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Ukraine's reconstruction gap: Why public finance has not yet crowded in private capital

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The World Bank puts Ukraine's reconstruction needs at almost \$600 billion. At every Ukraine Recovery Conference since Lugano in 2022, the conclusion has been the same: public money alone cannot meet a bill this size, and private capital must be mobilised. Four years on, it has not arrived. Fresh foreign equity since the invasion totals roughly \$2.9 billion – equivalent to 1.5% of some \$200 billion in non-military support over the same period.

This paper draws on three original registers of project-level data from international financial institutions (IFIs), the EU Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF) and Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline – together mapping roughly \$80 billion in reconstruction commitments and plans. The registers tell a clear story: public institutions sit at every layer, and public money rarely crowds in private capital.

For support to public authorities (34% of UIF and 33% of IFI project finance), this is logical. However, even support to publicly owned companies with commercial activities and to the private sector so far rarely attracts announced private co-investment. Although 43% of Ukraine's public investment pipeline by volume generates income, almost no private participation has been secured. Hence, public finance substitutes for private capital in segments that in peacetime would engage private participation.

International financial support is no longer only filling a gap; it is settling who will own Ukraine's productive assets after the war. A state-led structure built now will have to be unwound later to meet EU competition rules.

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Acronyms

ADUIF	Amber Dragon Ukraine Infrastructure Fund I
ADVANCE	Advancing Needed Credit Enhancement for Ukraine
ASPI	Anticipated Social and Project Impact
BIO	Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries
BSTDB	Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
CAPEX	Capital Expenditure
CEU	Central European University
DFC	U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DPO	Development Policy Operation
DREAM	Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECA	Export Credit Agency
EFF	Extended Fund Facility
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIF	European Investment Fund
EIFO	Export and Investment Fund of Denmark
ESRS	Environmental and Social Review Summary
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMO	Dutch Entrepreneurial Development Bank
FREE	Financing Recovery, Reconstruction and Economic Enhancement
FSG	First Loss Guarantee
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GP	General Partner
HCCF	Horizon Capital Catalyst Fund
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFU	Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Denmark)

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
KSE	Kyiv School of Economics
KUKE	Export Credit Insurance Corporation (Poland)
LP	Limited Partner
MCPPI	Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Program
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
NBU	National Bank of Ukraine
NEFCO	Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
NEURC	National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PE	Private Equity
PEACE	Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance
PIM	Public Investment Management
PIP	Public Investment Program
PPA	Power Purchase Agreement
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PSO	Public Service Obligation
RDNA	Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
RDNA4	Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
RDNA5	Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
REBUF	Rebuild Ukraine Fund
RLF	Risk Loss Facility
RSF	Risk Sharing Facility
SII	Summary of Investment Information
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SPP	Single Project Pipeline
SPUR	Supporting Reconstruction and Recovery
TA	Technical Assistance
TI	Transparency International
UIF	Ukraine Investment Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
URC	Ukraine Recovery Conference
URGF	Ukraine Recovery Guarantee Facility
URTF	Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund
WB	World Bank

Executive summary

The paradox

Four years into the war, Ukraine's reconstruction needs stand at almost \$600 billion. At every Ukraine Recovery Conference since Lugano in 2022, the conclusion has been the same: public money alone cannot meet a bill this size, and private capital must be mobilised. Four years on, it has not arrived. Foreign direct investment as new equity into Ukraine since the invasion totals roughly \$2.9 billion – equivalent to 1.5% of approximately \$200 billion in non-military support over the same period.

Reconstruction-relevant investment has instead remained on public and state-owned enterprise (SOE) balance sheets, even where assets are commercial, substituting for rather than crowding in private capital. This exposes a paradox: public finance must step in where private capital cannot go, yet is simultaneously expected to draw it in.

What the evidence shows

This paper draws on three original registers of project-level data – from the international financial institutions (IFIs), the EU Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF), and Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline (SPP) – together mapping roughly \$80 billion in reconstruction commitments and plans, compiled from official sources between February 2022 and April 2026.

These registers tell a clear story: public institutions sit at every layer of reconstruction activities – as the sources of funds, as the intermediaries channelling them, and as the entities implementing the projects. Public money rarely crowds in private capital, and for the most part does not move ownership to private hands; it substitutes for private investment rather than mobilising it. For money channelled to public authorities as emergency support for critical physical or social infrastructure – 34% of UIF and 33% of IFI project finance – the question of private participation does not arise, nor should it necessarily. However, 25% of UIF and 39% of IFI reconstruction funds are channelled to publicly owned companies, which cover a continuum of activities from public service obligations to commercial, cash-generating outcomes. On the commercial end of this spectrum, there would in peacetime be some private buy-in, for example in the form of public-private partnerships. There are few traces of that happening: the EU's guarantees to these companies mobilise about 30% more in IFI lending, with no announced private co-investment. Publicly owned companies are treated as creditworthy borrowers, but not as platforms for private participation.

Even where UIF and IFI directly support the private sector, there is little documentation that this crowds in private capital. Nearly \$1 billion has been raised in private reconstruction funds since February 2022, yet the “private” funds rest almost exclusively on investments from IFIs and development finance institutions (DFIs).

Ukraine’s own investment pipeline runs through public authorities (25%) and publicly owned companies (75%). Of 146 projects worth \$53 billion, 43% by volume generate revenue, but only an \$8.9 million microgrid in Ternopil records confirmed investor interest. Two wind projects illustrate the point: a public investment of roughly \$1 billion in a wind power project, classified on DREAM, Ukraine’s official project platform, as revenue-generating, draws no investor interest, while a privately owned wind farm reached financial close in 2024 with \$74 million of private equity behind \$171 million of public debt. The difference is ownership structure, not sector.

Why ownership matters

At the scale of \$200 billion over four years, reconstruction finance does more than plug a wartime funding gap: it allocates who will own and manage productive assets after the war, and where the returns accrue. What begins as necessary substitution hardens into institutional path dependence. A state-led ownership structure entrenched now will later have to be unwound to meet EU competition rule, and the European Commission’s own enlargement reporting notes that state-owned enterprises underperform private firms.

From substitution to structured crowding-in

Private-sector-led reconstruction may not be realistic during active war. But the shift from substitution to de-risking can begin now, through how public capital is structured. The paper proposes three shifts.

Reclassify – treat assets by economic function, not by administrative sponsor. A cash-generating asset routed through a publicly owned company is still a candidate for private participation, and its revenue profile should determine how it is financed.

Reposition – move public finance behind private capital rather than in place of it. When public capital absorbs general credit risk, the asset stays publicly owned; when it absorbs specific project risks – wartime destruction, political interference, counterparty payment risk – through guarantees, insurance, or first-loss equity, the asset can be privately held. War-risk cover should be extended to lost income, not only physical destruction. And equity should be scaled.

Test – before financing fixes the structure of a publicly owned, cash-generating project, private participation should be tested with a documented offer and a recorded response.

None of this implies that reconstruction can be financed predominantly by private capital in the near term. The benchmark is narrower: whether public finance fills the gap in ways that preserve and test the option of private co-ownership where it is economically plausible. Meeting it means trading breadth for depth – accepting mobilisation ratios of one to three rather than five to ten, because deep coverage of capital destruction and income interruption is what may change an investment committee decision.

Introduction

Four years of war have ravaged Ukraine's infrastructure. Almost \$200 billion of direct damage has been inflicted since February 2022, and reconstruction needs are estimated at \$588 billion according to the World Bank ([WB 2026](#)).

Ukrainian and European leaders insist that private capital must be mobilised to rebuild the country, even during wartime. Across the Ukraine Recovery Conferences, from Lugano in 2022 ([Governments of Switzerland and Ukraine, 2022](#)) to Rome in 2025 ([Governments of Italy and Ukraine, 2025](#)) the private sector has been declared a pillar of reconstruction. However, the international private investment response has been limited. Foreign is equivalent to only 1.5% of total non-military international financial support from 2022 ([National Bank of Ukraine, 2026](#)).¹

Reconstruction-relevant investment has instead remained on public and state-owned enterprise (SOE) balance sheets, even where assets are commercial, effectively substituting for rather than crowding in private capital. This exposes a paradox: public finance must step in where private capital cannot go, yet is simultaneously expected to draw it in.

This paper advances four arguments:

1. Deterrents to foreign direct investment, including war risk, governance constraints, labour shortages, and power disruptions, do not fully explain why roughly \$200 billion in non-military support since 2022 has not generated stronger crowding-in.
2. Original datasets show that public financial instruments predominantly substitute for private capital even where assets generate commercial cash flows, where private participation should be most achievable.
3. The dominance of support to the public sector and SOEs produces ownership outcomes that narrow the path for private capital after the war. Reconstruction finance allocates who owns and manages productive assets and where rents accrue, entrenching a state-led structure that will later have to adjust to EU competition standards. Paradoxically, SOEs are treated as creditworthy borrowers, but not as platforms for private participation.
4. Private-sector-led reconstruction may not be realistic during active wartime, but the shift from substitution to de-risking can still be

¹ Figures exclude debt instruments and reinvested earnings; fresh equity was approximately 27% of total inward FDI in 2022–2025; this refers to new direct investment equity flows from non-resident investors, following standard international FDI measurement conventions.

accelerated by changing how public capital is structured, specifically, its ability to absorb defined wartime and counterparty risks.

The analysis draws on three original registers compiling project-level data from IFIs, the EU Ukraine Investment Framework, and Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline from February 2022.

1. The gap

Private foreign investment in Ukraine remained a trickle between 2022 and 2025. Fresh foreign equity into Ukraine amounted to approximately \$500 million in 2022, \$550 million in 2023, \$930 million in 2024, and \$960 million in 2025 ([National Bank of Ukraine, 2026](#)). Of the roughly \$2.94 billion in fresh FDI across that period, well under \$1 billion went to industry and energy² – the sectors that form the physical backbone of reconstruction.

The scale of that figure becomes clear against the public flows running in parallel. From 2022 to 2025, international partners provided nearly \$173 billion in budgetary support to Ukraine.³ The EU and its member states alone have contributed close to \$104 billion in financial, budgetary, and humanitarian support since the full-scale invasion ([EEAS, 2026](#)). The most reliable figure for total reconstruction finance is provided by the World Bank, which estimates that at least \$20.3 billion in reconstruction needs have been met across nine sectors since 2022.⁴ The Ukrainian government identified \$11.9 billion in priority public investment projects for 2025 and \$11.3 billion for 2026 through the Single Project Pipeline. Of this, approximately \$5.5 billion and \$3.9 billion, respectively, were secured through the State Budget and international partners.⁵

² The industry share of FDI fell from 46% (2019–21) to 24% (2022–24), while services rose from 45% to 72%. ([Poluschkin and Kirchner, 2025](#); [OECD, 2025](#)).

³ Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, "Olga Zykova at the EIB Group Forum: Since 2022, Ukraine has received nearly \$173 billion in budget support from international partners" 6 March 2026.

⁴ RDNA5. The \$20.3B figure covers nine sectors and explicitly excludes the energy sector, where significant additional repair spending has occurred; the true scale of reconstruction finance deployed is therefore higher than this figure implies.

⁵ See [WB, Government of Ukraine, EC and UN \(2025\)](#) for 2025 figures and RDNA5 ([WB, Government of Ukraine, EC and UN \(2026\)](#)) for 2026 figures.

Table 1. International support to Ukraine and fresh foreign equity, 2022–2025 (\$ billion)

Category	2022	2023	2024	2025	2022–2025
Financial aid	34.4	38.6	55.7	42.9	171.6
Humanitarian aid	9.9	6.2	5.2	4.6	26.0
Total (excl. military)	44.3	44.8	61.0	47.5	197.6
Fresh foreign equity	0.50	0.55	0.93	0.96	2.94
Fresh foreign equity: % of financial and hum. assistance	1.1%	1.2%	1.5%	2.0%	1.5%

Notes: i Financial and budgetary support, excluding military. ii Excludes debt and reinvested earnings; full-year 2025.

Sources: [Trebesh et al. \(2026\)](#); [NBU \(2026\)](#).

2. Why is international private capital not flowing

The reasons why international private capital is not flowing to Ukraine are well-documented. First, the physical war risk is documented in the World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) (WB, Government of Ukraine, EU and UN, 2026). This publication, now in its fifth edition, provides a detailed picture of ongoing destruction, as well as the crippling effects on basic infrastructure. The shortage of energy supply, including for businesses, is portrayed by the IEA ([IEA, 2024](#)), and Ukraine suffers from acute labour shortages ([KSE, 2025](#), [IOM, 2024](#)).

Second, a vast body of literature describes investment risks arising from political and institutional factors,⁶ corruption,⁷ insufficiently entrenched rule of law, regulatory weaknesses, a history of oligarchic control over multiple sectors, the concentration of power in the presidency,⁸ the reach of SOEs and current state dominance of the economy.⁹ EU accession provides the external anchor for institutional reform,¹⁰ and the European Commission documents progress in this alignment process in detail ([EC, 2025](#)).

⁶ IFC (2023) describes the range of reforms needed to improve the business environment. The “unfinished business” of reforming the Ukrainian state is highlighted in Dabrowski (2023).

⁷ The evolution of the perception of corruption in Ukraine is documented by Transparency International (2021); Ukraine has climbed from 126th to 104th place on the global ranking of countries from 2020 to 2025.

⁸ An analysis of the concentration of power in the presidency historically and under President Zelensky is included in Madlovics and Magyar (eds. 2023).

⁹ An overview of the state involvement in the economy, the need for SOE privatisation and the status for the reform process is provided by the European Commission (2025).

¹⁰ The weakening and remaining strength of oligarchs post-2022 is analysed in Goriunov et al. (2023). This New York Times article discusses how oligarchs have been reined in, for now, by the war: Meheut (2024). The evolving role of oligarchs is treated academically in Madlovics and Magyar (eds. 2023).

Third, two competing truths appear to hold for the macroeconomic impacts of the war: 1) the Ukrainian government and National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) have managed the multiple crises well;¹¹ 2) the Ukrainian economy remains vulnerable, with large public deficits and dependence on external aid,¹² as well as growing current account deficits.¹³ The outlook suggests moderate economic growth,¹⁴ but investments at scale will necessarily be considered in light of the long-term financial sustainability of the Ukrainian government and the wider stability of the economy.

Fourth, the question of whether credible exit options exist may also be a deterrent for investors. NBU's capital control measures, though gradually eased since 2024, remain subject to wartime restrictions that create residual uncertainty for hard-currency investors, and shallow domestic capital markets provide a limited local investor base.

Notwithstanding these constraints, some international private capital has entered – \$2.94 billion in fresh foreign equity across 2022–2025. Active fundraising processes at Horizon Capital and Dragon Capital, as well as the evolution of IFI/DFI/ECA instruments, indicate that more is available under the right conditions. However, the investment deterrents and the modest equity inflows suggest that private capital cannot drive reconstruction at the scale required during active wartime – public finance must lead. The question this paper addresses is narrower: within the constraints these deterrents create, do international public financial instruments mobilise the private capital that is available, or do they substitute for it? The data compiled in the following section suggest that some level of substitution is unavoidable in wartime Ukraine, but also that the proposition of crowding in has not been sufficiently tested.

3. International public finance: substitution vs. de-risking

Reconstruction finance for Ukraine has been predominantly public at every layer, from sources and intermediaries to implementing entities, as shown in the project-level data compiled for this paper. That pattern was inevitable in 2022–23, when emergency stabilisation was the priority. Across all IFIs in the register, equity represents only 2.9% of project-level commitments over 2022–26 (Table 3B);

¹¹ In the 2025 IMF review of the extended arrangement under the extended fund facility, Ukraine met all quantitative criteria and two structural benchmarks: IMF (2025).

¹² A comprehensive analysis of the initial effects of the war on the Ukrainian economy is found in Boyarchuk and Dabrowski (2023). The World Bank has also analysed the macro- and microeconomic impacts of the war in RDNA5 and in Avdeenko et al. (2024).

¹³ The current account deficit is expected to rise sharply: 16.2% of GDP in 2025, 20.8% 2026, 21.5% 2027, according to Betliy et al. (2025).

¹⁴ IMF projects growth of 4.5% in 2026 and 4.8% in 2027: IMF, Eighth EFF Review for Ukraine; the German Economic Team is more cautious at 2.1% and 2.6% respectively: IMF (2025); Betliy et al. (2025).

among the three IFIs with equity capacity (EBRD, EIB, IFC), the share has risen from 2.6% in 2022–24 to 5.9% in 2025–26 (Table A2.1); even the recent increase leaves equity at the margins of the instrument mix. The question, therefore, is whether the current instruments strike the right balance between substituting for and de-risking private capital, and whether they enlarge or narrow future pathways for private participation. The empirical scope is project-level reconstruction operations announced or committed between February 2022 and 15 April 2026: IFI commitments documented as approved projects on IFI websites (EBRD, EIB, IFC, World Bank URTF, MIGA), the 62 announced programs under the EU Ukraine Investment Framework, bilateral DFI commitments, and all projects on Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline as posted to the DREAM platform. Sovereign balance-of-payments support, budget support (World Bank PEACE/DPO; bilateral budget support), humanitarian aid, and military assistance are excluded.¹⁵

3.1 Substitution vs. de-risking: a diagnostic framework

Three questions clarify where an asset sits on the spectrum from substitution towards risk mitigation and de-risking:

Is the asset delivering a public good or a commercial service?

Does it generate predictable cash flows?

Under normal conditions, would it attract private investment or PPP structuring?

In wartime Ukraine, public finance fills in for private capital even in commercially viable segments. This is substitution, not risk mitigation or de-risking. The sections below document this pattern across IFI project finance, the EU Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF), bilateral DFI equity, and Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline.

3.2 UIF and IFI support for reconstruction projects since February 2022

3.2.1 UIF and IFI support to public authorities

Not all reconstruction finance is designed to attract private capital, nor could it be. A third of UIF and project-level IFI funds go to public authorities (33.4% and 34%, respectively, Table 3A, Table 4); budget support is excluded from these figures. This is emergency sovereign support for functions that would be taxpayer-financed in peacetime. The bulk of this is given as debt or guarantees supporting debt (75.5% and 81.5%) and a small portion as grants (Tables 3B, 4, and A1.1). A breakdown of IFI project funding to the public sector illustrates that this is mostly for the social sector and public infrastructure repair and reconstruction (Table 2). Support to public authorities is public capital performing public functions, and the substitution question arises here only insofar as cash-generating assets are involved.

¹⁵ See Statistical Annex, A.0, for the full selection methodology.

Table 2. IFI project finance to public authorities by function, 2022–2026 (\$ million, indicative)

Category	Amount (\$M)	Share
Public infrastructure repair and reconstruction	\$2,411	37.3%
Social sector	\$2,184	33.8%
Institutional reform	\$1,661	25.7%
Emergency municipal liquidity	\$207	3.2%
TOTAL	\$6,463	100.0%

Source: Author's IFI project register (Annex A1) based on project documents and official statements from IFIs. Public authority recipients only – central government, ministries, agencies, and sovereign-borrower entities; budget support not included. Excludes state-owned enterprises, NGOs, and private sector recipients. Commitments, not disbursements.

Table 3A. IFI funding by recipient type, 2022–2026 (share of registered project finance)

IFI	Public authorities	Public companies	Private companies
EBRD	3.0%	59.8%	37.1%
EIB	54.7%	33.3%	12.1%
IFC	0.0%	5.3%	94.7%
World Bank	66.2%	23.8%	10.0%
IFI total – project finance only	33.4%	39.3%	27.2%

Source: Author's IFI project register (Annex A1) based on project documents and official statements from IFIs. Shares calculated from registered project-finance entries (commitments, not disbursements). Excludes World Bank budget support and policy-based lending. "World Bank" combines URTF reconstruction projects with MIGA war-risk guarantees. Civil-society recipients (0.1% of total) are excluded from displayed shares.

Table 3B. IFI finance by instrument type – project-level operations, 2022–2026

Institution	Equity	Debt	Guarantee	Grant	Total (\$M)
EBRD	3.0%	67.9%	22.1%	7.0%	\$7,799
EIB	2.6%	85.0%	8.9%	3.5%	\$4,597
IFC	15.8%	56.8%	27.4%	–	\$1,326
MIGA	–	–	100.0%	–	\$564
WB-URTF	–	68.4%	–	31.6%	\$5,058
% of total	2.9%	69.4%	15.8%	11.9%	\$19,344

Source: Author's IFI project register (Annex A1) based on project documents and official statements from IFIs. Shares calculated from registered project-finance entries (commitments, not disbursements). Excludes World Bank budget support and policy-based lending. Numbers may not sum exactly due to rounding.

Table 4. UIF commitments by delivery channel and instrument (\$ million)

Delivery channel	Programs	Guarantee (\$M)	Grant/TA (\$M)	Equity (\$M)	Total (\$M)	% of total
Public authorities	27	\$2,083	\$472	—	\$2,555	34%
Public companies	12	\$1,508	\$398	—	\$1,906	25%
Private companies	23	\$2,192	\$584	\$240	\$3,016	40%
TOTAL	62	\$5,784	\$1,454	\$240	\$7,478	100%
Share of total	—	77%	19%	3%	100%	—

Source: Author's UIF register (Annex A2) based on program documents posted on the UIF website. Channel breakdown based on the author's analysis of the register.

3.2.2 UIF and IFI support to publicly owned companies

It is in publicly owned companies that reconstruction finance moves from clearly public functions toward commercially oriented activities, and where the balance between substitution and crowding-in is most consequential. The figures illustrate the extent to which Ukrainian authorities and IFIs/UIF rely on publicly owned companies: they have received 39.3% of IFI reconstruction finance and 25% of the UIF envelope (Tables 3A and 4). This support serves a dual function: delivering critical public goods (gas, electricity, port management, among others) while providing capital to enterprises exposed to wartime damage and risk.

This category is not homogeneous: some SOEs perform public service obligations (PSOs), others are commercially oriented, and many sit on a continuum between the two – from state energy companies managing critical grid infrastructure to SOEs in agribusiness, logistics, and telecoms ([EC, 2025](#)).

A December 2024 Cabinet decision makes this distinction clear: SOEs performing PSOs will remain under state ownership, and commercial SOEs fall into two categories: those to be privatised or liquidated, and those whose privatisation is suspended under martial law. Entity-level privatisation is an end point; in the meantime, private-sector participation may be possible at the project level, but the current structuring of financial support forecloses this opportunity. Whether this is the correct trade-off depends in part on wartime necessities – the urgency of repair, the limited private capital immediately available, and the public necessity of critical services.

Whether driven by institutional preference for SOE counterparties or by default routing that does not test private participation, the outcome in this channel is structurally exclusionary. This suggests a mismatch between the objective of bringing in private capital and the reality of how SOE support is functioning. If international public financing can be used to draw in private capital for SOE

projects, the mobilisation effect of public expenditure would increase. Currently, IFI and UIF support to SOEs is extended almost entirely as debt or guarantees in support of debt. Within IFIs' support to publicly owned companies, the instrument mix is 67% debt, 12% guarantees, and 21% grants (Table A1.1, within-channel shares), whereas the UIF relies primarily on guarantees (77% of the envelope) backing IFI lending, with grants accounting for the remaining 23% (Table 4). In effect, SOEs are treated as creditworthy borrowers, not as platforms for private participation. Table 5 illustrates this pattern for UIF. Across \$1.9 billion in support to publicly owned companies, the mobilisation effect is almost entirely IFI lending against an EU guarantee, at a total average mobilisation ratio of 1.3 and no announcements of private co-investments. In practice, EU and IFI instruments finance SOE projects with public money: guarantees back IFI lending, and grants complement it.

As a result, the SOE channel shows substitution but no observable crowding-in of private capital. Some substitution is unavoidable in wartime Ukraine; the concern is its reach. Only when SOE-implemented projects begin to offer equity stakes or other risk-sharing positions will public money start to leverage, rather than replace, private investment. The SOE channel is where substitution extends into territory where de-risking is available but not yet deployed – and where the choice of instrument has determined that outcome.

Table 5. UIF support to publicly owned companies: programs, recipients and mobilisation

Program	Recipient SOE	IFI partner	Instrument	EU commit. (\$M)	Exp. mob. (\$M)	Type of capital mobilised	UIF stated mob. ratio	Announcement of private capital mobilised?
Debt Financing to Ukrainian State-Owned Entities	Ukrainian SOEs (energy sector)	EBRD	Guarantee + grant/TA	\$551	\$816	Additional IFI debt to same SOEs; fiscal burden relief only	1.5x	No
Ukraine Emergency and Decarbonisation Support EIB	Ukrainian SOEs (energy/industrial)	EIB	Guarantee + grant/TA	\$359	\$382	IFI own-account debt to energy SOEs	1.1x	No
Ukraine District Heating EIB	Municipal heating utilities	EIB	Guarantee	\$218	\$218	IFI own-account debt to municipal utilities	1.0x	No
Investment Grant to Naftogaz	Naftogaz	EIB	Grant / TA	\$140	\$138	Direct grant to SOE operating budget	1.0x	No
Support of UHE Stability and Recovery EIB	Ukrhydroenergo	EIB	Guarantee	\$131	\$157	IFI own-account debt to state hydropower SOE	1.2x	No
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Electricity Transmission	Ukrenergo	KfW	Grant / TA	\$111	\$272	Grant enables EBRD loan to same SOE (public co-financing)	2.5x	No
EU NEFCO Green Recovery Program	Municipalities and utilities	NEFCO	Guarantee + grant/TA	\$119	\$126	IFI own-account debt to municipal utilities	1.1x	No

Program	Recipient SOE	IFI partner	Instrument	EU commit. (\$M)	Exp. mob. (\$M)	Type of capital mobilised	UIF stated mob. ratio	Announcement of private capital mobilised?
Ukraine Railway Modernisation EIB	Ukrzaliznytsia	EIB	Guarantee	\$55	\$55	IFI own-account debt to state railway SOE	1.0x	No
Energy Security and Grid Stability (Eximbanka)	Ukrenergo	Eximbanka	Guarantee + grant/TA	\$102	\$110	IFI own-account debt to energy transmission SOE	1.1x	No
Repairing Essential Logistics Infrastructure and Network Connectivity (RELINC) Project	Ukrzaliznytsia / State Roads Agency	IBRD	Guarantee + grant/TA	\$76	\$93	IFI own-account debt to transport SOEs	1.2x	No
Investment Grant to Ukraine District Heating Program	Municipal utilities via state banks	EIB	Grant / TA	\$34	\$42	Direct grant to municipal heating utilities	1.3x	No
Ukrposhta Modernisation and Digitalisation EIB	Ukrposhta	EIB	Guarantee	\$12	\$14	IFI own-account debt to state postal operator	1.1x	No
TOTAL – 12 programs	–	–	–	\$1,906	\$2,423	IFI own-account debt or direct grants to SOEs; no private capital alongside	1.0x–2.5x (avg. 1.3x)	No – all 12

Source: Author's UIF register (Annex A2) based on program documents posted on the UIF website. All 12 UIF programs are classified as support to publicly owned companies, sorted by EU commitment. Figures are UIF-stated projections, not verified outcomes. All programs deploy guarantees or grants; none deploy equity.

3.2.3 UIF and IFI support to private companies

International public support to the private sector is overwhelmingly either substituting for private capital or sustaining private-sector activity without generating private co-ownership of reconstruction assets. Across equity, debt, and guarantees, the pattern is consistent: private capital either does not enter, cannot be verified, or enters in a form that does not produce co-ownership.

Even equity – the primary pathway to private co-ownership – has yet to produce confirmed private commitments at scale. Equity instruments represent only 8% and 11% of the private-sector envelope in UIF and IFI project finance, respectively and have so far crowded out other public capital rather than private investment. The investors in Horizon Capital's recently announced Catalyst Fund are IFC, EBRD, Swedfund, Norfund, FMO, and Proparco – all IFIs and DFIs. The same pattern holds in Dragon Capital's REBUF vehicle, where investors listed in the press release include IFC, EBRD, Swedfund, Norfund, and BIO. The picture may be evolving – Horizon and Dragon are now seeking private limited partners (LPs) – but at the time of writing, public capital has substituted for, rather than crowded in, private capital in private equity (PE) investment vehicles.

The debt channel is designed, at least in principle, to crowd in private capital: UIF and IFI project lending represent 41% and 24% of their respective private-sector envelopes (Figure 1), and reported mobilisation ratios of 3.1x–11.5x (Table 6) imply significant private co-investment at project close. In these structures, a subsidised, publicly covered loan is normally expected to trigger parallel private equity and debt needed to close the deal. However, neither UIF nor IFIs publish the project-level breakdowns – private source, amount, and instrument – that would make the mobilisation claim verifiable. The data compiled for this paper from UIF and IFI sources do not verify the reported mobilisation ratios, and therefore describe the expectation of crowding-in, not the documented fact of it. Guarantees are the most consequential instrument for crowding-in in the current architecture, accounting for 41% of IFI and 73% of UIF private-sector finance (Figure 1) – but they are not homogeneous. The bulk absorbs wartime credit risk that commercial banks would otherwise carry on their own balance sheets, keeping the financial system liquid and enabling lending that almost certainly would not have occurred in wartime. This supports private-sector reconstruction activity at firm level, as Ukrainian businesses draw on this credit to sustain operations and invest. But it does so through bank balance sheets, not through private investors sitting alongside IFIs in the capital stack of identifiable projects: these guarantees mobilise private intermediated lending rather than project-level private co-investment. A smaller share works differently – MIGA's war-risk guarantees, for instance, sit behind private foreign direct investment directly, closer to the

risk-absorbing de-risking this paper argues for. The dominant pattern, however, remains intermediated lending rather than project-level co-ownership.

Table 6. UIF private sector support: anticipated additional capital


Mechanism	Commitment (\$M)	Anticipated (\$M)	Form	UIF stated mob. Ratio
Bank intermediation (EU guarantee → IFI risk-sharing → bank lending)	\$1,838	\$9,903	Debt	1.0x–10.4x
Grants via banks (EU grant → bank → SME subsidies)	\$514	\$3,024	Debt	3.4x–6.7x
EU guarantee → direct IFI loan to private company	\$425	\$3,627	Debt (IFI) + implied sponsor equity (undisclosed)	5.5x–11.5x
EU Flagship Fund (EU junior equity)	\$240	\$545	Equity (private LP; pending)	2.3x
TOTAL UIF TO PRIVATE COMPANIES	\$3,016	\$17,099	Mixed (debt and equity)	5.7x avg

Source: Author's UIF register (Annex A2) based on program documents posted on the UIF website. Four mechanisms through which UIF capital reaches private companies. Anticipated figures are UIF-stated mobilisation projections; amounts are not verified at the project level on the UIF website.

Pattern across support to public and private companies

Within support to public and private companies — 66.5% of IFI project finance and 66% of UIF — debt and guarantees make up the bulk of support, with few clearly documented private co-investments at scale. UIF and IFIs have optimised for creditworthy borrowers and efficient disbursement rather than private ownership outcomes. Even where de-risking may have been within reach, substitution has been the dominant effect.

Figure 1. IFI and UIF finance to private companies: breakdown by instrument



Source: Author's IFI register (Annex A1), based on project documents and official statements from IFIs, and Author's UIF register (Annex A2), based on project documents on the UIF website

3.3 Bilateral DFIs

Bilateral DFIs have taken a different route from IFIs and UIF – concentrating their Ukraine exposure more in equity commitments to privately managed fund vehicles rather than debt or guarantees to public borrowers (Table 7), offering an early test of whether public equity can mobilise private equity. Nordic DFIs have been the most active bilateral equity providers: confirmed commitments to Horizon Capital and Dragon Capital fund vehicles total approximately \$123 million from Swedfund, Norfund, and IFU. The EU Flagship Equity Fund has drawn in a broader bilateral coalition, with Germany, Italy, France, and Poland each contributing first-loss equity tranches of \$16.4 million. Beyond equity, France's €200 million bilateral grant program finances critical infrastructure reconstruction through French companies working with Ukrainian public entities. In the equity channel specifically, bilateral DFIs are so far crowding in other public equity rather than private capital – with the Flagship Fund and the Horizon Catalyst Fund the two most important vehicles designed to break that pattern, and private LP fundraising now underway.

Table 7. Recent equity fund vehicles for Ukraine: first-close investor composition

Fund vehicle	Manager(s)	Status	Public finance committed (\$M)	Private LPs announced
Rebuild Ukraine Fund (REBUF)	Dragon Capital	16 Jan 2026 First close	86.0	None
Horizon Capital Catalyst Fund (HCCF)	Horizon Capital	20 Jan 2026 First close	136.3 ^a	None
Amber Dragon Ukraine Infrastructure Fund I (ADUIF)	Amber Infrastructure / Dragon Capital (JV)	21 Jan 2026 First close	198.4	None named ^b
European Flagship Fund for the Reconstruction of Ukraine	Dragon Capital + Amber Infrastructure	14 Jan 2026 Manager selected	239.8	None
TOTAL			660.5	None named
<p><i>No foreign private LPs were disclosed at first close. The \$660.5M committed across these four vehicles is entirely public capital. Private fundraising is ongoing. \$ million. "Public finance committed" includes named amounts disclosed by IFIs, bilateral DFIs, and EU/multilateral channels at first close.</i></p> <p>^a <i>Proparco committed an undisclosed amount; HCCF first close announced as >€150M / >\$163.5M against \$136.3M of named DFI commitments.</i></p> <p>^b <i>ADUIF first close announced as ~€200M / \$218M; residual of ~\$19.6M above-named DFI commitments implies GP commitment.</i></p>				

Sources: Author's register of wartime fund vehicles (Annex A3) based on IFI, DFI, and Fund Managers' project documents and official statements.

3.4 Export credit and FDI de-risking instruments

Export credit agencies (ECAs) and FDI de-risking instruments are the clearest case of crowding-in in the international support architecture: the public commitment is a precondition for private capital, not a replacement for it. Most major ECAs have introduced dedicated Ukraine facilities since 2022, expanded coverage to include war risk – physical asset destruction is now explicitly covered by Germany, France, and Poland – and, in several cases, raised ceilings and extended tenors to 15 years for infrastructure and 22 years for renewables.

At the EU level, the EIF Export Credit Pilot (€300 million) provides counter-guarantees to ECAs on EU SME exports, and the EBRD's URGF reinsures Ukrainian insurers on inland cargo and transport war risk. Poland's KUKE has been the most active ECA, insuring approximately €1.5 billion since 2022. A critical gap

on the investment-insurance side is business-income-loss coverage: only the U.S. DFC and France's Bpifrance currently extend it.

Utilisation data across European facilities remains patchy. But the coverage gaps and the aggregate evidence point in the same direction: these instruments have not yet produced private investment at scale, consistent with foreign equity only representing 1.5% of total international finance since 2022.

3.5 Ukraine's own pipeline: reform and its limits

Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline (SPP) — mandated by the PIM Roadmap of 27 December 2023 — is the most direct evidence of how the public-channel default operates from the demand side. Alongside the SPP, Ukraine has enacted a PPP law, the DREAM platform, and an investment catalogue for private investors, all intended to make the pipeline more legible to private capital. The data reveal the gap between intent and outcome.


A project-level analysis of the 146 projects on the DREAM platform shows that 75% of CAPEX is routed through SOEs, and 43% of total CAPEX sits in projects classified as revenue-generating — assets that in peacetime would be candidates for private participation. Of these, 92% by value have received no PPP assessment. For the 8% where a PPP was considered, investor interest is recorded as absent in all but one case — the Ternopil microgrid, representing 0.02% of total volume. Private readiness is not systematically assessed, and projects are routed into public-channel financing regardless of their revenue profile.

The Naftogaz Bioenergy wind program makes the point precisely. Four wind farm projects owned by a Naftogaz subsidiary across three locations — in Vinnytsia, Berezivka and Mariivka, with total CAPEX of over \$1.03 billion (£42.8 billion) — are classified as income-generating, self-sustaining and PPP-suitable in the DREAM appraisal fields yet record no investor interest. The basis for that assessment is not disclosed. By contrast, EBRD, IFC and BSTDB provided \$171 million in debt to a private wind farm developed by Galnaftogaz, enabling financial close with \$74 million in sponsor equity. The Galnaftogaz project is smaller than any of the Naftogaz Bioenergy projects individually, but the principle is the same: both are wind farms, both in Ukraine, both during the war. The difference is ownership structure. Sectoral risk does not explain the divergence — pipeline design does.

What the SPP data establish is that Ukraine's own investment pipeline replicates the public-channel default documented across the IFI and UIF registers. The legal avenue for private co-investment exists, but the evidence on the DREAM platform reveals that it is not being used.

In parallel to DREAM, the Ministry of Economy has since 2023 presented selected SPP projects to international investors through the Investment Catalogue, an annual publication prepared with KSE Institute that aggregates 250 investment cases across 11 sectors. Several large SOE projects are explicitly drawn from the SPP, which represents an attempt to draw private capital into the PIP framework. The Catalogue specifies neither the public support available for these projects nor how private capital and public instruments would combine to make them bankable.

Figure 2. From SPP pipeline to private investor: a four-stage filter



Sole project with confirmed investor interest: Ternopil microgrid (£367 m / \$8.9 m)

Source: Author's analysis based on data on DREAM (dream.gov.ua). All figures and classifications shown are as recorded on DREAM. Each stage applies one filter to the prior stage's cohort: Revenue-generating = projects DREAM classifies as income-generating, self-sustaining, or both; PPP-suitable = DREAM records a positive PPP suitability assessment; investor interest = DREAM records confirmed private investor interest.

4. Why ownership matters

Crowding in private capital is often framed in terms of mobilisation ratios – how much private finance each public dollar can stretch. However, at the scale of \$200 billion over four years, non-military international public finance does not merely plug a wartime funding gap; it allocates who owns and manages productive assets tomorrow and where rents accrue. When most reconstruction-relevant capital flows through sovereign balance sheets and SOEs, what begins as necessary substitution becomes institutional path dependence at

scale: actors made commercially viable by today's public and EU-backed instruments may shape – and contest – the rules of the post-war economy. Ownership outcomes are not neutral for market formation. Assets developed and operated under public ownership during reconstruction will shape pricing structures, investment incentives, and regulatory expectations in the post-war economy. In the context of EU accession, these ownership outcomes matter: systematically allocating commercially viable assets to public balance sheets entrenches a state-led ownership structure, which will have to be adjusted to meet EU competition standards.

An extended period of SOE dominance also has operational consequences: the EU Commission notes that “SOEs underperform compared to private firms, reflecting operational inefficiencies ([EC, 2025](#)).” The question is therefore not only whether public finance is sufficient, but whether its current configuration supports or constrains Ukraine's own stated end-goal of a more competitive, private-sector-led economy aligned with EU norms.

5. From substitution to structured crowding-in

Crowding in private capital for reconstruction can and should be systematically tested. This requires three shifts: reclassifying assets by economic function rather than by administrative sponsor, repositioning public finance from the ownership layer to the risk mitigation layer of the capital stack in those commercially viable cases, and testing crowding-in as a verifiable policy objective rather than a standing aspiration. The argument is not that private capital would flow at scale under current wartime conditions, but that the instrument mix does not sufficiently reveal how much could flow, because it does not systematically test the proposition.

5.1 Reclassify: treat assets by function, not by sponsor

A first shift is to separate the economic character of assets from the administrative identity of their sponsor. In the current architecture, projects originating within SOEs or public pipelines are routed into public-channel finance almost by default, regardless of whether their revenue profile would support private participation – as the contrast between Naftogaz Bioenergy and Galnaftogaz illustrates.

Function-based classification could be embedded in Ukraine's own public investment management system, sorting projects by economic function and recording PPP or private-readiness assessments at the pipeline stage, before projects are matched to financing. To avoid adding prohibitive friction in wartime, these screens should run in parallel with technical and safeguard appraisal once

projects enter the DREAM/SPP pipeline – the incremental cost is small relative to typical project preparation timelines. For cash-generating assets capable of supporting private participation, structured testing of private interest – and explicit justification where fully public financing is retained – should be the norm rather than the exception.

The necessity of this exercise is underscored by the scale. Across the registers examined here – the SPP pipeline, the UIF envelope, and IFI project-level operations – the aggregate value of commercially viable, cash-generating assets routed to public-channel financing is on the order of tens of billions of dollars. Over the RDNA5 ten-year reconstruction horizon, the cumulative total will be substantially larger.

5.2 Reposition: move public finance behind private capital, not in place of it

Section 4 established that Ukraine's reconstruction-finance architecture is producing ownership outcomes that matter for the post-war economy. Those outcomes follow from an operational choice: which risks public capital absorbs, and for whom. When public capital absorbs the general credit risk of sovereigns and SOEs, it is extended as senior debt to public counterparties and lands on public balance sheets. The result is that reconstruction assets remain under public ownership. When public capital absorbs specific project risks – wartime destruction, political interference, counterparty payment risk – it is deployed as guarantees, insurance, or first-loss equity to private counterparties, stands behind or outside the project's capital stack, and allows reconstruction assets to be privately held. Repositioning is the second choice: a shift in what risks public capital is deployed to absorb, with consequences that follow.

Repositioning is not hypothetical in Ukraine. On the insurance side, EIFO's €381 million guarantee on the Tyligulska wind project enabled the largest wartime renewable energy investment in the country ([Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities of Denmark, 2025](#)); DFC has deployed \$357 million in named-peril political-risk insurance at firm and project levels ([U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, 2024](#)). The EU Flagship Equity Fund places junior equity behind anticipated private LP commitments; bilateral DFI equity commitments to Horizon Capital, Dragon Capital, and Amber Infrastructure place public capital alongside private LPs in privately managed vehicles; and the Galnaftogaz wind project reached financial close in 2024 with EBRD and IFC debt behind private sponsor equity. These transactions share a structural feature: they trade leverage for depth. They show that when public capital takes genuinely risk-absorbing

positions behind private investors, reconstruction deals can close even under wartime conditions.

For repositioning of SOE assets, the policy choice is whether they proceed to purely public borrowing or are deliberately structured to test private participation and, where feasible, move public capital into risk-absorbing positions behind private investors.

The general shift is from lending to public borrowers toward risk-absorbing positions around private capital. Guarantees and insurance act directly on war-related risks that deter private investors; another step change in the provision of these instruments, including by insuring business income, would be welcomed by international companies considering investments in Ukraine. Equity matters distinctly: it is the instrument that converts public support into private co-ownership rather than public-backed debt, and its provision should be accelerated. This is already underway at the margin: the equity share among the IFIs with the capacity for equity doubled from 2022–24 to 2025–26 (Table A2.1). The task is a shift in the mix of existing operations toward patterns already visible in IFC’s Ukraine portfolio, bilateral DFI fund equity, and deep-coverage insurance — applied at scale as private-origination instruments grow beyond their current marginal share.

5.3 Test: make crowding-in a verifiable policy objective

Section 3 showed that within IFI and UIF support to public and private companies — 66.5% and 66% of project finance, respectively — debt and guarantees dominate, with few documented private co-investments at scale. Whether this reflects market conditions or default routing can only be known by testing the market with a structured offer at the project or asset level. Where such an offer is made, and private capital does not respond, debt and guarantees are the necessary outcome of a tested constraint; where no offer is made, they are the outcome of decisions that do not test. The Naftogaz Bioenergy and Galnaftogaz cases in Section 3.5 illustrate the stakes: \$1.8 billion in CAPEX classified as income-generating and PPP-suitable with no recorded investor interest, versus a private wind farm that reached financial close in 2024 with private-sponsor equity behind EBRD and IFC debt. The first shows substitution by default; the second shows what de-risking by design can produce.

A test is a structured offer on specified terms — instrument, position, price, tenor, risk absorption, exit — made before public capital fixes the capital structure. The terms must allow a private investor to take an investment committee decision. Informal soundings do not constitute a test, and offers at terms no plausible

investor could accept would produce false negatives. A documented response includes acceptance, rejection, or a counterproposal on structure or pricing. Tests will differ by investor class, and a test designed for one may fail for another. Line ministries and lead IFIs — IFC, EBRD, the World Bank — would conduct and document these tests. As a working standard, non-emergency reconstruction assets with commercial cash flow should not reach financing decisions without either a documented offer of private participation and response or a reasoned justification for substitution.

The objection is wartime expediency: structuring takes time that the war does not allow. This is locally rational at the project level. At the architecture level, however, misclassifying commercially viable assets at the scale documented in Section 3 shapes the post-war ownership structure rather than wartime deployment timelines. Testing adds documentation rather than delay; public capital still flows, but the question becomes where it sits in the capital structure and who the counterparty is. The proposition excludes emergency repair and restoration that leave no structuring window. It applies to reconstruction assets with commercial cash flow where such a window already exists — for example, projects far enough along the SPP/DREAM pipeline or comparable appraisal processes to be ready for financing decisions — and shows whether debt and guarantees are truly the necessary outcome of a tested market response, or whether de-risking behind private co-investors is available and simply unused.

5.4 Sectoral preconditions

The instrument-side reforms in 5.1 through 5.3 require counterpart work on Ukraine's regulatory and contract frameworks. Where tariffs are cost-reflective, off-take agreements are enforceable, and payment discipline is credible over a 15–20-year horizon, testing and repositioning can bite. Where those conditions are absent, no instrument can sustainably produce private participation at scale. Ukrenergo illustrates the point. The transmission system operator carries most of the public-channel finance flowing to Ukraine's grid as a creditworthy IFI borrower, yet its bankability for private co-investment is structurally constrained: administered tariffs, cross-subsidy obligations, and downstream payment arrears create counterparty risk no project-level guarantee can absorb. Under current conditions, public substitution is possibly the only feasible model for financing Ukrenergo's grid expansion and reconstruction. What would change this is regulatory reform — cost-reflective tariffs under NEURC independence, payment discipline, EU market-rule alignment — alongside international partners underwriting Ukrenergo's ability to enter credible long-term PPAs through sovereign guarantees, IFI credit enhancement, or EU backstop arrangements. These conditions are not immediately attainable under wartime constraints, and

for significant parts of Ukraine's reconstruction pipeline, they may remain binding for years. Instrument-side reforms and regulatory reforms are complementary, not alternative. As EU accession advances the regulatory conditions, the remedies in 5.1 through 5.3 apply to more of the reconstruction pipeline.

6. Conclusion

None of this implies that reconstruction could or should be financed predominantly by private capital in the near term. Public finance will underpin Ukraine's reconstruction for years to come; core public goods, social services, municipal survival, and emergency repairs will continue to depend on it. The benchmark is whether public finance has filled the gap in ways that preserve and test the option of private co-ownership where that option is economically plausible.

Since 2025, public financial instruments have begun to move toward this benchmark, but crowding-in of private capital remains limited in scale. This reflects investment deterrents, sectoral and regulatory constraints, and wartime expediency, but also the still limited use of public capital in risk-absorbing positions behind project-level private investment. The proposition of crowding-in remains insufficiently tested. The public investment pipeline is not designed to draw in private capital, and the share of risk capital to private companies remains minimal, at around 3% of project-level international financial support.

The scale of the challenge — around \$600 billion of reconstruction needs, combined with the security imperative of sustaining Ukraine — requires allocating a greater share of public finance to private-sector risk mitigation, for assets under both private and public ownership. This implies trading breadth for depth: accepting mobilisation ratios of one to three rather than five to ten. Deep coverage of capital destruction and cash-flow interruption, with public capital positioned behind private investors in the capital stack, is what changes investment-committee decisions; thin coverage calibrated to high ratios does not produce transactions.

The case for private co-ownership in reconstruction is not only about mobilising finance. The deployment of public capital determines who owns and manages assets, and the current public sector-led reconstruction will make adjustments to EU competition rules more difficult. To enable a transition to a more private-sector-led reconstruction after the war, commercially viable assets should be reclassified and repositioned for private participation.

Statistical annex

A.0 Methodology and scope

This annex documents the four registers compiled for this paper: the IFI register, the UIF register, the fund vehicle register, and the Single Project Pipeline (SPP) register. The empirical scope is project-level reconstruction operations announced between the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and the closing date of 15 April 2026.

Sources and verification. Inclusion across all registers is based on official sources – primarily project pages and project databases, supplemented by additional information verified in press releases or other official communications. Primary sources include IFI project databases and disclosures (EBRD, EIB, IFC, World Bank, MIGA); EU institutional documents on the Ukraine Investment Framework; DFI official communication; and the DREAM platform, which hosts Ukraine’s Single Project Pipeline (dream.gov.ua). Where official sources differ on figures for the same operation, the register records the most recent verified figure from the institution itself, with the variance documented in register notes where material.

Recipient classification. Each operation is classified into one of four recipient categories – public authorities, publicly owned companies, civil society and NGOs, or private companies – based on the entity that manages the cash. The classification rule matters most for operations where the formal counterparty and the cash-managing entity differ. Where a ministry is primarily a pass-through to a publicly owned company – for example, where a sovereign loan formally signed by the Ministry of Finance funds investment by Ukrenergo or a regional state utility – the operation is classified as support to the publicly owned company. The architectural argument the paper makes about ownership outcomes depends on tracking where the cash actually lands; classifying a sovereign-signed loan as support to public authorities when the cash is spent by a state-owned company would understate the SOE channel. Conversely, where a state-owned bank receives an IFI credit line for SME on-lending, the operation is classified as support to the publicly owned company (the bank), not to private companies. End-use does not change channel classification: the channel reflects who manages the cash, not who eventually receives the on-lent funds.

Co-financing convention. Each operation is recorded at the IFI's own-account exposure, not at total project cost or covered portfolio size. For risk-sharing facilities (EBRD RLF/RSF/FSG, IFC RSF), this means the IFI guarantee or first-loss layer is recorded, not the underlying portfolio enabled. For blended finance, capital routed through the IFI structure (e.g. third-party concessional

contributions disbursed via IFC) is included in IFI totals; parallel capital from B-loan participants, MCPP investors, or other DFIs co-lending alongside the IFI is excluded. This convention deliberately understates the gross capital alongside IFI commitments to avoid double-counting and to keep institutional totals comparable.

Pre-war operations disclosed late. A small number of pre-2022 operations were disclosed in the IFI databases during the 2022–2026 window (transparency back-fill rather than new commitments). These are flagged in the register and excluded from aggregate totals; they are not new reconstruction-era exposure.

Conventions across registers. All amounts in \$ or € are converted at a fixed rate of \$1.09/€ throughout the period, regardless of the announcement date, to keep cross-period comparisons consistent. Spot-rate conversion would produce comparability artefacts unrelated to the underlying flows. Figures represent amounts announced at the project or program level – board approvals, signed agreements, or named project disclosures. Broader pledges that have not been translated into a project-level announcement are not included.

A.1. IFI Register

The IFI register documents announced project-level reconstruction operations from EBRD, EIB, IFC, World Bank URTF, and MIGA between February 2022 and 15 April 2026, totalling approximately \$19.3 billion. It draws on the project databases of each IFI, with official press releases or other official communications providing supplementary information.

World Bank program-level credit-enhancement envelopes (ADVANCE, SPUR) are excluded from aggregate figures; their reconstruction-relevant deployment is captured within URTF project-level totals. For guarantee facilities (one-shot contracts with no pending balance after signing), the amount recorded is the signed commitment rather than the proposed envelope; for framework loans and equity investments (where partial signings leave an unsigned balance open), the announced or approved envelope is recorded. Tables A1.1–3 support Sections 3.2 and 4 of the body.

World Bank Group operations are split into two registers: WB-URTF (the 12 named project-level operations under the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund) and MIGA (political-risk guarantees, recorded separately given the distinct mandate and instrument structure).

Table A1.1. IFI finance by institution, recipient channel, and instrument

\$ million, indicative. Period 2022–2026; cutoff 15 April 2026. Each cell shows the share of the overall project-level total (\$19,344M).

Institution	Recipient channel	Equity	Debt	Guarantee	Grant	% of total	Total (\$M)
EBRD	Public authorities	–	1.11%	–	0.12%	1.23%	\$237.69M
EBRD	Public companies	–	17.40%	4.08%	2.64%	24.11%	\$4,664.69M
EBRD	Civil society	–	–	–	0.02%	0.02%	\$4.50M
EBRD	Private companies	1.22%	8.86%	4.82%	0.05%	14.95%	\$2,892.33M
EBRD total	All channels	1.22%	27.37%	8.89%	2.84%	40.32%	\$7,799.21M
EIB	Public authorities	–	12.24%	–	0.71%	12.95%	\$2,505.18M
EIB	Public companies	–	7.62%	0.21%	0.05%	7.88%	\$1,525.07M
EIB	Civil society	–	–	–	0.07%	0.07%	\$13.73M
EIB	Private companies	0.62%	0.34%	1.90%	–	2.86%	\$552.84M
EIB total	All channels	0.62%	20.21%	2.11%	0.83%	23.76%	\$4,596.82M
IFC	Public companies	–	–	0.36%	–	0.36%	\$70.00M
IFC	Private companies	1.08%	3.89%	1.51%	–	6.49%	\$1,255.73M
IFC total	All channels	1.08%	3.89%	1.88%	–	6.85%	\$1,325.73M
MIGA	Private companies	–	–	2.92%	–	2.92%	\$564.00M
MIGA total	All channels	–	–	2.92%	–	2.92%	\$564.00M
WB-URTF	Public authorities	–	16.71%	–	2.52%	19.23%	\$3,719.77M
WB-URTF	Public companies	–	1.19%	–	5.73%	6.92%	\$1,338.00M
WB-URTF total	All channels	–	17.90%	–	8.25%	26.15%	\$5,057.77M
ALL IFIs	By channel						
	Public authorities	–	30.06%	–	3.35%	33.41%	\$6,462.64M
	Public companies	–	26.21%	4.65%	8.42%	39.28%	\$7,597.76M
	Civil society	–	–	–	0.09%	0.09%	\$18.23M
	Private companies	2.92%	13.10%	11.15%	0.05%	27.22%	\$5,264.90M
Grand total	Total (\$M)	\$566	\$13,418	\$3,055	\$2,305	100%	\$19,344
	% of total	2.92%	69.37%	15.79%	11.91%	100%	100%

Notes: All percentages are shares of the overall project-level total (\$19,344M). Excludes IMF sovereign balance-of-payments support and World Bank budget support (PEACE, FREE, ADVANCE, DPO series). Civil society receives \$18M (0.1% of total) – EBRD humanitarian and rehabilitation grants and EIB Institute / UNDP technical assistance to NGOs. "WB-URTF" covers Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund projects (\$5,058M); MIGA is shown separately, reflecting its distinct mandate (political-risk guarantees).

Source: Author's IFI project register (cutoff 15 April 2026); EBRD project pages, EIB project pages, IFC SII/ESRS/ASPI, World Bank URTF tracker, MIGA portal. € converted at \$1.09/€.

Table A1.2 Snapshots of instrument shifts for EBRD, EIB and IFC: projects announced 2022–24 vs. 2025–26

Shares within each period (institution-specific denominators) of all project-level reconstruction finance across all instruments.

Equity share — EBRD + EIB + IFC combined

Instrument	2022–24 share	2025–26 share	Change (pp)
Equity (3 IFIs combined)	2.6%	5.9%	+3.3pp

EBRD

Instrument and recipient	2022–24 share	2025–26 share	Change (pp)
Equity (all recipients)	1.8%	4.6%	+2.7pp
Debt to public companies	47.9%	36.9%	-11.0pp
Guarantee to public companies	8.6%	12.2%	+3.6pp

EIB

Instrument and recipient	2022–24 share	2025–26 share	Change (pp)
Equity (all recipients)	2.2%	3.0%	+0.7pp
Debt to public companies	10.2%	52.2%	+42.1pp
Debt to public authorities	66.7%	37.6%	-29.1pp

IFC

Instrument and recipient	2022–24 share	2025–26 share	Change (pp)
Equity (all recipients)	8.1%	27.5%	+19.4pp
Debt to private companies	75.4%	28.4%	-47.1pp
Guarantee to private companies	16.4%	30.7%	+14.3pp

Source: Author's IFI project register. Period 1 (2022–24): February 2022 – end-2024. Period 2 (2025–26): January 2025 – 15 April 2026. All instruments included (debt, equity, guarantee, grant); shares add to 100% by period for each IFI. The combined equity row uses a pooled denominator across the three IFIs. EBRD and EIB rows show the dominant SOE-routed instruments; EIB also shows the offsetting fall in debt to public authorities; IFC rows show its dominant private-sector channel. € converted at 1.09. Commitments, not disbursements. MIGA and WB-URTF excluded.

Table A1.3. IFI capital: co-financing evidence by mobilisation mechanism

All registered project-finance entries from the EBRD, EIB, IFC, MIGA and WB-URTF registers (February 2022 – 15 April 2026): 225 entries totalling \$19,326M, mapped to six mobilisation mechanisms.

Mobilisation mechanism	IFI commitment	Co-financing structure	Private capital crowded in?
Debt and guarantees to public authorities	\$6,463M (33.4%) 50 entries	Sovereign and municipal balance sheets	No
Debt and guarantees to publicly owned companies	\$7,598M (39.3%) 57 entries	SOE balance sheets	No
IFI risk-sharing and intermediary debt to private banks	\$1,838M (9.5%) 59 entries	Private bank on-lending	Indirect via banks
IFI direct loans, equity and guarantees to private companies	\$2,369M (12.2%) 43 entries	Sponsor equity implied; not disclosed	Sponsor equity implied
IFI equity in private fund vehicles	\$494M (2.6%) 15 entries	Public DFIs only; no private LPs	No private LPs announced
MIGA war-risk guarantees to private investors	\$564M (2.9%) 1 entry	Insurance on existing private FDI	Insurance only

Source: Author's IFI project register (cutoff 15 April 2026). Excludes \$18M civil-society support (4 entries) and 6 zero-amount advisory engagements; total registered = \$19,344M.

A.2. The EU Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF)

The UIF register documents the 62 announced programs under the EU Ukraine Investment Framework as of 15 April 2026, totalling approximately \$7.5 billion in EU commitments. The register is constructed from official UIF project pages, with amounts converted at \$1.09/€ for consistency with the IFI register. Table A2.1 classifies the 62 programs by delivery channel and mobilisation mechanism, with EU commitment, announced expected mobilisation, mobilisation ratio, type of additional capital mobilised, and confirmed private-capital outcome documented for each mechanism. The table supports Section 3.2 of the body.

Table A2.1: UIF private sector support by mobilisation mechanism

Mobilisation mechanism	N	EU commit. (\$M)	% of UIF	Exp. mob. (\$M)	Type of capital mobilised	UIF stated mob. ratio	Private capital mobilised?
Support for public authorities and publicly owned companies							
Sovereign/public lending – 1:1 EU guarantee backs direct IFI loan	13	\$1,426	19%	\$2,429	Public debt (IFI sovereign/municipal lending)	1.0x	No
Sovereign/public lending – with blending EU guarantee + grants, triggers larger IFI lending	16	\$2,234	30%	\$6,431	Public debt + grants (IFI loan blended with EU/IFI grants)	1.1x–2.2x	No
SOE guarantees substitution; EU guarantee replaces sovereign guarantee for SOE	2	\$653	9%	\$926	SOE debt (EBRD own-account; fiscal relief only)	1.5x	No
Grants: direct deployment to public entities	9	\$798	11%	\$1,503	Public grants (direct to public entities)	1.0x–2.9x	No
Indirect private sector support							
Bank intermediation – two-layer contingent EU guarantee → IFI → banks → SMEs	11	\$923	12%	\$4,382	Bank debt (bank own balance sheet; no ownership transfer)	1.0x–10.4x	Indirect
Grants: subsidies and technical assistance via banks	6	\$723	10%	\$3,812	Bank debt (grants subsidise SME borrowing costs)	2.7x–5.8x	Indirect
Direct private sector support							
EU guarantee enabling a direct IFI loan to private company	4	\$481	6%	\$3,689	IFI debt + implied sponsor equity (undisclosed)	3.1x–11.5x	Yes (partial)
Equity: catalytic capital to a privately managed fund	1	\$240	3%	\$545	Private equity (EU junior + private LP co-investment)	2.3x target	Yes (target)
TOTAL	62	\$7,478	100%	\$23,717	–	3.2x	–

Note: Mobilisation ratios shown are as stated by UIF programme documents at the announcement stage. They reflect expected leverage at design rather than realised deployment. Where ranges are shown (e.g. 1.0x–10.4x for bank intermediation), the lower bound reflects programs still in tendering and the upper bound reflects programs with public mobilisation targets at full envelope size.

Source: Author's analysis of all 61 projects posted on the UIF website <https://uif.eu> plus the EU Flagship Fund, which is also part of UIF.

A.3 Investment vehicles and bilateral DFI finance

The bilateral DFI register documents IFI and bilateral DFI equity commitments to seven privately managed fund vehicles where full investor rosters are publicly disclosed: Horizon Capital Catalyst Fund, Horizon Capital Growth Fund IV, Rebuild Ukraine Fund, Amber Dragon Ukraine Infrastructure Fund I, Ukraine Phoenix Tech Fund, Flyer One Ventures Fund V, and the European Flagship Fund for the Reconstruction of Ukraine. Total documented commitments: approximately \$978 million.

The register does not attempt comprehensive coverage of bilateral DFI deployment to Ukraine. Significant programs operated by KfW Entwicklungsbank, KfW IPEX, DEG, BII, and FMO are not aggregated here, nor is bilateral DFI activity beyond the verified fund-vehicle universe. Comprehensive bilateral DFI coverage would require resources and access beyond the scope of this paper, and partial coverage would be more misleading than scope-bounded coverage of what is verifiable.

Table A3.1 documents the LP-by-vehicle matrix, showing each investor's commitments across the seven fund vehicles. The table supports Section 3.3 of the body.

Table A3.1. Equity commitments by investor and fund vehicle (\$M)

Investor	Type	Country	HCGF IV	Flyer One V	UPTF	REBUF	HCCF	ADUIF	Flagship	Total (\$M)
IFC	IFI	Multilateral	30	5.45	—	25	54.5	43.6	—	158.55
EBRD	IFI	Multilateral	50	10.9	—	25	32.7	65.4	—	184
EIB	IFI	Multilateral	27	—	16.4	—	—	54.5	109	206.9
Bilateral DFI total ^a	Bilateral DFI	15 inst./12 countries	135	—	20.15	36	49.1	34.9	65.4	340.55
EU grants (UIF)	EU/Multilat.	EU	—	—	—	—	—	—	65.4	65.4
Other ^b	Sponsor/LP/Other	Various	—	—	2.7	—	—	19.6	—	22.3
TOTAL — 7 fund vehicles			242	16.35	39.25	86	136.3	218	239.8	977.7

^a **Bilateral DFI composition:** BGK (Poland), BIO (Belgium), Bpifrance (France), CDP (Italy), DEG (Germany), DFC (USA), Finnfund (Finland), FMO (Netherlands), IFD/Impact Fund Denmark, JICA (Japan), KfW (Germany), Norfund (Norway), Proparco (France), SIFEM (Switzerland), Swedfund (Sweden). Proparco appears in HCCF and HCGF IV with ND (amount not publicly disclosed); Proparco UPTF \$5.45M is the only named Proparco amount included.

^b **Other composition:** WNISEF (USAID-backed, ND in HCGF IV); Zero Gap Fund (Rockefeller/MacArthur, ND in HCGF IV); Amber + Dragon Capital sponsor GP commitment \$19.6M (ADUIF); Henri Seydoux private LP \$2.7M (UPTF); named private LPs at HCGF IV final close (abrdn PE, Blue Earth Capital, others — amounts not disclosed).

Sources: Author's register based on official statements and press releases from fund managers, IFIs, and DFIs.

A.4 Ukraine's single project pipeline for public investment projects

The SPP register documents all projects posted on Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline on the DREAM platform (dream.gov.ua) as of 15 April 2026. The register covers the full state-level SPP pipeline as posted; non-SPP projects on the DREAM platform – including regional and community pipelines – are not included.

Project cost is recorded from the project-level Investment Feasibility Study posted on DREAM, taking only the "preparation" and "implementation" line items; operation and closure costs are excluded. € amounts are converted at a fixed rate of 41.36 €/ \$ throughout.

Each project is classified along three dimensions: a commercial-viability tier derived mechanically from DREAM's income and self-sustaining fields; a recipient channel distinguishing public-authority recipients from state-owned enterprises; and DREAM's recorded PPP suitability. Definitions and rules are set out in the table notes that follow.

Tables A4.1–3 support Section 3.5 of the body.

Table A4.1. Tier composition and recipient channel of the SPP on DREAM

Universe: 146 projects in the SPP on DREAM (€2,206.0 bn / \$53.34 b).

Tier × Recipient channel	Projects (n)	Investment (€ bn)	Investment (\$ bn)	Share by n	Share by \$
Tier 1 – Income-generating and self-sustaining	25	703.7	17.01	17.1%	31.9%
└ Public authorities	1	6.1	0.15	0.7%	0.3%
└ SOEs / publicly-owned companies	24	697.6	16.86	16.4%	31.6%
Tier 2 – Income-generating but not self-sustaining	19	233.7	5.65	13.0%	10.6%
└ Public authorities	8	24.5	0.59	5.5%	1.1%
└ SOEs / publicly-owned companies	11	209.2	5.06	7.5%	9.5%
Tier 3 – Public goods / non-revenue	102	1268.6	30.67	69.9%	57.5%
└ Public authorities	48	511.9	12.38	32.9%	23.2%
└ SOEs / publicly-owned companies	54	756.7	18.29	37.0%	34.3%
Single Project Pipeline total	146	2,206.0	53.34	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Author's analysis of Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline (SPP) on the DREAM platform (dream.gov.ua), cutoff 15 April 2026. CAPEX = preparation + implementation phases only; operation/closure phases excluded. Tier classification: Tier 1 = projects DREAM classifies as self-sustaining (income-generating with revenues

covering project costs); Tier 2 = projects DREAM classifies as income-generating but not self-sustaining (revenue exists but requires subsidy, tariff support, or PSO arrangement); Tier 3 = projects DREAM classifies as not income-generating (public goods or non-revenue infrastructure). "Share by n" = projects' share of 146; "Share by \$" = \$ share of total SPP investment cost.

Table A4.2. PPP suitability among cash-generating assets in the SPP

Universe: 44 cash-generating projects in the SPP on DREAM (Tier 1 + Tier 2 commercially active assets – €937.4 bn / \$22.66 bn).

PPP suitability outcome (DREAM)	Projects (n)	Investment (\$ bn)	Share by n	Share by \$
PPP-suitable*	8	1.79	18.2%	7.9%
PPP-not suitable	0	0.00	0.0%	0.0%
PPP-excluded by nature	26	17.08	59.1%	75.4%
No assessment conducted	10	3.79	22.7%	16.7%
PPP-assessed (suitable + not suitable)	8	1.79	18.2%	7.9%
Never PPP-assessed (excluded by nature + no assessment)	36	20.87	81.8%	92.1%
Cash-generating universe (Tier 1 + Tier 2 commercially active)	44	22.66	100.0%	100.0%

* The PPP-suitable cell contains the Ternopil microgrid (#79, Tier 2; \$ 8.89 m), the only project in the cash-generating universe for which DREAM records confirmed private investor interest.

Source: Author's analysis of Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline (SPP) on the DREAM platform (dream.gov.ua), cutoff 15 April 2026. Notes: PPP-suitable = DREAM PPP suitability assessment returned 'is suitable for PPP'; PPP-not suitable = assessment conducted with negative result; PPP-excluded by nature = DREAM marks the project's nature/character as not falling under PPP legislation (no assessment performed); No assessment conducted = DREAM records no PPP suitability assessment. The cash-generating universe combines Tier 1 (income-generating and self-sustaining; n=25, \$ 17.01 bn) and Tier 2 (income-generating but not self-sustaining; n=19, \$ 5.65 bn) – projects DREAM classifies as having either income or self-sustaining capacity. Tier 3 (income=No, n=102, \$ 30.67 bn) is excluded as commercially inactive. "Share by n" = projects share of 44; "Share by \$" = \$ share of \$ 22.66 bn.

Table A4.3. Recipient channel composition by commercial-viability tier

Universe: 146 projects in the SPP on DREAM (€2,206.0 bn / \$53.34 bn at €/\$ = 41.36).

Tier	Public authorities		Publicly owned companies		Tier total		Publicly owned companies	
	n	\$ bn	n	\$ bn	n	\$ bn	by n	by \$
Tier 1 – Income-generating and self-sustaining	1	0.15	24	16.86	25	17.01	96.0%	99.1%
Tier 2 – Income-generating but not self-sustaining	8	0.59	11	5.06	19	5.65	57.9%	89.6%
Tier 3 – Public goods / non-revenue	48	12.38	54	18.29	102	30.67	52.9%	59.6%
Single Project Pipeline total	57	13.12	89	40.21	146	53.34	61.0%	75.4%

Source: Author's analysis of Ukraine's Single Project Pipeline (SPP) on the DREAM platform (dream.gov.ua), cutoff

15 April 2026. Notes: Tier classification as in Table A4.1.

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