

Can the Pan-African Programme revitalise the JAES?

Background document for the informal meeting on the proposed Pan-African Programme for the financing of the Joint Africa EU-Strategy (JAES)

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"...Africa and the EU will work together to build synergies between existing cooperation agreements in support of the partnership, including through the progressive establishment of a Pan-African financial support programme" – Lisbon Declaration 2007

"...both [European and African] sides agree to further engage, without delay, in the discussions on the African proposals to jointly establish an African Integration Facility to support the implementation of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan." – par. 13 JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

"A pan-African instrument will be created to support the implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy, focusing on the clear added value of cross regional and continental activities. It will be flexible enough to accommodate contributions from EU Member States, African States, financial institutions and the private sector" – European Commission proposal for the new DCI Regulation, December 2011²

Introduction

With the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in 2007, Africa and Europe intended to herald a new era in their relationship; an era where the EU would deal with Africa in its entirety, and one in which the post-colonial legacy and the exclusive development focus of their relations would be left behind and a new strategic partnership on a more equal footing would be sought. This new approach had gained momentum as a result of a number of trends, notably: i) a growing dynamics of political and economic integration in Africa, exemplified by the increasing role of the African Union (AU) at the continental level, notably in the area of Peace and Security, ii) a shared recognition by both the EU and Africa that they had to work together to effectively address global challenges, to seize new opportunities for bilateral cooperation in promising areas, and to make their voice heard in the international arena, iii) an increasing awareness that the Cotonou Agreement, which will expire in 2020, might not be best suited to steer EU-Africa relations in the 21st century.

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² COM(2011) 500 final.

1. Despite the innovative thinking reflected in the establishment of the strategic partnership and its thematic priority areas, several issues surfaced in the course of its 5-years of implementation. Some examples of the shortcomings of the JAES are the weakness of political and policy dialogue, the inadequate institutional architecture, the challenge of going beyond the Commission-to-Commission relations and the uneasy co-existence of the JAES with other policy frameworks such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). One other key recurring criticism of the JAES in the course of its implementation has been the **lack of dedicated resources** for its implementation.
2. Funding has been a thorn in the flesh of the JAES since its inception. This issue has been frequently discussed between Africa and the European Union, including in the context of Summits, Ministerial Dialogues, Joint Task Force (JTF) Meetings, as well as at a workshop at the African Union headquarters dedicated to the financing of the JAES in 2009. From the European perspective, initial efforts were made to highlight the amount of resources that were dedicated to cooperation with Africa (although not specifically to the JAES) by the EU through its different instruments, arguing that the challenge is on how to harmonise the existing instruments rather than creating new ones. According to the EU it dedicated €24.4 bn for the period covering 2007-2013 (through different instruments), not counting the significantly higher national development budgets of EU Member States.
3. On the African side, there were concerns that the implementation of the JAES would be stalled unless additional resources were made available for its implementation (from the EU and from African member states). The use already dedicated resources from other programmes (i.e. AUC Support Programme under the 10th EDF) was not seen as a sustainable long-term solution. The pressure mounted on the EU to create a dedicated envelope to finance the JAES. To this end, the AU's Executive Council of July 2010 requested the African Union Commission (AUC) to engage with the EU in order to establish an "African Integration Facility" modelled on the African Peace Facility (APF) with a view of "finding a solution to sustainable funding requirements" for the Strategy.³
4. On June 29th 2011 the Commission (COM) responded to these demands and decided to address the issue. The proposal for the EU's net financial perspectives 2014-2020 offered the opportunity to put forward the creation of a dedicated financial envelop to support the implementation of the JAES. This was enshrined in the Communication "A Budget for Europe 2020"⁴ which proposed a new multi-annual financial framework (MFF) for the EU's budget for the period of 2014-2020. The budget covers multiple areas that stretch beyond the EU external action. In its Communication, the COM proposes to increase the overall budget of the Union from the currently running € 975 bn covering the period 2007-2013 to € 1025 bn for the period 2014-2020. It also proposes to increase the size of the budget for external actions to € 70 bn from its current level of € 55 bn. This represents 6.8% of the total budget (cf. 5.7% in the current period). The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) is envisioned to manage 29.4% of these funds or € 20.58 bn.
5. Under the DCI, the COM proposes the creation of a Pan-African Programme (PAP) with a proposed €1 Billion envelop, which aim would be to support the implementation of the JAES with a focus the clear added value of cross-regional and continental activities. The PAP should be flexible enough to accommodate contributions from EU Member States, African States, international financial institutions and the private sector. In the Impact Assessment conducted in preparation of the DCI proposal, two scenarios were explored to inform the choice made for the proposal. It is noted that no other alternative scenarios for funding besides no change over the current situation (where some limited initiatives in the framework of the JAES were funded out of the intra-ACP programme of the 10th European Development Fund) were considered. The two options are summarised in Box 1 and provided the basis for the COM's decision to propose option 4(b) as part of the new DCI Regulation.

³ AU's Executive Council decision on the establishment of an African integration facility DOC.EX.CL/579(XVII) 18-23 July 2010, Uganda.

⁴ COM(2011) 500 final, Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions, A Budget for Europe 2020, Brussels, 29.6.2011

Box 1: Options explored in the DCI Impact Assessment for the funding of the JAES⁵

Option 4a: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover all activities of the JAES	Option 4b: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover only continental activities of the JAES
<p><i>Strength:</i> Coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as well as add to their overall efficiency.</p> <p><i>Weaknesses:</i> (1) Risk of duplication with other instruments such as the EDF or the ENI, (2) New area with possible impact on fund allocation for other DCI priorities.</p>	<p><i>Strength:</i> Coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as well as add to their overall efficiency.</p> <p><i>Weakness:</i> Complex follow up to ensure good complementarity between EDF, ENI and DCI.</p>

6. The timing to address the financing issue is now ripe. The negotiations of the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) present an opportunity to be seized. The proposal to create a PAP to finance a new **way of working between Europe and Africa** is therefore a significant step forward. However, it is true that the revision of the European financial instruments and the creation of dedicated funding for the JAES will not be the magic wand that will single-handedly revive the Strategy. Several adjustments will need to be made in order to address the larger challenges for EU-Africa relations.
7. ECDPM has facilitated the negotiation process of the JAES and closely monitored its implementation since its launch. In its capacity as a non-partisan foundation, ECDPM seeks to contribute to the debate on the future **funding of the JAES** and more widely on the **value of a continued European engagement in the framework of the JAES**. This paper therefore aims to provide an input into the negotiations on the establishment of the PAP. It highlights the need for **political decisions** to be taken regarding the European engagement with Africa, as well as some of the opportunities and challenges presented in the Commission's proposal.

First things first: The Value of the JAES

8. In the current time of financial austerity, and given the limited political appetite in the JAES, negotiations for a dedicated financial envelope to fund the Strategy are all but easy. Several actors within the EU have, formally (i.e. some NGOs) or informally (i.e. some EU member states) expressed their doubts about the justification for a financial envelope dedicated to resuscitating the JAES, which is perceived in some quarters as a 'patient on life support'. This scepticism is largely triggered by the **perceived and real challenges that the Strategy** has been facing since its adoption in 2007.
9. A discussion on the funding of the JAES cannot take place in a vacuum - without a broader reflection on its value. It is therefore important to first put aside the discussion on funding and assess the **value of a continued engagement within the framework of the JAES** (beyond the funding question). In doing so, it is important to **distinguish between: i) the JAES as a political and policy framework for EU-Africa relations, ii) the operational (and potentially costly) JAES action plans, and iii) the implementation structures and working arrangements**. The first point (JAES as a framework) continues to be relevant. Indeed, the fundamental reasons that pushed the EU in 2007 to put its relations with the neighbouring continent on a new strategic footing have not been questioned. The existence of a work plan is favoured too as it renders concrete the cooperation – even though there is an acknowledgement of the need to strengthen dialogue. There is however consensus on the need to revisit the working modalities.
10. The JAES, as a policy framework, proposes a new approach to cooperation between Europe and Africa. This new approach is informed by changes (1) in Africa and in Europe, (2) in the nature of EU-Africa relations as a result of adaptations to cooperation modalities and the emergence of new actors and (3) the emergence of new global challenges and opportunities that are of interest to both continents. The Lisbon Declaration (December 2007) recognises these changes and rightly notes that "the world has also changed" therefore creating the "need for a new phase in the Africa-EU relationship, a new strategic partnership and a Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a *political vision* and

⁵ The impact Assessment report is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2011/sec_2011_1469_en.pdf.

roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas". This shared vision was re-affirmed by both sides at their last Summit in 2010.

11. Delivering on a new 'political vision' requires learning from past experiences as well as innovating. The JAES sought to follow innovative set of ambitions that would allow it to break away with past approaches, notably
 - A **partnership of equals** that goes beyond traditional, development-centred donor-recipient relationship;
 - To reinforce and **elevate the Africa-EU partnership** to address issues of common concern (i.e. peace and security, migration, mobility and employment, democratic governance, climate change and energy, trade and regional integration, science, ICTs and space applications, etc.);
 - Treating **Africa as one** and **upgrading the Africa-EU political dialogue** to enable a strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership;
 - To strengthen **regional integration** in Africa; and
 - To provide an overarching **long-term framework for Africa-EU relations** that goes beyond traditional cooperation and adapts to new realities.
12. As changes continue to unfold in both Europe and Africa, the ambition to embrace "an audacious approach, one that allows us to face with confidence the demands of our globalised world"⁶ is even more relevant today than it was in 2007. In Africa, fast economic growth coupled with deepening inequalities and persisting challenges to peace, security and democratic governance require a different response taking into account multiple actors, as opposed to traditional approaches to poverty reduction. Regional and continental institutions and mechanisms play an increasingly important role, notable in the peace and security areas. New African priorities have also emerged, some of which led to increasingly credible continental initiatives (i.e. APSA, PIDA, the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme, AGA). The international partners landscape has changed with the increasing importance of new donors and south-south cooperation, making it more important to ensure African-led coordination of the role of the different partners. In Europe, the financial and economic crisis, together with increasing "donor fatigue" and unresolved challenges such as illegal migration or trafficking, makes it more and more important to focus on increasing effective support to, and mutually beneficial relations with partner countries. The emergence of the European External Action Service (EEAS) reflects the calls for a more effective and coherent external action that better defends European interests. Furthermore, common issues of concern (e.g. migration) as well as global issues (e.g. climate change and energy) require more cooperation of a different nature between the two continents.
13. Furthermore, EU cooperation with Africa continues to focus on the national and regional level, with still limited engagement at the continental level – with the notable exception in the field of Peace and Security, where the EU's dedicated support through the African Peace Facility (APF) of more than 1bn since 2005 has made a significant contribution to settling African conflicts, enhancing African crisis management capacities, and putting in place a strengthened political dialogue on P&S issues between the EU and its partners. The added value of the JAES is that it should provide the space to build on this positive experience with the APF, and to engage with Africa at a different level and in different but equally relevant areas, for instance through replicating the experience of the African Peace and Security Architecture to the governance area. The JAES could provide a formidable framework to strengthen EU-Africa relations in the area of governance and to expand the success of the APF to new priorities.
14. The founding fathers and mothers of the JAES saw it as the framework that would help the formulation of a new and bold approach that would take into account the changing contexts. The lack of internal coherence and purpose, together with an uncertain future, of the ACP Group also required creative thinking to design an overarching long-term framework for EU-Africa relations treating Africa as one. This requires a long-term transformative agenda that recognises that change in the long-standing relations between Africa and Europe will need time to break from the past.

⁶ The Lisbon Declaration – EU Africa Summit, Lisbon 8-9 December 2007. Available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st16/st16343.en07.pdf>

15. However, it is true that the *implementation* of the JAES could be substantially improved. Most observers would agree that the ambitious objectives of the JAES have been unfulfilled in the first phase of its implementation, therefore fuelling scepticism about its value. However, it is worth scrutinising whether the real and alleged shortcomings of the JAES really reflect structural deficiencies of the Strategy itself (and if so, what should be done about them), or whether there are other root causes. For instance, one of the main criticisms aimed at the JAES include its inability to improve political dialogue between the two continents. Yet there is also a need to recognise the political leadership challenges both continents have among others.
16. A deeper analysis as to what contributed to the limited success of the implementation of the JAES would reveal that there are several reasons, notably:
- *Limited political leadership at the higher level to steer the implementation of the JAES and give life to its political character* – The JAES was designed to strengthen a *political* partnership and to underpin it with a distinct operational dimension. Yet the implementation of the strategy has been largely delegated to understaffed and underfunded units within the two Commissions, and some officials from member states co-chairing the 8 thematic partnerships. Almost no political guidance from the higher levels was provided. These actors invested considerably in the process, but lacked the power and support to move on political agendas. This limitation might have pushed the officials to limit their involvement to technical areas where they could contribute, mostly on the basis of initiatives and resources that preceded the JAES. Addressing the political, policy and operational shortfalls will therefore need a review of the leadership responsibilities of the relevant actors on both continents.
 - *Moving from shared issues to shared interests* – Europe and Africa may have joint issues but these are not all shared *interests*. The JAES could have been better used to strengthen cooperation on common interest but also provide a platform to also discuss *conflicting* interests. This in essence requires moving away from traditional approaches of avoiding controversial issues and applying the ‘JAES spirit’ more forcefully in order to ensure that the JAES becomes the framework for joint agenda-setting based on robust dialogue.
 - *Limited stakeholders’ involvement* – the JAES was deliberately designed as an inclusive process. De facto, this has been largely limited to dialogue between the Commissions. Involving several actors has proven to be a challenge, as many stakeholders (MS, parliaments, the NGO community, the private sector) have not been involved. The current JAES **structure** is perceived by many to be heavy and cumbersome, even though it had been designed to be light, flexible and informal. Both sides therefore need to revisit the underlying assumptions regarding stakeholder involvement, and draw the necessary conclusions. This will also require a clarification of roles and responsibilities between the different actors (i.e. institutions with formal mandates and experts with no formal mandate).
 - *Incentives for effective implementation* – Delivering on the aspirations of the JAES is a long-term process. Yet, it has been heavily criticised for failing to deliver substantial results within 5 years. The need to deliver quickly to maintain a minimum level of buy-in into the strategy as opposed to investing in long-term processes is one of the key challenges of the JAES. Parties engaged in the JAES are yet to find a workable balance between short-term delivery and long-term outcomes.
 - *Need to strengthen commitment for a real change in the culture of cooperation*. Admittedly, moving away from donor-recipient relationship to a partnership of equals is a process that will take time. The JAES challenges traditional modes of cooperation and suggests the need to move beyond aid. But are the actors ready? Furthermore, are the European and African officials empowered (i.e. in terms of processes) to contribute to this shift? Is there sufficient leadership in both continents to drive the change?
 - *The impact of asymmetries in capacity between the two ‘Unions’ needs to be adequately considered*. The difference between the nature, mandate and institutional delivery capacity of the EU and that of the relatively younger African continental institutions and mechanisms need to be taken into account. As a result it is inevitable that there are asymmetries between the capacities of each one to manage the JAES. How could this be taken more into account?
17. It is clear that the JAES has some challenges but these need to be detached from the strategy as an overarching framework. It is true that in light of the MFF discussions a decision needs to be taken before all the challenges of the JAES are addressed. With high level political discussions between

the EU and Africa no longer taking place at regular intervals⁷ and the Summit only scheduled for 2014, it is difficult to envisage how structural discussions could take place on the future of the JAES. But the MFF has to be approved well before the Summit. Time is running out. A decision will therefore need to be taken on the funding with a qualified assessment on the basis of the commitment of the EU. Within the internal EU decision-making, Member States and the European Parliament need to engage in a constructive debate with the COM and the EEAS to establish a common denominator on the creation and future use of the pan-African instrument. Therefore, inevitably, this will require a **political decision on the part of the EU provided that there is readiness to continue an engagement with the JAES as a strategy while recognising the need to improve its implementation.**

18. The question remains on whether financial resources would be able to help address (some) of the challenges faced by the JAES. So will money help?

Can funding contribute to improving the JAES?

19. Since the launch of the JAES several discussions have taken place between EU and African stakeholders on the need to dedicate specific resources to allow for the implementation of the JAES (see Box 2) and political commitments were made for the creation of a JAES financing fund. Several actors, both in the EU and in Africa have questioned the added value of the JAES accusing it of being a ‘talkshop’ and highlighted the need for resourcing the JAES as one of the main reasons that explain its limited implementation. Some of the arguments advanced in this respect included:
- The JAES was unable to show added value and political commitment to deliver as opposed to the well-endowed Cotonou Agreement (structured EDF funding);
 - Existing funding has been allocated to fund national and regional initiatives (through EDF and ENPI) but limited resources were available for cross-regional and continental initiative (north-southern Africa) since the JAES did not have its dedicated funds;
 - Limited resources were available for non-traditional areas of cooperation (i.e. continental governance initiatives); and
 - Attempts to mainstream the JAES into the EDF and the ENPI on the occasion of the mid-term reviews of these instruments produced no results, due to lack of ownership and political guidance on both sides, and to a narrow prioritisation of the objective of the specific instruments.
20. Besides sending a strong political signal, establishing an envelope for JAES funding might contribute to addressing some of the weaknesses of the JEAS. Availability of resources would provide an opportunity to better support **continental and cross-regional initiatives** in certain priority areas therefore providing a clear added value from the Cotonou / ENPI framework whose focus will remain largely national and regional. Dedicated JAES funding could also be used to engage in **innovative processes** in a sustained predictable manner. For instance, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance has now entered into force. Supporting this ambitious Charter, flexibly and as a process, would prove difficult through the EIDHR (focus and procedures) or the EDF (focus and regional coverage). No other instruments would allow for a strategic engagement with this process. This is valid for a number of other areas that could be covered by the JAES.

⁷ The Ministerial Troikas/Meetings, which was due to take place twice a year before being reduced to once a year, did not take place since 2010.

Box 2: Overview of EU-AU discussions on the funding of the JAES

- Addis Ababa, 5-7 October 2009 - Workshop on resources for implementation of the Action. The meeting called for a solution to provide the Action plan with adequate funds (and human/technical resources).
- Luxemburg, 26 April 2010 - 14th Africa-EU Ministerial meeting --> refers to the need to progressively establish a Pan-African financial support programme and to explore innovative financial arrangements including pool funding if necessary. It also hints at the use of the APF model to other areas of the Action plan. For more information: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114049.pdf
- Addis Abeba, 20-21 October 2010- Africa-EU Joint Task Force Meeting--> chapter on JAES financing follows up on the April Ministerial meeting. For more information: http://europafira.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/11th_meeting_jtf_20101021.pdf
- Brussels, 4-5 April 2011 - Africa-EU Joint Task Force Meeting --> reiterates the need to explore all possible avenues, including existing and new instruments, to finance JAES implementation--> EC is already looking into possibility of establishing a pan-African instrument in 2013-2020 budget. African Integration Facility still considered an option. Important: specific meeting on JAES financing is held during the JTF.
- May 2011, Council brochure "The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership" --> chapter on JAES financing calls for continuous mainstreaming of JAES into existing instruments, and hints at Africa Integration Facility. For more information: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3111092ENC.pdf
- Addis Abeba, 19 October 2011 - Africa-EU Joint Task Force Meeting --> it envisaged the creation of PAP at the upcoming MFF negotiations round. Exchange of views on the Africa Integration Facility.

21. In order for dedicated resources to contribute to the 'revival' of the JAES, the following questions could be addressed in the future negotiations of the JAES in 2013:

- *Greater targeting of JAES actions* – The JAES Action Plan includes a long list of actions that both sides agreed to undertake. Yet targeting is required both at the *partnership level* and in terms of the *level of implementation*. Attempts to target the level of implementation have been done in the recent revision of the Action Plan (2011-2013) but more efforts may be required in light of the new priorities, for instance under the Agenda for Change. Targeting in terms of partnership (content of the partnerships) would also allow for the definition of clear *joint interests and agenda*, which could be supported. Enhanced political and policy **dialogue** should play a central role in defining these priorities.
- *The need to be more inclusive* – ensuring delivery would require a clarification of burden-sharing and divisor of labour between relevant actors, as well as a solid actors analysis that takes into account line responsibility for the delivery of certain programmes (i.e. at the level of the AU commission or other African mandated mechanisms) as well as roles and mandates (avoiding the confusing between mandated institutions and experts). Ultimately all these actors would be included in the relevant JAES dialogue forums, which would in turn contribute to the ownership, quality of dialogue and the realisation of an inclusive partnership.
- *Revisiting the institutional architecture of the JAES* – the institutional architecture of the JAES, often viewed as cumbersome, could be revised to optimally guide priorities to be implemented under the Action Plan of the JAES. On both sides, clearer political leadership needs to be established in order to provide guidance on the priorities for which the resources could be directed. This should be done in a dialogue-conducive manner to encourage the construction of joint agendas.
- *A stronger African commitment to contribute own resources* – One of the key criticisms of the JAES is that the funding issue has largely been seen as a European responsibility. Yet, this is a joint partnership where signatories of the JAES, from both continents, have pledged to commit own financial resources to ensure the success of the partnership. Africa could in turn show its commitment to the partnership, and should contribute with its own resources towards the implementation of joint priorities.

Safeguarding the partnership principles

22. Once there is agreement – within the EU, and between the EU and Africa - on the value of a continued engagement with the JAES and the need to endow it with financial resources, it would be important to consider the modalities through which such funding could be best provided in order to remain faithful to the spirit of the JAES.
23. The COM's proposal for the DCI suggests that the PAP "shall support the implementation of the JAES and its Action plans, to cover activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature". It should, moreover, "promote complementarity and consistency with other financial instrument of the Union's external action [EDF and ENPI]". The dedicated annex to the Proposal emphasises the 'Africa as one' approach and the need for coherence between regional and continental levels.

Opportunities but also Risks...

24. Identifying dedicated financial resources for the implementation of the JAES is a **positive step forward**. The very proposal by the Commission reasserts its faith in the JAES and its intent to provide it with a long-term boost. Such a proactive behaviour was not a given, since the wave of financial austerity across the EU and the varied budgetary pressures to its external action budget. However, decisions now need to be taken urgently by both branches of the EU budget authority. Member States need to come clear whether they still want a strategic partnership with Africa, and the EP has now the authority to follow through its repeated calls for the creation of a PAP. It is important to recall the broader (surmountable) challenges the JAES faces and assess how the design of the new envelop, besides providing financial means, will prove to be a test to the partnership aspirations of the Strategy.
25. Lodging the PAP under the DCI comes with some **opportunities**:
 - Firstly, including support to Africa already under the EU budget could be a good test for a likely **budgetisation** of the EDF after the expiry of Cotonou in 2020. With the EDF slowly being aligned to the budget procedures -i.e. through the introduction of a stronger role for the European Parliament (EP)- the working modalities between budget and non-budget expenditure are being brought closer together.
 - Secondly, it can address the ambition of the JAES to **treat Africa as one** and allow covering both North and sub-Saharan Africa. [However, the 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement granted space for a programme to cover other regions beyond the ACP provided that it is managed by a recognised regional organisation. The latter condition was lifted with the recognition of the AU as an eligible regional body. The ENP also provides for the possibility for cross regional cooperation especially across EDF countries].
 - Thirdly, the DCI would provide the opportunity to expand participation to the European Parliament (EP), which has a committee jointly with the Pan-Africa Parliament (PAP) specifically focussing on the JAES.
26. However, establishing a PAP under the DCI can also come with **risks** that can further compound the challenges faced by the JAES. In order to **maintain the ambitions of the JAES**, it would be important to carefully consider the following questions:
 - **Moving beyond donor-recipient relationship** – The JAES has been designed first and foremost as a partnership whereby both Africa and Europe have responsibility for implementation, including the mobilization of the necessary resources. The proposed PAP will fall under EU Budget rules. The devil is in the resources allocation procedure. In order to access resources from the DCI, a process that required Strategy Papers and an intra-EU allocation discussions has to take place, meaning that space for dialogue with the African partners will be closed down. Although the proposal puts a waiver for "regions having a jointly agreed strategy with the EU"⁸ it goes on to layout the DCI allocation process, which is largely led by the Commission with the involvement of European stakeholders including the European Parliament and the European External Action Service (EEAS) where

⁸ Art. 11.3 (c) of the proposed DCI Regulation 2011/0406 (COD).

relevant. Unless Africans contribute, the management arrangement will automatically lead to the allocation of the resources of the PAP remaining a unilateral European affair. As a result, the EU would remain the single donor that approves or rejects funding for the implementation of the JAES specific actions. Depending on the size and management-modalities of African contributions (AIF), adequate joint implementation arrangements could be designed to optimise the use of all allocated resources for the JAES (i.e a pool fund jointly managed by European and African institutions); this scenario would maintain the spirit of the JAES and circumvent the criticism that there is a limited African ownership over the JAES.

- **‘Projectising’ the JAES** – The JAES is a partnership with a strong political dimension that requires *process* investments and not only project funding. The details in terms of what the proposed programme will fund are rather limited at this stage but it is clear that the funding would aim at “supporting particular *activities* of trans-regional, continental and trans-continental nature as well as relevant JAES initiatives in the global arena”.⁹ Yet the challenges facing the JAES go beyond activities. A concrete example in this respect is the need to sustain a focus on supporting **capacities** of regional and continental actors to engage in the JAES in a sustainable manner (beyond activities). Delivering on projects is of course useful to demonstrate the tangible impact of the JAES but it should be balanced with attention to process in order to ensure its sustainability and impact; a process that would consolidate real political dialogue between the two continents.
- **Addressing asymmetries** – It is important to distinguish between support provided for the JAES specifically and other support provided to support the process of regional integration in Africa (for **African agendas**). The latter are useful tools and should be addressed independently from the JAES. They are complementary with the JAES in that they will help create an enabling environment in the form of effective institutions but they should also maintain its separate logic (support to African agendas).
- **Is the JAES Plan of Action DACable?** The proposed PAP may only finance 10% of non DAC-able activities, according to the OECD DAC’s definition of ODA. This raises the question whether and how to fund other JAES activities, since not all of them may be ODA compliant. Most of the activities of the Peace and Security Partnership for instance, which is one of the said successful partnership of the JAES, may not be covered by the proposed programme - although this would be partially avoided should the APF remain under the EDF. It is true that the funding could be continued through other programmes but that will be outside of the dialogue framework provided by the JAES. A non-financial question this raises is: what is the added value of having a Peace and Security Partnership under the JAES while the traction is in other dialogue fora outside of the JAES?

Conclusion

27. In conclusion, when analysing the **challenges** faced by the JAES it is important to keep in mind its **three levels**: i) the overall vision of the Strategy, ii) the priorities set in the Action plans, and iii) the more immediate implementation level for the eight Partnerships.
28. There is a **need for a clear strategy and vision on the future of EU-Africa relations**. Discussions on the funding could be stalled on the basis of past experiences in implementing the strategy to which all stakeholders have contributed. But this should not cloud the judgment on the urgent need to work more seriously on transforming EU-Africa relations. If not the JAES, then all actors should be clear on the alternative framework that would allow this to materialise. If the consensus is indeed that the JAES, despite its challenges, offers a framework through which relations can be fundamentally revived, then the next EU-Africa summit will need to seriously take the task at hand and allow for a revision that would help address the criticism the JAES has been subject to over the last 5 years.

⁹Art. 9 of the proposed DCI regulation 2011/0406 (COD). *Own emphasis added.*

Appendix - List of Acronyms:

ACP:	African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries
AGA:	African Governance Architecture
AIF:	African Integration Facility
APF:	African Peace Facility
APSA:	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU:	African Union
AUC:	African Union Commission
COM:	European Commission
CPA:	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
DAC:	Development Assistance Committee
DCI:	Development Cooperation Instrument
ECDPM:	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF:	European Development Fund
EEAS:	European External Action Service
ENI:	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP:	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP:	European Parliament
EU:	European Union
JAES:	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JTF:	Joint Task Force meeting
MFF:	Multi-annual Financial Framework
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAP:	Pan-African Programme
P&S:	Peace and Security
PIDA:	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa

ECDPM Briefing Notes

ECDPM Briefing Notes present policy findings and advice, prepared and disseminated by Centre staff in response to specific requests by its partners. The aim is to stimulate broader reflection and debate on key policy questions relating to EU external action, with a focus on relations with countries in the South.

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