

Discussion Paper

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Use of PCD indicators by a selection of EU Member States

A Brief Analysis and Overview

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Key messages

Monitoring mechanisms and indicators measuring policy coherence for development can help to inform policy-making processes and strengthen accountability, by allowing a better assessment of trade-offs between (sometimes conflicting) policy objectives.

There is still a significant amount of methodological confusion when it comes to PCD monitoring, specifically when it comes to indicators.

The development of indicators, and PCD monitoring systems, is very much determined by governance structures and PCD priorities. Given the political nature of PCD, the process of developing indicators should be a political process, but one informed by credible independent expert analysis and methodological rigour.



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Acronyms

ABIA	Advisory Board for Irish Aid
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CID	Comité interministériel pour la coopération au développement
COP21	21 st Conference of the Parties on Climate Change
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAFM	Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESRF	Economic and Social Research Foundation
EU	European Union
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FPA	Fisheries Partnership Agreement
G20	Group of 20
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
GPG	Global Public Goods
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IVF	Instituto Marqués de Valle-Flor
LDC	Least Developed Country
MASP	Multiannual Strategic Plans
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MS	Member State
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
SE4ALL	Sustainable Energy For All
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
TIEAS	Tax Information Exchange Agreements
TRIPS	Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollar
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

This discussion paper **maps systems to monitor Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) efforts of a select number of EU Member States**, particularly their use of **PCD indicators**. Its aim is to **inform endeavours by governments seeking to establish a monitoring mechanism** to guide PCD efforts and strengthen accountability, by reinforcing their capacity to monitor, analyse and report on the development impacts of their own policies on partner countries. PCD indicators should be derived from PCD objectives and are therefore necessarily country specific, but the approaches by different EU countries can still provide inspiration and bring useful lessons to others when developing their own tailor-made PCD monitoring system.

Aid as well as non-aid policies of donor countries (e.g. trade, agriculture, energy etc.) can have a significant impact on developing countries. In this light, commitments to promote 'policy coherence for development' (PCD) are enshrined in the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and feature prominently in on-going discussions on the post-2015 development agenda. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has provided intellectual leadership on the concept of PCD, effectively encouraging OECD government policies to be mutually supportive of development goals in the developing world. This is reflected in the OECD Strategy on Development adopted in 2012, which emphasizes the importance of designing policies consistent with development policy objectives (OECD, 2012). At the level of the European Union (EU), the 1992 Treaty on the EU includes a legal commitment to take development objectives into account in the EU's policies with a potential effect on developing countries. This legal stance is supported by a political commitment in the 2005 European Consensus on Development, the key inter-institutional agreement on development cooperation signed by the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council and, recently, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The European Council has over the years called for a better-targeted PCD agenda. In May 2012, European ministers specifically encouraged the Commission to work on a more evidence-based approach to improve monitoring, implementation and follow-up of PCD action, while adding that *'relevant baselines, indicators and targets should also be developed including for measuring the impact of PCD in a way which demonstrates clear development results'* (EC, 2012).

Since 2005, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) has structured the EU PCD approach around twelve policy areas: trade, environment, climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, employment, migration, research and innovation, information technologies, transport and energy. While maintaining the focus on these 12 policy areas, the Council agreed in 2009 - in line with the recommendations of the biennial progress report on PCD that year- that the EU's agenda for PCD promotion would benefit from a more targeted approach built on 5 broad areas where a more pro-active EU engagement in PCD promotion could best support the efforts for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (Engel et al., 2013). As such the EU's Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 developed by the European Commission in collaboration with the Member States, identifies five broad PCD priority areas: (i) trade and finance, (ii) climate change, (iii) food security, (iv) migration and (v) security. The PCD Work Programme 2010-2013 further outlines a number of targets and indicators to track PCD progress in these priority areas (EC, 2010). The implementation of this work plan is monitored through biennial PCD reports, with input from EU institutions and the Member States (EC, 2013). Since progress towards PCD is subject to political decision-making and involves the balancing of a variety of (sometimes conflicting) interests, it necessarily involves trade-offs. While it is not all-determining, PCD monitoring may help to inform the decision-making process by allowing a better assessment of the trade-offs involved.

Pursuing and monitoring PCD efforts in EU policy-making is sensible as EU exclusive competence applies to some policy areas affecting developing countries, such as trade. In some areas competences are shared between the EU and the Member States (e.g. agriculture, environment and energy), in others the EU has a supporting or coordinating role only and no legislative power at all (e.g. industry). Furthermore, Member States' inputs and negotiating positions in EU decision-making processes shape EU policies. Hence, PCD deserves to also be monitored at national level in addition to the EU level.

Approach, methodology and structure

This discussion paper examines the PCD monitoring systems in place in a selection of eight EU Member States.¹ This includes relatively small Member States with a history of engaging in development issues, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Luxembourg. Germany, as a larger Member State, was also added to provide a different perspective. The paper furthermore covers the Netherlands and Sweden as countries with a strong track record in promoting PCD over a longer period of time. Together they offer a variety of PCD monitoring experiences within the European Union.

It should be noted that this study is limited to PCD monitoring mechanisms and indicators adopted by governments or, in the case of Ireland, that were developed in the context of a study commissioned by a government agency. While recognising that civil society organisations and academics provide useful and important analysis and knowledge on monitoring PCD progress as well, their work falls outside the scope of this discussion paper.

The **focus is on monitoring-mechanisms and indicators measuring PCD progress in general**, not in relation to one specific partner country only. This is not to negate the existence or importance of PCD assessments at partner country level. The Netherlands has examined the impact of Dutch, EU and domestic policies on development in Ghana and Bangladesh (IOB, 2014). Currently, Finland, in collaboration with the OECD Secretariat, the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) is involved in a pilot to assess policy (in-)coherencies for development of OECD members' policies in Tanzania, particularly related to food security. A similar pilot will be conducted in Burkina Faso, with support of Switzerland. Indeed, such studies are valuable to gain insights in how policy (in-)coherencies for development play out in specific partner countries and identify response strategies for EU/OECD Member States as well as partner countries.

Further, this overview covers mechanisms that are explicitly related to PCD, in particular what Member States have labelled as PCD indicators.² The study also examines related targets and objectives. In some cases governments may promote development objectives in non-development policies without explicitly referring to the concept of PCD, but these are not covered in this discussion paper.

The analysis is based on earlier studies of ECDPM³, additional desk-work and a select number of semi-structured interviews with key people knowledgeable on PCD monitoring at the European Commission and in some of the EU Member States covered.⁴

¹ Switzerland has also undertaken significant work to develop its PCD monitoring system but because it is not an EU Member State, it is outside the scope of this particular study.

² The definition of 'indicator' provided by the OECD/DAC is "*a quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development factor*". See <http://www.oecd.org/site/dacsmpd11/glossary.htm>

³ For example Galeazzi, G. et al. (2013), Keijzer, N. (2011) and King et al (2012).

⁴ The financial scope for this piece of work did not allow for a more encompassing study at this time.

The following section gives an overview of progress on PCD monitoring in the different EU Member States and where it fits in the broader PCD systems of these countries. Section 3 sheds light on the policy areas covered, particularly in comparison to the five EU PCD priority areas. Section 4 examines the PCD monitoring systems more closely as regards the causal chains and the key characteristics of the indicators. This is followed by concluding remarks. Annex 1 presents examples of chains of causality used by some member states and the EU in relation to trade and Annex 2 gives an overview of PCD indicators adopted by some member states broken down by policy areas.

2. Who monitors? PCD monitoring and where it fits in the broader PCD system

PCD monitoring and the development of indicators need to fit in the broader institutional PCD system and be owned beyond the international development department. It is a continuous process, not a one-off exercise. Exchanges with NGOs and academics can help to develop and track progress on PCD indicators.

Some of the EU Member States studied do not have a structured PCD monitoring mechanism. This holds true for Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg. They have committed to PCD and have institutional mechanisms to facilitate PCD, such as inter-departmental coordination committees and/or a multi-stakeholder advisory council. They have not, however, defined PCD objectives and indicators to monitor PCD progress systematically.

In Finland, the multi-stakeholder Development Policy Committee regularly publishes reports on the implementation of the Development Policy Programme that covers PCD. However, the country has not defined measurable targets and indicators that the reports can focus on.

Recent efforts can be discerned to strengthen PCD monitoring. Luxembourg indicates for example that the creation of a PCD monitoring mechanism is under discussion in the Inter-ministerial Committee on Development Cooperation, which has had a PCD mandate since May 2012 (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs Luxembourg, 2014). Belgium recently reached a political agreement on an institutional mechanism for PCD, following the new PCD commitments enshrined in the law on development cooperation since its revision in 2013.⁵ Once in place, an interdepartmental PCD Commission at federal level will decide on the focus areas to target Belgian PCD action, which is expected to be the basis for a log frame to better guide Belgium's PCD efforts. Efforts to strengthen PCD monitoring in these countries is generally also meant to improve accountability in relation to PCD.

In some cases **NGOs take on a PCD monitoring role in collaboration with the government.** In Luxembourg, the government engages with an NGO coalition on PCD, which publishes a "fair politics barometer" on the coherence of policies for sustainable and fair development. Although the 2012 barometer report is not a governmental document, it is supported by forewords by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Cooperation and Humanitarian Action and the Ombudsman (Cercle de Coopération des ONG de Développement, 2012).⁶ In Sweden a coalition of NGOs publishes a biennial shadow report following the publication of a governmental PCD report.

Ireland is an example of an EU Member State that has **engaged with academics on PCD monitoring.** The Advisory Board for Irish Aid (ABIA), a former independent advisory body of Irish Aid, has supported a study that attempts to develop a set of PCD indicators for Ireland (King & Matthews, 2012). The proposed indicators were informed by discussions with Irish government departments and representatives of non-

⁵ The institutional framework includes the establishment of: (i) an interdepartmental PCD Commission at federal level; (ii) an independent advisory council on PCD at federal level (will include CSO (NGOs and trade unions) and academia from Flanders and Wallonia); (iii) an NGO platform for scrutiny; and (iv) Impact Assessments with a PCD component.

⁶ A new version of the fair politics barometer is expected to be published soon.

governmental organisations. The indicators were discussed by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Development, but have not been officially adopted at this stage.

Examples of countries that have officially defined a whole-of-government PCD monitoring framework with indicators are Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. The Danish PCD Action plan was published in June 2014 (Danida, 2014). The inter-ministerial Special Committee on Development Policy Issues led the formulation of the plan, with contributions from Danish civil society, the parliament, the Council for Development Policy and research institutions. The action plan is a rolling document, up for review annually. In the Netherlands, an agenda for global public goods (GPG) was presented to parliament in 2011, with goals, actions and indicators (Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Netherlands, 2011a). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds the responsibility to monitor the implementation of the GPG agenda, together with the inter-ministerial Coordinating Committee (CoCo) on EU policy – given the important role played by the EU – the strategic Coordinating Committee for International Affairs (CoRIA) and a network of PCD focal points in different ministries, although the latter does not seem to be operational. Sweden adopted a Policy for Global Development in 2008, which contains objectives and indicators. The government reports on progress to the parliament biennially.

Some countries specify PCD targets in sectoral strategies. This is the case in Germany, where the BMZ sustainable agriculture strategy for example contains a section on policy coherence, which includes ambitions like *“complete abolition of agricultural export refunds and subsidies that distort competitions”* and *“maintaining an appropriate degree of latitude for protecting national and regional agricultural markets and taking account of trade partners’ level of development when it comes to defining obligations and commitments”* (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany. 2013). In Ireland, the Department of Agricultural, Food and the Marine has explicitly stated its PCD ambitions in the agricultural sector. The department’s strategy 2012-2014 contains a PCD commitment and a separate ‘Statement on Policy Coherence for Development’ presents three specific objectives and related indicators to track progress (DAFM, 2013). In Finland, the Strategy of the Ministry of Employment and Economy for the implementation of Finland’s Development Policy Programme (2009) and the Action Plan on External Economic Relations (2012) of the Prime Minister’s office contain PCD elements.

Table 1: Overview of the use of PCD Mechanisms and PCD Indicators

	PCD Mechanisms	‘Official’ cross-government PCD Indicators
1. <i>Belgium</i>	Yes	Not yet
2. <i>Denmark</i>	Yes	Yes
3. <i>Finland</i>	Yes	Not yet
4. <i>Germany</i>	Yes	Not yet
5. <i>Ireland</i>	Yes	Not yet
6. <i>Luxembourg</i>	Yes	Not yet
7. <i>Netherlands</i>	Yes	Yes
8. <i>Sweden</i>	Yes	Yes

3. What is monitored? PCD priority policy areas

Strategically defining a small number of thematic focus areas is important, to guide PCD efforts and ensure accountability.

The five PCD priority areas defined at EU level have greatly informed national PCD agendas. The choice for these five priority areas was based on the following criteria: i) high on the EU-agenda; ii) relevance toward developing countries and progress on the MDGs; iii) concrete options to incorporate development issues and build partnerships; iv) potential to link up to the development agenda at multilateral fora (EC, 2010). These criteria are deemed equally relevant at national level. Incorporating the EU PCD priority areas is also presented as a pragmatic choice that allows Member States to use the EU-system as a catalyst tool generating better guaranties to achieve progress (Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Netherlands, 2011b).

The global challenges the Netherlands focuses on to promote PCD are therefore identical to the EU priority areas. In Denmark, the EU priority areas are covered in their PCD action plan apart from migration. The Finnish Development Policy Programme mentions a number of key themes that overlap with the EU priority areas but climate change is missing. In the Swedish Policy for Global Development food security is left out, while 'oppression' (e.g. freedom of expression, sexual and reproductive health and rights, organised crime with special focus on human trafficking) is added. Germany doesn't have a PCD strategy that specifies priority areas, but BMZ reports a focus on fragile states, climate change, food security, migration (i.e. four of the five EU PCD priority areas, with trade and finance missing) and biodiversity (OECD, 2013).

Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland have no specific PCD focus on thematic policy areas. However, these countries do recognise the value of focussing, to ensure targeted PCD efforts and for accountability purposes. In this light, Ireland's Policy for International Development (2013) contains a commitment to identify specific policy areas where coherence can be enhanced as well as indicators to track performance. In Belgium, once the Interdepartmental Commission for PCD is operational, it is expected to decide what focus areas Belgian PCD action should target. By law, this Interdepartmental Commission is obliged to take into account at least the five EU PCD priority areas. In the same vein, the identification of subject areas is also part of on-going discussion in the inter-ministerial Committee on Development Cooperation on a PCD monitoring approach in Luxembourg.

4. How is PCD progress monitored? Causality chains and characteristics of indicators

There is a need to develop explicit chains of causality to underpin indicators. It should contain a mix of information on policy outcome, output and input. More specific indicators can provide better guidance and accountability, but broad ownership, which may require specificity concessions to balance different interests, is also of great importance to advance the PCD agenda. The monitoring framework can cover national, EU and international policy initiatives.

Indicators are meant to provide insights in progress towards PCD objectives. There is a need therefore to develop explicit chains of causality to underpin indicators. Individual indicators make little sense unless they are linked to a logical chain of desired development outcomes, policy reforms and actions.

Defining causal chains can be challenging, as explained also by King et al. (2012). First, this is the case because trade-offs between different development objectives can occur. For example, tensions exist between the goals of increasing trade and the reduction of carbon emissions. Second, heterogeneity between and within developing countries can create both winners and losers, e.g. traders may benefit from increased EU imports, while it may harm local producers. Third, the impact of OECD members' policies on third countries is influenced by domestic policies of those countries.

Different EU Member States have structured and named the causal chains in different ways (see Annex 1 for graphic examples of this by Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the EU). In Denmark's Action Plan for PCD, indicators are specifically linked to 'actions' and 'goals', which are then linked to 'policy tracks' guided by an overarching political objective of which there are a total of five. The Swedish Policy for Global Development has a somewhat similar structure, although with four instead of five levels (global challenges, policy areas, objectives and actions), as is the case of the EU PCD Work Programme (global challenges, policy areas, targets and indicators). The Dutch Global Goods Agenda is structured somewhat differently, moving from 'general' (i.e. international) goals to action points for the Netherlands. Indicators are defined for both the general goals as well as the actions to be undertaken by the Netherlands. A full overview of the indicators, clustered in policy areas, is available in Annex 2.

Examining these different approaches and indicators of the EU and its Member States, a number of observations can be made, which can provide lessons for other EU Member States in the process of developing their PCD monitoring system:

- In some cases the different logical frameworks **mix up objectives, targets, actions and indicators**. In the EU PCD Work Programme, the distinction between indicators and targets is occasionally blurred. For example, "*successful mainstreaming of gender in migration-related programmes*" is defined as an indicator, while it seems a target for which an indicator would still need to be defined (i.e. an indicator clarifying *when* we consider gender to have been successfully mainstreamed in migration-related programmes). The overall objectives in terms of development outcomes are even missing from the PCD Work Programme, i.e. what it is the EU is actually trying to achieve. For example, the target "*conclusion of WTO-compatible and development-oriented EPAs*" fails to set a clear PCD agenda, as long as it remains undefined what 'development-oriented' entails. This is more clearly defined in the Swedish Policy for Global Development, which also contains a commitment to "*work, primarily within the EU, for a favourable conclusion to the 2008 Doha Round*" and has

specified in the causality chain that this should contribute to the objective of *“increased export of agricultural products from developing countries”*. In a similar vein, the Danish PCD action plan specifies that PCD efforts in the area of trade serve the objective of *“[...] greater economic inclusion of least developed countries”*.

- Relatedly, **most indicators named as such measure policy inputs, policy outputs or policy stances, very few provide information on outcomes** (see Box 1 for an explanation of these different types of indicators). There are some rare exceptions, such as the Netherlands’ indicator of *“higher tax revenues (tax/GDP ratios) as a result of more effective tax systems and administration (legislation, policy and implementation)”* which can be considered an outcome as Dutch policies do not directly control tax collection in developing countries. The set of indicators proposed for Ireland by King and Matthews (2012) is different, as it includes quite a few policy outcome indicators, in combination with other types of indicators. This approach seems to have inspired the PCD statement of the Irish Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, which includes one input, one output and one outcome indicator (DAFM, 2013).⁷ In Sweden and Denmark, outcomes do feature, but at objective rather than indicator level, e.g. *“to improve the situation of women in conflict and post-conflict situations”*. This is not necessarily inferior to the Irish approach, but in that case it is important to regularly review the assumed causal links between policy initiatives (defined as indicators – Denmark – or actions - Sweden) and the desired outcomes (defined as objectives).

Box 1: Categorisation of indicators

Outcome Indicators: Policy indicators focussing on outcomes. Outcomes are defined as socio-economic variables such as income per capita, school enrolment rates or child malnutrition rates. They measure real trends that are a result of both policy and societal changes and may only be partly influenced by policy instruments. As such, they may therefore not accurately measure policy efforts. For example, countries in close proximity to developing countries and sharing a language are likely to have a higher proportion of immigrants for/with a given immigration policy.

Policy Outputs: Policy output indicators capture concrete changes in efforts designed to make policy more „development-friendly“. They are attractive measures because they are directly under the influence of policy-makers. A policy output might for example include the level of tuition fees for students from developing countries or a tariff rate for beef imports. The key challenge in identifying output indicators is the need to have a clear “story“ linking the indicator to success in development.

Policy Inputs: Policy input indicators are useful where it may be hard to quantify or summarise the output of a policy in a single indicator. Input indicators usually monitor donor expenditure on a particular policy area. The extent of financial contributions can be considered an important proxy for commitment to a policy area. Examples include financial contributions to aid for trade or biodiversity. Input indicators have the advantage that they are easily measurable and comparable across countries. However, because the effectiveness of expenditure in meeting development goals may differ across countries, rankings using policy input indicators must be interpreted cautiously.

Policy stance indicators: Policy stance indicators arise because of the nature of decision- making within multilateral agencies such as the UN or the European Union. For example, EU decision-making is a process of compromise between Council, Parliament and member states and the position defended by member states may not be reflected in the final outcome. A similar situation occurs in multilateral negotiations, where country positions may differ from the final agreement. To capture the negotiating position of countries in such negotiations rather than the agreed outcome, the transparent publication of pre-negotiation positions is required.

Source: King, M. et al. (2012).

⁷ The proposed policy input indicator is “annual comparison of ODA funding provided by DAFM”. The policy output indicator is “volume of export refunds from Ireland to third countries since 2001, measured in quantity of product”. The policy outcome indicator measures the “difference between the average annual growth rate of agricultural imports from the 49 LDCs and the average annual growth rate in agricultural imports from the rest of the world”.

- **The level of specificity of indicators differs between and even within monitoring systems of different countries.** It ranges from conducting a study (e.g. *“study conducted giving recommendations on how to include developing countries in green trade liberalisation”* - Denmark) or organising an event (e.g. *“successful high-level event organized by the Netherlands, which takes first step towards Integrated Mission Planning Process and Peace building Strategies in UN context”* - Netherlands) to broadly defined commitments to ensure policy initiatives are development friendly (e.g. *“promote development and thereby help combat poverty and oppression and prevent crisis and conflicts that force people to flee, through effective foreign, development, security and defense policies”* – Sweden).

The level of specificity is partly related to choices regarding the timeframe of the monitoring framework. The Danish PCD Action Plan defines short-term indicators for 1 to 2 years in length before achievement or revision, while Sweden currently still uses indicators defined in 2008. A longer timeframe allows governments to develop their work over time, but brings the risk that indicators are too broad to give much guidance or that the framework is not adapted to new incoherency issues. Importantly, the level of specificity may also be influenced by the participatory approach of the formulation process. When adopting a whole-of-government approach with strong inter-departmental participation, as in Sweden, the resulting indicators are likely to be more general due to compromises to balance different interests, than a framework that is developed primarily by the international development department. More specific indicators can provide better guidance and accountability, but broad ownership is also of great importance to advance the PCD agenda. A complete set of criteria to keep in mind when developing PCD indicators is presented in Box 2.

Box 2: Criteria for selection of PCD indicators

Transparency: Can a layperson understand what is happening? Does the index hide or reveal facts?
Policy relevance: Does the indicator/index relate to important societal debates?
Analytical soundness: Does the indicator measure the problem, or rather something else?
Responsiveness: Does a politician have any chance to improve the indicator/index?
Time horizon: How quickly can results be expected?
Non-ambiguity of “welfare message”: Does everybody agree that “more is better”, or vice versa?
Accountability: Does the indicator/index point at those who should be held responsible?
Robustness/ independence of assumptions: Could the value of the indicator change drastically by fumbling with some assumptions?
Measurability, data availability: Will we see comparable figures in the next ten years?

Source: King, M. et al. (2012).

- The monitoring frameworks examined in this paper pay most attention to EU policies. The Danish PCD Action Plan specifies that efforts will be concentrated on EU policies, as these rather than Danish national policies have the greatest impact on developing countries. Nevertheless, indicators related to national policy initiatives also feature in other frameworks. This is particularly the case in policy domains of shared competence or where the EU has no legislative power (e.g. visa policies and legal migration). However, some indicators on national initiatives even feature in areas of exclusive EU competence such as trade, like *“stimulate Swedish trade with developing countries within and through cooperation between the Swedish Trade Council, Swedfund, the National Board of Trade, ISA, Sida and others”*. International policy initiatives are also covered in all frameworks. This often concerns the WTO, but also other international fora such as the OECD, the United Nations and international financial institutions.

Indicators related to the EU and international fora can be formulated in two different ways. Denmark's indicators focus on policy decisions at these levels, e.g. "*a common EU black-list of jurisdictions that do not comply with minimum standards of good governance in tax matters established*". Others also include policy stance indicators representing the negotiating positions taken by national governments, e.g. "*actively promote a harmonized EU asylum and migration policy that will enhance Europe's ability to provide protection to those needs*". This stems from the fact that EU decision-making is a process of compromise and that the position of a Member State may not be reflected in the decisions taken.

5. Concluding remarks

The steps taken in some EU Member States to strengthen PCD monitoring frameworks provide some insight for other countries in the EU and beyond. Nevertheless, the analysis has shown that PCD monitoring remains challenging. The adoption and use of PCD indicators is still in its infancy, even within countries that have had a PCD 'system' for some time.

There is still a significant amount of methodological confusion around PCD monitoring, specifically when it comes to indicators. Furthermore, some indicators are too general to provide any meaningful guidance and most monitoring frameworks lack clarifications on roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved, to deliver on the PCD ambitions defined. Some of this confusion and lack of specificity are bi-products of the fact that it is still an emerging policy area and due to practical reasons (e.g. the challenge of data availability). Another credible explanation is that policy-makers do not want to tie themselves to frameworks or indicators that they themselves think will be difficult to deliver on or show progress against. Other interests than international development may prevail in setting PCD priorities and indicators, not least because monitoring frameworks are often the result of quite cumbersome but important inter-departmental drafting and consultation processes.

The development of indicators, and PCD monitoring systems more broadly, is very much determined by governance structures and PCD priorities of individual countries often inspired by multilateral commitments. Given the political nature of PCD it should be no surprise that politics inform policy choices. The process of developing indicators should be a political process, but one informed by credible independent expert analysis and methodological rigour. More analysis related to PCD monitoring would be useful to inform processes of developing indicators to ensure that meaningful issues are measured.

More research could usefully be conducted on different elements of PCD monitoring, such as causality chains, the definition of (country-specific) indicators, or, more broadly, political economy dimensions of effective and credible PCD monitoring mechanisms. Dialogues between country representatives on these topics, informed by such analysis, could also be a useful undertaking, possibly to be organised by the European Commission and/or the OECD Secretariat.

Finally, it should be noted that this discussion paper focussed primarily on the design of PCD monitoring frameworks, indicators in particular, and not their actual use in terms of how the outcomes feed into policy decisions. To make it work, continued ownership and sufficient capacity to assess progress against a rolling PCD monitoring framework is however required. Promoting and monitoring PCD is a continuous and political process, necessary to advance development objectives. It should not be reduced to a cumbersome technical exercise divorced from political realities. Despite the challenge of developing indicators, it would seem difficult to measure any worthwhile progress on PCD without them.

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
Regeringskansliet, 2014, *Den globala utmaningen migrationsströmmar; Skrivelse om samstämmighet for utveckling 2014*, Skr. 2013/14:154, Stockholm, Sverige

<http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/23/64/33/2435f177.pdf>


Annex 1: Examples of chains of causality used by EU Member States and at the EU level in the area of trade

The following graphic representations of chains of causality have been developed by the authors of this discussion paper based on official documents but have not been officially endorsed. These particular examples are indicative only and other chains in different areas could also have been produced.


A. Denmark




B. Sweden



C. The Netherlands



D. European Union



Annex 2: Overview of PCD indicators by selected EU member states

Please note that sub-areas have been categorised and grouped by ECDPM.

A. Trade and finance

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
<i>Development-friendliness of international trade regime and multilateral trade agreements</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LDCs stay on board in WTO negotiations and support future agreements Early sustainability impact assessments of trade agreements are conducted by EU The European Commission shows necessary flexibility in the negotiations of EPAs Study conducted giving recommendations on how to include developing countries in green trade liberalisation 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work, primarily with the EU, for a favourable conclusion to the 2008 Doha round Seek to ensure that broad EPA agreements and association agreements are entered into and implemented with particular attention to important development aspects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achievement of a WTO agenda and work programme that promote sustainable development, take account of inadequate capacity of and need for policy space for poor developing countries, with clear WTO rules on regional integration and a clear relationship between WTO and multilateral environmental agreements EU positing and the ensuing future WTO agenda and work programme are development friendly and promote sustainable trade More support from WTO for reform-minded developing countries in efforts towards autonomous and regional trade liberalisation and integration
<i>Market access</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Average tariffs on manufacturing / agricultural imports Share of duty free imports Trade restrictiveness indicators for manufactured / agricultural goods Trends in import growth rates EU and Irish trade preference utilisation 		

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
<i>Intellectual property rights</i>				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Part of the work programme in the TRIPs Council of the WTO are considerations related to: the impact of trade rules on intellectual property rights on access to medicines, the protection of and access to genetic resources, and innovation and transfer of climate-related and agricultural technology to poor development countries • Bilateral EU trade agreements are in conformity with WTO rights related to TRIPs flexibilities and the Doha Declaration on TRIPs
<i>Aid for Trade</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ODA expenditure on trade policies & regulations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Further raise ambition levels – in terms of effectiveness and resources • With regard to trade-related aid by working to strengthen EU trade aid and ensuring that the EU lives up to its current commitment to increase aid volumes by 2010 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate Aid for Trade for poor developing countries, monitored by WTO, OECD and World Bank • Dutch and EU budget space for effective Aid for Trade to promote capacity development in poor developing countries
<i>EU Member States' trade and investment in developing countries</i>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritise initiatives aimed at strengthening political and judicial frameworks in developing countries and to intensify the fight against corruption. • Stimulate Swedish trade with developing countries within and through cooperation between the Swedish Trade Council, Swedfund, the National Board of Trade, ISA, Sida and others. • Encourage observance of corporate social and environmental responsibility by 	

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
			<p>promoting fuller knowledge of the principles embodied in the UN Global Compact and the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote closer cooperation between policy areas to make full use of the initiative, experience and expertise of Swedish enterprises • Improve conditions for cooperation between government-sponsored development cooperation and the Swedish business sector, without however departing from the Swedish principle of non-tied aid. • Press for adoption by the EU of simpler and more development-friendly rules of origin 	
<p><i>Tax governance and finance</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automatic exchange of information becomes a mandatory part of the adopted EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation • Tax crimes are made a predicate offence and provisions for public access to information about beneficial ownership are included in the adopted EU anti-money laundering directive • A common EU black-list of jurisdictions that do not comply with minimum standards of good governance in tax matters established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ireland's financial contribution to debt relief • Existence of double taxation agreements with Irish Aid priority countries • Level of foreign bribery enforcement in OECD Convention countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribute to on-going efforts, primarily by the international financial institutions, to promote a generally stable and favourable investment climate and effective national regulations governing the financial sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The IMF takes greater account of the specific circumstances of developing countries in its new guidelines for the management of the capital account and capital flows • Higher tax revenues (tax/GDP/ratios) as a result of more effective tax systems and administration (legislation, policy and administration) • Tax departments in developing countries better equipped to combat tax evasion and capital flight • More international cooperation and transparency • Improved coordination between all players (OECD, IMF, World Bank, EU, UN and bilateral aid

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
				programmes) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Usable results for prices, information exchange, financial reporting by multi-nationals and capacity development • Modified international standards for automatic information exchange and less stringent requirements for administrative assistance in tax matters • Establishment of a panel of experts on transfer pricing • Improved international agreements on transparency in financial reporting by multinationals • Bilateral fiscal capacity building in one or more poor developing countries • Usable recommendations, possibly followed by capacity development on tax treaties and TIEAs • New tax treaties with poor developing countries meet the specific starting requirements of the memorandum on the application of tax treaties 2011

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
<i>Inclusive finance</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the development of financial services and local securities markets, including microcredits, and of the financial infrastructure, inter alia via the international financial institutions Analyse and take account of the conclusions and recommendations of the independent international Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, and pursue relevant issues in international forums Support knowledge enhancement in the field of land surveying and land and property registration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A dynamic financial sector in partner countries that also attracts foreign investors Internationally developed financial standards do not unnecessarily obstruct access for these groups The SME finance group will draw up an action plan for better inclusive financing for the agricultural sector for the G20 summit in 2012 Commercial financial institutions more interested in and actively providing for affordable services for these groups

B. Climate change

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An ambitious EU position for COP21 that sets higher thresholds in the international negotiations for a binding protocol. Language on SE4ALL and energy reflected in relevant EU documents as part of post-2015/SDG process. EU delegations further engaged in promoting SE4ALL-goals. Commitments reached in G20 to phase out Fossil Fuel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ODA spent on environmental protection Average annual growth rate of GHG emissions/PPP GDP Performance in meeting Kyoto Protocol targets ODA expenditure on climate change, as a % of 2008 GDP ODA expenditure on desertification in % of 2008 GDP ODA expenditure on biodiversity as % of 2008 GDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work to establish an ambitious and effective international climate regime after 2012 Continue to press for an ambitious climate policy in the EU and seek to ensure that the EU lives up to its current commitment on emission reductions and climate change adaptation Support programmes and initiatives that foster the sustainable use of natural 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In all partner countries climate and environment aspects are part of the MASPs CDKN will be advising 60 developing countries in the coming period, with support from the Netherlands and the UK REDD initiatives are aligned to the EU FLEGT initiative Developing countries have specific emission targets; Indonesia, for example, is

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
	Subsidies with a deadline, and measures secured to protect vulnerable groups.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ireland's commitment to international initiatives on biodiversity – adoption of Convention of Biological Diversity and Related Protocol • MFN tariffs on bioethanol • Subsidies for liquid biofuels ethanol and biodiesel 	<p>resources, through participatory processes, adoption of preventive measures aimed at preserving biological diversity, ecosystem services and genetic resources, and the promotion of renewable energy utilisation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorporate ecosystem concerns into adaptation and energy measures embedded in cooperation strategies for Sweden's partner countries and in the countries' own development strategies • Promote sustainable consumption and production both regionally and internationally, inter alia through participation in UN undertakings in connection with the Marrakech process 	<p>aiming for a 60% emission reduction through REDD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An operational Green Climate Fund in 2015 • Report on reduction efforts by UNFCCC, on the basis of the OECD/DAC system (Rio markers)

C. Food security

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
<i>Agricultural policy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective utilisation of WTO monitoring instruments of agricultural policies, incl. CAP (incl. ensuring greater transparency and reporting requirements) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National levels of market price support • Agricultural ODA expenditure as % of GDP in 2008 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review impact of CAP on developing countries, in terms of food security, environmental and social effects (with EC and MS)
<i>Trade</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Average tariffs on agricultural imports • Trade restrictiveness indicators for agricultural goods • Growth in agricultural imports from developing countries • Trade-distorting support 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abolish agricultural export subsidies by 2013, irrespective of the outcome of the Doha round in WTO • Realisation of the G20 action plan to reduce volatility of food prices

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Active influence exerted in international discussions on combating food scarcity, especially in context of G20 • Structurally improved alignment of supply and demand through at least two regional pilot projects • Improve transparency of food markets in seven countries, bilaterally or multilaterally • Decision at Eight's WTO Ministerial Conference to ban export restrictions on purchases of food aid by World Food Programme
<i>Research and development</i>				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More investment in knowledge and innovation in and for the benefit of developing countries
<i>Biodiversity</i>				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dutch knowledge and expertise inform policy decisions on growth, land and water use, biodiversity, climate and ecosystem management
<i>Land access and use and impact of bio energy production</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment adopted and Voluntary Guidelines on governance and land tenure promoted and implemented in a number of Danish priority countries for development cooperation. 			
<i>Fisheries policy reform</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ireland's participation in international agreements on fisheries protection • DAC country compliance scores for FAO (UN) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries • Average MFN and Applied tariffs on fish and fish product • Government financial transfers 		

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
		to fisheries sector • Ireland's industrial pelagic fishing possibilities in Morocco • FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Compliance scores for FPA countries • Marine protected areas, % of country's exclusive economic zone (partner country) • Ireland's contribution towards fisheries capacity building in developing countries,		

D. Migration

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
<i>Legal migration, mobility and circular migration</i>		• Non-DAC inflow as a percentage of total population • Number of residents in Ireland from different regions of the world • Country of origin of African migrants into Ireland	• Seek to ensure that the Swedish labour immigration policy reform helps to enhance the developmental effects of migration in developing countries, inter alia through measures aimed at promoting circular migration • Actively take part in EU's work on labour immigration and seek to ensure that reforms concerning immigration to the EU take conditions and needs of developing countries into consideration • Promote productive employment, democracy, respect for human rights and sustainable systems and institutions through development cooperation	• Agreements with countries of origin on broad cooperation on migration, including return • More voluntary departures by migrants not admitted to the Netherlands through successful reintegration in countries of origin • Temporary access and residence for highly skilled labour migrants with the knowledge and skills required in specific segments of the Dutch labour market

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribute to the implementation of the EU action plan developed to address the critical lack of healthcare personnel in certain developing countries, including the issue of ethical considerations in connection with recruitment of healthcare personnel from these countries • Promote international exchanges of students, teachers and researchers 	
<p><i>Migration and development agenda</i></p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for remittances to developing countries • Total UNHCR population of cern + applications / Billion USD of GDP • Ratio of tuition fees for non-DAC students and Irish students • Proportion of non-DAC (to total) students in tertiary education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase knowledge about diasporas in Sweden and their contribution to development in countries of origin, as well as more actively engage in and support their contribution in cooperation with relevant government agencies, the business community and NGOs • Promote the transfer of knowledge from individual labour immigrants and diasporas to their countries of origin, through initiatives in private sector development, trade, development cooperation and other policy areas as well as through active involvement in these issues in the EU and internationally • Work for more secure and cheaper remittance transfers, inter alia by commissioning a website with the UK website Send Money Home as a model • Support activities that will encourage entrepreneurship among migrants in Sweden who want to contribute to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Further reduction in the costs of transferring remittances • More support in EU and international forums (GFMD, IOM and UN) for a link between migration and development • MASPs • Developing countries supported in their policies to involve the diaspora in development and aid project's • Further reduction in the costs of transferring remittances from the Netherlands

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
<p><i>Migrants' rights and gender balance</i></p>			<p>development in their countries of origin</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support permanent and temporary return migration and return from Sweden, inter alia through coordinated measures by relevant authorities • Actively seek greater involvement on the part of the EU and the UN system in finding solutions to protracted refugee and internal displacement situations • Promote durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons by drawing attention to their specific situation and needs in the context of bilateral and multilateral development cooperation • Actively promote a harmonised EU asylum and migration policy that will enhance Europe's ability to provide protection to those in need • Promote development and thereby help combat poverty and oppression and prevent crises and conflicts that force people to flee, through effective foreign, development, security and defence policies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects in important countries of first asylum to boost protection and self-reliance of refugees • Support for migration management in developing countries, including protection of refugee

E. Security

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
<i>Strategic planning</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate focus on development aspects in the strategy and in the implementation of the strategy. • Implementation in line with the Gulf of Guinea Strategy and Council Conclusions that mention the importance of a comprehensive regional approach and capacity building • Stabilisation and development aspects are prioritised in the regulation and included in possible council conclusions on responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected areas. A thorough mapping of conflict minerals' supply chains is provided by the Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation in four essential security international treaty and related policies⁸ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work for more effective coordination of Swedish, EU and UN SSR measures in accordance with the SSR position paper drawn up in the Government Offices • Provide Swedish financial and personnel support for SSR initiatives, inter alia through targeted education and training measures • Support policy development, knowledge and information dissemination, and capacity building in this area • Contribute to the development of and improved conditions for more effective needs analysis • Seek to ensure that Sweden's contributions are characterised by an integrative, holistic approach, in which synergies with development cooperation are sought • Pursue the issue of cross-pillar cooperation in the EU, inter alia through the EU Foreign Service, and seek to ensure that the EU Action Plan on Fragile Situations, which is expected to be completed in 2009, is a reliable, robust tool for the Commission and member states • Develop models for effective communication, dialogue and 	

⁸ The conventions are: (i) Convention on Cluster Munitions; (ii) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention; (iii) Action Plan on UNSCR 1325; and (iv) Membership of the Extractive Industries Initiative

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
			exchange of knowledge and experiences between relevant ministries, authorities and government actors in the field, with a view to promoting the holistic approach that must characterise Swedish participation in international initiatives	
<i>Conflict related development plans</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peacekeeping contribution to UN-run operations as percentage of GDP • Peacekeeping contribution to non UN-run operations as percentage of GDP • Expenditure on security system management and reform as a percentage of GNP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote Aid for Trade initiatives in support of private sector development, and foster cooperation with the business and industrial sector in post-conflict countries on the basis of OECD guidelines for business corporations active in conflict zones • Develop methods and procedures for implementing confidence-building mechanism in the immediate post-conflict stage, strengthening peace, reintegrating former combatants, and supporting reconciliation processes and transitional justice • Seek to counter violence-oriented radicalisation and the development of breeding grounds for terrorism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement at the High Level Forum in Busan on goals and commitments in fragile and post-conflict countries • Agreement between UN agencies on activities in the field of security and legal order, and sufficient capacity and resources • Implementation of political strategies and joint programming in pilot countries, and an EU action plan on conflict and fragility • Successful high-level event organised by the Netherlands, which takes first step towards Integrated Mission Planning Process and Peacebuilding Strategies in UN context.
<i>Women, peace and security</i>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolution 1325 by supporting women's peace initiatives, pressing for a higher proportion of women in international peace and security promotion initiatives, conflict prevention work and peace talks • Raise the level of ambition, in terms of both effectiveness and provision of resources, with regard to women's participation 	

Sub-area	Denmark	Ireland (proposed by academics, discussed by govt.)	Sweden	Netherlands
			in democratic processes, education and employment for women, and support for women's sexual and reproductive health as part of development cooperation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen crime-fighting efforts with respect to sexual violence and other forms of assault, inter alia by continuing the work begun during Sweden's co-chairmanship of the Partners for Gender Justice Initiative to increase women's access to justice through the judicial system 	
<i>Proliferation of weapons</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exports of major conventional weapons, as % of exporter's real GDP, weighted by the recipient's Voice and Accountability score and its military spending/GDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seek to ensure that Swedish exports of military equipment do not hinder or counteract the promotion of equitable and sustainable development 	

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ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM's key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

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- Supporting societal dynamics of change related to democracy and governance in developing countries, particularly Africa
- Addressing food security as a global public good through information and support to regional integration, markets and agriculture

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