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Operationalising the West African EPA Development Programme

Moving beyond the paperwork

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Acronyms

AfT	Aid for Trade
AFD	Agence Francaise de Développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
BCEAO	Central Bank of West African States
BOAD	West African Development Bank
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAF	COMESA Adjustment Facility
CDP	Community Development Programme
CIF	COMESA Infrastructure Fund
DFID	Department for International Cooperation (UK)
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
EAC	East African Community
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIF	Enhanced Integrated Framework
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPADP	EPA Development Programme
EU	European Union
FAIR	Fonds d'Aide à l'Intégration Régionale/Regional Integration Support Fund
FORAPE	Regional EPA fund
IDA	International Development Association
IF	Integrated Framework
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JITAP	Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme
KfW	Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NOP	National Operational Plan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PACITR	Road Infrastructure and Transport Action Programme
PAU	UEMOA's Agricultural Policy
REP	Regional Economic Programme
RICMU	Regional Implementation, Coordination and Monitoring Unit
RISM	Regional Integration Support Mechanism
ROP	Regional Operational Plan
RPTF	Regional Preparatory Task Force
SME/SMI	Small and Medium Enterprises/Institutions
STDF	Standards and Trade Development Facility
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
SWARIP	Support for West Africa's Regional Integration Programme
TBT	Trade Barriers to Trade
TMEA	TradeMark East Africa
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union

Executive Summary

Since 2003, West Africa and the European Union (EU) have been negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), as is the case in many other African and Pacific regions. The EU has stated on numerous occasions that beyond market access, EPAs are to present an opportunity to strengthen regional integration and put 'trade at the service of development'. It is in this context that the EPA Development Programme (EPADP), better know under its French acronym PAPED, was developed by the region. It constitutes a framework to identify evolving development support needs in order for the region to reap the benefits of the EPA and to mitigate the negative impact of the agreement. If the EPA were to be signed, the EPADP could be operationalised to deliver on its potential. It is recognized by both parties that beyond resource mobilisation, the EPADP could be instrumental in improving aid effectiveness by contributing to a more coherent and coordinated approach to addressing the trade-related needs of the region. Against this background, this study aims to provide insights in the operationalisation of the EPADP and its potential to contribute to more effective aid, particularly at the regional level.

The EPADP is a rolling five-year programme formulated through a participatory approach led by the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions. It covers 5 'axes' that are further broken down into 28 'components'. Needs are further specified at the project level in National and Regional Operational Plans (NOPs/ROP), with a total cost initially estimated at €9.54bn, more recently re-evaluated to €15bn. The EU's commitment to support this programme has been articulated in the Council Conclusions of 10 May 2010[1]. The EU highlights the availability of at least €6.5bn from the EU for EPADP-related activities over the next five years, while total Aid for Trade (AfT) from all donors is conservatively estimated by the EU to exceed US$12bn over the same period. The Council calls on the EPADP and its EU response to be replicated in other ACP regions. In Central Africa, a similar process has just been launched. In this light, the EPADP process is a litmus test, which can provide useful lessons for other regions. Similarly, lessons learned in other regions regarding aid effectiveness issues can serve West Africa, as is demonstrated in this study.

The study presents several options to operationalise the EPADP, the choice of which depends on the ambitions of the parties and the added-value they see in this framework. These run from less to more ambitious options of how the EPADP could work, keeping in mind that the heavier options would necessarily include the realisation of the lighter options.

First, the EPADP could serve as a stocktaking framework aimed at identifying EPADP-related activities to determine the trade-related needs deriving from the EPA and beyond, and the funding available for those activities from EU institutions and Member States. In this respect, the EPADP could be a critical framework to pinpoint funding gaps in sectors and/or countries in need. This inventory effort is a necessary first step towards the second option of operationalisation, which would include, in conformity with the ambitions that the EPADP has set for itself, some joint monitoring efforts. In this respect, this study shows that in order to assess the performance of the EPADP to achieve its objectives, monitoring all AfT activities – be they included in the national or regional operational plans (NOPs/ROP) of the EPADP or in another related framework – is not only desirable, but also necessary to have a complete picture of results.

Beyond stocktaking and monitoring, the EPADP bears inherently the potential to act as a real coordination tool for more effective trade-related support to the region. Going further, the EPADP could indeed be exploited by EU and other donors to enhance joint programming, whereby donors, including EU institutions, member states and/or other development partners, would be encouraged to jointly programme their

[1] Council of the European Union (2010), Council Conclusions: EPA Development Programme (PAPED), 10 May 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/files/europa_only/st09634.en10.pdf

support aligned to the EPADP at both the regional and the national level. As such, the EPADP could guide 'who intervenes where' and thus contribute to the Division of Labour agenda. This would require a dialogue between recipients and donors on the EPADP going beyond the mere exchange of information making overlaps and gaps apparent, to go a step further by jointly correcting those irregularities and help donors build on comparative advantages. It could ensure against the emergence of "Aid for Trade orphans (i.e those *countries* and/or *sectors* whose AfT needs might be potentially neglected), make sure allocation of funds between EPADP axes matches the demand and ensure that collective efforts are aligned to the Aid for Trade needs of the region. Finally, the EPADP could lead to possibilities of joint delivery, or co-financing, potentially through specific joint projects/programmes, the creation of a multi-donor funded implementation agency with regional and national offices set up to implement EPADP related activities, or by ensuring the successful implementation of a regionally-owned fund, such as the EPA Regional Fund (FORAPE) as envisioned by the region. Setting up a regionally-owned fund may require considerable time and its success will partly depend on the willingness of donors to participate, but in principle it could contribute to an efficient allocation and disbursement of Aid for Trade funds based on the region's priorities. This is particularly the case if it allows for a differentiated approach, appropriate for distinct AfT intervention areas, following the example of the COMESA fund.

From all this, it follows that, in many respects, the EPADP could contribute to the delivery of more effective aid to West Africa and better donor coordination. If successfully operationalised, it could indeed positively affect the five main principles of the Paris Declaration of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. To make it work, however, *both* West African actors and their financial partners need to change the way they work. It will be up to concerned stakeholders to make choices on the operationalisation of the EPADP and to act accordingly.

Given the plurality of regional integration and development frameworks at both national and (sub)-regional level, stakeholders on both sides have the shared responsibility to ensure that the EPADP does not add another layer of potential duplication of work in an already complex networks of initiatives. The EPADP sits alongside other important regional integration frameworks in West Africa, most notably the Regional Economic Programme of the UEMOA, the Community Development Programme of ECOWAS, Aid for Trade initiatives, as well as sectoral programmes (such as in agriculture and the industrial sector). Ensuring that each of these frameworks has a distinctive role, and that all initiatives are coherent with one another would seem essential to exploit the potential added value of the EPADP as a strategic framework for trade related support to West Africa. Among those frameworks, the ECOWAS' AfT Strategy, as well as the region's Community Development Programme (CDP) that are currently being developed deserve some specific attention, since the ways these two programmes will be ultimately designed and implemented will bear important implications for the operationalisation of the EPADP. The AfT Strategy as conceived by the region will define broad strategic orientations, which implies that the more detailed and lower-level EPADP could contribute to the realisation of the AfT Strategy, provided that coherence is ensured. The Community Development Programme, with its broader focus to contribute to the realisation of the region's Vision 2020, could encompass the EPADP in a holistic approach to ensure coherence between all frameworks in and beyond trade.

Beyond such horizontal coherence between the EPADP and other regional frameworks, this study provides insights in issues of vertical coherence between the national and the regional level, which also need to be looked at with attention, particularly as one of the main added-values of the EPADP lies in the fact that it could potentially act as a mechanism to ensure increased consistency between what is being done at the level of the West African member countries and the regional priorities. Furthermore, coherence applies at the national level of the NOPs of the EPAPD not only with the National Poverty Reduction Strategies, but also with the various sectoral strategies and programmes. Overall, the EPADP needs to be considered a piece in a puzzle, rather than an autonomous self-sufficient framework. To be meaningful, the coherence of the EPADP with regional initiatives must be considered in a dynamic way both over time and it its implementation, and take a holistic and evolving approach to meet the region's Aid for Trade needs.

On the West Africa side, this would entail avoiding spheres of competition by ensuring effective communication and coordination mechanisms in the region to help ensure continuing coherence at all levels. Furthermore, there might be a need to rationalize institutional mechanisms for coordination at both the regional and national levels and make sure synergies are created when possible between already existing regional integration programmes on the one hand and between their institutions and coordination mechanisms on the other hand, so as to avoid the risk of diluting efforts and creating a donor fatigue on different agendas with overlapping objectives. This implies capitalising on and strengthening institutional mechanisms bringing together relevant stakeholders, including different departments from the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions, other regional bodies, officials from West African countries, as well as representatives of civil society, the private sector, EU member states and other development partners. Concrete structures analysed in this paper include among others interdepartmental committees of the ECOWAS Commission, the West Africa/Donor Working Group on Regional Economic Integration and the CDP Regional Advisory Council. On the national level, reference is made to general and thematic government donor consultative groups as well as Enhanced Integrated Framework structures. It is stressed that the role that existing institutional mechanisms can play will ultimately depend on how the EPADP will be used, while in all cases the programme needs to be discussed in all relevant settings, since it is only *one* of the relevant frameworks to pursue the region's Aid for Trade and Vision 2020 objectives.

On the EU side, support to the region in ensuring a coherent approach to the EPADP at the regional and national level can also prove critical, notably to make sure the region has the capacities to match its ambitions. Provided West African regional and national actors bring EPA-related needs to the fore when agreeing donor strategies and interventions, the EU and other donors could effectively provide technical and financial assistance. As such, the EPADP provides a perfect opportunity for the EU to demonstrate it can deliver on its commitments to strengthen aid coordination as reflected in the European Consensus on Development and the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour. Rather than taking decisions unilaterally as remains common practice, EU member states could act collectively to more effectively support the region.

It is only if both parties address these issues and decide to go beyond 'business as usual' that the EPADP could eventually successfully deliver on the high expectations it has raised, not only in West Africa and the EU, but also in other regions which may now be tempted to follow this example. These high expectations can only be justified when one looks at the potential this unique innovative programme contains. Moving beyond the paperwork is *technically* feasible and desirable; only time will now tell us whether it is also *politically* feasible and desired.

Introduction

Since 2003, West Africa and the European Union (EU) have been negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), as is the case in many other African and Pacific regions.[2] The EU has stated on numerous occasions that beyond market access, EPAs are to present an opportunity to strengthen regional integration and put 'trade at the service of development'. EPA provisions must thus be tailored to address the development objectives of the region. In parallel, accompanying measures and development assistance to build capacity, implement the EPA and support domestic reforms should be provided.

It is in this context that the EPA Development Programme (EPADP)[3] was developed. It has been elaborated by West Africa and constitutes a framework to identify evolving development support needs in order for the region to reap the benefits of the EPA and to mitigate the negative impact of the agreement. In line with the EPA, the overall goal of the EPADP is to build a competitive and harmonious regional economy that is integrated into the global economy and stimulate growth and sustainable development. Composed of an overarching regional strategic framework and further concretised in regional and national operational plans, the EPADP consists of five 'axes' that are broken down further into different 'components' describing areas for programmatic support. The total amount of support required for this programme for a first five-year period was initially estimated by the region at €9.54bn, then re-evaluated to €15bn.

The EU's commitment to support this programme has been articulated in the Council Conclusions of 10 May 2010. The EU highlights the availability of at least €6.5bn from the EU for EPADP-related activities over the next five year, while total Aid for Trade from all donors is conservatively estimated by the EU to exceed US$12bn over the same period[4].

While the level and the question of additionality of pledges from EU donors for the EPADP plays an important role in the EPA negotiations, the added value of the EPADP should go beyond resource mobilisation, as is recognised by both West African and the EU. Through efforts of West African countries, regional organisations and donors, the EPADP could be instrumental in improving aid effectiveness by contributing to a more coherent and coordinated approach to addressing the trade-related needs of the region.

For the EPADP to play such a role in case of the conclusion of an EPA, appropriate mechanisms for its operationalisation need to be identified, in line with the commitment articulated in the Council Conclusions of 10 May 2010 on the EPADP, which states that:

"An efficient operational framework will be drawn up to allow monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of EPADP components, based on existing development budget frameworks and aid mechanisms in West Africa and in keeping with international commitments on aid effectiveness."[5]

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[2] Bilal, S. and I. Ramdoo (2010). Which way forward in EPA negotiations? Seeking political leadership to address bottlenecks. (ECDPM Discussion Paper 100). Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management. www.ecdpm.org/dp100

[3] The EPADP is also know under the acronym PAPED, deduced from the French denomination *'Programme APE pour le Développement'.*

[4] ECDPM (2010). The EU Commitment to Deliver Aid for Trade in West Africa and Support the EPA Development Programme (PAPED). (ECDPM Discussion Paper 96). Maastricht: ECDPM (www.ecdpm.org/dp96). See also ECDPM (2010) The West Africa EPA Development Programme: Between conservatism and innovation, Trade Negotiations Insights. Vol 9. N5, June 2010 (www.acp-eu-trade.org/tni)

[5] Council of the European Union (2010). *Council Conclusions - EPA Development Programme (PAPED).* No. 9634/10. Brussels, 10 May 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/files/europa_only/st09634.en10.pdf

The EPADP should be seen in the wider context of the global Aid for Trade agenda that was initiated by the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in the context of deliberations at the World Trade Organisation in 2005. This led the EU to adopt a unilateral EU-wide Aid for Trade Strategy in 2007 and announce the elaboration of regional Aid for Trade packages, which are to be coordinated responses of EU institutions and member states to trade-related needs. While no Aid for Trade packages have been presented as such, the EU response to the EPADP as reflected in the Council Conclusions, is considered by EU officials to be a good first example. The Council calls on the EPADP and its EU response to be replicated in other ACP regions. In Central Africa, a similar process has just been launched. In this light, the EPADP process is a litmus test, which can provide useful lessons for other regions. Similarly, lessons learned in other regions regarding aid effectiveness issues can serve West Africa.

Against this background, this paper particularly aims to provide insights on the EPADP as a potential framework to contribute to more effective aid, particularly at the regional level. It is based on interviews with both West African and European stakeholders. Section 1 presents background information on the EPADP. The programme will not operate in isolation but amidst a broad range of related regional and national frameworks. Section 2 describes and analyses the links between the EPADP and other frameworks, particularly focussing on coherence and the added value of the EPADP. Most of those frameworks are accompanied by specific institutional mechanisms to coordinate stakeholders, presented and analysed in Section 3, which can potentially be exploited for the operationalisation of the EPADP. Section 4 outlines a variety of (non-mutually exclusive) options on what ways the EPADP can be used to contribute to more effective trade-related support to West Africa. This is followed by the conclusion.

1. The EPADP: an innovative and ambitious programme

The EPADP covers 16 countries in West Africa, which jointly negotiate an EPA with the EU[6]. These are the members of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), plus Mauritania. They are in majority Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with the exception of Cape Verde, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria. The group includes nine francophone, five anglophone and two lusophone countries. Amidst them are eight countries that form the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), all of which are francophone at the exception of Guinea Bissau.

The EPADP is a rolling five-year programme that was formulated based on a broad participatory approach led by the ECOWAS and UEMOA commissions, involving regional and national actors (governments, private sector and civil society). To mitigate the negative impacts of an EPA and create the conditions necessary to reap the benefits of an EPA, the programme covers 5 'axes':

- Diversification and increase of production capacities;
- Intra-regional trade development and facilitation of access to international markets;
- Improvement and reinforcement of trade related infrastructure;
- Making the necessary adjustments and taking into account other trade related needs;
- Support to the implementation and monitoring-evaluation of the EPA by the West Africa region.

Each of the axes is broken down further into 'components', adding up to 28 in total, which describe areas for programmatic support. Financing costs for each component for a five-year timeframe are provided in the overall regional EPADP framework document. Initially, the total amount was estimated by the region at €9.54bn for a first 5-year period, divided over the axes as indicated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Breakdown by axis of EPADP initial estimated cost of €9.54bn.



Source: ECOWAS-UEMOA (2009). See also: ECDPM (2010). The West Africa EPA Development Programme: Between Conservatism and Innovation. Trade Negotiations Insights. Vol9. Issue5.June 2010

Based on the EPADP regional framework, countries have developed each a 'National Operational Plan' (NOP), which further specify needs at the project level. This is complemented by a 'Regional Operational Plan' (ROP) which presents regional projects based on the subsidiarity principle. Based on the NOPs and

[6] These countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

ROP, the financial cost estimate of the first 5-year period of the EPADP increased from the initial estimate of €9.54bn to €15bn.

2. The need for coherence in operationalising the EPADP

2.1. Coherence among already existing regional integration frameworks

2.1.1. The EPADP: a piece in the puzzle of a development Vision

By putting emphasis only on the EPA, the name of the framework can be considered somewhat misleading. Though designed to cover EPA-related needs, by virtue of both its process and its content, the EPADP de facto covers areas and objectives with a much broader relevance than the strict EPA context. Indeed, the programme sets out a common UEMOA-ECOWAS regional Vision of economic integration both within West Africa and with the wider world. It aims to contribute to the implementation of policies and strategies adopted at the regional and national levels, whilst "tak[ing] account of all the actions that responds to the region's Vision and enable the EPA to contribute to the attainment of the regional integration goals and sustainable development of the West African region7". As such, the EPADP offers therefore a coherent framework to connect trade and development, to which additional trade-related activities can be included over time. It may serve as a useful technical tool and an invitation for all donors to engage in a more effective and coherent approach to addressing the trade-related needs of the region. This potential can however only be realised if the EPADP is articulated and implemented in coherence with those already-existing regional integration and development frameworks that share the same objectives. This must be the case irrespective of whether funds to be provided in the context of the EPADP are to be additional or not.

The EPADP, which sits alongside other important regional integration frameworks in West Africa, most notably UEMOA's Regional Economic Programme (REP), the under-elaboration ECOWAS' Community Development Programme (CDP), the AfT Strategy of UEMOA (as well as the soon-to-be-defined AfT Strategy of ECOWAS) and key sectoral policies (energy, industry, agriculture…), needs therefore to be considered a piece in the puzzle, rather than a autonomous self-sufficient framework.

2.1.2. A history of good practices

At the regional level, the importance of coherence has been acknowledged right from the elaboration of the programme.

The regional framework of the EPADP remains relatively broad; therefore in the text itself, there would seem at first sight to be no real problem of coherence between the priorities identified in the context of the EPADP and those identified in the region's Vision (and frameworks aimed at implementing that Vision).
Cross-references between the EPADP and already-existing programmes are numerous. In the EPADP, the region explicitly insists on the programme's coherence and compatibility with the regional and sectoral strategies/policies of the region. It states:

"The programme is consistent with ECOWAS Vision 2020 and is based on the sector policies already adopted in the region, the poverty reduction strategy paper, the UEMOA Regional Economic Programme (REP), the Integrated Framework, JITAP and the initial elements of the Community Development programme under preparation".

[7] ECOWAS/UEMOA. 2009. EPA Development Programme. Volume 1. Working Document. Draft Version January 2009.

At the sectoral level, the priorities of the EPADP have also been defined in accordance with the region's common agricultural and industrial policies, as further emphasised in the EPADP framework document.

Some stakeholders interviewed in the context of this study have argued that good collaboration between the two regional Commissions, ECOWAS and UEMOA, and – to a certain extent -- between the different departments (and/or officials) within these regional organisations, has been critical to ensure the good level of coherence between the priorities defined in the context of the EPADP and those already defined in the region's main strategic development and regional integration frameworks. A case in point in this respect concerns the linkages between the EPADP and the UEMOA's Regional Economic Programme (2006-2010) which indicate that to a large extent the former has coherently built upon the latter during its elaboration phase (see Box 1).

Box 1: An Example of good coherence between frameworks: the case of the EPADP and the UEMOA's REP

The Regional Economic Programme (REP) of UEMOA has been established jointly by the UEMOA Commission, the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), and the West African Development Bank (BOAD), in a progressive and participative approach involving member states, private sector and development partners. It is a five-year rolling programme aimed at enhancing regional integration in the subregion in line with the objectives of UEMOA's Vision 2015, notably through the strengthening of the productive sector and basic social services.
With this in mind, the REP identifies a number of federative projects that have been chosen at the regional level on the basis of their catalyst effects in the realisation of the growth and development objectives of UEMOA.

The REP 2006-2010 was designed around five strategic areas:

1) Consolidating good governance and enhancing economic integration by encouraging the convergence of national budgetary policies, the integration of factor markets and the development of Community solidarity
2) Developing, rehabilitating and modernising economic infrastructure
3) Establishing an integrated productive mechanism by restructuring firms, promoting the financing of SME/SMI and the development and processing of natural resources (Cotton agenda and securitisation of both the production and management of shared resources)
4) developing human resources, both by developing the quantitative level of health services and higher education systems.
5) Establishing a partnership for the mobilisation of resources for the financing of the programme and drawing up mechanisms for its execution and monitoring/evaluation[8]

To ensure coherence with other existing frameworks at the regional level, the REP is drawn up in consideration of sectoral policies adopted by the Unions, including the Regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Document, National Poverty Reduction Strategy Documents, ECOWAS programmes, particularly with regard to economic infrastructure, CILSS policies particularly with regard to rural development and the environment and the Short Term Plan of Action of NEPAD.

In terms of coherence between the REP (2006-2010) and the EPADP, it is worth noting that the two frameworks very much echo each other, with numerous overlaps of objectives, priorities and components, notably when it comes to the diversification and increase of production capacities, intra-regional trade development and improving infrastructure.

[8] UEMOA (2006). 2006-2010 Regional Economic Programme. Summary Report. July 2006. http://www.izf.net/upload/document/Situation/PER/REP_Summary%20report.pdf

According to a recent study[9], the results of the EPADP that are not included in the REP 2006-2010 only represent 6.4% of the global allocation foreseen for the EPADP. The main components of the EPADP which are not included in the REP and complement thereby the results expected from the PER, are notably related to the support to fiscal transition and fiscal compensations (R4C3 - 400m Euros), social reform (R4C5), Intellectual Property Rights (R4C7). Conversely, the results of the REP 2006-2010 that are not included in the EPADP represents approximately 6% of the global envelope of the REP.

2.1.3. A need for continuous efforts

To be meaningful, the coherence of the EPADP with regional initiatives must be considered in a dynamic way both over time and in its implementation. Annex 1 presents a comprehensive overview of the different regional integration frameworks in West Africa, detailing for each of these programmes and initiatives, their respective objectives and priority areas, and providing a rough attempt to analyse the coherence of the EPADP with other existing mechanisms. The information presented in this annex should however be interpreted with caution since it presents a static snapshot that does not necessarily match the dynamic programming nature of most of these programmes.

Most of the regional integration frameworks are indeed multi-year rolling programmes that are reviewed and updated regularly. Ensuring coherence is therefore a continuous exercise that is deemed to require constant (monitoring) efforts even (and especially) after the identification of the EPADP's priorities.

By way of illustration, at a time where the second phase of the REP is to be defined, it appears critical to ensure that the new priorities and projects identified in the REP 2011-2016 remain as much consistent with the EPADP as those of the REP 2006 – 2010. This does not only require constant communication between the different Commissions in charge of the two programmes; in terms of operationalisation, it could also call for a reinforcement and harmonisation of the programming and monitoring systems of the two Commissions, UEMOA and ECOWAS.

Moreover, as it is embedded in the context of the EPA negotiations, the EPADP's elaboration was at the time constrained by the calendar of the negotiations. This means that the regional framework of the EPADP has been finalised *before* some very strategic frameworks in the region. Among those frameworks, the ECOWAS' AfT Strategy, as well as the region's Community Development Programme (CDP) deserve some specific attention, since the ways these two programmes will be ultimately designed and implemented will bear some important implications for the operationalisation of the EPADP.

Indeed, so far, one of the bottlenecks to effective AfT in the region lie in the lack of a single strategic 'federative' document in the region beyond the Vision 2020. The Vision is admittedly the primary reference when it comes to the identification of trade and development priorities, but only states the big orientations for the region in the short and medium term. The lack of a single strategic document focusing specifically on AfT for the whole-of-ECOWAS region (by opposition to the francophone West African/UEMOA sub-region) renders the alignment of donors on the priorities defined by the region relatively difficult. At the regional level, for the moment the Regional Poverty Strategy Paper (whose scope goes far beyond trade and economic cooperation to encompass human capital, peace and security, access to land, access to education and health) is the only federative document of the region that encompasses the priorities of the two Commissions ECOWAS and UEMOA. This document does not however perfectly act as a federative

[9] Nicolas Ponty. 2009. Feuille de Route et priorité a moyen terme de la Commission de l'UEMOA. Preliminary Version of the report.

document that would allow greater alignment and coordination of donors when it comes to AfT priorities[10]. On the contrary, because it encompasses all aspects of the AfT agenda, the EPADP could potentially be conceived – depending on the format its operationalisation will take (see Section 4) – as such a currently missing federative instrument for effective AfT in the region. But so do equally in theory the CDP and the ECOWAS' AfT strategy. The question that arises therefore is: **Should the EPADP be operationalised to serve as *the* reference document in terms of AfT in the region, how would it then fit coherently with the (currently under elaboration) CDP as well as the ECOWAS' AfT strategy and where would its added-value lie?**

Articulation EPADP/ECOWAS AfT strategy

The ECOWAS' AfT Strategy should mainly be based on the UEMOA's already-defined AfT Strategy[11]. The latter is not unknown by the Trade Department of ECOWAS, since it has served as a basis for the elaboration of the EPADP.

The AfT Strategy as conceived by the region will define broad strategic orientations and is not meant to be operationalised *per se.* This implies that the more detailed and lower-level EPADP could contribute to the realisation of the AfT Strategy, provided that coherence is ensured.

In this respect, it should however be noted that whilst the AfT Strategy of the region is currently in the hands of the two Trade Departments of ECOWAS and UEMOA, within these Departments, it is not necessarily the same officials that are in charge of the EPADP and the AfT strategy. It is important therefore to stress once again the importance of good internal communication to ensure that all AfT-related frameworks are as much as possible in sync so as to avoid a counter-productive duplication/replication of efforts.

Articulation EPADP/CDP

As far as the CDP is concerned, given its broader focus and thematic coverage (see Box 2), it is possible to consider the possibility of it operating as a federative document at a broader level; it would therefore encompass the EPADP in a holistic approach to ensure coherence between all frameworks in and beyond trade. One of the CDP's objectives indeed is to look at what already exists in the region. Do these activities respond to the priorities of the region as defined in Vision 2020? Are there any duplications? What is missing? If something is missing, how can it be funded? And who will take the lead in that activity? The idea of the CDP is not to replace the sectoral frameworks, policies and programmes, such as the EPADP, on the contrary. The CDP intends to bring them together in a coherent manner. At the global level, AfT only represents about one third of ODA funds; thus, there would be, indeed, an added value for the CDP to compile in a coherent manner the region's priorities, including non-AfT areas, such as education, health, environment, etc. It will however be critical to ensure that there is a coherence and correspondence between the priorities and activities identified in the context of the EPADP and the AfT-related activities included in the CDP.

At a more operational level, it also remains to be seen how the CDP's institutional structures will build upon the EPADP and its possible implementation mechanisms. In that respect, and in order to prevent potential inconsistencies, initiatives to have joint meetings involving within ECOWAS both the Department in charge of Trade, Customs and Free Movement and the Macro-Economic Policy Department to discuss together

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10 Some observers have for instance described this document as an additional document with very little added value. Besides, the Regional Poverty Strategy Paper does not address the question of the integration of this regional agenda in the National Poverty Reduction Strategies. Those, as a result, only rarely include federative national projects and programmes (See for instance Ponty (2009)).

11 There has been a close collaboration between the two sub-regional Commissions in this respect, with UEMOA being asked to review the Terms of Reference for the development of the ECOWAS Aid for Trade Strategy.

the EPADP and the CDP and the relations between the two need to be further and more systematically encouraged.

Box 2: The Community Development Programme : An Overarching Framework[12]

The CDP is one of the main implementation tools of the Region's vision 2020. It has the ambition to serve as a coordination mechanism that would ensure that all the region's development programmes (at both the national and the regional level) are in coherence with one another.

The CDP goes beyond the Regional PRSP in that it intends to set development guidelines and directives with the direct participation of the region. The programme aims at:

- Providing a coherent framework between ECOWAS' different programmes and sectoral policies
- Providing a coherent framework between the programmes and priorities defined by the two West African regional institutions (ECOWAS/UEMOA)
- Providing a coherent framework between ECOWAS and the rest of the world
- Complementing national programmes in key areas

It comprises a set of strategic axes, among which "interconnection" of the populations, states, markets, transport infrastructure, information and communication, energy and water and financial and monetary technologies. The current framework has prioritised 10 strategic areas, which are 1: Integration of People, 2: Increased Cooperation among States, 3: Common Agricultural and Industrial Policies, 4: Interconnection of Transport Infrastructure, 5: Interconnection of ICTs, 6: Interconnection of Energy and Water systems, 7: Financial and Monetary Integration, 8: Human Development, 9: Research & Development, Innovation and 10: Common Regional Policies on the Environment and Natural Resources.

The elaboration of the CDP is in process. Inventory studies of existing programmes at the national level in all 15 Member States have been conducted and validated. An inventory of programmes at the regional level, for which information is collected among 36 regional organisations, is to be validated in July 2011. As a next step, the region will link the existing programmes to regional priorities, allowing the identification of duplication of efforts and funding gaps. This should lead to the identification of priority programmes for which resource mobilisation activities, particularly a donors' roundtable, will be organized. These steps are to be finalized by 2012[13].

As such, the EPADP is a critical element of the CDP and should be reflected in the priority programmes.

2.2. Vertical coherence between the national and the regional levels

Beyond horizontal coherence between the different existing frameworks at the regional level, vertical coherence, i.e. between the national and the regional levels, also need to be looked at with attention. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main added-values of the EPADP lies indeed in the fact that it could potentially act as a mechanism to ensure increased consistency between what is being done at the level of the member states and the regional priorities as defined in the Region's Vision.

[12] For more information on the Community Development Programme see: http://ecowascdp.org
[13] ECOWAS Commission (2011). CDP Unit: 2009 – 2011 Review and Prospects. Abuja: ECOWAS Commission.

Ensuring vertical coherence in the context of the EPADP has been a relatively challenging tasks, complicated by the fact that the EPADP regional framework was elaborated before countries were asked to develop their respective NOPs. Admittedly, in their first attempts to precise the details of the NOPs in early 2010, very few guidance was provided by the ECOWAS Commission to the national focal points, leading to a very low prioritization efforts and to the submission of a very long list of projects – sometimes old projects -- which had so far not found any type of funding. As a result, therefore, the total funding request of the combined NOPs from the different member states exceeded by far the needs assessment presented in the regional framework, adding up at the time to some €33bn. In order to address this problem, the NOPs have been revised in the course of 2010, with considerable efforts to ensure vertical coherence, notably through the classification of EPADP related activities in the NOPs by the regionally defined EPADP axes and components. In addition to strong guidance from the ECOWAS Commission which worked on redefining the specific criteria aimed at prioritizing activities, regional meetings were organized within thematic groups (infrastructure, agro-industry…) in order to review and consolidate the NOPs, activity by activity, to target primarily the most relevant activities to be given priority over the next 5 years. Moreover, it is important to note that in line with the principle of subsidiarity of the Region in relation to the States, all regional projects have been compiled in the ROP, which was being finalized at the time of the last RPTF meeting in September 2010. These important efforts have resulted in the re-evaluation of the EPADP to €15bn for the NOPs and ROP combined.

Overall, while the list of activities identified in the EPADP should be allowed to evolve over time to reflect emerging needs, it will be critical, moving forward, to ensure coherence between the overall EPADP framework and the underlying national plans, and to make sure the ROP complement the NOPs by addressing regional issues that can not be easily addressed at the country level in conformity with the subsidiarity principle. This should be a priority for West Africa, if the EPADP is to serve as a credible operational instrument for the strategic planning of support to West Africa.

2.3. Horizontal coherence at the national level

Last but not least, coherence applies at the national level. Indeed, the coherence and pertinence of the NOPs, not only with the National Poverty Reduction Strategies, but also with the various sectoral strategies and programmes (such as for instance the ECOWAP's National Agricultural Investment Programmes) is key if the EPADP is to fulfil its ambitions.

Such plans should be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances and evolving priorities as well as have clear linkages with general and sectoral strategies and be linked to budgetary instruments such as Public Investment Programmes and Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks.

In least-developed countries (LDCs), coherence is to be ensured with the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) diagnostics and action matrices. In this respect, it might be interesting to draw some lessons from the elaboration process of the UEMOA's Aid for Trade Strategy, whose priorities have been defined based on those selected by the member states in the context of the integrated framework. Projects and programmes identified in the context of the UEMOA's AfT Strategy have indeed been identified on the basis of the Integrated Framework, the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) and the REP.

2.4. Section Summary: Coherence and communication - two sides of the same coin

In view of the plurality of existing regional integration and development frameworks at both national and regional level, it is critical to ensure that the EPADP does not add another layer of complexity in an already intricate network of initiatives. Considering the EPADP as one piece of a broader puzzle is certainly therefore a pre-condition of its operationalisation. In this respect, effective **communication** will be critical to help ensure continued coherence at all levels, and facilitate interactions across different regional and national actors/departments/Ministries at both national and regional levels. Efforts have been undertaken recently in Mali in this regard and could potentially be replicated elsewhere[14] ; the idea being to notably encourage the mainstreaming and harmonisation of trade priorities across sectors.

This question of coherence between the various frameworks at the different levels should not be neglected, all the more since the multiplicity of frameworks that already exist alongside with the EPADP, entail a multiplicity of mechanisms for implementation that are already out there and on which it might be critical for West Africa to build upon.

3. Exploiting existing mechanisms for dialogue

In the context of the different strategic and operational frameworks described in the previous section, a broad range of institutional mechanisms for dialogue have been/will be set up. These not only concern mechanisms bringing together West African stakeholders, but also platforms for West African and donors to gather together and discuss the development priorities of the region, both at the regional and national levels. When operationalizing the EPADP, it will be crucial to exploit such existing mechanisms. Only then can a coherent approach towards West Africa's regional integration objectives be ensured, and can duplication and high transaction costs be avoided.

3.1. West African stakeholders joining up at the regional level

Within the ECOWAS Commission, an Internal Coordination Mechanism exists, bringing together staff from different departments. It is composed of Heads of departments as well as key project and programme coordinators. In this setting, dialogue on the whole pallet of regional frameworks, including the EPADP, can come together as the members jointly cover the different areas of work of the Commission. Currently, meetings of the Internal Coordination Mechanism are called on an irregular and ad-hoc basis. Recognising the untapped potential, the Commission is currently in a process of reflecting on ways to invigorate the system. Regularity of meetings and a systematic agenda setting, with the EPADP as a recurrent agenda point, can be among measures to be considered in order to ensure coherence between programmes over time.

Similarly, in the context of the Community Development Programme an Internal Technical Committee (ITC) has been created, another interdepartmental committee within the ECOWAS Commission. This is an additional platform where the EPADP can be discussed, as one of the key component of the CDP, while ensuring the complementarity of the work undertaken by the ITC and the Internal Coordination Mechanism.

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14 Mécanisme Global. 2011. *Vers un agenda commun de l'agriculture et de l'aide pour le commerce pour la gestion durable des terres (GDT) : L'expérience du Mali.* Genève: Mécanisme Global pour la Convention des Nations Unies pour la Lutte contre la Désertification. http://news.global-mechanism.org/u/nrd.php?p=uid_$llid$_254361_298_139

Thematic interdepartmental committees could also be used. For instance, the Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Development of the ECOWAS Commission is setting up an Interdepartmental Committee for Agriculture and Food. While the ECOWAP provides the main guiding document for this interdepartmental committee, it can be informed on the relevant aspects of the EPADP (e.g. Component R1C2), and discuss its links with the Common Agricultural Policy. The Trade Directorate could also consider setting up a separate Interdepartmental Committee on the EPADP, or Regional Economic Integration more broadly, to discuss coherence between the EPADP and the sectoral frameworks for which such interdepartmental coordination has not yet been formalised (e.g. WACIP…), although this should be streamlined with other initiatives to avoid a multiplication of interdepartmental committees bringing the same actors together.

Besides, for the EPADP to work efficiently, ensuring the coordination between the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions is crucial. This can be ensured through the bi-annual ECOWAS – UEMOA Commission meetings, the continuous supporting work of the ECOWAS – UEMOA Joint Technical Secretariat, as well as ad-hoc exchanges between the trade directorates of both Commissions.

But, coordination needs to go beyond the two Commissions, to also cover a broader range of West African stakeholders, including other regional bodies, civil society organisations and the private sector. In this context mechanisms that are currently being set up in the context of the CDP are relevant, notably:

- the Platform for regional intergovernmental organisations;
- the Regional Advisory Council.

The latter is to bring together regional intergovernmental organisations, CSOs and the private sector. As such, there is a certain similarity with the composition of the EPADP Regional Coordinating and Monitoring Unit announced in the EPADP document, which is to bring together representatives of the two regional organisations, specialized organisations responsible for specific projects, development banks, non state actors but also the member states. Synergies can be sought, which could include holding back-to-back meetings.

3.2. Where West Africa and donors meet

Donors' coordination at the regional level is generally considered to be deficient, which explains the interest of West Africa and the EU alike for the EPADP to contribute to a more harmonized approach. Nevertheless, there may be existing or planned platforms for West African – donor dialogue that can be exploited or strengthened to help the EPADP play this role.

In this context, and as envisaged by the region, the structures to be put in place for the implementation of the EPA could be used in the context of EPADP, such as the Joint EPA implementation Committee, composed of senior officials or their representatives of the member states and Commissions from both sides[15]. It can be noted however that EPA institutions are joint West Africa – EU bodies. If non-EU donors are to contribute to the funding of the EPADP as expected, then they may need to be involved in one way or the other. This is in line with the EPA, whose draft text indicates that the Joint Committee will ensure coordination with other donors[16]. Hence, it may be envisaged to invite non-EU donors to attend the meetings, as is common practice for the joint West Africa – EU Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) meetings, where development cooperation is discussed in the EPA negotiation phase.

[15] It remains to be seen however if trade or development officials will be sitting in this joint EPA implementation Committee which will have responsibilities in the areas of both trade and development.
[16] See Part VI. Art. 95 of the current draft EPA text.

Remarkably, the EPADP document does not refer in its section on the institutional implementation mechanism to the role of EPA related bodies other than the Joint Committee. Nevertheless, within the mandate assigned to them in the EPA, the Joint Consultative Committee, whose members are economic and social partners from both sides, and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly can discuss EPADP-related matters and issue recommendations. The Joint Council, composed of West African and EU ministers as well as the Presidents of the ECOWAS, UEMOA and European Commission, can provide overall strategic guidance.

Institutional mechanisms to coordinate support to West Africa, going beyond the EPA and the EPADP, should also be used to ensure greater coherence. Currently, several thematic donor coordination working groups exist at the ECOWAS level, namely for Agriculture, Capacity Development, Peace and Security and Regional Economic Integration. According to interviewees, the Regional Economic Integration Working Group, under the leadership of the EU delegation, met once in 2010 after which no more meetings were convened. The group could be reinvigorated and provide a platform to coordinate support to the regional economic integration process, with ECOWAS' future AfT Strategy and the EPADP as key reference documents. Practices of the Working Group on Agriculture (see Box 3), which is generally viewed as a well functioning and useful structure, could be copied.

Box 3: The ECOWAP Donor Working Group: a well-functioning regional coordination structure

The ECOWAP Donor Working Group brings together over twenty donors supporting West Africa to implement its common agricultural policy and reach the pursued objectives. Spain is the lead donor of the group; it convenes monthly meetings with other involved donors and in presence of ECOWAS Commission representatives, particularly from the Directorate for Agriculture and Regional Development.

Both the ECOWAS Commission and development partners agree that donor coordination in support of the ECOWAP at the regional level has considerably improved since the group is in place. It has allowed donors and the ECOWAS Commission to exchange information to strengthen alignment of donor support to the ECOWAP and enhance harmonisation. It has notably resulted in joint donor positions and has provided the Commission with a lead donor contact point on agriculture.

Elements contributing to the success of the group, which could be replicated for trade-related support, include a strong role for the lead donor, active involvement of a large number of donors and of the ECOWAS Commission, as well as the regularity of meetings. The existence of the ECOWAP as a federating document, which provides a good rallying point for the region and its development partners, is also cited as an important ingredient for the group's success. The Aid for Trade Strategy and the EPADP could potentially play such a role in the area of trade.

Weaknesses of the ECOWAP Working Group include the non-participation of some important development partners, such as China. Furthermore, a quantitative mapping of committed ECOWAP donor support initiated by the group provides some clarity of who-funds-what, but is in need of an update and could usefully capture pipeline projects/programmes, to serve more effectively as a harmonizing tool. Finally, links of the working group with actors at the national level could be strengthened. In this light, the group is setting up an ECOWAP Network of national lead donors on agriculture. This is to be a virtual group which would regularly interact via Internet and meet once a year, allowing for information sharing across countries and with the regional level.

While technical issues related to specific areas such as trade can be dealt with in a thematic group, higher coordination structures bring the range of regional policies and support programmes together. At the ECOWAS Commission, bi-monthly and annual ECOWAS/development partners coordination meetings serve this purpose. Thematic groups report to these meetings, which can include discussions on the EPADP. It is to be noted though that regardless of its name, bi-monthly meetings take place irregularly; no such meeting has taken place in 2011 as of yet. Additional human resources would be needed to manage and animate these mechanisms, considering that in the ECOWAS' External Relations Department only one staff member is tasked with relations with development partners.

In the UEMOA context, both the REP Steering Committee, which meets twice a year, and the Aid for Trade Steering Committee are particularly relevant, giving the overlap between the REP, the Aid for Trade Strategy and the EPADP. The REP Steering Committee is composed of representatives of the UEMOA Commission, the West African Development Bank and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). UEMOA member states and the private sector, together with development partners have an advisory role. In the Aid for Trade Steering Committee all these stakeholders are also represented, while membership is extended to the ECOWAS Commission and Civil Society Organisations (e.g. trade unions). The EPADP covers a broader geographic area than the UEMOA region and these Committees can thus not take a leading role in overall steering of the EPADP. However, they can watch over continuing coherence between the REP, the AfT Strategy and the EPADP and seek effective support from development partners for the three processes.

3.3. Building on the institutional environment in place at the national level

At the national level, use can be made of existing relevant coordination structures for national stakeholders and development partners. Mechanisms vary per country, making it necessary to assess on a country-by-country basis what existing institutional structures can be instrumental for the operationalisation of the EPADP and whether additional structures would have the potential to deliver an added value.

General and thematic government donor consultative groups could potentially be exploited and, where operational, the Enhanced Integrated Framework structures. All West African LDCs are beneficiaries of the EIF and should thus have put EIF structures in place, which consist of an EIF National Focal point, an EIF Donor Facilitator and an EIF Steering Committee (see Box 4). The positions of EIF focal point and EPADP national focal point could be combined. EIF Donor Facilitators could be appointed lead EPADP donors provided they are EU donors (which seems to be the case for half of those LDC West African countries), and the EIF Steering Committee could also potentially cover the EPADP (Annex 2 specifies for each West African countries who is the lead EIF Donor Facilitator). Moreover, the limitations of the EIF structures and process could potentially be addressed by bringing in the EPADP. For example, the EPADP could help mobilise additional funding for trade-related support and could lead to a more comprehensive approach going beyond trade-related needs only. It could also give a new impetus to the EIF process in LDCs where results have been limited so far. Furthermore, the EPADP also adds a regional component, whereas the EIF only operates at the national level.

As regards national stakeholders, the National Committees on CDP could also play a role. These represent national anchorage for monitoring the CDP. As of May 2011, seven out of fifteen ECOWAS countries have formalized these Committees by decree or ministerial directive; the others are in the process of doing so. The ECOWAS Commission provides funding to support these Committees. National Inter-Institutional Trade Committees, supported in the context of the regional Trade Negotiations Capacity Building Project, could also play a role. In UEMOA countries, National Aid for Trade Committees can be instrumental, which are based in national Trade Ministries and encompass focal points from other Ministries (e.g. Finance, Infrastructure, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs).

Box 4: The Enhanced Integrated Framework: bridging sectors for trade-related support[17]

The EIF is a multi-donor programme, set up in 1997 and reviewed in 2005, which supports LDCs to be more active players in the global trading system by helping them tackle supply-side constraints to trade. In this way, the programme has a wider goal of promoting economic growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction. As such, LDCs can use the EIF as a means to ensure coordinated donors' support in line with their trade-related needs and to lever additional Aid for Trade resources.
Under the EIF, LDCs conduct a Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) to identify constraints to competitiveness, supply chain weaknesses and sectors of greatest growth and/or export potential. The DTIS includes an Action Matrix that presents a list of priority reforms, which is validated by national stakeholders. This is followed by an implementation phase.

The programme is currently being implemented in 47 LDCs worldwide, including all LDCs in West Africa[18]. By way of illustration, in Mali, the EIF has supported the government mainstreaming its trade agenda and raise funds from development partners such as the AFD, UNDP and the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF). This covers activities such as trade capacity building, respect of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, notably in the vegetable and fruit sectors, as well as a set of projects to support the mango value chain from mango production to processing, marketing and exports.[19]

In-country structures for the implementation of the EIF are the following:

- the National EIF Focal Point, who is usually a senior government official who leads the EIF process and is supported by a National Implementation Unit;
- the EIF Donor Facilitator, who works with the National EIF Focal Point to facilitate donor coordination and the donor/ government dialogue on trade issues and Aid for Trade.
- the EIF National Steering Committee, which is the senior level forum for decision-making and coordination among government, the private sector, civil society and the donor community[20].

These can play a central role in the operationalisation of the EPADP at the national level.

3.4. Section Summary: No duplication for greater coherence

In sum, in the context of the operationalisation of the EPADP, and as visible in Table 1, there is ample space to exploit and build on existing institutional mechanisms for dialogue at both the regional and national levels.

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17 Enhanced Integrated Framework (2011). Quick guide. Enhanced Integrated Framework for trade-related assistance for Least Developed Countries. Geneva: Enhanced Integrated Framework.

18 This implies that Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria are the only ECOWAS countries not engaged in the EIF. Cape Verde, which graduated from LDC status early 2008, had requested to participate in the Integrated Framework before it left the LDC category, which has been accepted. Hence, a Diagnostic Trade Integration Study has been conducted and an Action Matrix defined. No official decision appears to have been taken as to the future of the EIF process in the country. On its website, the EIF Secretariat indicates that it has initiated dialogue with the Government of Cape Verde to understand the state of play in the DTIS Action Matrix implementation and identify possible need for support by the EIF.

19 Enhanced Integrated Framework (2011). Country Profile Mali. Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for trade-related assistance for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

20 http://www.enhancedif.org/EN%20web%20pages/About%20the%20EIF/Who's_who.htm

Before creating coordination mechanisms in the context of the EPADP, it might indeed be important to take stock of these different mechanisms, assess their performance, and when relevant, capitalize on what already exists and works on the ground. The danger indeed is a proliferation of frameworks and structures which overlap with one another; this bears the risk to dilute efforts and to create a donor fatigue on these different agenda, all the more since donors have to work with different interlocutors for each of these frameworks (Trade Department, Sectoral Departments, Strategic and macroeconomic department in sub-regional Commissions, or various Ministries at the national level).

In the context of the operationalisation of the EPADP, two major considerations might therefore be paid attention to:

- that one does not duplicate structures, but favour structural and institutional synergies as often as possible
- that one ensures coherence between the different frameworks, for instance by appointing a unit charged with coherence.

These two considerations are key conditions for the successful implementation and operationalisation of the EPADP. The role existing institutional mechanisms for dialogue will/can play will then ultimately depend on how the EPADP will be used. This question is discussed in the next section.

Table 1: List of Regional Development Initiatives in West Africa and their 'operationalisation'

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Relevant Sub-Regional Organisation	"Operationalisation"?	National Component?
General Regional Development Strategies			
Regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper -	Common ECOWAS and UEMOA document	+	–
Vision 2020 : From "ECOWAS of States to ECOWAS of People"	ECOWAS	–	–
Community Development Programme (CDP)	ECOWAS	+	?
Strategic Plan of the ECOWAS Commission 2011-2015	ECOWAS	+	–
UEMOA's 2015 vision	UEMOA	–	–
Regional Economic Programme (REP/PER)	UEMOA	+	+
Aid For Trade Strategy			
UEMOA's AFT Strategy	UEMOA	+	+
ECOWAS' AfT Strategy	ECOWAS	–	–
Examples of Sectoral Programmes/Initiatives			
Economic Community of West African States' Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)/ CADDP	ECOWAS	+	+
UEMOA Common Agricultural Policy (PAU)	UEMOA	+	–
West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP/PICAO)	ECOWAS	+	–
UEMOA Common Industrial Policy	UEMOA	+	–
Road Infrastructure and Transport Action Programme (PACITR)	UEMOA	+	–
West African Power Pool (WAPP)	ECOWAS	+	–

4. Different ways to use the EPADP

4.1. The EPADP as a stocktaking and monitoring framework

In the context of the EPADP, the West African region and the EU have undertaken a comprehensive stocktaking exercise aimed at identifying EPADP-related activities to determine respectively the trade-related needs deriving from the EPA (and beyond), and the funding available from EU institutions and Member States to finance those activities. As the EPADP has been/can be a useful mechanism to identify EPA-related needs, including beyond projects for which financing has already been secured, it could be a critical framework to pinpoint "aid anomalies" that should be corrected.

OECD figures have shown that not only levels of AfT fluctuate significantly on an annual basis, but also that per capita rates of AfT vary widely across West African countries, with for example Mali, Benin and Ghana receiving three to four times as much as Togo, Cote d'Ivoire and Niger[21]. By allowing a thorough stocktaking exercise, the EPADP could guide a re-adjustment of aid across countries when necessary[22]. More particularly, it could ensure against the emergence of "aid for trade orphans", i.e countries whose AfT needs are neglected.

In the same vein, sector-wise, data collected in the context of a recent ECDPM study[23] suggest that there might be a mismatch between resources currently identified by the EU in its response to the EPADP and the needs estimated by the region and presented in the 2009 EPADP Regional Strategic Framework[24]. A significant proportion of forthcoming donor-related EPADP activities (€3.63bn) are concentrated on EPADP Axis 1, while the EPADP itself only indicated a need for about half this amount at the time. By contrast, all other EPADP axes seemed to be underfunded, with the single most important axis (Axis 3 covering infrastructure) facing a significant shortfall (only €3.74bn provided, while needs have been estimated at €6.03bn). This calls for two remarks.

First, for the EPADP to act as a resource mobilisation tool favouring donors' alignment on the needs and priorities of the region, enough flexibility should be injected in its operationalisation process so as to ensure a rebalancing of priorities and the allocation of funds between axes according to evolving demands.

Secondly, any light option of operationalisation that would conceive the EPADP as a static and non rolling one-off exercise aimed at mobilising resources in the context of the EPA negotiations could not genuinely be conceived. Such an option would *de facto* contradict the ambition of the EPADP to periodically include new projects in the programme "on the basis of a rolling programming in the framework of monitoring-evaluation mechanisms provided for in the text of the agreement on the basis of the progress made in the implementation and impact of the EPA".

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[21] These figures should however be interpreted with caution. These have been estimated in 2009/2010 and are by definition incomplete, since disparities among countries may reflect different programming cycles, priorities among donors (e.g. EU vs. non-EU), absorption capacity by recipient countries or quality of reporting.

[22] One has to note however that the room for manoeuvre when it comes to adjustment possibilities across countries is sometimes rather small, notably at the bilateral level. First, donor countries often have their own priorities, for example based on national interests or historical ties. Secondly, for those loans-based donors, lending to LDCs might still remain difficult for reasons linked to debt sustainability.

[23] ECDPM (2010). The EU Commitment to Deliver Aid for Trade in West Africa and Support the EPA Development Programme (PAPED). (ECDPM Discussion Paper 96). Maastricht: ECDPM. http://www.ecdpm.org/dp96

[24] It should be noted here that the regional framework of the EPADP has recently been reviewed to match the needs identified at the national level and presented in the new NOPs submitted to the EU in the RPTF meeting held in September 2010 in Brussels.

Besides, it is only as a dynamic framework, being regularly updated, that the necessary match between the projects included in the NOPs/ROP, and the ones identified by the EU could eventually be foreseen. A quick look at the EPADP NOPs that have been submitted to the EU during the RPTF meeting held in Brussels in September 2010 shows indeed that, except for Benin, Togo and for Burkina Faso, all countries seem to have only included in their plans projects for which funding had not yet been acquired. Although this would seem consistent with the approach which primarily sees in the EPADP a tool for mobilising additional resources, it clearly is in disconnect with the EU response to the EPADP, which on the contrary focused mainly on the resources that have already been identified as forthcoming by the EU (and other donors). A dynamic approach could help to overcome gradually this disconnect.

Moreover, in order to mobilise resources and potentially guide a re-adjustment of aid across countries and sectors when needed, the EPADP will need to be fully coherent with other regional and national frameworks, as described previously. Full coherence would imply that the EPADP NOPS and ROP take into account projects that are already in place in the context of other frameworks with overlapping objectives (and for which funding might already have been secured). Funds requested in the context of the EPADP would in this vein need to include the funding gaps in other related frameworks. As those are often rolling programmes for which financing is acquired, and as needs are also evolving over time, coherence will require frequent monitoring and regular adjustments.

To fully act as an effective resource mobilisation tool in line with the countries' and region's overall priorities, the EPADP must therefore be conceived in a more dynamic perspective, as a multi-annual framework that has to be regularly updated and monitored. Two different ways of working can then be considered, depending on the level of ambitions of the parties and on their conceptions of the EPADP.

First, the EPADP could look at "additional needs" in isolation from trade-related needs that exist regardless of an EPA and for which funding may have already been ensured at the time of the elaboration of the EPADP. Joint monitoring in the context of the EPADP would then be conducted only on the activities included in the NOPs and ROP. Monitoring those activities will definitely have an added-value notably to assess at all times the scope of the support to the EPADP per component and per country. Should this be the favoured option, it might however be important as a next step to ensure that those monitored activities are considered in coherence with other AfT activities conducted in the context of other regional/national frameworks pursuing the same objectives. The parties will need to identify what coordination mechanisms can be used or created (for instance in the framework of the CDP) to ensure a structured approach to monitoring of AfT delivery and results, i.e. a certain degree of harmonisation between the different monitoring activities undertaken in the context of the different regional integration and development programmes of the region, including the EPADP. Potentially, there is a role to be played by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the ECOWAS Secretariat, which works under the direct responsibility of the Vice-President of the ECOWAS Commission. It is worth noting however that the EPADP contains far-reaching objectives, results and indicators, reflecting the aspiration of the region to strengthen results-oriented monitoring of Aid for Trade. Yet, a monitoring role ensured by the EPADP would clearly fall short on the ambitions that the EPADP sets for itself if it were to cover only additional needs. As most trade-related interventions for which funding was already assured at the time of the elaboration of the EPADP would be excluded from the monitoring exercise, the EPADP monitoring exercise would indeed only give a partial picture.

A second, more ambitious option, therefore, would then be to monitor in the context of the EPADP or beyond, all AfT activities – be they included in the NOPs/ROP of the EPADP or in other related frameworks. With its wide range of instruments and criteria for an effective results-oriented monitoring, the EPADP could play a catalytic role in the monitoring exercise, all the more since the ECOWAS' AfT strategy is intended to remain at the level of the broad outline of goals, aspirations and targets (see Section 2.2). In terms of institutions, should this option prevail, leading to the monitoring of all AfT needs, via or including the EPADP, it will be important to build on already existing monitoring units in the context of other frameworks. Annex 3 provides an overview of those existing units. Most notably, the overall coordination could be ensured by broader relevant units in the context of the CDP and/or directly under the supervision of the ECOWAS monitoring and evaluation unit. Coherence with the EPADP will then need to be ensured, potentially through the indirect involvement of the "Regional implementation, coordination and monitoring unit (RICMU)", as foreseen in the original EPADP framework.

In any case, joint monitoring would require some efforts from the parties.

First, to ease comparing of demand and supply of funding, West Africa should envisage to align the EPADP components more closely with WTO Aid for Trade categories, and in particular the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) codes. This contributes to transparency on Aid for Trade demand and supply, as the region can then more easily compare their data to the publicly available figures in the CRS database fed by OECD DAC donors. It can also help reduce transaction costs to harmonise reporting methods.

Secondly, monitoring would require regular and extensive data collection efforts from both West Africa and the EU. Data has to be collected at the national and regional level by a large number of implementing agencies and funders, brought together and synthesized. A prerequisite is that stakeholders involved consider the added value of the EPADP and AfT activities in general to outweigh the costs of such data collection efforts.

Finally, should other non-EU donors support EPADP-related interventions as envisaged, monitoring will need to include those activities in a coherent and coordinated manner.

4.2. The EPADP as a framework to further joint programming and co-financing

This being said, it is worth noting that the EPADP bears inherently the potential to go beyond stocktaking and monitoring to act as a real coordination tool for more effective trade-related support to the region. Indeed, right from the beginning, the programme has been presented by the parties as a framework that could "enable the EU, its member states and other development partners to have a common framework to better coordinate their support to the West Africa region within the EPA framework[25]". The EPADP could be instrumental in advancing joint programming (Section 4.2.1), joint delivery or co-financing (Section 4.2.2.).

4.2.1. The EPADP as a joint programming tool

The EPADP could first and foremost be exploited by EU and other donors to enhance joint programming. EU institutions, member states or other development partners are indeed encouraged to jointly programme their support aligned to the EPADP at the regional or the national level. As such, the EPADP could guide who intervenes where and as such contribute to the Division of Labour agenda. This would require a dialogue between recipients and donors on the EPADP going beyond mere information exchange, which makes overlaps and gaps apparent to go a step further by jointly correcting those irregularities and help donors build on comparative advantages. For the EU, the EPADP is an opportunity to demonstrate it can deliver on its commitments to strengthen (EU) aid coordination as reflected in the *European Consensus on*

[25] ECOWAS/UEMOA (2009). EPADP Volume 1. Working Document. Draft Version January 2009.

Development and the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*. Given the lack of progress in delivering on these agenda's so far, some have questioned whether there is a real will among EU member states and institutions to put them into practice, making it all the more relevant for the EU's credibility to seize this opportunity. It is in line with the EU's intention to develop Joint European Assistance Strategies for partner countries and regions post-2013, a process which is currently being thought through and debated among EU Institutions and member states.

It is true that joint programming is already taking place to some extent, notably in the context of the EIF, but it can be applied more widely both at the regional and the national level, based on the framework provided by the EPADP. An example of joint programming at the national level based on a nationally owned framework is Cambodia's Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), which built on the country's EIF Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (see Box 5).

Box 5: Cambodia's Trade Sector-wide Approach (SWAp)[26]

The Government of Cambodia, in collaboration with development partners, introduced a Trade Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in 2007, which is underpinned by an EIF Diagnostic Trade Integration Study. The SWAp is a joint programming framework that unites all activities funded by development partners in order to effectively assist the country to enhance its trade potential to contribute to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction.

A newly created Department for International Cooperation within the Ministry of Commerce spearheads the process. They support the functioning of a Sub-steering Committee for Trade Development and Trade-related Investment, comprising representatives from relevant line ministries, donors and the private sector. Three working groups report to the sub-committee, representing the pillars of the country's Trade Integration Strategy: (1) Reforms and Cross-Cutting Issues for Trade Development; (2) Products and Services Export Development; (3) Capacity Building for Trade Development. An inter-ministerial coordinating committee for accelerating the process of building a conducive environment for traders, manufacturers and investors was created to further strengthen coordination within the Cambodian government.[27]

One of the funding mechanism of the SWAp is the Trade Development Support Programme (TDSP) launched in March 2009, specifically dedicated to support the development, financing and implementing of the integrated trade strategy for an initial period of three years. It is a trust fund administered by the World Bank worth USD12.6 million in terms of total commitments from the European Commission, DANIDA and UNIDO.[28]

Critical for the success of the SWAp so far has been the leadership role of the Ministry of Commerce, UNDP driving donor coordination efforts, deep stakeholder engagement during implementation, strong inter-ministerial coordination and use of the framework beyond the policy level to cover programming.

As illustrated by this example, for the EPADP to be instrumental at both the regional and the national levels and act as a joint programming tool, West African States and regional bodies need to bring it to the fore

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26 ODI (2009). An integrated approach to Aid for Trade: Cambodia Trade Sector-wide Approach (SWAp). London: ODI.

27 Government of Cambodia (2010) Trade SWAp. Cambodia Trade Sector Wide Approach. Volume I, Issue 1, April 2010.

28 Government of Cambodia (2010). *Cambodia Trade Sector Wide Approach and the Way Forward. Eleven projects adopted by the Sub-steering Committee on Trade Development and Trade Related Investment* Press Release, 20 April 2010.

when agreeing (joint) donor strategies and interventions for the coming period. In many cases, donors' agencies can only respond to partner government priorities. If EPADP-related requests are not forthcoming from national governments and regional bodies, no resources will be allocated. It might be critical therefore on the West African side to ensure a genuine awareness about the existence of the EPADP and a political will to bring it forward during roundtables of donors. Some West African countries have included awareness raising activities for the EPADP in their operational plan for this purpose.

On the donor side, both headquarters and the country representations need to be informed. It is recognised by donors that while the officials attending the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) meetings may be well informed on the EPADP, this is not necessarily the case of others officials at headquarters or those based in West Africa. For the EPADP to be used as a framework for joint programming, it is crucial for staff directly involved in programming, most often based in the region, to be familiar with the programme.[29]

What are the institutional structures needed for the EPADP to play this joint programming role?
It requires regular dialogue between recipients and the donor community on the implementation, impact and financing of the programme to not only ensure donor alignment on the priorities of the region, but also to mobilise the necessary funding, committed for in Article IV of the EPA Agreement.

At the regional level, this dialogue could be ensured through the Joint EPA Implementation Committee. However, as the Committee is only to meet annually, with the possibility of additional extraordinary meetings, alternative lighter joint structures that can be convened on a more regular basis can support the process, such as potentially a revitalised Regional Economic Integration donor working group at the ECOWAS level. In addition, to ensure overall coherence, the EPADP should feature as an agenda point in other fora described in Section 3, which cover a broader range of topics, such as the bi-monthly and annual ECOWAS – development partners coordination meetings.

At the national level, as emphasized in Section 3, EIF structures could be used for LDCs, particularly the EIF national steering committee, with the EIF focal point and the EIF donor facilitator as driving forces. Alternatively, in countries where those structures are deficient, or non-existent (such as in the non-LDC countries), alternative structures can be created or other existing structures exploited, particularly country – donor coordination groups on trade, complemented by works of other sectoral groups (e.g. infrastructure, private sector development, agriculture). General country – donor coordination meetings could also be capitalized upon, when relevant. Primordial is that all those structures go beyond mere talking shops, leading to joint programming decisions based on the needs and priorities identified in the EPADP. Links between the national and regional level can be assured through the active participation of ECOWAS and EU Member States in the Joint EPA Implementation Committee.

Hence, should there be a certain degree of coherence between all existing and forthcoming regional integration and development programmes, with EPADP priorities integrated in national development plans and other regional frameworks, it would seem that in terms of dialogue between recipients and donors on the priorities of the region, there should in principle be no need for the creation of further mechanisms.

4.2.2. The EPADP as a potential framework for joint delivery and co-financing

Going one-step further, the EPADP could also potentially encourage parallel and joint co-financing, the latter implying that different partners pool their resources. The EPADP provides indeed an opportunity to

[29] This would imply either that those agencies/Ministries directly in charge of cooperation attend the RPTF meetings, or that that the attendees on the EU side (Brussels-based staff, trade adviser…) inform their respective Ministry in charge of cooperation and/or the representations/agencies in charge of cooperation on the field.

enhance the use of such mechanisms in a structured manner, leading to a rationalisation of implementation mechanisms and financial instruments that reduces transaction costs. Furthermore, it could bring EU and other donors with limited capacity to support the EPADP, possibly through a delegated management construction in which they have no active management role.

Lessons from promising co-financing experiences in the Region

Examples of existing co-financing initiatives that can cover EPADP-related interventions include the Support for West Africa's Regional Integration Programme (SWARIP) initiated by DFID while other donors are showing an interest to become involved (with Finland being most advanced). In the same vein, at the national level, the European Commission has delegated funds to Agence Française de Développement (AFD) for a programme to support the reform of the cotton sector in Mali and the second phase of a programme to upgrade businesses in Senegal. The EPADP can be a framework that helps donors to identify more opportunities for such collaboration under West African leadership and in response to the region's needs.

Another successful example at the regional level is the West African Power Pool (WAPP) a specialised institution of ECOWAS addressing power supply deficiency in West Africa through projects supported by multilateral and bilateral donors. Often cited as a good example of donor-REC and REC-Member states coordination, the WAPP benefits from the support of a broad range of donors, including the EC, the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), AFD, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), and the West African Development Bank (BOAD)[30].

One of the sources of funding of the WAPP is the EU – Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund. Given its aim of supporting infrastructure projects with a cross-border or regional impact in sub-Saharan Africa (see Box 6), the fund is a particularly relevant multi-donor co-financing instrument to support EPADP-related interventions.

Existing multi-donor funding mechanisms at the global level may also be exploited, such as the Standards and Trade Development Facility and the World Bank Trust Fund for Trade and Development.

Box 6: EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund[31]

The EU – Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, set up in 2007, facilitates support for infrastructure projects with a cross-border or regional impact in sub-Saharan Africa. Approved grants from the Trust Fund support interventions in the energy, transport, water and telecommunications sectors through four possible financial mechanisms: interest rate subsidies; technical assistance/feasibility studies; one-off grants for social or environmental components of projects; and grants covering early-stage premiums on risk mitigation insurance.

It is managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and blends grant resources of the European Commission and EU Member States with the lending and technical capacities of the EIB and other EU development banks such as AFD, KfW, Compañía española de financiación del desarrollo (COFIDES) and LuxDevelopment. Decisions on grant requests are taken by an Executive Committee of Donors. As such, the Trust Fund encourages coordination and co-financing between European grant providers and development banks.

30 ECDPM (2010). Joining Up Africa: Support to regional integration. ECDPM Discussion Paper 99. www.ecdpm.org/dp99

31 European Investment Bank (2007). EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Supports Study for West African Power Pool. Press Release. BEI/07/147, 19 December. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. 2007 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=BEI/07/147&type=HTML

Creation of a multi-donor funded implementation agency

Looking outside West Africa, lessons can also be learned from other African regions. In East Africa, for instance, the pilot projects of the multi-donor funded agency, TradeMark East Africa (see Box 7), seem to have been particularly successful in delivering concrete results[32].

Box 7: TradeMark East Africa

TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) is an initiative of DFID and set up as non-profit agency aimed at providing support for increased regional trade and economic integration within the East African Community (EAC)[33] through its headquarters in Nairobi and its branches in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Bujumbura, Kampala and Kigali.

As a multi-donor vehicle, TMEA has the ambition to improve aid effectiveness in the region and donors' division of labour. TMEA aims at mobilising US$150 million over a 5-year period. Donors currently involved include the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. Some contributions come in at the regional level (headquarters) and some at country level (field offices). A Partnership Fund has been set up to fund capacity building activities. There is also talk of a development fund that could potentially be led by the African Development Bank[34].

Following this approach, a multi-donor funded EPADP implementation agency could be set up with regional and national offices to implement EPADP-related activities. Such an initiative would resolve possible absorption capacity issues, as parallel structures are put in place to implement EPADP-related activities.

However, the transposition of such model to West Africa bears its limits that are important to keep in mind. First, from a feasibility point of view, it is to be noted that TradeMark East Africa covers a region of five countries only. It goes without saying that setting up such a structure in all West African countries is more challenging, all the more since the EPADP is to mobilise in five years more than a hundred times more than the amount of financing TMEA aims at mobilising over the same period. Furthermore, the TradeMark governance structure appears relatively heavy and parallel structures may well lead to sustainability problem. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, it remains doubtful whether such an operationalisation option would be sufficiently supported by the donor community as well as by the two sub-regional organisations. One frequent criticism of the TMEA indeed lies in the fact that creating a project-structure outside the regional organisation (EAC) to directly manage funding[35], goes against some of the principles of the Paris Declaration, notably ownership and alignment.

The possibility of co-financing through the creation of a regionally-owned fund

Alternatively therefore, and in coherence with the objectives of ownership emphasised in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, the EPADP could be implemented and operationalised through the creation of a regionally-owned fund.

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32 UK Government minister launches new trade initiative to pull millions of Africans out of poverty. DFID Press Release. 2 February 2011 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Press-releases/2011/UK-Government-minister-launches-new-trade-initiative-to-pull-millions-of-Africans-out-of-poverty/

33 www.trademarkea.com

34 The set up of this fund has been delayed due to public controversies around some of the AfDB's practices.

35 Trademark mirrors the EAC and member states' structures and tries to reinforce them, and although the agency recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with EAC secretariat, the initiative remains a parallel organisation outside the framework of the EAC. It will definitely take time for the EAC Secretariat to be strengthened. According to some sources, the latter does not currently have mechanisms to administer Trademark East Africa.

On this subject, it is worth noting that the region has foreseen in designing the EPADP the creation of an EPA Regional Fund (FORAPE – Fonds Regional APE) "to mobilize, coordinate, canalize European Union, members States of the Union, partners to development resources, as well as the region own resources supporting the EPA implementation, rapidly and efficiently[36]".

To ensure the critical coherence between already existing frameworks, ECOWAS, UEMOA and the EC, have called for a team of consultants to realise a study on the operationalisation of the fund and make concrete proposals on possible institutional settings. In the context of the latter study[37], a thorough mapping exercise has been realised in order to identify already existing Funds in the region, their implementation mechanisms and their applicable procedures, in order to subsequently draw lessons for the operationalisation of the FORAPE. According to the preliminary report of the first phase of this study, there would be a real added-value to the creation of the FORAPE, as none of the currently existing frameworks fulfil the objectives that the EPADP has set itself. Moreover, some regionally-owned funds inside the region could well provide some inspiration, such as the Peace Fund and the UEMOA's *Fonds d'Aide à l'Intégration Régionale* (FAIR), which are both considered good examples of vertically coherent initiatives that provide a good articulation between the national and the regional level through the use of a principal executing agency (BOAD in the case of the FAIR; UNDP in the case of the Peace Fund) or secondary executing agencies to implement activities at the national level. More lessons may be drawn at a later stage from the Regional Fund for Agriculture and Food, which is to be set up in the context of the ECOWAP.

In the same vein, it is also possible to draw lessons from other regions where regionally-owned funds are being created. The EAC is in the process of establishing a Development Fund which could be informative, but no framework detailing the functioning of the fund has been developed as of yet. It seems more opportune therefore to examine one of the most advanced of such funds, although not fully operational yet: the COMESA fund. It aims at mobilising resources to develop infrastructure and address adjustment costs related to integration and economic reforms in Eastern and Southern Africa. The fund comprises two components: (i) the COMESA Infrastructure Fund (CIF); and (ii) the COMESA Adjustment Facility (CAF). These two components and their respective coordination mechanisms are further described in Box 8.

Although its scope goes beyond EPA-related adjustments, the COMESA Fund bears a number of lessons for the design of an EPA Regional Fund in West Africa. First, this fund highlights the potential merits of choosing the appropriate financing instrument depending on the areas of action. The idea of relying on different financing instruments depending on the intervention areas (loans, interest-rate subsidies and/or Public-Private Partnerships for infrastructure-related needs *vs.* budget support for adjustment costs) is a structure, which could in principle also be considered for the different axes of the EPADP. Such a differentiated structure could allow an efficient disbursement of funds. Indeed, while a project-based grant funding may be favoured in the case of projects whose results may only be seen in the long-term, the third axis of the EPADP relative to the improvement and reinforcement of trade-related infrastructure could potentially be financed through the use of a revolving loan facility that would not only be sustainable in the long term, but which would also allow additional financing through the possible involvement of the private sector. However, it should be noted that in addition to private sector involvement, a key issue in relation to infrastructure – the most costly axis of the EPADP – is the provision of loans to finance regional infrastructure programmes (for example in the context of corridor development). Development finance

[36] ECOWAS/UEMOA (2009). EPA Development Programme. Volume 1. Working Document. Draft Version January 2009.

[37] Diop, Chimere, Diouf Oumar, Honliasso Anani and Seck Galaye, Appui à la creation du Fonds Regional APE – Afrique de l'Ouest. Rapport provisoire premiere étape, ECO, Octobre 2007.

institutions such as the World Bank, African Development Bank and AFD can not provide loans to most regional organisations[38] and therefore channel their funds through the national level. This implies that infrastructure investments along a corridor are negotiated with at least two or three different countries, which complicates project preparation and implementation.

Box 8: The COMESA Fund

The creation of a COMESA fund is foreseen in Article 150 of the COMESA Treaty; the protocol establishing the fund was signed in 2002. It consists of two distinct elements:

1. *the COMESA Infrastructure Fund* (CIF): the CIF is designed as a revolving loan facility to finance regional infrastructure projects, including via long-term loans at fixed interest rates and other financing mechanisms such as Public Private Partnerships; it is expected to attract non-grant financing and to deliver positive returns on investment; and

2. *the COMESA Adjustment Facility* (CAF): the Adjustment Facility is intended to assist countries via budget support to meet the costs of adjustment to trade liberalisation (e.g. through social safety nets or schemes to retrain the workforce); it is primarily financed by grants.

In terms of sources of funding for the CIF, the COMESA Member States have committed own resources as seed capital. The region seeks contributions from donors, international finance institutions, development finance institutions, sovereign funds and other private investors.

Even though the CIF focuses on mobilising resources beyond grant aid, e.g. from the private sector, some grant financing may contribute to leverage additional contributions. As becomes clear from conversation with experts, one of the issues to be resolved with regard to possible EC contributions to the CIF is how to make use of funds under the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Programme. In line with EDF procedures, these need to be given as grants whereas the CIF mainly relies on giving out loans or equity (which needs to be bought back). Hence, some financial engineering will be needed to devise mechanisms to ring-fence EDF funding and ensure that it is used according to the EDF procedures. One possibility might be to create different windows and use EDF funds only to finance grant-funded components, such as feasibility studies or other projects that are not expected to yield positive returns on investment in the short or medium term.

The purpose of the CIF, which distinguishes it from other instruments, is to finance holistic regional solutions to overcome constraints to regional integration and cross-border transactions posed by a lack of appropriate infrastructure. A pilot programme that illustrates this approach is the North-South Corridor initiated by the EAC-COMESA-SADC Tripartite in order to address bottlenecks to trade flows along a continuous corridor, through a series of separate but related infrastructure projects combined with reforms of policy and administration. Further, the CIF may play a unique role in combining donor funds and private sector funds, in a way that uses donor contributions to leverage more private financing of infrastructure projects in the region.

Source: ECDPM. 2009. Regionally Owned Funds Mechanisms for delivery of EU Aid for Trade in ACP regions. ECDPM Discussion Paper 90. Maastricht http://www.ecdpm.org/dp90

[38] Development finance institutions can not provide loans to regional bodies with the exception of regional banks such as the West African Development Bank and the Bank for Investment and Development.

As regards private sector involvement, the design of the CIF, which provides for the possibility to combine donor funds and private sector funds for the financing of costly infrastructure projects in the region, could also potentially be an option in West Africa, given the advantage of involving the private sector both in terms of cost-sharing, and in order to favour a more holistic approach to development finance, and *a fortiori* to Aid for Trade.

On the down side, however, such an implementation option would be quite demanding on the West African side. It would indeed require from the Region (and/or from the lead Executing agency) some significant resources and capacity. In this respect, it is worth noting that the operationalisation of the CIF is not as straightforward as was expected by some, as setting up the mechanism is proving to be quite difficult and time consuming. Setting up effective structures in the context of the CIF seems indeed to have encountered many bottlenecks, with the Fund still not being fully operational[39]. Time, but also leadership and political will are key prerequisites in this respect. It might therefore be important to undertake, with all the relevant stakeholders, including the EBID and the BOAD, a cost-benefit analysis, in view of the priority projects identified in the context of the EPADP Axis 3.

As far as the CAF is concerned, it is worth noting that the EC has been the only donor involved, through its Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM). The added-value therefore to channel funds through the adjustment facility so far could seem limited compared to more direct budget support programmes[40]. It will be key for West Africa to get donors' on board, for any regional fund to prove its worth. This does not prevent that once fully in place, some regional and national EPADP related activities could be financed through the EPA fund while others are financed through alternative means.

4.3. Section Summary: stakeholders to make choices

In sum, the EPADP can be operationalised in different ways. It may be used as a stocktaking exercise to mobilise resources in line with the region's needs and priorities and/or strengthen results-oriented monitoring of trade-related interventions. More ambitious options regarding the operationalisation of the EPADP could notably involve its use to further joint programming and co-financing, in order to strengthen donor alignment and harmonisation. It will ultimately be up to concerned stakeholders to make choices on the operationalisation of the EPADP and to act accordingly. Across-the-board, of course, some options highlighted above seem to have more potential than others. Notably, the EPADP bears inherently the potential to go beyond stocktaking and monitoring to act as a real coordination tool for more effective trade-related support to the region, for instance through parallel and joint co-financing. In any case, the issue of coherence between frameworks, stressed in Section 2 and 3, will be critical to ensure that the EPADP does not put more strains on the region than it would bring benefits. Indeed, operationalisation options from joint monitoring of AfT activities to the creation of a regional fund, will require time and efforts from the Region, hence the necessity to build, when possible, on already existing coordination mechanisms set up in the context of other frameworks.

[39] COMESA Infrastructure fund to be fully operational and to be chaired by Rwanda, COMESA Press Release www.comesa.int/lang-en/component/content/article/34-general-news/470-comesa-infrastructure-fund-to-be-fully-operational-and-to-be-chaired-by-rwanda

[40] ECDPM (2010). Joining Up Africa: Support to regional integration. ECDPM Discussion Paper 99. www.ecdpm.org/dp99

Conclusion: Going beyond "Business as usual"

In conclusion, several options can be identified to operationalise the EPADP depending on the ambitions of the parties and the added-value they see in this framework. Different existing options have been identified in the context of this study, using good practices from both within and outside the region. These run from less to more ambitious options of how the EPADP could work, keeping in mind that the heavier options would necessarily include the realisation of the lighter options.

First, the EPADP could serve as stocktaking framework aimed at identifying EPADP-related activities to determine the trade-related needs deriving from the EPA and beyond, and the funding available for those activities from EU institutions and Member States. In this respect, the EPADP could be a critical framework to pinpoint funding gaps in sectors and/or countries in need. This inventory effort is a necessary first step towards the second option of operationalisation, which would include, in conformity with the ambitions that the EPADP has set for itself, some joint monitoring efforts. In this respect, this paper has shown that in order to assess the performance of the EPADP to achieve its objectives, monitoring all AfT activities – be they included in the NOPs/ROP of the EPADP or in another related framework – is not only desirable but also necessary to have a complete picture of results. The EPADP contains objectives, results and indicators, clearly reflecting the ambition of the region to ensure results-oriented monitoring. It is up to the parties to exploit these and potentially therefore, go beyond additional needs towards a more comprehensive approach, possibly exploiting synergies with other existing monitoring frameworks.

Beyond stocktaking and monitoring, the EPADP bears inherently the potential to act as a real coordination tool for more effective trade-related support to the region. Going further, the EPADP could indeed be exploited by EU and other donors to enhance joint programming, whereby donors, including EU institutions, member states and/or other development partners, would be encouraged to jointly programme their support aligned to the EPADP at both the regional and the national levels. As such, the EPADP could guide 'who intervenes where' and as such contribute to the Division of Labour agenda. Finally, the EPADP could lead to possibilities of joint delivery, or co-financing, potentially through specific joint projects/programmes, the creation of a multi-donor funded implementation agency "à-la-TMEA", with regional and national offices set up to implement EPADP related activities, or by ensuring the successful implementation of a regionally-owned fund, such as the FORAPE. The ECOWAS Project Preparation and Development Unit, which will be set up in Togo, can potentially contribute to developing bankable infrastructure projects and mobilise the required resources, based on the EPADP operational plans.[41] In UEMOA countries a 'Project Support Agency' – whose creation is currently being considered - may contribute to the implementation of trade-related support guiding by the EPADP framework.

From all this, it follows that in many respects the EPADP could contribute to the delivery of more effective aid to West Africa and better donor coordination.

Of course, the question of additionality of funding cannot be neglected, as it is currently one of the main bottlenecks in the EPA negotiations that would need to be solved to progress towards the finalisation of an agreement between the parties and *a fortiori* to the operationalisation of the EPADP. In this respect, it might be important to grant unresolved issues in EPA negotiations, and most notably to this question of additionality of funds (and to a certain extent to the Protocol), the highest *political* attention. For the EPADP to provide an opportunity for more effective AfT delivery under West African leadership, all stakeholders

[41] ECOWAS. 2010. Signature de l'accord de siège relatif à l'unité de préparation et de développement de projet de la CEDEAO. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.tg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85:accord-cedeao-togo&catid=42:actualites&Itemid=67

should indeed have a clear perception of the nature of the EPADP and its general and specific objectives. This study has however shown that the added value of the EPADP goes beyond the question of additionality of funds, with the potential to serve as a valuable strategic framework and possibly as a coordination tool. If successfully operationalised, the EPADP could indeed positively affect the five main principles of the Paris Declaration of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. To make it work, however, *both* West African actors and their financial partners need to change the way they work.

First, given the plurality of regional integration and development frameworks at both national and (sub)-regional level, stakeholders on both sides have the shared responsibility to ensure that the EPADP does not add another layer of potential duplication of work in an already complex networks of initiatives. The EPADP sits alongside other important regional integration frameworks in West Africa, most notably the Regional Economic Programme of the UEMOA, the Community Development Programme of ECOWAS, Aid for Trade initiatives, as well as sectoral programmes (such as in agriculture and the industrial sector). Ensuring that each of these frameworks has a distinctive role, and that all initiatives are coherent with one another would seem essential to exploit the potential added value of the EPADP as a strategic framework for trade-related support to West Africa. This must be the case irrespective of whether the funds to support the programme are to be additional or not. Notably, ensuring horizontal coherence between the EPADP and the numerous other existing frameworks aimed at addressing trade-related needs is essential for the region to achieve its development vision and strategies. Even if the EPADP were to have for sole ambition the mobilisation of additional resources, looking at the EPADP in isolation from other existing frameworks related to regional integration and development would seem counterproductive. The EPADP cannot arguably ensure alone that West African countries will fully seize the opportunities offered by an EPA.

On the West Africa side, this would entail avoiding spheres of competition by ensuring some effective communication and coordination mechanisms in the region to help ensure continuing coherence at all levels. Furthermore, there might be a need to rationalize institutional mechanisms for coordination at both the regional and national levels and make sure synergies are created when possible between already existing regional integrations programmes and their institutions and coordination mechanisms, so as to avoid the risk to dilute efforts and to create a donor fatigue on different agenda with overlapping objectives. The EPADP needs to be considered in relation to the various other regional integration and development programmes that already exist in West Africa. It is only through the adoption of a holistic approach that the region could legitimately and meaningfully pursue the Region's AfT and Vision 2020 objectives. As the EPADP currently tends to focus mainly on "additional" needs and given the existence of more far-reaching and comprehensive initiatives, such as the Region's Community Development Programme, the EPADP might not necessarily be in the driving seat ensuring the overall coordination role, but it must in any case be considered an essential element of the broader regional framework, without which the puzzle could never be completed.

Secondly, for the EPADP to work, West African stakeholders should not only be aware of the EPADP, but political will and leadership to operationalise the EPADP might also prove critical in determining how the EPADP will be put into practice. For the EPADP to be instrumental at both the regional and the national levels, West African States need to bring it to the fore when agreeing donor strategies and interventions for the coming period. In many cases, donors' agencies can only respond to partner government priorities – if EPADP-related requests are not forthcoming from national governments, no resources will be allocated.

This said, it is clear that except in the very light option whereby the EPADP is only used as a stocktaking opportunity, the operationalisation of the EPADP requires a significant commitment in terms of human resources. It will require regular monitoring reports, as well as periodic adjustments, both at the national and the regional level. Continuing efforts are needed to ensure continued coherence and synergies of the EPADP with a broad range of policies and programmes at different levels. Currently limitations in capacities to implementation regional frameworks and programmes are a recurrent issue, as is stated in the ECOWAS Strategic Plan 2011 – 2015. While a great many of them are adopted, those often lack implementation.

On the EU side, therefore support to the region in ensuring a coherent approach to the EPADP at the regional and national level can also prove critical, notably to make sure the region has the capacities to match its ambitions.

Beyond providing technical and financial assistance, the EPADP provides a perfect opportunity for the EU to demonstrate it can deliver on its commitments to strengthen (EU) aid coordination as reflected in the European Consensus on Development and the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour. While recognising that development assistance is based on sovereign national decisions, the EU commits in the Code of Conduct to closer cooperation and enhanced complementarity among EU actors. It is stated that allocation decisions will take account of other donors' ongoing interventions and plans, while responding to priorities of partner countries and regions. Joint programming and making use of delegated cooperation constructions are also among the guiding principles of the Code of Conduct, which are replicated in the EU Joint Aid for Trade Strategy. In practice however, programming continues to predominantly be the result of unilateral decisions and coordination of country or sectoral (exit) strategies remains limited.[42] Progress in joint programming and delivery of support is limited.[43] Such behaviour in support of the EPADP will prove counterproductive.

It is only if both parties address these issues and decide to go beyond 'business as usual' that the EPADP could eventually successfully deliver on the high expectations it has raised, not only in West Africa and the EU, but also in other regions which may now be tempted to follow this example[44]. These high expectations can only be justified when one looks at the potential this unique innovative programme contains. Moving beyond the paperwork is *technically* feasible and desirable; only time will now tell us whether it is also *politically* feasible and desired.

[42] European Commission (2011). Third Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour. SEC (2011) 502. Brussels: European Commission.
[43] European Commission (2011). *Aid for Trade Monitoring Report 2011.* Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2011) 503. Brussels: European Commission
[44] See for instance on this topic the recent decision by Central Africa to define its own Regional EPA Accompanying and Development Programme (PRADA), building on the West African approach and the design of the EPADP.

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Annex 1: Development and RI Programmes in West Africa and coherence between frameworks

Programme/Initiative / Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
Definition of General Development Regional Strategies		
Regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper[45]	The Regional PRSP is a joint ECOWAS-UEMOA strategy which incorporates guidelines in a vast range of areas: "immigration, transport facilitation, regional trade, regional solidarity fund, incorporation of rural electricity supply and rural telephony in the regional infrastructural programmes, elimination of pandemic diseases, support for women-dominated areas" [46] It comprises 4 priorities: "1. Conflict management and the promotion of democracy and good governance to strengthen social cohesion and the effectiveness of policies; 2. Deepen integration of the economic area to reduce trade costs and increase competitiveness in order to accelerate diversification and enhance growth; 3. Food security and development/interconnectivity of infrastructure and harmonisation/coordination of sectoral policies in support of the integration of the economic area to ensure its competitiveness; 4. Strengthening of human capital and facilitation of mobility through a common space in order to support growth and make it distributive[47]"	The Regional-PRSP has a broader scope than the EPADP. The R-PRSP "offers an integrated reference framework that will allow mutual strengthening of national strategies and regional programs in various sectors: macroeconomics, trade, infrastructure, social, etc, in order to accelerate growth, deepen integration, and substantially reduce poverty in West Africa" [48] The R-PRSP sets a common vision and common priorities, but it stresses the importance of variable geometry between ECOWAS and UEMOA and the importance of the principle of progressiveness; it will be implemented through the respective Priority Action Plans of the 2 sub-regional organisations: the PER for UEMOA and the Priority action Plan of ECOWAS. There are some linkages between the R-PRSP and the PER/EPADP, notably with regards to the promotion of sub-regional economic integration, human capital and mobility. However, according to N. Ponty (2009), the regional-PRSP does not seem to address questions of vertical coherence between the regional priorities (and projects identified and implemented at the regional level) and the national priorities. Yet, it would seem critical for the R-PRSP to address this issue of coherence, so as to make sure that national PRSPs take into account the regional priorities and the NOPs of the EPADP[49].

45 Based on the document finalised in 2006. ECOWAS-UEMOA (2006) Regional Integration for Growth and Poverty Reduction in West Africa: Strategies and Plan of Action. http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/macro/srrp.pdf

46 ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, May 2006

47 European Commission. 2008. Commission staff Working Document accompanying the Communication on Regional Integration for Development in ACP Countries. The Regional Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes of the 10th European Development Fund. SEC(2008) 2538. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st13816-ad01.en08.pdf

48 ECOWAS-UEMOA (2006)

49 N.Ponty (2009).

Programme/Initiative / Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
ECOWAS		
Vision 2020: From "ECOWAS of States to ECOWAS of People"	- ECOWAS's Strategic Vision 2020 aims at creating a "sub-region without frontiers, where the people have access to the enormous resources and enjoy them", "a space within which people ply their business and live in peace in the Rule of Law, good governance and a healthy environment setting"; " a zone that is an integral part of the African continental space where all human beings [are] guided by shared principles"[50]. The Vision is articulated around 5 pillars: • Agriculture • Women, Children and Youth • The business community (economic actors) • Infrastructure (both physical and "soft" i.e. ICT, HR etc.) • Governance	- links to national/regional PRSPs: The Vision 2020 makes repeated references to national PRSPs, but wishes to outline a more regional approach to development. The regional (ECOWAS) PRSP is mentioned as an embodiment of this regional approach. The Vision constitutes the priority action plan of ECOWAS to translate the objectives of the Common UEMOA-ECOWAS R-PRSP. - links to NEPAD: ECOWAS sees itself as the regional platform for the implementation of the NEPAD aims and principles. Therefore, the document outlining the 'vision' for ECOWAS states that it is firmly anchored in the principles and objectives of NEPAD. - links with EPADP: The EPADP is not mentioned. The Vision 2020 covers however many of the EPADP's objectives but it does so in a much broader and "*aspirational*" manner.
Community Development Programme (CDP)	- The CDP is a programme of action that is likely to give concrete expression to the actions needed to accomplish the Vision 2020 - The CDP is still under definition. - The CDP comes to complement national development programmes (it notably addresses issues related to poverty reduction and the MDGs) - It comprises a set of strategic axes, among which "interconnection" of the populations, states, markets, transport infrastructure, information and communication, energy and water and financial and monetary technologies. - The current framework has prioritised 10 strategic areas, which are 1: Integration of People, 2: Increased Cooperation among States, 3: Common Agricultural and Industrial Policies, 4: Interconnection of Transport Infrastructure, 5: Interconnection of ICTs, 6: Interconnection of Energy and Water systems, 7: Financial and Monetary Integration, 8: Human Development, 9: Research & Development, Innovation and 10: Common Regional Policies on the Environment and Natural Resources.	The CDP is first and foremost a coordination mechanism that should ensure that all the region's programmes (i.e including regional integration, and development) are in coherence with one another. The CDP goes beyond the Regional PRSP in that it intends to fix development-related guidelines and directives, aiming at: • Providing a coherent framework bringing together all ECOWAS programmes and sectoral policies • Ensuring coherence between West African regional institutions (notably between ECOWAS and UEMOA/WAEMU) • Providing a coherent framework between West Africa and the rest of the world • Complementing national programmes in key areas Comparison with EPADP: The EPADP is obviously a critical element of the CDP – it should fit into the CDP at a more "operational" level. The EPADP was defined prior to the CDP due to constraints linked to EPA negotiations. There are joint meetings to discuss conjointly the EPADP and the CDP and the relations between the two. The CDP team has been operational since the beginning of the year and knows the ECOWAS' Trade Department quite well. Compared to the EPADP however, the CDP has a broader scope that goes beyond trade.

[50] ECOWAS Commission (2007)

Programme/Initiative / Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
Strategic Plan of the ECOWAS Commission 2011-2015[51]	- Six strategic priority goals have been set according to the strategic pillars. These priority goals are: 1. Promote Good Governance, Justice and Upgrade the Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism 2. Promote Infrastructural development and a Competitive Business Environment 3. Sustained Development and Cooperation in the Region 4. Deepen Socio-Economic and Monetary Integration 5. Reinforce Institutional Capacity 6. Strengthen the Mechanism for Integration into the Global Market - In the context of the Strategic plan, a Medium-term Regional Action Plan (MTRAP) has been defined. It would be a dynamic and responsive action plan that describes a destination at a moment in time (goals and timelines) as well as intermediate stops along the way (actionable steps) - In order to implement this Action plan, the capacity of the ECOWAS Institutions should be enhanced through the Capacity Development Strategy (CDS).	Link with CDP: The CDP "actualises the long term strategy of the region"; it is not a strategic plan for the region. - In the medium term, activities will be identified by the ECOWAS Commission in the Medium Term Regional Action Plan (MTRAP) so as to avoid overlaps[52].

51 ECOWAS (2010). Regional Strategic Plan 2011-2015. The Reader Friendly Version. A proactive mechanism for change. Abuja: ECOWAS Commission. September 2010. http://www.spu.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/REGIONAL-STRATEGIC-PLAN-RFV-in-English.pdf

52 ibid.

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
UEMOA		
UEMOA's 2015 Vision	The Vision emanated from the declaration entitled "Instilling a new dynamism in the regional integration process » (adopted in 2004 in Niamey) The emphasis is notably put on the importance to promote a **political zone** (with good performances regarding good governance), a more integrated **economic zone, regional solidarity**, an efficient network of competitive export-oriented SME/SMIs, and the importance to intensify efforts aimed at reducing poverty and inequalities[53].	There are obvious linkages with the other programmes in the region, as the Vision should indeed be seen as an overarching framework defining the overall direction of the sub-region. Links with NEPAD objectives on good governance and macro-economic management. - The Vision also aims for coherence with the PAU/ECOWAP on the productivity and efficiency of the agricultural sector and regional food security through increased regional integration and strong regional trade regime. There are also clear linkages with the Common Industrial Policy of helping firms to become competitive and contribute to increased output. - Overlaps with EPADP objectives on 'building a competitive and harmonious regional economy that is integrated into the global economy'. The Vision shares non-surprisingly similar aims on the axes, like diversification and increase of production capacities, intra-regional trade development and improving infrastructure.
Regional Economic Programme (REP/PER)	The REP, which is implemented through a 5-year rolling programme (updated each year) aims at realising the UEMOA 2015 vision. The REP revolves around a number of projects in different areas (transport, energy, ICT, agriculture, etc) which have been regionally chosen on the basis of their capacity to enhance regional integration, and improve the productive sector and social services.	To ensure coherence, the REP is drawn up in consideration of other general and sectoral policies adopted by the Unions, including the Regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Document, National Poverty Reduction Strategy Documents, ECOWAS programmes, particularly with regard to economic infrastructure, CILSS policies particularly with regard to rural development and the environment and the Short Term Plan of Action of NEPAD. The sectors comprise transport, energy, information and communication technology, human resources, agriculture, industry and good economic[54]. According to the PRSP document (2006), the REP was "modelled on the intervention areas of the PRSP" and political governance[55]. The REP constitutes the priority action plan of UEMOA to translate the objectives of the Common UEMOA-ECOWAS R-PRSP.

53 BOAD/BCAO/UEMOA (2006). 2006-2010. Regional Economic Program. Summary Report. July 2006. http://www.izf.net/upload/Institutions/Situation/PER/REP_Summary%20report.pdf

54 ibid.

55 ECOWAS-UEMOA (2006) Regional Integration for Growth and Poverty Reduction in West Africa: Strategies and Plan of Action. http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/macro/srrp.pdf

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
	The REP 2011-2015 is currently under elaboration. The REP 2006-2010 was designed around five strategic areas : 1) Consolidating good governance and enhancing economic integration by encouraging the convergence of national budgetary policies, the integration of factor markets and the development of Community solidarity 2) Developing, rehabilitating and modernising economic infrastructure 3) Establishing an integrated productive mechanism by restructuring firms, promoting the financing of SME/SMI and the development and processing of natural resources (Cotton agenda and securitisation of both the production and management of shared resources) .4) developing human resources, both by developing the quantitative level of health services and higher education systems. 5) Establishing a partnership for the mobilisation of resources for the financing of the programme and drawing up mechanisms for its execution and monitoring/evaluation[56].	**REP. 2006-2010**: Overlaps with EPADP on "building a competitive and harmonious regional economy that is integrated into the global economy". The REP shares similar aims on the axes, like diversification and increase of production capacities, intra-regional trade development and improving infrastructure. Infrastructure represented 78% of the PER 2006-2010; 62.7% of the EPADP (with some differences however regarding the relative importance of the different components (N. Ponty)[57]. There are areas in the REP (less than 6% of the total cost of the REP) that are not covered in the EPADP (e.g. governance programmes such as programme of election observation and conflict prevention and monitoring missions) and vice-versa (support for fiscal transition and compensation)[58].
Aid For Trade Strategy		
UEMOA AfT Strategy[59]	The general objective of the Strategy is to help UEMOA member states increase their exports of goods and services. With this in mind, five specific objectives have been defined: 1) ensuring ownership and management of trade policies and trade regulations by member states' and the Commission's experts (capacity building..) 2) developing intra-regional and international trade 3) reinforcing trade-related infrastructure in the region 4) diversifying and increasing production capacities 5) making the necessary adjustments and taking into account other trade-related needs.	- There is a great correspondence between the UEMOA AfT specific objectives and the EPADP axes. This is not surprising since the needs and priorities of the AfT strategy were identified based on the PER, as well as on the basis of the existing capacity building programmes in member states (IF and JITAP...) - The action plan matrixes have been defined following consultation at the national level. Those are in coherence with the priorities defined in the National Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies. Following these consultations, results are reviewed at the regional level. - The logical framework identifying specific actions, objectives results and projects has notably listed some ongoing projects corresponding to the different categories of AfT (eg. Trade-related adjustment measures, such as the fiscal reforms).

56 BOAD/BCAO/UEMOA. 2006.
57 N. Ponty. 2009
58 ibid.
59 Reference document for this section: UEMOA. Stratégie Régionale de Mise en Oeuvre du Programme d'aide pour le Commerce de l'UEMOA et Cadre logique pour la mise en oeuvre du Programme Aide pour le Commerce de l'UEMOA. Available at: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wto.org%2Ffrench%2Ftratop_f%2Fdevel_f%2Fa4t_f%2Fuemoa_f.doc&rct=j&q=Strategie%20Regionale%20de%20Mise%20en%20Oeuvre%20du%20Programme%20d'aide%20pour%20le%20Commerce%20de%20l'UEMOA&ei=m4CKTuqDF8uUOrGIzM0F&usg=AFQjCNFb4Gfs7QKQuhf6J6SY7Ey0dgpF1A&sig2=iJXv5jSOd2q4sGrSNvrYaw

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
ECOWAS AfT Strategy	**Currently under definition.** ECOWAS is currently in the process of enlarging UEMOA's AfT Strategy to cover all its members. Close collaboration between UEMOA and ECOWAS on this subject - ECOWAS has drafted the ToR for the AfT Strategy and has sent it to UEMOA for review. No further information at this stage.	The AfT Strategy, as conceived by the region, will go beyond the EPADP both in its geographical coverage (beyond the EU) and in its scope. It will define broad strategic orientations. The EPADP being located at a more operationalised/detailed level, the coherence between the two strategies could be made – at least in the text. In practice, it however remains to be seen how the two frameworks will fit with one another. Ideally, the AfT Strategy would have been defined prior to the EPADP; the difficulty however is that the EPADP has been constrained by the pace of EPA negotiations.
Sectoral Initiatives and/or Programmes		
Agriculture		
Economic Community of West African States' Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)	- Adopted on the 19th January 2005, the ECOWAP is based on the principles and priorities of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In 2009, this led to the adoption of a CAADP Regional Partnership Compact, which was signed by the ECOWAS Commission, Member States, the African Union, producers' organisations, the private sector, civil society and development partners. Investments needed for ECOWAP implementation are presented in National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs) and a Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP). Central objective : " contribut(ing) in a sustainable way to meeting the food needs of the population, to economic and social development, to the reduction of poverty in the Member States, and thus to reduce existing inequalities among territories, zones and nations[60]". - 3 major axes for action :(i) improvement in agricultural productivity and competitiveness; (ii) implementation of the intra-community trade regime; (iii) adaptation of the external trade regime.	- ECOWAP is linked to other programmes in the region including the Regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Document and National Poverty Reduction Strategy Documents (focus on curbing poverty and food scarcity), the Common Industrial Policy (improving the agricultural sector for competitiveness and productivity), as well as the REP (integrating the agricultural sector as part of an economic and trade regime). It links specifically with UEMOA/WAEMU's Agricultural Policy and the Strategic Framework for Food Security of ICDCS and the sub-regional programme to combat food desertification. There is also a clear link with the EPADP, particularly as regards development of the agricultural sector and promotion of agricultural trade. .

60 ECOWAS Commission 2008. The Regional Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) and the Offensive for food production and against hunger. Operational sequence: Progress on preparation of ECOWAP programmes and the Regional Offensive for food production and against hunger. Preparatory note prepared by ECOWAS in the context of the Co Joint Initiative by the French Presidency of the European Union and the ECOWAS Commission on . December 2008. Available at : http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/02_Progress-v_ang.pdf

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
UEMOA Common Agricultural Policy (PAU)[61]	Created in 2001 and implemented in the eight countries of UEMOA, the PAU covers all the activities related to agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fisheries and concerns all agricultural products.	- Good coherence between the PAU and ECOWAP, notably at the level of objectives, intervention areas. At the institutional level: signature between UEMOA and ECOWAS of a "Cooperation and Partnership Agreement" for the creation of a Joint Technical Secretariat to reinforce complementarity and coherence.
	General Objectives : (1) Achieving food security, by reducing the international dependence of UEMOA countries for food supplies and improving the functioning of the markets of agricultural goods ; (2) increasing productivity and agricultural production on a sustainable basis. ; (3) improving the living conditions of farmers, by developing the rural economy and upgrading their revenues and social status - Tri-annual programme - the second programme covers the period from 2009 to 2011	- The Tri-annual programme is to be seen in the context of the REP (Axis 3:" Building an integrated and competitive productive system ")
Regional Fund for Agricultural Development (FRDA)[62]	The FRDA was adopted in 2006 and focuses on 3 interventions areas[20]: (i) support to the development of agricultural finance systems (agricultural infrastructure and equipments, land use management, actions against soils degradation, transformation and marketing of agricultural products…) (ii) support to capacity building (training for the management of agricultural exploitations and for the sustainable management of natural resources, support to the creation of regional professional organisations and the diffusion of technologies, training for international agricultural negotiations…) (iii) regional institutional investments (including support to the regional institutional systems in charge of the implementation of the common agricultural policy)	The FRDA has been created in the context of the PAU (Art. 13), in order to finance UEMOA's agricultural sector. For coherence with other mechanisms and initiatives in West Africa, please see UEMOA's PAU.

61 UEMOA (2001) Acte additionnel n° 03/2001 portant adoption de la politique agricole de l'UEMOA. Available at: http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Actes/NewPages/acte_additionnel_03_2001.aspx

62 UEMOA. 2006. Règlement N 06/2006/CM/UEMOA fixant les modalités d'intervention, d'organisation et de fonctionnement du fonds régional de développement agricole (FRDA) (FRDA). http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/Actes/Reglement_06_2006_CM_UEMOA.pdf

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
Infrastructure and Transport		
UEMOA's Community Strategy and Action Plan for Road Infrastructure and Transport (PACITR)[63]	UEMOA's PACITR was adopted in 2001 (and covered a period of 10 years). The PACITR has 4 general objectives: 1) Harmonisation/convergence of national policies and regional coordination of road sector activities 2) Amelioration of the competitiveness of UEMOA's economies through the promotion of the free movement of goods and services and the reduction of road transport costs 3) Reduction of poverty 4) Reduction of the social costs of road insecurity It includes - among others - the following activities: 1) road investments and support actions (promotion of inter-State road infrastructure, notably to improve the connection between UEMOA capital cities (periodic maintenance, rehabilitation of roads, development of missing road links) 2) Trans-border rural road pilot programme 3) Harmonisation of procedures and regulations, creation of juxtaposed checkpoints at the borders and the monitoring of bad road practices through the creation of an observatory of abnormal practices on inter-State roads. 4) Road Safety The management, coordination and monitoring of the framework has been the responsibility of a specific steering committee[66].	Infrastructure and Transport also constitute important priorities of the EPADP (see for instance the third axis of the EPADP (notably R3C2/R3C3) as well as the support requested for the improvement of the performance of the logistical chain in West Africa's trade (R2C5)). The EPADP framework does make explicit reference to already-existing initiatives by ECOWAS and UEMOA in the transport sector, such as the joint ECOWAS and UEMOA's regional facilitation programme[64]. In terms of rehabilitation and construction of the regional road network (Component R3C2), the 2009 EPADP Framework also specifically took into account the activities already carried out in the context of the Regional Road Programme. It also specifies further that actions to be carried out shall notably involve "the construction of the missing portions of West Africa trans-coastal road, the trans-saharan (Dakar-Ndjamena) road and interconnection roads[65]".
ECOWAS' Priority Road Transport Programme (PRTP)	The PRTP aims at facilitating trade and speeding up economic regional integration, and more specifically at: 1) facilitating road transport across national borders 2) Implementing a network of trans-West African highways (including the trans-coastal highway linking Lagos and Nouakchott and the trans-Sahelian highway from Dakar to N'Djamena)[67].	
Regional Inter-State Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme	aims at improving the structure of the road network to reduce transport costs and make member states more competitive	

63 UEMOA. 2001. Décision N° 07/2001/CM/UEMOA portant adoption de la stratégie communautaire et d'un réseau d'infrastructures routières au sein de l'UEMOA. Dakar: UEMOA September 2001.

64 ECOWAS/UEMOA (2009). EPA Development Programme. Volume 1. Working Document. Draft Version January 2009.

65 ECOWAS/UEMOA (2009).

66 UNECA/AU. 2008. Third Report on Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA III). Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa, Addis Ababa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. pp 41

67 ECOWAS/UEMOA/UE (2008). European Community- West Africa. Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme.

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
(UEMOA-ECOWAS)	*Activities* → "Establishment of joint border posts for simultaneous control and inspection of goods so as to speed up passage and avoid congestion at the borders; controlling maximum permissible axle load of 11.5 tones[68]" → Establishment of observatories along the corridors to identify illegal practices → Instituting awareness campaigns on the procedures of inter- State road transit and transport conventions / interconnection of Customs IT system → Control of the HIV/AIDS along corridors especially at border posts[69]"	
Industrial Policy		
West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP) -- ECOWAS	- The policy was implemented in the 2010 meeting of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government and has a vision of 2030.[70] It comprises 4 specific objectives: 1. Diversification and broadening of the region's industrial production base (increased local raw material processing rate from 15-20% to an average of 30 % by 2030), support to the creation of new industrial production capacities and the development and upgrading of the existing ones; 2. Increased manufacturing industry's contribution to the regional GDP 3. Increased intra-Community trade to 40 % by 2030, with a 50% share of the region's trade in manufactured goods, particularly in the area of energy 4. Increased volume of exports of goods manufactured in West Africa to the global market (development of skills, industrial competitiveness and quality infrastructure, particularly in the areas of information, communication and transport) To achieve these objectives, the WACIP covers 10 regional programmes: development of micro-enterprises, SME/SMIs and major industries; industrial research and development Programme (IR&D); development of regional intellectual property rights (IPRs); Development of regional financing; business Opportunity Information Management System (ECO-BIZ); creation of the intra-Community and international industrial industrial partnership network; Infrastructural Development; Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology Programme (SQAM); Managerial capacity and skills development Programme: and Industry restructuring and upgrading programme[71].	The WACIP notably seeks to find coherence and links with the ECOWAS Energy Policy, the Regional Rural Electrification Programme, the Master Plan of energy production and interconnection of electricity networks of the ECOWAS Member States and the Energy Protocol signed by Heads of State and government of Member States. The Protocol, which is a new appendix to the 1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty, provides for a legal framework for investments in the energy sector. It furthermore seeks coherence with the European Initiative for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development, which decided on the PRSP Revision to the Integration of the Energy Programmes. There is notably an overlap with EPADP objectives on many of the WACIP priorities. The WACIP is incidentally mentioned many times throughout the EPADP 2009 framework. The latter further states: "As for the industrial sector, the EPA-DP takes into account the essential programmes identified by the region for the implementation of the industrial common policy related to the objectives of the EPA. It is mainly: standardization, quality assurance, accreditation, metrology, industry and trade information exchange; development of SME and technology; industrial research; skills development; Regional Property Rights; protection of innovative technologies and development of Regional industrial partnership[72]".

68 Yao G. Adzigbey. 2004. ECOWAS/UEMOA Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme. Presentation made at UNCTAD-WORLD BANK Trade Facilitation Seminar, Geneva, May 13, 2004.

69 ECOWAS/UEMOA/UE (2008). European Community - West Africa. Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme.

70 ECOWAS – Aid for Trade website: The West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP)- http://www.aidfortrade.ecowas.int/programmes/the-west-african-common-industrial-policy-wacip

71 ibid.

72 ECOWAS/UEMOA (2009). EPA Development Programme. Volume 1. Working Document. Draft Version January 2009.

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
UEMOA's Common Industrial Policy (PIC)[73]	The PIC was created in 1999. The vision of UEMOA's private and public actors regarding the future of their industrial policy could imply the doubling of the manufactured added-value achieved within the Union by 2020. This vision should rely on integrated and competitive SME/SMI, which should allow a better promotion of regional resources and new market share – notably in terms of exportations. 4 challenges have been identified: - **diversification of the industrial base** through the creation of new industries, which requires from the private sector to be able to attract more international investment and to develop partnerships ensuring a real transfers of know-how and knowledge. - **broadening of the industrial base** through the creation of many SME in diverse sectors (agro-industry, service-related activities...), which require a dynamic policy aimed at supporting SME and facilitating industry creation ; as well as a proactive policies, encouraging outsourcing activities - **competitiveness** (which requires innovation and adaptation from SMEs, but also a strong and efficient partnership between public and private actors) - **rationalization** (which appears necessary given the multiplicity of industrial units which could not be efficient before the enlargement of the regional market). Rationalization should not be imposed but should result from a real competition policy. The PIC comprises 6 programmes, which respectively aimed at: - developing of structures and programmes aimed at promoting quality - upgrading enterprises and their environment - promoting information networks - promoting investment and exportations - developing SME-SMI - reinforcing the consultation processes at the regional level.	- The objectives of UEMOA's Common Industrial Policy are not ignored in the EPADP. For instance, support requested in the context of the EPADP for compliance with (TBT/SPS) standards can be seen in line with the intention of UEMOA to favour a regional system of accreditation, standardization and quality promotion (see EPADP Text. Vol1). The UEMOA's Common industrial policy is mentioned many times throughout the EPADP general framework, notably but not solely when it comes to support for the "Structuring and upgrading of industry and related services"

73 For more information on the PIC : http://www.izf.net/pages/politique-industrielle-uemoa/2369/, or http://www.izf.net/upload/document/JournalOfficiel/AfriqueOuest/dec99/ACTEPIC.doc

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
Craft Industry		
UEMOA's craft industry promotion policy	Adopted by the Heads of states and governments in 2001, this policy pursues the following objectives[74]: - Improvement of the efficiency and competitiveness of craft-industry enterprises - Promotion of local resources and cultural heritage of UEMOA states - harmonisation of the regulatory frameworks relating to craft industry activities - amelioration of the contribution of the craft industry sector to GDP	Craft industry has been taken into account in the EPADP under Component R1C3 "Support for the development of cottage industry". Some clear overlap may exist therefore. The EPADP may be a means to further the objective of the UEMOA's craft industry promotion policy.
Energy		
West African Power Pool (WAPP)	- the WAPP was created during the 22nd Summit of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government - It aims at addressing the issue of power supply deficiency within West Africa "The vision of WAPP Organization is to integrate the national power system operations into a unified regional electricity market - with the expectation that such mechanism would, over the medium to long-term, assure the citizens of ECOWAS Member States a stable and reliable electricity supply at affordable costs[76]" Its objectives are to: • Formalise regional collaboration to develop power generation and transmission facilities (power security) • Improve the reliability and quality of power supply at the regional level • Minimise operating cost of networks ; • Increase investments needed for power grid expansion in the region (emphasis on the implementation of cross-border projects); • Create an attractive environment for investments in order to facilitate the funding of power generation and transmission facilities • Harmonize operating standards and rules • Create transparent and reliable mechanism for the swift settlement of power trade transactions ; • Increase the overall level of power supply in the region (implementation of priority generation and transmission projects to foster economic development and cheaper electricity supply to most)[77]	- The energy sector and the programmes of the region in this area, including the WAPP, have been taken into account when assessing the need for component R3C1 of the EPADP on "Building production capacities, transmission and reliable quality energy distribution at low price". Some synergies might therefore be possible.[75]
West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP)	The WAGP aims at connecting Nigeria to Togo, Benin and Ghana	- This project has been taken into account in the EPADP Framework when assessing the need for component R3C1 (see above WAPP)

74 Fore more information, see the Additional Act n° 05/2001 UEMOA (2001) “Acte additionnel n° 05/2001 relatif à la promotion de l'artisanat au sein de l'UEMOA” http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Actes/NewPages/acte_additionnel_05_2001.aspx
75 ECOWAS-UEMOA (2009)
76 WAPP website: http://www.ecowapp.org/?page_id=6
77 http://www.ecowapp.org/?page_id=6

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
UEMOA's Common Energy Policy (PEC)	Adopted in 2001, the PEC has the following objectives[78] 1) ensuring the security of energy supply within the Union 2) ensuring the optimal management of energy resources by systematizing the interconnection of electrical grids 3) promoting renewable energy 4) promoting energy efficiency 5) developing and improving access to energy services for rural populations 6) contributing to the preservation of the environment	The component R3C1 of the EPADP further the objective of UEMOA's PEC, by looking to "provide energy in adequate quantities to the productive sectors and at an affordable cost by pooling of all available resources on the regional market thanks to the expansion of trade in energy, energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy" (EPADP. Vol 1. Draft Version)
IRED _ Regional Initiative for Sustainable Energy	This 2009 initiative aims at implementing the “Vision for the future” 2030 which aims at increasing the electrification rate within UEMOA from 17% currently to 100% in 2030; at reducing the average price of electricity to 30 Frc CFA/KwH by the same date and increase the proportion of renewable and sustainable energies from 36% in 2007 to 82% by 2030[79]. 4 strategic axes[80] (1) developing a diversified, competitive and sustainable supply by rehabilitating existing groups, accelerating recent projects and development of new projects. This axis also involves exploiting the potential of (unused) renewable energy resources s and promoting the emergence of a regional industry of low-consumption bulbs (possibly in partnership with China) (2) Creating a regional plan for the management of energy consumption - (3) Accelerating the emergence of a regional exchange market for electric energy conducive to private investment and in line with the objectives of the WAPP. This objective can be achieved notably through the promotion of private-public partnerships, the harmonisation of institutional and regulatory frameworks related to the electrical sector and the improvement of the coordination between national regulation structures and the WAPP’s Regional Electricity Regulation Authority (4) Implementation of a mechanism dedicated to the financing of the electricity sector via notably the creation of a specific investment fund, which will benefit from the support of the Energy Development Fund which provide concessional funds for the financing of projects that are eligible to IRED. [81]	- Synergies could exist with Axis 3 of the EPADP, notably component R3C1A6.

78 See UEMOA (2001) Additional Act No04/2001 on the adoption of the PEC, Conference of Heads of State and Government. Dakar: 2001. http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Actes/NewPages/acte_additionnel_04_2001.aspx

79 For more information see: UEMOA (2009) Annex to the decision N°07/2009/CM/UEMOA relative to the implementation modalities of the strategy dubbed “ Regional Initiative for sustainable energy” (IRED): Strategy for the sustainable resolution of the energy crisis in UEMOA member states. http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/Actes/Annexe_decision_06_2009_CM_UEMOA.pdf

80 ibid.

81 For more information, see decision of the Council of Ministers N°08/2009/CM/UEMOA on the creation of the Energy Development Fund. http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/Actes/decision_08_2009_CM_UEMOA.pdf

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Description	Coherence / Mention of links to other regional frameworks
Water Resources and Environment		
UEMOA's Common Policy for the Improvement of the environment (PCAE)	This policy was adopted in 2008 and hinge on the four following strategic axes[82]: (1) contribution to the sustainable management of natural resources for the fight against poverty and food insecurity (systematisation, standardisation, and harmonisation of technical norms within UEMOA, rehabilitation of damaged resources…) (2) promotion of a clean and sustainable environment (development of modern urbanisation policies which take into consideration environmental aspects, innovative and participative approaches regarding waste management, harmonisation of legal text regarding the management of natural resources and hazardous wastes…) (3) capacity building for a concerted and sustainable management of environment (Promotion of education, training and research in the area of environment and sustainable development, promotion of eco-citizenship reinforcement of information and communication activities regarding environment management. (4) monitoring of the implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements. In the long term a regional financing mechanism for environment and natural resources management should be created. In the meanwhile the PCAE will notably be financed by the Regional Integration Assistance Fund (FAIR) and the Regional Fund for Agricultural Development (FRDA).	The priority of the region in terms of water management and environment are mentioned in the EPADP. When it comes to water, activities under the EPADP are comprised under Axis 1. Activity R1C2A4, notably aims at improving water management for production. Some synergies could therefore be found at the margin.
water resources and environment plan (ECOWEP) - 2009		

[82] See Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of UEMOA, Additional Act n°01/2008/CCEG/UEMOA: "Acte additionnel n°01/2008/CCEG/UEMOA portant adoption de la politique commune d'amélioration de l'environnement de l'UEMOA", Ouagadougou, 17 January 2008

Annex 2: EIF Lead Donor Facilitators by Country

Country	EIF Lead Donor Facilitator
Benin	Denmark
Burkina Faso	African Development Bank
Cape Verde	EU and Brazil [83]
The Gambia	European Union
Guinea	World Bank
Guinea Bissau	Spain
Liberia	World Bank
Mali	USAID
Mauritania	European Commission
Niger	European Commission
Senegal	European Commission
Sierra Leone	UNDP
Togo	UNDP

Source: http://www.enhancedif.org

[83] Although Cape Verde has graduated out of the LDC list of countries, it should still benefit from the EIF.

Annex 3: Regional Integration and Development Strategies and their institutional coordination mechanisms

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Relevant Sub-Regional Organisation	"Operationalisation" ?	National Component?	Institutional Coordination Mechanisms/ Monitoring Agency
General Regional Development Strategies				
Regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	Common ECOWAS and UEMOA document	+	–	- Joint Technical Secretariat ECOWAS/UEMOA + Permanent Secretariat of the Regional Poverty Reduction Unit (responsible for the central coordination of the analyses and/or synthesis of the activities of various management structures and the implementation of programs"). - The execution of projects is ensured by the PRSP Joint implementation Unit (CEDEAO-UEMOA). It is composed of Members of the ECOWAS/UEMOA Technical Committee. - In the long run, a monitoring and evaluation system was foreseen to provide information on poverty reduction through two main components: (1) a System for Collection and Analysis of Indicators at both national and regional level (notably monitoring of implementation of UEMOA's PER and ECOWAs' PAP) and (2) an Impact Assessment System " to assess the efficiency and impact of interventions and policies implemented under the poverty reduction program. - Nationally: Implementation by the structures in charge of PRSP nationally (national PRSP implementation units).
Vision 2020: From "ECOWAS of States to ECOWAS of People"	ECOWAS	–	–	- The Vision 2020 is not an operationalisation document. It is a broad outline of goals, aspirations and targets. - The document does not outline any specific coordination mechanisms, but stresses the importance of coordination amongst stakeholders through participatory mechanisms. Coordination mechanisms with other organisations are set out in the Strategic plan.

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Relevant Sub-Regional Organisation	"Operationalisation" ?	National Component?	Institutional Coordination Mechanisms/ Monitoring Agency
Community Development Programme (CDP)	ECOWAS	+	?	- It remains to be seen what the concrete aid modalities and instruments for the CDP will be and whether the CDP will identify new priorities and/projects beyond the stocktaking exercise of identifying existing RI frameworks. - "National Committee on CDP" have been created in ECOWAS Member states. - A Regional consultative framework to facilitate coordination between ECOWAS and other IGOs has also been established. - External partners' tour and roundtable of donors are foreseen in the final phase of conceptualization of the programme (2012). The programme being currently under elaboration, no further information is available at this stage, notably on whether it will include national programmes or not.
Strategic Plan of the ECOWAS Commission 2011-2015	ECOWAS	+	–	- In the context of this plan, an independent monitoring committee comprising public sector organs and agencies, private sector and civil society actors, as well as development partners, has been foreseen. It is stated that "the result of the monitoring would provide the framework for assessing the impact of donor support to the region and would also be the basis for aligning their development assistance to the needs of the region[84]".
UEMOA's 2015 Vision	UEMOA	–	–	- broad outline of goals, aspirations and targets. - The process is overseen by a Steering Committee which relies on official documents about the status and progress of projects. Donors get an opportunity to input on the effectiveness of the projects during joint meetings. - The Vision uses the Regional Economic Report to get substantial information about the region's economy. The monitoring is being done every 5 years leading to the next REP.

[84] ECOWAS (2010). Regional Strategic Plan. 2011-2015. Final Draft. September 2010. http://www.spu.ecowas.int/documents/regional-strategic-plan/final_draft-sp_doc__24_09_10/

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Relevant Sub-Regional Organisation	"Operationalisation" ?	National Component?	Institutional Coordination Mechanisms/ Monitoring Agency
Regional Economic Programme (REP/PER)	UEMOA	+	+	- Implementing bodies include UEMOA Council of Ministers, the REP Steering Committee, and the REP Management Unit - The Steering Committee is responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the REP. It comprises UEMOA Commission, West African Development Bank & BCEAO. UEMOA member states and development partners can have an advisory role. - The Steering Committee is helped by the REP Management Unit which is responsible on the one hand for appreciating the sectoral programmes and the monitoring and evaluation system, and, on the other hand, for preparing reports on the execution of the programme of action. According to the original document (2004), for each 5-year programme, there will be a mid-term review and a final review at the end of the fifth year[85]. This evaluation should be conducted by an independent unit. - At the national level: presence of National Economic Policy Committees & inter-ministerial technical committees (responsible for the execution on the national level)
Aid For Trade Strategy				
UEMOA's AFT Strategy	UEMOA	+	+	The institutional coordination mechanisms comprise: a Steering Committee (comprising member states, UEMOA, CEDEAO, civil society, private sector and development partners…), Regional and National Management Units; and national and regional authorizing officers informing the ultimate decision body, ie the Council of Ministers. At the national level, National AfT Committees are usually based in national Trade ministries, with sectoral focal points.
ECOWAS' AfT Strategy	ECOWAS	–	–	This Strategy is currently under elaboration. No further information is available at this stage. According to preliminary information, this Strategy will primarily define broad strategic orientations.

[85] UEMOA. 2004. Regional Economic Programme. May 2004. http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/Actes/PEREng.pdf

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Relevant Sub-Regional Organisation	"Operationalisation" ?	National Component?	Institutional Coordination Mechanisms/ Monitoring Agency
Sectoral Programmes/Initiatives				
Economic Community of West African States' Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)/ CAADP	ECOWAS	+	+	- ECOWAS Commission's Department of Agriculture and Rural Development leads ECOWAP/CAADP - In terms of dialogue: establishment of an Inter-departmental Committee for Agriculture and Food of the ECOWAS Commission to ensure the coherence of sectoral policies and of an "Advisory Committee for Agriculture and Food" ("forum for discussion among the ECOWAS Commission, Member States, the ECOWAS Parliament, professional organisations, regional cooperation organizations and the representatives of the technical and financial partners[86]") - For the implementation of the ECOWAP and particularly its related Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP), a "Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food" will be created. A "Regional Fund for Agriculture and Food" managed by EBID will be established to serve as a funding mechanism for the ECOWAP[87].
UEMOA Common Agricultural Policy (PAU)	UEMOA	+	–	- Lead institutional unit in charge of implementation and monitoring: UEMOA DDRE (Rural Development, Natural Resources and Environment Direction). At the regional level, support to the UEMOA Commission by the *Regional Consultative Committee for agricultural sectors* (technical assistance) - Network of focal points in each member states. They have the responsibility to ensure coherence and complementarity between the PAU and National Agricultural Policies.
West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP/PICAO)	ECOWAS	+	–	- The Strategy intends to establish a mechanism for consultation and implementation at national and regional level between the public and private sectors. Implementation and monitoring is ensured by ECOWAS relevant agencies (eg. Ministerial Commission of the Member States responsible for the industrial sector, Committee of National Experts for the industrial sector).
UEMOA Common Industrial Policy	UEMOA	+	–	- The UEMOA Commission plays an important role in coordinating this programme, notably by ensuring coordination with national stakeholders (member states, private sector…)

[86] ECOWAS Commission (2009) Regional Partnership Compact for the Implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP. Abuja: ECOWAS Commission. http://www.caadp.net/pdf/ECOWAP%20Regional%20Compact.pdf
[87] See for instance: http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3746,en_38233741_38247070_44425686_1_1_1_1,00.html

Programme/Initiative/ Framework	Relevant Sub-Regional Organisation	"Operationalisation"?	National Component?	Institutional Coordination Mechanisms/ Monitoring Agency
Road Infrastructure and Transport Action Programme (PACITR)	UEMOA	+	–	- The UEMOA Commission is in charge of initiating and coordinating the activities in relation with the Member States. The UEMOA Commission, as well as the BOAD, are primarily in charge of seeking the necessary financing.
West African Power Pool (WAPP)	ECOWAS	+	–	- The Governing Structure of the WAPP includes: the General Assembly, the Executive Board, the Organisational Committees and the WAPP General Secretariat, including the WAPP Information and Coordination Center. The WAPP General Secretariat is in charge of the day-to-day implementation - "The Secretary General also facilitates and maintains international cooperation arrangements with "power pool" organizations in other parts of the world and liaise with other relevant power sector stakeholders in ECOWAS Members States and throughout Africa.[88]" (Art. 7 of the A.A of the WAPP). - Structures of dialogue with financial partners notably include annual donors' coordination meeting.

[88] West African Power Pool (2005). Articles of Agreement Of The West African Power Pool : Organization and Functions. Accra: October 2005. www.ecowapp.org/?dl_id=6

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