

Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy



Veronika Tywuschik and Andrew Sherriff

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Comments on this discussion paper are welcome and can be addressed to the authors at: vt@ecdpm.org and as@ecdpm.org

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List of acronyms

AAA	Accra Action Agenda
ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
AF IT	Africa Implementation Teams of the JAES
AFRICOM	Africa Command of the United States Military
APF	African Peace Facility
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
AU PSC	Peace and Security Committee of the African Union
AUC	Africa Union Commission
C2C	College to College Meeting of the Africa Union Commission and European Commission
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Plan
CAR	Central African Republic
CBM	Christian Blind Mission (CSO)
CEEAC	Economic Community of Central Africa
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CIDO	Citizens Directorate of the African Union
COAFR	Council Cross-Pillar Working Group on Africa
COHOM	Council Working Group on Human Rights
CONCORD	European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development
COREPER	Permanent Representative Committee (of EU MS reps to the EC)
CPA	ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CSO	Civil-society organisation
DG DEV	Directorate-General for Development
DG ENTR	Directorate-General for Enterprise
DG JLS	Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations of the European Commission
DG SANCO	Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Affairs
EAC	East African Community
EARN	Europe Africa Policy Research Network
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	European Union
EU IT	European Implementation Teams of the JAES
EU PSC	Political and Security Committee of the European Union
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
G20	G20 Group of Countries
GHG	Green House Gas
GNI	Gross National Income
GSC	General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEG	Joint Expert Groups
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MS	Member State
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
REC	Regional Economic Community
S&T	Science and Technology
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
TCDA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States

1 Introduction and background

1.1 Introduction

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and its associated Action Plan, which were adopted in Lisbon in December 2007, are designed to change the nature of relations between Africa and Europe.¹ The strategy was formulated in response to geopolitical changes, globalisation and the processes of integration in Africa and Europe. At the core of the JAES is a much more overtly political relationship. It also contains several innovations that distinguish it from past EU-Africa policy initiatives:

- Firstly, it is a jointly agreed strategy between Africa and the European Union as a whole based on the principle of a partnership of equals.
- Second, it signals a departure for the EU, in that Africa is treated as a single continent for the first time.
- Third, it focuses on eight thematic partnerships that extend beyond the 'traditional' spheres of aid and development (see Table 1).
- Fourth, these partnerships have specific, jointly agreed Action Plans attached to them for the period from 2008 to 2010. These Action Plans are designed to produce concrete and measurable action, to be taken jointly by the next EU-Africa Summit in 2010.
- Fifth, it has an elaborate architecture that is designed to engage a wide range of African and European stakeholders including non-state actors on an ongoing basis in its governance and implementation (see Figure 1).
- Sixth, it was designed to enable Europe and Africa to adopt a common position on certain global issues.
- Seventh, there is a central role for the African Union and its Commission

One year after the adoption of the strategy in Lisbon, the time has now come to independently reflect on how the ambitious ideals and measures set out in the strategy and action plan have been put into practice.² To this end, this paper contains a description of the JAES, the background to its development, a description of the activities undertaken during the past year, an analysis of the development of its key elements, and a commentary on key challenges for 2009.³ It is designed to inform, but is not definitive, and its intention is to provoke discussion and reflection amongst key stakeholders and other interested parties.

The first year of the Strategy has been taken up largely with organisational issues (see Table 6 for a list of meeting) and the leadership of the EC and the AUC in the development of the institutional architecture required for implementing it, including the involvement of member-states. It is this architecture rather than any tangible progress that has been made on the detail of the Action Plans or, more widely, on transforming the relationship between Africa and

¹ The full text of the Strategy and Action Plan is available at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/EAS2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf A further information source is: General Secretariat of Council, 2008, *The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership*, Brussels, May. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan are sometimes referred to collectively as the Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership.

² For official descriptions of the process and progress, see Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, 2008, *Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan (2008-2010)*, 20-21 November, Addis Ababa, available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2008/november/au_eu/final%20documents/2008%2011%2021%20Joint%20Progress%20Report%20Final%20clean.doc and from the European Commission, 2008, *One year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU partnership at work*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, COM (2008) 617 final, Brussels, 17 October 2008, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_EU_africa_partnership_en.pdf and European Parliament, 2009, *One year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU partnership at work*, (2008/2318(INI)) Committee on Development Rapporteur - Maria Martens, 14th of January.

³ Given time constraints and some limited developments within the partnerships it does not look into the detail of individual partnerships.

Europe, that has been the main development of 2008. The strategy sets out a framework for greater political dialogue between Europe and Africa. While there are technical issues that need resolving, transforming the political relationship remains the biggest challenge for the JAES. Clearly, much work needs to be done to increase the ownership of the strategy and to publicise it beyond the European Commission and African Union Commission among member states capitals and other actors. It also remains to be seen how the various elements of the strategy will affect the often divergent interests of Europe and Africa, particularly as the question of how the strategy and the details of the action plan should be funded is far from clear.

1.2 Background to the development of the JAES and Europe-Africa relations

The drivers for the development of the joint strategy were the processes of integration in Africa and Europe, globalisation, Africa's initial response to the European Union's Strategy for Africa, a desire to institutionalise a more holistic approach to Europe-Africa relations, and the changing geopolitical context.

The JAES has been developed against the background of wider political processes of integration, in both Africa and the European Union. While commitments to pan-Africanism and the integration of Africa have been made ever since the 1930s and 1940s, these were followed concretely by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the Treaty of Lagos (1975) and the Abuja Treaty (1991), the global challenges of the new millennium have provided a stronger impetus for a reformulation of regional integration strategies in Africa.⁴ This was demonstrated by the launch of the NEPAD and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2001, two developments that required a response. In Europe, the European Union underwent enlargements in 2004 and 2007, growing from 15 to 27 member states. Although the new Lisbon Treaty governing the European Union was due to be ratified in 2008, the process was put on hold when Ireland voted against it in a referendum in June 2008. The Treaty was intended to clarify a number of aspects of the Union's governance. Clearly, African and European integration processes are not identical, and should not be analysed or viewed as such.

It was not until 2000 that the first EU-Africa Summit at Head of State level was held in Cairo, involving the entire EU (as it was then) and Africa. Since 2001, there have been various EU-Africa ministerial troika meetings, but these have not been complemented by an overarching policy framework until the JAES was adopted. The European Union first developed an EU Strategy for Africa in 2005; it was the European Commission who took the initiative and the Strategy was subsequently adopted by the European Council on behalf of the EU. Several African leaders expressed concern in 2006 that the European Union had not consulted them on the EU Strategy for Africa, and that any strategy should be jointly developed and owned by both Africa and Europe. Their concern was that the EU Strategy for Africa had a European bias.

It was against this background that talks began on a Joint Africa-EU Strategy. In February 2007, the first of a series of official meetings between representatives of the EC, EU member states, the AUC and African states was held to launch a process leading to a Joint Strategy. There were two phases of public consultation: the first phase resulted in the production of an outline joint strategy document while the second phase drafted the final version of the strategy and Action Plan that was approved at the Lisbon Summit. It involved meetings organised by the AUC with African civil society as well as events in Europe and Africa. In addition, there were a number of public meetings and an on-line consultation resulting in 37 positions adopted by 34

⁴ See, Dinka, T, Kennes, W.1 2007. Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges (ECDPM Discussion Paper 74). Maastricht.

different organisations and over 100 individual submissions.⁵ Although civil-society organisations expressed considerable scepticism about the consultation process and how their submissions were actually used, the process represented the first time an overarching policy framework had been developed using their input. The European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament also held consultations on the strategy. The outline was approved by the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika before being presented to the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon for adoption in December 2007. The strategy included eight areas of partnership many of which were similar to the areas of focus in the EU Strategy for Africa, while others were new or adapted.

One of the goals of the JAES was to complement rather than replace existing policy frameworks for EU-Africa relations. These existing frameworks continue to operate concurrently with the JAES. The first of these is the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which followed the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions signed by Europe and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries (ACP), and the origins of which may be traced back to the 1960s.⁶ The CPA is significantly different from the JAES in the sense that it is a legally agreed framework. The CPA is still the main vehicle for aid and trade between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific. At the same time, it also has a significant political dialogue component. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) provided for in the CPA have been the subject of considerable controversy and friction between Europe and Africa.⁷ The second five-year review of the CPA is currently underway and is due to be completed in 2010.

The second policy process is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Barcelona Process related to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership became the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008.

A third EU-Africa policy framework is the separate Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa that was complemented by the formation of a specific EU-South Africa strategic partnership in 2007. The EU and South Africa held their first high-level summit in 2008.

Africa continued to feature prominently on the global geopolitical agenda in 2008.⁸ The JAES came about as an African and European response to globalisation and this geopolitical agenda. Russia is becoming an increasingly important actor, particularly in relation to energy.⁹ China and India also continue to build links and extend their partnerships in Africa, including through the Africa-India Framework for cooperation.¹⁰ Europeans have shown considerable interest in the role played by China in Africa and its attempt to forge a relationship with Africa, as is illustrated by the European Commission's communication on the topic.¹¹ Japan also held a major meeting at head of state level with Africa in 2008, focusing on investment,¹² whilst other countries, such as Brazil, Turkey and Iran, are also developing their own plans for Africa.¹³ The

⁵ See <<http://europafrika.net/2007/05/20/public-consultation/>>

⁶ For a historical overview of the CPA and the EU's development policy in broader terms, see Frisch, Dieter, The European Union's development policy, *ECDPM Policy Management Report 15*, 2008.

⁷ For more background information on the Economic Partnership Agreements, see <<http://www.ecdpm.org/> and <<http://www.acp-eu-trade.org>>.

⁸ For further discussion on the EU and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific relations in a geopolitical context in 2009 and some specific information on individual partnerships see, Mackie, J., Koeb, E. and V. Tywuschik. 2008. *For better for worse...Challenges for ACP-EU Relations in 2009* (ECDPM InBrief 22). Maastricht: ECDPM.

⁹ Green, Mathew., 2008 "Brussels Takes on Gazprom in Nigeria", and "Europe plays catch-up in race for gas", *Financial Times*, 17 September 2008.

¹⁰ See <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2008/april/India-Africa/press_releases.htm>

¹¹ Commission of the European Communities, 2008. The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation, COM(2008)654 final.

¹² See the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) from 28 to 30 May, 2008. TICAD has its own Action Plan, see <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/index.html>>

¹³ See the Istanbul Declaration on Africa-Turkey Partnership, 2008: "Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future", 19 August. See <http://africa.mfa.gov.tr/framework-of-cooperation-for-africa-_turkey-partnership.en.mfa>. Iran has announced its intention of holding an Iran-Africa Summit in 2009.

United States continues to maintain relations in Africa, and has taken a strategic initiative of its own by establishing a new military command known as AFRICOM. The US has also expressed a desire to obtain at least 25% of US oil needs from Africa by 2015.¹⁴ With the election of Barack Obama as the next US President, there is a growing sentiment on the continent that the American engagement will change, although some are sceptical about this.

Throughout 2008, the globalisation process once again demonstrated the need for more collective responses. First of all, whilst the fluctuations in the prices of oil and other primary commodities have been a boon to certain African countries in early 2008, they have placed a tremendous strain on others. Secondly, the global financial crisis, threatens to undermine development gains in Africa which have seen an average annual growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa of 6.3% between 2003 and 2007.¹⁵ The global financial crisis has the potential to undermine aid flows, remittance income, income from primary commodities, foreign direct investment, and tourism not to mention the decline in value of assets held by African states in the West. In Europe, the financial crisis and the conflict between Georgia and Russia has focused minds on domestic issues. The financial crisis and pressure on jobs within Europe could also lead to greater political pressure for protectionism and stricter immigration measures. The financial crisis also led to the emergence of the G20 rather than just the G8 as an important global grouping; yet this is a grouping in which Africa has no formal voice. Energy security in Europe has been a concern for a number of years. With Europe so dependent on Russian energy resources, the need to diversify has become more pressing, and Africa is seen (as it is in the United States) as a valuable source of energy. Climate change has also had a greater impact on both the European and African political agendas, with various publications warning of dire consequences for security and development in Africa and Europe if the issue remains unaddressed.¹⁶ Several EU bilateral donors are now making climate change one of their top priorities. As regards peace and security, Darfur, the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and the International Criminal Court have received plenty of coverage in the European press. Other positive developments included Ghana launching its own government bonds and concluding a successful election process and change of government.

Another major policy initiative during the first year of the JAES was the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra. While the JAES has been promoted as a partnership that goes beyond aid, the Forum and the resultant Accra Action Agenda (AAA) are set to affect the JAES given the importance attached to it by stakeholders in Africa and Europe. To a certain extent, the key elements of the AAA appear to reinforce or restate some of the key principles of the JAES, particularly those associated with ownership, developing a partnership and gaining results. Yet the challenge as ever will be in the implementation of these principles.

¹⁴ Ploch, Laura, 2008. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, Congressional Research Service, 22 August, p. 17.

¹⁵ Osakwe, Patrick N., 2008 "Sub-Saharan Africa and the global financial crisis", *Trade Negotiation Insights*, volume 7, No. 10, p. 4.

¹⁶ See for example Smith, Dan and Janani Vivekananda, 2008. *A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between Climate Change, Peace and War*, London: International Alert.

2 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy commitments and joint structures

2.1 *Key commitments contained in the JAES*

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy contains a number of commitments¹⁷:

- enhanced political dialogue
- the unity of Africa: treating Africa as a single entity
- joint ownership and responsibility
- involvement of non-state actors
- a partnership characterised by equality
- addressing common challenges
- concrete and measurable outcomes in all areas of the partnership
- enhanced coherence with other policy frameworks
- strengthening institutional ties
- shared responsibility of EU and African states in implementing the partnership
- appropriate funding

It is these joint commitments that provide the basis for the analysis and commentary in this paper.

2.2 *Elements of the JAES*

The JAES is made up of five key elements:

1. an overarching policy framework;
2. various European and African institutions and actors that are party to the Strategy, both formally and informally;
3. the events and structures set up to jointly manage the relationship (the thematic partnerships being the most prominent of these);
4. the joint Action Plan to which the institutions and the members of the eight partnerships have committed themselves and which is to be reviewed by ministerial Troikas every six months;
5. financial resources. This is a critical success factor for the implementation of the Action Plan.

Obviously, it is the interrelationship between these various elements on which the success of the JAES ultimately hinges. This paper explores the progress made in relation to these five elements, and the challenges that remain for the future.

2.3 *The partnerships*

The Joint Strategy and Action Plan (2008-2010) are embedded in eight separate Africa-EU thematic partnerships (see Table 1). The Action Plan spells out the Priority Actions for each of the partnerships. These have been discussed by the European Implementation Teams (EU ITs), by the Joint Expert Groups for each of the partnerships in November 2008 and at the 10th

¹⁷ These commitments can be found throughout the text of the Strategy - http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/EAS2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf, particularly in sections, 1, 5, 6, 7 8 - iv, 9, 11, 12, 17, 46, 53, 94, 112, 116.

and 11th EU-Africa Ministerial Troikas.¹⁸ The EU ITs met prior to the first Troika in September 2008 to discuss the modalities and substance of the eight partnerships. The Africa Implementation Teams (AF ITs) have not yet been able to discuss their views separately from the Joint Expert Group meetings. They should be able to do so before the next Troika, which is scheduled for 28 April 2009.

Table 1: Partnerships and priority actions

Partnership	Priority actions
1. Peace and security	- Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security - Full operationalisation of African peace and security architecture - Predictable funding for African-led peace support operations
2. Democratic governance and human rights	- Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora - Promote the APRM and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance - Strengthen cooperation in cultural goods
3. Trade, regional integration and infrastructure	- Support the African integration agenda - Strengthen African capacities in the areas of rules, standards and quality control - Implement the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership
4. MDGs	- Secure the finance and policy base for achieving the MDGs - Speed up progress towards the MDG food security targets - Speed up progress in meeting the MDG health targets - Speed up progress in meeting the MDG education targets
5. Energy	Intensify cooperation on energy security and access
6. Climate change	- Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation - Address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the 'Green Wall for the Sahara' initiative
7. Migration, mobility and employment	- Implement the declaration of the Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development - Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on people trafficking - Implement and follow-up the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on employment and poverty alleviation in Africa
8. Science, information society and space	- Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa - Support S&T capacity-building in Africa and implement Africa's science and technology consolidated plan of action

Table 5 (Annex) indicates the progress made so far¹⁹ in each of the partnerships, the progress made by the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) and their joint recommendations which will be taken into consideration at the next JEG meetings fixed by each of the partnership's lead countries. The Action Plan and the partnerships will be implemented jointly by the European and African partners, with political and strategic coordination taking place both at an overall level and at the level of each of the eight partnerships.

Some actors in Africa and the EU have indicated they have had difficulties in encouraging their countries to join the partnerships. In the case of the governance partnership, in particular, it has taken the European Commission some time to convince the EU member states that it should coordinate the partnership. Other partnerships have faced similar problems, possibly because the JAES comes on top of other priorities and is therefore perceived as difficult to align with

¹⁸ Joint Communiqué of the 11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, Addis Ababa, 20-21 November 2008, see:

http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2008/november/au_eu/final%20documents/2008%2011%2021%20Final%20Communique%20EN.doc

¹⁹ Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan (2008-2010), Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, Addis Ababa (20-21 November 2008). See:


http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2008/november/au_eu/final%20documents/2008%2011%2021%20Joint%20Progress%20Report%20Final%20clean.doc

national priorities. On the other hand, the JAES certainly gives EU and African states an opportunity to become closely involved in the implementation process and to influence policy-making from the outset.

Some partnerships are more advanced than others in terms of modalities, action priorities and road maps. These differences may well stem from the degree of involvement of the various actors, their individual preparations for the partnerships and certainly their commitments.

2.4 JAES structures

The JAES has introduced a new structure of internal and external coordination. Diagram 1 visualises the coordination and interrelationship between the different actors and shows how the JAES is intended to be implemented and monitored (see the list of acronyms on page i for an explanation of the acronyms used).

Diagram 1: Institutional architecture of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

2.5 The Africa-EU inter-institutional structure

One of the innovations of the JAES is the commitment to jointly implement the Action Plan and to take joint decisions on activities, working arrangements and modalities for the eight partnerships. Africa and Europe have agreed to hold a series of joint meetings to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of the JAES and intensify the dialogue in various fora. The AU-EU dialogue, for instance, takes place through the JEGs, the ministerial troika meetings and the Summits, while the EC-AUC dialogue takes the form of the annual College-to-College Meetings and the AU-EU Task Force.

2.6 The Joint Expert Groups (JEGs)

The Joint Expert Groups are an exciting new tool. Their formation illustrates the attempt to jointly tackle global challenges and simultaneously involve CSOs in the implementation and monitoring process.²⁰ It was not until the 11th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika²¹ in Addis Ababa that the role of the JEGs was finally defined and the first guidelines for the Joint Expert Groups were published, yet some issues still remain to be resolved. These are informal, open-ended bodies that do not take new policy decisions or initiatives as had initially been suggested. On the contrary, the JEGs are intended to provide a forum in which experts can discuss the implementation and financing of the priority actions. Consisting of African, European and international actors as well as the intention of involving CSOs,²² each of the groups decides on its own working arrangements, and thus on the frequency of these joint meetings, their venue and composition. The JEGs have been mandated to coordinate the members' roles, set a timeline and road map for implementation by defining priority actions, foster debate and report regularly to the other actors. An official AU-EU website has been opened for this purpose,²³ on which official documents are presented to the public. Both partners have equal access to all informal and formal documents posted on an intranet site,²⁴ so as to guarantee transparency, accountability and complementarity. The exchange of information should also encourage JEG Members to join other partnerships if they are interested and to remain fully informed at all times.

The first JEG meetings for all eight partnerships took place in October and November 2008, and resulted in joint agreements on the priorities and activities for 2009. This joint approach has given both partners an opportunity to express their views on different fields of development cooperation and finally to draft a joint position. Although the first meeting highlighted the difficulties of such a joint approach, with most of the discussions centring on the modalities of the partnerships, good progress has been made: the Climate Change partnership, for instance, was one of the first to present a fully-fledged joint Africa-EU position. This was put forward to the Climate Change conference in Poznan, Poland, in December 2008. It is the first joint declaration on Climate Change issued by the two partners.²⁵

Overall, both partners recognise that the JEGs have opened up a new political dialogue in which both parties have had to prepare their partnerships and jointly agree on priorities and modalities. They have been surprisingly well attended on both sides and have generated lively discussions of a high quality. Although the Europeans feel that they have done most of the preparatory work for the first JEGs, the African partners, the AF ITs in particular, are likely to present their position papers on the Action Plan and the priority actions by February-March 2009.²⁶ The African partners claim that the joint approach has revealed both agreements and differences on certain issues. At the same time, they welcome the fact that they are consulted and that the partnerships are discussed jointly. Surprisingly, the EU CSO Steering Group and the AU ECOSOC were not invited to the first JEGs in Addis Ababa. However, the European Commission and the AUC are planning to involve them in the next JEGs.

²⁰ European Commission (2008). The Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. Guidelines for the Joint Expert Groups as endorsed by the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, 20-21 November 2008.

²¹ Council of the European Union (2008). Joint Communiqué. 11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting. Addis Ababa, 20-21 November 2008. 16189/08. Brussels, 20-21 November 2008

²² See below for further information on the role played by CSOs in the JEGs.

²³ www.africa-eu-partnership.org

²⁴ The corresponding intranet can be only accessed by representatives of the JEG and is not available to the general public.

²⁵ Africa-EU declaration on climate change (1 December 2008); see:

<http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/20081201-africa-eu-declaration-on-climate-change.doc>.

²⁶ European Commission and African Union Commission (2008). Africa-EU Ministerial Troika. Joint Progress Report on the Implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan (2008-2010). Brussels, 21 November 2008.

Interestingly, African countries pointed out in the first JEGs that the Action Plan did not contain a detailed specification of future projects. Their concern grew, turning into a fear that the JAES could replace EU-Africa development cooperation based on the CPA. Consequently, during JEG meetings, African countries have pushed for projects and funding to be clearly specified in the programme of activities for 2009. The European Commission, on the other hand, has stressed the fact that the JAES will not replace EU-Africa development cooperation; rather, it is intended to intensify and deepen the political dialogue, which had become fragmented in the past. The challenge, therefore, will be to come up with concrete and deliverable and jointly owned proposals for all partnerships so as to ensure that the African partners are fully committed to the JAES.

It has also been agreed that the JEGs should not meet solely in Brussels or Addis Ababa, the headquarters of both Unions, and that meetings should be held in a range of European and African countries or capitals. For example, it is anticipated that some JEGs will be held in capital cities rather than Brussels or Addis Ababa. This will enable the partnerships to move away from the current dominant Commission-to-Commission dialogue, and give states in both Europe and Africa greater responsibility for implementing and monitoring the JAES. It should also encourage them to provide financial support for the JEGs.

The next steps, therefore, will be to plan and perform activities for 2009 and to put efficient working arrangements in place for both partners. The responsibilities and roles of all actors involved in the JEGs will have to be defined. This applies particularly to the European and Pan-African Parliaments, civil-society organisations and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); all these bodies have recently raised the issue of their participation. While the first JEG meetings concentrated on the institutional structure and modalities, the next JEGs in February and March 2009 will have to move towards concrete activities. The European Commission and the EU as a whole must reassure African states that are afraid that the JAES might replace the existing framework of development cooperation. The forthcoming meetings need to clarify the difference between the JAES and CPA, as well as the question of funding.

2.7 College-to-College Meetings (C2C) and the AU-EU Task Force

The College-to-College (C2C) meetings are intended to intensify the partnership between the African Union and European Commissions. For this reason, it was agreed that they should be held more regularly, viz. each year. There have been three C2Cs to date: in Brussels in 2005, in Addis Ababa in 2006, and again in Brussels in 2008. No C2C meeting was organised in 2007, because of the Lisbon Summit in December 2007.

The C2C has three main objectives. It directs and develops an Africa-EU political agenda, it strengthens political and technical cooperation between the executives on the two continents, and finally, it monitors the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its first Action Plan. One of the advantages of the C2C is that it encourages very different parts of the European Commission (extending well beyond the RELEX family to DG Budget and DG Admin, for example) to work together with the AUC. This is certainly a tangible break from the past.

The last C2C meeting was held in Brussels on 1 October 2008.²⁷ The main aim was to push the agenda of the JAES and discuss the implementation process in detail with the AUC. The second aim of the meeting was to discuss bilateral cooperation between the European Commission and the AUC. All eight partnerships were debated and proposals and joint initiatives were agreed for each of them. The meeting resulted in an EC Communication entitled 'One year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU Partnership at work'²⁸ and describes the role to be

²⁷ European Commission and African Union Commission (2008). College –to-College meeting. Joint declaration. Brussels, 1 October 2008.

²⁸ Commission to the European Communities (2008). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. One year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU partnership at work. SEC (2008) 2603. COM (2008) 617

played by each of the actors and presents the first deliverables for all eight partnerships for 2009-2010.

This meeting also gave the two Commissions an opportunity to exchange views on various issues, especially with regard to the JAES. An addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the two Commissions was drawn up in order to promote information-sharing by means of joint training and staff exchanges. The next C2C meeting is due to take place in 2009, and will review the progress made since the beginning of 2008 and draw conclusions.

The AU-EU Task Force represents a further opportunity for the two Commissions to meet and discuss EU-Africa issues such as the JAES and the Action Plan. The Joint Task Force, which is made up of staff from AUC, EC and Council Secretariat departments working on “second pillar” matters, currently meets every six months to maintain momentum between the annual C2C meetings. At the last Troika meeting in November 2008, it was proposed that the mandate of the AU-EU Task Force should be extended to include the lead countries in the partnerships.

The Commission-to-Commission meetings are always good opportunities for the two partners to meet and discuss issues relating to the JAES and EU-Africa relations in general at different levels (i.e. at a political level in the C2C and at a technical level in the AU-EU Task Force). The extension of the current AU-EU Task Force is certainly a good idea, as it would mean involving the member states to a greater degree and would no doubt suit the JAES architecture much better, bearing in mind that no member states have yet been allowed to join the C2C and the EU-AU Task Force. It also underlines the wish expressed by both Commissions to abstain from a purely Commission-to-Commission dialogue in the future.

2.8 Africa-EU Ministerial Troika and EU-Africa summits

The Africa-EU Ministerial Troikas are held twice a year, either in Europe or in Africa. The first Africa-EU Troika around the JAES was scheduled for April 2008 during the Slovenian EU Presidency, but was postponed three times. Two Troika meetings were then held during the French EU Presidency, i.e. in Brussels on 16 September 2008 and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 20-21 November 2008.

The first Ministerial Troika in September 2008²⁹ was intended to inform the competent bodies about the progress made thus far and to enable ministers to assume their overall political responsibility for the partnership. The institutional architecture was approved by both partners. It was agreed to hold the next JEG meetings for each of the partnerships before the following Troika, which was scheduled for the end of November 2008. A report was published on the progress made by both parties, setting out each actor's responsibilities and duties for the future. Common challenges were identified, in particular in relation to the involvement of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the European Parliament (EP), the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), CSOs and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Both parties urged the EP and the PAP to establish mechanisms for closer cooperation, yet there already seems to be a good working relationship and common cause in relation to the JAES from the two parliaments. The CSOs were invited to extend the analytical work under the Europe Africa Policy Research Network (EARN) initiative and the mapping of European and African civil-society networks that can contribute to the implementation of the JAES.³⁰

final. Brussels, 17 October 2008.

²⁹ Council of the European Union (2008). EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting. Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008-2010): progress and way ahead. 13121/08. Brussels, 16 September 2008.

³⁰ For more information on EARN see, <http://www.europafrika.net/earn>

The second Troika, held in Addis Ababa on 20-21 November 2008,³¹ discussed the progress reports submitted by the JEGs for all the partnerships and welcomed the efforts to strengthen the dialogue between the two partners. It stressed the need for adequate funding in order to guarantee effective implementation. All parties were asked to allocate the necessary funds to the implementation process. However, no concrete proposals were made as to where the funding should come from.

It was initially assumed by some of the European Institutions that the lead countries of the eight partnerships would offer some additional funding at some point during implementation and monitoring. To date, however, no lead country has provided any additional financial resources. The assumption is that funding will be forthcoming once the JAES moves away from a debate on the architecture and starts the process of implementation in 2009. Nevertheless, the African partners have expressed concerns about the uncertainty of funding and have asked the EU to clarify the situation. No clear answer has been given yet. Some commentators have suggested that the European Commission is afraid of being confronted with the lack of financial resources and the associated problems. Especially some African actors have claimed that the EU is hiding behind Chinese financial resources, such as in the Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Partnership, which is also a priority of the Africa-EU-China Trilateral Partnership, concluded in 2008.

Overall, the November 2008 Troika seems to have produced far more results than the first Troika meeting of the year, considering the fact that both partners have become more aware of the strategy. According to some African actors, a positive outcome of the September Troika in 2008 was certainly the invitation extended to the AU to attend the EU consultation meeting on Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement with Mauritania. This was the first time that the African Union had been asked to take part in a consultation meeting, and was regarded by the African partners as a positive sign that the EU is ready and willing to improve the dialogue between the two partners and tackle the African crisis together. However, fear was expressed that it might be a one-off.

The EU and Africa were also generally both very positive about the November Troika, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the JEG meetings prior to the Troika certainly improved the level of debate and the overall atmosphere, and enhanced the political dialogue between the two partners. The Europeans and Africans were better prepared and discussions were more open and frank than before. For this reason, it was decided that the JEG meetings should be held on a regular basis before each Troika. Moreover, for the first time, the debate went 'beyond Africa' by covering the financial crisis, universal jurisdiction and the crisis in Georgia. It was not business as usual.

The next EU-AU Ministerial Troika is expected to take place in Luxembourg on the 28th of April 2009. It is supposed to undertake a comprehensive mid-term review of the progress made since the Lisbon Summit and decide on action to remedy any shortfalls. An overall review of the JAES will be carried out at the next Heads of State Summit in Sirte, Libya, in 2010.

³¹ Council of the European Union (2008). Joint Communiqué. 11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting. Addis Ababa, 20-21 November 2008. 16189/08. Brussels, 20-21 November 2008.

3 European and African actors involved in the JAES

3.1 *EU Actors: European Commission (EC), Council, member states, EU Delegation to the AU and EC Delegations in Africa*

3.1.1 European Commission

Together with its counterpart, the African Union Commission (AUC), the EC has been assigned a major role in ensuring the success of the JAES. In February 2008, shortly after the Lisbon Summit, the two partners organised a joint AU-EU Expert Meeting³² and agreed to produce a joint consolidated proposal on the architecture, mechanism and methodology of the JAES.

As the EU's executive body responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union's treaties and ensuring the general day-to-day operation of the Union, the EC has been tasked with facilitating the JAES, even though its implementation on the European side still remains a joint responsibility of the EC and the EU member states. Internally, the various Directorates-General³³ have a shared responsibility, involving not just DG Development (DG DEV) and other parts of the 'RELEX – the external relations family'³⁴ (notably DG RELEX), but other DGs such as Environment, Health and Agriculture.

To ensure that all its internal actors can participate in the implementation process, the EC decided to create several new internal coordination instruments. Firstly, the existing *Commission Africa intra-service task force*³⁵ was strengthened with the aim to guarantee transparency, a smooth flow of information and the early identification of issues that might fall under the Commission's institutional competence. This *Commission task force* involves all DGs, who are supposed to act in unison and in accordance with their mandates. DG DEV, DG RELEX, the EU delegation to the AU and Aidco³⁶ are all required to ensure coherence and overall coordination of the Action Plan. Consequently, for instance, DG DEV, DG Justice, Freedom and Security, DG RELEX and DG Employment are all involved in the migration, mobility and employment partnership together with Aidco and the EC delegations (see Table 2).

³² First AU-EU Joint Expert Meeting on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 4 February 2008.

³³ The EU Commission is composed of 26 Directorates-General. Each is headed by a Director-General under the responsibility of a Commissioner and deals with a specific field of policy, e.g. development in the case of DG DEV.

³⁴ DG RELEX works closely with other Directorates-General, notably EuropeAid, DGs Development, Trade and ECHO.

³⁵ Commission of the European Communities (2008). Communication to the Commission: from Commissioners Michel and Ferrero Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon Summit: engaging the Commission in a partnership of results. SEC (2008) 353 final. Brussels, 19 March 2008.

³⁶ The Commission's EuropeAid co-operation office (AidCo) manages the EU's external aid programmes and ensures that development assistance is delivered worldwide.

Table 2: EC coordination of the JAES: the Commission Africa intra-service task force

Partnership	DG Development (DEV)	Other DGs	Aidco	EU delegation to the AU
Overall coordination	Pan-African issues and institutions	Cabinet of Louis Michel (CAB LM) Cabinet of Benita Ferrero-Waldner (CAB BFW) RELEX – International Aid General Secretariat Council (GSC)	Unit C6 African Union and Peace Facility	
1. Peace and security	Pan-African issues and institutions, Peace and Security	RELEX, Crisis response and Peace Building DG Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS), External relations and enlargement	Unit C6 African Union and Peace Facility	
2. Democratic governance and human rights	Pan-African issues and institutions, governance	DG RELEX, Human rights and democratisation		
3. Trade and regional integration infrastructure	Economic development: Infrastructure and communication networks, trade and regional integration	DG Trade DG Health and Consumer Affairs (SANCO) DG Transport and Energy (TREN) DG Regional Affairs (REGIO)	Unit 2 Business, trade and regional integration	
4. Millennium development goals (MDGs)	Forward-looking studies and policy coherence	DG SANCO DG Agriculture (AGRI) RELEX	Unit 3 Social and human development and migration	
5. Energy	Economic development: Infrastructure and communication networks, trade and regional integration	DG TREN RELEX	Unit 7 Infrastructure	
6. Climate change	Sustainable management of natural resources	DG Environment (ENV) RELEX	Unit E6 Natural resources	
7. Migration, mobility and employment	Pan-African issues and institutions, migration	DG JLS DG RELEX DG Employment (EMPL)	Unit 3 Social and human development and migration	
8. Science, information Society and space	Economic development: Infrastructure and communication networks, trade and regional integration	DG RTD (Research) DG ENTR (Enterprise) DG INFSO (Information Society and Media) DG JRC (Joint Research Centre)	Unit 4 Centralised operations for the ACP countries	

Prior to the JAES, relations between European Commission and Africa were tackled vertically (i.e. only by DG DEV and DG Trade). The JAES has now created a combined vertical and horizontal approach by involving other DGs. This is a new feature and reflects the EC's willingness to improve coordination between its agencies and achieve an efficient division of labour.

Moreover, DG DEV has created *eight focal points, i.e. one for each of the partnerships*. This group is responsible for drafting the Commission inputs for the annual Joint Africa-EU implementation reports. Every Commission delegation (including the African ENP Region) is also supposed to create one contact point to report and follow-up on the Joint Strategy. The EC delegations should also act as links between the EU and Africa where the JAES is concerned.

3.1.2 The role of the Council of the European Union

Representing the EU member states, the Council³⁷ is another important actor in the process of implementing and monitoring the JAES. In May 2007, a special ad-hoc cross-pillar council working group was constituted to temporarily follow the drafting and adoption of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan. After the Lisbon Summit, another solution had to be found, in the light of the new JAES mandate of tackling 'Africa as one', as the ad-hoc cross-pillar council group³⁸ was concerned mainly with African issues not affecting north Africa, which was covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Consequently, in April 2008,³⁹ the COREPER Antici Group⁴⁰ decided to enlarge the mandate of the *Brussels-based cross pillar Council Working Group for Africa (COAFR)* and not to institutionalise the ad-hoc group. The current COAFR covers pan-African issues affecting both sub-Saharan and north Africa and reflecting the new vision of the JAES.

The new Council Working Group has started to meet more frequently and regularly discusses policy and strategic issues, including at the level of Africa Directors. In addition, other thematic Council Working Groups and Committees, including the ACP Group, the EDF Committee, environment experts, and others will contribute to the implementation of the Joint Strategy by mainstreaming it into their work. The members of the EU Troika are responsible for reporting to the COAFR and receive guidance from this working group for their meetings with their African counterparts. The COAFR met the EU CSO Steering Group in October 2008 and end of January 2009 to discuss the latter's role in the JEGs.

There may well be certain overlaps between the COAFR and the ACP Group, as in the case of the African Peace Facility (APF). In other words, the APF is largely the preserve of the ACP Group, even though it is the core of the JAES Peace and Security Partnership and is managed by the AU. Also clearly other Council working groups such as Council Working Group on Development, (CODEV), Council Working Group on Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM), Council Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM) and the EDF Committee also deal with EU-Africa issues. Thus, it remains to be seen how the different council working groups will work together in the future in furtherance of the aims of the JAES.

³⁷ Frequently referred to as the 'Council of Ministers', the Council is the EU's most important legislative committee. It concludes international treaties negotiated by the Commission. Decisions are taken either unanimously or by qualified majority. In some policy areas, resolutions must be approved unanimously. Otherwise, decisions are taken by qualified majority.

³⁸ Council of the European Union (2008). Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008-2010). Decision by the Antici Group. 8168/08. Brussels, 8 April 2008.

³⁹ Council of the European Union: Review of Council arrangements related to African matters. Brussels, 18 April 2008.

⁴⁰ Comité des Représentants Permanents/Permanent representatives Committee of the EC Council. The ambassadors of permanent representations to the EU (as COREPER II) and their substitutes/representatives (as COREPER I) meet in COREPER to prepare all Council decisions.

3.1.3 Role of the EU member states (EU MS)

The EU member states were asked by the EC to indicate their preferred choice of partnership and an initial list of EU MS implementation teams was drawn up in April 2008.⁴¹ Under the institutional framework adopted for the JAES, one particular member state is designated as the 'lead EU country' and is supposed to coordinate one partnership, working together with other interested EU countries and the EU Presidency.⁴² In general, the EU MS are not fully tied to any of the partnerships (this only applies to the lead country) and can therefore join another if they so wish (see Table 5). More sensitive partnerships which fall primarily under the Council competence such as Peace and Security and Trade and Regional Integration which falls under European Commission competence, are led by either of the two EU institutions, i.e. the Council and the EC.

Table 3: Distribution of partnerships among EU MS, African states and European CSOs

Partnership	EU	Africa	EU CSO Lead
1. Peace and security	General Secretariat of the Council , Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, Finland, European Commission	Algeria , Ethiopia, Morocco, Uganda, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, Cameroon, AUC	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, / Saferworld
2. Democratic governance, and human rights	Germany , Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Finland, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Italy, European Commission, General Secretariat Council	Egypt , Zambia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Morocco, Uganda, Burundi, Algeria, South Africa, Senegal	Human Rights and Democratisation Network, Amnesty International
3. Trade, regional integration and infrastructure	European Commission , Belgium, France, Italy, Czech Republic, Sweden, European Commission	South Africa , Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Uganda, Gabon, Cameroon, AUC, EAC	CONCORD
4. Millennium development goals (MDG)	United Kingdom , Estonia, Germany, France, Italy, Malta, Romania, Luxembourg, General Secretariat Council, Portugal, European Commission	Tunisia , Gabon, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Senegal, Tanzania, AUC	Christian Blind Mission (CBM)
5. Energy	Austria, Germany , France, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, General Secretariat Council,	African Union Commission , Uganda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, Algeria, Benin, South Africa, Cameroon, Congo	Climate Action Network

⁴¹ Commission of the European Communities (2008). Communication to the Commission: from Commissioners Michel and Ferrero Waldner: Follow-up to the Africa-EU Lisbon Summit: engaging the Commission in a partnership of results. SEC (2008) 353 final. Brussels, 19 March 2008.

⁴² In relation to certain Partnerships the lead role can also be taken on by the Commission or General Secretariat of the Council. See table 3.

	European Commission	Brazzaville, Senegal, , CEMAC, ECOWAS, COMESA, CEEC, UEMOA	
6. Climate Change	France , Belgium, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Czech Republic, General Secretariat of the Council, European Commission, Italy, Denmark, United Kingdom	Morocco , Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, South Africa, Cameroon, AUC	Climate Action Network
7. Migration, mobility and employment	Spain , Germany, United Kingdom, Malta, Italy, Portugal, France, Hungary, Denmark, Czech Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, European Commission, General Secretariat Council, Cyprus, Sweden	South Africa, Egypt, African Union Commission , Senegal, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Republic of Guinea, Morocco,	ITUC & ETUC
8. Science, information society and space	France, Portugal , Finland, Germany, European Commission, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, General Secretariat Council	Tunisia , Senegal, South Africa, AUC	

Lead countries are displayed in bold print. CSO leads are listed, but other CSOs are also involved.

The experience to date has been that some EU MS are fairly active, whereas others are more detached. This may be because the 'old' EU MS are already familiar with the EC structures and development cooperation. For the 'new' EU MS, Africa has certainly not been a foreign policy priority as it has for the traditional Western donors, which means that they are now entering a completely new arena. None of the new EU MS are lead countries. The EC realises that it will have a tough job raising the participation of the new EU MS in the JAES, especially as they have a different approach to development cooperation. The EC is therefore trying to mobilise more new EU MS to work on the JAES, especially as some of these countries are hosting the next EU Presidencies.⁴³

Together with representatives of the EC and the General Secretariat Council (GSC), the MS meet regularly in the European Implementation Teams (EU ITs) to discuss the work of the various partnerships. Every EU IT met twice before the 10th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika in September 2008.⁴⁴

The EC feels that one reason for the imbalance in the long standing relationship between EU and Africa has been the strong presence of the two Commissions, i.e. the AUC and the EC. The MS are likely to be more closely involved in the future, so as to balance decision-making and share responsibility among the various actors involved in the JAES. One way of doing so would be by changing the structure of the Joint AU-EU Task Force⁴⁵ and allowing EU MS and

⁴³ Czech Republic (first semester of 2009), Hungary (first quarter of 2011) and Poland (second quarter of 2011).

⁴⁴ Council of the European Union (2008). EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting. Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008-2010): progress and way ahead. 13121/08. Brussels, 16 September 2008.

⁴⁵ Operational Conclusions of the 7th meeting of the Joint AU-EU Task Force held on 17-18 April 2008 at the Headquarters of the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

African countries to participate, which is an idea that has already been mooted on a number of occasions. This would have a dual objective. First of all, a Joint AU-EU Task Force would bring the MS on board. Secondly, it would make them feel part of and responsible for a process while producing concrete internal results. At the moment, it seems that both Commissions feel that most organisational and technical responsibility rests on the shoulders of the EC and the AUC.

At present, only a few MS are seriously committed to the JAES and to the newly created 'burden-sharing approach'. Other countries would appear to limit their engagement to existing national initiatives, mostly at the level of bilateral cooperation with African countries. Others have also claimed only certain EU MS are willing to place additional resources (i.e. both financial and human) on the table and find it difficult to comply with their commitments under the Paris Declaration, Monterrey, Accra and Doha. Doubts have also been expressed about MS involved in partnerships covering more than one topic, such as Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure; Migration, Mobility and Employment; and Science, information society and space. Some MS tend naturally to focus on only one of the priority actions while ignoring others. In addition, some MS are more interested in discussing technical aspects, whereas others appear to want a political debate. A more coherent approach thus needs to be found, but one that recognises that MS engage because of their own interests..

Although there is little depth to the awareness of the JAES in the EU MS and the EU's agencies, some are more concerned about the strategy than others, especially because of their future EU Presidencies. Some few MS have sent one representative to all informal and formal JAES meetings and events to prepare for its upcoming EU Presidency.. Other European countries are thinking of establishing a pan-African Unit dealing mainly with African issues, in particular the implementation and monitoring of the strategy. More MS are likely to enlarge departments to handle the needs of JAES implementation. Sweden, Belgium and Spain, which are due to preside over the EU in 2009, the first half of 2010 and the second half of 2010 respectively, are likely to follow the same path, especially as either Spain or Belgium is due to organise the next Africa-EU Summit tentatively scheduled for Sirte, Libya, in 2010 together with the AU.

3.1.4 Role of EU delegation to the AU and EC delegations in Africa

The EU delegation to the African Union is playing an important role in implementing and monitoring the JAES. Its geographical position is an asset to the EU as it can closely follow the AUC's activities with regard to the JAES. Its political role is to strengthen the relationship between the EU and AU institutions and to enhance coordination with other international and multilateral partners.⁴⁶ It is also responsible for providing direct support to the AU, in particular by backing the AU's institutional development by planning and implementing capacity-building programmes (including the existing €55m Support Programme) and managing other initiatives. The EU delegation to the AU has gradually been strengthened since its creation in 2007. During the first Troika meeting in September 2008, the EU announced its intention of further extending the capacity of the delegation by seconding additional staff to various sections. These new members of staff are due to arrive in 2009 and should be working *inter alia* on the JAES, with at least one person attached to each partnership. Not surprisingly, the Council⁴⁷ has extended the mandate of the EU Special Representative for the African Union, Koen Vervaeke, to 2010. The extension highlights the importance of the EU delegation to the AU in Ethiopia and its pivotal role with regard to the JAES.

⁴⁶ Council of the European Union (2008). EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting. Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008-2010): progress and way ahead. 13121/08. Brussels, 16 September 2008.

⁴⁷ Council Joint Action extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative to the African Union, 18 November 2008, see: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st15/st15372.en08.pdf>.

The delegation's double-hatted status⁴⁸ raises questions about the role of the EC delegation in Ethiopia and in Africa in general. The apparent idea is to have at least one person in each of the delegations dealing specifically with the JAES. In the last Joint Annual Reports for the ACP, the EC delegations were asked to comment on the implementation of the JAES and indicate which partnerships were taken seriously in their countries. Certainly within the EU the predominately feeling is that the EUSR and the EU Delegation to the African Union have been one of the most important and useful developments in relation to the JAES.

3.2 African actors: AUC, African states and the AU Permanent Mission to the EU

3.2.1 The African Union Commission (AUC)

At the 10th AU Summit in Addis Ababa, the African Union Commission (AUC) was appointed by the AU member states to implement and monitor the JAES. The Economic Affairs Department at the AUC was given responsibility for overall coordination and designing focal points for the eight partnerships at the AUC departments (see Table 3). Like the EC, the AUC decided to form an inter-departmental Task Force, known as the AUC Africa Task Force.⁴⁹ Every department whose remit covers an area of the Action Plan is represented in the AUC Africa Task Force, whose members also participate in the African Implementation Teams (AF ITs).⁵⁰ This is intended to ensure that actions taken in the framework of the eight partnerships of the first Action Plan properly reflect the policies, commitments and decisions taken by the African Union.

Table 4: JAES coordination at the AUC

Partnership	Lead department at the AUC	RECs
Overall coordination	Economic Affairs	
Peace and security	Peace and Security	
Democratic governance, and human rights	Political Affairs	
Trade, regional integration and infrastructure	Economic Affairs, Trade and Industry, Infrastructure and Energy	EAC
MDGs	Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Women and Gender	
Energy	Infrastructure and Energy	
Climate change	Rural Economy and Agriculture	
Migration, mobility and employment	Social Affairs	
Science, information society and space	Human Resources, Science and Technology	

Although the AU Commission has been fairly active to date, its participation has been hampered by capacity constraints as well as a range of competing demands and strategic partnerships (with other significant global players such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey). The AUC also has a broad agenda in many areas as well as the interests of 53 member-states but in terms of sheer human and financial resources, as well as legal competences, it is not the equivalent of the European Commission. From an African standpoint, more African stakeholders are growing more interested in the JAES and are now starting to understand its purpose and workings. However, the question of capacity and understanding remains a

⁴⁸ Koen Vervaeke is both the European Union's Special Representative and Head of Delegation of the European Commission Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and has thus a double-hatted status.

⁴⁹ See Diagram 1.

⁵⁰ African Union (2008). Consultations on the Implementation of the First Action plan of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy. Department of Economic Affairs. May 2008.

problem, as does European comprehension of the AUC positions. The AU feels that specific funding has not gone beyond the theoretical stage. Most African countries are not prepared to commit additional human resources to the implementation process unless there is clarity about the funding of the JAES. The current financial crisis could make partners more reluctant to contribute additional funds. Yet there does seem to be some recognition that the responsibility for funding does not rely exclusively on the European side.

Some commentators have claimed that such an ambitious agenda is quite difficult to manage, bearing in mind that the entire responsibility for coordinating the strategy falls on the AUC's Department of Economic Affairs. An 'interdepartmental structure' tasked with coordinating and managing the implementation and monitoring of the JAES might be a solution to the current capacity problem. Another weakness is the need for the AUC to start reflecting on specific models for separating policy definition from policy implementation. At the moment, both functions are performed by one department, unlike at the EC, which has set up different agencies for policy definition and policy implementation. Separating these two tasks would certainly enable the AUC to retain its role as a policy-maker while delegating responsibility for implementation to semi-autonomous entities.

It remains to be seen whether the African Union can stretch itself to meet the requirements for effectively implementing the JAES. The AU is worried about the implementation and monitoring of the JAES as it feels that work on the JAES is not sufficiently visible to attract members in Africa. The capacity of the AUC is by no means the only challenge facing the implementation process, and a narrow approach to understanding these capacity constraints will not help the JAES achieve its goals. It is the visibility coupled with specific and identifiable interests of the JAES that will determine the commitment of other actors within and beyond the African Union Commission.

3.2.2 African states

In order to encourage African countries to join the JAES partnerships and inform its members about the overall process, the AU organised two consultation meetings, one in Burkina Faso and the other in Lesotho, and invited African countries to discuss implementation and suggest ideas for the partnerships. These consultation meetings also served to acquaint African countries with the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan and express their initial views on it.

The first meeting, held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on 19-20 March 2008,⁵¹ was attended by representatives from west, north, and central Africa as well as EU actors involved in the JAES, together with EC representatives. Although 30 African countries were invited, only 14 actually attended the meeting. Potentially concerning was the absence of Morocco and all the RECs. The north African countries were particularly vocal about Morocco's absence: given the vision encapsulated in the JAES of 'Africa as one', a number of African countries had assumed that Morocco⁵² would attend the meeting. The results of the meeting were mixed: some countries had little or no knowledge of the JAES, whilst others were quite active and displayed both interest and a willingness to contribute.

The second consultative meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 April 2008,⁵³ was of a similar nature. Little progress was made on the establishment of an African implementation architecture. Most discussion was about the partnerships, concepts and substance, probably

⁵¹ African Union (2008). Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the First Action Plan of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy. Ouagadougou spell, Burkina Faso. 19-20 March 2008.

⁵² The first draft list of countries interested in the eight partnerships suggests that Morocco is interested in the JAES, as it has enrolled for almost half of the partnerships.

⁵³ African Union (2008). Lesotho hosts consultative meeting on the Implementation of the First Action Plan of the Africa-EU Strategy adopted at Lisbon Summit. Addis Adaba, 14 April 2008.

due to the lack of familiarity with the JAES. Fourteen of the 21 countries invited actually attended the meeting. Many of the participants were surprised by the absence of Ethiopia, Botswana and other politically influential countries from the south. Although the AUC is determined to encourage the AU member states and the RECs to participate in the implementation process, it would seem that the JAES is not high on the agendas of many African countries and RECs at the moment.

In October 2008, the AUC officially published its list of lead and interested member states (see Table 5). Surprisingly, all the partnerships, with the exception of Trade (South Africa) and Energy (AUC), are coordinated by north African countries. This may hamper the implementation of the JAES in the future. The 'Africa as one' principle could prove difficult to effectuate if the partnerships are coordinated exclusively by north African countries. This underlines the limited ownership and capacities of sub-Saharan countries. In addition, it would have been certainly an asset for the process of African integration to have a mix of north and sub-Saharan African countries.

The African Union has also formed African Implementation Teams (AF ITs) consisting of African countries that have expressed an interest in one of the partnerships, the lead African countries (*Chef de File*), the AUC Task Force and the RECs.⁵⁴ As of December 2008 only a few African countries were able to meet in the AF ITs. As of January 2009 remains to be seen when all lead African countries of the eight partnerships will meet in the AF ITs, but the African countries will clearly need to discuss their views on the activities planned for the partnerships before the Joint Expert Groups meet again in 2009. It appears that the African countries still need to structure their involvement. Meetings are attended by representatives from embassies, foreign affairs ministries or the AUC. In other words, there is no single responsible person as there should be.

A particularly challenging task is the representation of the RECs. This remains relatively low, despite the attempts by the AU to mobilise them. The idea is for all eight RECs to be fully involved in the AF ITs as well as in the Joint Expert Groups in the future. The European Commission has reiterated its view that the RECs are pivotal to the implementation process, especially in partnerships such as Trade and Regional Integration. For this reason, it is vitally important that the AUC joins the African countries in mobilising the RECs, so as to ensure that they are present at the next JEG meetings in February and March 2009. Yet ultimately REC mobilisation will come through them seeing the whole JAES process as important to their own and member states interests.

3.2.3 AU Permanent Mission to the EU

Like the EU delegation to the AU,⁵⁵ the AU Permanent Mission to the EU has a key role to play in implementing and monitoring the JAES. Its geographical position allows it to be actively involved in events and meetings on the JAES in Europe. It also plays an important role in enhancing communication between the African Union and the European Union.

The AU Permanent Mission to the EU has at the moment three main roles. It monitors AU-EU cooperation and works closely with all the EU institutions. The Mission also prepares and coordinates regular working meetings of the EU and AU commissions in Brussels and Addis-Ababa (i.e. Troika meetings). It coordinates the group of African ambassadors in Brussels and monitors the implementation of the Cotonou ACP-EU partnership agreement and finally represents the AU and its African MS in the 27 member countries of the EU. Follow-up processes have been included in its mandate and the AU Permanent Representative in Brussels is operationally fully engaged. In other words, everything is being done to enhance the

⁵⁴ See diagram 1 and Table 5.

⁵⁵ Council of the European Union (2008). EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting. Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008-2010): progress and way ahead. 13121/08. Brussels, 16 September 2008.

AU Permanent Mission's capacity to fulfil its role.

At the same time, experience has shown that the AU Permanent Mission does face certain difficulties. The Permanent Mission was initially seen as the link between Brussels and Addis Ababa, but it is clear from the distribution of staff capacity that the AUC wishes to communicate directly. At the moment the Mission has very limited capacity to work on the JAES, whereas the AUC has focal points for each of the partnerships, as well as a number of support staff. Compared with the EU delegation to the AU, the AU Permanent Mission to the EU is the actor with the lowest capacity at the moment. Addis Ababa has been asked to strengthen the capacity of the Mission in Brussels. The AU Permanent Mission has expressed the need and desire to increase its ability to monitor and follow the JAES, yet this will require additional resources and capacity.

3.3 What role should be played by the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament, the EESC and the Committee of Regions?

The European Parliament (EP) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) have a special relationship that is reflected by the ad-hoc delegation of the European Parliament for relations with the Pan-African Parliament and the ad-hoc committee of the Pan-African Parliament for relations with the European Parliament. Both these committees meet regularly throughout the year. There were two joint meetings in 2008, one in South Africa and the other in Brussels, where the JAES was one of the main agenda items.

Both meetings in 2008 revealed that the EP and PAP feel excluded from the institutional arrangements for the JAES. Three letters were sent to the European Commission and the African Union Commission confirming their willingness to be more actively involved in implementing the Joint Strategy and asking to be regularly informed by the EC and AUC about progress and actions, as well as about forthcoming meetings. In addition, the two parliaments have decided to join four partnerships, namely, peace and security, democratic governance, MDGs, and trade and regional integration. They hope that action will soon be taken to enable them to attend JEG meetings. A recent EP opinion on the JAES has yet again revealed the desire to be more closely involved in the JAES.⁵⁶ The role of the two Parliaments was also discussed in the European Parliament end of January 2009 in the sidelines of the 12th AU Summit where the two parliaments have agreed on their institutional role in the establishment and monitoring of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, thereby enhancing its democratic legitimacy. The basis for the discussion is a joint EP-PAP proposal submitted to the EC and AUC.⁵⁷

The EC and AUC have pledged to improve their communication and have promised to include the two parliaments in the JAES process. However, the parliaments were not invited to the first JEG meetings in November 2008. It is clear that the two parliaments wish to have an impact, not at CSO level, but at an institutional level. For this reason, they wish to join the EU and AU Implementation Team (EU and AU ITs), the JEGs and the EU-AU Task Force. Resolving the role of the parliaments will be a key challenge to overcome in 2009 and on the agenda of this year's AU Summit in Addis.

The governance partnership was the first partnership to officially invite the EP, the Committee of the Regions and the EESC to attend a brainstorming session in Brussels and to inform them about the current state of play. Surprisingly, only the EESC and the Committee of the Regions took up the invitation.

⁵⁶ European Parliament (2008). Draft Opinion on One year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU partnership at work. (2008/2318(INI)). Committee on Development. Brussels, 14.12.2008.

⁵⁷ European Parliament and Pan-African Parliament (2008). On the role of PAP and EP in the Implementation and Monitoring of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. 17.12.2008
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200901/20090129ATT47516/20090129ATT47516EN.pdf>

Currently, the EESC has produced a draft opinion on the EU-Africa Strategy, publishing a document in July 2008⁵⁸ in response to a request from the DG DEV Commissioner made in July 2007. The European Parliament has published a second draft opinion on the implementation of the JAES in January 2009. The role of the EESC and the Committee of the Regions still needs to be clarified. The question is how the two committees will be able to contribute to the implementation process in 2009.

The European Parliament's ad-hoc delegation to South Africa has also taken the opportunity to meet the African stakeholders involved in the JAES. The EP President travelled to the headquarters of the African Union in September 2008 and visited a number of AU Commissioners, so as to gain a personal impression of the JAES. This visit might be a sign that the EP is interested in the JAES and its monitoring and implementation, and is interested in contributing to the process in the coming years. It remains to be seen how the EP and the PAP can be brought into the process. Clarity needs to be provided about the roles played by the EP and the PAP in the JEGs in particular. The PAP has remained vocal about the need to institutionalise its involvement at an appropriate level.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ European Economic and Social Committee (2008). Draft Opinion of the Section for External Relations on the EU-Africa Strategy. REX/247. Brussels, 17 July 2008.

⁵⁹ This position was forcefully expressed by Marwick Khumalo of the Pan Africa Parliament at the EARN seminar at Chatham House on the 12th of December 2009.

4 Special focus on the role of civil society

4.1 Civil society involvement in the JAES: the six entry points

The JAES offers a unique opportunity for civil-society organisations to get more involved than in the past EU-Africa frameworks. One of the stated aims of the strategy is to promote a 'broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership'.⁶⁰ The strategy pledges to create the conditions that are required to enable civil-society organisations (CSOs) play an active role. Unlike the Cairo Declaration of 2000, the JAES does not merely recognise CSOs as important actors. It goes a step further, by integrating them into the formal and informal institutional dialogue in the JEGs. There are six entry points⁶¹ for CSOs, to ensure the effective implementation and monitoring of the JAES and to enable them to become part of the institutional architecture. Accordingly, the EU and Africa have agreed:

- to establish mechanisms for closer cooperation and dialogue between the PAP and the EP, as well as between the AU, AU ECOSOC and the EESC,
- to map existing European and African civil-society networks,
- to organise a platform (EARN) for European and African research institutes and think-tanks to provide independent policy advice
- to facilitate consultations with CSOs ahead of key policy decisions,
- to invite representatives from civil society in Europe and Africa to express themselves ahead of the Ministerial troika meetings, and
- to establish joint expert groups on all priority actions identified in the Action Plan in which CSOs can participate.

Without a doubt, the most innovative aspect of the JEGs is the involvement and recognition of CSOs as experts and not just as 'watch-dogs'.

4.2 The African viewpoint on CSO involvement

A first consultation meeting on African civil society involvement was held in Bamako, Mali, on 3 March 2008.⁶² The 45 participants had an opportunity to discuss the outcomes of the Lisbon Summit, and thus the JAES, and to formulate strategies of engagement for the future. Together with the African Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) of the AUC, the African Union invited African CSOs to come up with 'actionable suggestions' for an 'engagement strategy'. It was stressed that there was a need for a core civil-society component that could drive and sustain the process, facilitate the execution of the implementation plan and guarantee that the process moved beyond 'rhetoric to constructive engagement and building synergies'.⁶³ Finally, it was decided to reactivate the CSO Steering Group⁶⁴ set up in Accra in Ghana last year during the consultation phase of the JAES.

The AU programme for mainstreaming civil society involvement is based on the commitment enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the Union to establish a union on the basis of a partnership

⁶⁰ European Communities (2008). The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership. General Secretariat. Council of the European Union.

⁶¹ European Commission (2008). Entry Points for civil-society organisations intervention in the implementation and monitoring of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

⁶² African Union (2008). Report of AU-CSO Consultation on the Implementation Phase of Africa-EU Strategic Partnership for Africa's Development. Bamako, Mali. 3-5 March 2008.

⁶³ African Union (2008). Report of AU-CSO Consultation on the Implementation Phase of Africa-EU Strategic Partnership for Africa's Development. Bamako, Mali, 3-5 March 2008.

⁶⁴ composed of 10 different actors from the following regions and expertise: North Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Youth, Academia (CODESRIA), Gender (FEMNET), ECOSOC and Diaspora

between governments and all segments of civil society. In 2008, the AU formerly created its civil-society forum, the AU ECOSOCC, as an official advisory body. ECOSOCC members are nominated and elected by a specific and unique process related to the overall architecture of the African Union, which is different from how European CSOs have been engaged and legitimised within the JAES. Its creation represents a significant step forward in the involvement of civil society in the body politics of the pan-African organisation. It is certainly a move forward to a participatory approach in the continent's integration and development strides⁶⁵. The AU ECOSOCC can serve as a network of expertise and thus be a catalyst for values, knowledge, and ideas of African civil society into AU policy processes. This can be also a potential added value of the implementation and monitoring process of the strategy within the AU structures as the ECOSOCC is intended to provide policy advice and play an advocacy role.

During the 10th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika in Brussels, the College-to College Meeting in October 2008 and the 11th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika in Addis Ababa, several informal meetings were held between the EC and African Union, in particular with the CIDO, on the involvement of CSOs in the JEG. The CIDO has frequently articulated that ECOSOCC is the official and legitimate body for CSOs yet has its own rather than a specific JAES process and timetable.

From the AU viewpoint, the AU CSO Steering Group, was initially proposed as a stop-gap CSO component for the JAES. Part of the issue was its status: it is regarded purely as an ad-hoc solution that would last until the AU ECOSOCC members had been elected and until the body was fully in place. Consequently, the Africans have presented AU ECOSOCC, as the main representative body for African civil society and as the main channel for CSO participation in the JAES. The CIDO will need more time to clarify JAES-related issues together with the newly elected AU ECOSOCC president. AU ECOSOCC has created eight sectoral committees⁶⁶ and intends to incorporate the eight partnerships of the JAES into the structures and discuss those in the eight committees in the future.

The process has certainly highlighted differences between the two partners on the process to engage CSO involvement in the JAES. While the EU CSO Steering Group exclusively represents CSOs related to the JAES, the AU ECOSOCC is an official institutional body within the overarching AU framework that is representing African CSOs. It remains to be seen how the AU ECOSOCC participation will be integrated into the JEGs. In addition, frustration has been expressed about Europe's assumption that the AU ECOSOCC is equivalent to that of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in Europe. The EC has proposed holding a meeting for both organisations in the framework of the JAES. Basically, the AUC is not reluctant to organise a joint meeting, provided it is clear that the two entities (EESC and ECOSOCC) differ in their composition, decision-making and representation.

The CIDO has announced plans for a meeting on CSO involvement in the JAES in early 2009. This is intended to clarify the involvement of CSOs in general, and African CSOs in particular. The coming year will be an important year for the African CSO component of the JAES, and will determine the success or otherwise of involving CSOs in the strategy.

4.3 The European viewpoint on CSO involvement

The EC, the Council Secretary General and the Slovenian EU Presidency with facilitation support from ECDPM convened a meeting in Brussels on 10 March 2008,⁶⁷ which a number of

⁶⁵ Ikome, F. (2008). The African Union's ECOSOCC: an overview. Institute for Global Dialogue. Issue 78/August 2008.

⁶⁶ Aligned to the departments that make up the AU Commission: peace and security; political affairs; infrastructure and energy; social affairs and health; human resources; science and technology; trade and industry; rural economy and agriculture; economic affairs; women and gender and cross-cutting issues.

⁶⁷ ECDPM (2008). Civil Society Involvement in the Implementation and Monitoring of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

CSOs were invited to attend in order to discuss possible entry points for civil-society organisations in the strategy.

The CSOs present at the meeting formed an EU CSO Steering Group to deal with the implementation and monitoring of the JAES. It has met several times since 10 March and has reached a consensus on principles and methods for the implementation of the strategy. It elected eight representatives, i.e. one for each of the partnerships,⁶⁸ so that it can be represented at all meetings of the EU Implementation Teams (EU ITs) as well as at the Joint Expert Group meetings (JEGs).

A proposal for civil-society engagement in implementing and monitoring the JAES was drafted, accompanied by a demand for civil-society and non-state actors to be given a prominent place in the institutional partnership. The proposal sets out the objectives of civil-society engagement, the general principles of civil-society participation in the JEGs and the modalities of CSO participation. It is proposed that at least two EU CSOs and two people from African CSOs should be invited to join each of the JEGs as full members, experts and decision-makers. The proposal,⁶⁹ which was sent to the French EU Presidency and the EC in July, was discussed at a separate meeting between the French EU Presidency and DG DEV in Brussels on 30 July. Subsequently, at the request of the EU CSO Steering Group, it was submitted to the Africa Council Working Group (COAFR) for endorsement.

The French EU Presidency also facilitated a meeting with CSOs. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the modalities of CSO participation in the implementation of the JAES on the basis of a detailed proposal. In the end, however, the meeting did not meet the CSOs' expectations. The COAFR, on the other hand, endorsed the proposal for civil-society participation and encouraged all EC experts to get more involved with CSOs. Despite this, it has rejected any CSO say in decision-making. CSOs are welcome to join the JEGs and other informal meetings when invited, but will not have any decision-making powers.

In October 2008, the EU CSO Steering Group met the members of the COAFR for the first time, to discuss further action on CSO participation and funding. Although this meeting was seen as quite useful, the EU CSO Steering Group was surprised to learn that the EU ITs and AF ITs were planning to convene the first JEGs without inviting CSOs. Another meeting between the COAFR and EU CSO Steering Group took place at the end of January 2009 and in the beginning of February 2009.

4.4 What are the prospects for CSO engagement in 2009?

The AU ECOSOCC and the EU CSO Steering Group are likely to face similar problems in the future. One challenge is definitely funding. The EC has asked the EU member states to put additional funding into the eight partnerships and also into CSO participation specifically to ensure CSO engagement. Although plans were made for mapping out possible EC funding of CSO involvement in the JAES, these were eventually dropped due to financial constraints. It was proposed to fund CSO participation through a new EC development programme called 'Non-state actors and local authorities in development'. It is unclear whether this programme can be used for CSO involvement in the JAES. It remains to be seen how CSOs will be able to participate in relevant meetings in the future in view of the shortage of financial resources.

The EU CSO Steering Group has expressed frustration that CSOs are not adequately involved in the eight partnerships. Where they are consulted, it is mainly about modalities and not about substance. Only three partnerships, viz. governance, MDG and peace and security, have

and its Action Plan (2008-2010). 10 March 2008. A ECDPM Report. Netherlands, Maastricht.

⁶⁸ See Table 5.

⁶⁹ EU CSO Steering Group (2008). Proposal for Civil Society engagement in the implementation and monitoring of the Joint Africa EU Strategy.

invited representatives of the EU CSO Steering Group to a consultation meeting to discuss a possible role for CSOs. Others have been just establishing contacts in the later half of 2008.

It seems that some EC Experts and the EU member states are less aware of the importance of CSO involvement in the partnerships than others. The tendency is to look at the Action Plans for their own partnerships, but not at the JAES as a whole. They are still struggling with the fact that CSOs should also be invited to informal meetings. The lack of trust also explains the reluctance of EU member states to invite CSOs to last year's first JEG meetings in Addis Ababa. The EU member states have stressed that they first need to get to know their African counterparts before involving the CSO Steering Groups from Europe and Africa. In other words, it is unclear at what stage the CSOs will be able to join the JEGs. The European member states have suggested organising a meeting of CSOs in April prior to the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika, at which both the European and the African CSO Steering Groups could meet and present their views. The Czech EU Presidency has shown great interest in organising such a meeting, but civil society remains somewhat disillusioned about its engagement in the JAES to date, and any meeting would have to address rather than fuel these concerns.

Although the engagement of CSOs, the EP and the PAP was on the agenda of the 11th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika, it is still not clear how the three actors will be involved in the future. The Peace and Security JEG states in its Joint Progress Report that *'the role of the European and Pan-African Parliament and Civil Society in the peace and security partnership was discussed () but their involvement would be defined at a later date in light of the relevant provisions of the JAES'*. The Governance partnership was able to consult CSOs at its meeting in October 2008. The MDG partnership also emphasised that it was in touch with civil society prior to the Troika and has exchanged views. The MDG partnership underlined in the last Troika Communiqué that the UK and EC representatives were developing arrangements *'to ensure the full participation of civil society, parliamentarians and subject experts'*. The partnership on energy decided to invite private-sector representatives and CSOs to the next High-Level Africa EU Meeting on Energy, scheduled for the second half of 2009. However, the communiqué does not clarify whether CSOs will be invited to the Energy JEG Meeting in February 2009, as these *'ways to involve the private sector and civil society still need to be discussed and elaborated.'* The partnership on climate change also stresses the importance of involving CSOs in the JAES, but does not make any specific proposals as to how to involve them and at what stage. There is a *'necessity to deepen at a later stage dialogue with other stakeholders, namely civil society, the private sector and parliaments, as well as international partners.'*

The final Troika Communiqué clearly puts pressure on the EU ITs and AF ITs to hold first consultative meetings with CSOs, the private sector and other actors who have been not included in the first JEG by the spring of 2009, so that they can play an active role in implementing and monitoring the Joint Strategy. Clearly, the participation of CSOs is likely to remain a hot issue in the coming year, if the institutional structure agreed by the two partners is not put into effect.

5 Conclusion and main challenges for 2009

As a policy framework the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plans offers significant opportunities for all stakeholders. Yet these will not be fulfilled if at least some progress is not made on the following areas in 2009. It is not only the potential benefit the JAES will bring, but also the price of the failure to implement that needs to be taken seriously by all the stakeholders.

5.1 One year is too early to judge – but the judging will start nonetheless

A year is a short period in which to judge progress, particularly as the JAES is a complex process involving a large number of very different stakeholders. Yet early deliverables have consistently been emphasised as being a key component of the JAES. It is crucial that the JAES is seen to 'deliver' in the next 18 months if key stakeholders are going to invest and if the JAES is to maintain or increase its momentum. At the same time, there is also a formal requirement to report on progress at the next EU-Africa Summit in 2010. The JAES has to deliver both overall and within the partnerships (see Table 5). Progress is also likely to be uneven across the partnerships.

Yet what constitutes 'delivery' may vary from one stakeholder to another and between Africa and Europe. It is clear that progress should mean more than simply the holding of meetings. In addition, whether key stakeholders see the JAES as a vehicle in which they can pursue their interests, individually and collectively, will be key to its success. At present, some of the key stakeholders, such as European and African states, harbour doubts about its added value. Key indicators for progress could be participation by multiple stakeholders, the investment of financial resources, the quality and equality of dialogue, the investment of institutional human resources capacity by major stakeholders, articulation of common positions within and between African and European stakeholders, and tangible progress in implementing the work plan.

5.2 Overcoming wider mistrust through dialogue and deed

The history of interaction between Africa and Europe is a long one. It is also riddled with both successes and significant failures. The latter, in particular, play itself out by raising the considerable suspicion and wariness that underlies much of the dialogue between Africa and Europe. While it may be less present in some of the more technical partnerships, it is certainly present in the more political ones (such as Democratic Governance and Human Rights). Joint ownership of the content and direction of the strategy between Europe and Africa is key. Yet, many in Africa are sceptical about Europe's motivation and actions, and fear that the JAES itself does little to address these. They are concerned in particular that dialogue is going to 'replace' development cooperation, and that the JAES doesn't really provide the framework to address the major contentious issues between Europe and Africa in terms of the Economic Partnership Agreements. Or that it is an attempt by Europe solely to counter the rise of China and other emerging actors in Africa. In Europe, there is concern about Africa's real ability to make the JAES or any policy process work and the motivation of African states and the AU to engage in critical and difficult dialogue where the subtext isn't financial resources. While this mutual wariness is the so-called 'elephant in the room', it is this that often underpins the nature of EU-Africa dialogue, and for the JAES it is no different. Those involved in the JAES from both European and African sides will have to overcome this through action if they are to make it a success. This does not necessarily mean that common ground must be found on all issues but rather that a robust dialogue promotes understanding and respect between Europe and Africa, and also of the different positions within Europe and Africa. In this regard, the JAES must in some way contribute to the transformation of the dialogue rather than reinvent the past.

5.3 *Resourcing the strategy and its partnerships*

One key issue is that of resourcing the strategy. This has two elements: first, the funding of the architecture (in terms of support to participate in and attend meetings) and, second, the funding of activities. While the Europeans at least are keen to say that the success of the strategy hinges on more than simply financial resources, as in any policy process financial resources are a key determinant of commitment. This point is not lost in Africa. Yet with the AU struggling to spend €55 million from the EDF under the institutional transformation process, some European member states are reluctant to invest in the strategy. However, the AU's own processes for managing financial resources are currently being built within the AUC. Also, the AUC is not the only vehicle through which the strategy could be resourced, nor should the onus on funding the strategy be exclusively and entirely on the Europeans. Between the European Commission and the EU member-states there are various positions as where the burden of financing should come from. It will be interesting to analyse whether those partnerships that have the most resources associated to them or through associated action are the ones that make the most progress or not. There is a risk that, without greater clarity and commitment of financial resources, interest in the JAES and its Action Plan will rapidly wane on both European and African sides.

5.4 *Coherence with other policy frameworks*

Coherence with other policy frameworks is one of the key commitments of the JAES. The current framework of the JAES requires the EU to adapt its work procedures as EU-Africa relations go beyond traditional development policy-making into other areas such as climate change and migration. Secondly, all pan-African aspects and dimensions of the JAES must be fully addressed. While respecting the current African integration process and acknowledging the specificities of each region, the EU has the obligation to ensure coherence between the JAES and other partnerships such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the newly established Mediterranean Union.⁷⁰ This also needs to apply to bilateral relations between EU and African states and the other instruments the European commission has to engage on the continent. To date, despite diplomatic pledges, there has not been a lot of evidence of any systematic attempt to achieve coherence in practice. Again expectations should be modest but there needs to be a notion of progress.

5.5 *Dealing with an asymmetric partnership*

On the European side, there is a feeling, particularly in the European Commission, that they have gone some way in living up to the principle of a dialogue of equals in the JAES. However, European approaches are often based on an assumption that they are dealing with equals and equivalents in terms of capacity, resources, institutions and integration processes. African institutions, their human resources and the nature of the integration process do not mirror those in the European Union. It is not just capacity development that is required, but gaining a better understanding of the differences between EU and AU processes. Creativity will be needed to manage a relationship in which the partners' capacities and interests are not the same, and in which their human resource capacities are also different. Finally, the JAES is set against the backdrop of a growing geopolitical interest in Africa, and a situation in which African officials have a multiple of interested potential partners and Europeans also have other policy frameworks to invest in.

⁷⁰ European Communities (2008). Communication to the Commission: from Commissioner Michel and Ferrero-Waldner: Follow up to the Africa-EU- Lisbon Summit: engaging the Commission in a partnership of results. SEC (2008) 353 Final. Brussels. 19 March 2008.

5.6 *Dealing with African and European political integration processes*

The JAES is also a tangible expression of European and African aspirations to take a more unified, coherent and collective approach to external action. Yet the JAES also relies on these wider political integration processes to make progress and provide clarity on the mechanisms for interaction. Common European and African positions take time to develop and solidify and formal and informal processes are necessary to achieve this. The rejection of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union by the Irish people obviously impacts on the wider political process in Europe.⁷¹ The JAES was designed at a time when it was assumed that many issues would be clarified by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. In short, the assumption was that the legal basis would be simpler and that there would be greater political and administrative clarity about the roles, responsibilities and mechanisms the EU would collectively be able to deploy. At the same time, the JAES also supposes that Africa would also have made progress at both a political and an institutional level in terms of the integration process and the resultant relationship between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African states and the different roles and responsibilities these actors would have, both individually and collectively. Whilst this process has encountered certain problems, there have also been some notable achievements during the year.⁷²

5.7 *Extending ownership beyond the Brussels - Addis Ababa axis*

There is now a Europe-Africa forum for dialogue on specific issues that did not exist before, both within individual partnerships and throughout the overall JAES process. The challenge now is to ensure that the dialogue, and for that matter the overall JAES process, is more than one that swings on an axis between Brussels and Addis Ababa. That is, it should not be reliant simply on an EC-to-AUC axis. Nor should it be entirely driven as a diplomatic process involving member-states representatives in Brussels or Addis Ababa. In most cases, both the European Commission and the African Union Commission have had to initially cajole EU and AU member states to join partnerships. There are now some small, encouraging signs that momentum is building towards the engagement of member states on both sides, but this will really need to increase further in 2009 particularly in terms of the levels of experts beyond diplomats. New modalities are being presented, with the member states leading on the partnership areas and with a new system for managing the JAES as a whole involving the member states rather than primarily the two Commissions.

5.8 *Building critical awareness from progress*

The JAES suffers from the fact that, amongst many of the key stakeholders, particularly those based in European and African capitals and beyond foreign ministries, there is a critical lack of awareness of its existence, let alone its substance, architecture, processes and recent achievements. Also, it is difficult to hold a dialogue of equals without both parties enjoying equal access to knowledge on the JAES. Although the AUC and the EC have produced a lot of information about the JAES, much of this is not particularly accessible to those who need it. However, the most effective advertisement for the JAES will not come from increased public relations, but rather its delivery and the perceived value that it can add to existing processes (and the costs of not being involved) or work conducted in the issue areas by stakeholders in Africa and Europe. However, there is a danger, despite clear commitments to the contrary, that

⁷¹ For an overview of how the Lisbon Treaty may affect the EU's external relations, with a particular focus on developing countries, see Koeb, E., A more political EU external action: Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for the EU's relations with developing countries (ECDPM InBrief 21). Maastricht : ECDPM. 2008.

⁷² October saw the first collective Summit at Head of State level of the African economic regional organisations, COMESA, EAC and SADC. The AU was also present at this meeting. For the final communiqué, see: <http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/FinalCommuniqueKampala_20081022.pdf>.

some stakeholders (particularly member states) will wait until they see progress before deciding to engage fully. As progress depends on their involvement, however, we risk getting into a classic chicken-and-egg situation. In order to prevent this, bold and creative leadership is required, both in the partnerships and at the overarching level. This leadership will have to come from political leaders in Europe and Africa, some of whom are likely to be replaced in 2009 as well as from senior level officials.

5.9 *Management of an inclusive process*

One of the main innovations of the JAES is its inclusive nature that it offers the promise of a different type of relationship with key stakeholders, including civil-society organisations. In reality, civil society and the parliaments have so far been sidelined. CSOs have also questioned whether the JAES is really worth the effort of engagement. There has been a distinct lack of clarity, continuity and direction from the main institutional partners about how civil society and parliaments could actually engage with the strategy and its action plan. This is despite the best efforts of some individuals within the EC and the AUC and clear commitments on the participation of non-state actors being a key feature of the JAES. If this issue is not clarified in 2009, civil society and parliaments may well become increasingly hostile to or disillusioned with the strategy.

5.10 *Being clear about the consequences of failure*

What has happened during the first year is that the institutional architecture for on JAES has been articulated and developed to the point where it is now ready for progress substance – particularly within the partnerships. This has taken some considerable effort that should be acknowledged. The next 18 months will be crucial to whether the future of Africa-EU relations are to be defined at least partially by the JAES and the principles it articulates. The alternative to the JAES is primarily a more fragmented bilateral approach which may suit some actors in the short term, but which would be the antithesis of the goals that political leaders in both Europe and Africa have set for themselves in an era of globalisation. The other alternative does not look particularly attractive: these include investing more in the fragmented policy frameworks of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Union of the Mediterranean, neither of which offers the holistic approach to Africa or to the issues facing both continents embodied by the JAES. If the JAES fails, then the EU and the AU will need to offer some alternative to pursue dialogue and joint priorities. Yet there is unlikely to be much enthusiasm in the short run to pursue this. In short, leadership and commitment is key to making the JAES a success 2009.

Annex

Table 5: Priority actions and activities for each of the partnerships for 2009-2010⁷³

Implementation of the eight thematic partnerships (First Action Plan)	
Partnership 1 - Peace and security	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
Enhance dialogue	TIMELINE: 1) Joint AU PSC and EU PSC meetings will be held on an annual basis (second meeting by September 2009). 2) Joint evaluation missions to CAR, Burundi, and Comoros in 2009, and Somalia ASAP. 3) Joint EU-Africa missions to post-conflict areas in 2009. 4) Possibility of establishing a centre for PCRD Policy Framework in Africa in 2009. 5) EU-Africa workshop in Africa in the first half of 2009. 6) EC, AU, and EU Council Sec. will submit proposals for operationalising consultation mechanisms in March 2009. 7) Development of an African SALW Strategy by December 2009. Develop modalities to engage African experts in the field of SALW by June 2009. Organise a joint workshop on eradication of ERW in 2009.
APSA	TIMELINE: 1) All projects being conducted to make operational CEWS will be identified in the first half of 2009. 2) ASF Operationalisation: The AMANI AFRICA / EURO-RECAMP will be launched and fully implemented in order to develop a Stand-By-Force by June 2010. A joint AU-RECs-EU study will be carried out to prepare a EU support programme for African training centres by June 2009. A joint seminar will be organised in the first quarter of 2009.
Predictable funding	TIMELINE: 1) Funding through the new APF for 2008-2010 will be made soon operational with €300 million.
Partnership 2 - Democratic governance and human rights	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
Enhance dialogue	TIMELINE: none 1) Both sides will prepare details of platform. 2) Co-chairs will develop proposals for cooperation. 3) Participation teams have been proposed to JEG to ensure coordination and coherence. 4) AfDB will provide info on project presented. 5) Both sides will present input statements on HR and governance. 5) Regular reporting on ongoing activities. 6) EU invites African partners to COHOM and COAFR sessions.
Promote APRM and African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance	TIMELINE: none 1) EU will receive African views on support of APRM and pan-African governance architecture. 2) Regular reporting on ongoing activities. 3) African side will present position on EU mapping. 4) African side will inform EU of activities needed to implement the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. 5) Morocco will develop proposal for local governance. 6) Women's participation will be streamlined throughout the priority action.
Cultural goods	TIMELINE: none 1) EC and AUC will consult to speed up inventory of ongoing activities. 2) A common list of activities and projects will be brought to next JEG meeting. 3) Regular reporting of ongoing activities.
OTHER	JEG meeting will be held twice between troika meetings.

⁷³ The authors are grateful for Jonas Heirman's of ECDPM's assistance in preparing this table.

Partnership 3 Trade, regional integration and infrastructure	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
African integration agenda	TIMELINE: none 1) Key priorities are A) the implementation of the Minimum Integration agenda, and B) the harmonisation and rationalisation of RECs. 2) Support to regional integration will be based upon 11 November 2008 conclusions on regional integration and EPAs adopted by the EU Council of Ministers.
Capacity in rules, standards, quality controls	TIMELINE: none 1) SPS training will take place Africa-wide, AUC officers' capacity will be strengthened, an information exchange platform will be created, knowledge of food and feed inspection will be enhanced, and discussions will take place on modernising laboratories. 2) Discussions will be initiated on industrial standards and normalisation, and priorities will be identified for cooperation, which will include support for firms and agency capacity development. 3) Studies to assess needs and potential for customs procedure harmonisation and rules of origin will take place at African level; information seminars will be held on the basis of EC 'customs blueprints'. 4) The African side will coordinate continent-wide statistics, through the promotion of the African Charter of Statistics, supported by Eurostat.
EU-Africa infrastructure partnership	TIMELINE: 1) Recruitment of technical assistance is planned for early 2009. 2) The EU-Africa Aviation Summit in Windhoek on 1 December 2008 will lay the foundations for enhanced cooperation in civil aviation, and develop a road map. The Infrastructure Trust Fund has received €146 million in grants.
OTHER	The EC and the EU will step up trade-related assistance to €2 billion annually by 2010.
Partnership 4 - Millennium Development Goals	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
Finance and policy base	TIMELINE: 1) EU Council is committed to increasing ODA collectively to 0.56% of GNI by 2010. 2) MDG partnership will link coherently with the outcomes of the EU Agenda for Action events and processes that are focused on achieving MDG targets by 2015. 3) The Doha Conference on Financing for Development in November-December 2008 is looked to as a key moment in defining the financial base for the MDGs.
Food security targets	TIMELINE: 1) Agree on a consolidated set of actions by JEG meeting in March 2009. Planned Discussion: 1) Select projects from AU/NEPAD Action Plan. 2) Ensure strategic link between food price crises and CAADP.
Health targets	TIMELINE: 1) Agree on a consolidated set of actions by JEG meeting in March 2009. Planned Discussion: 1) Select projects from AU/NEPAD Action Plan. 2) Tackle maternal mortality.
Education targets	TIMELINE: 1) Agree on a consolidated set of actions by JEG meeting in March 2009. Planned Discussion: 1) Select projects from AU/NEPAD Action Plan.
OTHER	The next JEG meeting will be held in March 2009.
Partnership 5 - Energy	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
Energy security and regional integration	TIMELINE: Will be presented in detail in the Road Map, which is to be completed in the next few months, along with mapping exercises, the formation of relevant Working Parties, the High-Level Africa-EU Meeting on Energy, and broadening and deepening communications between Africa and EU JEG members.
Renewable energy/efficiency	
Access to energy	

Scaling up investments	
Capacity building/technical transfer	
OTHER	The AUC has expressed interest in making progress by the upcoming AU Summit in January 2009. The next JEG meeting is due to take place in February 2009. The first High-Level Africa-EU Meeting on Energy will take place in the second half of 2009, probably at the same time as the Energy Partnership Forum. A formal African Implementation Team (AF-IT) will be formed.
Partnership 6 - Climate change	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
Common Agenda	TIMELINE: 1) To ensure that elements of the future climate change agreement, to be concluded in Copenhagen by the end of 2009, contribute to Africa's economic development. 2) Meetings will be held every six months, where possible jointly with international climate change workshops. 3) The following themes will be prioritised: capacity-building, water management, desertification, urban development, deforestation, firewood supply, access to energy/efficiency, sea level rise, pollution inventories (GHG, etc.), natural resources, disaster risk reduction. 3) The work plan for 2009 will focus on CLIMDEV, planning, capacity-building for UNFCCC, improving access to carbon credits, implementing the Global Climate Alliance, and strengthening disaster risk reduction policy cooperation between EU and AU.
Land degradation/aridity	TIMELINE: 1) Great Green Wall of Sahara pre-feasibility study will be completed by the end of 2008.
OTHER	A joint EU-Africa declaration on climate change will be adopted before the Poznan UNFCCC Conference in December 2008.
Partnership 7- Migration mobility and employment	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
Declaration of Tripoli	Priorities defined so far are remittances, diaspora and employment
Trafficking of human beings	1) Agreed on the need of a comprehensive, regular and transparent exchange of information between all partners (including those not present at this meeting), in particular through the use of an Africa-European Union INTRANET site, which is expected to become available soon. ;
Ouagadougou Declaration	2) Agreed, with a view to facilitating and speeding-up its work on the possibility, where appropriate, of tackling specific priorities in this area by smaller groups of committed States under the leadership of volunteering States which should report to the Informal Joint Expert Group. Particular reference was made to remittances including on the project of an African remittances Institute, on the work with African Diaspora as suggested by the Netherlands, and on employment issues, introduced by South Africa.
OTHER	Sub-groups meetings will be organised before the next informal Joint Expert Group meeting early 2009 on the identified priorities
Partnership 8 - Science, information society and space	
Priority action	Timeline and/or plan
Develop inclusive information society	TIMELINE: 1) African Connect, and the African Internet Exchange System (AXIS) were identified as Lighthouse Projects (early deliverables) to be commented upon by African and EU MS.
Support S & T capacity-building	TIMELINE: 1) African Research Grants & Scientific Awards and Water and Food Security in Africa were identified as Lighthouse Projects (early deliverables) to be commented upon by African and EU MS.
Enhance cooperation on space applications and technology	TIMELINE: 1) Capacity-building in the AUC in geospatial sciences was identified as a Lighthouse Project (early deliverables) to be commented upon by African and EU MS.

OTHER	JEG 8 would like the Troika to consider setting up a common dedicated financial instrument for the partnership in the long term. The meeting recommended postponing the Africa-EU Science and Technology Dialogue Initiative to the coming six months so that it would attract more interest.
EU-Africa ministerial recommendations	
Issue	Plan of action
1	African and EU members of the JEGs need to underpin their political commitment to the process with concrete contributions (i.e. human, financial and technical).
2	African and EU ownership must be promoted and both sides should set up and consolidate internal working groups.
3	The first consultative discussions should be held with key non-institutional actors before the spring of 2009.
4	Both sides must make efforts to treat Africa as 'one', and to adapt the policies, arrangements, and legal and financial frameworks to the needs and objectives of the partnership.
5	Coordination must be improved to reflect the Joint Strategy as a cross-cutting priority.
6	The principles, objectives and priorities of the Joint Strategy should be integrated into the programming of financial and technical cooperation, as well as into political dialogues with third parties.
7	EU and African actors should enhance contacts, coordination and cooperation in the UN and other international bodies.
8	EU should reaffirm its political and financial commitments to Africa.
9	The African side needs to provide leadership in and take responsibility for the effective delivery on commitments.
10	A structured dialogue should be organised with the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament.

Source: Adapted from Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, Addis Ababa (20-21 November 2008) *Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan (2008-2010)*. and correspondence with Marie Laure de Bergh, DG DEV regarding Partnership 7 MME.

Table 6: Selected Africa-EU Events in the framework of the JAES in 2008

Date	Event	Actors
4 February 2008	First AU-EU Joint Expert Meeting on the implementation of the Joint Strategy (Ethiopia, Addis Ababa)	AU EU
3-5 March 2008	CSO Consultation on the implementation phase of Africa-EU Strategic Partnership by the AUC, Bamako (Mali, Bamako)	CIDO CSO
10 March 2008	Seminar on civil society involvement in implementing and monitoring the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in Brussels (Belgium, Brussels)	EC CSO
19-20 March 2008	First AU Regional consultative meeting on the implementation of the first action plan of the Africa-EU Strategy (Burkina Faso)	AU MS AUC
2 April 2008	Meeting on Europe-Africa Research Network (EARN) in Brussels (Belgium, Brussels)	EARN ECDPM
14-15 April 2008	Lesotho hosts second AU consultative meeting on the implementation of the first action plan of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy (Lesotho, Maseru)	AU MS AUC
15-18 April 2008	Preparations for AU-EU joint task force meeting (Ethiopia, Addis Ababa)	EU AU
13-14 May 2008	Visit of ad-hoc EP delegation to Pan-African Parliament (South Africa)	EP PAP
6 June 2008	Implementing the 8th partnership of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy by means of an enhanced policy dialogue between EU and AU members (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)	AUC
5 June 2008	Africa-EU Dialogue Follow-up Committee Meeting (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)	AUC
16 September 2008	10th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika (Brussels, Belgium)	EU AU MS
1 October 2008	4th College-to-College meeting between the European Commission and the African Union Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	EC AUC
15-16 October 2008	Energy Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
13-14 November 2008	Climate Change Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
13-14 November 2008	Science Information Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
14 November 2008	Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
18 November 2008	Peace & Security Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
18 November 2008	Democratic Governance and Human Rights Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
19 November 2008	Millennium Development Goals Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
20-21 November 2008	Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa (Steering Committee)	JEG
20-21 November 2008	11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	EU AU MS
26 November 2008	Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership JEG meeting, Addis Ababa	JEG
12 December 2008	EARN meeting and public presentations on "Implementing Africa-EU Partnership one year after", Chatham House, London	EC CSO PAP

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The European Centre for Development Policy Management

Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21

6221 HE Maastricht, The Netherlands

Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00 Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 02

E-mail info@ecdpm.org www.ecdpm.org (A pdf file of this paper is available on our website)

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