




THE GLOBAL GAME HAS CHANGED

WHAT ROLE FOR EUROPE-AFRICA RELATIONS?

ONLINE PUBLICATION
APRIL 2014

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS / ABOUT THE PUBLICATION

We would like to thank all that have collaborated in this publication, as well as to those that have participated in the various debates and reflections promoted by EARN members, in Africa and in Europe.

This publication is produced on the initiative of the Center for International Studies (CEI, of ISCTE-IUL University), jointly with the Marquês Valle Flor Institute (IMVF) and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), in the framework of Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN), and launched online in parallel to the Conference on EU-Africa Relations, held in Lisbon on April 2014.

It draws together in one edited volume a selection of contributions, articles and interviews, which are either originals or republished and updated versions of works published in 2013 and 2014, in several blogs and websites. The views expressed are those of individual authors, who wrote their contributions or were interviewed in their personal capacities.

Most articles are presented in the original language, in English or in Portuguese.

This publication is funded by the Portuguese Cooperation, through the Camões - Institute for Cooperation and Language, and we gratefully acknowledge this support.

This is an e-book: its contents can be downloaded, printed, reproduced, cited and utilised in several ways, provided that the source is mentioned. The publication should be cited as: EARN (2014); The Global Game has changed: What Role for Europe-Africa Relations? Online Publication. CEI-ISCTE, IMVF and ECDPM, edited by Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira. Europe-Africa Policy Research Network: April 2014.

Editor: Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira

Layout: Diogo Lencastre

ISBN: 978-989-732-345-4

Drafted in April 2014

CONTENTS

Introduction	5
Statements at the Summit	6
I. STATE OF PLAY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR EU-AFRICA RELATIONS	10
The Future of the Africa-EU Partnership: Key Messages for the IV EU Africa Summit Report of the Lunch-time Seminars	12
The State of Play of Africa-EU relations and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Geert Laporte	20
INTERVIEW WITH Françoise Moreau	24
Are Africa and Europe turning a new page in their relationship? Faten Aggad and James Mackie	27
The future of Africa-EU Relations: Challenging times ahead Carolina Feilman Quina	29
BOX The Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Challenges and Prospects: A View from the African side?	34
INTERVIEW WITH Adebayo Olukoshi	35
The IV EU -Africa Summit: much ado about nothing? Marta Martinelli	37
Fostering a way forward in the EU-Africa Partnership Joseph Chilengi	39
Towards a Euro-African Alliance for Peace, Security and Development Philippe Darmuzey	43
INTERVIEW WITH Obadiah Mailafia	50
Africa-EU Relations: Dialogue and Capacity for Delivery Mehari Taddele Maru and Emebet G. Abate	53
ENTREVISTA A José Briosas e Gala	55
Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento é ajuda ao desenvolvimento e Diálogo Político é diálogo político Fernando Jorge Cardoso	58
II. GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS AND THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA	61
What prospects for a joint Africa-EU effort towards formulating a post-2015 framework for global development? Dirk Messner, Niels Keijzer, Svea Koch and Julia Leininger	63
A Renewed Global Partnership for a Post-2015 Era Carlos Lopes	65
CAIXA A Parceria Global para uma cooperação para o Desenvolvimento Eficaz: o Plano de Ação Africano	67

III. GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS	68
Still Relevant? The Future of EU Governance Support in Africa	
Clare Castillejo and Svea Koch	71
Conditionality and sanctions remain a stumbling block for EU-Africa relations	
Karen Del Biondo	72
The International Criminal Court: Challenges & Possibilities	
Kerstin Carlson	74
Governance and human rights: related challenges and prospects in EU-Africa relations	
Arthur Gwagwa	78
IV. PEACE AND SECURITY	80
Thoughts on Peacekeeping within an African background	
Victor Ângelo	82
A Cooperação UE-África para a Paz e Segurança	
Luís Bernardino	87
V. BEYOND DEVELOPMENT AID	92
Unleashing the full potential of the EU-Africa partnership: lifting the “development language” barrier?	
Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos	94
BOX	
A 10-point plan for a closer EU -Africa partnership	96
The EU and Africa in the XXIst Century: Time for a new deal	
Daniel Bach	97
EU-Africa Trade: between a Rock and a Hard Place?	
Annie Mutamba	100
Industrialização e renovação da parceria UE-África	
Serguei Ouattara	102
Resource governance in Africa: Policy lessons and global partnerships	
Oladiran Bello	103
Governança e Desenvolvimento Económico no Continente Africano: Mitos e Oportunidades	
Ana Paula Fernandes	108
Annexes:	110
Overview of EU-Africa Summits	111
BOX	
Data on Africa and the EU...	113

INTRODUCTION

Seven years after the long-term vision established in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), the overall ambitious goal of implementing a partnership between equals and take the Africa-EU relationship to a new strategic political level remain largely unfulfilled. The need for a mindset and paradigm shift is, however, more relevant than ever, particularly taking into account considerable changes in both continents in the last few years, in terms of social, demographic, political and economic dynamics.

While 'old Europe' keeps struggling with anaemic growth and high unemployment, Africa has become a pre-emerging continent. As Europe wrestles with self-doubts about its future and place as global actor and struggles to keep its contributions to international development, in Africa the expectations about the future are generally positive: high-growth rates, young populations, diversification of development financial flows and partnerships, as well as a stronger internal vision about its plans and interests (e.g. Agenda 2063, continental infrastructure programme – PIDA, agriculture and food strategy – CAADP, etc.). On the other hand, the challenges are also paramount: Africa continues to face major socio-economic and regional integration challenges; it is plagued by multidimensional poverty and recurrent crisis/fragilities, and therefore needs to actively build and consolidate its international partnerships to help implementing its transformation agenda, in an effective and sustainable way.

The IV EU-Africa Summit was an opportunity, among others, for leaders of both sides to think strategically about their collective continental interests and

values, in the framework of a long-shared, complex and varied relationship. The outputs reflect the underlying desire to proceed the relationship on basis of the reality, and the recognition of the need for a political and mental shift in the way the EU-Africa partnership is perceived. This does not mean that there are no disagreements, but each side is becoming clearer about what it wants. The evident shift towards a more economic focus – from aid to investment, from assistance to economic opportunities – is an example of this ongoing shift towards a win-win partnership that is based in a clear definition of interests.

One of the ongoing challenges is to overcome negative perceptions on both sides (from Africa about the EU – “EU imposes agendas”, “EU double standards”, “EU patronizing attitude” – and from Europe regarding Africa: “Africa does not implement”, “Africa is just interested in EU funds”). Contentious issues and contradictions need, therefore, to be tackled up vigorously and with open discussions – bearing in mind the broader context of wide opportunities and existing potential for increased cooperation in numerous areas. Managing expectations and diversity of objectives will certainly remain a delicate balancing act.

This publication approaches some of the issues involved in the reshaping of EU-Africa relations in the recent past and for the next few years. Several authors, from Europe and from Africa, assess the partnership's achievements so far and also the upcoming challenges in accommodating diverging interests and effectively responding to global challenges, so as to generate the famous win-win outcomes all partners are looking for.

SPEECHES AT THE SUMMIT...

MS. NKOSAZANA DLAMINI ZUMA

CHAIRPERSON OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION

"Let me start, by referring to late President Mandela when he said: 'I have walked a long road to freedom, I have missed steps along the way, but discovered the secret that after climbing the Great Hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I've taken a moment to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista, to look at the distance I've come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom comes responsibilities and I dare not linger. For my long walk is not ended.'"

The Africa-EU partnership has come a long way since the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000 and we probably missed a few steps together in our partnership. In 2000, Africa was regarded as the 21st century development challenge and a moral scar on the conscience of humanity.

Fourteen years later, Africa is the second fastest growing region in the world, public and private investment in infrastructure is on the increase and there is tangible progress on a number of social indicators, many of them due to our joint efforts.

We witnessed changes to the political landscape of the continent, with democratic elections becoming the

norm, demonstrating our collective commitment to promote a political culture based on legitimacy, inclusion and accountability.

Although stubborn pockets of conflicts remain, causing immense suffering and devastation especially for women and children; progress is being made through the African Peace and Security and Governance Architectures. We acknowledge the continual generosity of Europe's contribution towards peace in Africa.

There are however, many more hills to climb.

To address these challenges, the AU focuses on a set of Pan African priorities, captured by the African Agenda 2063, with elements reflected in the 4th Summit's theme of People, Prosperity and Peace.

Firstly, the African people as is the case with the European people are our most valued resource. The health, education, nutrition and general wellbeing of our populations therefore remain critical development priorities, now and into the future.

With a growing and young population, Africa needs a skills revolution and to scale up investments in science, research, technology and innovation. Investing in people also requires the empowerment of women and young people.

For our partnership, this means working together on training and skill development. Given the different demographic trajectories of our two continents (one young and the other ageing), we may have to in the near future share this human resource with you. It is in both our interest that it is a skilled human resource.

The Common African Agricultural Programme, African Mining Vision, African Industrial Development Plan and others frameworks are positioning Africa to harness and benefit from its vast natural resources, including land, water and forests; minerals and energy and its rich biodiversity and oceanic resources. Europe has great experience on all of these areas, and if we work smartly, coupled with African indigenous knowledge, we can all benefit from this.

Africa must therefore be given the policy space for its farmers and industries to compete fairly. We must address the contradiction that we are being asked to eliminate tariffs in 80% of trade, making African farmers even more vulnerable in the face of so called 'non-trade distorting' domestic support to farmers. This will not only impact on agriculture, but also on our nascent industries in all sectors, and put a halt to African industrialisation and diversification.



"With a growing and young population, Africa needs a skills revolution and to scale up investments in science, research, technology and innovation."

Africa needs the policy space to determine for itself what needs to be done with its natural and mineral resources, so that the continent can at last break out of the mould of exporter of raw materials, whilst jobs are being created elsewhere.

Our Pan African priorities furthermore include speeding up infrastructure development, the integration of the continent (including the creation of the Continental Free Trade Area) and improving intra-Africa trade and trade with the world. Our trade agreements must reinforce, rather than undermine the possibility of this African Free Trade Area and the growth of intra-African trade.

There are a number of further sectors cooperation such as infrastructure investment through the African Development Bank's Africa 50 private equity fund. We want European companies to form partnerships with local African businesses and entrepreneurs, to invest in agri-businesses, food-processing, green and blue economies, textile, ICT, manufacturing and other growing areas. We also need to work together to stop the illicit flows of capital from the continent.

We must take forward cooperation in the preservation of African biodiversity and forests, the protection of animal and fauna species, its fishing resources and in addressing the impact of climate change on the continent,

in a manner that strengthen African capacities and institutions. This is necessary for humanity, not only for Africans and we must therefore increase capacities to protect our fauna and flora.

None of the above can materialise and progress without silencing the guns. We must therefore redouble efforts to bring peace in South Sudan, CAR, Mali, Darfur, Somalia and the DRC, and consolidate peace in countries emerging from conflicts. Africa leaders committed to silence the guns by 2020, by addressing root causes of conflicts, such as trade and dumping of small arms, destabilisation so as to plunder our natural resources, and transnational crime and terrorism. Africa has a duty to build societies that are inclusive, democratic, accountable and tolerant; that respect human rights and manage diversity and ensure that no one is marginalised or excluded.

As we therefore survey the vistas that surround us, we must ensure frank engagements, and strengthen our partnership, based on mutual understanding of each other's challenges, opportunities and aspirations".

Remarks by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma to the 4th Africa-European Union Summit, Brussels, 3-4 April 2014

From left to right: Ms. Nkosazana DLAMINI ZUMA, Chairperson of the African Union Commission; Mr Mohamed OULD ABDEL AZIZ, President of the African Union; Mr Herman VAN ROMPUY, President of the European Council; Mr José Manuel BARRROSO, President of the European Commission.

Photo by The Council of the European Union



SPEECHES AT THE SUMMIT...

JOSÉ MANUEL DURÃO BARROSO

PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

"(...) There is a great sense of optimism in and around Africa these days. And rightly so. Africa has over the last decade become one of the fastest growing regions in the world, with 8 out of 10 fastest growing economies being African in 2012 and with a €1.6 trillion economy growing at about 6%.

Yet there are also undeniably great challenges facing the continent, some of them facing Europe as well. Sustainable and inclusive growth is a vital concern for both our continents and we are both aiming at generating jobs, in particular for the younger generations, as set out in the African Union's "Agenda 2063" and our own Europe 2020 strategy.

I believe that by bringing public and private actors together around a common vision, we can overcome those challenges and make our dreams and endeavours come true, while exploring the vast potential of our partnership.

When McKinsey Global Institute, in a study called *Africa at Work*, summed up Africa's impressive economic potential and prospects, it started by noting that the continent 'is poised to reap a demographic dividend'. More than half of Africa's population is aged under 25, and in 2050 Africa's population is set to double reaching 2 billion people. In this decade, Africa will add a further 122 million people to its workforce. These young men and women, increasingly well-educated with almost half of all citizens enjoying secondary or tertiary education by 2020, will be for Africa a strength and a great opportunity. They will form the basis of consumer-led growth, powered more than ever by Africa's internal dynamics.

These are not just abstract figures or simple demographic trends but also real-life business opportunities: to take an example, there are now more than 1 billion mobile subscriptions throughout the region. It is expected Africa's rise will create an extra 128 million consumer households by 2020. In short: the potential is huge.

It is the private sector that will have to reap it. Its contribution to inclusive and sustainable growth is vital. It provides some 90 percent of jobs in developing countries. It is an essential partner in the fight against poverty, and it takes up this role with relish. Businesses are emerging as ever more active players in the development field, both as a source of finance and as partners for governments, NGOs and donors. And together, governments,

societies, international donors and businesses are already forging a new development partnership on the ground.

The European Commission is eager to support that new partnership. A stronger emphasis on public-private partnerships and an even stronger focus of our own development tools on the drivers of growth are central tenets of our EU development strategy, the "Agenda for Change". With our upcoming initiative on "Strengthening the Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries", we will further deepen this engagement. We believe in the potential of your young and growing continent, with a vibrant and talented private sector, just like you do. The question is then: how to make the most of these talents?

One way is to look for further integration. Just as Europe has benefited enormously from integrating its single market, so Africa is now moving forward with regional and intra-continental trade. That is critical: in the European Union, 72% of all trade is within Europe; in Africa it is currently only about 12%.

Another way is to look beyond borders. In recent years, African countries are actively strengthening their partnerships across the globe and that is certainly a good thing. And we want our partnership to be one of the pillars of Africa's relationship with the rest of the world.

Our trade relation with Africa is already very strong. Europe is open for business from and with Africa – contrary to what some critics seem to think. About one third of Africa's trade already takes place with the European Union – making the EU the largest overseas market for African goods – and the trade balance is increasingly in Africa's favour. Flows have increased by nearly 45% between 2007 and 2012.

Through the Economic Partnership Agreements, we can tighten these bonds even further. EPAs are precisely the kind of partnership that promotes a business-friendly environment in Africa. Beyond tariffs, they contribute to wider reforms to strengthen the rule of law and to ensure a stable, predictable and transparent economic climate, which helps African countries attract much needed investment.

The recently concluded negotiations with West Africa are an important breakthrough that I would like to welcome. This EPA will generate growth and investment for all countries in the region. The process has been



“Just as Europe has benefited enormously from integrating its single market, so Africa is now moving forward with regional and intra-continental trade. That is critical: in the European Union, 72% of all trade is within Europe; in Africa it is currently only about 12%.

encouraging, business opportunities are being created on both sides, and it pushes forward integration efforts within regions.

The importance, I believe, goes even beyond the purely economic effects. Through the African Union and regional organizations, African countries are coming together to tackle common challenges and work towards common goals. These are very promising developments, making Africa a more coherent continent, more competitive and stronger towards the outside world. The European Union is fully committed to Africa's integration in world trade. To support this very tangibly, we remain the world's largest Aid for Trade donor by a wide margin – around 43% of which goes to Africa [in 2012].

But looking beyond borders is not enough for inclusive and sustainable growth. Trade alone won't do the trick. It also requires creating a strong support framework for businesses, harmonising regulations to meet the highest standards, assisting SMEs - who generate by far most of the trade and jobs -, in finding funds and strengthening their talents, helping companies and citizens find their role in the changing global context.

Africa is doing all this with sometimes remarkable results and the 2014 Doing Business Report, for instance, concludes that in fact some of the most economic reform-minded governments are to be found in Africa.

Africa can rely upon the European Union to support this huge transformation process. Africa remains by far the first beneficiary of European public development aid, which amounts to 40% of the total. Approximately €20 billion per year was provided to Africa by the European Union and its Member States collectively over the period 2007-2013. Over the coming 7 years, programs will focus even more on the countries most in need, and more than €25 billion of European Union grants will go to Africa. The European Commission has pushed hard that these levels remain intact until 2020, which was not self-evident in times of crisis. But we succeeded – ultimately because this is a matter of strategic intelligence. (...)”

Speech by President Barroso: Emerging Africa, at the EU-Africa Business Forum, Brussels, 31 March 2014

I.

**STATE OF PLAY
AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS FOR
EU-AFRICA
RELATIONS**

LES

TONGE Jean Dominique RUSTON



THE FUTURE OF THE AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP

“KEY MESSAGES FOR THE IV EU-AFRICA SUMMIT”¹

This report is a compilation of stakeholders views and messages from the Lunch-time Seminars organised by the European Commission, with the support of the JAES Support Mechanism, between November 2013 and March 2014

INTRODUCTION

The Lunch-time seminars were designed to create an informal dialogue amongst the widest possible sub-groups of Africa-EU partnership stakeholders and take their consolidated views and key messages to enrich the formal dialogue of the partnership, especially during the build-up process towards the IV Summit. Six seminars were held between November 2013 and March 2014. The first five seminars focussed on specific thematic areas and the last one reviewed the key messages from the past meetings and identified key priorities and actions that participants would like to see being addressed at the Summit of Heads of States and Governments.

The six seminars received the direct contribution of 35 African and European high-level speakers who shared their views and suggest ideas in each of the seminar. The high attendance to the six seminars, amounting to 600 persons, from AU and EU institutions, African Embassies based in Brussels, African and European think tanks, Civil Society Organisations, Youth, Trade Union and Business Sector, attending the six seminars is a testimony of the great interest of stakeholders on the Africa-EU Partnership.

The participants engaged in forward-looking debates on key issues with a very frank and constructive mindset. The informal character of these seminars and the fact that discussion took place under the Chatham House Rule contributed to open and successful debates. Each of the seminars generated a set of key messages aimed at informing the Africa-EU Partnership and the IV Africa-EU Summit.

This report presents a comprehensive output of the extensive discussions held at the **6th Lunch-time Seminar**. It attempts to distil the strategic issues, which if ad-

Seminar themes

Six Lunch-time Seminars on the Future of Africa-EU Partnership were organized between November 2013 and March 2014.

- i) Research and Innovation: What avenue for enhanced Africa-EU collaboration? (27th November 2013);
- ii) Dialogue and Negotiations in Global Fora: Collaboration for win-win negotiations in multilateral fora? (5th December 2013);
- iii) Future Relations and Continental Integration: A “win-win” Partnership beyond aid (12th December 2013);
- iv) Democratic Governance, HR and Fight against corruption (20th January 2014);
- v) Capacity for Peace and Security in Africa: The Way Forward (25th February 2014); and
- vi) Key Messages for the IV Summit (6th March 2014).

dressed, would “make a difference” to the partnership in its entirety and to reinforce the added value of the Africa-EU partnership. The **key messages** on the **first five seminars** on specific thematic areas are presented in **Annex A**.

MAIN TAKEAWAY POINTS

The views and messages conveyed during the seminars relate not only to the specific thematic areas of each seminar but also to issues which cut across the entire Africa-EU Partnership. Those *cross-cutting issues* contribute in particular to address important strategic questions:

- Is the Africa-EU partnership still relevant today?
- What are the major bottlenecks?
- What actions should be taken to make a breakthrough?

“Is the Africa-EU Partnership still relevant in today’s multi-polar world?”

The seminars have recalled that the world is considerably different from the situation which informed the conception of the Joint-Africa EU Strategy in 2007. Africa and the EU have themselves evolved and are constantly repositioning themselves in the new dynamics

¹ For a complete version of the report, including the list speakers and moderators of the Seminars, please see http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/africa_eu_lunch_seminar_-_final_report.pdf. All the photos in this text are courtesy of the Africa-EU Partnership Photo Gallery.

6th Lunch-time seminar

and in the changing international power-constellations. However, participants acknowledged that Africa and the EU have more to gain now from the inter-continental partnership than ever before. Some of the factors highlighted to justify the *added value of the continent-to-continent partnership* are:

- Africa's booming markets and Europe's low market growth rates
- Africa's aspirations for Regional and Continental Integration and Europe's success in that area
- Africa's concern for equitable growth and Europe's success in integrating the social dimension in its growth strategy
- Africa's need of an environmentally viable industrialisation and Europe's environment-friendly governance framework and technology
- The substantial increase in trade, investments and remittances flowing between Africa and the EU
- The opposite demographic trends on the two continents.

There was a general belief that “**a strong Africa-EU Partnership is not an option but that it is the only option**”. There was also an unequivocal call for the EU to

reprioritize Africa in the EU's investment, trade and foreign policy agenda and for Africa to look at Europe as its closest trading partners rather than an aid provider.

Major bottlenecks

However, there is a general perception that the significance and the pace of the results so far achieved are lower than both partners and their stakeholders had been expecting. The major bottlenecks of the Africa-EU Partnership as pointed out by participants are:

- Political dialogue and stakeholder involvement need to be substantially reviewed and strengthened
- Lack of financial and capacity means on both sides to implement ambitious action plans
- Conversely, results are fewer than initially expected, not happening fast enough and lack visibility. This threatens to erode stakeholder enthusiasm and political momentum.

Actions

The messages gathered from the seminars suggest three sets of actions:

- a) Consolidate and build on results achieved by the Partnership;
- b) Tapping more from the emerging opportunities potential on both Continents; and
- c) Change the way of doing business to achieve better results.

Consolidate results

There is a general acknowledgement amongst stakeholders that the Africa-EU Partnership has produced results in many areas, even if there is still a long way to go to bring out all the potential of the partnership. A stronger thrust need to be exerted to push the processes started to ensure greater resilience and create greater impact. Some of the actions that may be considered are:

- ***Restart the regular political dialogue as a driver of the Partnership between Summits:*** the horizontal and sectoral political dialogue at ministerial level is considered a necessity to steer the relations between the two continents;
- ***Mutual recognition of results and creation of higher impact:*** Africa and Europe should raise the visibility of positive achievements made so far, particularly in the areas such as Peace and Security, Maritime

Security, Democratic Governance, Human Rights, Fight against Trafficking of Cultural Goods, Migration, Research and Innovation, Infrastructure, Space technology applications, Capacity Building and make more efforts towards improving the direct impact on populations in Africa and Europe;

- **Create more awareness on the partnership in African and EU States:** It was especially pointed out the need for the EU to bring back Africa as one of its priorities and that particularly new EU Member States should be sensitized for the strategic interest of the Africa-EU Partnership for both sides;
- **Deliver a real ‘people-centred’ partnership by reinforcing the participation of and support to African and European youth organisations and civil society.** Empowerment of and strategic support to non-institutional stakeholders are seen as an essential element if the two continents are to realise the potential and opportunities of their relationship.

Tapping more on emerging opportunities and potential on the two Continents

- Africa and Europe have evolved a lot during the last few years, but those changes have not been fully taken into account in the way the Partnership players interact with each other and work together. The areas where those potential appear to be the most important are:
- **Africa is the last frontier to investment:** Market opportunities in Africa are unknown to many EU firms; Africa and EU private sectors need to develop a mutual understanding to more effectively work with each other (e.g. lack of communication facilities may affect response times, cultural differences including business cultures need to be understood and addressed);
- **Africa and Europe can make a difference in tackling global solutions:** Cumulatively representing nearly one half of UN membership, Africa and EU can be very influential in tackling global issues; African and European interests are closely related to each other on many of the pressing global issues such as the ongoing Climate Change and Post 2015 Development Framework negotiations;
- **Invest more in social protection:** More African countries are realising the importance of investing in social protection to achieve equitable and sustainable growth and can draw useful know-how from Europe in this area;

- **Mainstream Science and Technology in all partnership areas:** Africa and Europe should invest more in Research, Science, Technology and Innovation, for example to boost agricultural production. Universities and the private sector should be invited to collaborate more and play a key role in this venture;
- **Boost the investment in the African and European youth:** Employment, prosperity and peace on both continents require more inclusion of and financial support to joint youth activities; Create a Africa-EU Youth Facility to tackle common challenges and possibly create a Joint Youth Volunteer Programme, that will help the young in deepening mutual understanding, harvest opportunities and strengthen relationship; More opportunities for mobility and exchange; Develop more entrepreneurship programmes on the two continents.

Change the way of doing business

It is not only important to determine WHAT areas should the partnership focus on but also HOW the partners should work together in order to get better results. The seminars brought forward a number of issues that could serve as useful lessons for the future:

- **Take a fresh look at each other:** Mutual perceptions that both continents have of each other need to change dramatically and old stereotypes should be avoided. Africa offers solutions to many of Europe's problems and vice-versa. Whereas Africa should not solely perceive Europe as a neo-colonial power in Africa, Europe should not look at Africa as a continent ravaged by conflicts and as a mere source of problems;
- **Take into consideration the cultural identity and differences between EU and Africa:** There should be mutual respect while trying to have agreements in terms of human rights, political, social and economic aspects without any cultural alienation between the EU and Africa;
- **Work smarter:** There was a general recognition of the need to prioritise more in order to achieve better, more tangible and visible results and to build momentum. Meanwhile, it was acknowledged that prioritisation processes require time and resources, specifically when it comes to developing joint priorities;
- **Lead the way through “coalition of the willing”** between peer groups of African and EU ministers and/or “JAES ambassadors” that can be practical mechanisms for reaching useful outcomes including in global for a;

- **Apply the principle of equality in the Partnership relations:** Although the principle is recognised in the JAES, it is not systematically observed from either side; Europe needs to do away with its sometimes prescriptive approach or “imposing double standards”. On the other hand, although claiming “partnership beyond aid” Africa continues claiming aid money when it should make more financial contribution to joint-programmes ensuring this way greater ownership. **Acknowledge that the partnership is a 2-way process:** Africa has lessons from which Europe can learn as much as the other way round (e.g. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Balkans);
- **Be more explicit on interest: recognise that there is a lot to gain in a partnership of interests:** Both partners need to define their interests more clearly in order to develop an understanding of mutual priorities and thus to facilitate cooperation. For example EPAs are good for the EU as they will create export markets. The EU also has an interest in stronger partnership with Africa on peace and security and joint agendas in multilateral fora. Africa has also to gain in these areas and should be more upfront why it could prefer the EU over other partners – including in its appreciation for the European model of regional integration, inclusive development, social protection, fair domestic resource mobilisation and taxation. The issue of whether the **development dimension** of the partnership should be done away with was debated without reaching a conclusion due to the multiple use of this concept – development aid/promoting investment, growth and job creation/etc.;
- **Deal with irritants, tensions and contradictions:** The ongoing negotiations on the EPAs have been a main irritant impacting on the Partnership over the past ten years. Meanwhile, a deal was struck in West Africa on the conclusion of an EPA with the EU which could lead to a more open and constructive discussion on the topic. Other irritants relate to the overly normative approaches and conditionality applied by the EU whereas the EU criticizes a lack of progress on the Africa side to become less dependent on EU funds in spite of numerous declarations to build a partnership that is no longer dominated by aid;
- **Show results on issues that matter on continental level to build momentum:** The Partnership should put more emphasis on global issues that impact on

both continents such as multilateral negotiations, reform of international institutions, mobility, global threats;

- **Establish more effective delivery and monitoring mechanisms:** Use and support **home-grown processes** and systems to get better results, greater impact and create ownership. Moreover, performance indicators should be agreed to measure progress and impact as well as the efficiency of political decisions. This will help to measure the value and investment done in fora and workshops and correlate it with practical achievement in the field;
- **Guarantee a more inclusive approach,** involving the African and EU Youth as well as civil-society players both at policy and implementation levels in the various areas of the Joint Partnership and increase the role of Diaspora groups.

(ANNEX A): KEY MESSAGES FROM THE THEMATIC SEMINARS

This annex recalls the key messages of each of the first five seminars. Those messages relate both specific thematic areas as well as to cross-cutting issues of the Africa-EU Partnership.

Seminar 1: “What avenues for enhanced Africa-EU collaboration in research and innovation?” (27 November 2013)

- **Mainstream STI within the Africa-EU partnership:** Technology and Innovation should be factored into other initiatives within the Africa-EU initiatives such as higher education and mobility (Pan-African University), infrastructure (i.e. PIDA), internet access (AfricaConnect) and agriculture (CAADP);
- **Encourage governments to invest in R&D and STI :** the inter-continental partnership enables governments, private sector and research institutions to join forces and to identify specific interventions of mutual interests that can be taken forward at the national level;
- **Enhance the role of the private sector:** The private sector is essential to transform STI investments into concrete gains;
- **Apply the principles of win-win:** the Africa-EU partnership is based on the pursuit of common interests and mutual obligations. These principles should continue to be the basis for future STI initiatives;

1st Lunch-time seminar2nd Lunch-time seminar

- **Act in areas of comparative advantage:** African and European actors have complementary assets that should be better used to optimise joint STI initiatives.

Seminar 2: “Dialogue and Negotiations in Global Fora: Collaboration for win-win negotiations in multilateral fora?” (5 December 2013)

- **Africa and Europe have a lot of common interests in international climate negotiations.** Africa’s development and financing needs shall be taken into account, but it is vital that all countries of the world enter into binding climate commitments at the UN-FCCC Conference in Paris in December 2015. Given the importance of climate change for Africa, the topic should be prominently placed at the Leaders’ Summit and declaration in April 2014;
- **Africa and Europe need to address main irritants.** If Africa and Europe could reach a shared understanding of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDF) before or during multilateral negotiations then chances of success will substantially increase. Important ‘outstanding issues’ such as the Economic Partnership Agreements tend to have a negative spill-over on the willingness to reach compromises in other policy areas that are subject to international negotiations;
- **The partnership must embrace the ‘new Africa’.** While the partnership objectives and principles should be preserved, the way in which the continents perceive each other require substantial changes. Africa is changing rapidly as reflected in the Vision 2063 process. Only jointly can Africa and the EU successfully influence the changing international power-constellations, as well as ensuring conditions for a sustainable and inclusive economic growth;
- **A strong Africa-EU Partnership is not an option, it is the only option.** Given the geographical proximity, Europe’s future need for migrants due to its demographic trend, Africa’s enormous assets in terms of natural resources and growing population, a strong political and well-functioning partnership between

the two neighbouring continents is critical for their mutual prosperity;

- **Making coalitions for win-win negotiations in global fora** requires high level political engagement. Regular ministerial dialogues prior to international negotiations are necessary conditions for reaching win-win positions for the benefit of both continents;
- **Lead the way: ‘Coalitions of the willing’** between peer groups of African and EU ministers and/or ‘JAES ambassadors’ can be practical mechanisms for reaching useful outcomes in global fora. Such progressive ‘core groups’ could be established in the area of climate change, Post-2015 Framework negotiations, Peace and Security as well as other areas of joint concern;
- **Establish Investment guarantees and risk-sharing instruments** to compete in the African market. Other sources must be leveraged including private equity and private sector investments as response to climate change and other global challenges;
- **Building more coherence in policy frameworks at the global level.** The EU could, for example, improve the effectiveness of its actions through further mainstreaming climate action into development policies;
- Opportunity to emphasise **Climate Change at the next Africa-EU Summit.** Climate Change should figure prominently on the agenda or be discussed by African and European Ministers dealing with climate change on the side-lines of the Summit.

Seminar 3: “Future Relations and Continental Integration: a “win-win” Partnership beyond aid” (12 December 2013)

- **Take a fresh look at the changing realities:** The Africa-EU partnership must adapt to the political, economic and social changes happening on both continents and in the international power-constellations.
- **Change the terms of the relationship:** There were unequivocal calls for the EU to reprioritize Africa in the EU investment, trade and foreign policy agenda and for Africa to look at Europe as its closest trading

3rd Lunch-time seminar

partner rather than an aid provider. African countries should start financing part of their regional integration process themselves.

- **Low intra-African trade should be boosted:** regional value chains requiring a high level of specialisation provide important opportunities for Africa. The EU – with its successes and failures – offers know-how and capacities that can enrich African decisions in this regard. Political will to push forward the regional integration agenda, to reinforce regional institutions, mobilize investments to national and regional infrastructure development and capacity building will be necessary for a successful outcome;
- **“Break the ice” by dealing with the EPAs:** The EPA negotiations put a strain on the Africa-EU relationship and a political solution is needed. Technical solutions exist but an engagement at a high political level is required to push the negotiations forward. The discussion on EPAs should be included in the framework of JAES. Once the EPAs are concluded, Africa and EU could turn to addressing convergence of rules, standards and norms which go beyond the Cotonou Agreement;
- **Lessons that Africa can learn from Europe:** African integration requires effective ownership. Meanwhile it is important to look at the EU’s experience and how it may be useful for Africa, in particular to help Africa transform economic growth into well-being. Besides regional integration, addressing regional imbalances is important, through i.e. specific regional policies and tools that promote convergence of less-developed areas. These tools are not yet widely known in the development cooperation circles but are very important to tackle inequalities, promote local economic development, job creation and innovation;
- **Focus on regional rather than continental integration in Africa:** as the latter will not be a reality soon regional approaches to social and economic integration should be a priority ;
- **Nevertheless pan-African institutions are indispensable:** One significant area in which they can

contribute is the development of statistics and standards, which are of key importance to trade. Here the EU can play an important role;

- **Increase EU Africa cooperation on regulatory frameworks:** Participants called for enhanced capacity building in the area of regulatory frameworks, rules and standards, quality control and SPS measures to ensure that African exports can reach global markets;
- **Move from “aid for trade” to “investment for trade”:** trade facilitation is important to lower costs for African countries. Meanwhile, more attention is needed to build supply side capacities (skills, innovation, access to finance, entrepreneurship, territorial development).

Seminar 4: “Democratic Governance, Human Rights and Fight against corruption” (20 January 2014)

- **Africa and EU have common goals:** Good-governance, human rights, the fight against corruption, the promotion of greater transparency and accountability, are at the core of EU internal and external action (European Court of Human Rights, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, etc.) and are also upheld by the AU as demonstrated by the number of continental frameworks dealing with those issues such as the African Governance Architecture, the African Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, etc.
- **Strengthening of local systems and home-grown reform processes:** Those elements are seen as of key importance in Africa and EU countries and a way of enabling citizens to use rule of law to challenge those who threaten their rights .
- **Continental added-value:** Although good governance, justice, rule of law, the management of natural resources and fight against corruption are exercised at country level, there is an added-value in addressing it at continental level to promote shared values and harmonise standards as well as to ensure exchange of best practices, at all levels, including in important industries such as the exploitation of mineral resources.
- **No African or European country can claim immunity from the risk of corruption and bad governance:** Good governance, including the institutionalisation of rule of law, of strong judiciary systems

4th Lunch-time seminar

and fight against corruption is a permanent process; Africa and EU should work together on those issues without pointing fingers at each other.

- **Yes to frank and serious dialogue** – No to prescriptions: it emerged from the debate that renewed relations and enhanced dialogue should be based on forthrightness, and mutual respect, and avoid prescriptions and conditionality as it is doomed to fail in the long-run.
- **Transparency and accountability by citizens and corporate entities need to be reinforced in Africa and Europe** through the institutionalisation of effective legal and regulatory instruments to curb illicit financial flows including those that could potentially originate from the activities of multi-nationals and through reinforcing the roles of civil society institutions including consumer protection agencies and the strengthening of Parliament to Parliament dialogue;
- **Africa is not a monolithic block**: The tendency to treat Africa as a monolithic block should be done away with, especially when referring to issues related to governance, corruption and human rights;
- **There can be no room for double standards**: Africa and EU should avoid the application of double standards when taking measures on issues related to democratic governance, human rights, justice, rule of law, corruption and illicit financial flows, and illicit trafficking in general;
- **Respecting the life of spirit**: Africa and EU should consider adopting frameworks that meet peoples' identity to address issues relating to human rights such as the cases brought before the ICC;
- **Universal relevance and/or universal rights**: the debate underlined the need for addressing this question in an open and balanced manner and highlighted challenges being faced both by the EU and Africa, challenges of universal relevance – such as inequality, unemployment, fight for a sustainable environment, human rights (including rights of minorities), etc.
- **EU and AU must open further to civil society if the**

partnership is to be relevant: a call for more inclusiveness and more openness to civil society participation, at the various levels was made and considered essential, both on EU and AU side ; examples of possible steps to create a more enabling environment for civil society were given, such as the call for NGOs that have observer statues at the ACHPR to be encouraged to participate in dialogues on human rights in the framework of the joint partnership.

- **Prioritise areas where there is high level consensus**: Africa-EU partnership actors need to take joint-cognisance of the areas that are still blurred (such as the articulation between human rights and the rights of minorities) by factors such as cultural differences and colonial heritage, and park those requiring better consensus in order not to lose momentum.

Seminar 5: “Capacity for Peace and Security in Africa: the Way Forward” (25 February 2014)

- **Africa has made a big leap in terms of more effective conflict prevention, management and resolution** through the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as embedded in the AU Constitutive Act and the AU Peace and Security Protocol. APSA was launched only ten years ago as a framework for applying the AU principle of non-indifference and ensuring human security. Much has been achieved but there are still important political, institutional and financial constraints to be overcome.
- **Long-term capacity and institutional building**: the Africa-EU Partnership needs to invest more in long-term capacity building of APSA related institutions. The African Peace Facility has so far provided extensive support to operationalization of the APSA but its effectiveness and sustainability has been hampered due to various factors, such as generic capacity absorption constraints.
- **More African ownership and funding of APSA needed**: APSA is still too dependent on external funding to be credible and effective. Although support from the Africa-EU Partnership in particular will continue to be critical, there is an urgent need to mobilise more African funding to strengthen peace and security in Africa.
- **APSA is a means to an end, not an end in itself**: Lessons learnt from pragmatic experience, such as the AMISOM peacekeeping mission, need to be taken into account when reviewing some of the fun-

5th Lunch-time seminar

damental pillars of the architecture (e.g. the role of the ASF and the RECs).

- **Be clear on what is strategic for Africa and for the EU:** EU and Africa need to focus on mutual interests, be clear about shared objectives and prioritise their interventions in regions where most impact can be made. To achieve this, the two continents must be more strategic about each other and develop a more constructive partnership. There is a need to avoid long bureaucratic shopping lists and one-size fits all approaches.
- **Support in the area of peace and security through the African Peace Facility (APF) has been a game changer** in terms of making possible a growing number of African-led responses to political crises on the continent. The cooperation through this successful instrument should therefore be continued and politically reaffirmed.
- **Support to the African Stand-by Force (ASF) could be adapted** by concentrating efforts and resources where they are most needed as the degree of ASF operationalization differs significantly from region to region.
- The newly established **African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)**, which provides for African led and funded interventions, could be a promising mechanism to respond to crises more rapidly and to reinforce the principle of providing African solutions to African problems but there are still unresolved questions on practical issues (e.g. absence of a UN mandate, the funding of ACIRC after

the initial 30 days of operation, how it impacts on the relationship between the AU and the RECs);

- **Mediation and peace building need to be given ever bigger attention:** Better and more effective initiatives are required to prevent conflicts, including Security Sector Reform on a national level to support failing national security systems and to prevent regional and international spill-overs.
- **In some cases “global solutions” to “global problems” are needed:** Some problems need more than “African Solutions to African Problems” - they need global solutions to global problems and in this context the Africa-EU Partnership is a framework that can facilitate respective processes;
- **Align interventions with strategic priorities and build more coherence and synergy among instruments:** There is a call for more systematic efforts to avoid a duplication of efforts through overlapping programmes (e.g. APF vis-à-vis the regional EU programmes) while making sure that they address the linkages of relevant issues (e.g. piracy, trafficking, border management, transnational crime).
- **Underline the relevance of the Partnership at the next Summit:** It is critical that the commitment taken at the Lisbon Summit is reinforced and that the coming Africa-EU Summit makes a bold statement on how Africa and the EU want to work together in responding to both “conventional threats” and the “new” security challenges, such as trans-boundary crimes and trafficking, that have a negative impact on both continents.
- On a different note, it was mentioned that **Africa and the EU also share the same vision on peace and justice as enshrined in the Rome Statute establishing the ICC.** On the African side the question of universality of the Rome Statute, particularly in relation to the UN Security Council, is an issue of concern. However, it was stipulated that the forthcoming Summit is not the right occasion to address this topic.



<http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/>

Africa-EU Support Mechanism - info@jaes-support.com

THE STATE OF PLAY OF AFRICA-EU RELATIONS AND THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY

● GEERT LAPORTE, ECDPM

A RAPIDLY CHANGING LANDSCAPE

The context of Africa-EU relations has changed dramatically since the 2007 Lisbon summit when the Joint Africa-EU strategy (JAES) was adopted. Many African countries are benefitting from a major economic boom with impressive growth figures. Yet major challenges of sustainable and inclusive development, unemployment and political instability continue to persist in various parts of the continent.

On the other side of the Mediterranean, the EU has struggled for more than five years already with the effects of the economic and financial crisis. In spite of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the EU presents itself in the global arena as a divided and inward looking continent in global affairs and also in the partnership with Africa. New global players have created a more competitive context providing significantly more choice to Africa in the selection of its partners.

Against this background, the longstanding Africa-EU partnership is confronted with major challenges. Critical perceptions on both sides of the partnership persist and seem to be very hard to change.

The EU is perceived by many Africans to lack credibility and consistency in reconciling its strong normative, value driven agenda with its security and economic interests. There appears to be *fatigue* from Africa over patronising EU attitudes, reflected in the use of double standards and conditionalities in dealing with different African countries and leaders and the perceived *imposition* of European agendas. The negotiating process on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that has been dragging on for more than 10 years has fuelled these negative perceptions. This critical message is slowly trickling down at the level of European decision-makers and there is an increasing recognition in certain parts of the EU institutions and member states alike that “EPAs have been a well intentioned diplomatic disaster”.

But there is also a growing frustration on the EU side about African inconsistencies. Africa has major difficulties speaking with one voice in the partnership with the EU. The African Union (AU) does not yet have the legitimacy and moral authority to speak on behalf of the African states and the regional Economic Communities (RECs). European officials complain that “Africa does not implement its own decisions”. There is no shortage of ambitious declarations of intent from African Heads of State on the strategic directions in the African devel-

opment but concrete implementation is lagging behind. A case in point is the repeatedly declared ambition to reduce aid dependency and to build an Africa-EU *partnership on equal terms that puts an end to the longstanding donor-recipient type of relationship*.

However, for the time being, recommendations of African high-level advisory committees to establish sustainable finance mechanisms have remained hollow slogans. As a consequence addiction to *EU aid* continues in many African countries as well as in continental and regional institutions. Europe seems to accept that development aid will still be needed for some time in the future in most least developed and vulnerable countries in Africa. However, there is a growing perception in Brussels and several European capitals that African countries that are generating spectacular increases of revenue from the extraction of mineral resources and the economic boom, should invest more of their own resources in African development. Differentiation in aid allocation between least developed and middle-income countries in Africa will therefore be an unavoidable evolution in the Africa-EU partnership

THE JAES: HOW TO TURN HIGH AMBITIONS INTO RESULTS?

When the JAES was adopted in 2007 it had the strong ambition to build a strong strategic and political continent-to-continent partnership beyond aid that would *treat Africa as one continent*, ensure the participation of a multitude of stakeholders and deal with all issues of common concern and mutual interest in eight thematic partnerships.

Seven years later, the record of the JAES is rather mixed. A recent study on the JAES by ECDPM has pointed, amongst others, to progress realised in the area of peace and security with more maritime and transnational safety, the Africa-EU Infrastructure Trust Fund, initiatives that aim to strengthen African competitiveness and diversification in agriculture and industrial development, cooperation in the area of research, AUC-EC staff exchanges etc...¹.

¹ The implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding Confidence and Commitments, ECDPM study for the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, March 2014



It is also recognised that the JAES framework has helped to provide some level of structured dialogue between African and European decision-making structures.

However, the JAES is also facing major challenges, such as a lack of high level political traction on both sides of the partnership and a complex institutional set-up. Major divergences on key issues such as trade (EPAs) and issues of international justice and governance (International Criminal Court-ICC) do not seem to be addressed in an open and effective way. To make the JAES work, there is a need to ensure the political buy-in at Ministerial levels and to create a leaner framework for its day-to-day management that is better adapted to African institutions and capacities. It would also be useful to align the partnership to global and continental policy frameworks (e.g. the AU Agenda 2063) and to ensure a more effective participation of key stakeholders such as social and economic actors who at the end of the day should be the key drivers in the Africa-EU partnership. Last but not least, in a modern and effective partnership on equal footing, both the EU and Africa should mobilise sufficient financial resources to ensure an effective implementation of the JAES.

THE WAY FORWARD: HOW TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK AND MAKE THINGS MOVE?

Beyond the April 2014 summit of Heads of State in Brussels it seems crucial to keep the momentum and further invest in the *revitalisation* of the partnership. There is a risk that the broad overarching theme of the summit: “Peace, Prosperity and People” hides a profound discussion on the real issues that matter in the Africa-EU partnership. There is no need for yet another *Christmas tree* of thematic priorities. What is needed now is a way to deal with the *underlying psychology* in the Africa-EU partnership. This will require a radical overhaul of the traditional practices and recipes of the past. Some of the following elements could contribute to a different and more open way of interaction:

1. Tackle “irritants” on both sides of the partnership upfront

Partnerships can only survive if they do not shy away from addressing sensitive and delicate issues that have given or could give rise to tensions between both part-

ners. The EPA was the key irritant that has soured the partnership for more than 10 years. Unfortunately, the JAES did not manage to provide a suitable platform to address the controversial EPAs. There seems to be a more open and constructive approach, now that West Africa is in the final stage of concluding an EPA with the EU. But there is still some way to go to do away with the tensions that the EPA negotiations have created between both partners. Also the issue of cultural cooperation and the restitution of cultural goods by European countries to Africa remains a delicate issue in the partnership. For Africa this is clearly an issue that should be part of the dialogue on governance and human rights while the EU does not seem to be willing to fundamentally re-open this debate.

Other irritants between both continents relate to the *prescriptive, patronizing and inconsistent application* by the EU of values and normative approaches in the partnership with Africa without taking due account of the African pace and ownership of reforms. There is also a perception in parts of Africa that international institutions that are strongly backed by the EU, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), tend to apply double standards by targeting primarily African leadership.

But also the EU has accumulated frustration over some of the African positions. While the JAES was designed as a strategic framework that would also ensure the participation of non-state actors of civil society and private sector in dialogue and implementation, the African side seems to be rather reluctant to systematically involve these new actors in the partnership and to entrust these with more responsibilities. Europe also feels that there is some ambiguity in the African discourse on the economic and political *reform and change dynamics* and *structural transformations* on the continent. As mentioned earlier, there is no shortage of African ambitious strategies and declarations to mobilise own domestic revenue. However, in practice there is European irritation that progress is too slow on this crucial issue and that the Africa-EU partnership and also the ACP-EU partnership under the Cotonou Agreement continue to be overly dominated by an aid logic.

2. Be more explicit on interests

For several decades Europe has perceived Africa as a continent of crisis and threats. Now that new partners (BRICS) are eager to seize the opportunities on the African continent, Europe should not remain on the side-

lines. Instead it should be more explicit in articulating its interests. EPAs provide great opportunities for Europe in terms of export markets and access to strategic resources. In addition, the EU also has an interest in stronger partnership with Africa on peace and security and in multilateral fora on issues such as the Post 2015 debate, climate change, green economy and renewable energy. Together, both Africa and the EU represent a group of more than 80 countries, a potentially important power in the global arena. In the longer term Africa could also provide adequate answers in terms of increasingly skilled labour force to the ageing and decreasing European population. As stated by some African intellectuals *“Africa could become in the future a part of the solution to the problems in the EU”*

From its perspective, Africa could also be more explicit in clearly spelling out why and where the EU could bring a value added to Africa as compared to other partners. Several RECs have expressed interest and appreciation for the European model of regional integration. Also Europe's policies relating to inclusive development, social protection, mobilization and equitable redistribution of revenue and wealth could be attractive to Africa. Europe could also be of use to Africa in helping to tap the potential for a green economy, renewable energy and in tackling the enormous threats of climate change.

3. Show results on issues that really matter

While there has been some progress in the past years in areas such as peace and security, trade, transport, infrastructure, research, Post 2015, the question remains as to whether the EU is willing to go the extra mile on issues that matter a lot to Africa. Will the EU support Africa's demands to get a stronger African representation in global institutions, including in the UN Security Council? Will the EU be ready to grant reciprocal treatment in terms of free movement of Africans to Europe?

4. Change the mindset in the partnership

Factors relating to the mindset and the “psychology” of the partnership between Africa and Europe seem to play a major part in the current state of the relationship between both continents. In order to restore confidence and trust amongst its African partners, the EU could do away with overly prescriptive attitudes and normative ap-

proaches. There do not seem to be major divergences over the content of the value driven agendas which both continents seem to share to a large extent. It is more a matter of respecting the ownership, the pace and priority setting of internal African reform processes. Co-responsibility instead of conditionality should guide the partnership and that will hold a greater potential for success. Old practices die slowly but it appears that the EU is trying to learn from past failures, including poorly designed governance incentive initiatives.

But changes are also needed on the African side of the partnership. The renewed African assertiveness and self criticism is most welcome as it will help the African continent to make the right choices in terms of needs, strategic orientations and partners. In this context, the critical assessment of all Africa's strategic partnerships is a very timely and welcome exercise. However, more needs to be done to break the chains of extreme dependency. Repeatedly African leaders and institutions have expressed the desire to become financially independent from the EU and other international partners. Panels of wise Africans have been established to look into the innovative financing of African institutions. Also meetings of the African Ministers of Finance are now seriously looking into this issue. But it appears to be difficult to put these ideas into practice. Yet these are perceived to be key factors in building more balanced partnerships with the EU and other external partners.

In conclusion, the balance of power between Europe and Africa is undergoing major changes. Europe is still the major trade, investment and development cooperation partner of Africa but the longstanding dominant position is threatened. This does not need to be dramatic for both partners. On the contrary it may give rise to burden sharing among the various partners and to finding the best complementarity and role division, if Africa takes a firm lead over its own development. In the longer term this could lead to a healthier and more balanced partnership between both continents which will clearly benefit both Africa and Europe.

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This article was first published in the Bulletin of the African Union.

5 Challenges for EU-Africa Relations



01

Africa and Europe need to rebuild confidence and commitment in the partnership and this summit is an opportunity for dialogue at the highest level to bring about real change - influential leaders on both sides also need to stand up and to make this summit work

Leaders need to come to agreement on core issues of the Joint Africa EU Strategy for the future - Migration, Mobility, Post 2015, Agriculture, Food Security, Climate Change and Trade

02



03

All the partners need to change the mindset and culture of Africa-Europe dialogue, clearly expressing their expectations and interests to realise the ambition of the Joint Africa EU Strategy

We can build, block-by-block, on successes like the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) for a new Africa EU partnership for the future.

04



05

Both partners need to find ways to deal with irritants upfront - the Economic Partnership Agreements, International Criminal Court and LGBT Rights in Africa

www.ecdpm.org

Source: <http://africaeu2014.blogspot.pt/>

INTERVIEW WITH FRANÇOISE MOREAU

What is your assessment of the IV Africa-EU Summit?

In my point of view the Summit was successful and more harmonious than expected. The positive atmosphere as well as the high level of attendance demonstrated that the EU-Africa Partnership is alive and well, and that our cooperation is better and more appreciated than ever.

Moreover, the Summit allowed for taking a fresh look at policy priorities, the effectiveness of the Africa-EU Partnership as well as the needs of both partners. For instance, the Summit has marked a shift away from Aid to Investment as the focus of economic relations between Africa and Europe, and to a growing commitment on the part of Africans to take responsibility for their security while accepting the support they need to achieve that.

In terms of outcomes the Summit adopted a political Declaration and a Roadmap, which constitutes an ambitious framework of activities and results to be achieved over the next 3 years, as well as a remarkable declaration on migration. Besides, key areas of cooperation within the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy are now more focused and cooperation structures have been improved.

Besides the Summit several accompanying events were organised in Brussels to make sure that as many voices as possible of the Partnership were heard. An EU-Africa Business Forum, a Youth Summit and a Summit between the European Parliament and the Pan-African

Parliament took place just before the main Summit whereas an Africa-EU Civil Society Organisations Forum had already been organised back in October 2013.

What do you think is Europe's current added value to Africa, taking into account the diversification of flows, donors and partnerships for the continent?

I would say that Europe does not only add value to Africa but that the partnership between both continents is indeed essential.

The EU and its Member States are the biggest donor of development aid to Africa and constitute one of its main trading and investment partners. In 2012, 45% out of € 41 billion of Official Development Assistance received by Africa originated from the EU. During the same year, 28% of Africa's total trade, i.e. imports and exports, took place with the EU. Moreover, EUROSTAT calculated that direct investment stocks held by African investors in the EU have increased by more than 700% over the last ten years to reach the amount of € 77 billion in 2012.

“ The Summit allowed for taking a fresh look at policy priorities, the effectiveness of the Africa-EU Partnership as well as the needs of both partners. For instance, the Summit has marked a shift away from Aid to Investment as the focus of economic relations between Africa and Europe.



Photo: <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/>

Moreover, Africa and Europe cannot move ahead without each other as they have a strongly intertwined relationship with a shared neighbourhood as well as a common history and future. This is why both continents agreed on a strong political relationship and close cooperation in priority areas. This strategic partnership is based on shared values and joint interests among equal partners. It is unique in the sense that it is globally the only joint partnership between two continents. The EU draws from its own experience in supporting efforts by the African Union and its Members to step up regional and continental integration. It needs to be highlighted that in doing so the EU does not focus on short term measures but pursues a long term approach, which often involves less visible aspects of cooperation, such as capacity development and dialogue in areas such as good governance and human rights.

The EU also continues its long-term commitment to peace and security in Africa, to cite another example. A comprehensive approach taking into account the interdependence between security and development is applied, which strengthens African capacity for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and supports security sector reform as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development. Over the last ten years, the EU has committed more than € 1.2 billion to support African-led peace support operations and other efforts in the area of peace and security through the African Peace Facility, an innovative financing instrument established in 2004 in response to a request by African leaders.

The strong human ties between the EU and Africa are a testimony of our close relationship and further reinforce them. The thousands of African students coming to Europe every year to study are the best ambassadors of our partnership. The large African diaspora community living in Europe is a precious bond between the two continents and an important factor for development in Africa. Between 2007 and 2012, remittances have consistently accounted for more than 3% of Africa's GDP on average and in 2012, for the first time, became the largest external financial source to Africa, ahead of Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance. In 2012, 35% of global remittances to Africa originated in the EU.

Europe's value to Africa also manifests itself in the area of EU investments in Science, Technology and Innovation. Research communities on both continents are getting closer by jointly implementing EU research pro-

grammes on issues of direct interest to Africa, such as nutrition and food security. The EU is also sharing its technologies and know-how for instance through the recent signing of a cooperative arrangement on earth observation satellite technology with Africa.

Apart from the important relationship between Africa and Europe, the diversification of partners is beneficial for Africa and South-South cooperation can be a very relevant and powerful tool to exchange resources, technology, and knowledge.

How do you see the articulation between the various EU frameworks and instruments that deal with Africa?

There are several complementary policy and cooperation frameworks which govern EU relations with African countries. The most long-standing one is the EU's cooperation with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States which is enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement to which 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa are parties. In Northern Africa, five countries – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – benefit from the EU's partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood and participate in the Mediterranean Union. Relations between South Africa and the EU are governed by the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement concluded in 1999.

The Africa-EU relationship reached new levels in 2007 with the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy which put in place a framework for enhanced cooperation and strengthened political dialogue with Africa as a continent. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy provides an added value to existing frameworks by:

a) Situating the Partnership in a global context by jointly addressing global common challenges such as climate change, the protection of the environment, or peace and security. Through joint positions Africa and Europe have more weight in global fora;

b) Expanding Africa-EU cooperation into areas of common interest such as governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, energy, climate change, migration and mobility, or Science, Technology and Innovation and space applications.

Furthermore, the new *Pan-African Programme* will constitute one of the main sources of support to the implementation of the Strategic Partnership. It will be funded under the EU's Development Cooperation Instrument with a financial envelope of € 845 million for the period 2014-2020. The added value of the Pan-Af-

“The people of both continents must remain at the heart of the partnership and all cooperation should be aimed at improving their livelihoods.

frican programme builds on the cross-regional and continental dimension of its projects and programmes. It will complement other instruments such as the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Development Cooperation Instrument thematic programmes.

What would be, in your opinion, the main challenges for EU-Africa relations in the coming years - And what should the partnership seek to achieve in that context?

It is clear that EU-Africa relations have been continuously evolving and are today facing new challenges and opportunities. The Declaration and the Roadmap 2014-2017 that were both adopted at the EU-Africa Summit earlier this month identify the main areas of cooperation for the years to come and highlight some of the main challenges. I will mention a few of them here.

First and foremost, the people of both continents must remain at the heart of the partnership and all cooperation should be aimed at improving their livelihoods in a sustainable and inclusive manner. In this context it will be important to further facilitate the involvement of civil society organisations and the private sector in areas such as development, democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Both continents also share the challenge of sustainable economic growth and job creation. It will be crucial to find innovative ways to develop the private sector and stimulate investments in Europe and Africa. This needs to be achieved in an environmentally sound, inclusive and sustainable manner.

Likewise, peace and security are essential preconditions for development and prosperity on both continents. As we have seen recently in the Central African Republic, conflict and instability can undermine all efforts to reduce poverty and to accelerate growth. It is therefore vital to jointly address common security challenges and to further strengthen the operationalisation of the African

Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which aims at finding African solutions for African security problems.

Another challenge for a partnership of equals between both continents concerns the mobilisation of financial resources for development and security on the African side. The African Union still largely depends on EU funding and needs to explore ways to finance its own activities and progressively become self-sustainable.

When it comes to cooperation in global fora, Africa and the EU can have a critical influence on the changing international power-constellations by joining forces. To give a concrete example, both continents acknowledge that climate change constitutes a decisive global challenge that has to be urgently tackled. The EU and Africa need to work closely together to push for the adoption of a new globally binding climate agreement at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2015.

I am convinced that in order to address these and other common challenges jointly and effectively, both the EU and Africa need to pursue an open and constructive dialogue. Another key for success lies in the setting of clear and realistic objectives and results. Once these principles are fully embraced by both sides, the partnership will live up to its potential.

Françoise Moreau is Head of Unit for Africa-EU Partnership and African Peace Facility, at the European Commission, Brussels

ARE AFRICA AND EUROPE TURNING A NEW PAGE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP?

● **FATEN AGGAD AND JAMES MACKIE**

The 4th EU-Africa Summit planted the seeds for a potentially stronger, more balanced partnership between the EU and Africa. With African leaders embracing a businesslike approach, the discussions focused on growth and investment and the signs are that a frank debate took place. In a few years, we may look back on the Summit as something of a threshold moment in Africa-EU relations.

Seeking to understand the potential impact of a Summit immediately after the event is a perilous task, yet looking at the outcomes of last week's 4th Africa-EU Summit it is possible to think that in 5 years time we may look back on it as something of a threshold moment in Africa-EU relations.

With little sign of simple rubber-stamping of sanitized declarations prepared well in advance, the tone set, particularly by the African leadership present, was businesslike and pragmatic from the beginning. We will watch to see if this is not just a one-off, but also a real shift in Africa – EU relations that will last for the long term.

A NEW WIND IN THE SAILS

Although the event seems to have still been very largely about supporting African development, it was not primarily about aid to Africa. The summit attracted a large number of heads of states from both continents, which was not a given considering the low turn out at the previous summit 4 years ago in Gadhafi's Libya. The elephants in the room – the EPAs, the ICC and LGBT rights seem to have been largely overcome through dialogue and flexibility on both sides.

African and European leaders adopted a Declaration and a Roadmap 2014-2017, which set a political tone, recalling the need to continue dialogue on a number of issues where they can find common ground. The Roadmap sets out strategic priorities that can guide the identification of concrete areas of cooperation. The agreed priorities are Peace and Security; Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights; Human Development; Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and Continental Integration; Global and emerging issues. The only specific Declaration actually adopted was on Migration and Mobility.

A 'NORMALISATION' OF THE RELATIONSHIP?

These two main documents suggest that expectations from the relationship are changing, but could still be more clearly articulated. Reading between the lines it would seem the relationship is slowly moving towards a more standard international diplomatic relationship where both parties more openly stress complementarities and interests. If that is the case and one takes a longer-term perspective one can argue that some progress has been made. The fact that only one of the several proposed thematic declarations were agreed certainly raises questions about the actual alignment of respective interests and perspectives.

There is something to be said for limiting the number of grand statements and focusing on a more limited number that are properly negotiated. This can in effect be interpreted as a 'normalisation' of the relationship, with the leaders adding political weight to the statements and not just agreeing documents pre-cooked long in advance.

There appears to be recognition by both sides that if they do not work together they are less strong. In this declaration both sides acknowledge that they need each other. Yet, some analysts still think there is quite a lot of mistrust and outright frustration on both sides.

From the initial signing of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) there has always been a call to move the relationship beyond development into cooperation on wider international affairs. While the EU highlighted the aid it had earmarked for Africa during its next financial cycle, in practice development cooperation does not seem to have been the main focus of the discussion. The key area of cooperation remains the well-established partnership on peace and security while agricultural development and industrialisation (not part of the JAES to date) got quite some attention.

The debate seems to have been more about investment and growth. In the closing press conference **AU Commission Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma** noted: "We're not looking for grants for our infrastructure but investments through Sovereign Wealth Funds ... there will be returns to your investments ... we're industrializing, but you have technology that can relieve us from fos-

*sil fuel dependence, we can generate surplus energy to send across the Mediterranean ... together we can be two great continents ... development issues are key for peace and security ... without one corrupting another **we can really work together on all these issues....***". European leaders were however more traditional and perhaps too polite and conciliatory in their statements.

The Summit remained very largely on Africa rather than on what Europe and Africa might do together on tackling global challenges at the international level. Both documents do talk about the need to cooperate on the post-2015 agenda and on climate change, but the separate declarations prepared on those topics were not agreed. On some of the key issues that will dominate the international agenda in the coming years, there appeared to be limited convergence of views, nor any real clarity on how the two Unions might tackle them together.

WHITHER LEADERSHIP?

Mrs Dlamini-Zuma and her team did make a strong impression. For the EU it was less clear who would take things forward. This can to some extent be excused by the upcoming appointment of a new European Commis-

sion later this year, but if the JAES process is to gather real momentum Mrs Dlamini-Zuma will need a strong counterpart on the EU side – a challenge for the incoming EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security perhaps?

The Summit planted the seeds for a potentially stronger, more balanced partnership between the EU and Africa. Once the dust settles, it will be important to keep up the momentum. A starting point would be for the Roadmap to be further detailed to identify ways to operationalise the agreed priorities. This will prepare the ground for the next Summit, due to be held on African soil in 2017.

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The views presented are theirs and not that of ECDPM.

This article was originally published at ECDPM Talking Points: A blog on the challenges of the EU's international cooperation

Photo courtesy of The Council of the European Union



THE FUTURE OF AFRICA-EU RELATIONS: CHALLENGING TIMES AHEAD

● CAROLINA FEILMAN QUINA

After intensive preparatory negotiations the 4th Africa - EU Summit took place in Brussels last 2nd and 3rd of April with the presence of more than 60 Heads of State from Africa and the EU and ended in a tone of moderate optimism.

Africa-EU relations and the Joint Partnership have to be seen as a *process*, and as every process it evolves by steps, usually by small steps and seldom by huge breakthroughs. In three years time it will be possible to measure the importance and effectiveness of the IV Summit when assessing what was accomplished by then. But **managing expectations and perceptions** is important to avoid unnecessary frustrations on one side, and excessive optimism on the other. This doesn't mean that ambitions and a vision should be put aside; on the contrary, they are very much needed for a renewal of relations between Africa and the EU.

Assessing progress made in Africa-EU relations and more recently in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy process (it is important to recall that the JAES was adopted only

7 years ago!) implies revisiting the past and putting the evolving relations between Africa and Europe into historical, political and economic context, namely looking at the long travelled road since early days of the Yaoundé Convention (1963), a 10 years Convention deeply criticised by then key African leaders as Sekou Touré and Nkrumah, the 25 years of the Lomé Convention/Post Lomé Convention, and more recently the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (signed in 2000, revised in 2005 and in force until 2020).

The changes occurred since Yaoundé are very significant but are still far from the power relation shift called for, by African and Europeans' Heads of State, in the II Africa-EU Summit (Lisbon, December 2007).

The political and strategic vision and ambition then set out in the Joint Africa EU-Strategy, and now reconfirmed in the IV Summit, translated a genuine desire for a "new" balance of power when it called for a "*partnership of equals*", with "*shared principles and a common agenda*", and when it agreed to the principle of "*treating Africa as one*" (to support Africa's integration process).

The Cairo Summit (2000) was undoubtedly an important milestone particularly because it was the first time Heads of State from both Continents were meeting together outside the ACP framework. It was building on Cairo and its shortcomings that Lisbon was made possible. There was a clear sense, at all levels (political, institutional and Non-State actors included) and by all those more closely involved in the pre and post-Cairo process that long-term strategic vision was needed if the idea was to develop and deepen relations between Africa and Europe on new grounds.

The Lisbon Summit (2007) agreed precisely on a profound and strategic change in the relations between Africa and Europe bringing these relations into a new political level. After the 2007 Summit there was a sense, in many of those directly or indirectly involved in the very long negotiations, of having witnessed a breakthrough long-time awaited.

TIMES ARE CHANGING

When assessing the Joint Africa- EU Strategy process the existence of overlapping realities and of a complex institutional set up must be taken into account. Moreover, it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of "**many**" **Africas** and "**many**" **Europes** and the constant changing context in each continent and globally.

“Managing expectations and perceptions is important to avoid unnecessary frustrations on one side, and excessive optimism on the other. This doesn't mean that ambitions and a vision should be put aside; on the contrary.

EU changing context: since 2008, Europe is marked by a serious financial and economic crisis, growing unemployment and inequalities, economic growth stagnation and by a structural problem of demographic reduction. At the same time, at the political level, it is evident the growing influence on public opinion of extreme right-wing political movements and parties that base their positions on anti-European Union, xenophobic and anti-migrants stances. More recently, the crisis in a close and strategic neighbourhood – Ukraine/Russia is becoming a serious dilemma and a threat to peace.

On the other hand this last Summit took also place on the eve of European elections on May 25th that will very likely result on a strengthening of extreme right-wing parties' weight in the European Parliament. These elections will be followed by changes in all three EU institutions leadership, notably with a new president of the European Commission and a new team of Commissioners, a new president of the European Council and of the European Parliament. All these coming changes are likely to impact on Africa-EU relations.

Africa's changing context: Africa economy has kept growing steadily at a real GDP's average annual rate of 5,2% over the past 10 years, and in 2012, 8 out of the world's 10 fastest growing economies were African; it has an impressive demographic trend with rapidly growing population (more than 600 millions being under 25 years old, expected to rise to 860 millions in 2030) which creates both huge economic opportunities but also enormous challenges and demands quick responses in terms of job creation, infrastructures and social services; Africa is steadily attracting growing investment and economic cooperation and it has been able to speedily broaden and consolidate relations with new partners others than the EU, from the BRICS to Turkey, Japan, etc. .

This last decade has also seen a growing African business sector and an emerging middle class that together with governments are investing in areas of national or regional development impact, although the conditions for an inclusive and equitable economic growth and sustainable development is still far from being guaranteed. On the other hand, there is a growing awareness on the need to mobilise African own resources, notably through the fight against illicit financial flows and tax evasion – this being an area where cooperation between both sides should continue to be strengthened to support African Transformation Agenda 2063 with food security, agriculture and industrialization being key factors of the development process. At the same time the sound management of natural resources is now seen as an imperative to ensure they become a “development factor” rather than a “war factor”.

There are other elements of the equation that have to be taken into account, including the fact that political and social instability, conflicts and new security challenges, more complex than previous ones (organised crime, human trafficking, terrorism and maritime security from Eastern Africa to the Gulf of Guinea) still affect several African countries and/or regions.

Last but not least, there is an African *growing assertiveness* and reaction to what is said to be perceived as “double standards” (namely Africa's perception of the International Criminal Court) or “interference” or “normative approach” by the European Union (individual Member States and / or Institutions). This assertiveness results not only from Africa's development and growing economic importance at global level, but also from the fact that the new African Union Commission (AUC) leadership has brought a change in tone and in the way it reacts to the EU handling of certain African issues. What may have passed unnoticed in previous decades may be today perceived as resulting from lack of dialogue or lack of respect and by consequence having a direct impact on the relations and on daily work.

AFRICA AND EU'S CHANGING GLOBAL AGENDA'S

It is also useful, when looking at the Africa-EU Partnership and its future to note the changes in both EU and Africa's global agendas.

The *EU global agenda* has evolved during the past decades, notably since the EU enlargement, and the place occupied by Africa has also changed. If for several decades it was clear that Africa was “the” key priority for Europe (EU MS and institutions included), today Africa is “one” important priority together with other priorities (Russia, USA, Asia, Latin America...).

Similarly, it is important to see the changes occurring in the *African global agenda* which today includes a growing number of partners other than the EU, notably, China, India, Brazil, Turkey and Japan, new actors participating in the economic development of the continent and establishing new partnerships.

Of the €40 billion invested in Africa by foreign countries in 2012, only 21,5% were from EU; also in 2012, the EU remained Africa's main source of imports with 34% of total Africa imports and was the first client buying 40% of Africa exports but in both cases Europe is losing ground to “new” partners. The African Union

Commission has recently decided to launch a study (a comparative analysis) of all the partnerships Africa has developed with different countries and regions (Africa-EU, Africa-USA, Africa-China, Africa-India, Africa-Turkey, Africa-Brazil, etc.) and this timely study will provide not only “figures” but also insight of how partnerships are governed and perceived.

The EU is still by far the biggest trading partner, the biggest aid donor and the biggest humanitarian aid provider. The EU is also the main partner in key areas of African Transformation Agenda such as Research, Science and Innovation, Infra-structure development, Education and capacity building, and other areas as referred to in the IV Summit Political Declaration “*Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace*”. The EU is also the biggest partner and donor in the key area of Peace and Security (The EU is up to now - China is considering engaging in this area too - the largest donor of APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture, and is engaged in 8 Peace & Security operations) as well as being the biggest partner in the area of institutional building (African national, regional and continental institutions). On the other hand, the EU has experiences and “lessons learned” to share from the complex regional and political integration process or the building of the Welfare State, lessons that can be of use and shared with Africa.

But the EU is not alone anymore as it seemed for many decades: it remains the most important African partner and has the potential to play a *key* role in African transformation process but cannot ignore those other players with which Africa is related and this implies **looking for positive complementarities’ and cooperation** in the interest of all parties.

THE IV SUMMIT

In this context of changes happening in Africa and in Europe (and changing global Agendas of both Continents) **the fact that the IV Summit took place is a positive sign in itself**. The existence of a High Level dialogue forum, bringing together a overwhelming majority of Heads of State and Governments from both Continents (50 African countries represented, 41 of which at Head of State level/ Prime Minister level, and all EU counties represented at Head of State/Prime Minister level with the exception of 3 EU member States represented at Minister of Foreign Affairs level) and their respective Institutions (including European Parliament and Pan-African Parlia-

ment), Civil Society, Youth and Business Sector representatives and important observers such as UN/UNECA, is an achievement in itself. Even if there are some who point out the lack of concrete results in some important areas such as Climate Change, Post 2015 Framework or Trade, it is undeniable that this Summit represents another positive step in the process to build a more equal, inclusive and results oriented relation between Africa and the EU.

The strategic importance of relations between the two Continents has been reiterated and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy reconfirmed as enshrining the principles and shared values of the Partnership. A joint “*Political Declaration*” and a “*Way Forward*” document (2014-2017) moving from 8 to 5 areas in an attempt to refocus on what are considered to be the priorities for the coming 3 years, were agreed and should be welcomed even if these documents falls short of clarifying precisely how political dialogue will be enhanced or how the implementation set up will work and be monitored. The participation and focus on youth; the call for more involvement of private sector of both continents; the confirmation of the engagement of both partners to continue and develop cooperation in the key area of peace and security are not minor achievements of a Summit that due to the contexts referred above was not expected to deliver a new breakthrough in the relations between Africa and Europe. The final Declaration on Migration and Mobility is also significant as it deals and translates the agreement on a critical issue for both sides, notably for Europe and where Africa cooperation is needed.

It is a fact that there was no agreement over the document with the assessment of progress made so far as it is also worrying to see that there seems to have been no real progress in dealing with the most sensitive and difficult issues (the “*irritants*”) that have been souring the relations between Africa and the EU. And **addressing the most difficult issues is of essence to building trust** which is prerequisite for developing stronger Africa-EU relations from which both Continents have more to gain than ever.

BUILDING TRUST AND DEALING WITH THE “IRRITANTS” ON BOTH SIDES

In a changing world and in a changing context in both Continents (political, economic, social, demographic, etc.), changes that come with the risk of increasing tensions and divergences between Africa and EU, it

“Addressing the most difficult issues is of essence to building trust which is prerequisite for developing stronger Africa-EU relations from which both Continents have more to gain than ever.

is of paramount importance to enhance political dialogue (regular political dialogue) and to address the so-called “irritants”. This will call for strong political will and a change of mindset.

The lingering **Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)**’ negotiations have been a main “irritant” for the past ten years impacting negatively on Africa and EU relations. A majority of African countries have continued to flag doubts about a number of clauses of these agreements and their impact at national level but also at regional and pan-African level. It is well known that several African countries and the African Union Commission fear the possible negative impact of these agreements on African regional integration and on African industrialization/agricultural Transformation Agenda. When assessing the present list of African exports things could look alright but when looking ahead, in the long-run, a set of clauses in the agreements are judged to put constraints on African exports and by so hampering its agricultural development and industrialization. Furthermore, the EPA agreements to be signed with each African region are perceived not to be aligned and as a result could in the long-run constitute a barrier for inter-African market development. On the African side, many argue over the need to negotiate as a “block” with the EU and not separately, region by region.

In this last Summit, as in previous ones, no real progress seems to have been made over this issue. There is “agreed” language in the final *Summit Declaration* and *Way Forward* but it doesn’t address the difficult and open questions. All in all, the EPA question is still there and if not addressed at political level it will most probably continue to sour Africa-EU relations.

In dealing with this issue, as in dealing with other “irritants”, it is necessary that both sides acknowledge and make clear what are their differences and specific interests and on that basis negotiate and discuss frankly to bridge the gap between their positions and make a com-

promise possible.

The **International Criminal Court (ICC)** and the perception that it is selective if not outright biased should be addressed. Today 32 African countries are signatories to the Rome Treaty but the perception of unfair treatment of African leaders is very present and a focus of permanent tensions affecting relations at many levels.

Other “irritants” include what is perceived by some African countries to be excessively “**normative approaches**” and the way “**sanctions**” or “**conditionality**” is applied by the EU and /or its Member States. The growing difficult dialogue around issues of LGBT Rights well exemplified, notably, during the meeting between the European Parliament and Pan-African Parliament on the eve of the IV Summit, is another “irritant” that needs to be tackled. Last but not least the issue of Western Sahara continues unsolved and needing to be addressed as the tensions in the run-up to the Summit illustrates.

On the EU side, there is growing criticism over the lack of progress on the African side to become less dependent on EU funds in spite of numerous declarations to *go beyond a donor-recipient relationship* (a paradigm shift agreed in the Lisbon Summit/2007 and constituting one of the key JAES principles together with others already referred above). The IV Summit represented a positive step as it focused more on economic issues than on aid (or as President Zuma, African Union Commission Chairperson, put it “we want investment, not aid”) but there is still a long way to go.

None of the above issues will find the adequate response without more political dialogue and a genuine effort to build trust and to bridge positions.

INGREDIENTS FOR SUCCESS

Dialogue should be enhanced at different levels, redoubling efforts to engaging not only officials and institutions from both Africa and EU, but also stakeholders

active in the various areas covered by the partnership and regarding them not only as partners at the *implementation end* but also as partners at the *policy dialogue level*.

Facilitating and promoting synergies between the multiple initiatives happening in all areas of Africa-EU relations and building on the recommendations from processes, such as, the V Africa-EU Business Forum, the IV Africa-EU Civil Society Forum, the IV Africa-Europe Youth Leaders Summit, Africa-EU Economic and Social Actors Meeting, the JAES Seminars (organized by EC/DG EuropAid and the JAES Support Mechanism) and the Think-tanks Meetings - should deserve continued attention. In this process the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Support Mechanism and the new Pan-African Programme will play an important role.

Creating better conditions for effective youth participation – youth perceived as “*agents of change*”, notably through a joint Youth Facility (as called for by joint youth leaders Summit in Brussels, April 2014) could make a difference. Cultural dialogue, cooperation and exchanges should also continue to be developed as a critical element of “the better knowing each other” process.

Moving “radically” towards a ***people-centred approach*** (JAES, 2007) would bring a new impetus to Africa-EU relations and the way the joint Partnership is perceived.

Regarding political dialogue as an “*enabler*” for a better mutual understanding and acknowledgment of each side own interests as well as finding ways of bridging positions ensuring that together both sides have more to gain than to lose. And good opportunities for this kind of dialogue are the coming negotiations at global level on ***Climate Change*** (where Africa and the EU have a lot of common interests and enhanced political dialogue could help reach a shared understanding over CBDR-Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and would make possible reaching win-win positions with impact over coming negotiations) or ***the Post-2015 Development Framework*** where, again, together, Africa and the EU represent over 40% of UN membership and, if jointly, can influence the outcome of strategic negotiations like these.

A strong, continued and frank political dialogue, at all levels, is a pre-requisite for a win-win relation as it would facilitate clarifying each side own priorities and interests and could help bring change to the perceptions of each other.

CHALLENGING TIMES AHEAD

From 2000 (Cairo) to 2007 (Lisbon), from 2010 (Tripoli) up to 2014 (Brussels) - progress continued to be made and the partnership deepened in many areas and involving an ever growing number of stakeholders: institutions, experts, non-State actors, universities and research institutes, from both continents, dealing with a growing number of areas such as: Peace and Security, Research and Innovation, Migration, Infrastructures, private Sector development, Millennium Development Goals, Human Rights or Food Security.

At the global level there are more and more issues that demand a global response (sustainable development, climate change, drug and human trafficking, terrorism...) and as referred before important negotiations will take place concerning some of these issues in the very near future. The negotiation and agreement on Africa-EU common positions could have a decisive impact and influence on the outcome of global negotiations.

Building a win-win partnership is possible! It will require not forgetting history but rather building on it; it will require embracing the future with no past resentments and changing perceptions of each other; it will require continued and frank dialogue; it will require political will and trust.

The successful implementation of what was now decided and translated into the *Final Declaration* and into the document *Way Forward 2014-2017* is one of the big challenges for the next 3 years and requires clarifying further what will be the most effective set-up and institutional framework to ensure the partnership delivers on its commitments.

Dedicating ever greater efforts in **facilitating open and forthright dialogue** and exchanges covering the various areas will be a prerequisite for sustained progress in Africa-EU Relations and to what present generations will leave, as legacy, to future ones. As President Zuma said recently when addressing Africa-Europe Youth Leaders Summit in Brussels, April 2014: “*We can’t change history but we can change the future*”.

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THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS: A VIEW FROM AFRICAN SIDE?

The two parties concluded, following consultations throughout 2013, that the partnership remains relevant and must be revitalized and reconfigured. African stakeholders particularly insisted that the 2014 summit offers an opportunity for a frank and sincere dialogue on the prospects for a renewed partnership. For these actors, **this paradigm shift in the Africa-EU relation must be based on four main prerequisites:**

- Move away from an aid-centric, donor-beneficiary and techno-bureaucratic relationship and take it to a strategic level with strengthened policy dialogue and enhanced cooperation between equals.
- Articulate the policy dialogue in the renovated partnership around global challenges of mutual interest for the implementation of the strategic agendas of each party and on issues that could have a transformative impact on Africa and EU, and not on contentious issues like EPAs and ICC. This Selectivity strategy could be supported by a sequenced approach of the prioritization articulated by two-step. The first step would be to focus on a set of issues where there is political traction that is, issues of interest to both partners which benefit from clear leadership and where action has and will continue to be taken even if leadership and institutions change. The second step could be to include in the policy dialogue contentious issues that cannot be avoided but must be resolved without pressure and by taking time to develop a mutual comprehension.
- Recognize clearly the strategic interests of each party and shared responsibilities in the implementation of its agendas for change.
- Treat Africa as one, and clearly abandon all initiatives and policies that go against the socioeconomic transformation of the continent and its strong regional integration agenda. This will suppose in parallel more coherence in the EU's overall external action: Europe's different instruments should be rationalized according with the new dynamic and context and provide support to new policy and political objectives of the revamped partnership, avoiding duplication and disruption. This is for instance the case of the ongoing negotiations on EPAs, but also of the security and development strategy in Sahel and for specific strategies in other areas of cooperation between Africa and EU such as trade, migration, justice and human rights.

Within this framework, **African stakeholders** have put forward different **ideas as ways to revitalize Africa-EU relations:**

- Take into account, in the establishment of new partnership priorities, the African Union Commission's 2014-2017 strategic plan, the Africa's Vision 2063 and the continent's priorities.
- Lighten and streamline the institutional framework, based on the lessons learned from the operational difficulties encountered and the needs for better implementation and evaluation of decisions, as well as for promoting real and high level policy dialogue.
- Strengthen the commitment of other stakeholders - especially the Non State Actors (and not only Civil Society Organizations), local authorities, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the regional institutions, the formal private sector, ... The summit should be the place to begin a comprehensive consultative process that will enable these actors to make proposals, so that the strategy is no longer drafted only by governments.
- Tackle the issue of establishing a specific funding mechanism, which the Pan-African programme is certainly not going to address as its ability to deliver on the partnership thus depends on the effective reform of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) itself. In fact, even if EU's new budget, starting in 2014, allots some 845 millions of euros to this financial envelope dedicated to JAES, it is not yet clear how these funds will be managed jointly with African stakeholders and indeed whether their use will be aligned with JAES priorities.

These proposals are the result of consultations held during 2013 by the African Governance Institute, Dakar. They were published as part of the AGI policy brief number 9, January 2014.

INTERVIEW WITH ADEBAYO OLUKOSHI

What is your assessment of EU-Africa Relations in terms of Governance and Human Rights?

This is a big question but nevertheless an important one which strikes at the heart of some of the thorny issues in contemporary EU-Africa relations. Over the last two decades or more, we have witnessed struggles for and processes of democratisation across Africa which have carried implications for the forms – and, to an extent, the substance – of governance. Elections have become routine and in, several cases, have produced not only orderly successions but also the alternation of power among parties. The political space is characterised by an interplay of competing multiple party interests. Civil society is by and large established as an actor. Human rights have been enshrined in constitutions across the continent and blatant abuses of the types that were once common carry much greater domestic and international costs today than in the past. To be sure, like in other regions of the world, the process of democratisation in Africa is both incomplete and has been accompanied with some critical failings and reversals. Few on the continent will disagree that as much as significant ground has been covered, much more still needs to be done to make democratic governance and avowed commitments to human rights deeper and more substantive.

“EU member states cannot take it as a given that a political dialogue within the partnership means a discussion exclusively of African governance and human rights challenges.

Nevertheless, this cannot justify the deployment of the deficits that have been observed on the African side as justification or a basis either for conditionality in EU-Africa relations or as an argument for seeking to occupy a moral high ground which has no real foundation to it but which, in essence, reproduces old colonial relations in what is meant to be a partnership of equals. Not a few African leaders have argued, justifiably, that if the EU-Africa dialogue is to have a political component that should discuss all questions with openness and as frankly as possible, then it cannot be assumed nor is it either acceptable or sustainable that the only issues that would deserve to be tabled are those which are African. EU member states cannot take it as a given that a political dialogue within the partnership means a discussion exclusively of African governance and human rights challenges, with Europe assuming a posture which hectors and lectures Africans, and carrying on as though there are no real problems of governance and human rights in Europe itself that merit being included as dialogue points. I want to be clear: There are important governance and rights issues which could and should be discussed within the parameters of inter-state or inter-regional relations but, in a partnership, these must be tackled on a comprehensive and integrated basis which does not suppose that one party carries



a monopoly of problems and the other party enjoys the monopoly of solutions for dealing with the problems.

From an African perspective, what is the value-added of Europe, taking into account the diversification of donors, flows, and partnerships for the continent?

Africa is today positioned in global geo-politics almost like the beautiful bride with an array of competing suitors simultaneously asking either for dates or, even outrightly, a formal engagement. It can be quite overwhelming, even confusing. It is a wise bride who, beyond the flattery of mass attention, will set out criteria for carefully sifting through the various proposals on the table in order to determine what would be best over the long haul.

I have strong views as to whether the continent has been sufficiently rigorous in managing the new scramble for its attention but that is not for here and now. Europe may point to history, geography, and culture in seeking to establish a claim for a prime place, if not a privileged position, in matters Africa. I can hardly dispute the right of European officials when they argue the case for why they think there is a “natural”, even “organic” bond between their continent and Africa. However, there are enough grounds too for seriously faulting the arguments, not least because the history of relations between the two continents has not been an altogether happy one and much still needs to be done to move out of the colonial/neo-colonial paradigm that has been refracted into the donor-recipient framework which the EU, wittingly or unwittingly, has sought to embed its quest for partnership with Africa.

If Europe is to add value to Africa today, it must get out of that old, historically unjust, and discredited paradigm and instead position itself to meaningfully and substantively accompany African countries in their contemporary quest for a progressive structural transformation of economy and society. This goes way beyond seeking to deploy aid as a carrot for gaining position and presence in the face of competition from other players, including newly emerged ones. It will also require a wholesale change in style and approach when it comes to negotiating with Africa. Abrasiveness, conditionality, unilateral ultimatums, threats, etc., whether subtle or open, may have worked effectively at a point in the past. Today, they are increasingly anachronistic and ineffective.

What should the EU-Africa Partnership seek to achieve in the coming years to achieve its purpose?

Properly balanced, the EU-Africa partnership can deliver outcomes which would be beneficial for both Europe and Africa and the wider international system. To do so, there has to be a much better re-balancing of interests with a view to finding meeting points that are able to accommodate the strategic interests of the partners across the spectrum of economic, social, political, and cultural issues, not forgetting historical wrongs that are still waiting on the African side to be righted.

A first step in this direction is the non-negotiability of equality in the partnership. This has to be accompanied by an openness of spirit and a patience of purpose to sift through complex issues in order to achieve consensual outcomes which all parties can own. Double standards and double-dealing should be consigned to the dustbin of history. Furthermore, commitments, once made, should be seen through if only to ensure that relations are characterised by a much greater stability and predictability, two core ingredients of reliability and trust. It should not be that commitments are jettisoned at the slightest opportunity or on the slightest of excuses – often on matters that are not directly connected to the heart of the partnership.

In all of this, it should always be remembered that Africa has urgent need to muster its energies and resources in order to leap-frog itself out of prolonged underdevelopment. This will mean that the partnership of equals which the EU-Africa partnership hopes to be – and should be – cannot be anchored on a 100 per cent reciprocity in such domains as trade policy and rules. I realize this might not be an easy proposition to accept in practice even if the language of cooperation espouses it in public conversations. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for Europe to be less myopic and opportunist in its dealings with Africa and for Africa to be more bold and purposeful in its articulation of its goals so that, over the long haul, both continents can prosper from each other's strengths. A rich, stable, peaceful and democratic Africa can only be a favourable outcome for Europe.

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THE IV EU-AFRICA SUMMIT: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?

● MARTA MARTINELLI

On 2nd and 3rd of April African and European leaders have met in Brussels to discuss their perspectives on the theme 'Investing in people, prosperity and peace'. The background for such Summit was the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Partnership that aimed at establishing a partnership between the two continents based on equal footing relations and a people centered approach. The Partnership has been implemented through three-year action plans that came up for revision in April. Proposals for reform included a review of thematic priorities, of the effectiveness of the partnership and of its implementing institutions.

Since 2007 global dynamics have produced changes in the strategic and political environments of both Europe and Africa. The Arab uprisings have made it dramatically clear to African governments that Europe is animated by concrete interests like trade and stability. Regime changes

in Egypt and Libya have deprived the African Union of the leadership of two key proponents of pan-Africanism and driving factors of the relations with the European Unions. In addition, political competition for the leadership of the African Union has led to the emergence of South Africa with the Presidency of Dr. Zuma.

On the other hand Africa has earned in confidence and diversified its partnerships to include emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India, reducing its dependency from traditional partners such as European states. Africa's resources appeal to new investors and the renewed confidence leads Africa to adopt critical positions in the United Nations or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Europe, that had committed to 'treat Africa as one' does not hesitate to conclude bilateral trade agreements with different African states and end the preferential economic agreements that have characterised Eu-

Road in Bukatata, Uganda. Photo by Ana Elisa Cascão



rope-Africa relations but contrast with the free market principles supported by the WTO. It should come as no surprise that the Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs) issue was carefully avoided at the Summit and that it found the EU disagreeing on an African proposal to review the EPAs in line with the requirements generated by differential development and industrial conditions.

In addition, generic statements in favour of justice and against impunity have not concealed the fact that a frank discussion on the role of the International Criminal Court and the administration of international justice remains a sticky question in the relations between the two partners. Finally, the Summit was also taking place against the background of an infuriated polemic between Africa and its Western partners, including the EU, on the human rights of lesbians and gays. In spite of these premises the importance that both partners attach to their relations has been demonstrated by the high level of representations with a large number of heads of states from both sides.

Leaders have adopted a Declaration and Roadmap to guide work between 2014-2017 and both documents reaffirm the commitment to continue political dialogue. Five priorities have been identified amongst those suggested by African and European partners: these include Peace and Security; Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights; Human Development; Sustainable and inclusive development and Continental Integration; and finally Global emerging issues. An interesting development is the introduction in the action plan, of references to agriculture, food security and the need to focus on nutrition sensitive production, as important for Africa and for the EU's assistance framework. Some reference has been made to human security concerns by restating commitments to combat the spread of small arms and light weapons including through UN frameworks and to encourage the ratification and implementation of relevant instrument on cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines. Conflict prevention ('addressing the root causes of conflict' and strengthening of coordination in 'the planning and conduct of conflict prevention and peace supported activities') find more explicit prominence in the 2014-2017 roadmap. In addition, the reference to **the human rights dimension** of intercontinental cooperation on peace and security is also more explicit.

Whilst these can be saluted as an improved focus from the eight thematic areas identified in previous action plans, they remain **relatively vague and broad**

fields of engagement. Much of the language in the two documents refers to commitments to improve dialogue and foster cooperation and the lack of details on concrete actions and initiatives indicates perhaps that a lot of the energy in the coming three years will actually be spent on negotiating the details. It also points to the recurring critique that the Partnership is characterised by weak leadership and lack of vision.

Some of the **concerns raised by civil society organisations** (CSOs) in the period leading up to the Summit have not been addressed in the discussions. These include the democratic deficit of the Partnership which does not mention the role of parliamentary oversight or the need for participatory consultations to contribute insights to decision-making. CSOs had suggested setting up civil society working groups whose representatives would also sit in decision making fora and the creation of a dedicated budget line and a permanent secretariat that would facilitate civil society work and function as a documentation centre. The Roadmap makes reference to an agreement to 'increase synergies between the political dialogue and cooperation and to promote contributions from the private sector and civil society' as well as to 'joint annual forums ...that will gather together all the actors of the Partnership' to assess implementation of the Roadmap. It does not indicate how concretely it wishes to go about promoting such participation. Civil society had also indicated the importance of focusing on shared concerns and agendas such as the **Post-2015 development framework and climate change** but in spite of initial suggestions that these would form the basis for separate and dedicated declarations, leaders have failed to achieve a consensus and the only stand-alone declaration was on migration and mobility.

In sum the Summit demonstrated that decision-makers from both continents seem to agree on the importance of keeping political dialogue going. However, they have failed to convince observers about the concrete achievements they wish to realise: the people of the two continents might thus have to wait a bit longer before they can see the concrete deliverables of the partnership.

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FOSTERING A WAY FORWARD IN THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP

● JOSEPH CHILENGI¹

General context

Lisbon set out to achieve very ambitious and much needed *transformative agenda*. It aimed at building a *political partnership* based on *mutual interests*. Over the last 5 years, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was to some degree *useful* in providing some level of *structure* to partnership between the two continents. But it also faced several challenges, including lack of *political traction from both sides*, a non-optimal *institutional set-up*, *divergence on key issues* (i.e. trade and international justice systems) and *limited financial resources* to showcase the added value of a new framework.

In addition to these challenges it is important to note that the EU-Africa partnership operates in an even more complex context than the one of 2007. Africa partners have developed new frameworks, the EU is witnessing a revival of its economy while dealing with persistent internal challenges, and the international balance of power is in constant transformation. The partnership will need to anticipate on the impact of this new context **to ensure its sustainability and relevance**.

Fostering a way forward: Key messages for Stakeholder Participation

I wish to appreciate and propose two refinements as follows:

- 1) Increase and deepen stakeholders involvement and contribution to the Africa-EU partnership process. There is already a call for greater inclusiveness for civil society, but the requirement here calls for something higher. In the current discourse, inclusiveness focuses on participation of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and other actors but deepening the process implies going upstream and downstream. It involves assigning more critical responsibilities to non-governmental and non-state actors and broadening the scope of their activities in the implementation strategy. The objective is to redefine the partnership as an effective multi-stakeholder enterprise.
- 2) As a logical corollary also, there is the need to stimulate and sustain a dynamic interplay between the dif-

ferent facets of the partnership enterprise, security, governance, democracy, development and migration, etc., so that the effect of action in one area will create multiplier effect in another. It may be useful in this context to have a framework for teasing out and reinforcing the cross-cutting linkages in the process.

African CSOs see the partnership between African and European citizens and their institutions, but we have been concerned with limited presence and participation of indigenous European civil society. All we see is European civil society fronting international NGOs based in Brussels such as Human Rights Watch and others to speak on behalf of European citizens. African CSOs find this diluting and defeating the whole purposes of European citizens and their institutions peering to enhance the living conditions and development.

A. Cross-cutting messages

Change perceptions on both sides. To move forward the partnership requires a change in **perceptions and attitudes**:

- From the **EU's side**: need to move beyond “conditionalities” and embrace “co-responsibility”, respecting pace and ownership of African reform processes.
- From the **African side**: need to recognise that the EU is not a homogeneous group of former colonial powers but that it also includes young democracies that became independent as recently as the 1990s; growing self criticism & assertiveness: support “home grown” initiatives, review strategic partnerships and mobilise own resources to maintain independence of action (= tackling longstanding asymmetry in the partnership).
- **For both**: recognise **common interests** where they exist and “**agree to disagree**” on issues of divergence. The two are not mutually exclusive.

Link up with owned frameworks. African institutions and civil society are in the process of concluding their reflections around the future development agenda of the continent (i.e. **Agenda 2063**). The Agenda, which provides milestones for the next 10 years, is designed to be the **guiding framework** for Africa's development but also the basis used to negotiate Africa's international partnerships and international positions i.e. on the post-MDGs framework. Discussions around the Agenda 2063 come

¹ I was privileged to be one of those persons addressing the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the IV Africa-EU Summit in Brussels, on the theme “peace, prosperity and people” and my address was specifically under the session “people”.

at a time when Africa and the EU need to reflect on the priorities for their future cooperation. Therefore, it will be imperative to consider how the priority areas of the EU-Africa partnership are aligned to the African priorities, as articulated in the Agenda 2063 and notably its 10-year milestones. This would ensure that there is ownership and political tractions to back the Partnership.

Structure follows function. It is imperative to discuss the institutional set up of the JAES on the basis of its intended function. As initially conceived, the JAES was meant to be a *political* and *people-centered partnership*. Yet the institutional set-up was deficient in both these elements (poor political traction to make it political and limited involvement of civil society). It will be important to go back to basics when discussing the new institutional set-up.

B. Thematic messages

Trade

Negotiations to reach Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between Europe and African countries are now more of a decade old. The process has been long and protracted and most African countries have been asked to open up their economies to levels far too ambitious

compared to their levels of development. This has caused tensions, frustrations and mistrust. Technical solutions to bottlenecks have been explored in and out and it seems now that a breakthrough requires a political approach, that will have to preserve the political and economic interests and objectives of the EU and Africa alike, so as to strengthen rather than undermine their strategic relationship. If unresolved, this might be a key hurdle at the forthcoming joint summit. *Therefore...*

On the process:

While many individual African countries see the EPA as a means to preserve their market access in Europe, at least in the short term (because Europe is also engaged in trade negotiations with other partners, and therefore the preference margin of African countries will ultimately be eroded), it might undermine their own regional integration agenda, and efforts of African Union to work towards a continental Free Trade Area, in line with Agenda 2063. The reasons for this are:

- Since regional integration agendas are not finished in Africa, countries will give more preferences to Europe than to their own neighbours within their own regional groupings;



- Similarly, the boosting intra-African trade agenda is only starting now, and many countries would have opened up to Europe already, giving much more preferences than they would give to other regional groupings. African products will therefore be faced with competition from European products (in particular in agriculture where products are subsidised);
- EPAs lock countries within their regional configurations. Since all market access are not identical (West Africa has opened 75% to Europe; Eastern and Southern African countries have varying degrees of openness, ranging from 80 to 98%), it will be difficult to construct an African single market with a customs union, unless all countries align themselves to the most opened one.

On the content:

1. African countries are being asked to commit that if they enter trade negotiations with larger economies in the future, they will extend any preferences to Europe (if they give more to these countries than under EPAs). This constraints the policy space for negotiations even before those are started. African countries will not be able to get a better deal.

2. African countries are being asked to remove export taxes and asked not to apply any in the future. In the current context where the continent is developing industrial policy, this constraints their policy space to protect their domestic infant industries, who will be faced with competition from European private sector. Today, European private sector is even subsidising their SMEs to reach out for business and market access in Africa.

3. Level of openness: Countries are asked to liberalise their market at 80% (75% agreed in West Africa). African countries are heterogeneous, with different economic structures. EPAs fail to recognise this; treating African countries as if they are a single homogenous economy constraints countries in taking economic measures that will allow them to uplift their economic conditions.

4. Finally, the fact that Europe has at least 6 different trade schemes in Africa² complicates matters for continental integration: EPAs for some; Generalised system of preferences - with a standard preference for lower middle income countries, and duty free quota free for LDCs; a special trade agreement with South Africa; a special trade scheme for North Africa; and no preferences for upper middle income countries.

² The EU has at least 6 trade schemes with Africa: (1) Under its Generalised system of Preferences (GSP), which is its standard preference scheme available to all developing countries; LDCs benefit from full duty-free and quota-free market access to the EU without having to give anything in return to the EU. (2) Lower middle income countries have preferential access to EU market mainly for products that are not sensitive for European producers. (3) Upper middle income African countries have no preferential access to the EU market, unless they sign an EPA (today, Gabon and Congo Rep have no preferences). (4) EPAs - so far, four countries (Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Zimbabwe) have signed an EPA. ECOWAS (15 countries) likely to do so. They will have a different trade regime to the EU. (5) South Africa has a separate trade agreement - a Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement since 1999 with the EU. (6) North Africa - Europe has signed FTAs with a number of North Africa countries and is even thinking of having a broader framework across the Mediterranean - (EUROMED Agreement). This is not helpful for continental integration.

“Technical solutions to bottlenecks have been explored in and out and it seems now that a breakthrough requires a political approach, that will have to preserve the political and economic interests and objectives of the EU and Africa alike.

Natural Resources and industrialisation

The key issue here is that so far, Africa has been exporting raw materials and has not managed to add much value to it. As a commodities exporter, it is subject to the volatility of commodity prices; to geopolitical interests that have driven new partners to grab resources; to excessive dependence on exports of raw materials etc. Although rich in resources, countries on average remain poor and their economies too dependent on commodities. Recent high growth rates are not yet transformative. In addition, extractive sectors are not creating enough jobs to absorb the bulging youth. *Therefore...*

1. It is imperative for Africa to **industrialise and add value** to its natural resources. No country in the world has managed its economic transition without industrialisation;

2. Industrialisation should be done through **linkages** both *within* the extractive sector (i.e. beneficiation) and *outside* the extractive sector (i.e. by using resources from extractive sectors to finance other sectors of the economy like agriculture and services);

3. It is important to ensure that **infrastructure** (physical infrastructure; energy, ICT) at competitive price is available;

4. The role of the **private sector** is key: here we mean space to nurture, promote and develop an *indigenous African private sector*, that will be able to create jobs, bring ideas, be innovative etc. While Foreign Direct Investment is much welcomed, it is important to strike a balance to ensure the local private sector can take off;

5. **Fighting illicit capital flows:** It is important to cooperate with international partners to fight the scourge of financial drain from multinational companies. This is a collective effort both from countries home and host of multinationals.

Governance and shared values

It is widely recognised that good governance and respect for human rights, *as defined in international standards*, are cherished by the average European and African alike. African human rights standards, which are championed by different human rights groups and pan-African institutions, are based on internationally agreed standards.

The recent disagreements surrounding homosexual rights are increasingly becoming an irritant in the partnership between European countries and Africa. Some EU countries have also decided to suspend their development cooperation to certain African countries (i.e. Uganda) as a result of anti-homosexual laws being passed in some African countries.

This issue raises again the question on the use of conditionality and the shared values base on which the partnership is founded. It highlights the need to further define the parameters of the shared values that will guide the future partnership taking into account the respective values of each continent as well as priorities of the partnership.

Post-2015 framework

African stakeholders have agreed on a draft Common African Position on the post-2015 framework. The position is currently being further refined by the Sherpas of the High-level Committee on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

Africa and the EU have the potential to agree on a common position on the post-2015 framework. However, the pace of consultations in both continents meant that a common position at the EU-Africa summit was not possible. This however does not stop the two continents from exploring the possibility of an alliance around this question.

Additionally, when discussing the financing of the post-2015 framework it would be important to also be aware of the fact that the AU is also exploring alternative sources of financing for the implementation of its Agenda 2063. It would therefore be important to promote synergies between the different frameworks to ensure that the available resources are used optimally.

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TOWARDS A EURO-AFRICAN ALLIANCE FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW IMPETUS IN AFRICA-EUROPE RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 4TH EU-AFRICA SUMMIT

● PHILIPPE DARMUZEY

Abstract

A new impetus in Africa-Europe relations is sorely needed. By the middle of the twenty-first century, Africa and Europe will have 2.5 billion citizens that share a common border with close economic, cultural and linguistic ties that need to peacefully co-exist. If current trends persist then security and development will remain at the top of the priorities of the two continents and both Europe and Africa must focus on this core area of mutual interest in the long term.

I am proposing a Euro-African Alliance (Treaty) for Peace, Security and Development. My argument is built around several pillars, which are: (i) peace and security can act as the mainspring of EU-Africa relations; (ii) there will be ever growing common challenges in Europe and Africa in an area inhabited by 2.5 billion people by 2050; (iii) the management, prevention, and resolving of crises and their consequences for Africa and Europe will become an ever more pressing need; (iv) the security-development nexus will demand a multi-dimensional long-term approach; (v) both Africa and Europe need to pool resources to a critical mass in order to address these issues effectively; (vi) the Joint Africa-EU Strategy needs to evolve to become a security and defence Treaty between the two Unions as well as a political alliance. On substance my proposal suggests to go beyond the current policy framework of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership and the rhetoric of the Summit meetings that take place every three years. To be recognised and effective, the commitments by the partners on both sides of the Mediterranean must be fixed in a formal agreement that will consolidate the Africa-EU Partnership into a legally binding framework.

PEACE AS THE MAINSPRING OF EU-AFRICA RELATIONS

In December 2012, in the eye of the political and economic storm of the worst crisis in its 55-year history, the EU¹ in Oslo received the Nobel Peace Prize. Could this recognition offer Europe a good reason to restart construction on the roads where the EU is least expected: security and development? Crisis in Europe and in Africa keep calling for a new impetus in both continents to pursue integration processes and unfinished political unions.

The continued threats to security in Europe and beyond, together with the fears of a new cold war unfolding in Ukraine and Crimea, make it compulsory for the EU as a whole to rethink and revive its Common Security & Defence Policy.

Beyond the current EU borders, the ever increased frequency of European interventions in conflicts and crises, especially in Africa, has given some legitimacy to the holding in December 2013 of another Summit between leaders of France & Africa on peace and security.

Recent developments around the Mali conflict and involvement of France, the EU and the African Union² in the Sahel, or in Central Africa and terrorist attacks by al shebaab in Nairobi, in September 2013 are rekindling the debate on the need for a European Common Defence Policy and enhanced relationship with Africa for Peace, Security and Development.

Responding to these long-term challenges is the subject of the **proposal for a Euro-African Alliance (Treaty) for Peace, Security and Development** I made on 30 November 2012 as part of the Symposium of the University Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, "The African Peace and Security Architecture, 10 years after Durban". The above paper analyzes the concrete elements and the

¹ If the three major EU institutions were present, an indecent number of Member States (10 out of 27), including the United Kingdom, declined to attend the Oslo event at the appropriate political level.

² African Union (AU) in the broadest sense, including its regional economic communities (RECs), in the case of Mali crisis, ECOWAS / ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African).

feasibility of the establishment of a New Agreement³. My proposal was further developed in a communication made on the occasion of the Colloque of Ouagadougou on "l'APSA à la croisée des chemins", 25-26 October 2013.⁴

COMMON CHALLENGES IN EUROPE AND AFRICA IN AN AREA OF 2.5 BILLION PEOPLE BY 2050

Together, Europe and Africa will cover in the middle of the twenty-first century a contiguous economic space of 2 billion 500 million citizens geographically, economically, culturally and linguistically close. Many opinion leaders on the European scene have recently echoed the need for a new approach to security and development. Some rediscover the importance for peace, of strategic partnerships with regional organizations such as the African Union⁵, that meet the configuration of a multipolar world in which Africa becomes an actor that counts, beyond the negative stereotypes that usually keep being devoted to it.

PREVENT, MANAGE AND RESOLVE CRISES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR AFRICA AND EUROPE

The Libyan conflict, the crisis of the Arab Spring, the situation in Somalia for 20 years, the Sudan(s) and Darfur, the Ivorian crisis, Chad or the past, present and yet to come crises in eastern Congo, the Great Lakes, Central Africa and Sahel now or beyond Mali, teach us all the criticism and positive lessons of the relationship between

Europe and Africa in the prevention, management and resolution of crises and their consequences.

If Africa is now generally committed to the path of growth, economic and democratic progress, yet crisis situations and local, national and trans-regional pockets of fragility with their multiple and complex causes, are not nearly about to disappear from the political and strategic concerns of African and European citizens, leaders, institutions and governments. For example, beyond governance issues and corruption as determinants of political and institutional instability, trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings and money laundering have developed into permanent crime organisation especially in the Sahel-Saharan zone and West Africa. The strengthening links between drug traffickers and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and the Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa (Mijao) aggravates the porous borders between Africa and Europe, including through the complex ramifications of these groups with their mafia correspondents of the Camorra kind in Europe.

In the crisis of Mali, after the initial euphoria of surprise around the Serval operation⁶ deployed in the sub-regional theatre, a certain 'loneliness' of France stealthily emerged. President Hollande therefore sought a commitment from the EU in the management of the post-intervention phase: *"As the Mali regains its territorial integrity, comes the political time. This time must be that of the African organizations and that of Europe."* As he had done before, he called for the establishment of a European defense and a common diplomacy⁷. Similarly, the chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of the European Parliament stated *"France lost its soldiers. It accomplishes a mission on behalf of the European Union, welcomed by all countries. (...) We should ask ourselves about solidarity, not just financial, what it means on substance."* He then expressed the wish of a 'proactive' approach by the European Union.

The consequences of the Arab Spring and the rise of terrorism and arms trafficking revive the relevance of a more ambitious, comprehensive approach with a time horizon of at least 10 years. This raises serious questions

³ Philippe Darmuzey : "La Facilité de Soutien à la Paix pour l'Afrique, moteur d'une nouvelle Alliance Euro-Africaine pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement", Colloque de l'Université de Bordeaux IV sur "l'Architecture de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique : 10 ans après le Protocole de Durban". Bordeaux, 30 novembre 2012. Actes du colloque de Ouagadougou "l'APSA à la croisée des chemins", 25-26 octobre 2013, to be edited by Harmattan, Paris. 1st semester 2014.

⁴ Philippe Darmuzey : "Vers une Alliance Euro-Africaine pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement: *Et si le prix Nobel de la paix offrait un nouveau ressort à la coopération Europe-Afrique?*". Actes du colloque de Ouagadougou "l'APSA à la croisée des chemins", 25-26 octobre 2013, to be edited by Harmattan, Paris. 1st semester 2014.

⁵ e.g. Alain Juppé, former french Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and current Mayor of Bordeaux, conference at the Bordeaux Rotary Club, 9.01.2013.

⁶ With the well-known anti-depressant effects of national public opinion.

⁷ See articles by Nicolas Gros-Verheyde in the European Blog 'Bruxelles2' of March 13-14, 2012.

about the lack of 'strategic' vision, and the restrictive attitude of politicians in Europe who tend to resort to fragmented and limited actions to date.

The debate on the stalemate that has led the United States and its allies to strategic failure in Iraq and Afghanistan with European involvement was revived in the sands of the Sahel-Saharan Mali region. The Libyan crisis was too rapidly removed from media headlines and political agendas after the international intervention (France, UK, Belgium, EU, NATO, Arab League ...) in a context of strained relations with the African Union. Ultimately, in Mali success will be determined as much by the removal of Islamist groups as the ability to stabilize politically and economically develop the country. European Analysts keep discussing the risk posed by an early military engagement of a single State based on a series of insufficiently clear and collectively agreed doctrinal conditions.

THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: A DEMANDING MULTI-DIMENSIONAL LONG-TERM APPROACH

The evolution of the international debate on the link between security and development has led in recent years to the recognition of the need for a comprehensive, integrated and sequenced approach to conflicts combining military, diplomacy, humanitarian and development means. Challenges to peace and security in Africa affect us, directly and indirectly, but are so complex that **only a strong and united EU can mobilize the necessary skills (political, military, financial, technical) and the arsenal of instruments** for Statebuilding and reconstruction. Member States individually have neither the resources nor the sufficient critical mass. The toolbox of the EU should be further developed to better complement policies and instruments such as the African Peace Facility (APF). The newly created Pan-African Programme (PAP)⁸ should usefully complement the toolbox. It is also desirable to better connect these tools to facilitate their flexible, rapid and simultaneous use. Efficiency gains will result from the opening up and defragmentation of multiple centres of decision-making and institutional knowledge throughout the security and development chain in

Brussels (Commission, EEAS⁹, Council, and Parliament) and in capitals. Red tape and arsenal of inter-service and inter-institutional procedures accumulated and inherited from the "acquis" by the external action of the EU are no longer compatible with a critical response to crisis, situations of fragility and peace and security strategies. The Peace Facility for Africa is subject to a mix of decision procedures, legal, administrative, financial and political, which considerably weakens its political visibility, scope and operational efficiency.

CRITICAL MASS , POOLING OF RESOURCES AND MUTUAL INTEREST

European construction is often advanced through the cycles of crisis and subsequent pragmatic initiatives. Thus the CECA¹⁰ was initiated by the founding fathers — Monnet, Schuman, De Gasperi, Adenauer — at the end of the war, providing for the pooling of Community resources, production and marketing of coal and steel between the six founding Member States the Union. The current context of the systemic financial and budgetary crisis adds urgency to the pooling of EU funding for the deployment of a CFSP and ESDP¹¹ worthy of the name. Moreover, recent developments in the political and international context make integrated alliances between Africa and Europe more necessary and acceptable to each other, especially in the wake of the Arab springs and, for example, the recognition that Algeria and the Mediterranean countries of North Africa are more than ever essential players in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the lessons of the ambiguous involvement of the African Union for the treatment of the Libyan crisis were drawn, confirming a new commitment in conflicts on the continent by Pan-African institutions, especially the Council for Peace and Security and the Commission of the African Union. The latest crisis in Central Africa — counter-example of Mali as regards the French intervention, illustrates the reactivity of the new African Union which quickly took measures to suspend from the pan-African bodies the officials responsible of the unconstitu-

⁸ PAP was created in 2014 under the instrument for development cooperation (DCI) of the EU multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020

⁹ European External Action Service (EEAS), institutional representation of the 'common diplomacy' called for by President Holland in March 2012.

¹⁰ European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established by the Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951.

¹¹ Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Common Defence Policy (ESDP)

tional change resulting from the Seleka rebellion. Again, the Africans progressively realize the need for a critical mass and pooling of resources to respond to security challenges as evidenced by the progress of APSA¹² as well as the creation and staffing (still symbolic) of an African Peace Fund.

On both sides of the EU and the AU, time has come to raise to the next level the common ambition to deal with security and development in Europe and Africa.

WHY JAES SHOULD TURN INTO A POLITICAL ALLIANCE AND A SECURITY AND DEFENCE TREATY BETWEEN THE TWO UNIONS

The proposal of a Treaty is not built from scratch. Since 2007 an institutional and political “acquis” has enabled both Unions, their 82 Member States and sub-regional African Communities and “mechanisms” to interact on many levels:

- the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership and its Joint Strategy (JAES) that define shared principles and values and common objectives and mutual commitments, all renewed in 2010 at the Tripoli Summit;
- thematic partnerships in eight priority areas, including Peace and Security;
- the institutional architecture of implementation and its three-year action plans.

The activation of this institutional framework is coupled with a permanent political dialogue at various levels:

- continent to continent Summits every three years, the last in Brussels on 2-3 April 2014;
- biannual global ministerial dialogue, now limited to peace and security issues by the *fait accompli* from Baroness Ashton, High Representative of the EU for Foreign affairs and Security and Vice-President of the Commission;
- thematic or sectoral dialogues (environment, climate, education, democratic governance, human rights...) according to the circumstances;
- Annual Institutional High Level Dialogue between the two Commissions (EU-AUC).



HR Catherine Ashton and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
Photo courtesy by the European External Action Service

If the results are mixed in concrete terms, that *acquis* has not been challenged politically. It is even likely that without this framework for dialogue and political action, as well as a degree of institutional parallelism between the two Unions, prevention, management and resolution of past or ongoing crises in Africa (Somalia, Mali, Niger, Guinea(s), Sudan(s), Côte d' Ivoire, Central African Republic, the Lord's Resistance Army, DRC etc.) wouldn't have been discussed and progressively better understood by Europe and Africa as a whole. The same is true, albeit in small steps, of a common approach to major international threats (terrorism, various traffics, global challenges). Despite limited progress, the African Union with the support of Europe has strengthened its credibility in Somalia and now take a more systematic position and action in all African crises. The European Union, through one or more of its Member States (France, United Kingdom, Poland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and a few others), though never without a reference to the EU framework, has also made slow progress in its approach to crises and global threats. Based on this observation, there can be no turning back or status quo. But what progress can we expect next?

Europe, still under construction, seems to be moving according to the principle ‘necessity knows no law’: each major crisis having led to regression in the integration process (regression is a feature of the last 5 years period) is followed by a significant recovery process and a new step forward in European construction. This is true in

¹² African Peace & Security Architecture (APSA)

“Local, national and trans-regional pockets of fragility with their multiple and complex causes, are not nearly about to disappear from the political and strategic concerns of African and European citizens.

the external action of the EU where, despite the failures of the CFSP and the damage inflicted by the economic crisis, Europe is beginning to have an embryo common diplomatic service, and is about to agree and apply a new global («comprehensive») approach to crises and external conflicts. Moreover, recent months have seen the revival of the old debate on the need for a European (common) defense and security policy (to succeed the ghost ESDP). In France, despite the politicians' contortions to avoid it, the 2013 debate on the Defence budget (following the 'white paper'), irresistibly 'drifted' to the European dimension. International crises, emerging threats, interventions in Africa and the long lasting consequences of the Arab Springs together with dwindling budgets, all these factors push EU Member States forward in a new phase of pooling resources and policy instruments : necessity knows no law.

Although there are indisputable positive lessons to learn from the French intervention in Mali , there is much to say more generally on the method used to involve the EU: operation «Serval» was legitimately deployed through a minimum consultation of partners both to keep the surprise effect whilst not alienating essential European partners (Germany, UK...) and with a view to getting maximum political benefits. Afterwards, a European campaign was launched from Paris, highlighting the delays and deficiencies in Brussels, which allowed, in the first instance to justify the postponement of the

initially announced military withdrawal from Sahelian sands, and then, in a second step, to bear the burden ahead on the non-existence of a EU defensive solidarity over the years. Hence my argument: it has become a habit, in an unfinished European Union, (especially in the field of security and defense since the distant failure of the European Defence Community (EDC), caused by France in 1954) for the same Member States that count in this field and in the UN Security Council, to engage in solo-political on the theatre of high-risk and costly operations; then to turn back to European institutions to seek EU's full support, legitimacy and financial resources with a view to continuity and transfer of the risk of stalemate. How could the EU answer, even survive, such a political schizophrenia, when she has been denied democratic legitimacy, resources and a proper framework for action in this area by the same Member States that criticize its paralysis?

The African Union, meanwhile, has received a truly supranational mandate in the field of peace and security whereby its governing body, the Peace & Security Council, has been able to develop an effective operational framework through the APSA and the 'regional Communities & mechanisms' (RECs). These achievements are little known and rarely publicized. They have been made possible thanks to the support of the EU and its Member States. Africa, indisputably, recognizes the value added of the EU support in this area. Comparatively, the other emerging partners, including China, will never offer an equivalent and natural geo-strategic and cultural community of fate. But Europe cannot rely on this benefit eternally. Nevertheless, multilateral interventions as part of a political relationship between the two Unions will ultimately prove more acceptable and realistic for the treatment of bilateral crises. They will replace soon or late individual commitments from Member States of the EU of the “Françafrique” type as maligned, but never eradicated. Paradoxically, the Libyan crisis has advanced the African Union and drawn lessons for the future. If the intervention in Libya did not meet a consensus, it is because the AU was stuck in a double bind: that of a division due to the political legacy of the Gaddafi era, that of persistent fragmentation among North African Member States and sub-Saharan Africa . Lessons learned from the Arab Springs and the Sahel Mali-crises will gradually impose a less fragmented approach between Northern and Sub-Saharan African subregions.

NEED FOR A SUSTAINABLE AND LEGALLY BINDING POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

It is necessary to go beyond the current policy framework of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership and the rhetorics of the Summit meetings every three years. To be recognized and effective, the commitments by the stakeholders on both sides of the Mediterranean, must be fixed in a formal agreement that will consolidate the Africa-EU Partnership into a legally binding framework¹³. Neither the Cotonou Agreement and its ACP nebula, nor the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in its current state can meet this dual concern of a strategic and legal commitment. Both still provide a starting point to the feasibility of the project : Cotonou for the legal force of its framework; JAES for the political gains of the continental dialogue between the two Unions and new approaches sketched around security and international cooperation.

The future agreement and its legal basis should be based on mutual interest, commitment and the pooling of resources. The new Pan-African financial instrument (Pan-African Programme of the 2014-2020 EU DCI¹⁴ budget) combined with a reformed version of the African Peace Facility, more compatible with the new EU common foreign and security policy, will constitute the centre of gravity and the engine room to ensure the implementation of operational priorities in the short, medium and long term. They will complement and add consistency in the technical, human and bilateral financial instruments of EU Member States. The asymmetry of resources between the two continents will thus be progressively addressed pending a necessary growing financial and technical participation from national and regional African partners.

TOWARDS A EURO-AFRICAN ALLIANCE FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Forging a treaty of alliance between Europe and Africa for peace, security and development can be a major deliverable of the European and African construction processes.

During the 4th EU-Africa Summit on 2-3 April 2014 in Brussels, the 82 Heads of State and Government of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership had a unique opportunity to consider a new, more integrated, more ambitious approach, for the peace and security partnership, in the form of a Euro-African Alliance. A package of €2.5 billion could be put on the table with two main pillars: (1) the **Pan-African Programme** which will be the centre of gravity of the continent to continent cooperation with Africa in priority areas of mutual interest with a trans-regional and continental overall added value (€1 billion was initially proposed for the period 2014-2020) ; (2) the **Peace Facility (APF)**, which must evolve beyond its current purely instrumental nature. The APF financial allocation should be substantially increased as it would stand as the central mechanism of the Joint Security and Development Strategy in Africa. The corresponding thematic Partnership of the JAES would have to be revised accordingly. Matching this ambition with adequate resources is just a matter of political will from the Member

¹³ In Europe, although it is up to the EU institutions to inject a new momentum in this area, Member States should take their responsibility, hence the need for a binding agreement, which they cannot evade according to national imperatives of the moment.

¹⁴ Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)



The African Union Commission Chairperson, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, and the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, in the IV Africa-EU Summit
Photo courtesy from the European Council

States on the two sides. On the African side, this can be achieved through a gradually growing financial contribution to the above 2 pillars. Ideally this could go hand in hand with a merger of the African Peace facility and the AU Peace Fund.

This proposal is financially and politically feasible as a pragmatic and legal variation of the Strategic Partnership outlined in Lisbon in 2007 and confirmed in Tripoli in 2010¹⁵. It draws lessons from experience, from the Libyan crisis, Mali, Somalia and the 'Arab Spring' and other regional or international security challenges. It would, on the one hand, offer a real anchor point for a revival of the European defense project with the ambition to better link peace, security and development thus meeting the expectations of citizens on both sides of the Mediterranean. It would, on the other hand, enable the essential strengthening of our mutual strategic interests with Africa as a whole (AU + Morocco). This proposal is a concrete illustration of recent political statements made by a few European leaders (see above.)

Conflicts and crises as mentioned above, as well as the consequences of the Arab Spring, are the fundamental issues of EU-Africa relations in the coming years. A more ambitious and more integrated partnership approach will have to succeed the current practise of interventions in 'silo' through national means or instruments of the EU APF kind.

On 2-3 April 2014, by establishing the political, legal, strategic and financial foundations of a Euro-African Alliance for Peace, Security and Development, the European Union and the African Union and their member states, could provide a common answer based on mutual interest to the challenges of the XXI century. The two Unions would create a framework to add value to their relationships, which can be provided by no other partnership with emerging partners, be they China and other BRICS¹⁶. They would offer their Member States a new political platform for a more equal dialogue on conflicts and exit strategies towards economic and social development. They would give a new impetus to the pursuit of European construction and pan-African integration with the mutual benefits to be gained from the combined experience of the two continental processes. They would put an end to obsolete national debates in the two conti-

nents on past relationships that must quickly shift to new approaches to embrace the challenges of the twenty-first century.

In Europe, the pooling of coal and steel resources in the aftermath of the second world war led to a successful CECA; the mutualisation of security and defence resources, as a result of the crisis of the Euro and budgets, could as well lead to a revival of the European defense policy. Between Europe and Africa, an International treaty in the form of an Alliance for peace, security and development would address more effectively the common challenges of the two continents. It would further optimize the pooling of resources on the two sides whilst boosting the integration process of the two Unions. It is about time now to take Europe-Africa relations to the next level.



Photo courtesy of the European External Action Service (EEAS)

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¹⁵ Strategic Partnership and Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted at the Lisbon Summit, 7-8 December 2007.

¹⁶ BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (SA)

INTERVIEW WITH OBADIAH MAILAFIA

What is your assessment of the 4th Africa-EU Summit?

The much-awaited Fourth Europe-Africa Summit took place in Brussels on the 3rd and 4th of April as planned. Bringing together 60 Heads of State and Government (40 from Africa and 20 from Europe) was no mean feat in itself. We have to be honest enough to acknowledge that some elements of controversy had dogged the path to the Summit. I happen to know that because I was privileged to be involved in the policy dialogue organised by our EU Commission colleagues leading up to the Summit. Some concerns had been expressed among African circles that Morocco, which is not a member of the African Union, had been invited. This had to be at the expense of Western Sahara, which is recognised by the AU and vehemently opposed by the Government in Rabat. There had been initial controversies of whether Egypt could participate, as it has been suspended from the AU following the coup d'état by Field Marshal Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi that overthrew the Islamist-led administration of Mohammed Morsi. In the end, Egypt did make a low-key showing at the conference. Some EU member States had initially opposed the participation of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, only to capitulate within the last couple of weeks. Mugabe himself cancelled his planned visit after his wife's visa application was turned down. President Jacob Zuma of South Africa did not attend due to "other commitments", perhaps as a result of local difficulties involving alleged corruption in the building of his \$30 mansion at Nkandla.

The recently concluded Summit had as its theme, *"Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace"*. Given all the odds arrayed against it, the meeting was a success. Issues that would have been otherwise divisive were handled with civility. The EU had preferred not to discuss the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), but had come to realise the absurdity of not doing so. The issue of gay rights, championed by European leaders such as the openly gay Belgian premier Elio Di Rupo, was also handled with decorum.

The final communiqué reaffirmed the objectives set out in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the Lisbon Summit of 2007 and the 2010 Tripoli Declaration following the Third Summit in Libya. It noted the progress that has been made in good governance, democracy and human rights in Africa and the strides in macroeconomic growth. However, they regretted the fact that such growth has not been inclusive and has not trickled down to the poorest groups in society.

The Summit placed a strong accent on the idiom of interdependence and solidarity between the nations of

Africa and Europe, with ties rooted in history, trade and geographical contiguity: "our economies remain closely linked, and we will work to ensure that growth of the one will help the other. We are also convinced that trade and investment and closer economic integration each of our continents will accelerate growth."

Under the broad theme of "Security", Summit leaders agreed to work together to build a zone of mutual security. Preventing violent conflicts and tackling the conditions that generate instability are considered essential to building the foundations for a just and lasting peace in Africa. The leaders recognised terrorism as a menace that must be tackled head-on. The fragile situation in Mali, Central African Republic, Somalia, the Great Lakes and DRC came for special mention. The EU pledged to do their part to strengthen the African security architecture and to provide financial and logistical support to peacekeeping forces in Africa.

Under the broad theme of "Prosperity", Summit leaders committed themselves to working together to boost trade and growth as the foundations for sustainable prosperity. Tackling youth unemployment was considered an urgent imperative. Summit leaders welcomed progress being made with regard to EPA negotiations and committed themselves to exploring ways and means to ensure that a just and equitable settlement is reached between Europe and Africa. The Summit urged African nations to fast track the Continental Free Trade Area (CTFA) that would offer an opportunity to create a single market in Africa. They also expressed their determination to advance the Climate Change Agenda by cooperating in adopting a joint framework at the Paris 2015.

Under the theme of "People", the Summit underlined the importance of a people-centred approach to development. It committed the leaders of the EU and Africa to work together for an international development architecture that advances the cause of anti-poverty and accelerated human development within the framework of a post-2015 development agenda. People should be put at the heart of all governance efforts and human rights should be considered sacred, including commitment to fighting all forms of discrimination, racism and xenophobia on both sides of the continent.

A roadmap was drawn up for the implementation of partnership over the years 2014-2017, centred on (i) peace and security; (ii) democracy, good governance and human rights; (iii) human development; (iv) sustainable and include development and growth and continental integration; and (v) global and emerging issues. The EU announced a financial package of more than €28 billion of fi-



nancing to Africa over the years 2014-2020, in addition to resources from bilateral cooperation by member states. The Fifth Summit is scheduled to take place in Africa in 2017.

I am aware that there is some dissatisfaction in some quarters regarding the general and rather opaque nature of the outcomes. No price, in my view, can be placed on dialogue in itself. We may not have achieved the most optimal of outcomes, but the Summit agreed on fundamental principles and reaffirmed their commitment to working together as partners of destiny. The roadmap that has been jointly agreed gives us reason for hope.

From an African perspective, what do you think is Europe's current added value to Africa and the ACP, taking into account the current multitude of flows and partners for the continent?

Europe and Africa have come a long way. We are continental neighbours. We have a shared heritage rooted in history, language, trade and diplomatic relations. But, if truth be told, those relations have not always been based on truth, equality and justice. But things are changing, I believe, for the better. Today, Europe remains by far the most generous aid donor to Africa. Our trade linkages remain strong, although China has made significant inroads in recent years. The BRICS countries have become a major presence on the African economic and diplomatic scene. But I am not of the opinion that more trade with China or the BRICS necessarily means less and less of the same with Europe. We no longer live in a zero-sum world. All considered, Africans will continue to value their economic and diplomatic relationships with Europe. We aspire to the same Standards of Civilisation. We share the same aspirations for democracy and the rule of law and commitment to a world based on respect for the precepts of international law.

What would be, in your opinion, the main global and continental challenges for EU-Africa relations in the coming years?

Several issues come to mind. First and foremost, both sides need to expedite action in on finalising the EPA negotiations. This calls for greater flexibility and understanding on both sides. Africans need to view the New Europe not with old blinkers but as a regional community which wants a zone of mutual prosperity with Africa. Africans have not

easily forgotten that their ancient trading links with Europe were often enforced by gunboat diplomacy. An international division of labour that consigns Africans to being mere exporters of raw materials and consumers of expensive manufactured goods is no longer acceptable to most Africans. Europe must also accept that the old paradigm no longer has legitimacy. There are also issues surrounding the question of immigrants, in particular, the hundreds if not thousands, of youths in rickety boats making desperate efforts to enter Europe. There are bad immigrants and there are good immigrants. We need to work together to discourage the bad and encourage the good ones on a win-win basis. I think it is also important to close the credibility gap between Europe and Africa. I would like to see more visits between leaders on both sides. We also need to strengthen our cultural and educational links to bridge some of the gaps in understanding. I dream, for example, of an international Europe-Africa university institute based in Africa and committed to promoting intellectual and scientific linkages between our two continents. It would also train future leaders in government and business committed to enhancing our diplomatic, trade and investment linkages. Lastly, I believe it is essential that both the EU and AU Commissions have an institutional mechanism that works to drive the implementation of the roadmap for the strategic partnership. We do not have to wait for until the next Summit in 2017. Once the leaders have given their marching orders, the servants of the regional communities must get to work within a sound institutional framework to take the agenda forward.

In your opinion, what are the future prospects for the Cotonou Agreement, due to expire in 2020?

The relations between Europe and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States have long been viewed as model of North-South cooperation. Through the European Development Fund (EDF) and highly generous trading arrangements, Europe has been a major factor in the economic prospects of the 79 odd countries that make up the ACP. But it is evident that things may be changing. There is a perception, rightly or wrongly, that Europe is reassessing its relations with the ACP.

The Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009. The Treaty seeks a major overhaul of the European system and far-reaching restructuring of its key institutions. What has been rather troubling for the ACP is the fact that the Treaty makes no express reference to the long-standing partnership between the EU and the ACP. Global re-alignments and major shifts in EU policy orientations

“Global re-alignments and major shifts in EU policy orientations have given rise to concerns of possible downgrading of the importance of the ACP-EU Partnership.

have given rise to concerns of possible downgrading of the importance of the ACP-EU Partnership. The EU's neighbourhood focus with regard to Eastern Europe and North Africa; and its rapprochement with Latin America and the general thrust of its development policy re-orientation has led to some disquiet among ACP members.

It is evident that the ACP will continue to need Europe as a predictable source of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to finance their development. Europe, on the other hand, will continue to be a key player in many of those countries not only in terms of development assistance but also in the area of humanitarian intervention and political dialogue. Europe has technology and skills, while the ACP has an abundance of natural-resource endowments. There is therefore a basis for interdependence and mutuality of interests.

From a rational-actor viewpoint, we also believe that Europe will continually need the ACP to validate its evolving role as a global actor in international relations. As principal donor to the ACP, the EU has access to 79 member countries within its sphere of diplomatic and geopolitical influence. Cotonou provides a basis for the wielding of 'soft power' by Europe, a form of influence which Joseph Nye of Harvard has famously elaborated as the principal source of power in our twenty-first century. Lest we forget, the ACP has occasionally wielded its numerical strength and moral authority in support of EU international agendas, as exemplified by its support for EU representation in the UN General Assembly.

For the ACP countries, the uncertainties regarding the future are leading them to exploration of alternative linkages with the emerging South. The rise of the emerging economies and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -- the nations generally referred to as the BRICS -- offers perhaps a new window of opportunity. The ACP feel that they can leverage on their numeric strength and moral authority to promote their collective interests while building new alliances with the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America. A collective strategy to tap these opportunities has been part of the overall future orientation of the ACP. During 2013 the Seventh ACP Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, endorsed the initiative of the Secretary-General in creating a team of Eminent Persons headed by former Nigerian President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to think out alternative scenarios of the ACP post-2020 and to come up with recommendations.

The urgent appeal for action to validate the ACP Group's continuing relevance now is at the same time an

urgent reminder that the global context in which the ACP Group acts has transformed radically since Lomé I, but at the same time is a strong affirmation of the inherent dynamism and durability of the ACP Group. Through the vicissitudes of time, the ACP have weathered many a storm and have lost not a few heroic battles. Today, we could say that the organisation has come of age. The ACP no longer define their identity exclusively in terms of their partnership with Europe. Rather, they define their identity as being rooted in their sense of shared history; in their commitment to the universal values of democracy and the rule of law; in that dialogue of civilisations without which humanity's future is gravely imperilled.

More than anyone, the leadership within the ACP are keenly aware that the honeymoon of privileged access to EU markets is over, thanks to the emerging of rules-based WTO international trading regime. The new uncertainties deriving from the New Europe, with its changing institutional architecture and geopolitical priorities are also not lost on them. They know that these imperatives impose the necessity for choice; a choice that will require diversifying their economic and political linkages and embracing South-South cooperation and the opportunities opened up by the emerging economies of China, India and Brazil.

Regrettably, the ACP as an organisation also suffers from certain inherent weaknesses. For one thing, it has never quite performed with the credibility expected of an international organisation comprising 79 countries with a population of nearly a billion people. The status of the Secretary-General is, in truth, more that of Secretary than General. It seems also something of an oddity that an international organisation with such worldwide ambitions is largely run by ambassadors who are not even officially credited to the body. If an organisation is run by ambassadors whose primary briefs are to protect the narrow interests of their own countries, then that organisation is, ipso facto, bound to be crippled by immobility and indecision. Unless the ACP takes serious measures to reinvent itself as a forward-looking international organisation, it cannot expect to have a future beyond 2020.

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The views expressed in this interview are the interviewee's personal opinions and not the official views of the ACP or its Management and Principal Organs.

AFRICA-EU RELATIONS: DIALOGUE AND CAPACITY FOR DELIVERY

● MEHARI TADDELE MARU AND EMEBET G. ABATE

The 4th Africa-EU Summit was held at a unique period due to four important developments: the crises in South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Mali, and the ensuing upheavals in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, the new leadership at the African Union Commission (AUC), and the proliferation of African partnerships with various old and newly emerging powers. With a different philosophy influencing the new leadership at the AUC, and divergent views on the causes, consequences and responses to the crises following the North African uprisings, the relationship between the two continents needs to focus on overhauling the partnership and its underpinning assumptions.

A partnership characterised by fatigue and frustration

For varied reasons, those regularly engaged in the Africa-EU partnership tend to exhibit a degree of fatigue and frustration. If not addressed properly, the ongoing fatigue and frustration may grow to mutually assured distrust about the partnership. The AU has already indicated its position on the need to overhaul its partnerships with a view to embracing the minimalist and inclusive approach. More importantly it urges all partnerships to be anchored in priority based on “concrete projects with earmarked funding” modelled after the Africa-India, Africa-Korea and Africa-China or FOCAC partnerships.

The focus should be on “implementation, implementation, and implementation”

Compared to some other partnerships, the Africa-EU partnership has been characterised by a lack of delivery of concrete actions commensurate with the pledges and promises of the previous Summits and technical meetings. A case in point is the current disappointingly low performance in all partnership areas. This is partly due to the lengthy procedures in terms of disbursement of funding by the EU, but more so in that actual financial disbursement does not usually match up with pledges.

Largely, the lack of delivery emanates from the weak absorption capacity of the AU. The AUC, designed to be the engine of the AU, reflecting 78% of the budget and 92% of the total human resources of the AU, is currently functioning with only 54% of its approved staff complement. It has 1,458 staff members, of which 495 are professional. With 319 professional positions vacant,

it employs more than 800 short-term consultants. Its programme performance and budget execution rate, as assessed by the AU Assembly for 2012 remains at a dismal 60%. This conceals a much worse performance rate in the execution of its programme budget, which stands at a depressingly low 39%. Some departments critical to ensuring human security in the long term are “struggling between execution rates of 15% and 25% budget execution.”

Weaknesses on either side are likely to affect the overall performance of the partnership. Since one of the most serious binding constraints of the partnership has been the slow and low delivery of most of the projects, the effectiveness of the next partnership period will depend on the capability of the AU to absorb the existing funds and implement the relevant projects. Hence, given its human resource capacity limitations, and its sluggish internal decision-making procedures, the AU’s delivery capabilities in terms of this partnership will have to be developed as a partnership priority.

“If not addressed properly, the ongoing fatigue and frustration may grow to mutually assured distrust about the partnership (...) The Africa-EU partnership has been characterised by a lack of delivery of concrete actions commensurate with the pledges and promises...

Delivery as a measurement for an effective partnership

Effective delivery depends on the will and capacity of the partners. Both sides need to ensure continuous dialogue to reinforce political will and identify and reinforce overlapping consensus. On the EU side, it has to make resources available. The EU should provide much-needed funding without any conditional strings attached, and needs to understand Africa's priorities. This however does not mean that there should not be mutual accountability by either side toward one another. As such there should be a clear allocation of responsibilities, review of progress and proposals for addressing weaknesses. Such processes, though, need to be conducted on the basis of mutual respect and equality, not as a donor-recipient subordinate relationship, one questioning and the other responding. Both partners need to question and provide answers. Above all, however, dialogue should aim at offering impetus for implementation, and reviewing progress and ensuring mutual accountability.

Mega trends in Africa and the EU's unique pedigree

By aggressively working on fewer, yet more essential shared priorities with anticipated high returns on efforts and resources, the Africa-EU partnership could be turned into a natural and mutually vital partnership. However, the partnership needs to avoid areas that are already sufficiently covered by other partnerships in order to reduce the potential waste of resources by duplication of efforts. The partnership also needs to strive to enhance its returns for its efforts by investment in areas of comparative advantage.

In this regard, three mega trends in Africa shed light on the Africa-EU partnership's preferred area of focus. First, with increasing worldwide competition for resources, trade, investment and markets, and with an ill-equipped regulatory and enforcement mechanism, Africa still manages multiple and diverse partnerships. Currently, Africa has more than a dozen partnerships, including the Africa-EU, Africa-China (FOCAC), Africa-Japan (TICAD), Africa-India, Africa-Turkey, Africa-USA (AGOA), Africa-South America, Africa-France and the Africa-Caribbean partnerships. There are also the Afro-Arab and Korea-Africa Forum partnerships in addition to potentially new relationships such as the Africa-Iran and

Africa-Australasia partnerships. Other multilateral institutions such as the UN also collaborate very closely with Africa. As indicated in recent decisions of the AU, Africa is willing, but also progressively able, to grasp those opportunities with prospects for high returns and the ability to deliver results.

Second, and highly related to the first trend, is that in a bid to reclaim performance legitimacy, that African states have been denied by the 'Washington Consensus', African governments have focused heavily on the need to deliver basic services such as infrastructure, health, education and other public utilities. These increasing inclinations towards the 'developmental state' model comes with funding and soft loans devoid of governance related conditions. This trend is being enthusiastically supported within the AU Commission, including the new leadership. The main sources are non-traditional donors such as India, China and Korea. The deflationary implications of these trends for democracy, human rights and good governance are grave, as African developmental states seek performance legitimacy through delivery at the cost of popular legitimacy through democracy.

The AU needs to rapidly shift its focus toward the prevention of conflicts instead of unsuccessfully reacting to violent civil wars beyond its means. Increasingly, African problems will be local with regional and global impact, but their solution will mainly remain local in terms of grievances related to governance and political issues. Well-placed to promote democracy and human rights, the EU could assist the AU in a smooth transition towards preventive works through improved governance and economic development. Hence, in contrast to China, the unique pedigree of the EU and mega trends in Africa dictate that governance should take pride of place in this 4th Africa-EU partnership.

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This article was originally published online on January 2014.

ENTREVISTA A JOSÉ BRIOSA E GALA

Qual a análise que faz da IV Cimeira UE-África?

Não pretendendo evidentemente sugerir a existência de uma identidade de pontos de vista, apenas faço notar o estabelecimento hoje de um diálogo natural e maduro, que parece indicar ter-se franqueado um outro patamar do relacionamento.

Durante dois dias, 61 Chefes de Estado e de Governo (40 dos quais africanos e 21 europeus), em conjunto com as suas instituições políticas comuns implicadas no diálogo intercontinental, debateram o seu relacionamento estruturado em torno dos temas do “Investimento nas Pessoas, na Prosperidade e na Paz”.

A inspiração e a base metodológica preparatórias foram ainda a Estratégia Conjunta definida em 2007, na Cimeira de Lisboa, e re-avaliada na Cimeira de Trípoli, de 2010 e agora em Bruxelas com uma preocupação de concentrar as deliberações num conjunto temático em princípio mais focalizado, e com isso visando um ganho de profundidade e de eficácia: o que se traduziu formalmente na aprovação de uma Declaração política e de um Roteiro 2014-2017, este último de carácter operacional, onde se identificam áreas concretas de cooperação prioritária como Paz e Segurança, Democracia, Boa Governação de Direitos Humanos, Desenvolvimento, Integração regional, bem como outros temas de agenda política global.

Foi ainda aprovada uma Declaração sobre Migração e Mobilidade, exemplo de concretização de uma cooperação política em área extremamente sensível, mediante uma gestão coordenada dos fluxos migratórios e de políticas de mobilidade, visando combater o tráfico humano e as entradas irregulares, com reforço de protecção das vidas humanas.

Complementando esta reunião magna do Desenvolvimento e da cooperação política entre Europa e África, houve lugar à realização de um conjunto de eventos a ela associados, assinalando-se (1) uma Reunião de Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros, centrada sobre a paz e a segurança, (2) um evento ministerial específico sobre segurança marítima, (3) uma mini-cimeira (duas dezenas e meia de países representados) sobre a República Centro-Africana, (4) uma reunião dos países G5 do Sahel.

Paralelamente a esta intensa actividade diplomática, ocorreram múltiplas reuniões envolvendo parlamentares dos dois lados, encontros com organizações não governamentais e de diversos sectores da sociedade civil, incluindo da diáspora, e de que destaco um “Business Forum” com cerca de 1100 participantes.

Mas independentemente dos “factos diplomáticos” que assinalam um sucesso claro da Cimeira, e do envolvimento de alguma participação social expressiva, uma nota significativa respeita à ultrapassagem definitiva do espírito assistencialista, ou de mera ajuda a África, a favor de uma abordagem de investimento nos interesses comuns, de forma aberta, sendo assumida de forma descomplexada a conveniência em explorar-se as complementaridades sociais, demográficas e económicas.

Quais são as principais mais-valias da Europa para África, tendo em conta a diversificação de fluxos, doadores e parcerias para o continente africano?

A relação África-Europa é hoje consensualmente assumida como uma parceria em igualdade de estatuto, com partilha de interesses e de valores comuns. Facilitado pela proximidade geográfica, este diálogo, hoje institucionalizado, assenta num conhecimento mútuo desenvolvido ao longo da História e em laços que criaram um património cultural do qual participam várias línguas e um conjunto de valores imateriais com expressão constitucional, desde logo nas próprias Cartas fundadoras da identidade colectiva destes dois grandes espaços políticos.

Estamos bem conscientes do concurso das relações multipolares num mundo globalizado do qual ambos os espaços participam, induzindo a uma dispersão e a uma concorrência, em si mesmo positiva, mas colocando novos desafios de coordenação e coerência das políticas. A parceria euro-africana tem, a este respeito, características distintivas que podem funcionar em termos de integração e referência programática. Em primeiro lugar, porque se baseia em valores políticos e filosóficos dotados de universalidade, como o respeito pelos direitos do Homem e a instauração da justiça no funcionamento do Estado e nas relações entre este e os cidadãos. Depois, porque assume o princípio da autonomia e responsabilidade na formulação das políticas (“political ownership”), a partir do qual se define um quadro de objectivos e prioridades à escala continental, regional e nacional, e onde se integra o contributo europeu ao desenvolvimento. Este referente de apropriação política, dotado de estabilidade e previsibilidade, permite a possibilidade de, em havendo garantias de boas práticas de transparência e contabilidade governativa, concretizar o apoio a essas mesmas políticas através do apoio orçamental directo, exemplo de confiança e maturidade da cooperação. Finalmente, em termos de extensão, é um esforço direccionado para um larguíssimo espectro de domínios temáticos, os quais

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a Estratégia Conjunta de 2007 agrupava em 8 grandes áreas e agora nominalmente reduzidas a 5, e que continuam presentes nesta modalidade da parceria, aligeirada de estruturas redundantes.

Contrariamente ao afirmado por vários detractores, trata-se de um modelo de cooperação política que se defende bem de quaisquer complexos de paternalismo ou de dominação ideológica. Em relação ao primeiro aspecto, deve salientar-se que o apoio europeu ao desenvolvimento se insere nos grandes planos directores definidos nos documentos previamente inspirados na Nova Parceria Económica para o Desenvolvimento Africano (NEPAD) e aprovados pela União Africana, em domínios como a agricultura, infraestruturas e outros, ou seja, integrando prévias políticas soberanamente definidas. Quanto ao segundo, remete-se a resposta, sem didactismos deslocados, para a leitura atenta de instrumentos legais - tais como a Carta Africana dos Direitos do Homem e dos Povos (1981), o Acto Constitutivo da União Africana (2000), a Carta Africana sobre a Democracia, as Eleições e a Governança (2007) -, documentos oficiais da União Africana, onde se plasmam os valores e ideais que norteiam a sua missão. Enquanto parceira, a União Europeia foi desde 2007 convidada para 38 missões de observação eleitoral, acompanhando a União Africana e organizações regionais africanas e tem vindo também a ser igualmente convidada a apoiar o “African Peer Review Mechanism”, exercício exigente de aferição de boas práticas de governa-

ção democrática, exemplos elucidativos de comunhão de princípios políticos, numa cumplicidade de práticas e de valores que não tem paralelo.

Estamos na presença de um modelo que vai muito além da assistência ao desenvolvimento ou humanitária, para se inscrever num âmbito de cooperação muito alargado, onde tem sido possível obter consensos em áreas globais como a da luta contra as alterações climáticas ou mobilizar esforços conjuntos em matéria de segurança e luta contra a pirataria, subversão armada e terrorismo. A título de exemplo, na última década foram enviadas para o continente africano, ao abrigo da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, 16 missões de gestão de crises destinadas a manter a paz e prevenir conflitos (sete missões militares e nove missões civis), tendo a UE contribuído com 1,2 mil milhões de euros para o financiamento de muitas operações de apoio à paz sob liderança africana.

Modelo sem dúvida exigente, sujeito à discussão e exame permanente dos seus destinatários e respectivos povos, aos quais cumpre prestar contas, com procedimentos por vezes demasiado morosos e burocráticos, o que tem como contrapartida negativa e preço a pagar, o facto de não poucas vezes “desconseguir” responder de imediato a necessidades, designadamente oportunidades de investimento - aspectos que urge aperfeiçoar - mas que realisticamente nunca poderá, nem deverá, competir com a concessão de benesses comprometedoras, a prazo, de recursos naturais, a troco de desembolsos monetários rápidos.

Quais são, na sua opinião, os principais desafios para as relações UE-África nos próximos anos e o que deve a Parceria almejar, nesse contexto?

Podemos enunciar os grandes desafios futuros a partir do lema da Cimeira agora celebrada: investir nas Pessoas, na Prosperidade e na Paz. Assim, numa ordem inversa, investir na segurança em África é contribuir para a segurança da Europa e do resto do mundo, a começar naturalmente pela preservação das vidas das populações africanas e da sua normal actividade. A Facilidade de Paz Africana será renovada, do lado europeu, com perto de 800 mil milhões de euros para os próximos 3 anos, além da formação de 17 000 militares africanos; manter-se-ão, enquanto necessárias, as 7 missões militares da UE que, neste momento, se encontram designadamente na Somália, Mali, Líbia, República Centro-Africana, Sahel e República Democrática do Congo, envolvendo 2 300 homens e mulheres sob a bandeira da UE.

Do lado da Prosperidade, não esquecendo a missão inscrita nos Tratados quanto à luta contra a pobreza, o grande desafio é o de contribuir para a transformação da economia africana, que, se em termos globais tem vindo a crescer, desde 2000 a 2011, a uma média de 5,2 % ao ano - número mesmo superado desde aí, tendo a África subsahariana no mesmo período aumentado o seu PIB acumulado em 84% - e muito por força da venda de matérias primas, no entanto desejavelmente deverá fazê-lo de forma sustentável e inclusiva. Com metade da população do continente abaixo dos 20 anos, é crucial a criação de emprego, sob pena de geração de sentimentos de enorme frustração em populações urbanas concentradas. O acesso ao crédito é um elemento chave para o apoio a projectos de micro, pequenas e médias empresas. A forma de aumentar a eficácia das políticas junto de tecido económico africano, bem como um melhor apoio ao investidor europeu através de novos instrumentos financeiros que combinam empréstimos e subvenções, deverá constituir um enorme desafio qualitativo, ao lado do expressivo montante já previsto para os próximos 7 anos (25 mil milhões de euros). A consolidação do novo quadro legal relativo ao comércio, e em particular a aprovação e execução dos Acordos de Parceria Económica, deverá merecer uma monitorização atenta, esperando-se que os novos acordos reforcem a componente de integração regional e o seu comércio intra-regional (meros 12%, em comparação com os 72% do espaço intra-europeu).

Finalmente, é na aposta relativa às Pessoas que o parceiro europeu melhor poderá provar a sua mais-valia, distintiva, mobilizando de múltiplas formas esse capital cultural de que a relação Europa-África é detentora. Desde logo, através da execução inteligente do acordo alcançado sobre Migração e Mobilidade, e fazendo-se uso desse instrumento diplomático natural até agora pouco potenciado que a Diáspora em si corporiza, e cujas remessas financeiras - maioritariamente provenientes da Europa e com custos de transacção que têm de diminuir - hoje ultrapassam os montantes da ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento e do investimento externo directo no continente (estimativa de 64 mil milhões de euros em 2013). Depois, reforçando as áreas de educação e treino profissional - tão facilitadas por usos comuns linguísticos - com aprofundamento dos programas de intercâmbio universitários, designadamente via Erasmus+. O reforço das capacidades institucionais e do funcionamento do Estado de Direito está também à partida facilitado, tendo em conta a partilha, em muitos dos casos, de uma cultura jurídica que enforma o ambiente normativo em questão.

Por último, o intercâmbio cultural entre os dois continentes deve ser estimulado de modo mais criativo. É ao ganhar a imaginação e o coração dos jovens que poderemos garantir a nossa diferença específica.

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As opiniões expressas nesta entrevista são pessoais e não vinculam qualquer instituição.

AJUDA AO DESENVOLVIMENTO É AJUDA AO DESENVOLVIMENTO E DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO É DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO

● FERNANDO JORGE CARDOSO

A origem da ajuda europeia ao desenvolvimento nasceu no próprio Tratado de Roma em 1957, o qual, nos seus artigos 131 a 136, estabeleceu tratamento comercial preferencial às então colónias e territórios ultramarinos dos Estados membros e criou o Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento (FED) destinado a financiar a ajuda.

Com a descolonização e a assinatura dos Acordos de Yaoundé I, em 1963, e Yaoundé II, em 1969, e com a adesão ao grupo de países-alvo da ajuda das antigas colónias britânicas em resultado da entrada do Reino Unido para a Comunidade Económica Europeia (CEE) em 1973, ficou no essencial estabelecido o grupo de países que, formalmente, no acordo de Georgetown em 1975, adotou a designação ACP, acrónimo de países da África, Caraíbas e Pacífico.

Esta primeira fase da relação pós-colonial entre os países africanos e a CEE assentou, no essencial, na ajuda comercial, financeira e técnica e resultou na manutenção de laços de relacionamento preferencial de natureza económica e política entre países africanos e europeus, ajudando a consolidar um entrelaçamento clientelar paralelo entre elites empresariais e governantes de ambos os lados.

A subida dos preços do petróleo e a crise internacional de meados dos anos 1970 vai originar mudanças, algumas substanciais, mais nos objetivos e instrumentos e não tanto na natureza do relacionamento. Em 1975, é assinada a primeira das Convenções de Lomé que substituíram os Acordos de Yaoundé, cuja maior novidade foi o instrumento STABEX, destinado a estabilizar as receitas de exportação para um conjunto de produtos. Naquela altura, o designado Grupo dos 77 e a CNUCED exerciam uma forte pressão para criar uma Nova Ordem Económica Internacional, mais favorável aos países do Sul.

Rapidamente, porém, em virtude do agravamento das condições de financiamento, da contração da procura de matérias-primas, da recessão nas economias industrializadas e da crise das dívidas externas, houve uma mudança do paradigma nekeynesiano para o neoliberal nas políticas económicas dos países mais industrializados e, consequentemente, do enfoque da ajuda ao desenvolvimento, incluindo a ajuda europeia aos Estados ACP.

É assim que a segunda e terceira Convenções de Lomé, assinadas em 1980 e 1985, têm como principal novidade a introdução de apoio aos programas de ajustamento estrutural, concebidos pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional e generalizadamente aplicados em África e na América Latina (e Portugal). Sem dúvida que as Convenções de Lomé mantiveram, apesar de tudo, uma impor-

tante componente de financiamento do desenvolvimento e de ajuda comercial – com o mecanismo SYSMIN, émulo do STABEX para a área dos recursos minerais e energéticos, a ser introduzido logo a partir de 1981. No entanto, as mudanças de enfoque, a introdução de novos instrumentos financeiros ou o refinamento dos métodos participativos na definição dos objetivos e prioridades não tocam no essencial do relacionamento Europa-África: uns dão, outros recebem.

O fim da Guerra Fria e a implosão da antiga URSS (e do 2º dos mundos que compunham o sistema internacional pós-1945) representou o triunfo das democracias liberais e do sistema capitalista. A nova União Europeia e o respetivo processo de integração surgem como exemplo bem-sucedido de manutenção da paz, do crescimento económico e da solidariedade social. A reunificação alemã e a atração exercida sobre os países do leste europeu, bem como o consequente alargamento e as mudanças internacionais, vão refletir-se necessariamente no lugar ocupado pelos acordos ACP – e por África, em primeiro lugar.

Paralelamente, em África e designadamente na África Subsaariana, os regimes políticos militares e de partido único existentes em quase todos os países, vão mudar para democracias – regra geral apenas formalmente, com a generalidade das elites a conservarem o poder. Os novos regimes democráticos, enxertados em condições de grande fragilidade económica acelerada pelos modelos de ajustamento dos anos 80, vão ser incapazes, em muitos casos, de suster o surgimento de guerras internas de competição pelo poder e por recursos, com resultados trágicos em vários países africanos no final da primeira metade dos anos 1990.

A reorganização do sistema internacional sob o ímpeto da administração Clinton, subitamente rendida aos benefícios dos acordos inter-regionais, o crescente peso das economias asiáticas e latino-americanas, e o início das negociações para a adesão da China à Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) acontecem em paralelo com o processo de alargamento da UE e as mudanças em África – transições democráticas, crescimento da pobreza, conflitos violentos.

É nestas circunstâncias que, a Convenção de Lomé IV, assinada no final de 1989 para um horizonte de dez anos acaba por ter uma segunda edição em 1995, designada por *Lomé IV-bis*, com enfoque na introdução das designadas condicionalidades da ajuda – respeito pela democracia, direitos humanos, estado de direito, transparência e prestação de contas –, na luta contra a pobreza

e no anúncio do fim do sistema de preferências comerciais, contestado em sede da OMC por vários países, entre os quais os EUA.

A segunda metade dos anos 1990 e a entrada no novo século criam o *background* para a assinatura do Acordo de Cotonou. Na Europa, com o processo de alargamento a leste a prosseguir e a Alemanha a recuperar do imenso esforço económico e financeiro da integração da antiga RDA, prossegue a construção de uma política externa e de segurança que concede prioridade às regiões vizinhas, a leste e a sul, nos estados vizinhos do mediterrâneo, entre os quais os do norte de África. Os países ACP perdem claramente peso político nesta arquitetura, não obstante os sinais de relançamento económico que começam a anunciar-se em países da África Subsaariana e o esforço de “renascimento africano”, com uma intervenção forte das lideranças no sentido de terminar os conflitos violentos ainda existentes.

O Acordo de Cotonou, assinado em 2000, representa o alargamento das áreas de parceria, já expresso na Convenção de Lomé IV-bis, aos domínios da cooperação política, da segurança e do ambiente, tendo o horizonte de vinte anos, com revisões quinquenais. Ele inclui ainda provisões para os Acordos de Parceria Económica, destinados a substituir as preferências comerciais – assunto que se mantém, até hoje, como principal razão de discordâncias entre os dois lados, apesar de terem sido os países africanos a rejeitar a modalidade de negociações UE-África em favor das atuais, e muito atacadas pelos mesmos países africanos, negociações bilaterais.

A primeira cimeira UE-África, que ocorreu no Cairo também no ano 2000, criou mecanismos de encontros regulares para coordenação política, embora não tenha resultado num movimento forte de institucionalização de um novo relacionamento. A formalização da Nova Parceria para o Desenvolvimento Económico de África (NEPAD) e da União Africana em 2001 e 2002 respetivamente vão, porém, dar corpo à institucionalização de um relacionamento Europa-África paralelo ao relacionamento ACP-UE.

O período que mediou desde o início do século até à II Cimeira, realizada em Lisboa em 2007, foi caracterizado por importantes acontecimentos internacionais e regionais que condicionaram os objetivos e o enfoque da Cimeira. Os atentados terroristas de Nova Iorque, que levaram a uma mudança estratégica do conceito de segurança dos EUA, com implicações em todo o mundo, e a rápida afirmação da China como parceiro comercial



Inhaca, Moçambique. Foto de Ana Elisa Cascão

e financeiro competitivo em todo o mundo em resultado da sua entrada para a OMC, terão sido porventura os aspetos mais cruciais em termos internacionais, com implicações sobre a Europa, África e o seu relacionamento.

Na Europa, a introdução da moeda única reforçou a afirmação da Alemanha como principal ator interno, subalternizando a França e projetando a influência alemã no plano internacional e comandando a ação da UE. Em África, em consequência do aumento da procura de matérias-primas internacionais e da oferta de financiamento rápido e barato chinês, é retomado o crescimento económico, após cerca de trinta anos de estagnação e recessão desde os anos 1970.

Daí a relevância da Cimeira de Lisboa, que introduz a noção de Parceria Estratégica e a intenção de criar um relacionamento entre iguais, com base em interesses comuns e que vá além da cooperação – leia-se ajuda. Isto fica expresso na Declaração da Cimeira. Esta intenção é imediatamente liquidada, porém, no Plano de Ação, que é composto por oito parcerias, com ações a serem financiadas pelo FED e por fundos europeus provenientes de outras origens.

Ou seja, ao diálogo político contrapõe-se mais do mesmo: ajuda do doador ao recetor. E, para que fique claro, tal é do interesse de todas as partes: dos governos europeus, da Comissão Europeia, dos governos africanos, das sociedades civis de ambos os lados. Pois, o pragmatismo, “filosofia” mais praticada nos nossos tempos, assim o impõe. África, contrariamente a todas as outras parcerias europeias, permanece a única região não gerida pelas relações externas mas sim pelo Desenvolvimento – afinal é disso mesmo que se trata, ajuda ao desenvolvimento travestida de retórica política e comercial.

Entretanto, entre 2007 e 2014, operaram-se importantes transformações nas relações internacionais, incluindo em África e na Europa, e essas transformações estão a mudar radicalmente os conceitos de desenvolvimento e os paradigmas da ajuda.

Nessa altura, a crise financeira internacional não havia ainda lançado ondas de choque, o clima político europeu era de otimismo moderado e os fenómenos nacionalistas anti-UE eram secundários. As relações com a Rússia eram positivas, apesar dos atritos já existentes com as ameaças de alargamento da NATO. Hoje a situação é substancialmente diferente. O projeto da União Europeia está sob forte ataque e a Alemanha impôs uma estratégia de afirmação dos seus interesses e de defesa da austeridade, reforçando sentimentos nacionalistas.

Em África, há 7 anos, os equilíbrios regionais criados no início daquela década em torno da construção da União Africana mantinham-se, e a experiência africana de resolução de conflitos violentos apresentava sucessos. As “primaveras” árabes estavam fora do horizonte de expectativas. Hoje, a queda do regime líbio fez perder o maior financiador da Comissão da União Africana e os equilíbrios políticos regionais quebraram-se com a contestada eleição da África do Sul para lhe presidir.

Em paralelo com estes fenómenos, o peso económico e político europeu (países e União) diminuiu, face ao aparecimento de outros financiadores interessados em disputar os extensivos recursos energéticos e agrícolas do continente e dada a preferência na generalidade dos países africanos por modelos de cooperação do tipo do da China, sem condicionalidades políticas, modelo emulado por um conjunto de outros países como o Japão, a Coreia do Sul, Taiwan, Brasil ou Índia.

Face a esta nova conjuntura, a prioridade ao estreitamento das relações intercontinentais, que era um facto em 2007, foi desaparecendo das agendas dos decisores políticos. Nestas circunstâncias, não é de admirar o enfoque dado na última cimeira à eficácia (redução das parcerias de oito para cinco) e ao financiamento das mesmas: os dossiers com real importância para a parte africana são (como sempre foram) os do dinheiro, com a parte europeia empenhada em preservar a retórica da cooperação política e dos direitos humanos.

O tão falado apelo africano para que a União Europeia olhe para África como um todo é uma falácia, que mais não seja por ser evidente que tal não irá acontecer e todos o sabem. Na verdade, os interesses europeus (países e Comissão) continuarão a olhar África de várias maneiras: como países mediterrânicos, como países individuais, como regiões diferenciadas. Aliás, os países africanos também olham a Europa da mesma forma: como Comissão Europeia (enquanto esta for um importante fornecedor de ajuda) e como países individuais. Além

deste imperativo derivado dos interesses, a África não é vista como um todo pelos próprios africanos – países e pessoas.

Alargando um pouco o leque de análise, estes factos acontecem a par de fortes tendências para a cada vez mais rápida empresarialização da ajuda ao desenvolvimento, com o financiamento a servir para canalização dos negócios. O papel e a importância das Organizações Não-governamentais para o Desenvolvimento (ONGD) enquanto atores da cooperação têm vindo também a decrescer, levando a que as principais organizações internacionais se tenham já transformado, ou estejam a transformar-se, em grandes empresas ligadas entre si por consórcios concorrentes – tendência esta encorajada pela Comissão Europeia através do modelo de concentração do financiamento em mega projetos assumidos por consórcios multipaíses.

Por razões de imbricamento dos aparelhos e processos produtivos e dos laços, maus e bons, criados entre europeus e africanos, os dois continentes manterão um relacionamento estratégico e economicamente importante no futuro; as classes altas e médias africanas, suficientemente cosmopolitas e habituadas ao estilo de vida dito “ocidental” velarão para que tal aconteça.

No processo, haverá uma natural clarificação das regras do jogo que só os mais ingénuos e distraídos não quererão ver: os processos de ajuda não são desinteressados (a cooperação é um negócio) e a igualdade entre as partes é uma falácia. Como a crise nos tem ensinado duramente em Portugal (e na Europa), na relação entre credores e devedores, quem tem o dinheiro dita as condições; do lado africano a “cooperação” à chinesa, ou seja, ajuda ligada aos interesses chineses, dívidas para serem pagas, em dinheiro, em géneros ou em favores é, aliás, entendida como normal.

Em suma, na perspetiva da elevação das relações intercontinentais a um diálogo político, a última cimeira é pouco mais que um mero incidente de percurso. E assim será enquanto não houver uma clara separação entre ajuda ao desenvolvimento e cooperação política e comercial. Se a coexistência entre ambas é possível, a sua fusão resulta num produto híbrido.

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II.

**GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIPS
AND THE
POST-2015
DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA**



Advances in the global partnership on effective development co-operation, as defined in Paris, Accra and in Busan, are being received as historic opportunities with huge potential to transform the delivery of aid aligned to inclusive growth needs of developing countries. Continued efforts aimed at implementing shared commitments and holding each other to account based on principles of mutual respect, inclusiveness, ownership and leadership of own development agendas are of paramount importance. Africa remains resolute on the need to participate in Global Partnership fully, equally and effectively for voice and impactful outcomes. This fundamental principle will determine its sustained participation given the need for the global partnership to be responsive in supporting the Continent's Post-2015, agenda 2063 and NEPAD priorities which are guided by national priorities."

AFRICA ACTION PLAN ON DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS, 2014

"The world has changed profoundly since the Millennium Development Goals were set up in the year 2000 and to fulfil our vision of promoting sustainable development, we must go beyond them. For example, they didn't focus enough on reaching the very poorest and most excluded people and they didn't consider well enough the devastating effects of conflict and violence on development. The importance to development of good governance and institutions that guarantee the rule of law, free speech and open and accountable government wasn't sufficiently highlighted, nor was the need for inclusive growth to provide jobs".

ANDRIS PIEBALGS, EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER FOR DEVELOPMENT.
CLOSING CEREMONY, EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT DAYS 2013, BRUSSELS

"The new global development agenda presents an opportunity for Africa to take stock of our position in the world. We, in the High-Level Committee, and our colleagues at the African Union, often ask ourselves where does Africa want to be 30 years from now, and where do we want the world to be 30 years hence? Africa wants to be a part of a world where partnerships among nations are based on reliability, accountability and responsibility. In a new world of true partnership, people will no longer resort to violence to claim their basic human rights or rise up against dehumanizing treatment. By building true bridges of cooperation, and establishing new bases of partnership, we can build a world of global opportunities and shared responsibilities. It is possible, but it will demand a shift in traditional approaches. (...)Economic transformation is a not a priority for Africa alone. The recent economic meltdown that plunged the world into recession, the widening gap between rich and poor with its attending inequalities that fuel social unrest and the rising scourge of youth unemployment, as well as global environmental threats created by negative economic policies, clearly show that transformation is needed everywhere, not just in Africa. (...)Achieving this transformation will require collaboration - new partnerships, global and grounded in equality and mutual respect. We are confident that Africa and Europe, with historical ties, will be in the forefront to show that there truly is the beginning of a new era".

STATEMENT BY H.E. PRESIDENT ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF AT THE OPENING PLENARY OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT DAYS "A VISION FOR THE POST-2015 AGENDA", BELGIUM, NOVEMBER 26, 2013

WHAT PROSPECTS FOR A JOINT AFRICA-EU EFFORT TOWARDS FORMULATING A POST-2015 FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT?

● DIRK MESSNER, NIELS KEIJZER, SVEA KOCH AND JULIA LEININGER

The very first sentence of the Joint Strategy (JAES) that was adopted by Africa and Europe in 2007 observes that “Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values”. Such a high degree of convergence and confirmed shared vision, as headlined by the JAES, would make it not more than logical to join forces globally. This seems even more opportune given that since the adoption of the JAES a new African country (South Sudan) and a new EU member state (Croatia) adds to a total of 82 nation states— uniting over 40% of the United Nations’ membership.

The Africa-EU Summit in April 2014 represented a key opportunity to discuss the future of EU-Africa relations from an inter-regional perspective, including a look into how to act jointly in global governance fora and negotiations. The eventual adoption of a post-2015 framework for global development, will mark a decisive turning point for both the EU and Africa by agreeing on new sets of objectives for addressing global and national development challenges. European and African stakeholders seem to place cooperation on ‘global and emerging issues’ higher on their agendas, as it is now explicitly mentioned as a priority area for their relationship. Beyond climate change negotiations, the post 2015 development agenda is recognized as an important area for the EU and Africa in the adopted roadmap 2014-2017: “we commit to working in partnership during the upcoming negotiations with a view to reaching consensus in 2015. We will consult between groups from our two continents in New York. This will allow for both sides

to know their respective priorities, resolve differences of views openly and constructively, identify common interests and discuss developments in global discussions. We will also cooperate to ensure that the implementation of the post-2015 framework and of the 2063 Africa vision, including African development goals, will be complementary, consistent and mutually supportive”. This commitment is welcome as it provides the basis for further cooperation and harmonization of positions during the months ahead.

However forming joint positions does not go automatically and will require strong investments in coalition building between the two continents, as previous experiences in global fora illustrate all too well. The 2007 adopted JAES also recognized the importance of coordinating positions in international fora dealing with issues key for African and European development. This recognition however stands in stark contrast to a rather poor track record of coordination between Africa and Europe during recent important international negotiations. This poor track record stems from the fact that both, each for their own reasons, find it difficult to operate as a ‘block’ in international fora, let alone to operate and act together.

A key example, and for Europe a rather defining moment, were the negotiations during the 15th Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009. On 16 December that year, the late Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi in his capacity as leader of the African Delegation presented a compromise position reached with Europe in the presence of the Swedish President as chair of the rotating EU Presidency and the President of the

Senegal. Photo by Ana Elisa Casção



European Commission (EC). This compromise position called for a lower amount of climate finance to Africa than what was initially called for, and was welcomed by European leaders as leading to a joint position on climate finance. Sudan's chief negotiator Lumumba Di-Aping, as the chair of the G77 group, was fast to accuse Zenawi of capitulating to the EU and argued that no African nation would accept this as Africa's position. This effectively meant the end of the African Common Position negotiation strategy.

Roughly two years later, the EU's position on climate change again won the support of the chair of the African group of negotiators close to the conclusion of the 17th COP in Durban. This time around the emphasis was less on finance, but on the recognition that both Europe and Africa wanted to call for a legally binding agreement covering all nations of the world. Although the outcome of the Durban agreement has received a lukewarm reception, it does stand as a successful case where Africa and Europe cooperated together. A key difference with Copenhagen was that in this case both groups of countries, who together cannot unilaterally drive global decision-making, invested more in coalition building with other nations and thus together helped assemble a critical mass to put pressure on the remaining reluctant G20 members that eventually conceded to what was agreed.

The post-2015 framework for global development is too important to fail, both for Europe and Africa and it is crucial that both sides draw the right lessons from past experiences in order to use their joint weight in the negotiating process. The Op-Ed by the EC President and AU Commission chairperson published in April 2013 in several African and European media as well as the roadmap of the April Summit reflects this priority on paper: it recognises that the continents had to reinforce global cooperation, while stating a priority for such an engagement towards the adoption of the 'post MDG development agenda'. Process-wise, the EU member states have adopted their joint position in June this year, while on the African side High-Level Panel member and Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is presently chairing the AU's High-Level Committee on the post-2015 agenda. Moreover, in its vision for "Africa 2063" the African Union re-emphasizes the relevance of speaking with one African voice in global fora. While the Op-Ed of 2013 highlighted a shared challenge in promoting inclusive and sustainable growth, the roadmap does not address questions of content and focuses on process. Content

should have been addressed in a separate, detailed declaration on post-2015, similar to a separate declaration on migration and mobility. But the adoption of a detailed joint declaration on post 2015 failed during the Africa-EU Summit, similar to other declarations prepared on climate change, trade and food security, while only the joint declaration on migration was adopted.¹ This failure indicates disagreements and unresolved issues between the parties, as well as possibly difficulties in timing given that the AU had only recently adopted its position in February 2014.² Identifying and resolving these areas of diverging opinions and interests at an early stage might pave the way for a compromise when the negotiations at the UN level intensify. It is thus important to continue negotiations between the EU and Africa to bridge discords between both continents.

The process ahead is however complicated enough given the Inter-governmental Working Group negotiating Sustainable Development Goals and the short timeline available for negotiating the post-2015 framework. While discussions will definitely focus on the extent to which both continents positions are compatible, and will probably point out that in essential areas this is not the case, the Durban experience shows that Africa and Europe stand to benefit most from a 'joint venture' approach guided by an overall concern that surpasses the difference in interests and perspectives. The EU's position recognises this by saying it prioritises a continuing dialogue and 'outreach' with third countries, while the African position prioritises identifying African priorities for the new agenda. The challenge therefore is for Africa and Europe to seriously invest in a joint endeavour, in the spirit of the dialogue and partnership all have committed to.

The authors are members of the German Institute for Development (DIE). The article was adapted from a previous version published in the Africa-EU blog, in October 2013.

¹ Information about the Summit and the Declarations adopted can be found here: <http://www.european-council.europa.eu/eu-africa-summit-2014>

² As reported here: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201402041586.html>

A RENEWED GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR A POST-2015 ERA

● CARLOS LOPES

Between 2000 and 2009, eleven African countries grew at an annual rate of 7 percent or more, which is considered sufficient to double their economies in ten years. Africa's collective GDP at over US\$2 trillion today is roughly equal to Brazil's or Russia's, and larger than India's. On the economic front, Africa is now seen as a vibrant frontier market and an emerging pole of growth.

Social and political indicators have also improved with significant achievements in primary school enrolment and gender parity. Declines in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and maternal deaths have been recorded. However, unemployment remains high particularly among the youth, the gains in HIV/AIDS and malaria have been driven by access to vertical funds, nearly half the population is considered poor and Africa MDG progress is below par.

There is no doubt that global partnerships can provide the impetus for tackling the key socio-economic development challenges facing Africa. India went from being one of the world's largest recipient of foreign aid in mid-1980s to become a net donor with foreign aid constituting less than 0.3% of its national GDP and is now a member of the G20 and the BRICS. India's development performance is one of the most spectacular of the past 50 years. The coun-

try led an agricultural revolution transforming it into a net exporter of food, doubling its life expectancy, and halving its poverty rate.

Global partnerships, therefore, can work for Africa if they are aligned with the strategic vision of the continent and buttressed by a unified continental voice. The mixed results recorded with MDG8 on the one hand, and Africa's ambition of fostering sustainable transformative growth on the other hand, warrants that we think global partnership anew. The imminent end of the MDG era thus provides an opportunity to revisit global partnerships, in a way that is mutually beneficial and sustainable.

Global trade patterns are currently not in Africa's interest. At the dawn of the adoption of the next set of global development goals, Africa's contribution to global trade remains marginal, around 3 per cent, still dominated by primary commodities and largely unchanged since 2000.

Efforts to increase the continent's share of global trade through Aid for Trade and preferential market access initiatives have yielded mixed results. Though Aid for Trade commitments has increased in recent years, disbursements have fallen short of commitments. Furthermore, the proportion of developed country imports from Africa (admit-



“Global partnerships, therefore, can work for Africa if they are aligned with the strategic vision of the continent and buttressed by a unified continental voice.

ted duty-free) has stagnated. These trends are unfortunate since trade represents an important mechanism for promoting enduring economic growth and employment in developing countries.

That being said, we need to remain mindful of the heterogeneity of African countries such as the least developed countries (LDCs), the landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and the small island developing states (SIDS). The special needs of these countries as acknowledged by the Millennium Declaration must be reflected in the next global partnership framework which should do even better in terms of financing options for the most vulnerable countries.

What could be some desirable features for a new global partnership framework?

Global partnerships remain fundamental for addressing global concerns such as climate change, conflict and insecurity, financial instability, illicit capital flow, or health threats.

A new Global partnership must be mutually beneficial, promote autonomy of African states including through support for skills, technological development and industrialization as well as address Africa's developmental priorities. And while these priorities are country-specific, structural transformation and the development of the requisite capacities to sustain the transformation agenda are two areas that are common to most African countries. This new partnership must avoid the donor-recipient logic underpinning the Millennium Development Goal 8, relating to global partnerships and promote fair trade, foreign direct investment and forge cooperation with the indigenous private sector.

In parallel, Africa must assume greater ownership of its development agenda. This will require that countries undertake a critical assessment of their domestic resource potential and develop resource mobilization strategies aimed at maximizing that potential. Domestic resource mobilization is not only about fund-raising, it is also about restoring the accountability of the State to its people and correcting the inverted accountability of the State to development partners. Such accountability will require sound Monitoring and Evaluation frameworks, and a good baseline data starting in 2015. Hence, official statistical systems and additional information systems need special attention and support.

The new framework must also take into consideration the initial conditions of each country. This is important since performance should be appreciated in light of the road traveled, relative to the point of departure. We cannot repeat the methodological mistake of increasing every country's progress towards a universal goal as if they were all in the same departing line. In this light, mutual accountability, mechanisms of enforcement, mechanisms that foster compliance of multinational firms to international norms and standards should be indispensable features for this framework.

And finally, the future global partnership will have to include new sets of actors such as the private sector, parliamentarians, civil society, private foundations, women and the youth. In particular, the voices of the youth must be heard in the youngest continent.

As we transition to the successor development agenda we must be united in our commitment to negotiate a global partnership and financing architecture that is respectful of the development priorities of Africa, promotes the mutual interests of developed and developing countries and credibly holds all sides accountable for their actions. Failure to do so will constitute a dereliction of our duty as leaders of our institutions, communities and countries.

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This article was originally published in www.thebrokeronline.eu and also in the UNECA Executive Secretary's Blog.

A PARCERIA GLOBAL PARA UMA COOPERAÇÃO PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO EFICAZ: O PLANO DE AÇÃO AFRICANO

Decorreu no México, a 15 e 16 de Abril, a primeira Reunião Ministerial da Parceria Global para uma Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento Eficaz - PGCDE. Além das sessões plenárias sobre os resultados da implementação dos Compromissos de Busan; o papel do sector privado; o papel dos países de rendimento médio no desenvolvimento; a cooperação Sul-Sul, triangular e a partilha de conhecimentos e ainda sobre a mobilização de recursos financeiros nacionais; foram numerosos os eventos paralelos dedicados a temas tão vastos como a programação conjunta ou o papel dos países de rendimento médio no contexto global do pós-2015.

Sendo uma reunião de alto nível sobre o desenvolvimento eficaz, é interessante perceber a centralidade da realidade africana para este debate, a participação dos representantes do continente africano e a sua contribuição para a implementação de Busan.

O Comunicado endossado no México reitera os compromissos de Busan, em particular o compromisso da luta contra a pobreza, e menciona a importância dos direitos humanos e da igualdade de género para o desenvolvimento. A PGCDE propõe-se contribuir para o “como” do pós-2015, em sinergia com outros processos das Nações Unidas. Reconhece o papel importante da ajuda como catalisador de desenvolvimento e reitera a **mudança de paradigma da eficácia da ajuda para a eficácia do desenvolvimento**. Numa linguagem mais “onusiana” fala-se de “*secure a sustainable future that leaves no one behind*”, mas evita-se a linguagem das negociações do clima e reitera-se a de Busan com a utilização de “*we are all part of a development agenda (...) on the basis of common goals and shared principles*”. É ainda reiterada a importância da liderança dos processos nacionais de desenvolvimento, bem como a necessidade de que o desenvolvimento seja **inclusivo e participado pelo sector privado e pela sociedade civil**, incluindo pelas fundações. Contudo, o documento dedica uma sessão especial aos países de rendimento médio, sendo parca a referência aos países menos desenvolvidos, ainda a realidade prevalente no continente africano.

Por outro lado, em ano histórico no crescimento da Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento (APD) dos doadores do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento da OCDE (CAD), a ajuda para a África Subsaariana voltou a descer. Por sua vez, os resultados do processo de monitorização da implementação de Busan, se apontam para algumas

melhorias - o aumento da ajuda desligada, a maior utilização dos sistemas nacionais, e um maior empenho na transparência -, identificam também áreas onde um esforço suplementar deve ser realizado, por exemplo em matéria de previsibilidade e fragmentação da ajuda, tão importante para os países menos desenvolvidos, ainda dependentes da APD (34 países em África são ainda países menos desenvolvidos).

Sobre a coordenação da Plataforma para o Desenvolvimento Eficaz da Comissão da União Africana/NEPAD, aparece a proposta do continente: o Plano de Ação para o Desenvolvimento Eficaz. Este tem em conta as prioridades africanas que constam da Agenda da União Africana para 2063; a Agenda NEPAD; o Consenso Africano e Posição sobre Desenvolvimento Eficaz de 2011 e a Posição Africana para a agenda global pós-2015. O plano propõe uma visão partilhada para uma cooperação eficaz que promova: **o financiamento do desenvolvimento de África; a cooperação sul-sul e triangular; a integração regional e uma transformação económica inclusiva**. O Plano identifica as componentes fundamentais para o desenvolvimento do continente e os compromissos dos governos africanos, incluindo propostas concretas para a cooperação para o desenvolvimento, como sejam a promoção da mobilização de recursos internos; o combate ao fluxo ilícito de capitais; a mobilização do sector privado; a capacitação das instituições incluindo em matéria fiscal; construir capacidade de produção industrial; a criação de incentivos para que as empresas nacionais possam construir parcerias com empresas internacionais sobretudo em áreas como as indústrias extrativas; a criação de mecanismos de responsabilização mútua para África através de mecanismos de exame entre os pares africanos; a luta contra a corrupção (sendo o objetivo da União Africana o de que em 2063 o continente africano seja o menos corrupto); o apoio à representação adequada de África nas estruturas de governação global; e através da implementação dos compromissos de Busan, tendo presente a complexidade e abrangências dos contextos de desenvolvimento regionais e nacionais.

Quanto à governação da Parceria Global, foi confirmado no México que África manterá uma das três copresidências (decisão que será tomada na Cimeira da União Africana em Junho) passando também a contar com mais um representante no “Steering Committee”.



photo by Ana Elisa Cascão

Vários países Africanos participaram no exercício de acompanhamento da implementação do Acordo de Busan e estiveram representados no México. Dos 161 países subscritores da Parceria Global, 42 são africanos.

Entre os subscritores da Parceria Global estão Portugal, Moçambique, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, Timor-Leste, Brasil e São Tomé e Príncipe. A Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), à semelhança do que já acontece com a Francofonia e com a Commonwealth, dado o interesse destes países na temática, poderia potenciar um espaço de diálogo e de partilha de reflexões sobre o desenvolvimento eficaz e os desafios que se colocam em cada país, quer ao nível da identificação de resultados, quer do reforço das instituições eficazes e dos sistemas nacionais.

A Agenda de Busan, reiterada no México, pode servir de base para a construção de um diálogo político mais ativo e eficaz no combate às desigualdades sociais e à pobreza.

Mas, para tal, é preciso “desconstruir” uma arquitetura global baseada no Norte/Sul e dar espaço a que os mais vulneráveis possam ser o centro do debate; promovendo uma arquitetura sem preciosismos de classificação que se baseiem apenas em lógicas quantitativas de rendimento per capita. O próprio Plano de Ação para o Desenvolvimento Eficaz de África defende que a presente classificação de país de rendimento médio, baseada principalmente no rendimento nacional bruto, é desajustada. Hoje o mundo divide-se entre pobres e não pobres. A parceria Global deveria dar voz às mil milhões de pessoas que vivem em extrema pobreza e o diálogo político, no contexto desta Parceria, deveria servir para criar soluções e partilhar conhecimentos que promovam, fora da pressão dos grupos historicamente instituídos no quadro das Nações Unidas, um crescimento global sustentável e inclusivo. Este é sem dúvida simultaneamente a oportunidade e o desafio para o sucesso da Parceria Global.

III **GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS**



It is sad that for many years the African continent was only known for military coups, conflict, corruption, dictatorships and unelected one man rule that went on for decades. I am aware that the term 'governance' has become one of the catch-words in the international realm and thus, has generated a lot of interest and debate around the globe. Whilst we may not be agreed on all the elements of democracy and governance, we cannot fold our arms and do nothing because such universal values are essential ingredients for any strategy for sustainable development. (...) While countries may often differ on the subject of governance, it is clear that its fundamental principles are widely and broadly accepted by the international community, including Africa. (...) We should therefore be resolute in our efforts to align our national policies and legislation with these principles which include, among others, free, fair and transparent elections; constitutional transfer of power; predictable laws; protection of citizens' rights; equality before the law; favourable macro-economic policies; the rule of law, respect for human rights; an effective and credible judicial system; and efficient and effective public service to name some".

STATEMENT BY H.E. SIR SERETSE KHAMA, PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA AT THE 8TH AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM, OCTOBER 2013

"Africa has come a long way indeed but I will be the first to concede as many here will do that we are yet to fully attain the continental unity, integration and prosperity that was dreamt by those who preceded us. In fact, I dare say that our dreams will remain just that - a mirage until we fully consolidate democracy and strengthen governance and realize human and peoples' rights. At the heart of Africa's democratization project lie the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law."

SPEECH BY H.E. DR. AISHA ABDULLAHI, COMMISSIONER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION, AT THE 2ND ANNUAL HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE ON GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS, 25-27 NOVEMBER 2013, SENEGAL

STILL RELEVANT? THE FUTURE OF EU GOVERNANCE SUPPORT IN AFRICA

● CLARE CASTILLEJO (FRIDE) AND SVEA KOCH (DIE).

EU-Africa relations are shifting and creating new dilemmas for Europe's engagement on governance. As African countries grow and strengthen their political and economic relationships with emerging powers, the EU's ability to promote governance reform in Africa – particularly through political conditionalities – will inevitably decline. Paradoxically, however, the Arab revolutions and crisis in the Sahel have prompted a renewed EU interest in promoting “deep democracy” in its neighbourhood and beyond. Moreover, in the context of austerity there is greater demand from European citizens that aid to Africa is carefully spent, including through the use of conditionalities. These trends require Europe to profoundly rethink its approach to Africa's governance challenges.

“The EU's ability to promote governance reform in Africa - particularly through political conditionalities - will inevitably decline.

Such a rethink must begin with an honest appraisal of the EU's current approach to governance. The use of ‘positive conditionality’ to incentivise political reforms - both through the Governance Incentive Tranche and the European Neighbourhood Policy - has clearly fallen short of expectations. Meanwhile, the EU's application of ‘negative conditionality’, through aid cuts or foreign policy sanctions has proven inconsistent, with strategically important North African states largely spared these measures. Coordination on governance has also proved a challenge, with member states frequently prioritising their individual policies and national interests over common European approaches. The fragmented response to the governance crises in North Africa and the Sahel illustrate only too well such coordination failures.

So, given these lessons and the changing context, where next for the EU's engagement on governance in Africa? As aid becomes increasingly marginal to the EU-Africa relationship, it appears that coherence and leverage across different policy fields will become Brussels' central source of influence. In the future, the EU's governance agenda must be systematically incorporated into its development, foreign, trade and security policies. Policy coherence - traditionally a concern of the development community – must therefore be taken seriously in all external policy areas. The European External Action Service (EEAS) will need to play a central role in addressing and managing the inevitable trade-offs between the EU's normative agenda and its economic, foreign policy or security goals in Africa.

Seeking a comprehensive and reciprocal partnership with Africa on governance issues also implies that the EU and Africa develop a shared vision of the EU's role in supporting African governance. So far, too little attention has been paid to African perceptions of the EU's governance agenda or its renewed interest in political conditionalities. The EU-Africa relationship, however, is less asymmetrical than in the past and in order to be a credible partner the EU will need to better tailor its policies to fit African contexts and meet African demands. This includes finding effective ways to support African regional bodies, governments or civil society actors that promote democracy, as well as identifying appropriate responses in African countries that are closing down democratic space.

Discussion on these issues will obviously take place against the background of the changing global context. Africa's global economic and strategic importance is growing; its range of partners, investors and donors is expanding; and it is rethinking its relationship to both traditional and emerging powers. To remain relevant the EU must examine how it can balance its own interests in remaining an important political, trade and development partner for Africa with its commitments to promote democratic values. To remain effective, it must ensure that its policies have legitimacy in the eyes of African stakeholders and are relevant to rapidly changing African contexts.

This article was originally published in the Africa-EU blog, on September 2013.

CONDITIONALITY AND SANCTIONS REMAIN A STUMBLING BLOCK FOR EU-AFRICA RELATIONS

● KAREN DEL BIONDO

On April 2nd and 3rd 2014, 80 delegations from the European Union and Africa gathered together for the 4th EU-Africa summit with the aim to revive the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES).

Once again, the summit was preceded by a discussion on the participation of the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. When Brussels denied a visa to his wife Grace Mugabe, who is on the EU sanctions list, Mugabe decided to stay away from the summit, and called on other African leaders to do the same. The call was largely ignored by the other African leaders, with the notable exception of President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, who sent a ministerial delegation to replace him declaring that 'time must pass wherein we are looked as subjects, we are told who must come, who must not come'.

Although the discussion on Mugabe's participation did not block the summit, the issue does indicate some major points of disagreement in the EU-Africa relationship. It should be reminded that the same question caused the second EU-Africa summit to be postponed from 2003 until December 2007.

Political sanctions such as visa bans or the freezing of financial assets are not often imposed by the EU to react to human rights violations in Africa. Other recent examples include Ivory Coast, where sanctions were imposed against Laurent Gbagbo when he refused to cede victory to Alassane Ouattara after the Presidential elections in October 2010, and Guinea, where the EU adopted sanctions against the military junta as a reaction to the crackdown on an opposition rally in September 2009.

Somewhat more frequent is the suspension of aid. The EU has tried to make the application of political conditionality in line with the spirit of partnership in EU-Africa relations. Indeed, the human rights clause, which was included in the fourth Lomé Agreement in 1995 and in the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, was based on negotiations between the EU and the ACP group. Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates that, when one Party finds that the other Party has violated democratic principles, human rights or the rule of law, it should first invite that Party to hold consultations with the aim to find a solution to the crisis. Moreover, regular political dialogue, which was introduced under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, was to become the main venue to discuss problems related to these breaches, while sanctions were meant to be a measure of last resort.

Despite these provisions, the application of the human rights clause has mostly resulted in a partial suspen-

sion of aid, for example the redirection of aid in direct support to the government towards projects implemented by NGOs. It is difficult to overlook the power imbalance in the imposition of these measures: while in theory the ACP group could invoke the human rights clause against an EU member state, it is obviously not in the position to impose aid sanctions.

For this reason, the application of the conditionality clause has often been controversial. When the EU called for consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement with Zimbabwe in October 2001, Mugabe's government accused the EU of not having exhausted all possibilities under political dialogue. The discussion was repeated when the EU called for Art. 96 consultations with Guinea in 2003, which Guinea found unjustified given that a formal political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement had not taken place.

In this context, it may not be surprising that in recent years, the application of the human rights clause has mostly been limited to coups d'état. These cases are less controversial: following the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (2000), the African Union suspends member states in the case of a military coup d'état. In fact, the AU has been more consistent than the EU in this regard. When Mohamed Morsi was deposed by Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the AU suspended Egypt. The EU, however, refrained from openly classifying this event as a coup d'état. While the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau could not participate in the 2014 EU-Africa summit as suspended AU members, the Egyptian government was invited by the EU.

Despite the EU's proclaimed preference for positive measures, it often faces strong pressure from its citizens to suspend aid. Currently this is the case for gay rights. The recent adoption of legislation instituting long-term imprisonments for homosexuality in Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia has provoked strong protest in Europe. EU member states Denmark and the Netherlands have already suspended aid as a reaction to anti-gay legislation in Uganda, while the EU is reconsidering its own aid package in this country.

Another topic that challenges the idea of an EU-Africa partnership based on shared values is the International Criminal Court (ICC). Indeed, another notable absence at the 2014 EU-Africa summit was that of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who was not invited as there is an ICC arrest warrant against him. Many African

states, including the 34 that are party to the ICC, find that heads of state should be immune from indictment by the ICC. The question of immunity of heads of state became even more important when Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were sworn in as President and Vice-President of Kenya in 2013. A few years earlier, the ICC had summoned Kenyatta and Ruto, together with four others, in relation to the violence that took place after the December 2007 presidential elections in Kenya. In September 2013, the AU held an extra-ordinary summit on the ICC, during which it expressed itself against charges against serving AU Heads of State. After the summit, an AU delegation was sent to New York to convince the members of the UN Security Council to defer the Kenyan cases. The fact that the European members of the Security Council (UK, France, Luxembourg) did not support this bid is seen by some African countries as a lack of solidarity. Furthermore, there is a widespread be-

lief in Africa that the ICC particularly targets Africans, given that all the cases that are currently investigated are African.

The 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy states that 'Africa and Europe are bound together [...] by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy'. The above-mentioned examples show that there are differences between the continents on the values to pursue (e.g. gay rights) and on the appropriate instruments to do so (e.g. sanctions, conditionality, the ICC). Such issues have obstructed the EU-Africa relationship in the past and are likely to do so in the future, as the EU faces pressure to live up to its proclaimed role of spreading values in the world.

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Senegal. Photo by Ana Elisa Cascão



THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHALLENGES & POSSIBILITIES

● KERSTIN CARLSON

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in crisis in Africa. Charges that the Court “chases”¹ Africans have intensified with the ICC’s indictment of sitting leaders in Kenya and the UN Security Council’s refusal to interfere and postpone these processes.² In what amounts to the most significant challenge to the ICC since the U.S. opposition to the Court in the early 2000s, in October 2013 the African Union called an extraordinary summit to consider withdrawal from the ICC for its member states; the vote was evenly split. This article is designed to add context to the current debate surrounding the ICC in Africa.

I. POLITICS & RULE OF LAW

The 20th Century saw the rise in a commitment to holding individuals (and not merely nations) liable for violating laws. *International criminal law* emerged formally from the Allied response to Axis violations during World War II, and has continued to develop through the modern era, shaped through international treaties and practice. Experimental United Nations-founded international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s paved the way for the creation of a permanent international judicial institution, the International Criminal Court. Unlike earlier experimental tribunals, the ICC was not created by or for the United Nations and is an independent organization serving its member states. Currently, 122 states are members of the ICC, giving these states access to the ICC, and giving the ICC jurisdiction over events in their territories and involving their citizens. Several major global powers, including the United States, Russia, China and India are not members.

The ICC has jurisdiction over only the most severe violations of human rights law, which is presently limited to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.³ If one accepts that such acts are universally criminal, and that crimes should be prosecuted, then the relevant question becomes *what kind of institution*, implementing *what kind of rule of law practices*, should exist to tackle these universally

unacceptable, yet too frequently recurring, elements of our world? It is here that this paper intervenes to consider the ICC, the seminal global experiment in an international, juridical response to breaches of fundamental human rights. Unlike other international institutions –foremost among them the United Nations – the ICC has strong institutional mechanisms in place to shelter itself from interest and power politics. The two central, novel instruments constructed to permit the ICC to act in service to its member states (as opposed to in the service of globally dominant states) are *complementarity* and an *independent prosecutor*.

a. Complementarity

During the Rome Statute negotiations that preceded the construction of the ICC, a central debate concerned the jurisdiction of the imagined global criminal court.⁴ Would such a court have *universal jurisdiction* – permitting it to reach anywhere, into any conflict, and pluck out whatever defendants it chose? Or would the global court work under a more constrained form of jurisdiction? Universal jurisdiction carried the threat of a power-hungry court throwing its weight around and making a mockery of state sovereignty. A constrained court, on the other hand, risked disregarding human rights essentials or becoming the henchman for a small group of globally dominant state actors.

Early on in the treaty discussions a solution to the sovereignty problem of the ICC was proposed in the form of a *complementarity* provision.⁵ Complementarity holds that the ICC may act only if a member state is *unable or unwilling* to prosecute a criminal defendant. This guiding principle is so central to the ICC’s work that it bears repeating: the ICC may not intervene in any situation where a member state is already actively engaged in prosecuting crimes. This leaves member states primarily responsible for the prosecution of violations of international humanitarian law within their territory or by their nationals, and assigns the ICC a complementary, back-up role.

This foundational aspect of the ICC is strengthened, institutionally, by the ICC’s insistence on a ratification process by which all member states should align their own domestic laws with ICC law before they may become members. Member states may join the ICC only through

¹ Ethiopian Prime Minister and Chairman of the African Union Hailemariam Desalegn in address at African Union 50th Anniversary Summit May 2013, Aislinn Laing, *The Telegraph* May 28, 2013 (accessed February 23, 2014).

² Article 16 of the ICC statute permits the United Nations Security Council to postpone cases under its Article VII Peace & Security mandate.

³ The crime of aggression is in the process of being ratified by member states.

⁴ For an excellent discussion of the negotiations leading to the construction of the ICC, see William Schabas, *An Introduction to the International Criminal Court* (Cambridge 2012).

⁵ Article 17 of ICC.

an explicit concurrence with internationally recognized human rights, i.e. by writing such rights directly into their own laws. This practice has two important consequences. First, the ICC and its member states should recognize the same crimes, and there is lessened risk that the ICC might find some behaviour criminal that is not so recognized by a member state. Second, ICC member states explicitly retain their sovereignty by retaining all rights to “the first bite of the apple” as regards criminal processes against individuals violating international humanitarian law. Where a full and transparent criminal process takes place, the ICC will not (and indeed may not) act. Indeed, given the limited resources of the Court, rigorous investigation and prosecution by member states is likely to dissuade ICC investigation and indictment, as the Court turns its attention to conflicts in greater need of its capacities. Thus the *complementarity* provision provides a meeting place for sovereignty and human rights.

b. Independent prosecutor (and not an arm of the Security Council) – currently, Fatou Bensouda (Gambia)

The second institutionally significant element emerging from the Rome Statute was the provision that the ICC be headed by an *independent prosecutor capable of issuing her own indictments*. During the Rome Statute negotiations in the 1990s, a great deal of pressure was exerted by nations such as the United States to situate the ICC prosecutor under the direction of the United Nations Security Council.⁶ At the Rome Statute negotiations in the 1990s, however, a caucus of like-minded countries successfully moved to decouple the ICC from the Security Council. Thus the ICC Prosecutor enjoys the powers of *proprio motu*, the power to investigate, and indict, individuals engaged in any violations of international humanitarian law occurring in any ICC member state. While this power was perhaps the most contentious aspect of the ICC at the Court’s inception, it has in fact been used to date only very sparingly (only one situation before the ICC has been independently initiated by the Prosecutor, the indictments in Kenya), and thus the capacity for the Prosecutor to act independently should not be equated with the complaint that the ICC functions as an Africa-targeting, neo-colonial institution.

II. CONTEXTUALIZING ICC PRACTICE

Since its founding in 2002, the ICC has issued indictments in eight violent conflicts, pursuing in total 31 defendants. All eight of those conflicts are in Africa.⁷ Of these eight indictments, the Kenya case (further discussed below) is the first to have been initiated by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor on its own volition under its institutional *proprio motu* powers. Two indictments (including Sudanese president Al Bashir, discussed below) have been referrals by the UN Security Council. The majority of the ICC’s cases, however, have consisted of self-referrals by member states under the ICC’s complementarity provisions. In these cases, ICC member states in Africa have specifically requested the assistance of the Court in trying violations of international criminal law on their territory and/or involving their nationals.

a. Self-referrals & ICC as a Political Tool

As noted above, five of the eight ICC county cases have arisen under the self-referral process. This development – the aggressive use of self-referrals – is perhaps one of the most surprising directions taken by the ICC in its first decade of practice. Self-referrals seem to challenge regular understandings of sovereignty; why would a state *hand off* the trial of one of its own citizens to an external court? Yet the bulk of the ICC’s practice consists in precisely this action.

While each case has own particularities, what this practice reveals is that for several African governments, the ICC has served as a useful tool. In the first ICC verdict (2012), Congo’s Thomas Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment for the use of child soldiers. The Kinshasa government caught Lubanga, excised him from peace negotiations, and then handed him to the ICC through the self-referral process. In so doing, the government removed a prickly internal enemy and expended little political capital.⁸ Human rights groups have lamented this “one-sided approach”⁹ as it guarantees that participating state governments can insulate themselves from ICC scrutiny. Yet regardless one arguably sees an example of the ICC in service to its member states – African member states.

⁷ The ICC has investigated conflicts in Afghanistan and Colombia, but to date has issued no indictments in those conflicts.

⁸ Pascal Kampale, “The ICC and Lubanga: Missed Opportunities” *African Futures* March 2012 (last accessed February 16, 2014).

⁹ William Schabas *An Introduction to the International Criminal Court* (Cambridge 2012) p. 165.

⁶ See, for example, William Schabas *An Introduction to the International Criminal Court* (Cambridge 2012).



ICC Headquarters. Source: TheHague.com

b. No Immunity for Sovereigns: Kenya & Sudan

Discontent with the ICC is presently expressed chiefly in regard to two ongoing indictments; the indictment of Sudanese president Al Bashir, and the indictment of Kenyatta and Ruto in conjunction with violence following the Kenyan elections.

Kenya

Kenya joined the ICC in 2005. In December 2007 – February 2008, inter-ethnic violence following disputed elections claimed an excess of 1,300 lives in Kenya, with thousands injured and up to 350,000 displaced. The violence brought the state, by some analyses, to the brink of civil war. Moreover, this violence repeated a pattern seen for the past several decades in Kenya, where ethnic violence has been stoked to win political victories.¹⁰

A Kenyan committee tasked with investigating the violence, the Waki Commission, issued a report to the Kenyan Parliament recommending the establishment of an independent domestic tribunal to hear charges against specific individuals for instigating the violence. The Waki Commission further noted that in the absence of an independent Kenyan tribunal, it would forward the information it had collected, including a sealed list of names of parties it found most responsible, to the ICC. Prominent African leaders, including Desmond Tutu and Kofi Annan, stepped in and recommended the creation of a special tribunal in Kenya. In February 2009 the Kenyan government nevertheless declined to constitute an independent tribunal, and in July 2009, the Waki Commission forwarded its findings to the ICC.

Thus while true that the ICC – in its first independently case – initiated a prosecution against Kenyan politi-

cal leaders, the ICC was responding to a particularized set of circumstances. What would it have meant had Kenya's Waki Commission, having recommended an independent domestic tribunal to address cyclical fomented violence to its own government and failing in that effort, and subsequently requesting the assistance of the ICC Prosecutor, *not* been met with such assistance? Might it then have become possible to assert that the ICC was deaf to the requests of African victims?

Since being indicted by the ICC, Kenyatta and Ruto have assumed leadership of Kenya, building a political platform in part on a resistance to the ICC as a new form of colonialism. While “cooperating” with the proceedings in terms of making themselves available (and thus avoiding having the ICC issue arrest warrants, as has been the case for other indictees), both Kenyatta and Ruto have campaigned rigorously against the ICC. They have pushed for Kenyan, and more generally African, withdrawal from the ICC, vigorously pressing forward the “neo-colonial” argument. Meanwhile, the ICC cases against them are beset with problems. Several key witnesses for the ICC prosecution have either recanted their testimony or have died: the Office of the Prosecutor alleges obstructionism, witness tampering, and worse on the part of the defendants.

Sudan

The capacity for crimes to be referred to the UN Security Council is not designed to challenge the central elements of the ICC as a *member based* institution headed by an *independent prosecutor*. Rather, this capacity is best understood as practical: before the ICC's creation, the UN Security Council had formed several *ad hoc* tribunals under its peace and security mandate. In the wake of the ICC's creation, in place of creating new *ad hoc* tribunals, the UN Security Council may now refer such situations to the ICC.

This is precisely what happened in the case of Al Bashir of Sudan. Sudan is not a member of the ICC, and

¹⁰ Roth *New York Review of Books* February 6, 2014.

thus it is not possible for the ICC prosecutor to independently indict a Sudanese national. Following allegations of genocide in Darfur, however, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. After investigating, the ICC Prosecutor issued indictments for several individuals, including Sudan's president Al Bashir.

The Rome Statute includes a "failsafe" against ambitious ICC prosecution: Article 16 permits the UN Security Council to postpone an ICC proceeding for one year, renewable indefinitely. This provision permits the UN Security Council to intervene in sensitive situations and to effectively halt a prosecution. The UN Security Council has refrained from exercising this capacity in either the Al Bashir case or the cases against Kenyatta & Ruto. The ICC seems to bear the brunt of African political frustration regarding this political decision made by the UN Security Council.

III. THE FUTURE OF THE ICC: AFRICA AND BEYOND

International criminal law enjoys a controversial relationship to peace. On the one hand, many argue that international criminal law impedes peace by interfering with amnesties or other political solutions to conflicts. When conflicting parties can no longer be lured to the negotiating table with the promise of impunity in exchange for laying down arms, the argument goes, future lives are put at risk by imposing obstacles to peace in the name of justice for those who have already lost their lives. Proponents of international criminal law, on the other hand, argue that it encourages peace precisely through its steadfast rejection of impunity and/or sovereign (or other) forms of immunity. In this way, it embraces a rule of law doctrine, where no-one is above the law. By putting law before status or power, the argument goes, international criminal law further promises to deter future crime by putting would-be violators of international criminal law on notice that their acts may have judicial consequences, regardless of their relation to the organs of power in the state in which they find themselves. Finally, international criminal law asserts that its capacity to target culpable individuals relieves societies from experiencing collective harms, which is central to social reconstruction following human rights violations.

The theory that law can replace violence, including at a global level, is a definitive experiment of the times in which we live. Such a theory makes several assumptions, chief among them that law and violence are distinguishable (i.e. that there is more to the practice of law than the powerful

asserting authority over the less powerful). It is the validity of this distinction that is at issue in claims that international criminal law practices target Africans or that the "process has degenerated to some kind of race hunting".¹¹

Critiques of ICC practice and the related questions of whether the ICC should be reformed, or even whether it should continue, benefit from precision. In challenging the ICC, charges that the ICC is "political" miss the point, particularly given that much ICC politics has been amply steered by its African member states. The relevant question is rather – unless we abandon entirely the use of rule of law in response to violence, or our shared commitment to the recognition of human rights – what would the next ICC look like? If we were to try to build a new court, could we make a better one?

It is undeniable that the ICC's practice to date leaves much to criticize; this young, inexperienced institution has suffered perhaps an abnormally high number of growing pains, many of them doubtlessly self-inflicted. It is equally true that several of the most dominant global states – even those that, like the United States, profess a deep commitment to rule of law processes and human rights – have yet to become member states. Nevertheless, the ICC's structure – with respect for member state sovereignty at its centre and an institutionally constructed work-around from that other governing global body, the United Nations – imbues it with possibility.

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Professor Carlson wishes to thank the Commission of the African Union, the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, and the U.S. State Department African Regional Services office in Paris for making her participation possible in the Fridays at the Commission February 28, 2014 conference, for which these remarks were prepared. All views expressed herein are made in Professor Carlson's personal capacity.

¹¹ "International Criminal Court 'hunting' Africans because of their race, Ethiopia's prime minister claims" The Telegraph (accessed February 23, 2014)

GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN EU-AFRICA RELATIONS

● ARTHUR GWAGWA

The announcement of the Africa-EU Summit, which took place between 3 and 4 April 2014, was met with scepticism and a subdued level of enthusiasm, as many in the international human rights and democracy promotion communities view the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) either as irrelevant to their work or as lacking in focus, creativity, and a genuine commitment to upholding basic freedoms.

This scepticism is understandable since a clique of like-minded African states have successfully mounted an embargo by collectively conspiring for individual cases of human rights violations not to be discussed within the JAES framework. Whenever such issues unavoidably crop up, these states resort to diversionary tactics by alleging that the discussion of human rights within the framework reflects Eurocentric values and perspectives. In so alleging, they forget that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. Despite this, some retrogressive African states are increasingly using the arguments of history, sovereignty, culture and religion to question the fundamental principles of universality, equality before the law, and non-discrimination. This has been the case whenever such issues such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights are raised. Similarly, weak civil society scrutiny has disengaged JAES from its people-centered foundation, contrary to the human rights values of participation and empowerment. The next phase of the JAES should therefore refocus and prioritise human rights and democratic challenges, both within Africa and Europe, and institutionalize civil society participation and scrutiny.

What makes the above developments even more disappointing is that they are taking place at a time when Africa has been slowly finding its feet in both democratic and economic terms, recovering from the passing era of constitutional subversions through coups, military takeovers and executive decrees. The ruling elites are finding new ways of repressing human rights, circumventing and subverting the democratic processes in order to retain power. Autocratic regimes are becoming much savvier and better positioned to block efforts at democratization. No longer relying on brute force alone, autocrats are now relying on the manipulation of electoral institutions with the aid of election management organisations such as NIKUV, whose credentials are yet to be ascertained.

As a consequence of these sorts of practice, democracy is on the retreat throughout the continent and this

must be recognised and accepted if this trend is to be countered in order to bring the governance systems of African countries back to some semblance of good order. Genuinely democratic elections in Africa cannot be achieved unless a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms can be exercised on an ongoing basis without discrimination and without arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions. They, like other human rights and democracy more broadly, cannot be achieved without the protection provided by the rule of law.

The rule of law challenges in Egypt and the deteriorating crisis in central Africa, where an untold number of people have lost their lives to massive democratic backsliding in East Africa to **an aging dictator's club in the south**, all show signs that a passive and misguided joint partnership is coming home to roost. Other worrying human rights developments include the role of the African Union in endorsing acutely flawed elections, increasing restrictions on free expression, assembly, and peaceful protest e.g. the violent dispersal of Sahrawi people in Western Sahara by the Moroccan forces, a copy-and-paste mentality of restrictive legislation stifling civic activism, and a significant rise in homophobic laws, especially in Uganda and Nigeria, that violate rights to equality and freedom of association. The legal measures that stifle civil liberties are being passed under the dubious guise of public safety. While strictly enforcing the 'rule of law' in these contexts may display a veil of legitimacy to the outside world, those who work on behalf of - and are genuinely guided by - democratic principles know better than to stand down and accept the unacceptable.

These developments require the EU to work with progressive African governments within the JAES in altering its strategy and breaking previous policy molds by insisting that African leaders demonstrate accountability to their citizens, in terms of both protecting and advancing human rights. The EU must be in a position to articulate a coherent and consistent approach to human rights that makes full use of its combined economic and political clout as well as its wide range of instruments of cooperation, consistent with Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union.

The first step is to strengthen 'democratic institutions', of which the promotion of human rights and the rule of law are central tenets. The EU must match its rhetoric with concrete action by supporting Africa's independent regional mechanisms in ensuring effective protection of human rights. The use of regional mecha-

nisms is an effective means of responding to the cultural specificity arguments referred to above. The second step must be an increased investment in people. In particular, the support of crucial civil society initiatives such as human rights monitoring, grassroots civic engagement and long-term peace building will help to avoid the reactionary dispatch of blue helmets when problems arise in the future.

Given that the prevailing environment in Africa is characterized by widespread democratic backsliding, working with civil society will produce shared dividends for both the EU and its more progressive allies in the region - forces that are likely to have the wherewithal of both outlasting and reversing the region's antidemocratic trends.

Without adequate attention to human rights concerns in Africa, many of which underpin long-standing conflicts, the EU is likely to continue to see little return on its investments, and **democratic reversals will continue to outpace limited gains**. Immense challenges to the EU-Africa partnership will no doubt remain. However, to counter this, policymakers from both areas should appreciate and fully understand the inherent link between respect for basic human rights and the long-term security, peace and prosperity. In so doing, they must appreciate that crises do not merely erupt overnight but are usually the result of years of repression of human rights, and of those who dare to criticize it. This is the central understanding that should guide the thinking within JAES.

At such a consequential historical juncture, it is not the time for Europe to navel-gaze, baulk under the pressure of African political petulant tantrums or nourish old habits that reinforce the status quo. Rather, it is the time to shake off complacency and recognize that Africa's crisis of governance is being driven by a few individuals who remain committed to maintaining power and wealth at the expense of their people, thus collectively degrading Africa's future. It is time to chart a course towards a more secure and sustainable partnership that recognizes that human rights and democratic values are an essential golden thread in the narrative of development.

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Botswana. Photo by Ana Elisa Cascão

VI.

**PEACE
AND
SECURITY**



A particular strength of the EU is its ability to use a broad toolbox of instruments and policies that we - collectively with its Member States - have at our disposal. We strive to put into practice in close cooperation with international, regional and local partners our work on all phases of conflict - from prevention and early warning, to conflict management, post-conflict transition and sustainable development. This comprehensive approach has best been exemplified in dealing with crises in Africa, where our cooperation with the United Nations and the African Union has been instrumental to achieve results. (...) More and more the most difficult challenges to international peace and security require that we join forces. We therefore are working closely with international, regional and local partners”.

ADDRESS BY EU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE CATHERINE ASHTON AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND THE UN ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, NEW YORK, 14 FEBRUARY 2014

“The on-going violent conflicts in Africa highlight the continuing need for the African Union to remain actively seized not only of the management and resolution of conflicts, but also with the prevention of armed conflict. Regional, continental and international efforts to manage and resolve conflicts in Africa raise the necessity to deliberate on how to enhance the tools and methodology for conflict prevention, management and resolution”.

OPENING REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR RAMTANE LAMAMRA, COMMISSIONER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY AT THE PSC OPEN SESSION ON PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY , 22 MARCH 2014

THOUGHTS ON PEACEKEEPING WITHIN AN AFRICAN BACKGROUND

● VICTOR ÂNGELO

INTRODUCTION

On 10 April 2014 the United Nations (UN) Security Council approved the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), to be known as MINUSCA. Resolution 2149 (2014) defines MINUSCA's contextual parameters and objectives. The starting date for the mission will be 15 September 2014.

With another five months to go, that date looks far away. This is especially the case when the serious turmoil in the CAR since late 2012 is taken into account. And this timeline becomes even more problematic when repeated warnings from senior UN staff are recalled – that the situation was out of control and it was clear that the country was sliding into genocide.

A brief comment on the timing of the resolution that has just been adopted would emphasise the absurdly slow decision-making pace of the Security Council. If the premier international body responsible for peace and security – which basically means safeguarding human life and preventing severe violations of human rights – takes such an incredibly long time to respond to a not-so-complex crisis like the one in the CAR, what can we expect from the Council in more intricate situations?

“Not much indeed”, would be tempting to answer.

However, the issue is more intricate than this reply suggests. The slow response to the situation in CAR shows that there are a number of serious problems related to UN's peacekeeping capabilities, particularly in an African setting and in a region that is not directly linked to the strategic interests of the major global powers.

This is a very serious issue that requires urgent attention. Peacekeeping must be effective, fast-moving and people-centred. The UN remains the key player in matters of peacekeeping. In the end the security question that is so often raised is the security of the ordinary citizens, in particular the most vulnerable among them.

There is no other international or inter-governmental institution that is in a position to play a comparable role, not even the African Union (AU), notwithstanding all of efforts the African leaders have made over the last 15 years to strengthen this kind of capacity within their regional organisation. The AU's African Standby Force (ASF) is still work in progress, even in the East African region, where the preparatory work has gone further. At this stage, it is extremely optimistic to believe that the ASF will be fully operational in 2015, as was recently

recommended, in the December 2013 assessment, which further recognised the many delays this undertaking has suffered so far.

Outside Africa, NATO has been mentioned as a possible actor in the areas of peace enforcing and peacekeeping. However, the Atlantic Alliance has no vocation to play an international peacekeeping role. It could, in some cases, be used as a rapid response solution, as an entry force. But in the current circumstances, notably after the Libyan expedition and the deep-rooted tensions with Russia on the Eastern European front, it is highly improbable to have a UN Security Council request addressed to NATO. The same is true as far as the Russia-inspired Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is concerned. CSTO countries already established a peacekeeping architecture at the end of 2010. But the force is yet to be seen on the ground. To date, no operation has been assigned to CSTO. And it is difficult to foresee this organization playing any out-of-area active role in the medium term. However, both NATO and CSTO should be included in the wider debate about the future of peacekeeping.

There should be no doubt at this stage that the way forward is to strengthen the UN's capacity to respond. As that happens, it should not be forgotten that Africa is the continent where most peacekeeping missions are deployed. Recent missions, in South Sudan, Mali and now in CAR, have been approved in response to African challenges. In this context, as the UN should address some of its key shortcomings in peacekeeping, African leaders should also be encouraged to continue strengthening their own capacities. The goal here, in parallel to the reform of the UN apparatus, is to create an African capacity to respond to violent crises within the continent's five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In the foreseeable future, the RECs must be able to put together their respective Standby Forces, harmonise operational abilities and develop their regional machinery to deal with peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political transitions.

But, at this stage, it is important to focus on some of the key issues related to UN's peacekeeping, whilst taking into account African experiences and needs. What follows are some brief observations that should be considered in terms of advocating for the urgent need to sharpen the UN's tools.

FASTER DEPLOYMENTS

UN peacekeeping deployments take too long to materialise. This has now been a key issue for the last seven years or so. This is particularly the case in Africa, but is more generally so in non-English speaking countries.

Large scale Troop-Contributing Countries (TTCs) are overcommitted, in view of the demands coming from huge missions that are still in the field in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, South Sudan and elsewhere. Take the case of Mali, for instance. Only 55% of authorised military personnel have been deployed so far, despite the fact that the mission was established almost a year ago. Many of the troops that were fielded by the preceding African-only mission in the framework of a regional response – in this case ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) troops plus Chadian soldiers who were already on the ground before the UN military presence – could not be “re-hatted” and transferred to the UN because they did not meet the standards the UN requires for its contingents.

This will certainly be the same in the CAR. The 6,000 MISCA soldiers –troops from neighbouring countries belonging to the Economic Commission of Central African States (ECCAS) – will face the same difficulties in terms of their eventual “re-hatting” as blue berets. For many months there will be a poorly staffed MINUSCA trying to stretch itself in order to fulfil its mandate. Most likely, when the first period of the mandate comes to an end on 30 April 2015, the number of soldiers will be well below the 10,000 that the UN Security Council resolution 2149 authorised.

The same is valid for the police component. MINUSCA should have 1,800 police personnel, most of them gendarmerie. This component is critical in a mission that basically has to respond to issues of law and order in a society in chaos. However it is unlikely that the UN will be able to mobilize the required numbers. In general, states that participate in peacekeeping operations have no spare police capacity that can be made available. This is one of the big differences between police services and military forces – availability. The number of soldiers waiting for a job is much higher. And only a handful of countries have gendarmerie services. In Africa, this is the case mainly in French-speaking countries. Very often those gendarmerie forces are not fully prepared to serve

within a UN mission. Like their military counterparts, their standards of training do not meet the minimum requirements for a UN assignment.

All of this has an impact on the timely fulfilment of operations' mandates as well as the effectiveness and the image of the UN. As they try to emerge from traumatic crises and find any opportunity to make their living, people in the host nation will see many UN military convoys arriving over a long period of time, a never-ending flow of troops and highly conspicuous equipment. They will contrast this with very low levels of security operations. Before anything else, newly arrived soldiers will be busy with their own installation, building their infrastructure. This actually can easily be exploited by those in the country that are not in favour of an international military presence. Experience has shown that heavy and slow-paced deployments can undermine the political consent, which is critical for the mission.

Any crisis that is followed by a peacekeeping deployment must be able to show quick wins. And the easiest problem to turn around in the initial phase of a deployment has to do with the security environment. It might take long to address its most critical dimensions. But it is possible to improve the popular perception related to the low intensity security threats. This is where the priority should be. It has an immediate impact on the lives of the citizens. Changes to the security situation are among the first expectations. An improved situation is a winner, in terms of gaining people's support. But doing so requires faster deployments, troops that can hit the ground running. This is not the case today, in most of the situations.

EFFECTIVENESS

The countries providing brigades and vast numbers of police personnel are generally African (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, etc.) and South Asian (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan). They are oversubscribed in terms of UN peacekeeping commitments. Very often, however, politically they do not want to recognise this, as the international assignments are an important part of their armed forces' expectations. Rather, they tend to make promises and accept engagements without being sure they will have the capacity to deliver on time and with the necessary standards of quality. Also, the personnel they might be able to mobilise are general purpose infantry troops and street police officers. The force enablers and multipliers as well

as air and ground mobility assets are generally insufficient and sometimes inadequate for the terrain in which they have to operate. Without them, the effectiveness of a field presence is very limited or even non-existent.

Complexity calls for more focussed deployments, highly trained men and women and more specialised military personnel. Missions now require many more Special Forces and intelligence officers – both for people-based and signals information collection and analysis – than just sentinels and patrolmen. The Council is still caught up in an approach that tries to respond to generic skills, poor performance and low standards by increasing the numbers of soldiers. This way of doing business needs to change.

For sure, this is an area where developed countries must be more forthcoming. During the last two decades they have been moving away from engaging troops in UN peacekeeping operations, with one or two exceptions, like the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. It is time to see European and North American troops and police officers back in UN missions. The developed world must be a more active part of the peacekeeping equation. They must unequivocally demonstrate that global responsibility for peacekeeping is not shared out along the lines of money: those who pay for missions do not deploy and those who deploy, largely from the developing South, are paid to keep international peace. This undermines the principle of joint responsibility for world peace. It also does not take into account that the developed countries would have a greater chance to advocate for their values and interests if their soldiers could be found shoulder to shoulder with uniformed men and women coming from other regions of the world. Moreover, richer countries have and can spare the specialised personnel so much in demand. They also have the specific, highly efficient logistics capabilities that peacekeeping operations in remote areas around the world require.

The second move that more developed member states should make concerns training for defence and security personnel. The military training programme the EU is implementing in Mali is a good example and it should be replicated in the CAR. As it has just been decided for Mali, after a long hesitation, it must also include the gendarmerie and the police, not just the armed forces. Investing in the development of human resources and institutions is critical to help a country overcome chronic crisis. Richer nations must be much more committed to

security sector reform and the development of defence, police and penal institutions in countries coming out of a deep national crisis. The capacity building packages must also include revamping justice systems –without forgetting the relevance of traditional methods of administering justice – as a means of combating impunity and contributing to national reconciliation and long-term stability.

A cautionary note though. Training national forces and reforming national defence and security institutions in a post-crisis country must be accompanied by a plan for financial sustainability. Experience has shown that African officers trained in the best US and European academies often feel a high degree of professional frustration when they return to their national army corps, because those units are underfunded. Indeed, because of lack of resources, most units are unable to go beyond a collection of “barefooted” armed men, dressed in uniforms of fortune and flea market camouflage. They have no real means to operate. They can easily become the breeding ground for the future wave of discontent and crisis, as we have seen in Mali in 2012. The issue of the financial sustainability of modern armed forces and police services in a number of African countries requires an honest debate.

STRONG POLITICAL MANDATE

The effectiveness of any UN peacekeeping mission is clearly related to its political mandate. This mandate must be realistically defined.

In terms of the African-based missions, there is now a tendency to attach to mandates an array of concerns and objectives. They are certainly important but they are generally more related to long term development goals than to keeping the peace and creating the conditions for political transition and basic human security. It will be wise to strike a balance between comprehensiveness and the core objectives of peacekeeping. Focus would make the mission stronger. It would therefore increase the chances of success.

Mandates should above all aim at creating the political and security foundations on which peace building and development should rest. Actually, an area that requires greater attention, both in terms of knowledge and identification of the practical lessons learnt so far, is the one related to the connections between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. But those links cannot be a pretext for unworkable mandates.

“Those who pay for missions do not deploy and those who deploy, largely from the developing South, are paid to keep international peace. This undermines the principle of joint responsibility for world peace.

Next to focus, the political role of head of mission is critical for deep-rooted change, for the move from crisis to institutional, representative democracy. It is therefore indispensable to make sure the mission leadership gets the full political support of the Security Council and the relevant regional organisations (the AU, for instance, and the affected RECs).

In addition, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) must be better prepared to exercise their respective backstopping roles. For too long, the state of mind in both departments has been inspired by the arrogant attitude and detachment that comes from working at headquarters and too far away from the realities of the daily life in the field. In particular DPKO has shown, on many occasions, to lack the skills and field experience necessary to provide the right type of advice to the missions that fall under its responsibility and to serve as a permanent channel between the field and the key countries in the Security Council. The rotation of staff between headquarters and field needs to be effectively implemented.

Leadership issues are crucial in all complex situations, particularly in countries that have gone through major national upheavals. Those issues are not only about the quality of the mission leadership or the sorts of diplomatic interventions carried out by regional leaders. Leadership is fundamentally about daring to create the domestic conditions for a renewal of the national political elites in the post-crisis situation and allowing for the right type of leaders to emerge, including at the local level. New times call for new leaders grounded on accepted political practise; leaders with legitimacy. In this context, proper electoral processes, at the presidential, national and local levels, are critical elements of an exit strategy. They call for continued support by the best technical teams available within the international peace machinery. But they should not be considered the absolute benchmarks. To complete successful elections cannot be seen as the indicator that the mission has done its job and can leave. Nonetheless, fair elections do make the transition process more sustainable and open the door for an earlier exit of the international presence.

The emphasis on national and local political leadership cannot ignore the role of civil society. A strong civil society is essential for stability, reconciliation and democracy. Peacekeeping missions must give the example

and fully accept civil society as a critical partner in the transition process. That will send a clear message to the new political elite that will emerge after the crisis. Expertise on civil society relations must be part of the mission's skills.

REDUCING COSTS

UN peacekeeping operations are very costly endeavours. A mission like the one just approved for the CAR might require a billion US dollars a year. This is undoubtedly a lot of money. Its financing is mandatory for the UN member states once the mission has been authorised by the Council. At a time of continued cost restraint and belt tightening, governments in key capitals, those that carry the main budgetary burden for UN operations, become very hesitant when it comes to this level of expenditures. This is a basic reason why approval of the resolution on CAR was delayed. Finance ministries have the first word when it comes to deciding about new international operations. Moreover, the Council knows when a mission will begin but has no clear idea about when it will end.

It is therefore critically important to look at ways of containing costs. Not only should the mission objectives be clearly articulated, they should also be attainable within a reasonable amount of time. It is also imperative to build the national capacity to take over as soon as possible. The ultimate responsibility for peace and security in a country rests within its national borders, with its authorities and its citizens. Financial considerations make this principle more present than ever.

A further cost related question pertains to the exit strategy of the mission, which should be incorporated from the very beginning as a primary component of the mission design. It is essential that the Security Council asks DPKO and the head of the field mission to devise a reasonably defined plan focused on the gradual but steady transfer of responsibilities to the national and sub-regional authorities as soon as it is feasible to do so. Feasible means that peace can be sustained without direct intervention by the international community. A plan that would be both a road map to guide the peace keeping mission and serve as a blueprint for its exit strategy.

MOVING AHEAD

UN peacekeeping has achieved some notable results in the past. Sierra Leone, in Africa, and East Timor in the South Pacific, are just two recent examples of major successes in the recent past. UN peacekeeping has also changed a lot for the better over the last decade. Those who saw peacekeeping in the Balkans during the 1990s and then observe today's operations notice that the UN has come a long way in terms of integration of different dimensions and creating a balance between the military and the civilian components of missions. There is now much greater emphasis on law and order and policing, justice, local administration and conflict resolution at the community level, as well as on gender equality and human rights. The UN has also accumulated extensive experience in terms of logistics supply and sustainment, air and ground mobility and support to humanitarian emergencies.

But times keep changing. Conflicts are increasingly about basic natural resources and survival, differences in religious practices and faith-based behaviours, terrorism, wide spread banditry and criminality, and the collapse or limitations of state administration, leaving vast areas ungoverned. At the same time, violent conflicts tend to have deep and complex root causes, which necessitate time to be resolved. But the attention span of the international community has become shorter. And so many of us have acquired the fever of impatience, we live at the speed of the TV screen or even the social media, shaped by the 140-character approach. We want to see results before too long, if not immediately. Protracted conflicts tend to disappear from the public eye if they become too static or nothing happens. As they lose prominence, they receive less political and financial support. Their prolonged budgetary costs become more difficult to justify.

Sixteen missions are deployed in different parts of the world, nine of them in Africa. The defence sector has also been under review in several key developed countries, prompted by the need to adapt to contemporary threats and be prepared to respond to new international settings. This is therefore the moment to reflect again about the peacekeeping challenges as it was done almost 15 years ago, when the Brahimi report was issued. Time and circumstances make it advisable to review and update the recommendations of that important and influential report.

It is also the time for the EU and the AU to reflect, in house and in their joint consultations, on what can

be reasonably done by both parties to complement the UN peacekeeping work. This is a debate that should take place without further delay. It should be linked to the next evaluation of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) and its transformation into an instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. For Africa, the doubling of APF resources over the next three years, recently decided at the IV EU-Africa Summit, is encouraging and certainly appreciated. But there is a need to go beyond resources, as important as they are, and look at the substance of what really needs to be funded and how that can be integrated in a long-term strategy of greater African self-reliance. This about Africa's capacity to sort out its own conflicts.

This debate would also benefit from the long experience the Norwegians have acquired in the implementation of their Training for Peace programme (TFP). The programme, funded by the government of Norway since 1995 and managed by African institutions, has been able to evolve over time. It is now particularly attentive to training in the areas of African civilian capacities and police personnel for peacekeeping, as well as focused on the need to support applied research. In this, the EU has a good source of inspiration when designing the new generation of training missions. Such missions should take advantage of the Malian experience – the EU Training Mission –, be civilian led and as inclusive as possible.

The way forward should further consider the experience of coalitions of the willing and the role of small groupings of countries as suppliers of peace enforcing and peacekeeping tasks. But this is a discussion for another time. However, it cannot be brushed aside and ignored. Nor should China's ambitions to support peace and security operations in Africa be forgotten. Here, the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, approved in 2012, is worth noting.

All this calls for a very direct question: *Who is going to lead the debate on renovating peacekeeping?* It must be an institution that is in a position to bring all of the stakeholders together, including the EU, for sure, but above all, the African institutions that have the responsibility for peace and security throughout the continent.

The answer seems obvious.

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A COOPERAÇÃO UE-ÁFRICA PARA A PAZ E SEGURANÇA

● LUÍS MANUEL BRÁS BERNARDINO

"...Peace and Security are essential prerequisites for development and prosperity. In Africa and in Europe, conflict and instability can undermine all our efforts to reduce poverty and to accelerate growth..."

Declaração Final, IVª Cimeira UE-ÁFRICA, 2-3 Abril 2014

Introdução

A 4ª Cimeira UE-África, que decorreu entre 2 e 3 de abril em Bruxelas, reuniu os principais Chefes de Estado e de Governo europeus e africanos (apesar das ausências notadas), bem como responsáveis máximos da União Europeia (UE) e da União Africana (UA), além de vários fóruns e iniciativas da sociedade civil, sob o sugestivo tema *"Investir nos Povos, na Prosperidade e na Paz"*. Sob este desiderato pretendeu-se, mais uma vez, debater temas como a paz e a segurança, o investimento, as alterações climáticas e o problema das migrações, para além de se debater, transversalmente, a melhor forma de operacionalizar a cooperação estratégica entre regiões, continentes e principalmente, organizações de diferentes níveis e amplitudes. Pretende-se assim reforçar a cooperação es-

truturada na sequência das cimeiras anteriores realizadas no Cairo (2000), em Lisboa (2007) e em Trípoli (2010), num quadro de cooperação estratégica que tem já quase 15 anos.

As relações UE-África baseiam-se na bem estruturada *Joint Africa-EU Strategy* (JAES), adoptada na Cimeira de Lisboa em 2007. Contudo, uma das primeiras constatações é que a sua operacionalização e principalmente o grau de efetividade, não correspondem às necessidades e exigências que os problemas que afectam a África e a Europa requeriam, tornando-o num instrumento pouco consequente e em alguns aspectos inócuo, e que importava ser ajustado e dimensionado para uma nova realidade, em face do inovador quadro de ameaças e riscos que afetam este espaço geopolítico.

Neste quadro, a Cimeira de Bruxelas constituiu mais uma oportunidade para se analisar, debater e reformular a parceria UE-África, adoptando-se com base na JAES, um novo *roadmap* (2014-2017), onde se apontam novas áreas de cooperação para o futuro e que se espera possa constituir um novo patamar para a cooperação, nomeadamente na vertente da paz e da segurança.

EUTM-Somalia



Do Cairo a Bruxelas: Que cooperação na área da paz e segurança entre a UE-África?

Na “Declaração do Cairo” e no consequente “Plano de Acção” (que constituiria mais um plano de intenções) adoptado em 2 e 3 de Abril de 2000 na sequência da I Cimeira, a UE mostrou-se, desde o início, disposta a realizar uma cooperação mais formal e estruturada por via do apoio à edificação e operacionalização dos mecanismos de prevenção de conflitos da então Organização de Unidade Africana (OUA), destacando-a como interlocutor privilegiado nas relações político-estratégicas entre Europa e África. Esta “nova” cooperação pretendia, ambiciosamente, lançar uma inovadora forma de parceria entre os dois continentes e elevar as relações entre a UE e África ao mesmo nível daquelas que a UE mantinha com a América Latina e a Ásia, tendo resultado no estabelecimento de uma base institucional para o diálogo político-estratégico entre continentes e organizações continentais.

No quadro da segurança, o enfoque da “Declaração do Cairo” centrava-se essencialmente na prevenção, gestão e resolução de conflitos e no apoio às iniciativas de *peacebuilding*, sendo que se considerava como o primeiro responsável nesta matéria, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, de acordo com o art.º 2º da sua Carta, reafirmando-se nela os princípios da soberania, da integridade territorial, da independência e da não ingerência nos assuntos internos dos países. Neste quadro dogmático, a paz e a segurança, bem como a estabilidade e a justiça, viriam a ser considerados os pré-requisitos para o desenvolvimento socioeconómico, consolidados através do apoio aos mecanismos de prevenção, gestão e resolução de conflitos da OUA, apostando no reforço das capacidades de resposta rápida a nível regional, com um significado especial quando se comemorava em África o “Ano da Paz” (2000).

A cooperação que se iniciava, agora em termos mais formais, assentava nos seguintes vectores: apoio às situações pós-conflituais, nomeadamente através das iniciativas de Desarmamento, Desmobilização e Reintegração (DDR) de ex-combatentes; o combate ao terrorismo e ao tráfico de armamento e de pessoas; a restrição do uso de minas pessoais; o apoio à não proliferação e ao desarmamento nuclear, nomeadamente através do incentivo aos Estados Africanos para a assinatura do “*Tratado de Pelindaba*”, contribuindo assim para um continente sem armas nucleares, e ainda a temática da segurança alimentar, que constituiriam as principais preocupações na dimensão

paz e da segurança na relação Europa-África.

No contexto europeu e no quadro da “Estratégia Europeia de Segurança”¹ (2003) viria a ser aprovada em 12 de abril de 2005, a “*Visão Estratégica da UE para África*”² pois que o Conselho Europeu havia aprovado uma resolução específica relativa à prevenção, gestão e resolução de conflitos em África em 22 de novembro de 2004, bem como o respectivo “*Plano de Acção para o apoio da PESC à paz e segurança em África*” (2005/304/PESC). Este plano estava centrado no desenvolvimento de capacidades operacionais, no apoio ao planeamento de Estado-Maior, no suporte de ações de DDR e de reforma do sector da segurança, e em melhorar a coordenação interna e externa dos esforços da UE.

Estas orientações passaram a estar identificadas na *Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, aprovada na Cimeira de Lisboa entre os dois continentes, realizada em Portugal em 8 e 9 de dezembro de 2007, no âmbito da Presidência Portuguesa da UE, e materializada no “Plano de Acção I” (2007-2010), que identificava a paz e segurança no contexto das oito parcerias estratégicas entre a UE e a União Africana (UA). Neste quadro, viriam a ser adotadas ações prioritárias (e urgentes) que apontavam para a necessi-

¹ A “Estratégia Europeia de Segurança” foi publicada em dezembro de 2003 e apontava a África Subsariana como uma das principais fontes das ameaças à segurança da Europa, referindo nomeadamente: o terrorismo internacional, a imigração clandestina, o tráfico de armas, droga ou de pessoas, bem como as pandemias como os riscos principais para a segurança na Europa. Em 11 de dezembro de 2008, viria a ser publicado o “Relatório de Execução da Estratégia de Segurança Europeia”, designado por “*Garantir a Segurança num Mundo em Mudança*” - S407/08, onde se reitera a preocupação da segurança, mais centrado na atualidade política e conflitual do Norte de África e na região do Médio Oriente, sendo entretanto apresentado em março de 2010 o documento designado por “*Estratégia de Segurança Interna - Rumo a um modelo europeu de segurança*”, que vem reforçar a importância do continente Africano para a segurança da Europa. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313PTC.pdf].

² A “visão estratégica da UE para África” (2005) referia explicitamente que a “...Europa e África estão ligadas pela história, geografia e por uma visão comum de paz, democracia e pela prosperidade das pessoas...”, apostando na promoção da paz e da segurança pela cooperação com as Organizações Regionais Africanas e com os Estados Africanos, particularmente ao nível da prevenção, mediação e resolução de conflitos regionais. Na sequência das decisões políticas tomadas pela UA, na “Cimeira de Maputo” (2003), a UE no âmbito da sua Política Externa e de Segurança Comum e por via da Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa estabeleceu a iniciativa “*Peace Support Operations Facility for the African Union*” que implica o uso de recursos financeiros do FED para apoio às Operações de Paz realizadas pela UA em África, e que constituiu a forma de apoiar diretamente a edificação e a operacionalidade da Arquitectura de Paz e Segurança Africana.

dade de aprofundar o diálogo sobre os principais desafios e ameaças à paz e segurança no continente Africano, essencialmente voltados para o apoio à operacionalização da Arquitetura de Paz e Segurança em África (APSA) e em assegurar o apoio ao financiamento das operações de paz “Africanas” em África.

Novamente em África, os líderes europeus e africanos estiveram reunidos, de 29 a 30 de Novembro em 2010, em Trípoli (Líbia), na 3ª Cimeira UE-África. No quadro da segurança, o renovado Plano de Ação (2011-2013) continuava a ter como primeira prioridade a cooperação estratégica na vertente da consolidação da paz e da segurança e estava assente num *roadmap* que visava a operacionalização dos mecanismos de alerta e de resposta regional da APSA, nomeadamente através da cooperação com as Organizações Regionais Africanas.

Neste âmbito, o relatório do “Painel Prodi”, evocava um conjunto de iniciativas com vista a garantir a sustentabilidade do apoio às operações de paz sob a supervisão da UA. A construção de novas capacidades integradas no ciclo “*Amani Africa*”, em parcerias mais estruturadas e abrangentes, funcionaria como medidas de optimização dos mecanismos de prevenção e resolução de conflitos, em linha com o diálogo político e em sintonia com as orientações e prioridades das NU. A resiliência organizacional e o combate às ameaças latentes na relação Europa-África, vistas numa perspectiva global de segurança transnacional e no apoio ao combate ao crime organizado e ao tráfego de armas e seres humanos, foram também incluídas como medidas potenciadoras de um incremento do índice de segurança humana para o continente Africano.

Outra área aprovada foi a intenção de garantir a proteção de civis nos conflitos armados, nomeadamente das crianças, em linha com as orientações emanadas pelas NU através das Resoluções UNSC-R 1894, UNSC-R 1325 e UNSC-R 1820, potenciando o papel das mulheres na prevenção e resolução de conflitos. Estas áreas da cooperação, mais político-estratégicas do que operacionais, não contribuíram plenamente para uma melhor e mais efetiva relação de cooperação entre África e Europa, sendo apelidada de uma “cooperação estratégica estéril”, ou seja, onde os resultados tendem a não ser efetivos e os problemas tendem a persistir.

Na IV Cimeira entre a União Europeia e África (Bruxelas, Abril de 2014) reforçou-se o objetivo de continuar um diálogo construtivo sobre aspetos tão diversos como as questões políticas, económicas, sociais, de desen-

volvimento e com especial enfoque na vertente, sempre presente, da paz e segurança, na perspectiva de que sem segurança não existem condições de desenvolvimento nem de governabilidade.

No quadro da segurança, a cooperação Euro-Africana baseia-se em razões objetivas de necessidade e de diminuição do nível de riscos e ameaças para a Europa com origem em África. Neste sentido, a Estratégia Conjunta continua a promover o desenvolvimento de instrumentos de cooperação específica, tais como o *African Peace Facility* (APF)³ que visa financiar a APSA e que permite mobilizar recursos do apoio ao desenvolvimento para a criação de mecanismos de alerta, tais como o “*Continental Early Warning System*” e de resposta rápida, essencialmente ao nível das Organizações Regionais.

Os resultados passaram a constituir o elemento objetivo da cooperação no novo *roadmap* (2014-2017), em que as cinco áreas prioritárias apontam agora para um maior apoio às ações conjuntas a nível regional, continental ou global, que envolvam interesses comuns para África e Europa, o que se traduz, na área da paz e segurança, em:

- Reforçar o diálogo político no intuito de desenhar entendimentos comuns para os desafios da segurança em África em assuntos como: a paz; justiça (nomeadamente na confirmação da rejeição e combate à impunidade a nível nacional e internacional, apostando na jurisdição internacional) e na reconciliação; apostar no reforço da cooperação entre o Conselho de Paz e Segurança da UA e a Comissão Política de Segurança da UE;
- Continuar a identificar áreas da cooperação que requeiram mecanismos próprios e aconselhem à implementação de soluções orientadas para os resultados;
- Apoiar a operacionalização da APSA, particularmente no apoio às *African Standby Forces* ao nível da sua projeção, apoio e garantias de manutenção em operações de uma maneira sustentável, nomeadamente através do apoio ao treino e ao reforço das capacidades das Forças africanas, incluindo a componente policial e civil. Paralelamente, garante-se um apoio à capacid-

³ Na sequência das decisões políticas tomadas pela UA, na Cimeira de Maputo em 2003, a UE no âmbito da sua “*Política Externa e de Segurança Comum*” (PESC) e por via da “*Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa*” (PESD), estabeleceu a iniciativa “*Peace Support Operations Facility for the African Union*” que implicava o uso de recursos financeiros do FED para apoio às Operações de Paz realizadas pela UA em África e que constituiu a forma de apoiar diretamente a edificação e a operacionalidade da APSA.

ade da UA e das instituições africanas em áreas relacionadas com a prevenção de crises, o *peacebuilding* e a reconstrução pós-conflito, incluindo a assessoria e o fornecimento de material e de treino específico;

- Apostar no reforço da coordenação entre a UE e África envolvendo as Organizações Regionais Africanas, essencialmente no planeamento e na condução de atividades no âmbito da prevenção de conflitos e de apoio à paz, em cooperação com as NU;
- Reforçar a cooperação ao nível das medidas tendentes a diminuir as causas-base subjacentes aos conflitos, essencialmente em áreas como o combate ao terrorismo, e relacionado com as ameaças transnacionais como o crime organizado, incluindo o tráfico de pessoas, drogas, armas ligeiras e o tráfico ilegal de animais selvagens (essencialmente marfim);
- O aumento da cooperação ao nível dos Direitos Humanos relacionados com a segurança, associado às iniciativas de prevenção de conflitos, gestão de crises, e processos de pós-conflito, essencialmente nos esforços de apoio à Reforma do Sector da Segurança. O enfoque está também no combate à violência e na proteção de civis, em particular as mulheres e crianças, que se consideram os mais afetados pelos conflitos armados. Apoiar uma participação mais efetiva e uma maior representatividade das mulheres nos processos de prevenção, de paz e de reconstrução, no pós-conflito;
- Em complemento do apoio às Operações de Paz em curso em África através do *African Peace Facility*, aumentar a mobilização de recursos internacionais e africanos, para apoiar uma maior sustentabilidade (e capacidade de financiamento inopinados) das operações de paz em África conduzidas ao nível regional, apoiando assim as Organizações Regionais nos seus esforços para a paz e segurança no continente.

Estas áreas representam efetivamente um reforço da cooperação estratégica já existente, agora mais orientada para os resultados, e potencialmente mais realista e operacional, o que não simboliza contudo, que seja uma nova abordagem, mas sim um reforço da continuidade do tipo de cooperação entre a Europa e África que, como iremos ver, necessita de ter uma abordagem diferente.

Que perspetivas de futuro para a cooperação UE-África para a paz e segurança?

A cooperação para a paz e segurança entre a Europa

e África corresponde a um paradigma de cooperação que se encontra mais direcionado para a resolução de situações de crise e de emergência e no apoio à resolução de problemas através de ações imediatistas do pós-conflito, pois estas têm implicações diretas na segurança do espaço europeu. Assim, as medidas implementadas (ou a implementar) não implicam significativos contributos ao nível tecnológico e de defesa, pois que nesta cooperação não estão incluídos diálogos ao nível do desenvolvimento de tecnologias de defesa, no apoio à criação e uma indústria de defesa africana, no apoio à ciberdefesa e cibersegurança e à comunicação e vigilância por satélite, entre outras áreas, bem como - um pouco surpreendente - não havendo referência específica ao apoio à área da segurança marítima, e que representaria uma “nova” abordagem entre pares para a segurança global que é apregoada.

Temos a consciência, através das orientações emanadas e dos compromissos assumidos, que a Europa (e a UE) se continua a posicionar numa relação de doador, de fornecedor privilegiado, de mentor, mais experiente e “desenvolvido”. Este é um posicionamento que não constitui uma verdadeira cooperação estratégica e bidirecional entre pares, onde determinadas áreas da cooperação não são possíveis, onde a cooperação exclusiva se sobrepõe a uma cooperação inclusiva, de interesses imediatistas e orientados para a resposta a emergências. Pensamos assim que já muito foi feito e que muito se irá fazer, mas que não podemos esquecer que existem outros desafios noutras dimensões da segurança e do desenvolvimento que importaria partilhar, ainda que superficialmente, numa relação que pretende contribuir para um mundo mais seguro e inclusivo.

No caso da segurança marítima, o apoio no combate à pirataria no mar e à proteção naval na região do Corno de África e a recente adoção da Estratégia da UE para o Golfo da Guiné (aprovada pelo Conselho da UE em 17 de março de 2014) não estão expressas na cooperação com África, nem existe qualquer referência a um eventual apoio à “*Estratégia Marítima Integrada de África 2050*” (2012), nem ao “Plano de Acção” para a operacionalização, o que constitui uma área esquecida nesta cooperação que se quer estratégica. O mar e as problemáticas associadas, de vital importância para a segurança e não só, da Europa - e que deveria levar, desde já, à adoção de sinergias comuns de apoio - não teve relevância estratégica na estratégia Europa-África.

Pensamos ainda que a Europa tem diferentes níveis de preocupação, relação, e consequentemente, empenhamento, na cooperação para a paz e segurança com África,



EUTM-Somalia

e que existe mesmo uma divisão entre os interesses da UE e de alguns países na aproximação ao continente africano. Este aspeto tem influência, por exemplo, no compromisso que os países assumem nas contribuições para o apoio ao desenvolvimento e para a participação nas operações de paz em África. Deve-se, por isso, apostar numa melhor articulação entre os países e organizações, bem como num reforço da cooperação bi-multilateral, que permitiria melhorar e conferir outra dimensão, à cooperação entre países, regiões, organizações e continentes.

A cooperação entre estas entidades está condenada a ter futuro. Está destinada a um entendimento obrigatório, pois os riscos e ameaças existem nas duas margens do Mediterrâneo e uma cooperação efetiva para combater as ameaças transnacionais à segurança nacional e organizacional implica, cada vez mais, uma maior convergência de interesses, um maior empenhamento e compromisso europeu (e africano). Só uma resposta integrada e robusta assente em organizações comprometidas pode fazer face às ameaças que atualmente a Europa, África e o mundo enfrentam.

Embora o período de existência desta cooperação estruturada entre continentes (e organizações) seja relativamente curto e a conjuntura económica europeia não pareça muito favorável, pensamos que as áreas de cooperação consideradas são imediatistas, ainda pouco ambi-

ciosas e colocam em patamares diferenciados a Europa e África, nomeadamente na vertente da paz e da segurança, onde seria importante (e desejável), a par da consolidação da JAES, abrir um novo quadro de cooperação para lá de 2020, com a inclusão de novas áreas de cooperação. Estas inovadoras áreas de cooperação deveriam ir para além do curto prazo e apostar em áreas mais tecnológicas, científicas, industriais, e ainda abrindo linhas de cooperação estruturadas sobre o mar e a segurança marítima. Áreas de cooperação que tinham espaço, interesse e pertinência, para numa visão de futuro e a médio/longo prazo, integrar um outro quadro de cooperação: esta foi a visão que faltou nesta Cimeira de Bruxelas e que não existe ainda na relação Europa-África.

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V.

**BEYOND
DEVELOPMENT
AID**



Africa is on the move. The accelerating industrial development of Africa is a reality. The developing regions and countries that are sharing the benefits of globalisation are the rapidly industrialising ones. The European Union and Africa have genuine interest in increasing bilateral trade, investment and market integration in mutually beneficial relations to boost strong sustainable and inclusive growth and create jobs”.

EC VICE-PRESIDENT, ANTONIO TAJANI, COMMISSIONER RESPONSIBLE FOR INDUSTRY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AT THE 5TH EU-AFRICA BUSINESS FORUM ON “A COMMON FUTURE FOR EU/AFRICA: ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH”, APRIL 2014

“In the quest to realise the development goal, Africa should be mindful of the fact that, it has the larger responsibility to bridge that divide. Thus in considering the proposed ‘enhanced cooperation’, the critical issue of concern for Africa should be to determine the desired benefits from the new partnership within the context of globalization and its inherent competitive pressures that challenge realization of stable political and economic aspirations. With that in mind, Africa should look beyond traditional aid which is being discredited by many as continued dependence and more of a setback tactic than real assistance. Though many African leaders continue to cling on to it, the fact remains that it is an option that compromises long-term development strategies of aid dependent countries. African countries should look for the kind of cooperation that will eventually equip their citizens with the necessary technical know-how to bolster their efforts at value addition and intensify their search for local solutions to their challenges”.

AMBASSADOR NANA BEMA KUMI, DIRECTOR OF NYANSAPO HOUSE, INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES (1-2DP), GHANA

“A process of democratization that has taken root across much of the continent; ongoing improvements to the business environment; exponential growth in trade and investment and substantial improvements in the quality of human life have provided a platform for the economic growth that a large number of African economies have experienced over the past decade. (...) Securing our future in the 21st Century requires us to secure our prosperity. This means harnessing economic growth wherever in the world it is occurring. It means supporting our private sector and ensuring that it can compete in an increasingly competitive global marketplace. It means strengthening our relationships with our strategic partners, deepening our understanding and working together to seize the opportunities that it presents”.

STATEMENT BY H.E. DR. ANTHONY MARUPING, COMMISSIONER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION, AT THE AFRICA INVESTMENT FORUM, 8-10 APRIL 2014

UNLEASHING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP: LIFTING THE “DEVELOPMENT LANGUAGE” BARRIER?

● MYRTO HATZIGEORGOPOULOS

The fourth EU-Africa Summit was held in Brussels on 2-3 April 2014 under the theme “Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace”. Seven years after the latest Summit (Lisbon) that led to the adoption of the Joint-Africa EU Strategy, both continents underwent deep economic and political changes that have triggered the need to reset the dialogue. Analysts had warned that little was to be expected in terms of re-energising the partnership; indeed, the Summit concluded that the JAES remained the strategic political reference for EU-Africa relations. Regardless of this outcome, this remains an occasion to reflect on the nature of the EU-Africa relationship in the light of the developments that occurred in the past few years. Although the concept of “partnership of equals” has formally framed EU-Africa relations since 2007, one cannot question the fact that development assistance and policies have occupied the front stage. *Can the changed international balance of power result in a readjustment of the continent’s historical ties with Europe and put into question the patterns of cooperation that have come to define and frame this said relationship?*

The 2007 economic crisis, and its subsequent financial and banking crises, have severely weakened the EU as a committed, coherent and capable actor in Africa. Against the background of economic hardship in the European Union, Africa, in contrast, is hosting some of the fastest growing economies in the world.¹ Its average GDP has grown by 5.2% per year between 2003 and 2011, and, according to the International Monetary Fund’s estimates, 7 of the ten fastest growing economies in the world in 2011 were African.² With the gap between both entities shrinking, and with growing instability on the African continent, voices are increasingly being raised on the European side for more political engagement and less financial dependency from African states on the EU. African leaders, for their part, call for a more balanced relationship based on a true “partnership of equals”, in order to move away from the stigmatising “donor/recipient” pattern that has underpinned relations in the past decades.

Although “development”, and its quasi-unavoidable corollary of “aid” have been the driving force underpinning decades of EU-Africa cooperation, the concept, if

not the term, remain highly contentious. It is deplorable that the term has come to be dismissed as a buzzword, thereby disregarding much of its significance and implications. Since its emergence, development has been the target of a wide range of criticisms. While the object of the criticisms varies, several schools of thought focus on the factors of dominance and exploitation that development policies, in their view, necessarily entail. In this sense, development policies should be reviewed and the relationship redefined. But how can such a shift take place?

If policies are the defining feature of the relationship, the way these are communicated and formulated is meaningful. Thus, **development, both as a concept/ideology that drives policy-making, but equally as a rhetoric, is a defining element of the EU-Africa relation** and its importance shall not be underestimated. Indeed, as defined by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, “language is a system of signs [...] for encoding meaning and the realities of the world”.³ Human beings do not live in an objective world alone, and in consequence, the words and language used to express the peculiarity of an event or a relationship determine, to a large extent, the construction and understanding of reality that is communicated to the interlocutor. Sapir had rightly explained that “the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation”.⁴ The use of a specific language can, therefore:

- legitimise courses of action;
- maintain dominance;
- conceal realities: for example, the IMF talks about “donors” instead of “lenders”;
- sanitise / stereotype / stigmatise: for example, to talk about “arms smuggling” instead of “defence supplies”.⁵

In this sense, it can also constrain and frame actions within a given societal paradigm. In this respect, the term of “development”, and its corollaries of “aid” or “assis-

³ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 1919, New York: McGraw-Hill

⁴ Edward Sapir, The Status of Linguistics as a Science, *Language*, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 1929, pp. 207–219

⁵ Robert Chambers, “Words, power and the personal in development”, in Hywel Coleman (ed), *Language and Development: Africa and Beyond – Proceedings of the 7th International Language and Development Conference*, Addis Ababa 26-28 October 2005, pp. 122-123

¹ «Africa’s economy seeing fastest growth», BBC News Business, 11 July 2013

² <http://www.forbes.com/sites/teconomy/2012/11/09/africa-is-rising-fast/>

tance”, can be perceived as a point of contention in the current state of play. As pinpointed by Chambers, “The words and phrases used in development are **instruments of power and reflect relationships**”.⁶

As such, the frequent use of the term “development aid/assistance” in EU-Africa relations, and the unbalanced “donor/recipient” power relation that it confers, can, in reality, be considered as a major **barrier for the emergence of a true partnership of equals**. Indeed, what we call the “development language” usually encompasses terms such as “aid”, “assistance”, “poverty reduction”, “inequalities”, which, as emphasised in Sapi’s four uses of language, stigmatise the nature of the relationship within a “donor/recipient”, “developed/under-developed” power relation.

But beyond the uneven relationship that the term of “development” may suggest, there is a wide range of implications that come along the use of this term. To begin with, both donors and recipients have come to articulate their relationship and interactions through the spectacles of development aid. Not only does the language on development, confine the different actors into a unbalanced relation, but it also limits the spectrum of actors, initiatives, and policies that are included in the partnership to the development community. To bring about mutually beneficial changes (peace, democratic governance, economic growth, regional and continental integration), a wider representation of all sectors of activities should be taken into consideration and involved in the process. A noticeable consequence of the extreme focus on development has led to an over-representation of actors from the development community on the ground and in political negotiations, whereas entrepreneurs for example, are treated with suspicion.

It is in this sense that the Brussels Summit, with its headline “Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace”, reflected a generalised awareness of the need to move beyond the limited approach that has prevailed in the past years, by including the business-oriented term of **investment**. Preceded by the Africa-Europe Youth Summit and the Africa-EU Business Forum, the attempt was indeed to respond to the calls for a change of the terms of the Africa-EU relationship, so as to change the way challenges the continent faces are viewed and tackled. Providing an opportunity for African and European companies to network and exchange on potential business cooperation

and investment relations, **efforts were made to diversify the range of actors involved in the partnership and widen the range of activities and initiatives** within the cooperation framework. Although Africa is considered to have consolidated a number of advances in the framework of its longstanding partnership with the EU, African leaders increasingly raise their voice against the a relationship overly focused on development aid, especially considering that emerging powers offer to them credible and attractive alternatives.

A key message of the Summit, as formulated by the President of Guinea Alpha Condé, was that “Africa needs more economic cooperation and investments than aid”.⁷ Ultimately, the **“development language” could be replaced by a “business-oriented language”**, for example, replacing “poverty reduction” by “wealth creation”, “fighting unemployment” by “job creation”, “development aid” by “investment in”, a task in which entrepreneurs, and most importantly young entrepreneurship have a fundamental role to play.

With this in mind, should the “development language” be scrapped from our vocabulary? As always, the answer lies somewhere between “yes” and “no”. It is, in fact, “no, but”. Indeed, “development” reaches far beyond its sole economic dimension and the narrow-minded calculation of GDPs, GNPs and per capita incomes, as it encompasses initiatives in a series of areas ranging from infrastructures, health and conflict prevention to the complete transformation of the socio-cultural, political and economic belief systems of a particular society. It is clear that the work and efforts that the development community has dedicated to Africa in the past decade cannot be scrapped and replaced by a mere reference to investment.

A shift to business-oriented language is, naturally, insufficient. However, as the power and impact of language on overall perceptions, understanding and definition of actors’ roles and relations, has been demonstrated, words are of utmost importance; they represent and can bring about shifts in orientation and thinking.

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⁶ Ibid, p. 120.

⁷ La crise en Centrafrique ouvre le sommet UE-Afrique à Bruxelles, Libération, 2 Avril 2014

A 10-POINT PLAN FOR A CLOSER EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP

PROPOSALS BY LOUIS MICHEL

Africa's spectacular **economic growth** over the past 10 years has averaged more than 5% a year. Now courted by emerging powers as well as its traditional partners, the African continent has secured its place as an integral part of the global political and economic scene.

Globalisation offers the world unparalleled advantages. For it to be universally beneficial, though, it must be directed by governments that will seek to stimulate market forces while harnessing their power to improve the collective well-being, and that will forge social cohesion and consolidate democracy. (...) Africans and Europeans together have the capacity to adapt globalisation so that it better reflects their shared values and respects their identities. Without such an alliance, we'll have no choice over what direction globalisation takes.

(...) The major challenge that Africa faces is **improving political and economic governance**. At the political level, governance falls under the concept of the "just state", a state that guarantees democracy and the fundamental rights of male and female citizens. The state must seek to ensure social cohesion by managing resources in a responsible and impartial way to make sure they are distributed fairly. Without social cohesion, it is unrealistic to count on a country's citizens to show commitment, determination and active contribution. It is fundamentally important that each citizen has the right to be treated with fairness, justice, respect and dignity. A state that invests, regulates and guarantees social cohesion and democracy must be able to restore the faith of those who are discouraged or worried about globalisation or innovation.

At an economic level, the EU supplies more than half of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) that Africa receives. To overcome the hurdles that they face, however, poor countries need finance that goes well beyond what they can expect from future aid increases. Each percentage point of economic growth can benefit Africans more than the entire amount of the aid that the continent receives. This is not to say that there is any justification for reducing ODA, but that it is essential that Africa finds **complementary sources of finance**.

To be effective, the EU-Africa partnership should adopt the following concrete proposals:

1. Use a substantial part of ODA to promote economic development. Europe should focus its aid much more on supporting the emergence of an African economy driven by market forces, which is the only way to foster prosperity and finance the social services essential to public well-being.
2. Improve the business environment by supporting states based on laws that guarantee justice for companies, an impartial legislative framework and a macroeconomic context that favours private initiative.
3. Establish a tax system based on citizens' ability to pay and on fair taxation of transparently exploited natural resources, giving states the means to carry out their missions.
4. Promote legal security for investments. The private sector, whether local or international, is ready to accept levies and

take risks as long as it has a minimum of legal security. Investors will commit more easily if states put in place institutions and policies that respect human rights and strengthen the fight against corruption.

5. Promote policies that support the development of small and medium-sized companies, which are vital to job creation. Access to credit, technology transfer, professional training and management must become high priorities.
6. Ensure the honest and fair exploitation of natural resources. This is essential in a global economy so that countries can avoid indebtedness as well as looting and an inadequate remuneration of exploited resources. This means strengthening the legal arsenal to ensure better traceability of minerals from illegal mining, through international market controls for natural resources that could be inspired by the Dodd-Frank Act passed by the U.S. Congress.
7. Require companies operating in developing countries to subscribe to a code of ethics – with particular reference to the legislation on corporate social responsibility – whose application should be contractually assessed and verified.
8. Propose triangular co-operation with emerging countries like China, India and Brazil in order to allow more virtuous approaches. The impressive growth of emerging economies is a source of inspiration for African countries, and as both donors and aid recipients, they occupy a unique position in development policy terms.
9. Promote budget support rather than project aid. Budget support strengthens governance, increases the coherence of the national budget and, most importantly, commits states to setting priorities and achieving results. It allows full ownership by each country of its own development.
10. Promote regional integration as an engine of economic development. We must push for the early conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) so that developing countries can benefit from globalisation as soon as possible.

They need to invest more in education: good quality education, gender equality, strengthening of human resources, free meals at school, development of new ideas such as itinerant schools, multi-level teaching and alternative education programs. They should work towards a standard minimal level of social protection and also promote culture, which remains the most important expression of a people's identity and is the foundation of social cohesion.

These proposals were put forward by Louis Michel on the Spring of 2013 in Europe's World. For a complete version of the article, see <http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Contentnavigation/Publications/Library/overview/tabid/1186/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3407/A-10point-plan-for-a-closer-EUAfrica-partnership.aspx>

Louis Michel was Belgium's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from 1999-2004 and European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid from 2004-2009

THE EU AND AFRICA IN THE XXIST CENTURY: TIME FOR A NEW DEAL

● DANIEL BACH

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was launched nearly a decade and a half ago, yet the pending negotiations of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and regions still show no sign of significant progress in most cases. The issue has been a bone of contention in EU-Africa relations and is about to become a textbook illustration of Europe's limited ability to impose its views, a sharp contrast with the post-cold war decade. Brussels seems to be belatedly discovering that African states have recovered margins of negotiation, an unprecedented situation since the early 1970s.

It is time for the EU to operate a Copernician revolution. This should involve the definition of a more pragmatic set of priorities, based on the identification of what European interests are (or could be) in Africa, and a departure from the assumption that sub-Saharan Africa is still Europe's backyard.

The long shadow of Lomé...

The Lomé Convention, with its initial ambition to become a model for the treatment of the North-South divide, is now history, yet its institutional and ideational impact on current EU-Africa relations lingers on. Lomé was born out of a strategic and federating concern among Europeans: the quest for secure access to energy resources and minerals. This resulted in an unprecedented round of negotiation with the ACPs, emboldened by a favourable international context¹. The outcome was a holistic approach to development that, in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo (and in the context of cold war rivalries) was expected to offer a model for re-ordering of North-South relations in exchange for dependable access to oil and other strategic minerals. This trade-off was soon to lose much of its substance as energy and commodities renewed with their boom and bust cycles. The enthusiasm that had surrounded the conclusion of Lomé was also dampened by the failure of the Paris and Cancun conferences on the New International Economic Order (NIEO): the Lomé Convention kept being renewed, but it was increasingly associated with unfulfilled ambi-

tions and an outdated conception of development.² By the early 1990s, preferential access given to ACP exports had not prevented these from losing ground on the EU market due to competition from South-East Asian and Latin American producers. More generally, if one excludes Mauritius (due to its skilful management of the resources drawn from the Sugar protocol), the ACP's aid and trade regime failed to stimulate a diversification of African economies away from commodities.

What remains from the golden years of Lomé's generous trade-off is the elaborate (and costly) architecture of the joint EU-ACP Assemblies and Councils. They still formally preserve the illusion of a dynamic and intense web of 'partnerships' and shared interest, a sharp contrast with their lack of substantive achievements beyond public diplomacy events and the reconduction of the institutional status quo.

Streamlining at work: Cotonou, the EPAs and the JAES

The unimpressive record of the joint institutions echoes Europe's downgraded representations of Africa as a "distant abroad" since the end of the cold war.³ The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), also reflects, in its own way, EU perceptions of Africa as a region too close to be ignored, but now devoid of much strategic or economic significance. The CPA was signed in 2000, following half a decade of negotiations that revolved around two overlapping bullet points: streamlining and banalisation. Cotonou initially took its cue from the agreements concluded with the post-communist states of East and Central Europe. As a substitute to the end of the WTO waivers that allowed Lomé's non-reciprocal trade preferences system, a generic offer was also made to all the LDCs - the famous Everything But Arms (EBA) Initiative, granting duty-free and quota-free market access to all LDCs exports to the EU except arms. Cotonou purported to provide the roadmap towards a new and original inter-hemispheric partnership

¹ See for instance the testimony of Nigeria's former Minister of Economic Reconstruction and Development Adebayo Adedeji, "The travails of Regional Integration in Africa", in Adekeye Adebajo & Kaye Whiteman, eds., *The EU and Africa: from Eurafrique to Afro-Europa*, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012, pp. 89-90.

² Anna Dickson, "The Unimportance of Trade Preferences", in Karin Arts and Anna Dickson (eds), *EU Development Co-operation: From Model to Symbol*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press & Palgrave, pp 42-59; Daniel Bach, "Un ancrage à la dérive: la Convention de Lomé", *Revue Tiers Monde*, XXXIV, no 136, October-December 1993, pp. 749-758; also John Ravenhill, *Collective Clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

³ Daniel Bach, "The frontier as concept and metaphor" in "Emerging Africa: critical transitions" (special issue) *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 20, no 1 (April 2013), p. 3 ff.

“The EU’s narrow interpretation of WTO compatibility bears the mark of a period during which African states had a limited capacity to negotiate internationally. This is no longer the case.

based on trade liberalisation. In effect, the CPA rested on a deeply flawed assumption. While the prospects of joining the EU conferred legitimacy to the succession of drastic reforms imposed on the East and Central European candidates, in the case of the ACPs, it is the lure of ‘partnership’, as enshrined in EPAs, requiring reciprocal free trade, that was meant to be the driving force. Africa’s loss of strategic significance was further highlighted by its transformation into a middle ground for consensus building among Europeans and with the United States. By the time the G-8 summit met in Gleneagles in July 2005, Africa’s ongoing depiction as “as a scar on the conscience of the world”,⁴ had turned it into the perfect continent for consensus building over normative concerns.⁵

Characteristically, while images of a benign West being undermined by a ruthless and unscrupulous China kept flourishing in the Western media, whether or not to engage with China in Africa was not on the agendas - in Britain, the subject was ignored by the contributors to the Commission for Africa report (Blair report); in Brussels, the new strategy for EU-Africa relations released in October 2005 by the European Commission carefully avoided the issue.⁶

By 2007, the mood seemed about to change as the EU Commissioner for Development publicly stigmatized

the dissemination of moralising representations of Africa, while expressing the EU’s commitment to a new and strategic partnership with Africa. Launched with fanfare in the aftermath of the EU-Africa Lisbon summit, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) carried the ambition to promote a rejuvenation of EU-Africa relations that, we were repeatedly told, should involve a radical departure from the past. Six years later an impressive array of meetings has taken place, but no tangible results have been achieved. The JAES has instead, due to the sheer number of priority areas, highlighted the lack of any strategic focus in the conduct of the EU’s Africa ‘policy’. Yet, throughout the past decade, European ‘foreign policy’ towards Africa has increasingly revolved around concerns at the porosity and securitization of the EU’s Southern frontiers. Such concerns have also exercised a pervasive and insidious influence on interactions with Africa.⁷

The EU and Africa: back to the future...

The stalled EPA negotiations and the EU’s failure to instil strategic relevance into the JAES invite to draw lessons from the pragmatic, proactive and holistic engagement of the Chinese, Indians, South Koreans, Brazilians or Turks, lured by the resources and markets of Africa, but also by fresh opportunities for coalition-building within international institutions. The EU’s narrow interpretation of WTO compatibility bears the mark of a period during which African states had a limited capacity to negotiate internationally. This is no longer the case, even though growth rates remain closely linked to favorable terms of trade for their commodities and ongoing growth in the large emerging economies. Such a nexus generates opportunities for accumulation and entrepreneurship that no longer exclusively revolve around ‘capturing’ the state or seeking its protection. At the same time, the spectre of growth without (socially inclusive and ecologically sustainable) development still looms at large and this is where the experience of Europe remains highly relevant.

Largely spared by the 2008-9 financial crisis, sub-Saharan Africa is currently offering to investors, traders and

⁴ British Prime Minister Tony Blair as quoted in BBC News, 2 October 2001; T. Blair during a visit to South Africa in 2006 declared in a similar vein: ‘The world must judge us on Africa’, cited in *The Independent*, 12 February 2006.

⁵ As the “year of Africa” came to close, a rare dissenting call originated from a US bipartisan report released in November; Anthony Lake et al., *More than Humanitarianism, A Strategic US approach towards Africa*, New York: US Council on Foreign Relations, Task force report 56, 2005.

⁶ The communication merely acknowledged China’s rising importance to Africa, observing that “China merits special attention given its economic weight and political influence”; Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee*, Brussels: EC, 12 October 2005.

⁷ Daniel Bach, “The European Union and Africa: Trade liberalisation, constructive disengagement and the securitization of Europe’s External frontiers”, *Africa Review*, vol 3, 1, 2011, p. 33 ff; also Damien Helly, “The EU and Africa since the Lisbon summit of 2007: Continental drift or widening cracks?” *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 20, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 137-157.

immigrants opportunities that have kept being upgraded due to the 'high risk [with] low returns' equation associated with the Eurozone.⁸ The impact of the EPA negotiations on region-building in Africa has been disastrous and this deserves urgent attention in Brussels. Failing to do so will result in the dissemination of images of bureau-

⁸ Invest AD, Into Africa, Institutional Investor Intentions to 2016, Invest AD & Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu), January 2012 at <http://investad.com/reports/intoafrica.html> (accessed 12 July 2013); See also Ernst & Young, Looking beyond the obvious: globalization and new opportunities for growth, London, 2013

cratic arrogance and "provincialism" *vis a vis* sub-Saharan Africa. It is high time for the EU to take advantage of the current momentum to reset its priorities and prepare the ground for the future.

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"THE EU MODEL HAS BEEN UNDERMINED BY THE CONTRADICTIONARY POLICY ORIENTATIONS OF THE EU TOWARDS AFRICA"

While emerging market countries have recognized the opportunities Africa holds, for the EU's appreciation of the strategic importance of Africa, Africa is still too often viewed as a 'dark continent', made up of neo-patrimonial, quasi-states which offer few prospects for development. A victim narrative has been constructed whereby Africa is believed to epitomise the pitfalls of globalisation. This has given rise to a moralistic and humanitarian approach to Africa by the EU, which while well-intentioned, has not, arguably, been in the best interests of Africa. Failing to define Europe's geo-strategic interests in Africa has fostered the impression in EU circles that Africa is a 'dispensable continent' when it comes to setting the agenda of world affairs. The EU's vision of Africa needs to change if Europe does not wish to be sidelined in the future development of Africa.

It is true that in recent years there has been a move by the EU to chart a new course in EU-African relations. The Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership had the ambition to significantly altered the tone of the dialogue, but it has suffered from both a lack of funding and weak enforcement capacity. Furthermore, the African Union (AU) suffers from a 'fallacy of composition'. Its members are often also party to other organisations, treaties and frameworks which at times compete with the stated aims of the AU. It is therefore important that the countries of the AU rationalise their membership in order to strengthen the negotiating power of the AU.

As a model for the treatment of regional disparities within Europe, through successive enlargement processes, the EU model has been highly successful. The lure of the benefits of EU membership has spurred on liberalising and democratising reforms and conferred upon the EU project a sense of ownership and legitimacy. It remains to be seen however whether this model can be transposed onto other settings such as Africa in order to serve as a catalyst for development as well as a framework for North-South dialogue. The situation in Africa is for example not analogous to that of Eastern Europe during the

time of the EU's expansion – the weakness of many African states is much greater. Region building in Africa is often more about state building and the reconfiguration of state-society interactions than about region-building.

However, emulation of the EU model for African development and EU-Africa dialogue is not simply a matter of state capacity building. The EU model has been undermined by the contradictory policy orientations of the EU towards Africa. Economic liberalisation and integration in Africa has for instance been undermined by EU protectionist policies and an unwillingness to treat Africa as a single market. Democratisation in Africa meanwhile has largely been sacrificed in favour of enforcement of the status quo. Lastly, the concept of ownership is pursued along narrow security parameters. In the interest of European border control, Africa is expected to regulate its migration outflows, while European peace keeping forces steadily retreat from the continent. In sum, the EU's strategic partnership with Africa is not simply a model lost in translation; it is a model which never even started being tried or implemented.

The choice is not between a 'no strings attached' versus a Washington Consensus model of engagement between the EU and Africa. What is needed is a true strategic partnership between the EU and Africa based on the identification of more clearly defined European priorities. So should a dialogue of equals, articulated in a coherent set of policies. If this does not happen, the provincialisation of Europe rather than the marginalisation of Africa is at stake.

This text is an adapted summary of the Kapuscinski Lecture, given by Prof. Daniel Bach with the title 'The EU's Strategic Partnership with Africa - a Model Lost in Translation?', in the Society for International Development Netherlands and the International Institute of Social Studies, in April 2011. The full report of the lecture is available at <http://sidnl.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/final-text-report-kapuscinski-lecture.pdf>

EU-AFRICA TRADE: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE?

● ANNIE MUTAMBA

The 4th EU-Africa Summit has concluded with leaders expressing their commitment to “develop globally competitive industries that can succeed in today’s global markets”. While the intercontinental trade regime is in sore need of reform, the summit failed to provide the political momentum to reinvigorate this relationship. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), while not on the official agenda, unsurprisingly invited themselves onto the sidelines of the summit. It is now high time to consider the other side of the coin: a transatlantic free trade deal currently negotiated between the European Union and the United States could have wide-ranging impact on the overall African economy.

With peace, security and governance on the agenda of the EU-Africa Summit, there was no shortage of elephants in the room. The Summit Declaration states “EPAs should be structured to ensure that trade expands and that it supports growth of intra-regional trade in Africa”. It is indeed a multifaceted issue, which deserves particular consideration in the current international framework.

The United States and the European Union recently concluded their fourth round of negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), an ambitious trade deal designed to reinforce ties between the two largest economies. If successful, the transatlantic bloc would become the largest integrated market in the world, with both sides already accounting for half of the world’s GDP and 30% of global trade. The partnership would undoubtedly boost US and EU firms’ ability to compete in other markets. Last but certainly not least, TTIP has the potential to set the global trade agenda for decades.

Clearly TTIP is not a mere addition to the current patchwork of international free trade agreements. EU’s main trading partners – and African countries in particular – have an interest in how these negotiations develop and in their ultimate outcome.

TTIP vs EPA vs coherence in the EU-Africa trade regime

In the context of bilateral free trade agreements, legitimate concerns are often raised regarding the impact on third parties: a high degree of economic integration generally goes hand in hand with significant trade diver-

INSIGHT ON ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (EPAs)

The European Commission’s deadline to normalise trade relations with the ACP group of countries is getting closer: from 1 October 2014, ACPs will have to switch to new economic partnership agreements with the EU. If ACP countries do not sign up to the new interim EPAs by the October deadline, they will fall back into a less advantageous trade regime and lose the commercial preferences foreseen by the so-called Cotonou Agreement.

The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) - among which many African states - indeed enjoy complete access to the European market without reciprocity for all of their products, except arms, and will be able to maintain those favourable conditions in the interim economic partnership agreements. However, this will not be the case for the relatively wealthier ACP countries. For them, the agreements mean they will need to open up their domestic markets to the EU because the favourable trade regime was deemed incompatible with the WTO’s international trade rules.

For now, the negotiations are led mainly on a country-by-country basis, leading to differences in substance which are making the establishment of regional free trade zones in Africa more difficult. African governments are nervous about the consequences of opening up their markets to EU goods and have been delaying any decision for as long as possible, mainly because they fear heavy financial losses after custom duties are abolished and they also worry about the influx of European products, which will become more competitive on the African market because of customs exemptions.

After 10 years of negotiations, on 24th January 2014, West African and European Commission (EC) negotiators reached a major breakthrough on what now will be the first regional EPA since 2007. To which extent issues agreed in West Africa could have a positive impact on other regions remains to be seen.

“The current EU-US negotiations should be a wake-up call for African governments to be proactive and limit the burden that a trade deal of this magnitude will unquestionably bring along.

sion effects. Given its preferential access to EU markets, Africa should keep an eye out for TTIP's long-term implications, as it would then have to compete with the world's largest free trade zone in a marketplace of 800 million of the world's richest consumers.

TTIP's ramifications go far beyond the transatlantic region and, whatever the final scenario, the African economy will have to deal with the consequences. North and West Africa – which share the Atlantic with the USA and the EU – would be particularly affected, given their extensive trade relations with Europe. Furthermore the Ivory Coast and Guinea can expect detrimental effects as their exports into the EU are affected by the USA. According to a study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation, Sub-Saharan Africa – which currently accounts for 2% of global trade and clearly needs wider access to developed consumer markets – stands to lose ground in the transatlantic market.

A wake-up call for African leaders to manage the impact

African economies are changing fast and coming on strong but they are still exposed and sensitive to changes in global trading schemes.

Of course Africa will have no direct say in the TTIP negotiations. However substantial implications can be foreseen for the private sector, which has a fundamental

role to play in Africa's capacity to compete at the global level. For African business leaders with international ambitions, TTIP could come as an opportunity or a threat – either way ignoring the current talks can be costly in the long-term. By way of example it can be noted that new global trade rules might include ways to handle public enterprises, labour laws and energy subsidies in international trade.

The current EU-US negotiations should be a wake-up call for African governments to be proactive and limit the burden that a trade deal of this magnitude will unquestionably bring along. African countries are under pressure to sign comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) covering intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, public procurement, investment, and services – all areas revisited in TTIP.

A lot is at stake, including the added value of the Africa-EU partnership. African leaders are facing a challenge of priority setting with strong policy implications. Should they adopt a wait-and-see approach until they have a better understanding of how TTIP, if successful, will roll out in practice? Or take proactive steps to ensure that improved transatlantic ties do not come at their expense? The clock is ticking.

On their way out of Brussels, African political leaders should not turn a blind eye to this major issue – it is set to become increasingly self-evident over time. And African economies definitely deserve a fair deal.

Annie Mutamba is Co-Founder of Meridia Partners.

This article was originally published in the [Africa-EU blog](#)

INDUSTRIALIZAÇÃO E RENOVAÇÃO DA PARCERIA UE-ÁFRICA

● **SERGUEI OUATTARA**

Com uma taxa de crescimento acima dos 5%, África é descrita como um viveiro de oportunidades e parece agora estar numa posição forte. No entanto, embora este crescimento suscite inveja por parte de outras regiões do mundo, não mascara em nada as realidades e a precariedade que ainda existe no continente.

Assim, os louvores proclamados por uns enfrentam o ceticismo dos outros. Mas sejam afro-pessimistas ou afro-otimistas, todos concordam que a conjuntura atual é favorável para África, pelo que os agentes da renovação têm uma oportunidade importante para exigir as medidas necessárias.

A industrialização como pedra angular do desenvolvimento

Entre todas os fatores impulsionadores do desenvolvimento disponíveis em África, a industrialização é indubitavelmente aquele que pode produzir resultados mais convincentes. Com efeito, apenas uma transformação estrutural do sector industrial poderá permitir ao continente atingir um crescimento sustentável. Atualmente, é necessário que África recupere o atraso acumulado nas suas atividades de transformação e fabrico, uma vez que estas são portadoras de valor agregado, fornecem empregos e permitem consolidar o crescimento, tornando este crescimento menos dependente de fatores externos.

Já em 2011, o relatório do CNUCED (Conferência das Nações Unidas para o Comércio e Desenvolvimento), sobre a Promoção do Desenvolvimento Industrial em África no novo ambiente global, recomendava a opção por políticas de industrialização como apoio às empresas e a implementação de relações eficazes entre estas e o Estado. As empresas devem, na realidade, ser centrais em todos os processos de desenvolvimento, uma vez que, mesmo existindo numerosos obstáculos como a fraqueza das infraestruturas, a implementação de políticas ambiciosas e coerentes (em termos de clima de negócios, de financiamentos, de investimentos e de apoio ao sector privado) contribui para o progresso. Desta forma, empresas africanas mais fortes gerarão mais empregos para os jovens, os quais são cada vez mais numerosos na entrada para o mercado de trabalho.

Em seguida, a dinâmica comercial intra-africana poderá consolidar-se e, por fim, as empresas serão mais competitivas nos mercados internacionais. Para além disso, o crescimento do tecido industrial africano pode significar um aumento das receitas fiscais dos Estados, as

“Sejam afro-pessimistas ou afro-otimistas, todos concordam que a conjuntura atual é favorável para África.

quais podem, por sua vez, ser reinvestidas noutros sectores que consolidam o crescimento, tais como a educação, o desenvolvimento das infraestruturas, etc. Em última análise, os Estados africanos poderiam ultrapassar progressivamente as ajudas externas.

Repensar a parceria UE-África

A Cimeira UE-África constituiu uma oportunidade para marcar um verdadeiro ponto de viragem na parceria entre os dois continentes. A este respeito, nas reuniões preliminares da Cimeira – pois a Estratégia Conjunta UE-África organizou uma série de reuniões com actores da sociedade civil africana e europeia, com o objetivo de elaborar recomendações submetidas à Cimeira – salientei alguns aspetos que poderiam integrar esta “nova parceria”: dotar as empresas africanas de capacidades de produção e reforçar a formação técnica e universitária são questões que devem estar no centro da parceria.

É necessária a criação de indicadores de desempenho para medir o impacto das decisões tomadas. É também fundamental insistir na importância de envolver as diásporas na parceria. De facto, a existência de uma diáspora qualificada é um ativo adicional para o sector privado dos dois continentes, quer pelas suas competências, quer pela sua cultura dual. Finalmente, saliento também que, para a consolidação de uma parceria entre iguais, é essencial que as duas partes expressem os seus interesses de forma explícita. Na realidade, os interesses europeus foram muito pouco referidos.

Serguei Ouattara é Presidente da Câmara de Comércio União Europeia-África, em Bruxelas. Este artigo foi originalmente publicado em língua francesa no [website da Câmara de Comércio UE-África](#).

RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: POLICY LESSONS AND GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS

● OLADIRAN BELLO

Introduction

Sustainable and inclusive resource governance is rapidly emerging as a focal policy concern for African states. If booming extractive activities are to be translated into concrete development outcomes, recent research lessons from diverse African contexts must be worked more closely into the design of emerging African-led initiatives on extractive governance like the Africa Mining Vision (AMV). This is vital if the AMV and other home-grown initiatives are to gain domestic credibility and actually deliver inclusive, sustainable development. The African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC), as the implementing agency of the AMV, should step up its mapping of existing expertise within Africa and set out plans to access expertise that exist beyond the continent. Lesson sharing and policy coherence are also needed to develop independent African capacities for resource governance that are fully fit for purpose.

Research lessons: a synthesis

Since its inception in July 2007, SAIIA's Governance of Africa's Resources Programme (GARP) has developed expertise in the governance of natural resources over a range of sectors in several African countries¹. The case studies have revealed important lessons which are of direct relevance to the transforming extractive governance agenda in Africa today.

In terms of overarching lessons, there exists a need for broader, integrated (and where appropriate, regionally-focused) approaches to take account of policy trade-offs and options in resource governance. Second, beyond the traditional resource curse discourse, the role of institutional quality in mediating extractive governance and development outcomes in Africa has progressively come to the fore. Third, framing resource governance ap-

proaches with development objectives explicitly in mind – including in crafting extractive regulatory frameworks and institutions – is a desirable paradigmatic shift that can immensely benefit Africa. Echoing this paradigmatic shift, the African Union Commission (AUC) Chair, Nkozasana Dlamini Zuma, cautioned at the April 2014 EU-Africa summit on the need for Africa to avoid the mistake of exporting its growing agricultural raw products to be processed elsewhere (as was done with mining).

In the mining and hydrocarbons sector specifically, a key insight is the widening gap between the headline economic contributions of the mining and oil sector and grimmer local realities especially in near-mine communities. Closing this gap remains a key obstacle in the way of more inclusive and responsive resource governance in Africa. The immediate challenge posed by the mining boom and expanding foreign extractive interests on the continent is that it has become more difficult to reconcile the low value addition to Africa's export-oriented extractive industries and the desire to catalyse employment creation and social and economic progress through extractive-based development.

At the same time, citizens, civil society groups, donors and wider international stakeholders are exerting pressures for far-reaching changes for more inclusive extractive development on the continent. Regarding pressures for greater transparency in the management of extractive revenues, one of the key problems uncovered is the existence of a growing gap between Africa's expanding resource base and the inadequacy of existing oversight mechanisms. This highlights the need for more context-specific understanding of extractive governance challenges ultimately to strengthen governance of the sector and enable context-adaptive application of international transparency measures to more meaningfully reflect African realities.

The programme's research on both Mozambique and South Africa, for example, highlight the need to move beyond conventional thinking on transparency. Rather, mutual learning and outreach should be promoted between civil society and governmental actors that could jointly identify the broader utility of initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)². In

¹ These cover case studies of gold, diamond and copper mining in Tanzania, Angola and the DRC; the mitigation of climate change through forestry governance in the DRC; the politics of climate change and the role of South Africa as an advocate of change (COP 17); fisheries research for sustainable livelihoods in Tanzania and Angola; and lessons for cleaner, more equitable governance of the oil industry in Angola, Ghana and Sudan. The Programme's second phase (2010-2013) focused on resource governance in Mozambique (gas, coal, fisheries and mangroves forest), Namibia (fisheries and marine phosphate mining), South Africa (mining and labour unrest, and mangrove forests) and Zimbabwe (artisanal gold mining and indigenisation policy).

² See for example Rogerio Ossemame, "Is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Relevant for Reducing Diversion of Public Revenue? The Mozambican Experience", SAIIA policy Briefing, No. 61, January 2013 and Oladiran Bello, "SA should leverage the EITI, SAIIA Diplomatic Pouch, 21 May 2013".

particular, there is a need for a vehicle for African peer learning and the regionalisation of national regulatory best practices. The prospects for these have been considerably enhanced by the formulation of the AMV even though critical implementation challenges remain.

A transforming extractive governance agenda

Several factors are contributing to the shift in the resource governance agenda and policy outlook in Africa. They include: the narrative of Africa Rising³ and the urgent imperative to leverage resurgent growth to drive regional integration, infrastructure development and greater economic and social inclusion. Closely related, the ongoing “resource boom” in Africa has underpinned impressive growth figures without delivering corresponding social, economic and human development gains especially in mining communities.⁴ Further, there is a growing realisation in high level policy circles of Africa’s resource potential and its enhanced geopolitical prospects in an increasingly competitive and geo-economic global context. Other subtle but interesting shifts have also been occurring in terms of interconnecting policy agendas. One dimension of this is the increasing linkage between new resource governance ideas and long-standing concerns such as addressing conflict and fragility, constructing social safety nets and fostering greater social and economic inclusion.

Several processes have emerged recently as evidence of this attendant resource governance focus in the pan-continental context. They include major African-led initiatives and forums such as Kofi Annan’s Africa Progress Panel and the Thabo Mbeki-led High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows (inaugurated by the AU and UNECA in February 2012). Also, the inclusion of a resource governance questionnaire in the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the resource focus in the last two *Africa Economic Outlook* reports underline this trend. Crucially, the African Union Commission has placed considerable emphasis on funding Africa’s devel-

opment agenda through the mobilisation of Africa’s domestic resources.

While all of these portend increasing African ownership of resource governance and related policy discourses, the incipient shift from global to African-led regulatory frameworks is also potentially fraught with problems of alignment, coordination and avoiding duplication. Africa must redouble its effort to domesticate multilateral initiatives like the EITI, the Kimberley Process (KP) and others so that these can become reinforcing layers to solidify the emerging Africa resource governance architecture.

On the one hand, there has been a rising tendency among foreign donor governments and agencies – driven primarily by resource security considerations – to invest in rival natural resources management frameworks in Africa. These encourage policy fragmentation without seeking true African ownership. On the other hand, the continent will be well served to seek out closer synergies between the fore-runner initiatives, including externally-inspired ones like the EITI, and newer Africa-led initiatives such as the African Mining Vision (AMV). This is essential to tap and build systematically on the nearly three decades of useful experience accumulated by coalitions of local and global campaigners on promoting improved resource governance in Africa. How can the potential of the Africa-led frameworks be maximised alongside efforts to harness the particular strengths of global mechanisms? The extent to which the AMV succeeds in meshing multiple layers of expertise and instruments in the African extractive governance space will determine to a considerable degree the developmental contributions of Africa’s mineral resources for the next decade.

The African Mining Vision: Minding the gaps

Expectations have been growing of the recently launched African Mining Vision (AMV). Its core mandate is to promote the transformative role of minerals in the development of the African continent. The AMV, adopted by African mining ministers in January 2009, remains the most prominent among the many continental-level extractive governance initiatives that have proliferated in recent years.

The Africa Mining Development Centre (AMDC), which is the AMV’s implementing unit, is located within the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Addis Ababa. Tasked with providing strategic operational support for the AMV and its Action Plan, the AMDC ben-

³ Preceding the *Economist*’s edition of 3 December 2011 on this subject, other commentators highlighted Africa’s rapidly transforming outlook. See O. Bello and M. Manrique, “Africa Rising?” in R. Youngs (ed.), *Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2012: What kind of Geo-economic Europe*, (Madrid: FRIDE, 2011)

⁴ Despite an unprecedented recent episode of sustained growth, ordinary people perceive that they have not benefitted from Africa’s commodities boom, as detailed in a recent Afrobarometer survey.

“There has been a rising tendency among foreign donor governments and agencies - driven primarily by resource security considerations - to invest in rival natural resources management frameworks in Africa.

efits from its link-up with institutional partners including the AU and the AfDB (both key pan-African institutions) as well as the UNDP. In recognition of the need to adapt the AMV's key precepts to the specific challenges in each country, the AMDC and its partners are also elaborating individual Country Mining Visions (CMV) better to respond to local specificities. The AMDC has attracted strong financial support from major mining countries, most notably Canada and Australia which have contributed 5million Canadian dollars and 15 million Australian dollars respectively to the AMDC's start-up budget.⁵

Despite the AMV and AMDC's strong coordinating mandate, they have not been without potential rivals and challengers. Among these is the African Development Bank's (AfDB) African Natural Resources Centre which, like the AMDC, aims to provide technical assistance and capacity building to African states, but with a notably broader focus beyond minerals. Relatedly, the Mining Charter and the Revenue Watch Institute (two recently merged initiatives backed by the British economist, Paul Collier) are undertaking activities in Mozambique and Tanzania which directly compete with the AMDC's work on developing CMVs for both countries. Other high level African engagements on extractive governance have also been taking place without a clear link up to

the AMDC's work or plans. If unchecked, uncoordinated actions risk fragmenting African efforts on promoting mutual learning, experience sharing and pooling of expertise and capabilities on resource governance. In terms of capacity, the AMDC is itself facing delays in putting in place much needed expertise. This owes in part to the bureaucratic hurdles that the AMDC must narrate as it deals with several institutional partners (AU, UNDP and AfDB). Tellingly, some African governments have been reportedly expressing disquiet over the AMDC's reliance on Australian and Canadian funding.

There are at least six interlocking set of challenges that the AMV – or indeed any extractive governance regime – must address (or at least pay heed to) in order to frame a comprehensive African regime than can mobilise extractives to sustain balanced and inclusive development across the continent. These include issues such as mining and exploratory rights allocation; contract negotiation, royalties and technical structuration of extractive deals; revenue transparency; developing capacity for effective oversight (including geospatial information and monitoring and evaluation systems); managing resources and conflict dynamics; and wider global regulatory dimensions (such as tax harmonisation, transfer pricing and beneficial ownership). These are all essential dimensions of the puzzle that no framework can adequately address on its own if existing deficiencies and loopholes are to be plugged. The desirability of leveraging other frameworks and their comparative advantages is therefore evident in the diverse policy issues outlined above. The AMV would do well to set itself up from the outset to leverage all of the myriad instruments that are potentially complementary in each of those areas. It must weigh each one of them carefully with a view to tapping their particular strengths and experiences.

By no means an exhaustive list, global/multilateral initiatives that have accumulated such valuable experience in the African context include the EITI and the Kimberly Process. Both have made significant progress on specific issues whilst continuing to grapple with others. The EITI for example offers important lessons in terms of its adaptive orientation (it has introduced major procedural changes at each of its global conferences including the last one in May 2013 where it unveiled the New EITI standard with a more central role for CSOs). The Kimberley Process has also managed to convene extractive sector stakeholders from the global North and South, and transcend the traditional public-private sec-

⁵ This strong financial support has also encouraged other potential donors to consider grants to the AMDC.

tor divide in significant ways. All of these are arguably important experiences that can inform the AMV/AMDC just as there exists the potential to learn from the Kimberley Process's own particular failing in deferring excessively to its member governments. Others such as the Voluntary Principles, which since 2000 has convened governments, companies, and NGOs on the specific link between human rights and extractive development, also probably merit the AMDC's consideration for closer institutional collaboration.

Overhauling EU-Africa cooperation on resource governance

Africa's extractive sector is fast transforming with once dominant Western extractive companies ceding ground to companies from emerging countries such as China. In Mozambique, for example, Brazil's Vale has emerged to play a dominant role in new coal exploration and production. Alongside this increasing challenge to Western extractive investments in Africa, companies are facing growing pressure to demonstrate their environmental, social and especially developmental contribution. If the EU and the OECD can provide strong leadership in at least *four key areas*, EU companies can become better placed than their global peers to meet the stricter operation standards and developmental impact being demanded by communities and governments in Africa.

First, there is growing agitation for such issues as adequate remuneration of labourers, better working conditions, protecting the environment and local service provision. These demands strain the existing business models favoured by many companies but they could also become an opportunity for European firms. After all, all these ascendant social and environmental issues are in theory written into the DNA of how European companies are supposed to operate.

Second, there are a number of issues beyond governance which could represent business opportunities for OECD companies. As Africans focus on greater local processing to improve Africa's position along global value chains, a grim consensus is emerging which asserts that Africa's extractive boom in the last two decades has come at a great cost. There is rising hostility to the extant extractive model which promotes exportation of African resources for value addition elsewhere. This has given rise to the realisation that Africa must do more locally through policies to promote beneficiation and local

linkages. It is an increasingly influential viewpoint that few serious international actors in African extractives will be able to side-step. Willingness on the part of Western firms to adapt their business model to empower African partners and communities could become a game changer in the increasingly stiff competition for access to natural resources. Recent examples include Botswana, where the government persuaded De Beers in 2013 to relocate the high value diamond cutting and polishing operations from London to Gaborone.

Third, the changing nature of technology is likely to see incremental innovations which will drive three important transitions in African extractives. The incipient global shift towards mechanisation of extractive processes raises the question of how low skilled workers can be re-skilled into other productive sectors. Also, advanced technological inputs are needed to secure vital efficiency gain and resource recovery rates, including in maturing mining jurisdictions like South African (gold) and Zambia and the DRC (copper belt). Also, the impact of technology can be felt in the regulatory sphere, for instance in the ability to monitor corporate practices. As new technologies enhance governance oversight, firms that are willing to work in tandem with this technical changes to deliver improved social and developmental performance and greater transparency will possess an edge. All of these should influence European regulatory thinking and policy interventions to boost European competitiveness globally.

Fourth, plans are now afoot for reduction in material inputs in key EU countries (Germany for example is reportedly aiming to compress material demands by 90 percent to year 2030). This shift, may see African export to Asian grow just as the West's demand declines rapidly. The key implications are likely to be in the area of governance (greater European freedom of action due to less resource dependence) and transformation of global supply chains (shift in production patterns, division of labour and specialisation/competitiveness along value chains). This will further expand the space for for less geopolitically and geo-economically driven patterns of cooperation on resource governance between the EU and Africa. This can enhance the space for technical cooperation and exchanges and contribute to improved and well capacitated extractive governance initiatives away from the recent geo-economic slant seen in EU resource politics since the global financial and sovereign debt crises. "De-commodification" or falling resource demands from

then EU will also likely increase the extractive material resource pool for African countries to benefit, possibly supporting advanced high value added local production to meet the needs of a growing African middle class by 2030.

Concluding remarks

The overarching focus in Africa's emerging resource governance discourse is the key imperative of leveraging existing and new extractive discoveries to drive lasting socio-economic and human capital development. There is thus a need for the AMV/AMDC to shoulder the all-important coordinating mandate first, by building progressively on existing knowledge, and second, building closer partnerships with African and global frameworks and actors (including the EU) so that these can all become mutually self-reinforcing fulcrums in the effort to harness extractive activities for development in Africa. Most crucially, whilst the AMV itself has opened up opportunities to upscale Africa's independent capacity for extractive governance, subsisting challenges facing the AMDC as its implementing arm, including the risk of

damaging duplications and a dearth of appropriate technical capacity, must be urgently addressed. Among the main recommendations, are:

- The AMV requires targeted strategic partnerships with relevant global/multilateral extractive government mechanisms in order to leverage their accumulated experiences.
- The AMDC requires a close reading of specific research lessons learnt on the ground to frame its in-country activities and the elaboration of CMVs.
- The AMDC should develop practical platforms for experience-sharing in reflection of the important lesson learnt on mutual outreach between CSOs and (inter)governmental actors.
- The AMDC should clarify urgently the specific extractive governance issues in which it possesses comparative advantage whilst envisioning broader partnerships to gain access to complimentary expertise.

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Rwanda. Photo by Ana Elisa Cascão



GOVERNAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONÓMICO NO CONTINENTE AFRICANO: MITOS E OPORTUNIDADES

● ANA PAULA FERNANDES

Existem inúmeros estudos e análises que defendem que a boa governação promove o crescimento económico e reduz a pobreza. Os próprios indicadores do Relatório do Banco Mundial, “*Doing Business Index 2014*” e o Relatório de 2014 do African Center for Economic Transformation, “*Growth with Depth*”, bem como o trabalho de Thomas Carothers e Diana de Gramont, “*Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution*”, ou o recente livro de Steven Levitt, “*Why Nations Fail: the origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*”, consideram fundamental a existência de uma liderança, de um Governo e de instituições públicas eficazes na criação das condições de estabilidade, de regulação e de legalidade; fundamentais ao desenvolvimento do sector empresarial nacional e à atração de investimento direto estrangeiro socialmente responsável.

Existem também certamente argumentos e teses contrárias e neste texto não queremos entrar num debate sobre prós e contras, nem analisar as diferentes definições de boa governação. Parece contudo pertinente, neste ano de Cimeira UE-África, refletir sobre os mitos e as oportunidades

do *nexus* entre desenvolvimento económico e governação.

Os Governos desempenham um papel crucial na construção de ambientes propícios para o desenvolvimento e crescimento da atividade económica. Estabelecem as regras que clarificam os direitos de propriedade, que reduzem os custos de transação e ainda as regras que aumentam a previsibilidade e a transparência das atividades económicas. Sem estas regras será difícil a qualquer empresário, sobretudo de micro ou pequena dimensão, desenvolver o seu negócio de forma a criar emprego. Sabemos que, na maior parte das economias, as pequenas empresas são o motor da criação de emprego e do crescimento económico, e o continente africano não é exceção.

Mas, o que nos dizem os dados sobre a realidade no continente africano? Parece existir um hiato entre a perceção e a realidade. Entre a versão pessimista e a otimista tentaremos realisticamente, e tendo presente que cada país constitui uma realidade complexa e distinta, apresentar dados agregados, recentes, que podem ajudar a interpelar alguns dos **mitos** mais conhecidos:

Mito	Realidade
Os Governos Africanos não implementam reformas	Segundo dados do Relatório do Banco Mundial “ <i>Doing Business de 2014</i> ”, 9 países da África Subsaariana estão entre as 20 economias que mais reduziram o deficit de regulação desde 2009. O Ruanda está entre os países que apresentaram as maiores transformações no ambiente de negócios em 2012/2013. Ainda segundo o Banco Mundial, as economias que melhoraram nos indicadores medidos pelo Relatório são as que, em geral, têm demonstrado predisposição para desenvolver reformas noutras áreas como a saúde, a educação e a igualdade de género.
Não há sinais de que o crescimento económico em África seja sustentável	No Índice deste ano do “ <i>Doing Business</i> ”, o Ruanda aparece classificado na 32ª posição - Portugal figura na 31ª. A África do Sul aparece em 41º lugar e o Botsuana em 56º, melhor do que a Itália, que aparece na 65ª posição. O Gana classifica-se em 67º, melhor que a Grécia, em 72º.
Não existe mercado interno	A população do continente africano é de cerca de mil milhões de pessoas. Estima-se que a mesma seja de cerca de 2 mil milhões em 2050.
Os empresários não investem em África porque o risco é muito elevado	Mesmo em África, os empresários investem em países que apresentam índices menos favoráveis ao desenvolvimento comercial e empresarial. O empresários portugueses investem menos em Cabo Verde, classificado em 121º de um total de 189 países do Índice “ <i>Doing Business</i> ” do Banco Mundial, do que em Angola, classificado em 179º. O crescimento médio no continente Africano, segundo as “ <i>Perspetivas Económicas para África 2014</i> ” do Centro de Desenvolvimento da OCDE, situa-se em cerca de 4% estimando-se em 5% para 2015. A inflação situa-se abaixo dos 6%. O Investimento direto estrangeiro é agora o fluxo financeiro mais importante do continente, atingindo em 2014 cerca de 80 mil milhões de dólares. Estão já em curso um conjunto significativo de medidas no combate aos fluxos ilícitos de capitais. A receita através da coleta de impostos tem também aumentado, tendo sido em 2012 de cerca de 527,3 mil milhões de dólares. Ao nível da segurança, o número de conflitos armados no continente diminuiu desde 2000, embora 12 países estejam entre os 65 países que globalmente apresentam maiores riscos de instabilidade social. O risco existe, mas as potencialidades também, e o risco nem sempre é o fator mais determinante quando se decide onde investir.



Capas *The Economist*, em 2000 (the Hopeless Continent) e em 2011 (Africa Rising).

A “desconstrução” dos mitos não nos deve fazer esquecer a magnitude dos desafios que ainda existem. Será importante melhorar a eficácia e eficiência dos governos. Para além da governação para o investimento, é importante desenvolver uma governação para as pessoas. É essencial para assegurar o crescimento e o desenvolvimento no continente uma governação que combata as desigualdades sociais e formalize progressivamente o emprego, garantindo uma remuneração justa. A capacitação dos recursos humanos e o acesso a tecnologia é central para o crescimento. É igualmente importante acelerar a industrialização e o investimento em infraestruturas, construir cadeias de valor regionais e criar as condições para a exploração sustentável dos recursos naturais.

Se a realidade é conhecida e se os constrangimentos estão há muito identificados, falta **consolidar a mudança de paradigma em curso** na comunidade internacional no apoio ao desenvolvimento em África.

A Organização para o Desenvolvimento e Cooperação Económica - OCDE, por exemplo, tem estado particularmente ativa no apoio à agenda africana da mobilização dos recursos nacionais para o desenvolvimento; incluindo a agenda da fiscalidade e desenvolvimento e no combate aos fluxos ilícitos de capitais. O Grupo de Investimento e Desenvolvimento (AGID), também da OCDE, tem centrado o seu trabalho em três áreas principais: a atualização das orientações da OCDE para o enquadramento das políticas para o investimento, comumente designado de PFI (este é um instrumento de cariz global, que tem sido utilizado por países em desenvolvimento e desenvolvidos); na área do *due diligence* em matéria de indústrias extrativas e minerais provenientes

de regiões de conflito; e ainda estuda os mecanismos de financiamento às infraestruturas, em particular a contribuição dos doadores.

Alguns dados do recente estudo da OCDE, sobre o apoio dos doadores ao desenvolvimento das infraestruturas, apontam para uma maior canalização de recursos da Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento (APD), para países como o Brasil e não para países menos desenvolvidos, o que não deixa de ser surpreendente. A APD deve ser um catalisador na promoção do desenvolvimento, também económico, de África, não só através de instrumentos inovadores de financiamento ao desenvolvimento, como através de parcerias com o setor privado e ainda promovendo políticas globais comerciais coerentes e justas, que garantam o acesso equitativo de produtos oriundos dos países em desenvolvimento.

São muitos os desafios e as oportunidades, mas o desenvolvimento económico de África é crucial para a construção de um mundo mais próspero e sustentável.

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As opiniões expressas neste artigo são pessoais e não vinculam qualquer instituição.

ANNEXES

OVERVIEW OF EU-AFRICA SUMMITS

2000

I EU-Africa Summit, Cairo

Since the late 1990's the EU has gradually moved towards a more specific relationship with Africa (beyond the ACP). The first EU-Africa Summit held in Cairo, in April 2000, launched a comprehensive framework for political dialogue between the EU and Africa, with the following priority areas: i) regional integration in Africa; ii) integration of Africa into the world economy; iii) human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and rule of law; iv) peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution; and v) development issues (sustainable development challenges and poverty eradication, health, environment, food security, drug consumption and trafficking, culture).

2000-2007

The changing political climate in Europe and Africa laid the foundations for a new type of partnership between the EU and Africa. In Europe, the deepening of the European integration process led to the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the subsequent push for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and European Security Strategy (ESS), in line with European ambitions for a greater political role on the international scene. In 2004, the African Peace Facility was established, using funds from the European Development Fund (EDF).

In Africa, the launch of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD, 2001) and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU, 2002) have reinforced this trend towards a greater pan-African cooperation and given a significant boost to EU-Africa partnership, not least because the EU finally had on the African side a comparable institutional partner committed to common priorities.

The EU Strategy for Africa, adopted by the EU Council in December 2005 was a comprehensive policy framework that reflected the priorities of the EU in its relationship with Africa. The Strategy aimed to reinforce coordination and complementarity across the various EC's Directorates General and between the EC and EU member states' policies and strategies towards Africa, as

well as to ensure greater coherence among different European policy areas that have an impact on Africa. In December 2005, it was also held the first College-College meeting between the European Commission and the African Union Commission.

2007

II EU-Africa Summit, Lisbon

Seven years after the I Summit, the world had changed, and so did the two continents. There was a need for a **new strategic partnership**, that is reflected in the vision and ambition of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The Joint Strategy focuses on moving:

- *Beyond development cooperation*, by opening up the Africa-EU dialogue and cooperation to issues of joint concern and interest;
- *Beyond Africa*, by moving away from the traditional focus on purely African development matters, towards effectively addressing global challenges such as migration, climate change, peace and security;
- *Beyond fragmentation*, in “treating Africa a one” and supporting Africa's aspirations to find trans-regional and continental responses to some of the most important challenges;
- *Beyond institutions*, in working towards a people-centered partnership, ensuring better participation of African and European citizens.

Its main **objectives** are: to reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern; to strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development; to jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative and legitimate institutions; and to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership.

In 2008-2009, the JAES structure was set up, around **eight thematic partnerships** (implementation teams, joint expert groups for the JAES thematic areas). The JAES provides an overarching long-term policy framework for Africa-EU relations and is being implemented through successive Action Plans that cover proposed priority actions for three years: Action Plan I (2008-2010)

2010**III EU-Africa Summit, Tripoli**

The Summit reaffirmed the commitment to the JAES, in the Tripoli Declaration, and approved the Action Plan II (2011-2013). In view of the overarching Summit theme “Investment, economic growth and job creation” the meeting underlined the essential link between a reinvigorated economic cooperation and regional integration via different sectors, including the private sector, with a reinforced cooperation in the thematic partnerships under the Joint Strategy: peace and security, democratic and economic governance and respect for human rights are prerequisites of development.

2014**IV EU-Africa Summit, Brussels**

The Heads of State and Government of the EU and Africa gathered in Brussels on the theme of “Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace”:

- **Peace and security:** Leaders recognised the importance of peace and security as essential prerequisites for development and prosperity; they gave their support to the African aspiration and commitment to ensuring peace and stability in Africa and agreed to support African capabilities in this area through any available means, with a particular focus on capacity-building. Both continents agreed to strengthen common effort to fight international terrorism and to combat the spread of small arms. The summit also convened a special debate on the situation in the Central African Republic, a day after the EU officially launched its military mission in the country, where 1,000 peacekeepers will be deployed.
- **Prosperity:** Leaders pledged to pursue policies to create jobs and stimulate long-term growth on both continents. The EU also underlined its commitment to continuing to support African countries in the preparation of climate-resilient and low-emission development strategies. Leaders on both sides agreed to cooperate more closely in the field of maritime policy; they also highlighted the importance of ensuring prudent and transparent management of respective natural resources, and responsible mineral

sourcing. The summit declaration also underlines the importance of encouraging greater investment and economic development within and between countries in both continents, alongside developing transport, access to drinking water and to sustainable and affordable energy.

- **People:** The summit recognised the importance of upholding human rights in both continents and confirmed a joint commitment to continuing efforts towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals. On the question of education, leaders agreed to pursue policies to promote inclusive job creation with a focus on young people and women, and to promote student exchange programmes between the two continents and within Africa. The summit highlighted the need for a comprehensive approach to tackle the serious social and human impact of irregular migration and adopted a separate declaration on migration and mobility.

In the Summit declaration, leaders highlighted the close nature of EU-Africa relations and the overall objective of reinforcing a strategic partnership of equals. They agreed that **the JAES remains the strategic political reference for EU-Africa relations** and that its implementation should be further improved. Therefore, the implementation of the JAES shall focus on the following **5 priority areas:** (i) Peace and Security; (ii) Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights; (iii) Human development; (iv) Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; (v) Global and emerging issues. For each of these objectives, a number of actions have been identified at inter-regional, continental or global levels in the Roadmap 2014-2017

Sources/Useful links:

Africa-EU Partnership website:
<http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/>
 European Council, on the Africa-EU Summit:
<http://www.european-council.europa.eu/eu-africa-summit-2014>
 African Union
<http://www.au.int/>
 Africa-Europe Relations: Looking beyond 2014 (blog)
<http://africaeu2014.blogspot.pt/>

DATA ON AFRICA AND THE EU...

By 2030 Africa will have 1.5 billion people, and together with China and India, will have two-thirds of the world's young professionals.

One-third of Africa's countries have GDP growth rates of more than 6%. The costs of starting a business have fallen by more than two-thirds over the past seven years, while delays for starting a business have been halved.

The continent's middle class is growing rapidly - around 350 million Africans now earn between \$2 and \$20 a day.

The share of the population living below the extreme poverty line in Africa has fallen from 51% in 2005 to 39% in 2012. However, a large majority of least developed countries, as identified by the UN (34 out of 49) are in Africa.

Aid The EU remains the most important donor for Africa. African countries received close to €24 billion of Official Development Aid (ODA) from the EU for the period 2007–2012. Other top donors to Africa are the USA and the World Bank.

In 2011, Africa received a total of €34.3 billion in aid, according to the OECD. Yet *The Africa Report* magazine noted that in the same year €43.7 billion was funneled out of Africa to the rest of the world, including into tax havens in the EU.

Trade between the two continents grew by 46% between 2007 and 2012 and both blocs are keen on a deal although Africa remains, largely, an exporter of raw materials (primarily oil and gas from Libya, Nigeria, Algeria and Angola) to the EU and an importer of finished products.

Africa's share of manufactured imports from Asia has been on a continuous rise, while Europe's share of Africa's imports of this nature has been on a continuous decline.

China-Africa: In 2013, Chinese-African trade surpassed the \$200 billion mark for the first time, making China Africa's biggest bilateral trading partner. In July 2012, China announced a \$20 billion credit window available to African countries over three years (higher than the \$16.5 billion provided under the European Development Fund between over five years from 2008).

Climate change: the Africa Adaptation Gap Report (2013) estimates that Africa will have to face very significant adaptation costs - up to \$7-15 billion per year by 2020. Reinforced climate change cooperation between the EU and Africa is vital to a new globally climate Agreement until the UNFCCC (United Nations Conference on Climate Change) Conference in Paris in December 2015.

Migration: While a lot of the news coverage focuses on African migrants, most of the asylum seekers in Europe are not from the continent. In 2013 most of the asylum applicants to the EU came from Syria, Russia, Afghanistan, Serbia, Pakistan and Kosovo, in that order.

Peace and Security: At the start of the IV summit the EU had announced a new military operation to the Central African Republic, adding to on-going operations in Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, DR Congo, the Comoros and against the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa. Many of these are conducted in conjunction with African countries through the African Peace Facility and with the support and approval of the United Nations. The summit resolved to commit another €800 million to the facility over the next three years.

There will be, in total, 28 billion Euros made available to Africa by the EU between 2014 and 2016. The funds will go towards aid, trade, investment as well as peace and security programmes in Africa.



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
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