. These are peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade, regional integration and infrastructure; objectives of the Millennium Development Goals, food security, health and education, energy, climate change, migration, mobility and employment, science, information society and space. Building on the lessons learned during the first three years of implementation, a second Action Plan (2011-2013) was adopted at the third Africa-EU Summit, held in Tripoli, Libya in 2010.

From the outset, the JAES has taken into account the active participation of the civil society, especially regarding the eight thematic partnerships mentioned. Civil society participation was materialised through the setting up of two steering committees, with the support of the Commissions of the African and European Unions.

Two steering committees

The European Steering Committee took as an option to include a range of interacting networks who were working on the relationship between the two continents and representing different issues of importance for the effective implementation of the partnership. These include development cooperation organisations that are active in the field of governance and human rights, labour, promotion of peace, environmental issues and youth active in social matters. The European Committee works on a flexible basis and is mainly dedicated to the coordination and the follow-up of thematic issues of the partnership as well as ongoing evaluation of the strategy itself, which is far from having fulfilled its promises.

Correspondingly, the Africa Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Steering Committee was constituted through an election process at the annual CSO consultations of the JAES. The Africa Committee is reviewed every two years. The members of the Steering Committee provide the link between CSOs and the JAES process and each lead CSO for each partnership is responsible for mobilising CSOs on their respective continents towards the JAES process. It also ensures the participation of CSOs in the implementation of the JAES plan of action. It meets once every year to consult with the wider CSO constituency in Africa and receives policy direction before the next consultation.

Both committees communicate regularly and seek to meet periodically. This was particularly the case during the first week of the Africa-EU civil society held in Cairo in November 2010. The Committee sent a joint appeal to the official Summit of the Heads of State and Government, meeting that month in Tripoli.



Since 2012, the two committees have begun to share their analysis and work together on three interrelated aspects of the strategy. The first is the evaluation of the strategy, especially regarding strategic partnerships underway. The second is the reform process of the strategy as proposed by the European institutions and currently under discussion between the African Union Commission and the European Commission. The third is the preparation of the next EU-Africa summit scheduled for early April 2014 in Brussels. In this context, two preparatory

Civil society participation was materialised through the setting up of two steering committees, with the support of European and African Commissions.

committees were set up by the steering committees: they have already met three times in March, May and July. They designed the programme of a forum which is expected to meet in Brussels from 24 to 26 October 2013, bringing together 40 selected delegates

selected respectively from both continent on the basis of criteria of representativeness and expertise.

En route to a Forum Africa-EU Civil Society

The Forum of the Africa-EU civil society, which has received support from European and African Commissions pursue two main objectives. The first is to make contributions to the reform process of the strategy currently being negotiated and which is expected to be adopted at the Summit of 2014. This will include ensuring that civil society becomes a significant player in the new mechanism which will be established. It is expected to make the strategy, not only a mechanism for cooperation between state institutions, but also a place of involvement of affected populations in both continents.

But the preparatory committees also agreed on six topics on which they want the Forum to send loud and clear messages to the institutions in order to have an impact on their political orientations. These themes, which concern both Africa, Europe but also the relationship between the two continents, are migration, food security (including the issues of climate change and agriculture), social inequality, peace, security and governance, democratic participation, human rights and transparency as well as trade and sustainable investment between Europe and Africa. Two other themes will be reflected in all the debates: gender and natural resources.

The outcome of the Forum will be presented to representatives of African and European institutions at the end of the meeting but will also feed into the intense advocacy work between the Forum and the Summit where the two committees also hope to speak.

Expectations of civil society

It is essential that the civil society on both continents is associated with the reform strategy. It is also important that the civil society finds its place and play an active role that allows it to have a real impact on the direction the strategy will take. It would be a similar effort at parliamentary level. These dynamics will lead to mechanisms involving parliaments and civil society in a renewed strategy. The disappearance of written proposals in the new European thematic

partnerships should, for example, not be at the expense of the latter's participation. For that, it should include more information to parliaments and to the civil society of both continents in order to address the current lack of transparency in the decision making process. All of this also involves the allocation of human and financial resources as well as the implementation of flexible mechanisms that allow a real and effective participation.

In addition, the civil society on both continents would like to see efforts focusing on a strategy for political dialogue and confidence-building, based on shared values and common objectives identified. As often repeated, it can not be an EU Strategy for Africa, but an opportunity to discuss the problems faced by the two continents in their respective policies and in their relationship. For instance, migration, governance or climate questions are issues of importance both for EU and African citizens and policymakers. In many areas, Europe and Africa can learn from each other.

...it can not be an EU Strategy for Africa, but an opportunity to discuss the problems faced by the two continents

It is also important that the JAES shows its appreciation and its complementarity with other existing instruments like the Cotonou Agreement and the European neighborhood policy with the Southern Mediterranean countries. Thus it could offer increased synergies between different existing cooperation programs while focusing on areas where the EU and the AU can really bring something new. Limited resources in these times of crisis should avoid duplication of efforts.

Both the African and the European civil society are ready to provide their critical but positive contributions to the construction of a new strategy that meets the expectations of the peoples living in the two continents. For this, it requires space, resources and recognition that allows it to be a real actress alongside

governments, international institutions and the parliamentary world.

Authors

Joseph Chilengi is a member of the African CSO steering committee.

G rard Karlshausen is a member of the European CSO steering committee.

Civil Society Organisations (CSO) from Africa and Europe have, since the preparation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and its Action Plan, expressed their interests in being fully involved both in the implementation and monitoring of the Strategy.

CSOs from both continents have extensively commented on the JAES before its approval and from the outset the strategy has taken their active participation into account.

Through the setting up of two steering committees, with the support of the Commissions of the African and European Unions, civil society participation was materialised. These committees communicate regularly and seek to meet periodically in order to ensure that civil society has a real impact on the direction the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is taking.

The European and the African steering committees are flexible platforms to gather networks representing a wide range of issues related to EU-Africa relations and topics of common interest.

Both committees remain open to include various actors such as networks representing the African diaspora in Europe or organizations dealing with specific issues like education, health or agriculture.

Trusting that EU-Africa strategy could constitute an important tool to enhance the dialog between the two continents in the future, the steering committees try to fuel a promising dynamic between CSOs in Africa and Europe.

Source: *Europafrica.net*, <http://europafrica.net/civil-society/>

The APRM: Celebrating a decade of peer reviewing and learning while institutionalising democratic governance in Africa

Kojo Busia



Over the past decade, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has strived to demonstrate that monitoring and assessing tools originating outside Africa have proven to be ineffective due to their inherent design, accountability and ownership flaws. It has also shown that mechanisms that are designed and led by Africa stand a better chance of enabling decisions that empower citizens and support reforms.

As the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) enters its tenth year of existence along side the 50th Anniversary since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity / African Union (OAU/AU), it is important to celebrate this uniquely home-grown African initiative, while assessing its significant contributions toward institutionalising democratic processes and new development paradigms across the continent.

This is so because it is often misunderstood by observers outside the continent that the APRM is merely an African-owned and -led governance assessment tool. What is missing from such perspective is that, ultimately, the APRM is about institutionalising domestic accountability in governance, viewed against the background of externally driven democracy and governance reforms imposed on the continent over the last fifty-years or so.

In this context, the mechanism has contributed to democratic processes throughout the continent in both visible and intangible ways, even if formidable challenges still remain in terms of sustainable institutional and organisational capacities. While external partners such as the European Union (EU) and the Africa-EU Partnership have made some fledgling contributions in the upstream stages of implementation, it is now time to establish partnerships that can support the implementation of the downstream stages of the process, including implementing the National Programs of Actions.

APRM as a unique Home-Grown Approach to African Shared Values

APRM is often described as “Africa’s unique and innovative approach to governance” with the objective of improving governance dynamics at the local, national, continental and international levels. Since its adoption, the APRM has become the most visible achievement of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in promoting good governance in Africa. The Constitutive Act (2002) of the AU signified the willingness of African States to relinquish a substantial degree of sovereignty in pursuit of continental political and economic objectives. It also marked the increasing awareness among African States of the need for commonly shared values to shape and determine individual and collective actions. The APRM was the most significant manifestation of these shared values and, also, the vehicle through which this new approach could be monitored and institutionalised.

Viewed in the context of Constitutive Act of the African Union, therefore, the APRM embodies and seeks to promote three fundamental values of the African Union: Freedom and Human Rights, Participatory Development, and Accountability. The mechanism seeks to emphasise the interdependency of *democracy and development* and their mutual reinforcement.

The Contributions of the APRM to the Democratic Process and Development

Since its first mention in the NEPAD official documents in 2001 and the subsequent adoption of the accession of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

in 2003, the APRM has made considerable progress in terms of the number of countries acceding, the rolling-out of the structures, institutions and organisation of the review process, as well as the degree of active participation and engagement of stakeholders, both nationally and continentally. Participation in the APRM process rate has been growing steadily since 2003. By January 2013, thirty-one countries had voluntarily acceded by signing the MoU - representing about 75 per cent of the continent’s population.

Another level of progress made in the implementation of the APRM process is the innovations seen in the setting up the national structures and institutions and in the marshalling of organisational capacity for undertaking the country self-assessment processes. In the end, however, the nature and quality of civil society participation in the APRM process is directly linked to the political context in each country.

Since its inception, the mechanism has registered some remarkable progress. One of the fundamental achievements emanating from a decade experience with the APRM is that it is gradually allowing a shift away from accountability to external actors or donors to domestically driven accountability processes. This means that unlike the era of structural adjustment, whereby states were satisfying the conditions and preferences of external actors, the APRM has initiated accountability to domestic constituencies of development policies, who are the citizens.

The long-term implication of this shift is that there would be a decrease in

Africa's dependency on external ideas for policy-making to more internally driven policy making and setting of priorities. This issue is fundamental to the African transformative agenda.

As a governance framework, the APRM is gradually fostering the practice of participatory governance through a deliberative process of consultation, dialogue and accountability. The APRM has created a heightened awareness of governance and development challenges among citizens and given them hope that their voices would be listened to and their desires implemented. Thus, we are beginning to witness an incipient transformation in the relationship between the state and society in Africa. This transformation would lead to a new "social contract" that would be needed to ensure better development outcomes for all citizens. The lessons emerging from the recent global financial and economic crisis, the Arab Spring and the emerging consensus on post-2015 MDGs all point to the need for governance systems that foster a new "social compact" between the state and society. Another major contribution being made by the APRM to national, regional and continental policy-making is the availability of a huge corpus of data, knowledge, experiences and insights in the four thematic pillars of the mechanism.

The APRM participating countries that have gone through a rigorous self-assessment exercise, have at their disposal, high quality data to draw upon in order to gain insight into the genesis of the present problems confronting them, to monitor progress towards the achievement of national and internationally agreed goals and, collectively explore the best approaches to resolving them.

In addition, the APRM country self-assessment process and the external validation by peers and the panel have led to the acceptance of common structural and systemic challenges that confront ALL African states and the need for collective solutions among them. For example, the issue of Diversity Management – ethnicity, gender, youth, regionalism, race, xenophobia – are common challenges of nation-building which even advanced democracies cannot hide away nor pretend do not exist. Yet, the APRM has brought this issue to the fore and legitimised it as a challenge that must be confronted if Africa is to make headway in managing its rich tapestry of diverse communities.

The issues of natural resource governance and management, land ownership and

population growth, resource-based conflicts and climate change have all been highlighted by the APRM reports and collective efforts are now underway by the African Union, RECs and the APRM Strategic Partners to institutionalize best practices. The strategic importance of using the APRM in collective bargaining in natural resource management and global climate change negotiations cannot be underestimated.

Challenges Facing the Mechanism

Despite the remarkable achievements chalked by the APRM since its inception some ten-year ago, the mechanism faces institutional and structural challenges related to the governance of the mechanism. First, the initial enthusiasm that greeted the inauguration of the

...One of the fundamental achievements emanating from a decade experience with the APRM is that it is gradually allowing a shift away from accountability to external actors or donors to domestically driven accountability processes.

process has waned down, with most of the initiating Heads of States – like President Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mbeki of South Africa – having stepped down from office. As a collective effort by the African Union, the enthusiasm of individual African leaders goes a long way in ensuring its success. In addition, the institutional set up of the APRM Secretariat has faced multiple capacity challenges, including the security of tenure of its staffing and the lack of clarity of the relationship between the APRM Secretariat and other governing structures of the mechanism such as the Committee of Focal Points, who report directly to the Heads of States. While such issues are currently being addressed, they are certainly bound to limit the realization of its full potential.

Expected Role of the Africa-EU Partnership in Supporting the APRM

Over the past decade, the APRM has strived to demonstrate that monitoring and assessing tools originating outside

Africa have proven to be ineffective due to their inherent design, accountability and ownership flaws. It has also shown that mechanisms that are designed and led by Africa stand a better chance of enabling decisions that empower citizens and support reforms. The EU Governance Incentive Tranche (GIT) was established by the EU in 2006 with the purpose of allocating resources as a "governance incentive" to the ACP countries that "schedule governance reforms" in return for support. While this may sound like a benign form of conditionality, the GIT would be better off aligning this allocation with the APRM country National Plans of Action which is already owned and led by the Africa. If the purpose of the EU governance Tranche is to strengthen country owned and driven governance process, then it would have more positive outcomes through such alignment. The history of reforms has shown that conditionalities – whether consensual or not – only works when they are in touch with an internally driven process for reforms.

Looking Forward

The APRM and its corollary program NEPAD, were created by the nascent African Union with the primary purpose of reshaping and transforming the governance systems and structures on the African continent in the context of development partnership between Africa and the rest of the world. Essentially, it was conceived as a double contract between African states and their citizens on the one hand (domestic accountability) and among African states themselves in pursuit of good political, economic, corporate and social governance standards. Ten-years down the road, the mechanism appears to be making significant contributions towards laying the groundwork for establishing domestic accountability – the extent to which the state is answerable for its actions to its own citizens, rather than to external actors, especially donors. This marks the beginning of a long journey towards consolidating democratic processes in Africa.

Author

Kojo Busia has been leading United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)'s strategic, technical, analytical and institutional strengthening support to the APRM continental secretariat since 2007. He is currently being redeployed to lead the Governance Cluster Team of the African Mineral Development Centre in ECA.

EPA Update

This section covers recent EPA developments to all ACP and EAC regions. Stay tuned for coverage of negotiations in other regions.

Quentin de Roquefeuil

African ACPs

EPA coordination meeting held in Libreville

The African Union (AU) meeting of EPA negotiators took place in Libreville, Gabon, on 24-25 July. This meeting's importance was bolstered by the upcoming EU-Africa Summit in April 2014, ahead of which the African Union plans to craft a common position on EPAs to be presented there.

Each EPA negotiating Region presented the state of play of their respective negotiating process. All expressed concern at the looming October 2014 deadline for the implementation of Interim EPAs. Other items on the agenda included cooperation on customs matter, the impact of the EU's new GSP scheme and EPA implementation issues.

The AUC, for its part, presented the outcome of a mission to Brussels during which a number of proposals were made to the EU, including, *inter alia*, seeking a WTO waiver to extend unilateral preferences and the development of a joint matrix outlining contentious issues and possible textual compromise areas.

Disagreements on whether or not EPAs should be included on the agenda of the Africa-EU summit also surfaced in Brussels. The AU is seeking to include the topic on the agenda of high-level discussions, while the EU is resisting such a move, arguing that it could hijack the summit and obscure other issues of discussion. For the AU, presenting a strong common position on EPAs at the meeting would be a significant advance in its goal to push the EU towards the flexibility it deems essential for development friendly EPAs.

On this basis, the Libreville meeting reflected on the development of a common African position ahead of the Africa-EU summit and "agreed in principle" on a roadmap on trade issues leading to the Africa-EU summit. Officials also agreed on drawing a matrix of contentious issues with textual proposals for their resolutions, while, at the same time, developing proposals for alternatives to EPAs. Further, an assessment of EPAs on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) currently being negotiated is foreseen.

EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht visits African Countries in July

EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht visited four African countries in July - Kenya, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa - and met the respective Trade ministers.

Commissioner De Gucht seemed eager to highlight that the EPAs provided a legal trading arrangement in line with the continent's renewed growth prospects, and appeared hopeful that negotiations could come to fruition relatively soon. In Kenya, he insisted that he had mandated his negotiators "not to come back empty-handed" from next rounds of negotiations, and added in Botswana that he hoped that the next SADC negotiating round would be the "final round in which we can resolve the outstanding issues".¹ In Namibia, De Gucht alluded to the latest SADC offer on Agricultural Market

Access, a particularly important bone of contention in the current negotiations (see below), saying that the current SACU offer was still insufficient for the EU.²

De Gucht's remarks in South Africa, ahead of the sixth South Africa-EU Summit in Pretoria on 18 July were more critical. He deplored South Africa's recent decision to cancel bilateral investment treaties with some EU member states, stating that "there was little consultation with us" on the decision, and held that such a move would weaken commercial ties between the EU and South Africa. These remarks were made at the South Africa-EU Business Forum, organized by the South African the Department of International Relations and Co-operation. The Commissioner also noted a host of restrictive measures against EU trade being considered by South Africa.

Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS leaders call for Extraordinary Summit of West African Heads of State and Governments on the region's Common External Tariff and EPA

ECOWAS leaders have called for an extraordinary summit of Heads of States and Government in Dakar in October in order to "deepen reflection" on the region's common external tariff (CET) and EPA negotiations. The decision came about after the conclusion of the 70th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers that was followed by the 43rd ordinary session of the ECOWAS authority of heads of state and government, the highest decision making body in the West African economic region.

The decision to call for the meeting might signal that a compromise on the CET and on the way forward on EPA negotiations might still be in sight. It is noteworthy that Cote d'Ivoire's Senior Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Charles Koffi Diby, chairman of the ECOWAS ministerial council, renewed calls for a speedy conclusion of EPA negotiations. The CET's design is progressing well, with the region's trade defense instruments finally drafted and having been put to the ministers for consideration and approval. An important step ahead seems to be modifying ECOWAS Member States WTO schedules in order to accommodate the CET's duty rates.

To that effect, the ECOWAS commission undertook a mission to the WTO earlier this summer. ECOWAS is reportedly aiming for the next tri-annual period of renegotiations of bound tariff schedules at the WTO, which will begin in 2015. The WTO secretariat has agreed to provide technical assistance in these undertakings.

West African negotiators, which have not met their EU counterparts for a year and a half, are meant to meet in September to renew dialogue on the basis of their new Market Access offer standing at around 75%, a 5 percentage points increase from ECOWAS' previous position.

Southern African Development Community

EU asks SACU to improve its agricultural Market Access offer

As we reported in our last issues, SACU was to come up with a new offer on agricultural Market Access by the 18-21 June negotiating round held in Brussels.

Sources report that the EU has declined the offer on the grounds that it was insufficient to match the market access the European block offers its Southern African counterparts. Agricultural products are of a sensitive nature for SACU countries, which voice strong concerns with regard to the impact of further commitments. Efforts and dialogue are underway to find a way out of the current impasse.

Similarly, the EU had also asked the SADC region to review its non-agricultural Market Access offer before engaging in new negotiations.

The parties have also agreed to postpone a possible service chapter to later in the process given the likelihood that a goods only agreement could be reached before the drafting of a service chapter. A framework text for further negotiation has been developed to that effect.

On Rules of Origin (RoOs), discussions on cumulation and administrative cooperation with regard to GSP beneficiary appear to have made substantial progress, with a new proposal from SADC being reviewed by the EU. Cumulation on agricultural products from countries with which the EU has an FTA also remains unresolved. Further a compromise seems within reach for RoOs on fish. The ball is now in Namibia's camp, who has to agree to remove a reference to a declaration stating that all fish caught in Namibian waters and landed in Namibian ports enjoy originating status.

On "traditional" contentious issues such as export taxes, MFN clause and infant industry provisions, both parties agreed to submit text or hold internal consultations before the next meeting, currently scheduled for the last week of September.

East African Community

EAC-EU EPA Negotiations at a crucial juncture, EAC proposes Ministerial meeting

As we had previously reported, the EAC and the EU are in the process of outlining issues to be deferred at the ministerial level for a possible compromise on high-profile issues currently holding back the conclusion of an agreement. The Ministerial meeting is currently scheduled for September.

The list of issues to be discussed at the ministerial level was further refined during a negotiation session held in Arusha on the 18th and 19th of July. These are: the MFN clause, cumulation with South Africa, time-bound asymmetry in Rules of Origin, and outstanding product-specific rules, wording on the relations to the Cotonou Agreement, issues of good governance in taxation, and finally the so-called "Turkey clause" concerning countries with which the EU has a

Customs Union agreement. The list could further expand if other matters are not settled at technical and senior official levels in rounds to be held ahead of the Ministerial. This is notably the case for text that has not been agreed upon in the dispute settlement chapter.

On the issues still outstanding, some stand out for their important implication and longstanding controversial nature. The EAC has, as we had reported last year, linked the outcome of agricultural text to the article on export taxes. Retaining the maximum flexibility in the use of export taxes is a priority for the EAC, an issue where the EC is seeking constraining provisions. The situation is essentially reversed for the EU, which rejects the inclusion of domestic support in the agreement. The EAC proposal would exchange the lack of bidding commitments on domestic agricultural support and export subsidies to the scrapping of the text on export taxes.

It is unclear if this issue has been delegated to ministerial level, which could signal that negotiators could try to hammer out a deal before the Ministerial. Further, the MFN clause stands out as a deal-breaker. It would provide for the “automatic” (depending on the wording) extension of any

additional concessions made by the EAC in another bilateral agreement. The EAC is proposing to include language that would weaken the “automatic” granting of additional commitments, whereas the EU is arguing for a solution whereby not all countries would be covered by this clause.

It remains to be seen whether the two sides can muster enough will to compromise on these issues to seal a final deal on what has been a 10 year long, at times acrimonious process. A breakthrough during the ministerial would also significantly reshuffle the cards on both sides months before the EU-Africa Summit. The EAC-EU EPA could be the first full EPA signed with an African region.

Pacific ACPs

Pacific EPA talks break down amidst public row

Pacific EPA talks have been suspended after the last negotiating session in Brussels in July. The suspension comes after a series of unusually harsh public exchanges of words between the European Commission and authorities in the Pacific, with both sides blaming each other for the slow pace of negotiations and lack of flexibility.³

During the round, held in Brussels on July 5th, it became apparent that parties would not find common grounds on provisions relating to the sustainable management of fisheries in the Pacific ACP countries (PACPs). The PACPs maintain their position that any dispositions on fishery management would have to be undertaken in the framework of Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, not through legally binding bilateral provisions. The Vanuatu Daily posts also reports that the Island wishes to maintain 30% of its tariff lines uncovered by the agreement, against the EU request for 80% coverage. The longstanding negotiations on the so-called global sourcing provision are also still unresolved.

Pacific countries have reportedly asked for another meeting in September, which was not accepted by the EU. The Europeans are invoking the need to consult with stakeholders. It is unclear when the talks will resume, especially as Pacific leaders had set 2013 as a “deadline” to reach an agreement.

Notes:

1. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-687_en.htm and <http://tinyurl.com/p3jhrja>
2. <http://tinyurl.com/pjs7wzn>
3. See our previous EPA update

Monthly highlights from ECDPM’s Talking Points

www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org

[Podcast] Frustrations with EU-Africa relations Talking Points ECDPM, August 16 2013

Transcript In the wider context of the discussion of EU-Africa relations and ahead of both the European Think Tanks Group conference and the EU-Africa summit in 2014 we asked some people at ECDPM what they thought were challenges for EU-Africa relations. Dr James Mackie, senior advisor on EU development policy: I think EU-Africa relations can be frustrating in that they... take time. That’s not just because the political processes are slow and there are a lot of actors involved etc. But the protagonists on both sides are quite demanding of each other. The Europeans tend ...

West Africa on the move to accelerate the implementation of its regional agricultural policy (ECOWAP), Talking Points, Jeske van Seters, 25 July 2013

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is undertaking efforts to accelerate the implementation of their regional agricultural policy, the ECOWAP/Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Programme (CAADP), and its related regional and national investment plans. In that context, ministers of the 15 ECOWAS member states are scheduled to get together from 16 to 20 September for the Agriculture/Environment/Water Resources Specialised Ministerial Committee. They’ll meet in Lomé, Togo, for the long awaited launch of the Regional Food and Agriculture Agency housed there, which is being created to facilitate the implementation of regional ECOWAP/CAADP initiatives. The ministerial meeting (...)

Monthly highlights from ECDPM’s Weekly Compass Update

www.ecdpm.org/weeklycompass

Is there a future for Political Economy Analysis in the European Commission?, Weekly Compass, No 157, 26 July 2013

The European Commission’s (EC) Capacity4Dev website recently posted a message saying that Political Economy Analysis under its present form should be discontinued. In a Talking Points Audio interview, ECDPM’s Head of Strategy, Jean Bossuyt, outlines why the EC’s decision is a surprise, and not a surprise. ‘You badly need Political Economy Analysis, that should be the principle,’ he says. How Political Economy Analysis is done is not the issue. The essence is that the European Union Delegations have the tools to properly read rapidly evolving political situations, so they can detect where there is traction in society, and can then tailor their cooperation accordingly. ‘The worst for European cooperation credibility is that you go very far on the political road in terms of policy discourse, but you remain under equipped in terms of instruments.’ That would be a recipe for failure, says Bossuyt.

The enriching business of nutrition. Market-based partnerships and regional approaches to nutrition: What role for CAADP? Weekly Compass, No 156, 19 July 2013

With gathering momentum around engaging the private sector for development and a spate of recent nutrition summits, statements and initiatives, this ECDPM Discussion Paper discusses the implications of linking the two agendas. It looks in particular at what might be done in Africa through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) to turn nutrition policy statements into action, particularly at the regional level. The analysis suggests that although there is clear potential for aligning interests, market-based approaches are no golden bullets. They still require supporting institutions, standards, policy coordination from governments, and financial support for risk-sharing and effectively to “create the market”. Small markets and value-chain linkages potentially raise the need to think regionally about nutrition.

ACP-EU Trade Calendar

September

EAC-EU Negotiating session (TBC)

EAC-EU Ministerial Meeting (TBC)

ECOWAS-EU Negotiating session (TBC)

23 September - SADC-EU Negotiating meeting (TBC)

October

(Date TBC) ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit of West African Heads of State and Governments on CET and EPAs, Dakar, Senegal.

Resources

Overview of the Decentralisation Process in Latin America: Main achievements, trends and future challenges. Jean Bossuyt, Willem Vervaeke, ECDPM Discussion Paper 148, July 2013

External Influences on Regional Integration in West Africa: The role of third parties Sanoussi Bilal. In: Sohn, R., Konadu Oppong, A. (eds.). 2013. Regional trade and monetary integration in West Africa and Europe. WAI-Zei Paper 6. Bonn: University of Bonn, August 2013

European Trade Policy, Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration in Africa. Isabelle Ramdoo, Sanoussi Bilal in: Kleimann, D. (ed.). EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Commerce, Foreign Policy, and Development Aspects, 2013, European University Institute

The Enriching Business of Nutrition. Market-based Partnerships and Regional Approaches to Nutrition: What Role for CAADP? Bruce Byiers, Simona Seravesi, ECDPM Discussion Paper 149, July 2013

The CAADP and Emerging Economies: The Case of Tanzania. Anna Rosengren, ECDPM Discussion Paper 147, July 2013

Tax Administration Reform in the Francophone Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Patrick Fossat and Michel Bua, IMF Working Paper, July 2013

Assessing the Effectiveness of Aid for Trade: Lessons from the Ground. ICTSD Issue Paper No. 29, July 2013

Revenue Reform and Statebuilding in Anglophone Africa. Mick Moore, IDS Working Paper, Volume 2013 No. 428, July 2013

Holding Excess Foreign Reserves Versus Infrastructure Finance: What Should Africa Do? Cedric Achille Mbeng Mezui and Uche Duru, African Development Bank Group, Working Paper No.178, May 2013

The Contribution of African Women to Economic Growth and Development in Post-Colonial Africa. Emmanuel Akyeampong and Hippolyte Fofack, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6537, July 2013

Scenarios Assessment and Transitions towards a Sustainable Euro-Mediterranean in 2030. Rym Ayadi and Carlo Sessa, European Commission, Policy Paper No.9, July 2013

Note on the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. Africa Governance Institute, Policy Brief No.4, July 2013

The Design of Pro-Poor Policies: How to Make Them More Effective. Sayantan Ghosal, The CAGE-Chatham House Series, No.8, July 2013

The Global Partnership for Development: A Review of MDG 8 and Proposals for the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Charles Kenny and Sarah Dykstra, Centre for Global Development Policy Paper 026, July 2013

Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing. OECD, June 2013

Multilateral Aid Review Update 2013: Interim Report. DFID, 18 July 2013

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Editor:

Sanoussi Bilal
sb@ecdpm.org

Co-editor:

Anna Rosengren
ar@ecdpm.org

Isabelle Ramdoo
Faten Aggad-Clerx
Sahra El Fassi

Production:

Claudia Backes

HEAD OFFICE

SIÈGE

Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21
6211 HE Maastricht
The Netherlands Pays Bas
Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00
Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 02

BRUSSELS OFFICE

BUREAU À BRUXELLES

Rue Archimède 5
1000 Brussels Bruxelles
Belgium Belgique
Tel +32 (0)2 237 43 10
Fax +32 (0)2 237 43 19

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To order a hard copy of an ECDPM publication, e-mail info@ecdpm.org

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