European Centre for Development Policy Management
ecdpm

Discussion Paper

No. 147
July 2013

The CAADP and Emerging Economies:

The case of Tanzania

Anna Rosengren

www.ecdpm.org/dp147

European Centre for Development Policy Management
ecdpm

The CAADP and Emerging Economies:

The case of Tanzania

Anna Rosengren

July 2013

Key messages

Increasing investments into the Tanzanian agricultural sector brings new much needed resources. Yet, it is unclear if Tanzania has sufficiently coherent policy framework to turn resources to agricultural development.

Despite several high-level commitments to support the CAADP, none of the emerging economies have yet taken the step to align their activities with the framework. What can be done to make CAADP more attractive to all partners?

Currently, there appears to be too many competing agricultural strategies that all involves partner support, which not only decreases the domestic agricultural policy coherence but also potentially reduces the traction of CAADP.

Table of Contents

List of Boxes

List of Figures

Acknowledgements

ECDPM gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has made this study possible. This study builds upon work carried out by ECDPM in food security (www.ecdpm.org/foodsecurity) and is part of a larger study Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics in African Agriculture: what role for CAADP?. The field research was undertaken as a joint project between ECDPM and Sokoine Agricultural University (SUA), and the author would like to thank Dr. Jumanne Abdallah at the Department of Forest Economics at SUA for his very valuable assistance. The author would further like to thank all the persons interviewed for this study for their time and insights. Francesco Rampa provided much appreciated assistance and experience with field research, in addition to valuable comments. In addition, thanks to Quentin de Roquefeuil and Dan Lui for comments on earlier drafts of the study, as well as several other external reviewers. The views expressed herein are those of the author only and should not be attributed to any other person or institution. For comments and information, please contact Anna Rosengren (ar@ecdpm.org).

Acronyms

ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Programme
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
ASP	Agriculture Strategic Plan (Zanzibar)
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Management
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoT	Government of Tanzania
KK	Kilimo Kwanza
KOICA	South Korea Development Agency
MAFC	Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture
TAFSIP	Tanzania Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plan
TIC	Tanzania Investment Centre
TNBC	Tanzanian National Business Council
TNBC	Tanzania National Business Council
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
URT	United Republic of Tanzania

Executive Summary

The agricultural landscape in Tanzania is changing - from being a neglected sector with little public and private investments; it has become a domestic and international priority sector. Agricultural development and growth is perceived not only as a key sector for improved overall development, but increasingly also as an area of potential high-return investments.

One major factor is the establishment of the pan-African Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP). Tanzania signed their CAADP Compact in July 2010, and subsequently finalised the Investment Plan "**Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan**" (TAFSIP) in November 2011. CAADP-TAFSIP did not however arrive in a vacuum; two major agricultural development programmes were already in place in Tanzania. The first one is the **Agricultural Sector Development Strategy** (ASDP) accompanied by the **Agricultural Sector Development Programme** (ASDP) for mainland Tanzania, and the Agriculture Strategic Plan (ASP) for Zanzibar. The other major agricultural initiative**, Kilimo Kwanza (KK),** was launched by President Kikwete in 2009. While ASDP is centrally planned and funded, with a main focus on smallholders and irrigation projects, KK is a public-private initiative emphasising agricultural transformation through modernisation and commercialisation, large-scale projects and stronger Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The KK is, both in terms of management and vision, a clear break away from the heavily public-centred ASDP, which have a created a challenging situation with two competing national agricultural development strategies.

The external international partners' elevated agricultural focus forms part of the transformative process of the Tanzanian agricultural sector. Several emerging economies have been present in African agriculture for a long time, for example China has been actively involved for more than 40 years, yet the last period has seen an exponential increase that in many ways have changed the circumstances and realities of agricultural cooperation, investments and growth. These public and private investments provide much needed resources in terms of capital, technological transfers and capacity development. However, even though this increase certainly is very welcomed, there is a need to ensure that these new resources (as well as any resources provided by traditional donors) truly bring forth sustainable and inclusive agricultural and rural development that also benefits smallholders. Given the important role that CAADP can play in ensuring these objectives, this study tries to explore the potentials for further synergies between CAADP and Tanzania's emerging partners.

Clearly, emerging economies are not a homogenous group but rather a set of different countries with different experiences, approaches and strategies. Yet, interviews with representatives from China, India, Brazil and South Korea revealed some commonalties, such as:

- A tendency to provide demand driven, ad hoc support focused on capacity and vocational training, and technology transfers.
- Support is generally provided at a government-to-government level and tends to be smaller in scale compared to that of traditional donors.
- Two principles tend to underline support provided by emerging economies: i) it is non-conditional and ii) it is largely based on domestic experiences of agricultural and rural development.
- Several interviewees stated that the different support modalities of the emerging and the traditional partners often prove complementary and also allow for greater differentiation of assistance.

In terms of private investments into agriculture, the claim that China, India and Brazil are investing heavily seems to be somewhat of an overstatement. Most of the stakeholders interviewed, both from Tanzania and the emerging economies, stated that investments still remain quite marginal but that a future increase is to be expected. Moreover, the origin of the investments seemed to be perceived as of little importance. Tanzanian policy makers frequently emphasised the need for enhanced investments, independently of where it comes from and what form it takes. Thus, the origin of investments seemed to be a non-issue amongst Tanzanian policy makers and other stakeholders.

Land is a central and highly politicised issue in Tanzania, which attracts great attention both in the national and international development policy debates[1]. Most interviewed stakeholders welcome further investments, both national and international, and see it as a necessity for enhanced overall agricultural development. However, there are also frequent concerns about the short, medium and long term risks these investments could bring, in particular for smallholder farmers, as well as scepticism of the real benefits that large-scale investments can provide to the local community and the society at large. The latter ties in to a broader discussion concerning the dynamic of the large-scale investment and the role they can play in furthering agricultural development.

CAADP has so far had a limited traction with emerging economies, and despite some high-level statements of support, no emerging economy has yet aligned its development support under the framework. When talking to public representatives from emerging economies, several arguments are put forward to explain their limited interest in further aligning their agricultural development support to CAADP. While many of these might be very valid, the real question is not why the new partners are opting out of CAADP, but rather *why the Tanzanian government has not requested that they join.* Greater partner alignment could facilitate and promote improved partner coherence, national ownership, predictability of external assistance, improved efficiency and a reduced risk of overlapping or counterproductive projects.

However, currently there appears to be too many competing agricultural strategies that all involves partner support, which not only decreases the domestic agricultural policy coherence but also potentially reduces the traction of CAADP. Thus, the factor of paramount importance is the need for further coherence and coordination between the different Tanzanian ministries and strategies. Beyond this, some further recommendation on how to improve the influence and traction of CAADP is provided in the conclusion.

[1] See for example Mwami and Kamata (2011) and Mousseau and Mittal (2011).

1. Introduction

1.1. Agriculture in Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania has experienced a steadily increasing economic growth averaging at 6.0 per cent per annum over the last decade that, coupled with its long-term political stability, has rendered Tanzania the nickname "Africa's sleeping giant"[2]. Moreover, during a country visit in 2011, Kofi Annan stated his conviction that Tanzanian has potential to "*...not only feed its own citizens but to become a breadbasket for the rest of Africa*"[3]. Despite these optimistic claims, Tanzania is still among the poorest countries in the world, it ranked number 152 out of 187 countries in UNDP's 2013 Human Development Index[4] with a per capita income of US$1,383 and with 36 per cent of the population living below the poverty level[5].

Agriculture remains the key sector in Tanzania; currently it employs 80 per cent of the workforce, provides 85 per cent of exports and accounts for more than 25 per cent of the national GDP[6]. Staple food production dominates the sector, with maize being the most important crop followed by rice, sorghum, millet, wheat, bananas, potatoes and beans. The most cultivated cash crops are coffee, cashews, cotton, tobacco, tea, cloves, sisal, oil seeds and flowers. As in many other countries, female small-scale producer make up the majority of the agricultural work force, with farm sizes on average between 0.9 and 3 hectare (ha)[7]. In fact, 98 per cent of women living in rural areas are active in agriculture[8]. There are severe indicators of acute food insecurity, e.g. malnutrition is the underlying cause of 50 per cent of the under 5 mortality rate and 40 per cent of all children suffers from stunting due to chronic under- or malnutrition[9].

The failure to transform the economic growth into agricultural development is due to numerous factors: state, market and policy failures have all been attributed to this disconnection[10]. However, it is also clear that throughout the last decades the agricultural sector has not attracted adequate public attention and investments, in combination with very limited private investments. Similar to many other African countries, the economic political and policy focus has been diverted away from agriculture towards sectors perceived as more conducive to economic growth.

Yet, in the last years agriculture has returned to the top of the agenda, both in Tanzania and in other African countries. A key factor is the establishment of high-priority agricultural policy frameworks, such as the pan-African **Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP),** as well as numerous Tanzanian national agricultural support programmes, which will be further described and discussed below. Agriculture has also become more prominent on the international development agenda, often in combination with private sector development initiatives. Examples are the G8 *New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition* launched at the 2012 G8 Summit at Camp David, and the *African Growth*

2 See FAO (2010: 25).
3 See Kofi Annan Foundation (2011).
4 See UNDP (2013).
5 See CIA (2013).
6 See FAO (2010).
7 See Mousseau and Mittal (2011).
8 See SAGCOT (2011)
9 See URT (2011).
10 According to the Government of Tanzania (GoT) in their "Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan" (TAFSIP), the disconnection between economic growth and poverty and food insecurity can be accounted to three factors: i) agricultural sector growth has been driven by large scale farms producing mainly export crops in specific parts of the country; ii) per capita maize production has declined as a result of low input use and market constraints, and; iii) low calorie availability is constraining productivity in the smallholder sub-sector. See TAFSIP (2011: 2).

Initiative, a stakeholder platform conceptually based on public-private partnerships and strong private sector engagement.

Beyond the amplified focus on agriculture by traditional donors, emerging economies have also increased their presence in Africa's agricultural sector. Several emerging economies have been present in African agriculture for a long time, for example China has been actively involved for more than 40 years, yet the last period has seen an exponential increase that in many ways have changed the circumstances and realities of agricultural cooperation, investments and growth. There is moreover a stronger emphasis on agricultural development cooperation beyond pure commercial investments, again exemplified by China who in 2011 published their *White Paper on Aid*[11], where agriculture featured high on the agenda.

The increased presence in agriculture of both public and private actors brings much needed resources, both in terms of financial investments and technical skills and capacity, which in many ways is a very welcomed development. Yet, as with any type of cooperation and investments, independent if their origin, there is a need to ensure that these activities truly bring forth a sustainable, inclusive agricultural development that also benefits local smallholders. This study tries to explore the potentials for CAADP, as the main African-led agricultural development framework, to also include Africa's emerging partners.

1.2. Purpose, Approach, Methodology and Structure of the Study

This country case study forms part of a wider study conducted by the European Centre for Development Management (ECDPM), which looks at the increased presence of emerging economies in the African agricultural sector and how their activities relate to the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Programme (CAADP). Together with literature reviews, field trips and interviews were undertaken in Tanzania, Ghana and Ethiopia, aiming to understand how stakeholders *perceive* the emerging public and private partners and their agricultural activities. The study further investigates how these different agricultural development cooperation programmes and investment patterns influence issues of land management. Ultimately, the study aims to explore whether there is room for improved coherence and possible synergies between the food security approaches of traditional development partners and emerging economies, in particular in terms of sharing experiences and lessons, as well as the identification of potential complementarities and cooperation prospects in the context of CAADP

The Tanzanian case study is a joint research project between ECDPM and the Department of Forest Economics at Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro, Tanzania. During the autumn of 2012, over 30 interviews were conducted with representatives from the Government of Tanzania (GoT), Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), farmers organisations, researchers, policy institutions, private firms as well as with representatives from emerging partners' embassies, development cooperation agencies, and private sector actors.

The rest of the study is structured as follows; part two outlines emerging economies' activities and influence on the Tanzanian agricultural sector, both in terms of public and private investments. Section 3 looks at the development and implementation of CAADP in Tanzania, while chapter 4 focuses on land and land management issues. Section 5 discusses possible linkages and synergies between the emerging economies and CAADP, while chapter 6 provides a conclusion.

[11] China White Paper on Aid, see The People's Republic of China (2011).

2. Emerging economies in the Tanzanian agricultural sector

2.1. Emerging economies' agricultural development cooperation in Tanzania

First, it is important to highlight the obvious, namely that emerging economies are not a homogeneous group but rather a set of countries with very different experiences, approaches and strategies. The drivers and incentives behind the last decade's upsurge in agricultural support and investment by countries such as India, China and Brazil stems from a wide variety of push and pull factors relating to e.g. availability of land, population pressures and domestic policies regarding trade, investment and bilateral relations. Yet, some commonalities can be detected. While one of the main agricultural support modalities employed by traditional donors is to provide support directly to the national governments via General Budget Support (GBS), representatives from emerging economies i.e. India, Brazil and South Korea, present an altogether different image of their development cooperation. Some of the recurrent patterns of their cooperation are highlighted below.

Interviewed representatives from Indian, South Korean and Brazilian embassies emphasised that all support is given on a purely demand driven basis. In order for a project to be launched, a concrete request needs to be put forward by the GoT. Generally, the processes follow a similar path – initiated by the Tanzanian government who sends a specific request to the emerging economy's development agency or embassy in Tanzania. They then forward the request to their national headquarter, who, in consultation with the agency - and commonly also the beneficiary government - designs the project. Regardless of whether the Tanzanian government formed part of the design team or not, the GoT has to approve a project before it is launched. In general, cooperation is firmly on the **government-to-government level**, though the local and district council might be involved in the ensuing implementation process.

Moreover, most of emerging economies' agricultural development projects are provided on an ad hoc basis and tend to be smaller in scale and timeframe compared to that of traditional donors. These support projects and programmes are often targeted towards capacity and vocational training and technological transfers, while the direct financial support tends to be more limited. As stated by an official from the Korean Development Agency KIOCA, "*a lot of traditional development partners provide financial support, but we know how to transfer that to development*". As will be further described below, KOICA has several training centres across Tanzania that focus on know-how dissemination and technology transfer to local farmers on a communal basis.

China has also focused its activities on direct technical support. Between the 1964's 'Economic and Technological Cooperation and Loan Agreement' and 1970, China financed projects such as the Ruvu State Farm, the Urafiki Cotton Textile Factory, the Upenja State Farm and the Ubongo Farm Implements Factory etc. In present time, China has established a new agro-technology research and demonstration centre in Mvomore District, Morogoro region, as well as a smaller technical assistance project. The demonstration centre is part of the 2006 Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) pledge to build 10 (later increased to 20) agro-technology centres in Africa. The centre includes 10ha of experimental fields (hybrid and conventional rice, horticulture and maize), a laboratory, a training complex, offices, a modern poultry and egg complex, a greenhouse, a tissue culture room and four deep wells for water supply. The project started in 2009 and was a public-private endeavour in which a Chinese company, the Chongqing Zhongyi Seed Company, ran for a public tender to designed and constructed the centre. The centre was then handed over to the Tanzanian state (April 2011), but the Chinese company will remain for another three years to provide technical assistance. China also arranges several training courses, both in Tanzania and in China. For example, every year since 2006 Zanzibar officials have travelled to China to take part in intensive, short-term, training courses on agricultural management, handicraft production and fishery techniques. [12]

Similarly, Brazil is also providing support through training courses, in particular in the production of cashew apples, horticulture and livestock. Total agricultural support provided by Brazil accounts for less than US$1m, but the volume might increase within the next years as Brazil is planning to expand its activities beyond its traditional Portuguese speaking African partners[13]. As announced at the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 2013, Brazil will cancel or restructure almost US$900 million of debt owned by African countries, as part of a plan to increase future funding to the continent. Tanzania, which owes Brazil US$237m, is among the 12 African countries set to benefit[14].

Another vital aspect that was repeatedly mentioned during our interviews with emerging economies official representatives was that assistance is provided without any form of political conditionality. This forms part of the "no strings attached", non-interference approach held by many emerging partners. For example China's White Paper on Aid states that aid is provided so as to "*Imposing no political conditions... China never uses foreign aid as a means to interfere in recipient countries' internal affairs or seek political privileges for itself.*"[15] Brazil and India is applying the same principles; a representative from Brazil explained it as a "soft power approach", where the long-term goal is to create positive and beneficial diplomatic relations rather than focusing on short-term benefits.

Finally, all diplomats and government officials from emerging economies emphasised the fact that their assistance is largely based on their own domestic experiences of agricultural transformation and development. The knowledge and understanding based on first hand experiences of agricultural and rural development is often praised as one of the most significant strengths and value-additions of emerging economies development support. This is a very essential feature, which to a high degree defines the type and design of the cooperation modalities. Even though the circumstances and demands surely differ between countries, representatives from emerging economies' embassies repeatedly stated that the natural, social and environmental challenges of the partner country often resembles those of their own country, and that important lessons therefore can be learnt.

[12] See Brautigam (2012).
[13] See more: de Roquefeuil (2013).
[14] See for example BBC (2013).
[15] See The People's Republic of China (2011: 4).

Box 1: Saemauel Undong Movement

One example of an agricultural development approached based on domestic experiences is the South Korean Saemauel Undong Movement (Eng. New Village Movement). KOICA base large parts of their development cooperation on the fundaments of a Korean national agricultural development programme from the 1960-70s, called the *Saemauel Undong Movement*. The movement had significant impact on the Korean agricultural development, and was fairly successful under its approximately 10 active years in providing agricultural growth and reduced hunger. This approach has influenced projects in Jinga Village (Bagamoyo), Pangawe Village (Morogoro), Cheju Village (Zanzibar) and Kibokwa Village (Zanzibar). In Morogoro, KIOCA has launched an integrated rural development pilot programme called the Hunger Project, which to a large degree is based on these fundaments. Launched in 2011, this 3-year pilot project is now on its second year and an estimated 80 per cent of the initial commitments have been implemented.

Three spiritual foundations, self-reliance, hard-work and a communal spirit, have been integrated into the project via the emphasis on the farmers' own contributions, the village's shared responsibility for harvest and livestock and the fact that all assets are communally owned. The project is divided into two parts, one focusing on agricultural activities and one on constructions of a school, a hospital, a road and an irrigation system. KIOCA provided the villagers with initial training to promote the benefits of the project, but despite the many successes of the project there remains a fairly widespread scepticism of the intent of KIOCA, the true level of voluntariness, and a hesitation to work on communal land rather than the individually owned land. This could in part be based on the previous Tanzanian experience of the Ujamaa[16], which might cause some reluctance among farmers. There have furthermore been conflicts with the surrounding villages about the project's fairly extensive use of land and water. The issue remain unsolved, and since the project ends in 2013, it is unclear if it will be resolved before it is finalised.

Source: Interviews with representatives from the Hunger project, the KIOCA office in Tanzania and Reed, 2010.

The perception of emerging economies' agricultural programmes in Tanzania, and of its capacity to develop and implement efficient agricultural development strategies, also diverges among different actors. While Tanzanian officials often expressed that they see traditional development partners as increasingly pessimistic in their cooperation with Tanzania, emerging economies are perceived to be more forward looking. Part reason for this could be the rhetoric and logic used in bilateral development cooperation, where the traditional partners still consider themselves as primarily donors, and slowly are loosing patience and faith in the capacity of Tanzania to realise different support projects. On the other hand, most emerging economies put greater emphasis on mutual benefits and the potential opportunities that can result from wider engagement and cooperation. Emerging economies' cooperation schemes and programmes are also often less prone to losses and risks as they tend to be short-term and at a lower financial (and reputational) cost.

The aforementioned perceptions of emerging economies' development support characteristics are perhaps not ground breaking as they fit fairly well with the overall understanding and rhetoric of the emerging economies engagement. However, it is interesting to notice that several Tanzanian stakeholders perceive these approaches to be highly complementary to the support provided by traditional donors. Even though there is a clear preference for budget support within the Tanzanian government, others argued that the assistance received through emerging economies' support modalities is a necessary step towards decreased aid dependence and stalling agricultural growth.

[16] *Ujamaa*, Swahili for 'family hood', was the social and economic policy developed by Julius Kambarage Nyerere, president of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985. Centred on collective agriculture, under a process called villagization, *ujamaa* also called for nationalization of banks and industry, and an increased level of self-reliance at both an individual and a national level. See more Boddy-Evans.

Two major arguments where put forward in support of the emerging development partners approach. First, technological transfers and capacity training is considered a vital aspect in promoting a rise in agricultural production and efficiency. One stakeholder argued that while the traditional partners nowadays mainly target their capacity building project at the policy level, the emerging economies' capacity support is provided at a more technical and concrete level, which can prove more beneficial for agricultural producers and others engaged along the value chains. Despite emerging economies regularly being criticised for low levels of transparency and accountability, the second favourable argument is that these approaches can actually reduce bureaucracy and misuse of funding. Since support is provided via services rather than financial means, the incentives and opportunities for corruption decreased and with that the risk that the overall value of the support is reduced by inefficiency, misuse and corruption.

Lastly, a representative from the Prime Minster's Office also emphasised the value of cultural transformation and multicultural exchange. According to this interviewee, the work ethics and saving propensity of migrated Chinese labour force could have an important impact on the Tanzanian strategy towards reducing Official Development Assistance (ODA) dependence via improved domestic resource mobilisation, sustainable consumption and increased private savings.

2.2. Emerging economies' private investments in Tanzania

The promotion of agricultural investment through enhanced private sector engagement is seen as a key component in the Tanzanian strategy towards rural and agricultural development, poverty reduction and improved food and nutrition security. In a speech held in December 2012, Tanzania's president H.E. Dr Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete stated:

> *"We want to achieve agricultural transformation through enhanced participation of private sector. We believe that private sector will make a huge impact in tackling the constraining factors to agricultural growth in the country. Private entrepreneurs can engage in large-scale farming, supply of advanced agricultural inputs and modern farm implements. The private sector can provide credit, ready market and engage in agro-processing to add value."*[17]

However, representatives from both traditional and emerging countries' development agencies all stated that they have a very limited or even non-existing relationship with the national private firms operating in the country. Interviewees from South Korea, Brazil and India emphasized the complete separation between the public and private sector active in Tanzania. While the same was stated by many of the traditional partners, a representative from the EU-delegation did mention a forum for the EU-delegation and European private firms operating in Tanzania. The aim of this forum is to provide a platform for improved insights and understanding of the main constraints and challenges that private firms are facing in Tanzania, such as the fiscal environment, transportation network (the port), immigration, etc. The outcomes are mainly used at technical levels to try to enhance the business climate in the country. Yet, beyond these meetings there are few channels for the delegation to further engage with European companies.

[17] See Kikwete (2012).

Throughout the last years, plenty of reports, primarily from the media, have portrait the emerging economies as hungry for land, food and a stable supply of natural resources, and therefore eager to make substantial investments in the African agricultural sector. However, there is a growing realisation that these reports in fact might be, at least partly, overstated or even incorrect[18]. The findings of this study supports this latter assessment, as very few of the interviewed stakeholders - including media, government officials, development partner representatives and farmer organisations - could mention more than perhaps one or two private agricultural investments originating from an emerging economy, and next to no one could give any further details of those investments.

Overall there is a very limited public overview of foreign and national agricultural investments. This is partly due to the fact that the institute responsible for all investments, the Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC), does not share confidential information and also themselves lack a complete overview of all investments. Two well-informed interviewees claimed that the majority of agricultural investments originate from Tanzania, followed by investments from OECD countries and Arab countries, while investors originating from emerging economies only rank fourth on the “list” of agricultural investments. Since the statistics of agro-investment were very difficult to obtain, we failed to test the accuracy of this statement but it nevertheless gives an impression of the perceived extent and relevance of the emerging economies’ investments in the country.

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the origin of the investors is not perceived as particularly important. In general, most stakeholders said that all types of investments are welcomed, provided that they bring in new resources and do not violate the environmental, social and labour regulations. Every private company willing to invest in Tanzanian agriculture needs to go via the TIC which is said to be a one stop shop, who then evaluates the investment proposal, both in terms of scale and timeframe, but also in terms of assessing the degree to which these investments will benefit the nearby local community. One of the preconditions set by the TIC is that all investment needs to involve local small-scale farmers and cannot therefore target isolated enclaves. These rules naturally apply independently of the companies’ origin, however there have been repeated complaints about the capacity of the TIC to ensure compliance, in particular with regard to land investment, which is further discussed below.

In fact, if any difference can be detected between investments from traditional and emerging companies, any conflict is statistically more likely to involve a firm from a traditional donor country than a firm from an emerging economy. This is probability less related to the quality of the different investments but rather due to the quantitative fact that there simply are more companies from EU or US active in Tanzania, which all operate under the same national legislative framework. It was also argues that western companies in fact are more scrutinised since they usually have a more public profile and often pledge to some social commitment. Companies from emerging economies on the other hand tend to keep a lower profile and stay out of public attention.

[18] See for example ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/ak241e/ak241e.pdf and see Sloley (2012).

3. CAADP in Tanzania

3.1. CAADP

CAADP is the agricultural programme of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), a programme of the African Union. Established by the African Union (AU) assembly in 2003, CAADP's goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 per cent of their national budgets and raise agricultural productivity by at least six per cent per annum. CAADP identifies four key pillars for food security improvement and agricultural investment: (1) Sustainable Land and Water Management; (2) Market Access; (3) Food Supply and Hunger; and (4) Agricultural Research.

The CAADP is centred around the definition of national and regional plans ('Compacts'), an agreement between all stakeholders (public, private as well as donors) serving as a framework for partnerships, alliances, and dialogue to design and implement the required policy interventions and investment programmes. The formulation of national and regional investment plans is one of the most important activities to implement CAADP after the definition and signature of the Compact. CAADP therefore is not a donors' programme, even though most traditional donors have an advisory role. Rather, it is a common framework for stimulating and guiding national, regional and continental initiatives on enhanced agriculture productivity and food security which each region and country can develop and implement as preferred. CAADP is a very advanced attempt at fully implementing the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action on Aid Effectiveness. It is difficult to identify similar partnerships, even sector-wide approaches, that can claim to have the same: degree of African ownership- both among political and technical experts- at continental, regional national levels, (unlike many other AU/regional initiatives such as free trade arrangements); robust plans for mutual accountability (serious monitoring & evaluation is built into CAADP); outreach to other sectors (trade, capacity development, natural resources, infrastructure, research and technology, safety); level of ODA predictability (substantial commitments of funds and relatively advanced alignment by donors) and regular donor coordination (e.g. headquarters focal points work together via teleconference every other week to task-divide and harmonize their CAADP activities).

The clear linkages between trade and agriculture within CAADP are confirmed by the fact that around thirty percent of the investment needs included in national CAADP Investment plans formulated so far relate to the development of market access and value chains. Weaknesses remain, with CAADP criticized by some stakeholders for lacking sufficient private sector involvement, regional level implementation, and clarity on the continental-regional-national nexus[19] [20].

[19] For more information on CAADP see www.caadp.net.
[20] See Rampa. Afun-Ogidan, van Seters (2012).

3.2. CAADP in Tanzania – the TAFSIP

Tanzania signed their CAADP Compact in July 2010[21][22], and subsequently finalised the Investment Plan "Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan[23]" (TAFSIP) in November 2011. TAFSIP's overarching goal is to '*contribute to the national economic growth, household income and exports in line with national and sectoral development aspirations,* while the development objective aims to '*rationalize allocation of resources to achieve six per cent agricultural GDP growth, consistent with national objectives to reduce rural poverty and improve household food and nutrition security'.* TAFSIP further rests on four thematic pillars; i) Agricultural Productivity and Production; ii) Food and Nutrition Security; ii) Rural Commercialization, and; Institutional Development.[24]

CAADP-TAFSIP did not however arrive in a vacuum, two major agricultural development programmes were already in place in Tanzania. The first one is the **Agricultural Sector Development Strategy** (ASDP) accompanied by the **Agricultural Sector Development Programme** (ASDP) for mainland Tanzania, and the Agriculture Strategic Plan (ASP) for Zanzibar. ASDP covers the period 2006-13 and its main objectives are to i) enable farmers to have better access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure, and; ii) increase private sector investments in agriculture based on an improved regulatory and policy environment. The Tanzania Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperation (MAFC) have the main responsibility for the programme, with the assistance of three advisory task forces formed by GoT, donors and non-state actors. ASDP receive its major funding by GoT (75%), donors (13%) and farmers (12%)[25]. As ASDP expires by the end of 2013, an ASDP II is expected to be formulated within the year, though the process is reportedly severely delayed.

The other major agricultural initiative, Kilimo Kwanza (KK), was launched by President Kikwete in 2009 as step towards achieving Tanzania's Vision 2025. Kilimo Kwanza is Swahili for Agriculture First, and it is presented as a *national resolve to accelerate agricultural transformation*[26]. KK was formulated by the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC), which is a forum for public-private dialogue made up 20 members from the public and the private sector respectively, and chaired by the President of Tanzania. KK enjoys high-level political support and is, both in terms of management and vision, a clear break away from the heavily public-sector focused ASDP. While ASDP is centrally planned and funded with a main focus on smallholders and irrigation projects, KK is a public-private initiative emphasising agricultural transformation through modernisation and commercialisation, large-scale projects and stronger Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). [27] The first major project launched under the banner of Kilimo Kwanza is SACGOT, the agricultural trade corridor described below.

[21] See United Republic of Tanzania (2010a).
[22] See United Republic of Tanzania (2010b).
[23] See United Republic of Tanzania (2011).
[24] See United Republic of Tanzania (2011: ii).
[25] See Cooksey (2012: 9).
[26] See Ngaiza (2012: 4).
[27] Ibid.

Box 2: Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania

As part of the *Kilimo Kwansa* initiative, SAGCOT was launched as a public-private partnership at the World Economic Forum on Africa in 2010. The primary aim of the project is to bring in large volumes of national and international private investment that can bring new economic opportunities for smallholder producers. This will be done via "*incentivising stronger linkages between smallholders and commercial agribusiness, including "hub and outgrower" schemes that allow smallholders in the vicinity of large-scale farms to access inputs, extension services, value-adding facilities and markets*[28]*"*. By committing to $2.1 billion of private investment to be catalysed over the next twenty years, together with $1.3 billion of public sector grants and loans and 350,000 hectares of land, SAGCOT aspires to lift more than two million people permanently out of poverty. Other targeted outcomes over the next 20 years include transforming tens of thousands of smallholder farmers into commercial farmers, creating 420,000 new employment opportunities in the agricultural value chain, raising the annual value of farming revenues to $1.2 billion and assuring regional food security.[29]

In preparing for the establishment of the Tanzanian CAADP Compact, a multi-sector taskforce was set up for the stocktaking of the Tanzanian agricultural policy framework. The taskforce consisted of members from the lead agricultural and natural resource ministries, donors and civil society. They found several gaps in the policy framework, including low private sector participation, limited incentives to investors, neglect of issues such as climate change, nutrition, and food security, as well as insufficient investments into research, transport, irrigation, and marketing development. Yet, when the Compact was signed in 2010 it stated that: *Tanzania is implementing CAADP through the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) for Tanzania Mainland and the Agriculture Strategic Plan (ASP) for Zanzibar*[30]

Figure 1: CAADP timeline

March 2003	CAADP endorsed by African heads of state in Maputo
September 2008	USAID commit $15m to CAADP over 5 years. Other donors follow.
March 2010	Joint mission of NEPAD, CAADP Lead Pillar Institutions and Southern African Development Community (SADC) visits Tanzania
April 2010	Follow up mission by NEPAD Agency, FAO Investment Centre Rome, and ReSAKSS-EAC. Multi-sector Taskforce established.
May 2010	Stocktaking by CAADP Taskforce.
July 2010	Roundtable (6th July) and signing of Compact (8th July).
May 2011	Independent technical review of the proposed Investment Plan, 25th – 31st May.
November 2011	Investment Plan finalised. The Tanzania Agriculture Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) launched by President Kikwete on the 11th November. High-level Business Meeting: technical meeting 10th and the 'political buy-in' and launch on the 11th.
December 2011	TAFSIP implementation begins.
May 2012	Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) approves a grant of $22.9m to the GoT for input subsidies and rice irrigation scheme rehabilitation.

Source: Cooksey, 2013

28 See SAGCOT (2011:1)
29 See SAGCOT (2011) and Byiers and Rampa (2013)
30 See United Republic of Tanzania (2010b: 3)

This was however not accepted by the NEPAP-CAADP who, based on the task force assessment, deemed the ASDP as 'non CAADP-compliant" and requested that it be updated with a new Investment Plan. In November 2011, the task force thus presented the TAFSIP as the main framework through which CAADP was to be implemented. According to Cooksey, TAFSIP can be understood as a political move to replace ASDP as the main agricultural framework, while basically ignoring the KK by passing it of as a mere 'slogan'. This set up creates an interesting dynamics, where the agricultural policy field is divided into two main parts, the ASDP-TAFSIP-CAADP ("owned" by the MAFC) and the KK-SAGCOT ("owned" by the president, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the TNBC), both claiming to actively promote the private sector, though with different focus[31].

Figure 2: Position of the TAFSIP in the National Planning Hierarchy



Source: United Republic of Tanzania, 2011

31 See Cooksey (2013).

4. Agricultural public and private investments and land

Land is a central and highly politicised issue in Tanzania, which attracts great attention both in the national and international development policy debates[32]. Regardless of the policy directions given by CAADP or other frameworks, in Tanzania, like any other countries, land is amongst the key real obstacles to increase investments in agriculture. Therefore, any discussion on the role and impact of both emerging and traditional partners cannot underestimate the land governance issue.

Most interviewed stakeholders welcome further investments, both national and international, and see it as a necessity for enhanced overall agricultural development. However, there are also frequent concerns about the short, medium and long terms risk these investments could bring, in particular for smallholder farmers, as well as scepticism of the real benefits that large-scale investments can provide to the local community and the society at large. The latter ties in to a broader discussion concerning the dynamic of the large-scale investment and the role they can play in furthering agricultural development.

While some see potential for improved social services through increased development-friendly investments, others feel that this must remain the responsibility of the Tanzanian government and that the prime benefit of increased investments is enhanced economic opportunities. Nevertheless, there is widespread consensus that if these investments are going to bring about benefits for smallholders without increasing their land vulnerability, the land tenure system of contractual agreements and legal control need to be improved. The current weakness of the land tenure governing system is related to a range of political issues such as the definition of unused land, compensations, transparency, compliance measures, information and education.

The legal definition of land is one of the more fundamental issues in the land debate in Tanzania. First of all, since independence land in Tanzania has been divided into two different tenure systems; a formal law governing land held by non-African settlers and a customary law governing land held by Africans. Four policies underlies this dual structure (i) all land belongs to the state and not to individuals; (ii) the right to land depends on the way the land is used; (iii) land rights are managed administratively rather than judicially, and; (iv) land is not a saleable commodity. All except the last one is still firmly in use to this day. In 1998/99 a new land law was launched, which was divided into a Land Act[33] and a Village Land Act[34]. The law, which entered into force in May 2011, has since then provided the overarching administrative framework for three categories of land: "*general land*", "*village land*" and "*reserved land*". Village land is the land within the demarcated areas for each of the 12 000 Tanzanian villages, reserve land is the land that by a respective sectorial legislation has been set aside for reserves (e.g. national parks, marine park, forest reserve etc.), and general land is all remaining areas of land. Foreign investment can only be made in land categorised as general land.

However, there are two components within these definitions that make the process more complicated. First of all, through Part 111 Section 4(1) of the Village Land Act the President has been given the right to transfer village land into general or reserved land if it serves the public interest. According to Section 4(2), most types of investments serve the public interest. The village assemblies have the right to reject these reclassifications, but only if the total land area is below 250 hectares. Yet, even in cases where the land areal is less than 250 hectares, no clear mechanisms exist for the village assembly to appeal or block a Presidential transfer of land. Thus, given the national aim to promote private large-scale

32 See for example Mwami and Kamata (2011) and Mousseau and Mittal (2011).
33 See United Republic of Tanzania (1998).
34 See United Republic of Tanzania (1999).

land investments, there is a risk that villages might lose their land in order to secure vast areas of undisrupted land for investment. Second, while the Village Land Act defines general land as “all public land that is not reserved land or village land”, the Land Act definition also includes unoccupied or unused village land. Beyond the incoherence and unclarity this double interpretation causes, there is further risk of infringement of village land currently idle but with important future (short- and long-term) uses, should the Land Act definition be used.[35] Since TAFSIP is aligned to the Land Act but not to the Village Land Act, this would indeed be the definition used by CAADP-TAFSIP. TAFSIP however recognises that the Land Policy does not provide for agricultural land demarcation at all levels and that the follow up of the implementation is weak. The strategy sets out to strengthen the governance in land distribution to avoid land disputes and increase public awareness of land laws especially in rural areas[36].

Research institutes and farmers organisations have also argued that the praxis of TIC at times creates problems. TIC is responsible for providing farmers that will be affected by large investments with accurate and transparent information as well as ensuring that they get appropriately compensated. However, several interviewed stakeholders claimed that this recurrently is regarded primarily as a statement of intent rather than an actual policy. According to these stakeholders, farmers are often ill informed of their rights, responsibilities and the legal frameworks. The legal challenges are however not restricted to information gaps; several stakeholder criticised both TIC and investing companies for applying inappropriate and insufficient contractual instruments and strategies. In negotiations with local communities, TIC and investors have been found using the minutes of the first introductory meeting as the contractual basis rather than committing to strong legal arrangements. Furthermore, farmers have also reported cases where land deals have been settled between TIC, the investor and a few local elites, and where the majority of the affected farmers have been excluded.

Fundamental to this is the fact that all the aforementioned challenges, in terms of legal definitions of land, appropriate compensations and legal procedures etc. are seen by the international partners as problems that must be governed and dealt with by the Tanzanian government. The role of the development partners is fairly limited since any company investing in Tanzania naturally have to follow Tanzanian national law, rather than regulations set up by their home government. Thus, the only way to promote sustainable investments to the benefit of the smallholders and the national economy is by providing capacity training and financial support to the government or by establishing voluntary guidelines. One example of the latter is FAO’s “*Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of Food Security*”, which seeks to improve and further develop tenure governance practices and policies[37].

Overall, representatives of traditional donors’ agencies and embassies seemed more aware of the complexity of land tenure issues and more conscious of their own role, compared to the representatives from the emerging economies. In the Camp David Summit of 2012, G8 countries announced the establishment of the “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” (New Alliance), which is a cooperation framework in which G8 countries, private firms and the national government have committed to lift 50 million people out of poverty over the next 10 years via sustainable and inclusive agricultural growth. Currently in the Tanzanian framework, 9 domestic companies and 11 international, out of which one Indian, have signed “Letters of Intent” that outlines their intended investments in support of the New Alliance’s goals. The members further “*confirm their intent to take account of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forest in the Context of National Food*

35 See Mousseau and Mittal (eds.) (2011).
36 See United Republic of Tanzania (2011: 48).
37 See FAO (2012).

Security"[38]*,* thus potentially taking a fairly active step towards better land practices. Only a few of the interviewed stakeholders had any deeper knowledge of the New Alliance, and among them the perceptions of its potential benefits differed quite substantially. One of the private signatories of the New Alliance stated that even though it might be too early to discuss any real impacts, the involvement of the private sector has the potential to increase the impact and relevance for local farmers, compared to purely public projects that rarely reach the poorest smallholders. Others we spoke to were however less enthusiastic, stating that the New Alliance now has to go from rhetoric to action and prove that it can provide a long-term tool for agricultural development that indeed benefited local smallholders.

[38] See G8 Cooperation Framework (2012: 3).

5. Emerging economies and CAADP

Looking at the way that CAADP is operationalized and implemented in Tanzania, there are basically three potential alternatives for partners, either they align their activities with the CAADP-TAFSIP, or they provide support via SAGCOT (which is governed outside of CAADP), or they avoid aligning their assistance to any national strategy and rely on government demand without explicitly joining a cooperation framework. Basically, most traditional donors can be found either in scenario 1 or 2, while almost all emerging economies can be found in scenario 3. None of the interviewed representatives from the emerging economies seemed to find much value or attraction in coordinating their activities with the CAADP framework. Their baseline argument was that CAADP, despite its claim of being fully African owned, to a high degree remains governed by the traditional donors and their cooperation modalities. Moreover, it was argued that the objective to adhere to the CAADP principles primarily rests with the partner government. Thus, when negotiating agricultural cooperation deals, it is the national government that should ensure that their demands are aligned to CAADP. As most agreements with emerging economies are on a government-to-government level, the GoT have sufficient political space to further push the CAADP agenda within their cooperation strategies, should they want to. However, as was showed above, the CAADP principles might be given varying priority depending on whether the cooperation arrangement is made with the MAFC or with the Prime Minister's Office.

A second argument for not aligning to CAADP is that it would be counteractive to the aim of emerging economies to provide non-conditional support without a political agenda. Whether CAADP is perceived as a donor driven or African programme, the framework is not compatible with the core fundaments of the emerging economies' strategic visions of international cooperation and thus it is not in their strategic interest to sign. Further, even if CAADP is "fully owned" by the GoT, there might still be reluctance to join coordination bodies where topics like budget support triggers, policy dialogue on the regulatory environment, etc., are the main substantial points on the agenda.

Nevertheless, in the last years there have been a few official policy statements addressing the objective of bringing together traditional and emerging development partners and to expand the international support to CAADP. The most significant is perhaps the Joint Statement on Global Food Security in the **l'Aquila Food Security Initiative** launched at the l'Aquila G8 Summit in 2009. Through that initiative, over 40 countries and organisations (among them the G8 members, African Union Commission and the AU presidency, as well as the major emerging economies[39]), announced that they fully support the CAADP goals and that they aim to facilitate the implementation of CAADP at the national, regional and continental levels. The signatory countries moreover committed to align their interventions in Africa with the CAADP framework.[40]

Similarly, in the report of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation held July 2012, it is stated under point 4.1.3. "*The two sides commended African countries' progress in implementing a growth-oriented agricultural agenda under the framework of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), and pledged to work together in support of CAADP.*"[41]

Finally, China and NEPAD recently signed a MoU on African Agricultural Growth, which stated that:

39 The emerging economies who endorsed the AFSI were: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, South Africa and Turkey.
40 See G8 Summit (2009).
41 See FOCAC (2012).

> *'Both parties will work together to enhance the participation of Chinese enterprises as well as African enterprises in Africa's agriculture and rural development. Furthermore, they will work together to regularly arrange high-level exchanges, and have policy, practical and technical dialogues between Africa and China with a view to accelerating Africa's agricultural and rural development. The NEPAD Agency within its mandate, will add value to the on-going bilateral agriculture and rural development programmes between China and Africa by assisting the African Union member states to incorporate the above into their national CAADP development processes.' 42*

Note that except for the l'Aquila Declaration, the statement above refer to "supporting" rather than 'aligning", which is a weaker commitment. Since there appears to be no practical implications of signing the l'Aquila declaration, this might furthermore be seen more as a rhetoric move rather than a committed pledge to align with the CAADP framework. Overall knowledge of the l'Aquila Declaration appears to be quite low, both amongst traditional and emerging development partners, as well as amongst Tanzanian stakeholders. Yet importantly, at a broader level this might imply that there is **an increasing international pressure for emerging economies (and perhaps in particular China) to engage further in development dialogues and frameworks**, which perhaps could affect their strategic priorities and directions. That said, the chance that China or India will join the CAADP within the foreseeable future remains fairly unlikely. A representative from the Indian embassy in Paris said that the signature of l'Aquila in itself did not mean that much but that it rather should be understood as a part of a wider realisation amongst partners that improved cooperation will be necessary in the future.

Looking at the development partners more broadly, the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) is currently the strongest mechanism for partner coherence. JAST arranges monthly meetings on each cooperation area, with USAID currently chairing the agricultural meetings. The meetings are open for everyone but the chairman reported that none of the emerging economies have attended any of the meetings even though several invitations have been sent out. Korea has however voiced an interest and will (most likely) join the meetings shortly.

When asking interviewees about future possibilities of greater emerging economies' alignment with CAADP, South Korea and Brazil were generally perceived as more open while China and India were expected to be more reluctant to wider cooperation. South Korea has taken decisive steps towards closing the gap between themselves and the traditional partners, both internationally by joining the DAC group, and potentially also in Tanzania - should they take an active part in the JAST meetings. Brazil has not yet taken any concrete initiatives in Tanzania towards closer cooperation and coordination, but the Brazilian Development Agency (ABC) and Embrapa[43] have focused a lot of their activities on south-south and trilateral cooperation. The Brazilian embassy in Tanzania maintained that even though no project are planned for now, should their agricultural operations grow, they would indeed be open for enhanced cooperation with other partners.

[42] See NEPAD (2011).
[43] Brazil's largest agricultural research centre, provides *inter alia* technical training and capacity building to developing countries.

The fact that the new ASDP II will be launched this year (though the planning meetings have reportedly been delayed several times) might perhaps lead to enhanced coordination between the different national agencies which could improve the agricultural policy climate. As the objective of attracting further investment currently ranks on top on the list of national priorities, the actions and strategies of national, traditional and emerging partners will be fundamental in the process of transforming Tanzania's agriculture.

6. Conclusion

One of the key features of the CAADP approach is that should provide a single platform for partners to identify, align and coordinate their activities within a clear agricultural policy framework with strong national ownership. However, in the case of Tanzania, CAADP is rather arranged as one platform among others. With agriculture taking a more prominent position, it is vital that African countries take affirmative actions to ensure that the increased activities truly benefit agricultural and overall development in a sustainable and inclusive manner. Having competing agricultural strategies might reduce the capacity to do so, while also creating options for partners to 'pick and chose' the framework that currently fits them the best. Land regulations are a case in point, yet in the long-run stable and predictable land management systems are also in the interest of investors, independent of their origin. Thus, without a strong regulatory framework there is a substantial risk that the increase in agricultural investments brings little in terms of inclusive and substantial growth for the benefits of smallholder farmers.

When talking to public representatives from emerging economies, several arguments are put forward to explain their limited interest in further aligning their agricultural development support to CAADP. While many of these might be very valid, the real question is not why the new partners are opting out of CAADP, but rather *why the Tanzanian government has not requested that they join.* Beyond the benefits outlined above, greater partner alignment under one coherent framework could also facilitate and promote improved partner coherence, national ownership, predictability of external assistance, improved efficiency and a reduced risk of overlapping or counterproductive projects.

Not only Tanzania but also emerging economies could gain from aligning their activities to CAADP-TAFSIP. The core logic of CAADP is about creating an African-driven level playing field where all partners are acting on equal footing. As a level playing field increases the predictability of regulations and policies, which in principle should be in the interest of any partner, unless they feel that they are being treated preferentially outside of the arrangement. Moreover, the elevating international pressure on companies to act "ethically" and to pursue CSR activities can be seen as a further pragmatic argument of joining CAADP. Private companies from both traditional and emerging economies need to ensure that their products are not perceived as "bad", or otherwise they risk loosing market shares to companies with better public images. Lastly, and as also argued by the China-DAC study Group[44], closer partner cooperation provides ample learning opportunities, where the emerging economies in particular could learn from traditional donors' managerial and administrative experiences.

However, currently there appears to be too many competing agricultural strategies that all involves partner support. This risk not only to decreases the domestic agricultural policy coherence but it can also potentially reduce the traction of CAADP. Thus, the factor of paramount importance is the need for further coherence and coordination between the different Tanzanian ministries and strategies. Beyond this, some further recommendation on how to improve the influence and traction of CAADP is provided below.

Recommendations

As a first step it is necessary to better take into account the differences amongst emerging economies, in terms for example of the factors driving investment. The demographic pressure on agricultural land and food supplies is much greater in India and China than in Brazil, which can explain why the latter seems to be more willing to engage in agricultural development cooperation along the lines of the

44 See China-DAC Study Group (2011).

traditional donors' engagement. Furthermore, there are many different actors within the emerging economies (as within the traditional donors), where for example technical agencies or ministries of agriculture may be more interested in trilateral cooperation programmes compared to other ministries working under different sets of institutional incentives.

Secondly, while it is important to recognise the differences between the approaches of traditional donors and those of emerging economies, it is also vital to highlight similarities and areas of shared interest – such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or whatever is called activities that are becoming an imperative for all. It is moreover important to identify and minimize any potential factors that can spur enhanced competition and thus limit possibilities for cooperation.

Thirdly, as EE's in general tend to cooperate bilaterally and engage in ad hoc technical projects rather than long-term strategic dialogues, it might be more feasible to take a country-by-country and project-by-project approach. This could also entail experts from emerging economies providing particular technical inputs to the CAADP-TAFSIP, including for example investment in particular crops, trilateral cooperation between traditional donors and emerging development partners, and increased information sharing within the JAST.

Fourth, there is a need to further question how CAADP can be made more attractive for emerging economies. Is there a way to reduce the widespread perception of CAADP as a platform heavily influenced by the development strategies of the OECD-DAC partners? Does the CAADP framework provide sufficient operational room to include development partners that largely provide government-to-government technical assistance with in general limited focus on policy dialogues?

Fifth, establishing informal multi-stakeholder discussion platforms, aimed towards mutually beneficial partnerships and improved understanding of each other's objectives, modalities and practices is an imperative step forward. There is a very wide range of stakeholders involved at present and relations are often characterised by a lack of open and constructive communication leading to low levels of trust and mutual understanding. For instance, representatives from European donor agencies and NGOs often view emerging economies' activities in Africa with scepticism, while many emerging economies' representatives see themselves as providing more modern and efficient alternatives to the out-dated, patronising and inefficient development strategies of the e.g. EU. Finally, several Tanzanian stakeholders (ministries, civil society, farmers organisations, etc.) emphasised that their viewpoints are too often ignored in multilateral policy discussions about sustainable agricultural development and the roles of both traditional donors and emerging economies in Africa.

Finally, with regard to the private sector, a more inclusive approach to private investment might be achieved by improving government-business dialogues. Currently, it is quite rare for private businesses from both traditional and emerging development partners to sit down together in a forum with the government, to discuss policies and the private sector's concerns. The 'normalisation' of government-business relations would see for example Chinese investors cooperate and sit alongside European investors to discuss with an African government about a level playing field with clear and predictable rules for all companies, regardless of their origin.

Bibliography

BBC. 25 May 2013. *Brazil 'to write off' almost $900m of African debt*. BBC News Latin America & Caribbean. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22669331.

Boddy-Evans, A. *What was Ujamaa? Nyerere's social and economic policy in Tanzania in the 1960s and 70s.* About.com African History. http://africanhistory.about.com/od/tanzania/a/What-Was-Ujamaa.htm.

Brautigam and Tang, 2012, *An overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural engagement in Tanzania,* IFPRI Discussion Paper 01214, Development Strategy and Governance Division, http://www.ifpri.org/publication/overview-chinese-agricultural-and-rural-engagement-tanzania.

Byiers, B. and Rampa, F. 2013*. Corridors of power or plenty? Lessons from Tanzania and Mozambique and implications for CAADP,* ECDPM Discussion Paper 138. http://www.ecdpm.org/dp138.

China-DAC Study Group (2011) *Effective Support for Agricultural Development,* Joint Study Visit to Tanzania, IPRCC, OECD.

CIA, *World Fact Book: Tanzania,* (retrieved 26-06-13), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html.

Cooksey, 2012, *Politics, Patronage and Projects: The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Tanzania,* Future Agricultures Working paper 40, United Kingdom.

Cooksey, 2013, *The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and agricultural policies in Tanzania: Going with or against the grain?* Future Agriculture Working Paper, United Kingdom.

De Roquefeuil, 2013, *The CAADP and Emerging Economies: The Case of Ghana and Brazil,* ECDPM Discussion Paper 146, Maastricht, June 2013.

FAO, 2010, *Bioenergy and Food Security. The BEFS Analysis for Tanzania,* Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United States, Rome http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1544e/i1544e.pdf.

FAO, 2012, *Voluntary Guidelines on the responsible Governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the Context of national food security*, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Rome http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf.

FOCAC, 2012, *The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,* Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015) http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/hywj/t954620.htm.

G8 Cooperation Framework, 2012, *The "New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition" in Tanzania,* Camp David http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/190624.pdf.

G8 Summit at l'Aquila, *"G8 Efforts towards Global Food Security"* 8-10 July 2009, http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Report_Global_Food_Security%2c2.pdf.

Kikwete, H.E. President of the United Republic of Tanzania (2012), Speech at the Employer of the Year Award Ceremony, Mlimani City Conference Centre, Dar es Salaam, 12 December 2012 http://www.wavuti.com/4/post/2012/12/speech-by-pres-kikwete-in-the-employer-of-the-year-award-ceremony.html#axzz2XcdHp0Qp.

Kofi Annan Foundation, 2011, *AGRA Board visits breadbasket projects in Tanzania"* http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/photos/2011/04/agra-board-visits-breadbasket-projects-tanzania.

Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, 2008, *Agriculture Sector Review and Public Expenditure Review 2008/09*, Final Report, The United Republic of Tanzania. http://www.agriculture.go.tz/publications/english%20docs/Agricultutre%20Sector%20Review%20and%20Public%20Expenditure%20Review%20200809.pdf.

Mousseau and Mittal (eds.) 2011, *Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa. Country Report: Tanzania.* The Oakland Institute, United States http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_country_report_tanzania.pdf.

Mwami and Kamata, 2011, *Land Grabbing in a Post investment Period and Popular reaction in the Rufiji River Basin,* HAKIARDHI, http://farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/LAND%20GRABBING%20IN%20A%20POST%20INVESTMENT%20PERIOD%20AND%20POPULAR%20REACTIONS%20IN%20THE%20RUFIJI%20RIVER%20BASIN.pdf.

NEPAD. 12 September 2011. NEPAD, China Sign MoU on African Agricultural Growth. IISD Reporting Services. http://africasd.iisd.org/news/nepad-china-sign-mou-on-african-agricultural-growth/.

Ngaiza, S. 2012, *Integrated Policy Approach to Commercializing Smallholder Maize Production,* FAO-University of Nairobi – Regional Workshop, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, Norfolk Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, 6-7 June 2012, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/esa/Workshop_reports/Smallholders_2012/Presentations_1/Ngaiza_Kilimo_Kwanza_Tanzania.pdf.

Rampa, Afun-Ogidan and van Seters, 2012, *Regional approaches to food security in Africa: The CAADP and other relevant policies and programmes in COMESA,* ECDPM Discussion Paper 128a, Maastricht http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/E6455BC5CC2CA9BBC1257A3700571D0B/$FILE/DP128a%20final%2023-04.pdf.

Reed, 2010, *Is Saemaul Undong a Model for Developing Countries Today?* Paper prepared for International Symposium in Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of Saemaul Undong, Hosted by the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre, September 30 http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SaemaulUndongReedSept2010FINAL.pdf.

SAGCOT, 2011, “*Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania - Investment Blueprint*”, January 2011. http://www.sagcot.com/resources/downloads-resources/

Sloley, C. 9 November 2012. *African land grab is a myth, says China expert.* Citywire global. http://citywire.co.uk/global/african-land-grab-is-a-myth-says-china-expert/a633041.

The People's Republic of China, 2011, White Paper on Aid, Beijing http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/21/c_13839683.htm.

UNDP, 2013, *Human Development Report,* New York: United Nations Development Programme. http://hdr.undp.org/en/.

United Republic of Tanzania, 1998, *Land Act,* Dar es Salaam, http://tanzania.eregulations.org/Media/Editor_Repo/tanzania%20land%20act.pdf.

United Republic of Tanzania, 1999, *Village Land Act,* Dar es Salaam, http://www.dlist-asclme.org/sites/default/files/doclib/view6.pdf.

United Republic of Tanzania, 2010a, *The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP): Compact for Supporting Agricultural Development in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam.

United Republic of Tanzania, 2010b, *The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP): Post Compact Roadmap for Tanzania,* Dar es Salaam, July 2010, http://www.caadp.net/pdf/Tanzania%20Post%20Compact%20Road%20Map.pdf.

United Republic of Tanzania, 2011, *Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), 2011-12 to 2020-21*, Second Draft Summary Report, 22 May 2011. http://agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/Tanzania%20Second%20Draft%20Summary%20TAFSIP.PDF.

About ECDPM

ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM's key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

Thematic priorities

ECDPM organises its work around four themes:

- Reconciling values and interests in the external action of the EU and other international players
- Promoting economic governance and trade for inclusive and sustainable growth
- Supporting societal dynamics of change related to democracy and governance in developing countries, particularly Africa
- Addressing food security as a global public good through information and support to regional integration, markets and agriculture

Approach

ECDPM is a "think and do tank". It links policies and practice using a mix of roles and methods. ECDPM organises and facilitates policy dialogues, provides tailor-made analysis and advice, participates in South-North networks and does policy-oriented research with partners from the South.

ECDPM also assists with the implementation of policies and has a strong track record in evaluating policy impact. ECDPM's activities are largely designed to support institutions in the developing world to define their own agendas. ECDPM brings a frank and independent perspective to its activities, entering partnerships with an open mind and a clear focus on results.

For more information please visit www.ecdpm.org

ECDPM Discussion Papers

ECDPM Discussion Papers present initial findings of work-in-progress at the Centre to facilitate meaningful and substantive exchange on key policy questions. The aim is to stimulate broader reflection and informed debate on EU external action, with a focus on relations with countries in the South.

This publication benefits from the generous support of ECDPM's core, institutional and programme funders: The Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (DFID).

ISSN 1571-7577

European Centre for Development Policy Management

ecdpm

HEAD OFFICE
SIÈGE
Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21
6211 HE Maastricht
The Netherlands *Pays Bas*
Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00
Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 02

BRUSSELS OFFICE
BUREAU DE BRUXELLES
Rue Archimède 5
1000 Brussels *Bruxelles*
Belgium *Belgique*
Tel +32 (0)2 237 43 10
Fax +32 (0)2 237 43 19

info@ecdpm.org
www.ecdpm.org
KvK 41077447