


THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

Bruce Byiers



ecdpm

The political economy of regional integration in Africa

Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) Report

Bruce Byiers

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MEMBER COUNTRIES: 8

Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Somalia
Sudan
South Sudan
Uganda

IGAD Member States

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Acronyms

AEC	African Economic Community
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AUPD	African Union Panel on Darfur
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWARU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Units
CHD	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CILSS	Comité Permanent Inter État de la Lutte Contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel
CoH	Cessation of Hostilities
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EASBRIG	East Africa Standby Brigade
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFFORT	Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESPA	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HoAI	Horn of Africa Initiative
IBF	IGAD Business Forum
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICPALD	IGAD Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
IDDRSI	IGAD's Drought Disaster and Sustainability Initiative
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
IPSS	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
IRAPP	IGAD Regional HIV and AIDS Partnership Programme
IRCC MTR	Inter-Regional Coordination Committee Mid Term Review
ISAP	Institutional Strengthening Action Plan
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Program
ISTVS	IGAD Sheikh Technical Veterinary School and Reference Centre
JFA	The Joint Financing Agreement
LAPSSET	Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCP	National Congress Party

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NIF	National Islamic Front
NGO/CSO	Non-Governmental Organisation/Civil Society Organisation
OSSREA	Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa
PDF	Prevention and Deterrence Force
PIDA	African Union Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PwC	PricewaterhouseCoopers
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RIP	Regional Indicative Programmes
RPF	Regional Programming Framework
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SFO	Somalia Facilitation Office
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/iO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
TSU	Technical Support Unit
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United National Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development
WDI	World Development Indicators
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

Why a political economy study of IGAD?

Starting out in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), IGAD widened its scope and mandate with its transformation to IGAD in 1996. IGAD is therefore a young organisation addressing a widening regional agenda. Varying degrees of success across policy areas underline the need to better understand the drivers and constraints to IGAD's regional role.

Regional integration in the Horn of Africa is particularly challenging due to the web of long-run, inter and intra-state conflicts, rivalries, alliances and anti-alliances ('my enemy's enemy is my friend') that shape relationships among countries. At the same time, within-country politics are also subject to widely varying political settlements and capacities to govern. All this is affected by major environmental challenges, and by continually changing external interests and influences on the region.

While IGAD has achieved progress in regional cooperation under complex conditions, critics express frustration at the limited regional market integration and conflict prevention. Some question the relevance of IGAD as a basis for regional integration, particularly given overlapping membership of multiple Regional Economic Communities (RECs) - all except Somalia are members of other RECs - and common policy areas with COMESA and the EAC in particular.

This study therefore seeks to answer the following question: what are the main political-economic actors and factors that shape how IGAD sets and implements its agenda in the Horn of Africa? It focuses in particular on peace and security, and economic integration. It focuses on the key within-country and between-country historical, structural and institutional factors and how these influence the key groups that shape how and why IGAD functions as it does. Both areas are key to the IGAD agenda but are also mutually dependent, underpinning regional policies on food security, gender equality and climate change.

Context

As a 'building block' of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), IGAD hosts one of Africa's most elaborate Conflict Early Warning Systems and is recognised for its role in conflict mediation, particularly the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and subsequent referendum. Continuing violence in South Sudan since December 2013 and the range of political and economic interests affected by the birth of a new, landlocked member state make the Sudan-South Sudan peace talks an interesting case for further analysing the workings of IGAD.

IGAD is also an AU-recognised Regional Economic Community and building block of the African Economic Community (AEC) under the AEC Treaty, implying a commitment to establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) and regional infrastructure and transport development. Economic integration in the region makes an interesting case study given the wide variation in economic policy approaches and challenges among member states, their limited economic complementarity, and the fact that most are also pursuing economic integration through other RECs.

Together, these issues raise questions about the potential role and specific added value of IGAD's regional approach and who is driving it. It also raises a challenge to IGAD to identify how to build on the high levels of informal regional trade and other relations, and the growing sub-regional and bilateral relations among

members as a basis for greater regional cooperation and integration. The relevance of the current study is underlined by IGAD's on-going strategy development for the period 2016-2020.

Key findings of the IGAD study

The findings suggest tensions between IGAD's original aims, member state interests, donor reliance and continental objectives that encourage IGAD to 'look like a REC', to mirror comparable RECs in Africa. While adopting many of the institutional *forms*, in practice IGAD *functions* through *ad hoc* processes, with frequent, personalised involvement of Heads of State, and few systematic, institutionalised approaches to addressing regional common interests.

There is therefore also a tension between structural factors that support the logic of regional integration, and conflicts that undermine regional integration taking place in practice. Having three landlocked members and common environmental challenges supports the logic for more regional cooperation. And economic ties of interdependence are growing in relation to water, energy and physical infrastructure. Yet to date these features have been largely mitigated by the long-run historical conflicts and tensions in the region.

Ethiopia and Ethiopian interests shape IGAD's actions – it is the only country bordering all other IGAD member states except Uganda, is an 'emerging hegemon', and has its own clear development strategy of slow and controlled economic opening. This then determines much of IGAD's room for manoeuvre, particularly in the realm of economic integration and trade. At the same time, Ethiopia has long been the only Member State to regularly pay its IGAD contribution on time.

Despite some suspicions around Ethiopia's role in defining and driving the IGAD agenda, IGAD originally was, and still is seen by some as a neutral platform to address bilateral tensions and rivalries and (at least partially) offset the influence of specific members such as Ethiopia, or external parties.

Integration in cross-border infrastructures for transport, electricity, oil and water has been greater than market integration. This reflects geopolitical interests among IGAD member states and the more 'politically salient' nature of infrastructures. Where taking place, economic and trade integration are on the basis of national interest and bilateral agreements, again often led by Ethiopia. Kenyan and Ugandan membership of IGAD emerges as being (currently) related more to security than economic concerns.

While fora have been created to engage private sector and civil society actors around the IGAD agenda, these are considered weak. Those that might engage on market integration do not share a common vision or sufficient organisation, whether formal firms or informal cross-border traders.

Conflict resolution and management is the one area where IGAD has managed to build on common interests among member states. This is largely due to the political cost of cross-border conflict spillover, creating potential costs to non-cooperation. However, steps to further institutionalise the peace and security architecture are seen as potentially limiting the actions of Heads of State, who may prefer the current ad-hoc approaches to conflict resolution and management.

IGAD has arguably also played a role in neutralising 'national interests' that might have come to dominate regional security relations. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains instrumental, hosting all Peace and Security related institutions, chairing IGAD since 2008, and playing a key role in South Sudan mediation efforts.

While political appointments to the IGAD Secretariat and the distribution of IGAD ‘specialised institutions’ among Member States is criticised as inefficient and dispersed, it also reflects the reality of inter-state bargaining and can be seen as raising member state ownership of the IGAD agenda.

IGAD(D) has always relied heavily on donor finance. While helping realise many IGAD activities, this creates heavy reporting costs and reduces autonomy for the IGAD Secretariat to target resources to areas where it sees the need, unless in line with donor interests and (often earmarked) funding plans. It also encourages creating ‘institutional forms’ to satisfy donors, even if not carrying out their envisaged ‘function.’

Implications

Supporting IGAD as though it operated solely according to its formal mandates and institutions will likely lead to frustration with lack of progress, as frequently voiced by donors and other interviewees. This requires that policy-makers and their supporters engage with a more political understanding, recognising that attempts to *alter* the influence of structural factors and inter-state willingness to cooperate regionally will be challenging in the short to medium term. This suggests the need to find ways to *adapt*, *avoid* or *await*.

The analysis suggests the need for policies to *adapt* to the IGAD context and incentives that the region’s countries and leaders face by paying more attention to the different long-run development trajectories and interests within and between states – with specific attention to Ethiopian interests. This suggests that further progress in IGAD integration must rely on a combination of support for top-down, state-led ‘formal’ processes with an approach that builds on bilateral, national, informal and *ad hoc* processes.

Some therefore suggest international actors should fund more regular, high-level summits at the regional level, rather than the everyday activities of the IGAD secretariat and other bureaucratic organs, given their vulnerability to high-level politicking. The analysis here also underlines the important role such high-level summits seem to have played, particularly in conflict mediation. The challenge may lie in how a formal regional institution can or should more proactively engage with such informal dynamics.

Other ways of adapting to current incentive structures might relate to the political traction around infrastructures, corridors and ports as vehicles for promoting wider, regional reforms in the IGAD region. Regional policy-makers and donors might build on and promote growing economic interdependency, but also encourage private sector investment around key transport routes, simultaneously creating a constituency with an interest in furthering the economic integration agenda.

The report also highlights the difference in political salience between IGAD peace and security and regional economic concerns. The clear and present danger of cross-border spillover of conflicts, with visible costs to inaction, stands in contrast to the far more opaque, aspirational objectives of trade or economic integration.

Beyond attempts to alter – or adapt to – the incentives facing governments and other actors involved in regional integration, a better political economy understanding may allow policies to somehow *avoid* clear blockages to reform related to current circumstances. Bilateral agreements represent a potential way of avoiding regional blockages, though with a potential future cost, in lost regional political legitimacy and multiple, overlapping structures.

Finally, this report also highlights the importance of timing, with key events able to alter circumstances in unforeseen ways – suggesting that some policy options may have to *await* more propitious political-

economic circumstances. The impact on Egypto-Ethiopian relations of previously unforeseen political changes in Egypt is a case in point. This may require some opportunism but also preparation or plans and coalitions for when the moment comes - history is made of critical junctures, and policy-makers must be ready for when conditions suddenly align so that key interests can be recognised and aligned.

1. Introduction

1.1. Why this study?

Regional integration and cooperation have long been high on the agenda for African countries, regions and their organisations. This is driven by the wide recognition that regional cooperation is vital to tackle development challenges that cannot be solved at a national level. Many such inter-state problems affect poor people's lives in areas ranging from human security, mobility, rural livelihoods, trade, infrastructure, to environment and climate change. Often such cross-country or regional problems have a particular impact on women, for example in the case of informal cross-border trade and violent conflicts.

Over the years, this has resulted in many commitments, policy documents and strategies, with accompanying financial and other support. Yet policy-makers, partner country representatives and non-state actors frequently express frustration with progress. While regional integration and cooperation is taking place, levels of progress differ widely across regions and policy areas, and are not appreciated or understood in the same way.

This report presents the findings of a study of an important regional organisation in Africa, the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in the Horn of Africa. The report is part of a broader study that also includes the African Union and four other Regional Economic Communities in Africa.¹

On paper, IGAD has a mandate to promote regional cooperation and integration across a broad range of topics. These are explicitly stated as: cooperation on macroeconomic policies; free movement of goods, services, and people; regional food security; drought resilience; complementary infrastructures; peace & stability in the subregion; programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; and the objectives of COMESA.² Yet IGAD is a relatively young institution in a region characterised by a web of long-running inter and intra-state conflicts, rivalries, alliances and anti-alliances ('my enemy's enemy is my friend'), and members with varying political settlements and capacities to govern. All this is amidst major environmental challenges and continually changing external interests and influences.

Given the extremely difficult context and history of the region, IGAD can proudly point to some progress in regional cooperation and collaboration, offering "unique experiments in managing diversity, state formation and governance, and forms of engagement with outside cultures and influences" (Obi, 2013). But critics express frustration at the limited progress in regional market integration and conflict resolution and the low capacity in IGAD institutions, while some even question the relevance of IGAD as a basis for regional integration, not least given overlapping REC membership - all IGAD members except Somalia are also members of other RECs.

This study addresses the following central question for IGAD: *what are the main political-economic actors and factors that determine how IGAD sets and implements its agenda in the Horn of Africa?* It focuses in particular on peace and security, and broadly defined economic integration, bringing to the fore the most important historical, structural, and institutional factors, and the key groups that define within-country and between-country relations that shape how and why the IGAD Secretariat operates as it does.

¹ The other five studies deal with the political economy of Regional Economic Communities, i.e. the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

² See the IGAD Establishing Document.

1.2. Why a political economy analysis?

The challenges and complexities of promoting effective regional cooperation and integration are formidable, though not unique to Africa. Sometimes, support to regional processes has been misguided by too narrow a focus on one dominant regional model, such as that of the European Union. In other cases, the agenda gets side-tracked, taking regional structures to be the sole driver for regional integration.

Rather than focus on best-practice or normative models, policy reform and support that builds on political economy analysis is open to the multiple actors and forms of regional processes, whether they are managed or driven by formal regional organisations, or by state and non-state actors operating from different countries. The political economy approach is dedicated to analysing how and why multiple actors and factors interact in a particular regional context, and the effects they have on change and development processes. In particular, the analysis focuses on how power and resources are distributed and contested in regional contexts. This includes an interest in the effects that global actors and factors have on the incentives of the regional and national level actors.

Such an approach aims to get away from judging IGAD in terms of what it 'should' look like and 'should' be doing as one of the African Union's eight regional building blocks; but rather focus on what it is doing and why. By examining the different actors and factors that affect the way IGAD works, this study therefore aims to provide an improved understanding of what is technically desirable and politically feasible, as well as help identify the types of partnerships or coalitions that support regional cooperation and regional integration in the IGAD region.

1.3. Methodology of the study

1.3.1. A five-lens framework

In all regional dynamics, five broad sets of political economy actors and factors interact with one another to shape or influence the incentive environment, behaviour and ideas, as well as the distribution of resources, rents, and power.³ Hence, this study applies a five-lens approach to unpack these five sets of actors and factors.

The first political economy lens identifies the less visible - but often deeply influential - **foundational** or structural factors that are mostly embedded in geography, culture, history and the core economic features or endowments of countries or regions. Their influence may be hard or impossible to change.

A second lens looks at **institutions**, in this context understood as rules of the game. These can be formal, written or codified rules (in legal texts, etc.), which interact continuously with other formal institutions, as well as with informal rules of the game. The distinction between formal and informal rules of the game is crucial, as both are not one another's opposite, but rather two sets of rules of the game. Informal institutions are often associated with culture, beliefs, customs, norms, etc. The way formal and informal institutions interact is vital for understanding why a particular institutional form is effective in a particular context, and why the same institution is dysfunctional in another context.⁴

³ *Rents* can be understood as income that is additional to market based profits (from monopoly trading, from subsidies, from owning scarce resources, corruption and aid) and wages.

⁴ Formal traffic rules in a context where there is a culture of compliance have a different result on road safety than the same rules in a context in which the informal rules of the game are essentially about breaking these traffic rules. In order to ensure compliance of behaviour of road users with the formal rules, one often needs a range of other formal institutions to obtain road safety, with extra costs involved to finance a thicker institutional environment.

Thirdly, **actors and agency** need to be factored in in the analytical framework. The interactions between institutions and foundational factors create political and other incentives to which these actors respond. Ideas, beliefs, leadership capabilities etc. also help explain the potential for change, or the stickiness of the *status quo*. In the context of transnational or regional processes, it may help point to the interests in – or opposition against – overcoming hurdles to creating regional public goods. In particular, the reality of how political institutions such as multi-party democracy interact with social and economic institutions provides insights in the incentive environment of political elites and other stakeholders.

A fourth political economy lens helps differentiate between different **sectors or sub-sectors**, and how these further influence the incentive environment of actors. Infrastructure has a different appeal to political leaders than social services have. In certain contexts rural roads may have a stronger appeal to politicians on a campaign-trail, than say investments in regional transport infrastructure, or in the less visible but no less essential maintenance of such infrastructures.

A fifth lens focuses on **external factors** that affect the domestic political economy and the regional dynamics and organisations. Global trade and investment patterns are obvious candidates in this fifth category. Of particular interest to the six cases is the way old and new donors impact on the incentive environment in which national and regional actors operate and the way traditional donors directly influence regional processes and organisations.

1.3.2. Approach of the IGAD study

This IGAD report is part of a broader study, with five more reports on the African Union, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC). All cases follow the same approach, which involved a workshop with the research team on the joint methodology and further discussion with the African Union and representatives of the RECs in Addis Ababa (October 2014). The IGAD case builds on inputs from a team of experts from Europe and Africa. It involved desk study, participation in conferences and workshops, and three field visits during which 40 individuals were interviewed. The report was peer reviewed by a Quality Support Group, which combined independent academic expertise, as well as the comments of several staff of the Embassy of Sweden staff.

Due in part to their novelty, analyses of the political economy of regional organisations such as IGAD are subject to limitations. Political economy analyses necessitate access to data, information and previous analyses that are often not readily available. The selection of cases for analyses, and indeed the decision to focus on two separate cases, necessarily entails trade offs in terms of depth and scope of analysis, while research can be overtaken by on-going events. Nonetheless, both cases studied here are considered illustrative of the broader political dynamics at play within the IGAD organisational setup and therefore have relevance for areas not covered in detail here.

A **separate synthesis report** provides a summary of the six reports. It formulates ten statements and presents the key findings on the political economy of regional organisations in Africa, which further help identify the most important implications for different stakeholders with an interest in supporting or nurturing regional dynamics.

1.4. Scope and structure of the IGAD study

1.4.1. A focus on security and economic integration

The five-lens approach is applied to two key thematic areas in IGAD policy: peace and security, and economic integration. Not only are the two explicit objectives of IGAD, they are potentially also mutually dependent (IGAD, 2010).⁵ Peace and security is arguably a pre-condition for increased regional market integration, while increased regional economic integration promotes mutual economic dependence between states and may itself engender peace by heightening the opportunity cost of conflict. The two are also important for addressing other regional challenges such as those relating to food security, gender equality and the effects of climate change.

While their *potential* mutual reinforcement is clear, in practice economic and security interdependence can frequently pull in opposite directions. Tensions exist between regional security requirements, such as tighter border controls and restrictions on movements of goods and people, and the goal of economic integration that point to free movement and open borders (Healy, 2011). Promoting a regional agenda in this context requires a regional body that can engender trust and willingness to engage in a region of long-run hostility and suspicion, underlining the importance of this political economy analysis of IGAD.

1.4.2. The importance of peace and security in IGAD

IGAD is a 'building bloc' of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with peace, security and humanitarian affairs one of its three main pillars of work. It hosts one of Africa's most elaborate Conflict Early Warning Systems and is widely recognised for its role in conflict mediation, particularly in negotiating Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and the subsequent referendum.⁶ At the same time, though emerging, a robust regional Peace and Security Architecture is not yet in place and violent conflict has continued in South Sudan since December 2013, making the Sudan-South Sudan peace talks an interesting case for further analysis.

This is particularly so given the range of political and economic interests affected by the birth of a new, landlocked independent member state, the impact on neighbouring countries and populations, and the external influences that were brought to bear on IGAD in the process. The case illustrates how IGAD has worked through a range of institutional forms to engage warring parties where interests align within and between states. Peace and security is also a key area for donors supporting the region, forming one of the EU's key pillars along with economic integration and natural resource management in its Regional Indicative Programme for 2014 to 2020 (EC, 2015), for example. The study does not analyse IGAD's full range of operations in peace and security but has potential relevance for interesting work also taking place in Somalia, for example.

1.4.3. IGAD as a regional economic community

Although IGAD has largely become synonymous with peace and security, it is also an AU-recognised Regional Economic Community (REC) and building block of the African Economic Community (AEC) under the AEC Treaty. This entails commitments to establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA), macro-economic convergence, industrial development and investment promotion, infrastructure and transport development, information technology, tourism development, and the development of energy, agriculture, environment and natural resources (Abdi and Seid, 2013). As such, economic cooperation and integration is another of

⁵ According to their Mission Statement "The IGAD mission is to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation: i) Food Security and environmental protection ii) Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and, iii) Economic cooperation and integration."

⁶ The other is ECOWARN in ECOWAS (Brett, 2013).

IGAD's three priority areas, while market integration also supports the third pillar of work on food security and environmental protection. The recently approved Horn of Africa Initiative (HoAI) further supports the linkages between these with a large pool of external funding targeted at vulnerability and resilience, and economic opportunity and integration (World Bank, 2014).

Beyond its importance in strategies and commitments, economic integration in the IGAD region makes an interesting case study given the wide variation in economic policy approaches and challenges among member states, their limited economic complementarity, and the fact that most are also pursuing economic integration through the EAC (East African Community) and COMESA (the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, COMESA). This then raises questions about the potential role and specific added value of IGAD's economic agenda and who is driving it. It also raises a challenge to IGAD to identify how to build on the high levels of informal regional trade and the growing sub-regional and bilateral relations among members as a basis for greater regional economic integration.

The remainder of the study is as follows: Section 2 looks at the structural and foundational factors that affect IGAD's policy choice and implementation at a general level, the formal and informal institutions, and how these frame and are shaped by actors in the region, including external actors. Sections 3 and 4 zoom in on the two thematic areas under analysis, linking the common regional factors identified in Section 2 with sector-specific institutions and how they affect the behaviour of various key actors in determining IGAD's policy choice and implementation in terms of the dynamics taking place between countries within the region, and within some key countries.⁷ Section 5 concludes with the main findings, and potential policy implications.

⁷ Explanations and illustrations of the methodology, in the form of five lenses, are presented in a separate document.

2. The Nature of IGAD

With eight member states, IGAD is the third smallest of the eight RECs recognised by the AU, after the 5-member EAC and AMU (Arab Maghreb Union). IGAD also has the third smallest population, at 236 million people. While in principle, this might facilitate the job of IGAD in promoting regional cooperation, other features of the region clearly mitigate against this.

This section gives a broad overview of i) the foundational and structural factors of IGAD, ii) the key institutional forms and mandates and how they are applied in practice, iii) some main, broad actor concerns and interests at the Member State level, as well as iv) the influence of external actors and factors. It focuses on how these have affected the formation and original mandate of IGADD, before focusing on the formal institutional setup in IGAD, and how this works in practice - considered the 'informal' institutions or 'rules of the game'. These in turn shape the actions of some of the key actors who determine IGAD's policy choice and implementation of the regional agenda, setting the scene for the more detailed sectoral discussions in Sections 3 and 4.

2.1. Foundational factors

Various long-run or hard-to-change factors such as common climate and environmental challenges support the logic of regional cooperation in the IGAD region. But the structural factors that might advocate for a regional approach are at least partially offset by long-running historical grievances and conflicts and very low levels of economic development that reduce trust and lower the opportunities available for cooperation. These factors then raise difficulties for regionalism through formal IGAD institutions and processes, leading to the emergence of rather more 'informal' and ad-hoc approaches to regionalisation, as discussed below.

2.1.1. Drought - an 'apolitical' regional agenda?

The purpose and objectives of IGAD have broadened considerably from those of the original Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) established in 1986. Formed by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda with Eritrea joining in 1993, IGADD was ostensibly a regional response to the 1984-85 drought affecting all six founder countries.

Yet it is said that IGADD owes less to recognition of the benefits of regional cooperation than to political factors, not least external pressure from donors and international agencies (e.g. Woodward, 2013; El-Affendi, 2009; Young, 2007). The lure of foreign development aid played an important role, while Adar (2000) particularly highlights the instrumental role of the UN's Environmental Program (UNEP) in IGADD's formation: IGAD is thus the only AU-recognised REC that traces its origins to the UN system.⁸

Cold War and other regional tensions also influenced IGADD's origins: in 1986 Ethiopia's Derg was supported by the USSR and Somalia and Sudan both backed by the US (a switch from two decades earlier). This obliged any regional organisation to be as 'non-political' as possible (Woodward, 2013). IGADD therefore allowed USSR-aligned Ethiopia to engage with the then clear Western allies Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya around the uncontroversial topic of drought, (Woodward, 2013).

⁸ "Following the relative success of the Comité Permanent Inter État de la Lutte Contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), the states of the region were urged to form an intergovernmental authority to coordinate the fight against drought and famine. Several resolutions were passed by the UN General Assembly to this effect, starting with resolution 35/90 of December 1980." (El-Affendi, 2009). Nonetheless, "the first step in establishing the regional organisation was taken by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 38/216 of 20 December 1983 (Ameyo, 2010, cited in Bereketeab, 2012).

Importantly, it also gave Ethiopia a way to access much-needed Western finance.⁹ While Djibouti played host to the founding meeting of IGADD and hosts the IGAD Secretariat today, no individual country took leadership for the body (Dersso, 2015). IGADD went operational “with limited objectives and a high dependence on donors that would have serious implications for its independence” (Bereketeab, 2012).

The transition from IGADD to IGAD in 1996 is generally described as a kind of evolution, driven less by any actor or events than a ‘realisation’ that IGADD was becoming a forum for more than drought-related issues, not least regional security.¹⁰ But the changing circumstances also reflected a changing context with the end of the Cold War, the fall of Ethiopia’s Derg, the end of Somalia’s Biarre regime, and Eritrean independence in 1991. Together these raised countries’ willingness to cooperate (Interview). Above all, IGADD was becoming an important forum for discussing the Sudan peace process.

Soon after being revitalised in its new guise, IGAD became a Regional Economic Community (REC), signing the Protocol on Relations between the AUC and RECs on 25 February 1998. This outlined a roadmap of economic liberalization programs as part of a new role in contributing to the African Economic Community. Thus, though “IGAD was never originally meant to be a REC” (Interview), IGADD’s original narrow focus on drought and development was expanded with the launch of IGAD in its current form, with peace and security and economic integration added as key pillars of its regional agenda.¹¹

While South Sudan’s independence increased IGAD membership, Eritrea unilaterally temporarily suspended its membership in 2007 and remains outside the organisation today in spite of reports of requests to re-enter the group in 2012 (IGAD, 2010).¹² Despite its suspension, Eritrea is nonetheless included in the analysis below.

2.1.2. ...In a conflictual environment

The need for IGADD to be apolitical stemmed from fifty years of protracted, chronic and complex conflicts. These include state–society; state–state; and society–society conflicts (Cliffe 2004; Bereketeab, 2013; Dersso, 2015), reflecting inter-racial, inter-ethnic, inter-clan, inter-religious and even inter-occupational (farmers vs pastoralists) tensions (Mengisteab, 2013). Interstate wars have at times been hard to distinguish from intra-state wars - the Somali wars and Ethiopia’s Ogaden insurgencies were, for example, hard to distinguish in the 1960s and 1970s (Mengisteab, 2013) - while the repercussions of these are still being felt today, with around 150 armed conflicts per year, together these reportedly increased countries’ willingness to cooperate. While this heightens the need for a regional body to address peace and security concerns, many member states still actively pursue policies that fuel distrust and rivalry within and among the member states, hindering the progress that IGAD might make in pursuing its regional agenda (Berhanu, 2013).

Møller (2013) points in particular to three “relations of enmity [that] have been particularly venomous”. These are between:

⁹ Both Somalia and Ethiopia were USSR-supported until Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia’s Ogaden region in 1977-78, forcing the USSR to choose sides, after which Somalia was US-supported. This “was not just a matter of superpower choice, but reflected developments in domestic politics” (Woodward, 2013a). This was also a time when the number of conflicts in the Horn reached a crescendo (Healy, 2011), while Ethiopia is said to have been “involved in an alliance with Libya and South Yemen aimed mainly against Sudan” (EL-Affendi, 2009).

¹⁰ Even in the IGAD establishing document it states that it became “increasingly apparent” that the Authority provided a regular forum where leaders of the Eastern African countries were able to tackle other political and socioeconomic issues.

¹¹ Economic Commission for Africa 2013, Domestication and Mainstreaming of Regional Integration Processes Instruments and Decisions into National Policies, Legal and Regulatory Frameworks.

¹² On Eritrea’s self suspension see, for example: <http://stesfamariam.com/2014/04/10/eritreas-igad-suspension-and-reactivation-decisions-sacrosanct-and-legal/>

1. *Ethiopia and Somalia* - mainly because of Somalia's irredentist ambitions of uniting all Somali nationals in one state, now also involving Kenya¹³;
2. *Sudan and Uganda* - through a protracted proxy war between the Uganda-supported Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan and the Sudan-supported Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda;¹⁴
3. *Ethiopia and Eritrea* - dating back to the protracted struggle for Eritrean independence which, despite aligning the two leaders against the Ethiopian Derg regime, still led to full-scale war in 1998-2000 over the border territory around Badme.¹⁵ Eritrea is routinely suspected of supporting Somali irredentism to destabilise Ethiopia in particular, partially explaining Eritrea's decision to suspend its IGAD membership in 2007, although it is now reported to seek readmission, with muted response.¹⁶

These three conflicts underpin many other conflicts, contributing to the region's security complex or 'conflict system' (Berhanu, 2013) that entwines the member states.¹⁷ For example, when Ethiopia cut relations with Eritrea, this boosted the role of Djibouti's economy as Ethiopia's main access to port services, providing additional resources to the ruling Issa elite and their clientelistic networks. This led Eritrea to provide support to the marginalised Afar, thus perpetuating tensions within Djibouti and with Eritrea (Berhanu, 2013).

2.1.3. Common environmental features

Much of the conflict in the Horn of Africa arguably relates to the frequent drought, food and water shortages and growing environmental degradation (e.g. Dersso, 2014), all of which can be related to climate change. IGAD countries have a large Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) area (see Figure 1 below) requiring specific policy responses. This has led Kenya to establish a special ministry for the ASAL areas (the Ministry of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands) and a specific ASAL policy framework as an annex to the overall development vision (de Weijer and Afun-Ogidan, 2012), for example, and offers a logical basis for regional cooperation in the IGAD region.

The physical challenges are also reflected in external partner approaches: the EC's Regional Indicative Planning document underlines environmental challenges, including population pressure, land clearing, overuse and degradation, and tenure uncertainty and overgrazing, all of which can lead to drought, desertification, soil erosion and reduction of arable land and pasture, landslides, increased occurrence of floods and storms caused by climate change, destroying the eco-systems (EC, 2015). While the harsh physical environment characterising much of the region ostensibly underpinned the emergence of IGADD, they are arguably also at the root of today's tensions.


¹³ The Somali peninsula was carved up into five colonial territories at the Berlin Conference of 1884. Britain took over two areas (British Somaliland and the Northern Frontier Districts of the Kenya Colony), the third went to France (French Somaliland), Southern Somalia became an Italian colony (Italian Somaliland) and Ethiopia seized western Somaliland – Haud and Reserve Area, and Ogaden (Drysdale, 1964). Three of these territories gained independence to form two countries, the Somali Republic (British and Italian Somalilands) in 1960, and the French colony became the Republic of Djibouti in 1977 (Samatar, 2013).

¹⁴ Uganda replaced Ethiopia as foreign patron, with the SPLA originally formed in Ethiopia in 1983.

¹⁵ After Eritrean independence there was a territorial dispute with Ethiopia around Badme. Despite international arbitration in Eritrean favour, and acceptance in principle by Ethiopia, this has not been implemented. (e.g. El-Affendi, 2009).

¹⁶ <http://stesfamariam.com/2014/04/10/eritreas-igad-suspension-and-reactivation-decisions-sacrosanct-and-legal/>

¹⁷ These include the Ethiopian-Somali wars (1964, 1977-78, 2006-9), the Kenyan-Somali war (1963), the Ugandan-Tanzanian war (1978-79) and the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war (1998-2000) (Mengisteab, 2013).

Figure 1: IGAD Agro-ecological zones¹⁸

At the same time, IGAD has one of the highest concentrations of livestock in the world, with a livestock population of over 336 million ruminants (including cattle, camels and goats) over a space of 5.2m square kms. Around 78 percent of the IGAD population lives primarily from agriculture with revenues from agriculture estimated at an average of 15 percent of GDP per member state, over half of which comes from livestock trade (EC, 2015).¹⁹ Relatedly, IGAD has the lowest urban population jointly with the EAC, at 22 percent. That much of the livestock trade is cross-border and informal represents a clear challenge to formal institutional regional processes.

While the common physical challenges and threats posed by climate change offer a potential rallying point for regional cooperation, the related long-run conflicts have far-reaching economic and political implications that surely impact on IGAD's agenda, but also imply a difficult context for promoting a regional vision.

2.1.4. Economic structures

Having three landlocked member states strengthens the logic for greater economic integration in the IGAD region. That one of these (Ethiopia) is the most populated country in the region with 94 million inhabitants (World Bank, WDI) further bolsters the case. Djibouti's location, relative stability and neutrality have helped position it as Ethiopia's main opening to the sea following the loss of access to Eritrea's Assab port in 1998. Nonetheless, the region's markets remain extremely fragmented with poor (though improving) infrastructures that raise the costs of transport between countries but also within countries - it reportedly costs less to transport a container from China to Djibouti than from Djibouti to Addis Ababa.²⁰

¹⁸ Source: IFRC (2015).

¹⁹ http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/IGAD%20Platform%20for%20Drought%20Resilience%20and%20Sustainability.pdf

²⁰ The Economist, 21 April 2012, Ocean Ahoy, <http://www.economist.com/node/21553050>.

The region's physical environment has arguably hindered long-run economic development in the region. The IGAD sub-region has a per capita income of US\$754 in 2011, far below the Sub-Saharan average of US\$1446 in the same year (at current prices and exchange rates), while the combined GDP of the seven IGAD member countries was US\$167 billion in 2011, far below Egypt's GDP of US\$232 billion in the same year (Abdi and Seid, 2013).

These economic characteristics also define the benefits to be had from greater regional integration. Although IGAD is relatively homogeneous, with the richest country income per head only three times that of the poorest, compared to a factor of 49 in SADC or 51 in COMESA (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014), the region's economy is dominated by the three economies of Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Together they represent more than 80 percent of the region's GDP (World Bank, 2013), with 31.9, 26.5 and 22.8 percent of regional GDP respectively. Meanwhile, Ethiopian GDP growth was 8.5 percent in 2013, compared to nearly 6 percent in Kenya, 5.3 percent in Uganda, and 4.8 percent in Djibouti in 2012 (World Bank, 2014).

Though economic interdependence is growing, there is very limited complementarity between IGAD member states' production. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are significant producers of coffee, each with their different types and provenances recognised in international markets; Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan are major exporters of livestock and livestock products; Sudan and Ethiopia both produce sesame and oil seeds for export; khat is a lucrative regional export commodity from Kenya and Ethiopia (Healy, 2011). Without greater regional economic complementarities, private sector opportunities and therefore the pressure exerted on politicians are limited.

Unlike coffee, sesame and oil seeds, most livestock and khat trade is informal. This affects the kind of data available on what trade is actually taking place to form policies it also affects the nature of trade relations in the region. Those engaged in informal trade may be more interested in upholding the *status quo*, thus limiting the role that institutions targeted at formal trade can play in building on this to promote greater economic integration. At the same time, the difficulty of bringing informal trade into more institutionalised regional processes and dialogue also raises tensions between reformers and rent-seekers, and between traditional ways of life that rely on informal production and exchange, and modern agricultural and extractive production. Those who willingly engage in such formal processes may well only be on the margins of this large-scale informal trade.

2.1.5. A complex wider region

The IGAD region's proximity to the Middle East also influences the context in which it works, with numerous relations that divide rather than uniting member countries. While Saudi Arabia serves as a key market for livestock from the Horn of Africa, and numerous Arab countries host migrant workers from IGAD countries, the proximity of IGAD countries to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are key to the region's Cold War and present strategic relevance. Where Israeli saw Ethiopia as a non-Muslim ally in the region, Saudi Arabia has long seen its Yemen-related security concerns as linked to the Horn of Africa, not least Somalia, with fears that state collapse in Yemen might allow Iran-backed Houthi rebels to gain indirect control over shipping through the Gulf of Aden. The complexity of relations goes further: IGAD has a memorandum of understanding with Iran, while Iran also engages with numerous IGAD member countries to offset Arab influence.

These potential inconsistencies and tensions in IGAD and member state external relations affect the political calculations at play at national and regional levels. The Djibouti regime is said to use the neighbouring threats of piracy and Islamist terrorism to maintain its neo-patrimonial system (Woodward, 2013) with resources from the French naval base, US Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa

and the presence of other EU countries and Japan, all soon to be joined also by China.²¹ While UAE was a key ally and investor in Djibouti's ports, relations have recently soured between the two when the port concession was put into question under allegations of corruption, by extension also potentially souring relations with UAE's (and until recently Djibouti's) ally Saudi Arabia.²² According to some, these relations lead the Arab League to engage with IGAD more frequently than the AU (El-Fassi and Meru, 2015).²³ The Arab League's relationship with Sudan in particular has been long and ambivalent, shifting from animosity during Hassan Al Turabi's reign in the Cold War to more normal yet tense diplomatic relations now, with some Arab League members having severe reservations about the right to self-determination in relation to the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Weber, 2010). In addition, IGAD has had talks on collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are members along with other Arab Persian Gulf states.

Also an Arab League member, Egypt has long expressed interest in joining IGAD and is politically, economically and geographically linked to IGAD countries through the Nile waters (Figure 2). While Egypt is thought to prefer a strong central Somali state to counterbalance Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn, the Yemen-related risks to shipping lanes mean that Egypt has almost no alternative to aligning with Ethiopia as the only regional power in East Africa with an effective army (von Lossow and Roll, 2015). This may be an important factor in understanding recent security relations, but also recent breakthroughs in economic relations relating to sharing the Nile waters, illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed further below.

Still looking beyond the IGAD region, IGAD also has Memoranda of Understanding with Turkey and India, reflecting their rising roles in world economic and political affairs and their interest in the region. Turkish companies in particular are reported as investing \$3bn in Ethiopia (of \$7bn to the continent as a whole) while their government recently announced plans to finance development of an industrial zone by Turkish investors in Djibouti.²⁴

²¹ The Combined Joint Task-force for the Horn of Africa or AfricaCom is "a "dynamic, operational United States Military headquarters countering violent extremist organisations in East Africa, helping to ensure the protection of the homeland, American citizens and American interests". <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/>. Its role includes drone-missions in the region e.g. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. In 2015 China announced plans to open a military base in the country, reportedly near the port of Obock <http://www.africa-confidential.com/index.aspx?pageid=7&articleid=11182>

²² See, for example here: Tesfa News, May 2015, Saudia Arabia Declares Djibouti FM Persona Non Grata, <http://www.tesfanews.net/saudi-arabia-declares-djibouti-fm-persona-non-grata/>

²³ For example, in March 1998, Egypt and the Arab League jointly hosted Somali reconciliation talks, which undermined the Ethiopia led Soderre peace process. IGAD called for an end to 'the proliferation of competing initiatives' (Healy, 2009). In 2006, on the other hand, the Arab League joined with the AU and IGAD to call for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and renewed dialogue in Somalia (Healy, 2009). El-Fassi and Meru (2015) cite sources stating that "IGAD receives funding for each activity the Arab League would like jointly coordinate with IGAD."

²⁴ <http://newbusinessethiopia.com/index.php/resources/10-governance/195/turkey-vow-to-serve-as-africa-s-voice-at-g20#sthash.jOpjYRes.dpuf>

Figure 2: The Nile River Basin, including IGAD countries and the wider region²⁵

While all this suggests that IGAD is seen as a legitimate partner for countries and regional organisations in the wider region, it nonetheless highlights the network of alliances with other countries and organisations in the region. These all affect national politics and, by extension, IGAD's agenda and the room for manoeuvre to implement it.

2.1.6. The influence of foundational factors

Overall, the foundational or structural factors point to the logic and optimism for regional integration based on common regional challenges, particularly in the physical environment. However, historical and structural factors relating to the region's economy and its location in the world also hinder member states in pursuing greater integration. Progress in the regional agenda then depends a lot on how institutions and actors operate within that context.

2.2. Institutional factors

The above foundational factors most clearly influence the institutional setup of IGAD as described in the Establishing Agreement, but also how its agenda is set and the degree of progress that can be made.

This section points to the expanding mandates and accompanying institutions in IGAD, suggesting that although IGAD has many of the formal trappings of a REC, 'it looks like a REC', in terms of *function*, it has limited ability to drive what integration is taking place. While partially related to capacity, Member State and

²⁵ Source: Water Balance: <http://waterbalance.org/water-development-options-and-management-of-the-eastern-nile/>

other actor interests also play an important role. While this suggests that IGAD is adapting to Member State interests rather than driving an agenda, this more 'informal' or 'ad-hoc' approach may be the most appropriate at present and provide a basis for more institutionalised regional integration in the future.

2.2.1. An expanding mandate

Expanding on IGADDs mandate to address drought and desertification, the current stated IGAD mission is to assist and complement the Member States' efforts to achieve, through increased cooperation: Food Security and environmental protection; Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs; Economic cooperation and integration; and IGAD Corporate development. This is in line with the African Union Commission strategy.

The Secretariat is made up of 4 Divisions corresponding to the four areas, and charged with implementing policies and programmes, designing new programmes and proposals, and implementing decisions of the Assembly and Council, with advice from the Committee of Ambassadors. The IGAD Establishing Agreement highlights the need to promote joint development strategies on a long list of topics aiming to: harmonise macroeconomic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; harmonise policies with regard to ... free movement of goods, services, and people; achieve regional food security and encourage and... collectively combat drought; develop...complementary infrastructure...; promote peace & stability in the sub-region; and promote ...the objectives of COMESA.²⁶

Within the IGAD Secretariat, heads of division are political appointments by Member States. Djibouti holds agriculture; Sudan economy; Uganda finance; Ethiopia peace and security; while the Executive Secretary is from Kenya and the Head of Planning is Somali (interviewee). Although political appointments are criticised by some, many interlocutors see this as a pragmatic means of ensuring member state ownership of IGAD and its institutional processes.

Figures vary on the actual number of IGAD staff. While there may be only forty-four permanent staff (Dersso, 2014) interviewees refer to 100 Secretariat staff and 400 IGAD staff overall including contract staff and those employed in the many IGAD-related organisations. Staff numbers are also said to have grown rapidly over recent years, partly reflecting IGAD's success in raising funding and rising to meet the challenge of its expanded mandate, it also points to the fragmented organisational structure, discussed further below, and the number of staff on temporary or consultancy-type contracts. This latter point may have important implications for institutional memory and the long-term development of IGAD as an effective organisation.

2.2.2. IGAD governance structures

Beyond the Secretariat, IGAD has built up a wide array of organisational structures and *fora* to address and implement its broad agenda. This formal institutional architecture includes the governing structures of IGAD but also a series of so-called Specialised Institutions, each hosted by a different IGAD member. All of these institutions have the potential to carry political weight in their respective thematic areas, prompting interest in which countries hold key roles and representatives in which institutions.


The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments stands out as the key IGAD body across thematic areas. It has a mandate to make policy, direct and control the functions of IGAD, set guidelines, monitor

²⁶ Based on these, the four pillars of the current IGAD strategy are as follows: Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment - To promote attainment of food security and sustainable management of the environment and natural resources; Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation and Integration and Social Development - To promote regional economic cooperation, integration and social development; Pillar 3: Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs - To promote good governance, peace and security, and to address humanitarian crises; Pillar 4. Corporate Development Services - To enhance the corporate capacity of IGAD to effectively deliver its mandate.

political issues related to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and appoint the Executive Secretary (IGAD, 1996).²⁷ it is supported by the Council of Ministers (of Foreign Affairs), Committee of Ambassadors and the IGAD Secretariat. While all have their specific roles and duties, decision-making power remains in the hands of national leaders through the Assembly. The IGAD Executive Secretary is a political appointment and is currently held by a Kenyan, seen as a way to balance Ethiopian chairmanship and domination of IGAD.

Figure 3: Organisation of IGAD²⁸

Figure 1. Organization of IGAD



Formally, chairmanship of the Assembly should rotate with each ordinary summit. However, with no ordinary summits since the 12th Ordinary Summit in Addis Ababa on 14th of June 2008, Ethiopia has chaired both the Heads of State Assembly and the Council of Ministers since then, leading Eritrea and other critics to charge that “IGAD has become a rubberstamp of Ethiopia” (Bereketeab, 2012).²⁹ Nonetheless, interviews suggest other member states including Sudan, as next intended chair, support

²⁷ Article 9 in IGAD, 1996, Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi.

²⁸ Dersso (2014).

²⁹ See, for example:

<http://www.tesfanews.net/ethiopia-refuses-to-abdicate-igad-chairmanship/#Db5dm1ofAMKdZVxp.99>

Ethiopia's extended chairmanship given its neutral role, particularly in Sudan-South Sudan disputes.³⁰ Further information on the formal IGAD institutions can be found in the Annex.

While the lack of Ordinary Summits is criticised, an example of where formal rules are not being followed, one of the cited strengths of IGAD is precisely its ability to organise Extraordinary Summits of Heads of State at short notice (Mahboub, Chatham House, 2014). This is arguably an important strength for a regional organisation in such a volatile region. Further, given that both the Assembly and Council of Ministers take decisions by consensus (and if not by ballot for the former, and by majority in the latter), this in principle avoids one country such as Ethiopia explicitly dominating procedures through veto, an alternative possibility.³¹ Nonetheless, this way of working is said by some to create difficulties and detachment from the work of the Secretariat in implementing its longer-term agenda.

In a parallel structure, four years after the decision to establish it an IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union was established in 2004.³² It aims to enhance cooperation and experience-sharing between parliaments among member states, with the implicit aim of further increasing country ownership over the IGAD agenda. Chaired by the Speaker of Sudan's National Assembly, the seat of the IGAD-IPU was established in Addis Ababa in 2007 with an Executive Council that has met every year since 2008. As Bereketeab (2012) notes, this has the potential to move IGAD "from an executive-centred organisation to a more balanced or legislative-tilted one", making IGAD "popularly based and a genuinely representative organisation". However, most agree that this remains a distant objective while current decision-making in IGAD rests on the discretion of the Assembly of Heads of State and the Council, with accountability to domestic political systems and paymasters and technical appointments (Bereketeab, 2012). The reasons for this seem likely to rest with Member State interests, discussed in the next section.

2.2.3. An array of Specialised Institutions

In addition to these governance structures, IGAD hosts numerous so-called Specialised Institutions and offices relating to its different mandates. According to the IGAD Establishment Agreement, "The Assembly may establish and locate any institution of the Authority in any Member State based on functional considerations and equitable distribution of activities of the Authority in the Member States".

This has led to at least fifteen different IGAD offices spread around Member States, with eight Specialised Institutions or offices shared between Ethiopia and Kenya.³³ Addis Ababa hosts five on security-related issues - the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP), the IGAD Somalia Peace and Reconciliation Facilitation Office, the Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan and a Technical Support Unit. Nairobi hosts climate and pastoral focused institutions - the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development (ICPALD), the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center (ICPAC) and a Resilience Analysis Unit. IGAD also has country offices in Sudan, and South Sudan, while Uganda hosts the IGAD Regional HIV and AIDS Partnership Programme (IRAPP) and the IGAD Sheikh Technical Veterinary School and Reference Centre. Djibouti hosts the IGAD Business Arbitration Center. While widely dispersed around the region, there is a clear concentration in Ethiopia on peace and security institutions, and climate and pastoral institutions in Kenya.

³⁰ 2016 is the end of this Chair's term. Sudan should be next but due to the ICC Bashir is unlikely to want to. Kenya-Ethiopia some of the collusion relates to Eritrea, Eritrea wanted to come back and persuaded Uganda and Kenya to do its bid for them; South Sudan would be "happy to become Chair"; Kenya is not a major contender for Chairmanship, they are only interested in stability. (Interview, December 2014).

³¹ The move to allow majority decisions in the Council came with the 1996 reforms as part of attempts to streamline decision-making (El-Affendi, 2009).

³² http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/news_archive/igad_meeting_nairobi.htm

³³ These are summarised in the Annex.

The proliferation of Member State proposals for Specialised Institutions and other offices is a growing concern to some, reflecting an “instruments approach rather than a systems approach” (Interview).³⁴ Member State proposals generally request IGAD to entirely fund these, while it has proven politically sensitive for the Executive Secretary and other member States to oppose proposals. The institutions have substantial autonomy that can undermine regional coordination but also lead to parallel fundraising from donors, leading to confusion, overlap and at least inefficiencies in the use of funds. The IGAD CEWARN was given as an example of one IGAD institution which essentially “has its own relationship with donors” (Interview).³⁵ Anecdotally, the Djibouti-based IGAD Secretariat headquarters is seen by some as isolated from the real action taking place in Addis Ababa and Nairobi. This has practical consequences for IGAD partners in determining where the main interlocutor is for which aspect of the IGAD agenda.

Other organisational challenges were raised in reports such as the 2011 audit by Ernst and Young, some of which remain reportedly relevant today. The report proposed improvements in the staff rules and regulation, restructuring of the IGAD divisions and also aligning IGAD to the other RECs particularly to EAC and COMESA. In a more recent report, structures were deemed “adequate” but arbitrary decisions by management were cited as a risk, often related to the weak internal audit systems that, while potentially due to weak capacity, might also easily be instrumentalised (PwC, 2014). Table 1 below highlights some of the principle gaps identified by PwC (2014) and potential “improvement opportunities”, several of which come back in the sectoral analysis presented later in this study.

Table 1: Gaps and opportunities

Key gaps/challenges	Improvement opportunities
Ineffective governance structures and oversight roles	Develop and implement a robust governance system delineating authorities and responsibilities
Improvement areas on documentation and communication of policies, procedures and manuals	Simplification, enforcement and effective training
Manual processes –e.g. program management within several divisions, maintenance of project information, payment processing, leave management	System acquisition and automation of core processes in line with the new processes
Duplication of roles across divisions and even within departments. For example, procurement.	Functional review in line with strategy to ensure a lean and efficient organisation
Insufficient number of qualified personnel in the various divisions who are not engaged by donor funded projects	Redesign the organisational structure in line with the functional requirements of the organisation
Lack of service-related performance metrics and service level agreements between core divisions and support departments	Implement a holistic performance management system that encompasses process performance and activity timelines.
Poor communication both vertically and horizontally	Develop and implement a communication plan within the organisation
Inadequate resources such as systems, tools and equipment	Align budgets to strategic plan to ensure that resources are allocated optimally

Source: PwC (2014).

³⁴ Donor interview, Addis Ababa.

³⁵ IGAD Liaison, Addis Ababa.

Despite the criticism that IGAD's institutional form is the outcome of political bargaining and trade-offs, several interviewees also point to this as an expression of ownership of regional agenda items. The balance between fragmentation and decentralisation is likely to relate to how they are financed, and how this affects actual implementation of programmes and projects. This is also likely to be a question of organisational and regional maturity, with greater integration and trust leading to more technocratic organisations through time.

2.2.4. IGAD non-governmental organisations

Beyond its governance and Specialised Institutions, the IGAD setup further makes room for non-governmental participation. The IGAD-NGO/CSOs Forum was formed at the 8th IGAD Assembly in Khartoum 2002 to “provide a framework for civil society consultation and cooperation with IGAD (IGAD-NGO/CSO, 2003)”, while there is also an IGAD Business Forum (IBF) and an IGAD Women and Peace Forum.³⁶ While these additional bodies aim at providing further accountability mechanisms and legitimacy to the IGAD project, in reality, many people do not see these as functioning effectively in engaging with the IGAD agenda beyond specific events and workshops.

Since its establishment more than a decade ago, the NGO/CSO Forum has failed to take off. According to one IGAD official cited by Meru and El-Fassi (2015) the CSOs Forum was ‘still-born’ when GIZ stopped providing funding, with little momentum or alternative sources of funding to carry on. Further, they point to the backlash from states to stifle what were seen as externally supported CSOs, for example in Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan, where states have often increased their oversight of CSOs and NGOs through membership selection criteria that heavily depend on state approval (Nukawora, 2011). This means that there is little real demand and pressure from CSOs and the private sector for IGAD or its member states to deliver on regional integration.

On this basis, IGAD is not short of governance structures but critics point to the lack of efficiency and independence of these, while several are essentially non-functional in promoting regional public goods as envisioned in the IGAD Establishing Agreement.

2.2.5. Revisiting the IGAD mandate

The breadth of IGAD's mandate raises questions about the demand for this broader agenda. Without instruments to enforce regional agreements or sanction member states, critics state that IGAD remains very weak. To address this, IGAD is currently working on a new strategy for 2016-2020 while an IGAD Treaty has been drafted and validated by legal experts of the Member states awaiting adoption by the Council of Ministers.³⁷

One of the aims of the draft Treaty is to transform the ‘implied mandates’ of IGAD into ‘expressed full-fledged’ authority to engage on its mandate areas (Meru and El-Fassi, 2015). The revised treaty is

³⁶ Statutes of the IGAD-NGO/CSO Forum, 2003; In 2002, a Consultative Meeting of IGAD/CSO's and NGO's Meeting held in Addis Ababa reached a decision to convene the first assembly of the CSOs Forum (Meru and El-Fassi, 2015). The IBF was launched in 2010 with a role of facilitating regional integration and the foreseen creation of an IGAD free trade area. The forum is an apex body of the national chambers of commerce and industries in the IGAD member states. The IBF is based in Kampala, Uganda, but is not yet a statutory organ of IGAD although the 2015 IGAD Business Forum in Djibouti recommended that this happen. The position of the IBF in Uganda is unclear due to difficulties in establishing a legal basis for the organisation.

³⁷ The initiative came from the Executive Secretary, with directions from the Council of Ministers in 2009 for IGAD to consult Member States on the need for an amendment to the establishment agreement. IGAD prepared a report that was validated in workshops held in Addis Ababa in 2010 and in Djibouti in 2011. The Committee of Ambassadors has approved it and the final draft is waiting for an ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers and Heads of State, although one has not been held since 2008.

presented by the IGAD secretariat as a review of the Agreement Establishing IGAD and in interviews was backed by the rationale that if the treaty is legal, then member states will *have* to implement. But as the following sections underline, much depends on the way that member states and other key actors and external factors interact around the regional agenda.

2.2.6. IGAD finance and budgeting

The way IGAD is financed has clear implications for its functioning. The average annual IGAD budget is reportedly around USD115 million, of which approximately only ten percent is raised from member state contributions. Half of this is spent on peace and security (Interviewee). While concrete information on member state contributions was not obtained, interviewees recount that Ethiopia is the best performer on making timely contributions, followed by Kenya. This then also gives Ethiopia additional leverage in agenda-setting and bargaining around regional strategies.

The remaining IGAD budget comes from development partners.³⁸ As such, IGAD member state contributions are said to cover salaries and recurrent costs, while donors cover projects. As cited above, IGAD also relies on donor-funded contracts to staff key functions within the current organisation structure.³⁹ That means that in practice much of the financial allocation is determined by external partners (as discussed in section 2.4).

On paper, the budget process is relatively straightforward. The IGAD Secretariat develops an annual action plan consolidating divisions and programmes and their projects with an estimated budget. They also indicate where sources are already identified so that projects are tagged with either existing multi-year funding or new solicited funding. The Executive Secretary submits the budgetary plans to the Committee of Ambassadors and Council of Ministers, who generally approve it without substantive change. Thus, despite the powers of approval of the budget being with the Council of Ministers, the financial planning and budget allocation powers are mostly in the hands of the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat. Although some donors express frustration with the budget approval process, PwC (2014) also confirms the above understanding.

2.2.7. The role of institutions

Analysing IGAD's institutional forms leaves an impression of donor-fuelled fast growth, with a rapidly expanding scope of activities, carried out through a range of different regional institutions dispersed widely throughout the region. Allied with somewhat weak administrative capacity, and taking account of the foundational factors discussed above, the challenge for IGAD is increasingly apparent. While some hope a new treaty will add legal weight to the IGAD construction, unless it can be aligned with the interests and incentives of member states and groups within them, the subject of the next section, it is not clear that such a top-down, formal approach will necessarily have additional traction.

2.3. Actors and agency

Promoting regional collaboration ultimately depends on the willingness or ability of member states to work with neighbouring countries in their pursuit. This is particularly so given the type of observation commonly made that IGAD is “an association of members with incompatible interests”, as the long-run conflicts attest.

³⁸ Source: Interviewee

³⁹ These include the procurement head, the system accountant and the Project Preparation and Management Unit (PPMU) officers. Due to limited numbers of personnel, there is reportedly inadequate segregation of duties amongst the major functions such as authorizing transactions, recording transactions, reconciling information and maintaining custody of assets.

While the thematic sections will go into the details of specific interest groups, this section summarises some of the key issues at a more general level. These include the fulfilling of (broadly defined) 'national interests' through overlapping membership of regional organisations, the importance of Ethiopia and its apparent preference for bilateral approaches, the related range of different political settlements among countries, as well as the cross-border ties between population groups and indeed between leading elites.

2.3.1. Overlapping memberships

As with most African countries, IGAD Member States are all members of at least one other REC. This may limit the ability of Member States to fully engage in the IGAD regional agenda given often limited administrative capacities, but also the different objectives they may seek through IGAD - the EC (2015) cites multiple and overlapping REC membership as a key constraining factor to greater regional integration. While problematic, understanding the rationale suggests the need to take this into account rather than to try and alter it.

Kenya and Uganda are both members of the EAC, which South Sudan and Somalia have applied to join, while Kenya is also a member of CEN-SAD, along with Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. All IGAD members except Somalia and South Sudan are also members of COMESA though Ethiopia has yet to accede to the COMESA Free Trade Area and Uganda is still in the process of implementation it (COMESA, 2015). Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia are also members of the 22-country Arab League with Eritrea an observer, while Sudan, South-Sudan, Uganda and Kenya are also members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

Regional organisations can serve different purposes for different states and may vary through time (e.g. Gathii, 2011). Although economic integration is a mandated area for IGAD, Kenya and Uganda favour the EAC for economic integration, with the EAC quite advanced among African RECs. The EC (2015), a key donor, even states that economic integration work in IGAD will build on what the EAC has already achieved. While Kenyan and Ugandan economic interests are rising in other IGAD countries, for example with the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor linking to Addis Ababa, discussed below, their key interest in IGAD membership is security - Kenya and Uganda are both engaged militarily in Somalia with Ethiopia and Djibouti while both are affected by South Sudan.

For non-EAC members of IGAD, COMESA is often seen as the trade REC, again ostensibly lowering the added value of IGAD in promoting regional markets and an IGAD FTA. The agreement establishing IGAD indeed states that IGAD will support the goal of COMESA integration. However, national interests may be harder to achieve through such a large configuration (see COMESA study), leading some countries, particularly Ethiopia, to maintain interest in IGAD's economic integration agenda which it can potentially also better align with its own development strategy - "why should Ethiopia have to listen to some small island state like Mauritius", one interviewee said. Other interviewees point to the fact that countries complain of having "no voice in COMESA", offsetting some of its benefits, but also potentially raising the attractiveness of addressing trade through IGAD.

While serving national interests, overlapping REC membership adds complexity to promoting regional integration or cooperation through one or another regional forum. This is particularly so with the expanding mandates of all RECs from previously narrower agendas. Allied with foundational factors of distrust among member states, as well as a degree of countries hedging bets through multiple RECs, much of what is taking place in IGAD is therefore based on bilateral relations, often with Ethiopia at the centre.

2.3.2. The centrality of Ethiopian interests

Looking across key IGAD member state interests and actions, Ethiopia is pivotal to IGAD policy choice and implementation. As the largest landlocked country in the world by population, bordering all other IGAD members except Uganda and representing approximately 40 percent of the IGAD region's population, Ethiopia's reliance on its neighbours for access to imports and exports implies it has much to gain and lose through regional integration progress.

The specific nature of Ethiopian federal politics and their 'developmental state' approach to government also affect their approach to regional economic and security cooperation, with power in the Ethiopian government highly centralised (Woodward, 2013). Since Meles, Ethiopian leaders and the leading party cast their vision of a Great Ethiopia in terms of "benign regional hegemony: What is good for Ethiopia is good for the Horn of Africa" (Verhoeven, 2015). This leads Ethiopia to project its influence through regional organisations on conflict prevention, deploying thousands of Ethiopian UN peacekeepers to the Abyei border region between Sudan and South Sudan; conflict management, hosting mediation efforts for the South Sudanese civil war; and combating terrorism, continual military action against Somalia's Al-Shabab. As seen above, it hosts the majority if not all of the IGAD security-related specialised institutions.

As further discussed below, plans are underway to tie the region to Ethiopia by exporting thousands of megawatts of electricity from dams on the Blue Nile and Ethiopian rivers. This would shift the regional balance of power away from Nairobi, Khartoum, and Cairo to Addis Ababa through economic interdependence, "but very much on Ethiopia's terms" (Verhoeven, 2015). At the same time, its security agenda aims to set itself apart from its troublesome neighbours through 'responsible international behaviour', (Verhoeven, 2011).

Nonetheless, there is deep scepticism about Ethiopia's interest in regional economic integration: "economic nationalism is a much stronger thread than regionalism and Ethiopia's main regional aspiration is to displace Kenya as the strongest IGAD economy" (Healy, 2011). By way of illustration, while Ethiopia is ostensibly building its role in the COMESA region, was a founding member of COMESA, recently took over chairmanship and hosted the most recent COMESA Heads of State Summit, it has yet to sign the FTA, with doubts about when and even whether it will. Makonnen and Lulie (2014) point in particular to studies suggesting joining the FTA would increase unemployment, undermining their national objectives, as discussed further below.

While some criticise the dominance of Ethiopia in the region, IGAD is not entirely at the mercy of Ethiopian policy. Ethiopia is arguably the most-affected by the regional instability and relies on IGAD legitimacy for resolving regional conflicts. In some respects it also needs IGAD to legitimise Ethiopian policy, for example on trade where it maintains IGAD as a potential vehicle for trade liberalisation rather than COMESA. This serves to underline the importance of regional powers, but also the political priorities within these.

2.3.3. Political settlements

Beyond Ethiopia's, IGAD's ability to act as a region is also affected by the diverse range of political settlements across other member states. Sudan and Eritrea are widely considered to be authoritarian and repressive while Uganda is described as a semi-authoritarian regime - "with the trappings of democracy but undermined by patronage, violence and repression for the sole purpose of remaining in power" (Tripp, 2010). "Somalia has almost no state to speak of while South Sudan has little experience of political parties or of state formation" (Woodward, 2013) and Ethiopia is criticised in some quarters for lacking popular legitimacy and its disregard for human rights.

The varying degrees of state fragility, legitimacy and acceptance are an endogenous part of the conflict system described above. Importantly for regional dynamics, El-Affendi (2009) suggests that non-democratic governments tend to be jealous of their sovereignty, reluctant to accept accountability to domestic constituencies, and to be even more suspicious of developing regional institutions that would constrain their freedom of action”.

IGAD is host to two of the three worst performing countries on governance in Africa - Eritrea and Somalia. While Kenya and Uganda rank reasonably well in the Ibrahim Index of Governance, at 17th and 19th, respectively, the remaining IGAD members score poorly, with Ethiopia 32nd, Djibouti 35th, Eritrea 50th and Somalia 52nd out of 52 countries. One Political Risk Map (AON, 2015) classifies Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan as ‘very high risk’, Ethiopia as ‘high-risk’ and the remaining Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti as ‘medium-high-risk’. This high political risk is a major challenge for IGAD structures to address, affecting the potential for addressing peace and security and promoting formal economic activity and regional integration and cooperation more broadly.

2.3.4. The ties that bind

Many of the economic and security dynamics in the region relate to shared identities across borders. These are underpinned by nomadic livelihoods and informal trade in livestock that have persevered despite the persistent conflict situation in the region, but which so far have remained largely outside formal regional processes. While this growing ‘invisible integration’ may be a source of empowerment and freedom from state control (Kibreab, 2012), and may offer a cross-border basis on which to build broader regional integration, it is also a source of vulnerability and marginalisation and can be instrumentalised to feed ongoing regional conflicts: the current South Sudan conflict has sent South Sudanese Nuer to join their Ethiopian brethren, altering the ethnic balance in Gambella and creating tensions there (e.g. Feyissa, 2014).⁴⁰ Although these informal cross-border relations are therefore a reality of regional relations, and suggest that regional economic integration is taking place, the challenge is for IGAD to somehow adapt its formal approach to these informal practices and groups of actors.

Similarly, the common history and backgrounds of IGAD political elites offer opportunities and challenges for regional institutions to build on. Several IGAD member state leaders come from security backgrounds, and have close personal relations (Interview). The common independence history and past allegiances offer some opportunities for trust that might be used for furthering regional integration. At the same time, it creates a focus on security issues and brings similar challenges of moving from liberation movement to government (e.g. Clapham, 2012). As Berhe (2014) summarises, change in the domestic politics of most member countries, improved relationship among member states, and the coming of a coalition of leaders pursuing an agenda for regional security cooperation supported by the favourable international support together brought the revitalization of IGAD.

2.3.5. The role of actors & interests

This section touches on only some of the broad forms in which actors and interests play out in the IGAD region, particularly in terms of country level interests in regional processes. The implication, further developed in the thematic sections, is that country level interests ultimately dominate the formal institutional mechanisms set up through IGAD.

⁴⁰ “The unhappy scenario that unfolded during the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war is a case in point. The Ethiopians of Eritrean extraction born and raised in Ethiopia and the Eritreans of Ethiopian origin that were fully integrated into the two countries were subjected not only to state control but also to arbitrary expulsion” (Kibreab, 2012). See also Scott, J.C., 2010 *The Art of Not Being Governed*.

2.4. External Factors

While the previous sections described the evolution and expansion of IGAD's mandate from drought to peace and security through a mixture of circumstances and donor support, "the suspicion has been that IGAD and regionalism have not been a necessary step for the regimes of the Horn so much as the fulfilment of an agenda encouraged from outside at several levels of the international community" (Woodward, 2013). Having started out relatively donor dependent, IGAD is and seems likely to remain so in the future, given the resource needs of its institutional frameworks and the difficulty in raising finance from Member States.

2.4.1. External partners

The average contribution of partner funding to IGAD over 2009-2012 was 27.5 percent from the EU institutions and 34.5 percent from EU member states. This then combines with 21 percent from the World Bank, and the remainder from USAID (8%), the UN (3%), the African Development Bank (1%), Canada (1%), Norway (1%) and 3 percent through the Joint Financing Arrangement (IRCC MTR, 2012), (Helly, D). To put this in perspective, the EU's Regional Indicative Programme for IGAD foresees EUR80m for IGAD over the period from 2014 to 2020 (compared to EUR85 each for COMESA and the EAC, EUR90m for SADC and EUR50m for the IOC).

This has implications for power relations between donors, IGAD Member Countries and IGAD governing institutions, as well as for agenda setting and the incentives created for the IGAD Secretariat. According to the EC's programming document for the region, "the greatest risk to the implementation of programmes designed to address the challenges described above is lack of financial support from IGAD member states" (EC, 2015).

Although considerable frustration is sometimes expressed regarding the coordination mechanisms in place between IGAD and donors, some external partners admitted in interviews that very little has in fact been done to coordinate among themselves. Anecdotally, this is not helped by the division in IGAD representatives around the Specialised Institutions, with few key meetings and personnel finally taking place in Djibouti, where IGAD-focused donor staff are based, but rather in Addis Ababa and Nairobi. Further, one might argue that more strategic steering by donors would further undermine the 'ownership' principle.

An IGAD Partners' Forum was set up for discussions with partner countries out of the "Friends of IGADD group" with 26 states and four international organizations in 1998. However, interviewees were unclear on when this had last met and precisely what impact it has on the day-to-day operations of the IGAD Secretariat, given its more political nature. There are also working groups around the key pillars of work of IGAD, with regular meetings during the year to discuss plans and execution, but critics feel that donors do not get a chance to get a full overview of activities and the links between different areas, while discussions focus on reporting rather than strategy.

Although not all donors are on-board, Joint Financial Arrangements (JFAs) are being set up around IGAD pillars with accompanying technical dialogues. JFAs are intended to partially overcome the reporting burden on IGAD to its partners and help improve dialogue for those partners willing to sign JFAs. But IGAD must still satisfy non-JFA donor reporting requirements, placing a heavy burden on IGAD systems. To take an example, the JFA for the implementation of the Institutional Strengthening Action Plan is financed by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden but represents only 3 percent of the budget. At the same time, other partners including the European Commission (EC), the Canadian development agency CIDA and the

World Bank contribute resources to implementation of the Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP) outside the JFA initiative and therefore with their own reporting requirements.⁴¹ The Secretariat is also in discussions with the World Bank to operate as intermediary for them to finance projects in Somalia, a new way of working that will bring additional specific requirements. IGAD Secretariat is currently in discussions with donors to have a unified reporting mechanism that will greatly simplify procedures if acceptable to all. At the same time, the Secretariat is reportedly far from passing the EC's seven pillar assessment.

Unlike other regional organisations such as the AU, IGAD reportedly overspends on projects and tries to move funding from one project to another, which has affected its relations with donors. While intended to provide a degree of greater flexibility and easier joint reporting, the JFAs also tie budgets to specific work areas, limiting the degree of freedom that the IGAD secretariat and its members have in re-allocating funds across different pillars where they deem fit - for example, funds aimed at peace and security could not be used for promoting economic integration. Interviewees also referred to some projects on governance issues that were unable to raise sufficient funding and that remained so-called 'donor orphans'.

2.4.2. The role of external partners

The role of external partners in IGAD's functioning is crucial. By financing the majority of the IGAD budget, partners have expectations about the way their money is spent, and accountability requirements to be met. Being unable to finance its activities through member contributions, there is therefore a tension between IGAD Member State ownership and implementation of the IGAD regional agenda, and that of the development partners, aspects that will come back in the sectoral case studies presented below and as illustrated in Box 1 below.

Box 1: IGAD, drought and agriculture - donor alignment?⁴²

While the bulk of this report is focused on IGAD's pillars of economic integration and peace and security, support to the third pillar of agriculture and environment also illustrates some of the risks of donor reliance.

Interlocutors express concern about IGAD's expanding mandate and the role of donors in maintaining coherence rather than promoting overlaps and overstretch. The case of IGAD's approaches to drought and agriculture through the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) and Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) illustrate how different strategies have emerged to address similar issues but according to different sets of interests and with different sets of donor funding attached. Further, they are areas where other EAC and COMESA also cooperate on similar topics with the same member countries, raising concerns about capacity to implement but also to coordinate such wide-ranging regional programmes in an efficient way.

The emergence of two agendas: IDDRSI and CAADP

Between 2010 and 2011, parts of the Horn of Africa experienced their worst droughts in history, leading Heads of State and Governments from IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) to come together to endorse a more preventative, regional and holistic approach towards ending drought emergencies in the region. A 2011 Summit gave birth to the IDDRSI and a number of related initiatives aimed at operationalizing the drought resilience agenda in the region's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL).⁴³ An IDDRSI Regional Platform was also established to coordinate and mobilise

⁴¹ More on Development partner areas and focus etc: <http://resilience.igad.int/index.php/about/partners> - joint financing arrangements and ISAP - Institutional Strengthening Action Plan.

⁴² This draws on de Weijer and Afun-Ogidan (2012).

⁴³ This includes the Common Programming Frameworks to guide national interventions, a Regional Programming Framework (RPF), and an IDDRSI Strategic Plan, all geared, in one way or the other, towards addressing regional aspects of the resilience effort.

resources around all the processes⁴⁴ while the IGAD Secretariat prepared a Regional Programming Paper based on consultation with member states, development partners and other stakeholders, including non-state actors.⁴⁵

Although the IGAD region is predominantly an ASAL area, in most countries, sedentary farming takes precedence in government policies, creating potential tensions with pastoralists, who are not always able to provide sufficient input into agricultural policy processes, while conflicts are often concentrated in ASAL zones. The IDDRSI is therefore seen by some as a somewhat ASAL-specific approach to food security, with many donors largely supportive of its goals and approach, as evidenced by their participation and funding of the different IDDRSI-related platforms and institutions.

At the same time, under the auspices of the African Union's NEPAD, the AUC is very clear about using CAADP as the flagship framework to ensure food security and build resilience of vulnerable populations to food crises. The CAADP priority areas in the IGAD Regional CAADP Compact are: (i) Sustainable use and management of natural resources; (ii) Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access; (iii) Increasing agricultural production and improving food security and nutrition; (iv) Support for institutional development and the harmonization of policies. Though not exactly the same, IDDRSI aims to think and work as a region to build resilience and sustainability against drought; align relief with long-term development; act in a preventive and holistic manner; invest in ASALs; with IGAD in the lead.⁴⁶ However, the second programme objective under IDDRSI relates to market access, with the objective to "enhance access to markets, financial services and trade as a precursor to IGAD free trade area (FTA) and common market."⁴⁷

Complementarities?

This then offers potential complementarities with other regions - to some, the IDDRSI is focused only on ASAL areas, while the CAADP covers all agro-ecological zones.⁴⁸ However, while the national level IDDRSI and CAADP compacts are one and the same for Somalia and Djibouti, there are questions on how to manage the overlaps at the regional level. This has important implications for external support to the IDDRSI Regional Platform and to CAADP. More broadly, while IDDRSI is seen by many as a priority of the donors with its focus on vulnerability, and CAADP is the AUC priority and seen as focusing on markets – interviewees raised the issue that this also varies across countries, with Uganda, for example, prominently including trade in its IDDRSI Country Programming Paper.

Further, the EAC and COMESA both have their own CAADP Compacts, creating overlaps – Ministry of Trade officials in Uganda explained how they were not involved in the IGAD CAADP Compact or IDDRSI process but *are* involved in the COMESA CAADP process. IGAD drought, water and agriculture issues are then coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the IDDRSI Focal Point is in the Office of the Prime Minister. While this may reflect the priority given to IDDRSI, it also highlights how the CAADP and IDDRSI, though on paper complementary, are separately dealt with within government while these intra-country relations with different RECs for similar initiatives clearly also increase the risk of overlap and duplication.

While these are still works in progress and still evolving, questions therefore remain about how to ensure their complementarity and maximise synergies among these related but different agendas under one regional IGAD

⁴⁴ The 3-tier platform comprising a General Assembly of all participating stakeholders, a 30-member Platform Steering Committee (PSC), and a Platform Coordinating Unit is in the process of being established http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/IGAD%20Platform%20for%20Drought%20Resilience%20and%20Sustainability.pdf

⁴⁵ <http://resilience.igadhost.com/index.php/programs-projects/rpp>

⁴⁶ http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/8.%20Partnerships%20to%20implement%20IDDRSI.pdf

⁴⁷ http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/8.%20Partnerships%20to%20implement%20IDDRSI.pdf

⁴⁸ [http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/IGAD%20Regional%20Platform_FSNWG%20\(16%20Feb%202012\).pdf](http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/IGAD%20Regional%20Platform_FSNWG%20(16%20Feb%202012).pdf)

umbrella. On this there is some scepticism. Largely as a result of donor engagement, Gibbons (2014) states that “All governments, donors and implementing agencies in the region have adopted ‘resilience-speak’ in their communications, and strategies “but wonders to what extent has this paradigm shift resulted in a change in practice. Further, there is a problem of the tension between being holistic and overlap, illustrated by recommendations to “Ensure that the resilience agenda is broadened outside of the food security and livelihood sectors to make sure it encompasses education, governance, voice, land rights.” (Gibbons, 2014).

There is broad agreement that IGAD is the right (and possibly only) REC that can adequately forge regional approaches to address ASAL specific issues but it is important to understand if this specialization is recognised and agreed among member states. Nonetheless, current capacity level of the Secretariat is very low, which makes it difficult to adequately coordinate and facilitate these multiple, overlapping processes, with the underlying concern of being the degree to which member states are committed or interested in ensuring a regional approach is implemented as opposed to simply fulfilling donor preferences.

2.5. Summary

The above analysis already provides some insights on the major actors and factors that have shaped, and continue to shape, the IGAD agenda and its implementation. The discussion of foundational factors, institutional mechanisms, actors and external factors all point to the array of different forces that both positively and negatively affect how IGAD can and does advance the regional agenda. While common challenges associated with the physical environment and landlocked countries underpin the logic of greater regional collaboration, and while this has been supported through large amounts of financial and other support for partners, the discussion of different national interests, particularly of Ethiopia, and the external influence on the origins and on-going development of IGAD point to a greater reliance on sub-regional approaches and *ad-hoc*, approaches to regionalisation than policy documents suggest.

These points are further discussed and developed in the following sections that delve into differences in how IGAD operates in different policy areas. In particular the next section examines IGAD’s role in peace and security, particularly in relation to South Sudan-Sudan dynamics, and Section 4 at IGAD’s role in promoting regional economic integration.

3. IGAD Peace & Security

This section analyses IGAD's involvement in the mediation in the Sudan conflict and between Sudan and South Sudan as a case study from IGAD's broad range of peace and security activities. It addresses the question, "what actors and factors affect the role of IGAD in the Sudan conflict and subsequent conflict in South Sudan". This includes the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the "hand-over" to the African Union-led High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement between Sudan and South Sudan and, briefly, IGAD mediation following the outbreak of violence in December 2013. Reference is also made to its peace and security architecture, mediation capacities and the Conflict Early Warning System (CEWARN).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 is regarded as one of the few bright notes in the region's recent history (e.g. Berhanu, 2013) and is one where IGAD is recognised for its important role. While IGAD successfully facilitated that process, followed by the referendum in southern Sudan and South Sudan independence in 2011, a number of issues were left unattended with the result that violent conflict broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. While a robust IGAD Peace and Security Architecture is not yet in place to deal with this, it is emerging.

Through reference to these examples, the section aims to help uncover who and what drives IGAD's peace and security agenda and its implementation. While limited to the Sudan process, that arguably faces different political-economic drivers and constraints to other regional conflicts such as Somalia, the findings are intended to be indicative of the dynamics that affect such regional dynamics. A number of key member states have been instrumental in the peace process, such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, yet for different reasons. External factors have also had an important role both on the circumstances and IGAD's ability to respond. The discussion highlights the positive role that IGAD can and has played as a forum for frank discussion and negotiation, but also points to the lack of regularity or institutionalisation of regional approaches to conflict mediation, a paradox given the existence of long-running conflicts in the region.

3.1. Foundational factors

As referred to above, a number of factors have framed the actions of IGAD in the area of peace and security in the region. These include its strategic geographic location, history of conflict in the region and strong cross-border ethnic ties (De Waal, 2015).

At the summit in Djibouti in November 1996 to launch the new 'revitalized' IGAD, the leaders affirmed that 'Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs are the sub-region's top priority.' (El-Affendi, 2009). Further, the short-lived peace that had existed between IGAD(D) member states was collapsing by the late 1990s, with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda identifying Sudan as a threat due to its increasingly expansionist Islamist policy through support to armed groups in the region. From 1994 onwards, Sudan started providing support to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad against Afewerki's government, as well as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), while Uganda in return supported the SPLA/M (Murithi, 2009). The 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea war then added to the conflagration.

A foundational aspect of IGAD's role in the Sudan CPA relates to external actors' reaction to these circumstances. After putting Sudan on the list of countries supporting terrorism in 1993, the US gave strong support to regional and international measures against Sudan, and stepped up military support to the three neighbouring countries opposed to Sudan (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda). In 1997, the three countries supported an all out offensive on three fronts in an attempt to overthrow the regime, with the US imposing

unilateral economic and diplomatic sanctions against Sudan later that year. An Egyptian-Libyan 1999 initiative for peace in Sudan was undermined and ended by US diplomacy with Egypt (Woodward, 2013) while the conflict in Darfur and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency against Uganda's government, enmeshed within Sudan's civil war, bringing ever greater urgency to the need to contain the conflict system.

External conditions also changed, altering the balance of interests within the region. "Following 9/11 the [Sudanese] government was more fearful of the United States and possible action against it as part of the 'war on terror'" (Woodward, 2013). The government therefore responded positively when the new US administration of George W. Bush, who had personal sympathy for the war-torn South, appointed former Senator John Danforth as his special representative to Sudan. This wider internationalization of the IGAD efforts, with the United States joined by Britain and Norway in what became known as the Troika, was to be an important dimension to IGAD's role in achieving temporary peace, coinciding with the period when IGAD was re-emerging under its new guise and at its strongest on peace and security issues

3.2. Institutions

3.2.1. IGAD's Peace & Security institutions

The IGAD Peace and Security institutional setup illustrates the wide scope of organisations set up in this area, also underlining the potential challenges for coordination of regional approaches. The Peace and Security Division of the IGAD Secretariat oversees governance and humanitarian affairs, the Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution and Mediation programme, which manages the Somalia and Sudan Peace processes. It also oversees the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and until 2007, the coordination of the East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). The new emerging IGAD Peace and Security architecture includes, amongst others, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) (replacing the IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism - ICPAT), Conflict Early Warning Response Units, and a Mediation Support Unit as well as various Liaison Offices, including in Juba and Khartoum. Even within the peace and security sector then, there is a proliferation of organisations and offices which in addition, are physically spread out over the region, raising the challenge of coherent regional implementation of the agenda, even when desired.

An IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (2010-2014) was drafted and proposed in December 2010 but never adopted by IGAD Heads of State and Government. The ambition of the IPSS was to rectify many of the institutional weaknesses of IGAD's Peace and Security Agenda and envisaged to develop an IGAD peace and security agenda that is "in alignment with that of the APSA, including early warning and Panel of the Wise" (Dersso, 2014).

While the bulk of IGAD finance is dedicated to mediation and peace and security issues, IGAD has not fully implemented provisions of its 1996 Agreement. These stipulated the creation of mechanisms "for the prevention, management, and resolution of inter-and intra-state conflicts" (Dersso, 2014). Firstly, IGAD has no body comparable to that of the AU Peace and Security Council to take decisions on peace and security matters in the region, and no indication that it will have any similar structure. In practice, this responsibility is undertaken by the IGAD Summit (Assembly of Heads of State and Government) with support from the Council of Ministers. While this reliance on Heads of State may appear cumbersome, there is a certain shared belief among IGAD proponents that "At the political level, regular summits create trust, and personal relationships ... are said to be good" (Verhoeven, 2011). This relates back to the country-level interests discussed in the previous section and is an important theme running through discussions of IGAD's approach to peace and security in the region, with interviewees pointing to the fact that both

Mengistu and Biarre, and Meles and Isaias were able to meet and talk through IGAD even when their countries were at war (Interviewee).

Particularly important for the CPA was also the coordination with the international community through the IGAD Partners Forum. This emerged from the international donor group of 'the Friends of IGADD' set up in 1995 "at the behest of the Netherlands pledging support for IGADD's peacemaking and development role in the region" (Al-Affendi, 2009). This combination is thought to have been extremely important to identify the key issues at the core of the conflict. By linking with the international community this could also bring to bear the necessary political and technical resources, including international pressure, specifically that of the USA, to encourage the SPLM/A and Government of Sudan to make the needed concessions.

3.2.2. A REC for overcoming distrust?

The CPA process illustrates a pragmatic rather than formalistic approach to regional peace mediation. In 1993 an IGADD Standing Committee on Peace in Sudan was established, chaired by then Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi with the presidents of Ethiopia (Meles Zenawi), Eritrea (Issaias Afewerki) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni). This initiative emerged from a proposal from Ethiopia and Eritrea for IGADD to replace Uganda in mediating the Sudanese conflict as a more neutral partner - this was on the realisation that security cooperation could not proceed smoothly with such a major conflict occurring just next door in Sudan (El-Affendi, 2009). This was the basis for extending IGADD's mandate to incorporate peace and security under the new IGAD in 1996.

The committee began talks in 1994 and quickly agreed on the Declaration of Principles (DOP), a key document in the Sudan peace negotiations. This was accepted by the SPLM/A but not by the Government of Sudan. The Sudanese government rejected the issues of self-determination and religious orientation in the DOP and subsequently demanded that Eritrea and Uganda withdraw from the IGAD Standing Committee, as Khartoum suspected they would lean towards the SPLM/A (Murithi, 2009). In an attempt to revamp the peace talks, the Sub-Ministerial Committee on Conflict in Sudan was established in 1999, again by Kenya, who had remained relatively neutral in the conflict. This Committee established a Permanent Secretariat for the IGAD Peace Process in the Sudan based in Nairobi, under the tutelage of the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This had a mandate 'to carry out continuous and sustained mediation efforts with view to arrive at a peaceful resolution of the conflict' by Special Envoy Ambassador Daniel Mboya (Young, 2007). Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda were permitted to send peace Ambassadors, which in practice meant their ambassadors to Kenya served as envoys.

Although they provided the link between the region and the peace process, the ambassador envoys were not accountable to IGAD. Some were loyal to the Secretariat but did not work at or for the Secretariat, remaining responsible at all times to their governments and with tense relations (Young, 2007). This complicated the mediation and already begins to reflect a later regular occurrence of regional but *ad hoc* approaches with unclear relations to the IGAD Secretariat.

3.2.3. A neutral forum

While the conflicts and tensions of the late 1990s led to growing mistrust among countries and their ambassadors, the neutrality of the IGAD Secretariat began to be seen as a clear benefit and relations with the Secretariat were generally good (Young, 2007). As remarked above, President Bashir also sought assistance to begin a peace process to pre-empt any UN initiative or more US involvement, particularly given the precedent of US military involvement in Somalia. The overthrow of Mengistu in the mid-1990s had also already given the Sudanese government hope for better relations with the new Ethiopian

governments. Sudan therefore requested IGAD to assist in its peace process, viewing IGAD as the only vehicle that could prevent external actors from infringing on its internal affairs (Adar, 2000).

Further, Sudan wanted to counterbalance Eritrea and Ethiopia, and assumed Uganda would continue to support the SPLM/A. Kenya thus became the obvious regional candidate to lead the process. Djibouti was not a member of the Peace Committee. Kenya had strongest links and influence with the UK and US while its officials had less knowledge of the conflict than Ethiopian and Eritrean counterparts. Nonetheless, it was seen as a neutral player guiding a neutral platform. Further, it was an African initiative, and the only group the SPLM would accept (Young, 2007). By neutralising potentially strong outside influence and balancing interests within the region, IGAD therefore succeeded in bringing the two parties together to negotiate towards the CPA.

3.2.4. Adaptive regional approaches

In this context, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between Khartoum and SPLM/A was not as comprehensive as it was portrayed. On the contrary, it was so narrow that it marginalised other ongoing conflicts in eastern Sudan, Darfur, Nuba Mountain and Kordofan, further aggravating those situations (Bartrop, 2011; ICG, 2011 - both cited in Bereketiab, 2013). This limited definition of peace, focusing solely on the north-south dimension of conflict excluded other political parties and civil society, treating media as a threat to the process, and leaving the fate of the process to SPLM/A leader Garang and First VP Ali Osman Taha. The agreement was therefore basically an agreement based on the lowest common denominator of the parties (Young, 2007).⁴⁹

Nonetheless, IGAD showed persistence in its wish to actively monitor the implementation of the CPA. In March 2010 it called a special meeting in Nairobi to discuss the upcoming elections and “various problems that were occurring” (Woodward, 2013), encouraged in this by the new South Sudanese Government which had put considerable store by IGAD thanks to its role in the CPA. After the referendum, the AU High Level Implementation Panel with former president Thabo Mbeki at its head (assisted by former president of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya and General Abdulsalami Abubakar; none of them IGAD presidents) was charged with further engaging with both partners to implement the CPA (Interview).⁵⁰

This change in roles as the process continued is interesting in illustrating the adaptability of the current IGAD organisational setup. In other words, the lack of institutionalization of IGAD and the high level of decentralization, allows regional leaders to develop relatively ad-hoc mechanism and solutions depending on the context and in line with their mandate. Whereas IGAD was able to engage when Sudan was one country, once it became a case of mediation it appears that the AU was charged with the task, therefore at a higher level and “able to bypass the regional powerplays” (interviewee). This change of roles may

⁴⁹ The Sudan is also mired in intra-state conflicts in the eastern, western and northern parts of the country (Ahmed 2010: 4). In the East, the Beja people live with the reality of remaining at the margins of central power - until the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) following the Asmara Agreement in October 2006, the Beja Congress, with the help of SPLM/A, carried out several operations in eastern Sudan. The ESPA allowed the Eastern Front to join the Government of National Unity as a junior partner. Low-intensity conflicts against the North intermittently emerge in many other regions too. These include the Southern Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Nubia which complicates the picture. These conflicts gained momentum following the independence of the South in July 2011. Even historically the South was never properly integrated and the colonial and post-colonial state of Sudan facilitated the realization of the notion of separate statehood. The British ruled the South as part of their East African colonies and they had plans to merge the South with Uganda (El Mahdi 1965; Johnson 2003; Deng 2010).

⁵⁰ The AU High level Implementation Panel originates from the AU Panel on Darfur (see also below) which was established when the problems in Darfur became bigger. Following the June 2011 elections conflicts in Abyei, the AU mediated to set up a Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), facilitating separated discussions on Abyei. At this point, the AU PSC also decided higher level engaged was needed to deal with this (Interview Biotshoko Mokgatthe, AJOC facilitator, December 2014).

nonetheless have suited IGAD in terms of not appearing too close to South Sudan. This again highlights the pragmatism at play and the degree of flexibility in a volatile context.

Box 2: IGAD vs ECOWAS - Similar but not the same

It is insightful to compare the peace and security roles of IGAD and ECOWAS. Both RECs were in place before the establishment of the African Union and the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2002. Both had already carved out important peace and security roles in their respective regions, though with vastly different characteristics and institutional set ups. The APSA is envisaged to integrate as much as possible with 'similar structures' in the RECs. But given the considerable differences between the various RECs, this has proven difficult.

ECOWAS' role in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau is well documented, and many of ECOWAS' peace and security policies and mechanisms were elaborated in the 1990s. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was defined by the initial Protocol of December 1999 (later complemented and amended by the Supplementary Protocol of 2001), and enabled ECOWAS to legitimise and further structure its interventions in emerging or existing political crisis in Member States. As the 2010 APSA Assessment writes: "West Africa, perhaps more than any other region, has one of the most robust and proactive decision-making organs, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). It has taken very intrusive and binding decisions including the deployment of peace operations to Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia in 2003, and has suspended several of its members from its Council for failing to comply with its norms."

IGAD is structured upon a vastly different institutional set-up, with a more inter-governmental and less intrusive approach than ECOWAS. Again the 2010 APSA Assessment writes: "IGAD does not have an equivalent of the PSC that is distinct from its overall political organs: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the Council of Ministers, and there are no plans to constitute one in the near future. Moreover, it does not have the equivalent of the MSC, but an *ad hoc* panel of Chiefs of Defence Staff has been convened to provide advice on military issues such as its planned peace operation for Somalia which never materialized." IGAD is currently reviewing its mandate, but the process is proving slow to implement. (Sources: Gilles Yabi (2010), African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study.)

3.2.5. A multitude of actors and processes

While IGAD had driven the CPA mediation process, the AU has been leading the monitoring of the implementation of the post-secession agreements signed in 2012 following the secession of South Sudan in January 2011, through the AUHIP. The origins of the AUHIP are the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) foreseen in the CPA: made up of the Troika (US, UK and Norway), the AU High Representative, the UN Special Envoy occasionally (but mostly send UN DPA directors), Ethiopia, and the Arab League (later on). The AEC was composed of ambassadors. While intended to have leverage, it did not have sufficient authority, and had no means after investigating a breach to ensure the guilty party would act. The AEC should have reported to IGAD, but no provision in the CPA suggests this. In this case the lack of authority to punish guilty parties or report to IGAD or another international body was reportedly due to the decision of Garang and Ali Osman (Young, 2007). So the problem of the AEC was that despite its good intentions, it was at the level of ambassadors and "presidents do not want to be told by ambassadors.

So the mandate watered down, became a mandate without authority, requiring a higher level with a AU Panel on Darfur” (Interview Biotshoko Mokgatlhe, AJOC facilitator, December 2014).⁵¹

The AU Panel on Darfur later morphed into the AU High-level Implementation Panel in 2010 (Interview). The AUHIP therefore took over the lead to follow up on CPA provisions, and has been limited to intra-Sudan issues with regards to contested territories. This attempted to host discussions with the South Sudan and Sudan governments to bridge gaps in the implementation of the CPA.

But the IGAD-led process for South Sudan and AUHIP-led process for Sudan-South Sudan were deliberately kept separate, with the AUHIP an offshoot of the CPA to deal with contested border areas. The AUHIP therefore focused on border issues, oil, administrative issues, pension, and security arrangements. While on paper the same panel is dealing with South Sudan (internal) – Sudan (internal) – Sudan/South Sudan issues, in reality there is no communication between the AU panel and IGAD. Mbeki was accused of bias towards Sudan following a number of obstacles during negotiations about wealth-sharing agreements and kept at a distance from the South Sudan internal process due to a loss of credibility (Interview).

There was widespread annoyance that the Sudan IGAD secretariat was shut down after the signing of the CPA. Donors expressed willingness to continue financing the body as a means of monitoring the implementation of the agreement but the decision was made by the Government of Kenya to end the affairs of the office. In the absence of any provision in the CPA for the role of Secretariat in a post-CPA era, it was not clear how it could or should continue. This suggests either insufficient consideration was given to the matter, or that there was strong opposition to any continuing role for IGAD in peace process (Young, 2007).

3.2.6. 'Things fall apart'

Following the outbreak of violent conflict in December 2013, IGAD established a team of mediators, with members from Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya, “operating under the umbrella of IGAD” (interviewee). At the start of 2015 however, despite a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH) signed in January 2014, a peace agreement between the Government of South Sudan and the opposition parties (including SPLM/iO of Riek Machar) still lingers on due to the failure of both parties to agree to a power-sharing deal and reform of the South Sudanese state. In December 2014, the African Union initiated the establishment of an AU High-level Ad Hoc Committee to bolster the IGAD-led mediation.

There have therefore been multiple, overlapping and at times contradictory processes. These include the IGAD Mediation, the AU Heads of State committee, the Tanzanian led process to re-unite the competing factions of the SPLM, Chinese hosted meetings with the SPLM/iO in Sudan, a sidebar Kenyan effort, and dialogue between the Ugandans and the parties in Kampala, among other *ad hoc* initiatives. In addition, Qatar has been a major actor in the Darfur peace process. The AU Commission of Inquiry (investigating atrocities committed by both sides) was expected to be acted upon at the AU Heads of State summit in late January 2015.

⁵¹ The AU Panel on Darfur (AUPD) initially formed in 2008, presented its 2010 Darfur Report to the PSC, morphed in 2010 in AUHIP: former president Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), General Abdulsalami Abubaker (Nigeria) and P. Buyoya (Burundi); AUPD composed of officials from the region: Ethiopia, Egypt, was quite a team. When names were brought/recommended to Mbeki, answer: “I need other people, choose my own team”. Mbeki not a military man, but knew he was entering into military/security issues; so chose General Abubaker (Nigeria) as a military man; Pierre Buyoya had come to power through coup himself (Interview Biotshoko Mokgatlhe, AJOC facilitator, December 2014)

While under the umbrella of IGAD, these processes have not been operating under a united regional strategy, IGAD has not taken a visible lead in marshalling different actors behind a defined strategy, creating space for the proliferation of processes. The absence of IGAD leadership has allowed international pressure to take a stronger role, and also allow for forum shopping among the different initiatives (ICG, 2015). In March 2015, IGAD mediators proposed to enhance the mediation effort to a so-called IGAD Plus formula, which would include five countries from the region, the UN, the AU and the Troika. As such, the role and effectiveness of IGAD in its role in peace and security continues to fluctuate.

3.2.7. AU-IGAD relations

As the above discussions highlight, the AU and IGAD are both operating in the same territory. IGAD is one of the building blocks of the African Peace and Security while most IGAD member states form part of the East African Standby Force, one of the five regional brigades of the African Standby Force.

But the interplay between IGAD and the AU goes beyond the APSA. According to most, IGAD has a very close and complementary relationship to the AU. They understand each other very well, partly as a result of physical proximity, and in particular jointly collaborate on AMISOM (Africa Union Mission in Somalia) and UNAMID United Nations- African Union Mission in Darfur. The swift establishment of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, deployment of AMISOM, and the sanctions on Eritrea, mediation and potential sanctions on South Sudan, the postponement of the release of the Report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan all came as result of the close cooperation (coordination and in some cases collaboration) between IGAD and AU organs. An important element is the membership of Ethiopia of the AU Peace and Security Council, which is congruent with the country's leadership on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, further discussed below.

Box 3: Integration of IGAD in the African Peace and Security Architecture

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is envisaged to be built upon the five regions as 'building blocks' of the continental structure. The five regions (North Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, South Africa and East Africa) do not overlap with the eight Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs). From the outset, the overlapping membership of several countries in different RECs, crossing over several regions have given rise to concerns of the lack of horizontal and vertical integration of the AU and the RECs/RM's peace and security mechanisms. There are notable differences between the different RECs and RM's, let alone between the AU and the different RECs and RMs.

With regards to IGAD, the 2010 APSA Assessment notes that "IGAD does not have an equivalent of the PSC that is distinct from its overall political organs: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the Council of Ministers, and there are no plans to constitute one in the near future." IGAD's peace and security architecture indeed looks considerably different from the AU. But according to IGAD officials this is not a problem and the question arises whether institutional isomorphism would lead to more effective solutions to long-running regional tensions. "The differences in sé are not a problem, as they are the result of institutional development in a distinct political and historical context." (Interviewee) Perhaps a disaggregated assessment is needed to assess progress with regards to peace and security and the more "indirect" contribution of IGAD member states to the operationalization of the APSA, as noted by the 2013 Assessment of the African Standby Forces. Nevertheless, IGAD has made efforts to establish similar structures, including a Council of Elders, as an East African Panel of the Wise.

As a result of overlapping membership, the East African Standby Force (EASF), which allows to incorporate both member states from the East African Community and IGAD. Currently, the EASF draws its membership from 10 active Member States including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, which are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (MoU). South Sudan is expected to join soon. As a result of overlapping membership, and in similar

vein to the decentralised nature of IGAD, offices and support elements of the East Africa Standby Force are spread across the region. While Ethiopia as the perceived regional hegemon, Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda are all active members of East African Standby Force. CEWARN is said to have inspired the AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and is widely praised alongside with ECOWARN in West Africa. Information sharing remains challenging across the continent, with lack of intelligence sharing mechanisms and issues of sovereignty, including between the AU and IGAD (Interviewee)

The overlapping membership means that integration of IGAD (and by extension EAC members in the field of peace and security) will never be straightforward. The physical proximity however IGAD to the African Union institutions has enhanced coordination and understanding between both organisations though the relationship is not free from tensions. IGAD's pivotal state, Ethiopia, hosts the African Union headquarters and has been chairing IGAD since 2008. Burundi, Ethiopia, and Uganda have all been significant contributing countries to the AU mission in Somalia. Indeed, the 2013 African Standby Force assessment indicated in a notable increase in African peace operation capacity since the launch of the ASF project. Inevitably, this enhanced capacity of EASF participating countries and IGAD member states contributes to the further operationalization of the APSA. (Sources: Assessment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (2010); Assessment of the African Standby Force (2013), The Interrelationship between the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Global Peace and Security Architecture and regional Initiatives (2013))

When war broke out in South Sudan in 2013 the speed of IGAD's response and frequency of IGAD Heads of State summits were testimony to the war's regional importance (ICG 2015). This is partly due to the immediate effects felt by neighbouring countries in contrast to the other AU Member States so "it makes logically perfect sense to keep the RECs as a first response mechanism" (Interview).

These elements relate to the wider discussion of subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs, which are especially pertinent in the field of peace and security. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation in the area of peace and security was signed between the AU, RECs and the Regional Coordinating Mechanisms (RM's) of Northern Africa in January 2008, outlining the principles of cooperation. While some argue that the issue of subsidiarity for peace and security as conceptualised in the UN Chapter VIII is directly translated within the AU system, others argue that the question of subsidiarity has not been settled, and struggles over leadership have at times led to clashes between RECs and the AU, as for example in Mali. "We have not developed a clear understanding of the modalities of subsidiarity. The AU wanted IGAD to lead [in South Sudan]. In Mali [however] ECOWAS wanted to lead, but the AU was only one who could bring together all Mali's neighbours, such as Libya, Chad and Mauritania... the PSC will have to address this." (Interview).

Other interlocutors put it in terms of competition: "The AU PSC sees itself as the guarantor for peace and security; look at neighbourhood as their private issues and there is always "war" between Addis and the respective capitals" (Interview). The AU itself has underlined that even between the AU and the UN no there is no consensus on subsidiarity (African Union, 2012). "When [that] response becomes ineffective, then we need to go back to the table to avoid countries becoming part of the problem instead of part of the solution." (Interview). In that respect, RECs in some cases are the only one able to respond rapidly. However, this raises questions regarding the effectiveness of that response when economic, political and security interlinkages cannot be distinguished (Interview).

In the case of Sudan and South Sudan, the picture is more complex and indicates a pragmatic approach., void of permanent institutionalisation. While IGAD negotiated the CPA, it has been the AUHIP which has been given the responsibility to oversee the implementation of the CPA (while at the same time engaging in mediation efforts in Darfur). In the case of South Sudan, IGAD led the mediation efforts following the

outbreak of outbreak of violence in December 2013. IGAD established the Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan who reported directly to the Heads of States, with a process so centralised that thematic committees were not empowered. This also meant that Uganda was only “seriously engaged at the Heads of State level”. This “weakened the envoys ability to convince the warring parties that they represented the whole region and enabled Uganda to avoid more constructive participation in the mediation” and also meant that when the mediation efforts stalled and relations became strained, warring parties were inclined to go directly to a head of state, undermining IGAD to take “institutional positions” (ICG, 2015) In December 2013, “the PSC decided that IGAD would take the lead to ensure complementarity in the case of South Sudan” (Interview). Through 2014, the AU publicly supported the efforts by IGAD mediators and continued to take a more supportive role. In December 2014, the PSC decided to enhance and scale up its support to IGAD and its mediation efforts, including consultations with the region’s leaders on the urgent establishment of a AU High Level Ad-hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government from the five regions of the continent. Clear terms of reference still need to be drafted, High-Level Ad Hoc Committee still needs to be operationalised (ISS, 2015; PSC Communiqué).

The AU has also established a Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan to investigate human rights violations in the country. Arguably, this could never have been done by IGAD itself, given the implication of certain IGAD member states in these violations, including Uganda’s troops. The publication of the report was postponed at the request of IGAD to allow peace talks a chance in January 2015. There is an important interplay between IGAD and the AU, which centres upon the membership of IGAD member states in the AU Peace and Security Council. This suggests that certain messages are directly addressed in the PSC without IGAD filtering. It is no secret that Ethiopia, long-time member of the PSC, has deplored Uganda’s unilateral military actions as an obstruction to peace in South Sudan. Given the long-standing animosities in the region and the slow progress to date, experts have noted that the AU has a growing role to play, in coordinating African support for IGAD and the possibility to directly engage regional Heads of State through their High Representative Konaré (ICG, 2015)

Donors have remarked that “the AU cannot do everything, and it will need some years to address all aspects of APSA from the political and technical level.[...] For a balanced development of APSA, RECs are building blocks” (Interviewee). Donors have noted the problem of REC absorption capacity, and the lack of formal relations with RECs in Addis (Interview) though as mentioned, IGAD is perhaps better placed than most RECs in relation to the AU. These are pertinent as the EU and other donors envisage investing a lot more in regional capacities for peace and security. For IGAD, the EU foresees budgetary support of EUR 40 million which is ten-times its current member contributions (Interviewee).

3.2.8. IGAD institutions in the Sudan-South Sudan peace process

In sum, while mechanisms were often formalised with a clear mandate and objective, these have been forced to adjust, retract or expand their activities depending on the interplay between national interests, emerging conflicts and external factors. The role played by the Au High Level Panel is a key example of the institutional flexibility AU and IGAD mechanism have need to adopt to remain effective or legitimate. Nonetheless, it is apparent that IGAD struggles to drive the regional agenda and essentially must adapt to national interests, further raising the complexity of its role in a situation of limited capacity.

3.3. Actors and interests

The regional structures for peace and security clearly only work to the degree that there is a shared security concern requiring coordinated cooperation among the states in that region (e.g. Berhe, 2014). That is, regional cooperation on security in the Horn depends on whether or not the national security interests

Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda align or overlap. While since the 1990s East Africa has developed what many consider to be an impressive security architecture, the region's security institutions may suffer from too much nationalism and self-interest (e.g. Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013), with implications for how IGAD institutions operate in practice. Interestingly, several IGAD member states are major contributors to both AU and UN peacekeeping missions, with Ethiopia the largest African contributor in Africa to UN peacekeeping operations, while Kenya and Uganda have major troop participation in both.⁵² This is again testimony to the huge capacity and potential within each MS that has not been translated into institutional regional capacity (Interview, December 2014).

3.3.1. 'National interests' and overlapping RECs

Importantly, IGAD is not the only peace and security organisation operating in the region. At least for Kenya and Uganda, IGAD is accompanied by the security role played by the East African Community (EAC) and the East African Standby Force, formed in 2004. While the EAC focuses primarily on economic cooperation, according to Jacobsen and Nordby (2013) the APSA allowed both IGAD and the EAC to expand their security ambitions, leading to overlap and competition, for example in the area of early warning systems.

Box 4: CEWARN: much praise, yet limited scope

IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2002 as a platform for regional cooperation on conflict prevention and mitigation through data collection and early warning and response, with Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERU's) located in each country. In the pilot phase between 2002 and 2006, CEWARN's original mandate focused on pastoralist conflicts, including the Karamoja cluster (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan border) and expanding to the Somali cluster (Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya); and included the establishment of a secretariat office in Addis Ababa. The 2006-2011 Strategy expanded the mechanism to cover all IGAD Member States. This was followed by the current CEWARN strategy 2012-2019, which shifts focus to a broader range of thematic issues and geographic areas, following two months of fieldwork and in-depth consultations in the Member States.

A recent Saferworld report found that the system lacked sustainable funding, and that field monitors were inadequately remunerated. Their number and geographical spread was equally inadequate in light of the 2012-2019 Strategy, and has prevented solid data collection on the expanded number of themes. Capacity and resources constraints are a reality. The Saferworld report also noted lack of neutrality among field monitors in some cases. CEWARN was found to play an important role in highlighting regional issues, monitoring the work of CEWERU's and bringing together differing states and stakeholders. However, according to Saferworld, CEWARN could play a greater role in maximizing the impact of these initiatives and mobilise higher-level political actors. Finally, CEWARN remains heavily reliant on donor funds.

In a similar way seen across IGAD's disaggregate institutionalization process; CEWARN seems to face political and institutional obstacles in order to realise its expanding geographic and thematic scope. While there have been successes in certain smaller pastoralist conflicts, CEWARN has been largely absent from bigger conflicts, including the most recent conflict in South Sudan.

Instead of relying on the existing CEWERU mechanism, IGAD Envoys decided to establish a separate mechanism with peace agreement monitors as part of the January 2014 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The resources are absent, but sovereignty issues are also at play. IGAD is referred to as an "awkward animal" (Interview [with Moses Okello, CEWARN Secretariat,] Addis, December 2014), with a regional mandate, a separate protocol (2002) and a rigorously layered set-up, with CEWERU's (field monitors) reporting weekly to National Research Institutes (NRI's) who pass it on

⁵² <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>

to CEWARN, followed by a technical, later ambassadorial level meeting, before it reaches IGAD's higher echelons. Also in the case of CEWARN, the decentralised set-up reflects an overly political context "Information sharing across member states [bumps into] sovereignty issues, and there are discrepancies in reporting, so we develop approximate results. It's a tricky terrain no details are shared: our reports outline trends." (Interview [with Moses Okello, CEWARN Secretariat,] Addis, December 2014)

Sovereignty issues with regards to data sharing are a recurrent problem, including in other RECS, such as SADC. "Information is owned by the Member States, so we can't share, also not with the African Union." (Interview [with Moses Okello, CEWARN Secretariat,] Addis, December 2014) CEWARN's integration in the continental Conflict and Early Warning System (CEWS) is clearly not without difficulties. "Twice a year there is a retreat on the CEWS, when information is shared; [but] this has been difficult since 2011 as the region has been changing dramatically." (Interview [with Moses Okello, CEWARN Secretariat,] Addis, December 2014) (Sources: interviews in Addis Ababa, December 2014; Saferworld, 2015).

This competition then reflects the dominance of the national interests of Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively. In response, relatively small countries like Uganda – a member of IGAD, the EAC, the EASF and the Great Lakes Initiative – uses its multiple membership "to maximize Uganda's regional influence" leading to these overlaps and duplication, and reluctance to fully engage in one regional process (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013). Fisher (2014) also relates this to how security is defined in member states - this is often determined by security elites within the countries in the Horn where there is limited space for parliaments or civil society to contribute to the definition of security that goes beyond the regime or the state. These different national and sub-national interests determine the interactions states then have with different regional organisations and their activities, a key element in understanding IGAD's role in regional peace and security.

For the Sudan-South Sudan case study here, security interests appear to have aligned for independence for Southern Sudan through a shared understanding of Khartoum's aggressive policy and Nile water policy. This is in contrast with Somalia, where concerns were linked to regime security (Ethiopia), economic issues (Kenya) and international diplomacy (Uganda) (Fisher, 2014). The main actors and interests around Sudan and South Sudan and how these then impact on how IGAD has been able to engage, are discussed in further detail below.

3.3.2. Shifting sands of national interests

The 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia war unravelled an alliance that until then had kept Khartoum at the negotiating table. The threat of either side then using Sudanese territory to their advantage meant that both countries moved quickly to improve their relations with Khartoum. This meant that Uganda alone maintained an aggressive stance against the Sudanese regime. But the growing LRA insurgency in Northern Uganda and failed policies in Rwanda and Congo led Museveni to give more attention to domestic security issues, setting the stage for compromise on his long-term support to SPLM/A for an agreement with Khartoum on ending its assistance to LRA

Ethiopia has been key to circumstances throughout IGAD mediation efforts and is a key broker of improved Sudan-South Sudan relations. In particular Ethiopia has an incentive for peaceful resolution to the conflict given the links between its own restive and rival Nuer and Anyuak populations and the potential involvement of Eritrea (ICG, 2014). Ethiopia's mediation efforts were also shaped by rivalry with Kenya; some Ethiopian officials believe Nairobi gained too much economically and diplomatically from its role in helping secure the 2005 agreement that paved the way for South Sudan's eventual secession (IRIN, 2014).

Ethiopia again figures strongly in IGAD-AU relations. While Addis Ababa is the seat of AU Headquarters for the Peace and Security Committee, Permanent Representatives Committee and AUC, other Pan African diplomats, high-ranking officials with the mandate to make decisions on funding are also located in Addis Ababa. As well as chairing IGAD since 2008, it has been elected three times as member of the PSC and has influence on the AU organs and representative of AU Member States in Addis Ababa. With the numerous IGAD offices and specialised institutions also based in Addis Ababa, IGAD has a greater opportunity than other RECs to strengthen its relations with AU and influence decision (El-Fassi and Meru, 2015).

IGAD has adopted a policy of 'non-indifference' rather than 'non-interference', which is – at least superficially – in line with the AU Charter. Meetings of the IGAD summit of heads of state and governments jointly address peace and security challenges at the highest level of decision-making. But parallel to the activities of IGAD as an institutional framework, the individual interventions and decisions of the regional leaders mask their narrow national interests, which in turn undermine the credibility of the IGAD process (Astill-Brown, 2014). Further, these interests are not always "in sync with peace" (Interview), while trust among IGAD members remains relatively low.

Tensions with Uganda over management of the crisis have become particularly public, after it deployed its national army in Juba and other parts of South Sudan. Uganda has also confirmed its troops are fighting alongside South Sudan's government against 'rebels' in a position informed by a long history of animosity towards Sudan and a deep dislike of former Vice President and current head of SPLM/A-iO, Riek Machar (ICG, 2015). Even if South Sudan has six neighbouring countries, it is only Uganda that deployed her army in Juba unilaterally.

While Ethiopia has been calling for the Uganda's army to withdraw from South Sudan (ICG, 2014), Ethiopian officials reportedly regard the Ugandans as "upstarts" intruding on their sphere of influence in the Sudans, a view shaped by diplomatic weight accrued by long-serving former Ethiopian PM Zenawi (IRIN, 2014) and the self-image of the lead nation of IGAD.⁵³ While there has been regional competition between both countries for overall regional leadership, competition is less overt in Somalia, where both countries are troop-contributing countries for the African Union mission fighting Al-Shabaab (ICG, 2015a).

Uganda also has huge economic interests in South Sudan, with over one million Ugandans working and living in the country (Fisher, 2014). While there are allegations that senior Ugandan and South Sudanese officials are benefitting from their army's involvement in the war, Ugandan businesses are losing from the instability. (ICG 2015) In this regard, while Kenya is very focused on economic integration through the EAC, the EAC has no strong security structure, leading it to rely more on IGAD. IGAD may therefore be best to deal with peace and security in the region, particularly also considering the increased number of al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory.

The importance of IGAD as a platform for presidents and Heads of State to be open and frank about respective issues and problems was highlighted when Sudan severed diplomatic relations with Kenya on 28 November 2011 on account of a Kenyan court order to 'catch' Sudan's President if he steps on Kenyan soil. Further, several experts have stated that progress in finding a solution in Sudan was the result of shifting regional alliances and relations around regional conflicts (Healy 2011; Murithi 2009). These opened up new opportunities of a role for IGAD.

⁵³ Similarly, talks suffered a blow in September 2014, for example, when a South Sudan government spokesperson demanded the removal of the Ethiopian chief mediator, accusing him of pursuing regime change at the behest of the USA, the UK and Norway. He reportedly also demanded that the process relocate to Kenya (IRIN, 2014).

Beyond IGAD countries, Rwanda, Burundi and Egypt volunteered to contribute troops to the Prevention and Deterrence Force (PDF), which was expected to monitor the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement negotiated by IGAD between the warring parties in South Sudan on 23 January 2014. None are IGAD member states, highlighting the increasingly wide regional dimensions of the conflict. For example, participation of the Ugandan army in the PDF would undermine neutrality. Broader regional intervention opens a Pandora's box of possibly proxy conflict, with Egypt offering to send troops in the midst of tensions with Ethiopia over Nile water just one example of regional rivalries that could find their outlet on South Sudanese territory (ICG, 2014)

As all of this highlights the Horn of Africa is a fast changing environment with the actions of different actors making the work of regional organisations and supporting these extremely open to failure and requiring flexibility. For example, Riek Machar was a Vice-President in Khartoum government before becoming the Vice-President in South Sudan. de Waal (2015) cites Bona as saying, "Garang's real reasons for fighting the long civil war with the North were never clear because he never spelt them out" (p. 157). Moreover, he so centralised political management that decision-making was completely paralyzed apart from in his person: "in the SPLA world, there was no system. Whatever Colonel John Garang de Mabior decreed was the system. The SPLA has been running South Sudan since 2005 and still there is no system" (p. 161). With such personalised internal dynamics within countries as well as between them, this partly explains the heavy use of Summits to address regional issues rather than more institutionalised approaches.

3.3.3. Post-independence crisis

Although South Sudan assumed full independence on 9 July 2011, both states were unable to settle a number of outstanding issues. This is partly due to the reluctance of the international community to hold the Khartoum government to the terms of the CPA (Sansculotte-Greenidge and Tsuma, 2011), but also relates to oil-sharing in particular.

While Verhoeven (2011) points out that the Port Sudan pipeline served as an incentive to hold the CPA together to maintain stability, Saeed (2013) points out that while Sudanese political parties wrangled over the question of oil-sharing, they were not united on a national programme in the face of the NCP. In the midst of them were oil exploration companies who had their interests aligned with the governing partners (NCP and SPLM) and their respective armies, who protect the oil installations. Furthermore, there are five categories of international (external) actors operating in Abyei Territory: UN agencies, international humanitarian organizations, UN international monitors commissioned under chapter 6 of the UN Charter (now chapter 7 of the Charter), and Joint Integrated Units foreseen in the CPA (now replaced by an AU-backed force of 4,200).

It is the oil wealth of the borderline belt and Abyei Territory in particular that really matters to both the Sudanese government and the SPLM while it is surface land resources that matter most to the local pastoralist clients, Ngok-Dinka/Misiriyae, particularly water, pasture and forest resources for livestock herding. However, as a disputed territory, Abyei may hold the key to Sudan's future stability. The borderline belt dividing Sudan and South Sudan includes not only the Three Transitional Areas – Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei – covering 66 per cent of borderline, which are governed by a separate CPA Protocol, and the disputed Abyei Area with a protocol specific to it, but also five states in South Sudan which are subject to the other major CPA Protocols governing power-sharing, resource-sharing and security.

At the same time, the borderline belt is the main source of food production and food security, with the Nile as its primary endowment making it an important bone of contention.⁵⁴

This complexity has again instilled a reliance on more ad-hoc, and in some cases ‘firefighting’ approaches, in addressing regional challenges, which have been forced to adapt to the realities, including national interests and the lack of institutional capacity in general in IGAD.

3.4. External actors

3.4.1. Development partners

While the interconnected nature of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa suggest the need for a regional approach, the allegiances and alliances with outside actors can undermine this.⁵⁵ While IGAD managed to formally broker a Sudanese peace deal in 2005, the more decisive role was arguably that of external actors, mainly the US, UK, Italy and Norway (El-Affendi, 2009). Efforts to revamp the peace negotiations were heavily supported by the international community. IGAD responded to proliferating efforts, notably by Libya and Egypt, in Sudan by establishing the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), which supported IGAD with offers of international recognition and financial support (Murithi, 2009). In 1999, the IPF led by the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom (and to a lesser extent Italy) and civil society groups, were able to get IGAD to agree on establishing this Permanent Secretariat for the Conflict in Sudan and the appointment of new special envoy (Young, 2007). Only later, in June 2001, did the so-called Troika emerge, at the initiative of the United States to support the Sudan peace process with the United Kingdom and Norway, based on their long-term engagement in the country (Natsios, 2012).

IGAD’s administrative and political weakness led to domination of the peace process by the US and close allies, operating through Kenya. With financing largely channelled through the Government of Kenya and GTZ, the Special envoy reported to Nairobi with IGAD having no control over him. Secretariat staff reports to the Special Envoy, and observers were responsible for their respective countries, as were the ambassador Envoys. The IGAD Council of Ministers rarely questioned the Kenya led mediation. There is a suggestion that IGAD had no capacity to structure the peace process, or influence its course or objectives, and in one interpretation was not even permitted under the CPA to play a role in the post-conflict era (Young, 2007).

At the same time, donors have failed to engage strategically, as witnessed in the 2014 push for a “multi-stakeholder” process by the Troika. In an attempt to avoid the mistakes of a more exclusionary CPA process, the EU and the Troika aimed to establish a process to bring together representatives from opposition political parties, faith based groups and civil society. But as experts noted, IGAD is ill-equipped to manage this type of process, as political debate in member states is largely held within the ruling party.

In addition however, the EU and Troika had little idea which groups and individuals to identify as representative and influential, also being nervous of engaging armed actors (ICG, 2015). The conflict in South Sudan has raised sensitive issues within the United Nations and other external donors such as the

⁵⁴ The Borderline Belt lies within the realms of three medieval kingdoms: Funj Sultanate (1504–1820), headquartered at Sinnar and controlling the east bank of the White Nile and expanding to Kordofan and Darfur in the middle of the eighteenth century; Musabba’at Sultanate in North Kordofan and the Kingdom of Tegali, corresponding to the Southern Kordofan segment of the border; as well as Darfur Sultanate (1664–1916) with strong command-outreach in the Bahr-al-Arab border segment.

⁵⁵ The Clinton Administration also supported the cause of southern rebels [domestic political agenda] and provided \$ 20 million dollars in military support to countries in the region. Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia needed minimal encouragement to enhance their own military support to SPLA/M (Healy, 2011).

United States. The decision not to create an International Contact Group under UN auspices left IGAD in the driving seat, but there is little consensus on what a greater role for the UN could mean and how to more effectively support but not overrule IGAD (ICG, 2015).

3.4.2. What can a donor do?

So while IGAD can point to positive achievements and is building its capacity to respond to conflict in the region, “the suspicion has been that improving regional relations has not been a necessary step for the regimes of the Horn, so much as the fulfilment of an agenda encouraged from outside at several levels of the international community” (Woodward, 2013).

As this suggests, understanding the political primacy of IGAD peace and security cooperation should be a key point of departure for donors’ engagement in the region. As a policy brief by Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit has argued in the case of Sudan and South Sudan “One of the basic paradigms of donor engagement in South Sudan after the inking of the CPA in 2005 was that the region represented a post-conflict environment [...]” (Hemmer and Grinstead, 2015). As a result, donors adopted an approach that prioritised state building, which translated into a predominantly technical exercise aiming to enhance the capacity of central state institutions, with efforts focused mostly on Juba. The bulk of fighting during the civil war with Sudan’s Khartoum government has however occurred between Southern Sudanese elites. “[When] the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) assumed the roles of a state, it adopted an inclusive ‘big tent’ policy. Co-option and accommodation were the name of the game: political and civil servant positions were doled out in exchange for loyalty, and scores of militias, many of whom had served as proxy forces for Khartoum during the war, were put on the payroll and integrated into the army” (Hemmer and Grinstead, 2015). A more political narrative for donor engagement with the region could have better addressed some of these risk factors and avoided donors being taken by surprise following the outbreak of violence in December 2013.

According to close observers of IGAD peace and security cooperation, donors need to support (1) strategic planning capacities; and (2) training mediation technical expertise, verification and monitoring experts. With regards to the 23 January 2014, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement IGAD wanted 150 monitors in South Sudan to follow up on implementation of the CoH agreements. This implied 2 monitors per county. There are 68 counties in South Sudan, with some of them the size of European countries. (Interview, December 2014). The capacity demands are huge, while donors are struggling to find effective entry points in a context where technical positions are often political appointments. For example, Denmark supported the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) with the development of a mediation handbook, and CHD received funding to develop Standard Operating Procedures for mediation. This was based on an understanding of the need to strengthen the capacity of middle management mediation experts. High-level mediators (e.g. members of AU High Level Panel) will never look at these types of handbooks. “Donors need to be realistic [of what they can achieve], as from the outside it is not possible to understand all [these intricacies] They find it difficult accept that mediators are political appointments because of their political baggage or background/credit.” (Interview Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenridge, CHD, December 2014)

The EU is in the process of revising its support to the APSA, to make its tools more complementary. This refers to better demarcating the Peace Facility (from where the biggest chunk of support to the APSA originates) and Regional Indicative Programmes. The APF’s focus will likely remain the AU (as there is no RIP for the AU), and focus on activities for crisis management, continue building capabilities for conflict management and resolution. The RIPs will focus on the capacity building of RECs, including staff costs, Early Warning Systems and mediation. (Interview). While some interlocutors have remarked that the EU is

becoming submissive and accommodating most of the time although, much has changed with the opening of the dedicated EU delegation, with seconded staff from the EU e.g. for AMISOM (Interview). A question arises whether the EU's engagement with IGAD and the Horn of Africa is at a sufficiently high-level with sufficient resources, given the high intensity of conflicts and challenges in the region.

The EU previously appointed a Special Representative for Sudan, Rosalind Marsden.⁵⁶ Her mandate ran until June 2013, with the key objective to achieve a peaceful transition under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), including the organisation of credible referenda on Abyei and on self-determination of South Sudan in January 2011. As of 2012, her mandate included the objective was “to contribute to the mitigation and elimination of threats to the stability of South Sudan and the wider region posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).” Following the termination of her mandate, it was merged with the current EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Alex Rondos. The latter's office is arguably understaffed, with only two political advisors, for a mandate which is expected to contribute to the continued stabilisation of Somalia, the peaceful coexistence of Sudan and South Sudan, the resolution of current conflicts between or within countries in the region and the support of political, security and economic regional cooperation (EEAS, 2013).⁵⁷

3.5. Conclusions

IGAD's contribution to the continental peace and security architecture, the African Peace and Security Architecture, has been partially successful. IGAD has led mediation efforts in most conflict situations, most prominently in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, but less prominently in Darfur and not without criticism or obstacles in the other cases. IGAD Member states have considerable peacekeeping experience through participation in AU or UN missions. The East African Standby Force, as one of the regional brigades of the African Standby Force (ASF) of which most IGAD member states are part, is fully operational, though IGAD has never successfully mounted a full-blown peace support operation on its own.⁵⁸

As the discussion around IGAD's role in Sudan and South Sudan show, IGAD's institutional framework for peace and security manages to provide a forum to discuss peace and security at the highest political level. IGAD's peace and security architecture has strengthened since its establishment and responded to newly emerging threats and capitalizing on existing expertise but challenges remain and capacity development has been uneven. While IGAD's expertise in peace and security is primarily related to mediation and early warning, its institutional complexity indicates a pragmatic and decentralised set-up as a result of national interests and a willingness to show institutional flexibility, resulting in a myriad of specialised agencies, liaison offices and headquarters across the region.

While relatively effective at bringing together the ultimate decision-makers, it struggles to overcome the often-conflicting national security interests and rivalries among the main countries, namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda and the key actors within those, as illustrated in the South Sudan conflict. How the security agenda and response is defined, relies on security elites within all main countries in the Horn with limited space for parliaments or civil society to contribute to the definition of security that goes beyond the regime or the state. IGAD success in the CPA seems to be because security interests aligned through a shared vision of Khartoum's aggressive policy (Fisher, 2014) and Sudan's own concern of being categorised as an Islamist threat by the US.

⁵⁶ See EEAS, http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/rosalind-marsden/index_en.htm

⁵⁷ http://eeas.europa.eu/eusr/docs/index_en.htm

⁵⁸ The Prevention and Deterrence Force (PDF) as part of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) proposed by IGAD in January 2014 and envisaged to be composed of Kenyan and Ethiopian troops was subsumed in UNMISS.

As such, IGAD's peace and security architecture is primarily a result of a political compromise between national interests rather than a linear process of institutional functionality. Regional integration and cooperation in peace and security has fluctuated. For example, according to some IGAD used to be stronger: after the 2005 CPA "it went into hibernation". Ethiopia remains the strongest member of IGAD, and has been spearheading the IGAD mediation process for South Sudan since conflict broke out in December 2013. "Previously, Uganda (unofficially) withdrew from IGAD because Ethiopia was "abusing IGAD to this extent (2006-2010)" (Interview), while according to another interviewee, Uganda now uses IGAD to legitimise its presence in South Sudan.

The lack of an institutional framework and the *ad hoc* nature that characterises IGAD's work in this area continue to undermine the building of institutional memory and development of institutionalised capacity and expertise by the regional body. As the IPSS itself admitted, IGAD's efforts "have been reactive [and] lack continuity and institutional memory due to the *ad hoc* approach [...] pursued so far. Further, the selection of cases for IGAD intervention depends on national interests and the ability of IGAD to be seen to be neutral, which is not the case for Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions.

Nonetheless, for peace and security, IGAD is the key platform to convene and openly discuss differences, with ad-hoc institutions reflecting the interests and demands of Heads of State depending on timing and situational context. The institutional set up of IGAD therefore reflects the overwhelming influence and guidance by the Member States' Heads of State and Government and national priorities in defining IGAD's role but remains a place for neutral discussion.

4. Regional Economic Integration

In contrast to IGAD's relative success on conflict mediation, its progress on economic integration has been described as 'dismal' (IGAD, 2012). Nonetheless, market integration and broad regional economic integration remain key stated IGAD objectives while its role as one of Africa's eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) gives it a formal mandate to create a free trade area, customs unions and eventually a common market. Beyond market integration, sometimes referred to as 'shallow integration', IGAD's strategy also reflects aspirations of 'deep integration' including the soft and hard infrastructures that facilitate economic exchange and interdependence. Economic integration and market access also underpin IGAD's approaches to its third pillar of food security and drought and disaster reduction, reflecting the fundamental place economic integration takes in its vision for regional cooperation and integration.

This section examines some the key actors and factors that shape how and why IGAD defines and implements its regional economic integration agenda, including both market and broader economic integration. The challenge is great, particularly given the scale of informal trade, while most cross-border progress appears to be taking place in terms of cross-border transit corridors, energy and water. On top of this, IGAD faces a Catch-22: while it lacks the resources or capabilities to achieve economic integration on its own, its international partners appear unconvinced of IGAD's abilities in this field (Woodward, 2013).

But beyond resources, and despite active engagement with the AU and others on trade and economic issues, IGAD is considered by many as irrelevant in the field of economic integration given the overlapping REC membership of its members, particularly the EAC and COMESA. Above all, this section points to the overriding importance of 'national interests', particularly of Ethiopia, and how these shape the regional economic agenda - it has yet to be seen if Ethiopia's engagement with the region through bilateral agreements is a building block or stumbling block to greater IGAD economic integration.

4.1. Economic foundational factors

4.1.1. Formal trade

The IGAD region has experienced closer economic integration than today but this ended with the Ethiopia-Eritrea war.⁵⁹ As such, trade flows between IGAD members are relatively low, even in comparison with already low intra-African averages.

As Tables 2 and 3 show, only Somalia-Ethiopia, Kenya-Uganda, and Sudan-Uganda (here aggregating Sudan and South Sudan) rank in each other's top five import and export partners. In the neighbouring region, Saudi Arabia is among the top five trade partners (exports or imports) for four countries, Egypt for three, Yemen for two and Oman for one, surpassing IGAD trade shares for all but Kenya and Uganda.

⁵⁹ Regime change in Ethiopia in 1991 followed by the implosion of Somalia temporarily led to closer cooperation between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan in economic, security and political areas. "Following Eritrea's independence in May 1993, the two countries [Ethiopia and Eritrea] signed a series of agreements aimed at preserving their de facto economic unity (single currency, free movements of goods and people, no trade barriers and unrestricted use of Eritrean ports for Ethiopia). But as early as 1995, the Eritreans began complaining about a variety of taxes levied locally in Ethiopia and regarded these as indirect trade barriers. They also expressed reservations about restrictions on Ethiopian exports. The Ethiopians were also complaining about Eritrean re-exporting of important hard currency earners such as coffee and animal hide. They also criticized the more liberal Eritrean foreign exchange policies which affected the value of the common currency" (El-Affendi, 2012). Sudanese currency was also made legal tender in Eritrea, while free movement of people and goods across borders of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan was agreed (El-Affendi, 2012).

Table 2: IGAD Member State Top 5 Import Sources (share of total imports, 2013)

Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	Sudan (N & S)	Uganda
China (34.2%)	China (31.9%)	China (27%)	India (23.8%)	Oman (23%)	China (29.5%)	India (26.8%)
India (12.9%)	Egypt (14.6%)	India (11.2%)	China (19.5%)	Ethiopia (22.9%)	India (10.2%)	China (10.7%)
Indonesia (9.6%)	Germany (9.4%)	Saudi Arabia (8.5%)	Japan (5.5%)	India (13.4%)	Egypt (6.4%)	Kenya (9.7%)
Saudi Arabia (6.6%)	Italy (8.4%)	Japan (4.7%)	South Africa (4.9%)	China (9.6%)	Saudi Arabia (6.3%)	UAE (6.7%)
USA (5.7%)	Saudi Arabia (4.1%)	USA (4.7%)	UK (4.3%)	Pakistan (4.5%)	Uganda (4.9%)	Japan (5.7%)

Table 3: IGAD Member Top 5 Export Destinations (share of total exports in 2013)

Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	Sudan (N& S)	Uganda
Saudi Arabia (38.7%)	Canada (60.3%)	Somalia (12.3%)	Zambia (13.5%)	Saudi Arabia (56.3%)	China (68.7%)	Sudan N & S (17.2%)
Egypt (10.2%)	China (19.8%)	China (11.9%)	Uganda (10.6%)	Oman (21%)	Saudi Arabia (7.8%)	Kenya (13.1%)
Yemen (6%)	Republic of Korea (7.1%)	Germany (6.8%)	Netherlands (9.3%)	Yemen (8.4%)	Japan (6.8%)	DRC (11.1%)
India (5.8%)	Venezuela (3.9%)	Netherlands (6.5%)	USA (8.8%)	India (7.4%)	India (5%)	Rwanda (9%)
USA (4.6%)	Egypt (3.7%)	Saudi Arabia (6.4%)	UK (8.1%)	China (3%)	Rep. of Korea (1.8%)	Switzerland (6.6%)

Source: ITC Trade Map

Strikingly, both India and China rank in the top five import partner countries for all except Eritrea for whom India is not a key partner. China is also among the top five export destinations for Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea, while the G8 countries also feature as key trade partners for all IGAD members. Notably, in his address to the 18th COMESA Summit, the Prime Minister of Egypt noted that “Egyptian exports to the COMESA region are immense, and that the country is the biggest importer of tea from Kenya, and beef from Sudan and Ethiopia” - all three IGAD countries.

4.1.2. Informal trade flows

Although recorded trade flows between IGAD members are relatively low, economic exchange is nonetheless taking place through informal trade. One estimate puts IGAD Member State informal activity at approximately 40 percent of GDP. Much of the informal trade across borders in the region reportedly involves essential foodstuffs and basic requirements such as medicines, clothing and fuel. Healy (2011) cites an Ethiopian study of 2007/08 revealing informal exports worth tens of millions of dollars that included beans to Kenya, khat to Djibouti and coffee to Sudan.

A large part of the informal trade in the region also relates to livestock trade. Ethiopia has one of the largest livestock populations in Africa “but has a complex and only partially modernised marketing structure” (Love, 2009). The estimated value of this trade is at least \$200 million annually, with at least half of the animals originating in the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia. It is highly seasonal, organised to meet peak demand for live animals during the Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, when 70% of the exports take place (Healy, 2011), partially accounting for Saudi Arabia’s role as a regional trade partner. However, while quality is often poor, the formal procedures for exporting live animals also involve considerable documentation and fees, and encourage the use of informal channels. While IGAD is attempting to help improve quality, there is also a danger that future cross-border trade will be threatened if enforcement of regulations means greater centralization, or diversion to formal routes.

The conflict in south central Somalia has diverted livestock exports from Somalia and its Ethiopian hinterland away from the ports of the region to cross-border trekking into northeast Kenya, while at the same time opening up a reverse trade not only in clothing and household goods but also in small arms (Love, 2009). Conflict has meant that trading routes to the seaports of southern Somalia for shipping on to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Gulf states have been disrupted and many supplies are diverted overland to the northern Kenya markets. The ban in September 2000 by Middle East countries on imports of live animals from the Horn following an outbreak of Rift Valley fever has been another contributory factor.

Also worth highlighting though not trade as such, is the large numbers of Ethiopian and Eritrean citizens also work in businesses and private homes in the Sudanese towns of Khartoum and Gedarf, sending back remittances, while Sudanese businessmen are regular visitors to Addis (Verhoeven, 2011).

The presence and scale of this informal trade is a structural factor in the region. While potentially difficult for formal institutional approaches to address, much depends on the actors and interests behind this trade, and whether these operate through dispersed networks that might be built upon regionally, or through deeply embedded interests linked to political elites, discussed below in terms of actors and agency.

4.1.3. Regional resources and infrastructure

Regional resources and infrastructure provide an additional key foundational factor affecting IGAD’s role on economic integration. While current intra-regional trade in goods is relatively low, varying access to water, hydroelectric energy, oil and related infrastructures across member states is raising levels of economic interdependence among IGAD states with potential opportunities for greater coordination through IGAD and/or other regional organisations.

Ethiopia has already begun supplying neighbouring countries with energy from hydroelectric power, gaining the moniker the ‘water tower of East Africa’ with its seven major drainage basins and related potential for hydroelectric power generation. Although drought in Eastern Ethiopia is reportedly currently affecting electricity supplies to Djibouti, according to the Ethiopian Electric Power Authority, the country has an estimated potential of producing over 45,000 MW of hydroelectric power, making it the potential major house of hydropower in Africa (EPCO, Gibe III HEP Office 2010). The country is now generating over 2000 MW and soon to acquire a 10,000MW production capacity once the projects under construction are completed in the coming four years, according to reports of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation. The expected hydropower capacity from the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) exceeds Ethiopia’s current domestic power market (see Box 2), and will therefore need to be sold outside Ethiopia. As such transmission lines are being planned to regional markets while a power trade agreement “will ensure that

the Ethiopian people receive a good financial return on their investment” (Plaut, 2015).⁶⁰ This then underlines the potential importance to Ethiopia of an East African Power Pool, a separate regional initiative currently underway (see COMESA study), again separate from IGAD processes, while Ethiopia is hosting its secretariat.

Box 5: IGAD, water resources and regional relations

Though IGAD is not explicitly responsible for Nile waters issues, it affects IGAD member relations while there are clear overlaps between the work of IGAD and the Nile Basin Initiative. The brief summary highlights how factors creating regional tensions around common natural resources, a key fundamental factor in the IGAD region, can be altered by political events and evolving national or elite political interests.

The Nile as a Foundational Factor

With water a scarce resource across much of the IGAD region, the waters of the Nile River Basin play a key role in regional dynamics and national interests, shaping the context in which IGAD institutions must operate. While in theory the need for regional water management might stimulate cooperation, in practice water politics create tensions between IGAD countries and the wider region, as the case of upstream Ethiopia and downstream Egypt testify. This has security but also economic implications.

Institutions

Until recently, Nile waters were governed by two agreements – the 1929 Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and Great Britain, and the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan (e.g. Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015). As of 1999, collaboration around the Nile is coordinated by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), a ‘temporary institution’ (EC, 2015) established as pressures on the river became more intense, especially in Ethiopia and East Africa. In particular, the 1959 agreement did not account for use of Nile waters by Ethiopia, creating tensions around construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a major hydroelectric project intended to produce.

While facing numerous challenges, the NBI has reportedly been a useful platform to bring together all ten Nile countries, facilitating information exchange and capacity development, as well as the joint planning and development of water and related resources (EC, 2015). Like other regional organisations, the funding of transboundary water institutions by affected countries is often minimal, unreliable or late, affecting their sustainability and increasing donor dependence, with the same donors as are supporting IGAD often operating as key financiers. Alongside the NBI, a Uganda-registered civil society network, the Nile Basin Discourse, has been formed with around 900 members and partner organisations for information sharing and encouraging cooperation around water-related issues, including IGAD water policy through a MoU with IGAD.

IGAD recently financed the 4th Nile Basin Development Forum, allowing all IGAD members to join, while an MoU is under preparation between IGAD and the NBI, potentially offering avenues for closer collaboration and streamlining of regional approaches in the future, but also reflecting the power of money, with the NBI seeing IGAD as a channel to access EU funds (interviewee).

Although news points to on-going tensions and difficulties in producing accurate impact studies, for example, the NBI has helped create conditions for a “new” Nile agreement in 2015 between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, and construction of the dam is now underway with completion scheduled for 2017.

Actors and interests

⁶⁰ See Africa Intelligence, for example. <http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/business-circles/2015/08/28/eeepco-can%E2%80%99t-supply-enough-electricity-to-djibouti,108089047-ART>

While little can change the structural factors in place, relations can change and offer windows of opportunity for regional cooperation. Part of the reasons behind declining tensions includes the political changes in Egypt that have allowed something of a rapprochement.

In 2011, the launch of the Renaissance Dam (GERD) prompted then Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, to state that while he was “not calling for war” with Ethiopia, Egypt’s water security could not be violated at all”, that “all options are open”, and that Egyptians would not accept any projects on the Nile River that threatened their livelihood (Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015). Under Abdel Fatah al-Sisi Egypt moderated its stance in the Nile water dispute with Ethiopia, with Cairo now seeking cooperation rather than conflict. But this rapprochement is not driven by any fundamental reversal in Egypt’s Nile water policy. Instead, Cairo recognises that its options are restricted by the advanced state of dam construction and the altering regional landscape of conflict and tensions - Ethiopia is seen as an increasingly important partner, especially in matters of regional security in the southern Red Sea given that disruptions to shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait would immediately impact traffic to the Suez Canal, an important sources of Egypt’s revenue. The current Suez Canal expansion – Sisi’s own economic prestige project, which it is hoped will contribute billions of dollars in revenue to the overstretched state budget – has in fact increased the strategic relevance of this shipping route for Egypt in recent months (von Lossow and Roll, 2015), indirectly also affecting its willingness to concede on Nile water.

Further, since 2010 an increase in trade and investment flows between the two countries has indeed been observed while politically influential Egyptian corporations like Qalaa Holdings and cable manufacturer Elsewedy Electric have made significant investments in Ethiopia (the most populous country in East Africa) and are therefore also likely to have been lobbying in Cairo for an easing of political relations (von Lossow and Roll, 2015).

Sudan also has been an important player in smoothing Ethio-Egyptian relations. Again, this relates to ongoing changes in the region with Sudan, now bereft of its erstwhile water-wealthy Southern part, putting it in a difficult situation with its geographical position on the middle Nile and significant ambitions to develop its commercial agriculture. As Saeed (2013) points out, “The abundance of seasonal streams will turn the South Sudan into a water giant as regards future strategies for the Nile waters. The ‘old’ Sudan will become a water-deficit country, in spite of the fact that the Nile traverses it from South to North”. This also alters the willingness to engage with Ethiopia and Egypt, with Sudan also due to import some of Ethiopia’s hydroelectricity.

South Sudan’s potential for agricultural production, lack of mass industrialization and services economy, mean South Sudan’s natural comparative advantage for the moment lies in livestock and cultivation of food crops (Verhoeven, 2012). While South Sudan has plenty of rainfall, Nile water is said to be South Sudan’s most unpredictable variant, so building hydro-infrastructure could help generate valuable megawatts of power and divert water for irrigation in riverine zones of agricultural production (Verhoeven, 2012). This may trigger new tensions with Egypt and Sudan, not covered by the Agreements made in the 2015 Nile Agreement which only covers the Blue Nile (Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015).

External factors

China is an additional external factor in the region’s hydro political *status quo*: while there is much interest in China’s imports of oil and mineral resource from Africa, less well known is that China is the main partner in Sudan’s dam program and increasingly involved in Ethiopia’s hydro-infrastructure (Verhoeven, 2012). Sinohydro, the world largest dam building company, owned by CCP and actively encouraging constructor of further dams on the Sudanese and Ethiopian Nile means that growing Chinese influence has reduced Western leverage over both Khartoum and Addis (Verhoeven, 2012). At the same time, China wants regional stability for its activities and business interests, providing a further drive towards collaboration rather than conflict.

A further foundational factor driving economic interdependence and trade is the need for access to ports for landlocked Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan, not to mention the hinterlands of the coastal member countries. The loss of Ethiopia's access to Eritrea's Assab port provided the economic rationale for substantial investment from Dubai that has transformed Djibouti port into a major international transport hub (Healy, 2011). But after years of distrust and hostility, and while port access has been affected by conflicts in Somalia and spillovers of the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, more attention is being paid to alternative routes using Port Sudan and Berbera in Somaliland, and to Kenya's Port of Lamu through the so-called LAPSSET Corridor (Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport Corridor). Sudan has started to supply petroleum products to Ethiopia, and Port Sudan has become an outlet for Ethiopian agricultural exports (Healy, 2011). These realities offer possibilities for regional coordination through IGAD although that also depends on member country interests, discussed below.

Figure 4: Major IGAD regional corridors



Source: IGAD (2014)

4.1.4. Foundational factors for regional economic integration

While these different foundational factors offer a potential basis for greater regional economic integration, they do not point to the precise role, relevance or demand for IGAD to facilitate or drive these different economic integration processes. A key recurring question in interviews and the literature then relates to the value added and legitimacy of IGAD in promoting economic integration given its focus and apparent strengths in peace and security, and the overlapping membership of most IGAD members with other RECs.

4.2. Institutions

As discussed, IGAD has a formal mandate to promote trade and economic integration. At the same time, regional economic integration in IGAD is seen as a vehicle for achieving its other key objectives, not least drought resilience and food security through the IDDRSI and CAADP, respectively. While illustrating a potentially useful approach to linking regional policy areas, trade and economic integration are generally not considered strong points of IGAD with implementation falling considerably short of its objectives and rhetoric.⁶¹ This section tries to distinguish between IGAD's formally stated role on economic integration, and how integration is taking place in practice, before the following section relates these to country-level interests in integrating the region's economies.

4.2.1. IGAD or COMESA for regional trade?

IGAD was deemed to be a “strong and viable” Regional Economic Community by the Assembly of the African Union held in Banjul in July 2006 (Abdi and Seid, 2013). The signing of the protocol on the relationship between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities in January 2008 reaffirmed the role of IGAD as a recognised regional economic community, while the African Union rejected a high level audit panel recommendation to relegate IGAD to an organization for only peace and security as well as desertification matters (Abdi and Seid, 2013). Anecdotally, despite the high share of COMESA membership, there was a perceived need for a REC in the Horn of Africa to balance with those in Eastern, Southern, Western and Central Africa. Paradoxically, IGAD's mandate on trade may also relate to Ethiopian influence, as discussed below.

The protocol signed with the African Union requires IGAD to:

1. Cooperate, align and coordinate its policies and programs with those of the Union;
2. Promote inter-regional projects in all fields;
3. Cooperate with the Union in the integration endeavour and attend and participate effectively in all meetings of the Union and in the activities included in the protocol; and
4. Submit reports to the Executive Council and the Assembly on progress achieved and difficulties encountered in the implementation of the provisions of the protocol.

IGAD's liaison office regularly and actively attends meetings arranged by the various AU Departments (Interview). Other activities undertaken in the region include the development of policy frameworks including a protocol on free movement of people, projects for transport standardisation such as axle load limits, and policies on migration and cross-border issues, including communicable livestock diseases (Dersso, 2014).

⁶¹ The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) IDDRSI offers a regional approach linking economic, ecological and security concerns that highlights market access, trade and financial services among seven priority intervention areas. The others are i) environment and natural resources and management, ii) market access, trade and financial services, iii) livelihoods support and basic social services, iv) pastoral disaster risk management, preparedness and effective response, v) research, knowledge management and technology transfer, vi) conflict prevention resolution and peace-building, vii) coordination, institutional strengthening and partnerships. Similarly IGAD work on food security through the 2013 CAADP (the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme) Compact highlights “improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access” as its second pillar with an aim to contribute to six main areas of action which can be summarised as: i) strengthening governance of regional trade policies and policy development; ii) developing regional market infrastructure iii) promoting regional knowledge management, iv) sustainable natural resource use and management; v) increased agricultural production and food and nutrition security; vi) research, technology dissemination and institution building (IGAD, XXXX).

In 2008 IGAD also aligned its trade policy with the AU through its Minimum Regional Integration Plan (MIP) that aims “to re-position IGAD as a development institution and accordingly refocus its regional integration agenda”. It includes a commitment to create a free trade area (FTA) between 2009 and 2012, a commitment that has not been met. It also lays out numerous objectives relating to its three core areas of food security and environment, peace and security, and economic cooperation and integration, with most progress seemingly in the area of peace and security. Economic cooperation in particular has had several studies undertaken and a protocol on free movement of people but no ratification or further progress.

Anecdotally the MIP has so far, served mostly as a framework for (potentially useful) studies on one stop border posts, movement of people, and other cross-border issues but with no concrete roadmap with deadlines and deliverables on other commitments. According to a Ugandan Ministry of Trade official, the last IGAD trade meeting took place in 2012 on the adoption of the Simplified Trade Regime that most countries in attendance were already implementing, further underlining the irrelevance of IGAD seen by some officials working in this area.

At the same time, the IGAD Vision has as an objective to “Promote and realize the objectives of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Economic Community”. COMESA is commonly seen by member states and officials as the REC that specialises in trade, with all IGAD except Somalia members, while Kenya and Uganda are advancing on their own regional economic integration through the EAC. While all IGAD members except Somalia reportedly have desks or divisions dedicated to COMESA relations, this is not the case for COMESA (IGAD, 2012), further reflecting COMESA’s more established role. The recent launch of the Tripartite FTA between COMESA, EAC and SADC further casts doubts on IGAD’s role in promoting trade.

Although IGAD sees its role as promoting trade and has that mandate, according to interviewees the Member States generally do not expect it to play this role.⁶² According to the World Bank (2014), “IGAD has lagged behind other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in negotiating and interpreting trade agreements, and the institutional framework to resolve associated disputes is weak” (World Bank, 2014). While the reference to COMESA in IGAD’s Vision is seen by some as reflecting a specialisation of IGAD in peace and security, not trade issue, other interviewees see the COMESA reference as a limitation on IGAD’s mandate and blame it for slow progress on an IGAD FTA. This may be correct inasmuch as the resources dedicated to economic affairs results in a virtually on-man department, working through consultant-based studies (Interviewee). On-going work to revise the establishment document is reportedly likely to establish further independence from COMESA processes.

Again, Ethiopia is central. Even if the Final Communiqué of COMESA’s most recent summit, chaired by Ethiopia, ‘commended the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on its commitment to join the COMESA Free Trade Area and urged the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to expedite ongoing internal consultations and finalize instruments of accession to the COMESA Free Trade Area and deposit them with the COMESA Secretariat’, many remain sceptical on when or if Ethiopia will join the COMESA FTA (COMESA, 2015). The goes for its WTO accession, originally foreseen for 2015 but stalling due to the threat of competition in services sector, most notably the telecoms and finance sectors.⁶³ The Ethiopian government reportedly also reacted against a tabled MoU between IGAD and the EAC. Given comments cited above about Ethiopia’s reluctance to be ‘pushed around by small countries like Mauritius’, this leads some to suspect that Ethiopia favours maintaining an FTA on the IGAD agenda as a smaller and ultimately more flexible or even malleable economic integration tool for its purposes than COMESA or the EAC.

⁶² IGAD Liaison officer

⁶³ See for example: <http://www.voanews.com/content/ethiopia-may-delay-joining-wto-in-2015-cites-competition/1924137.html>

4.2.2. Sub-regional agreements: building blocks or stumbling blocks?

As such, much of the progress in both market and broader economic integration in the IGAD region relates to bilateral agreements and joint Ministerial arrangements outside the IGAD framework and/or at a sub-regional level, particularly involving Ethiopia. While cited by some as a potential basis for greater future regionalisation, the fear is more that this (further) undermines progress through IGAD.

With about 70 percent of traffic through the Port of Djibouti comprising imports to and exports from Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Djibouti have signed more than 30 agreements on trade and a wide range of issues (Mekonnen and Lulie, 2014). At the same time, Ethiopia is establishing bilateral agreements with Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, covering transport, trade, investment, mining and tourism. This includes a Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation with Sudan in 2005 that abolished tariff barriers, eased rules of origin on trade between the two and established an MoU for customs cooperation.⁶⁴ Further, Ethiopia has introduced a licensing system to regulate cross-border trade with Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia, governing the types of goods that can be traded, how often, and how far from border posts goods can be traded. Ethiopia also recently signed bilateral trade-related agreements with Uganda and in 2012 signed the Ethio-Kenyan Special Status Agreement which was ratified in April 2014.⁶⁵ Looking at economic integration more broadly, Ethiopia and Somaliland are also negotiating an agreement over the supply of electricity to Somaliland's capital of Hargeisa (Mekonnen and Lulie, 2014), while the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor through Kenya represents a further sub-regional undertaking to integrate economies.

Supplying hydroelectric power to Djibouti in 2011 was the first phase of Ethiopia's major regional strategy to export its abundant hydroelectric power with a connection to Sudan made in December 2013, while the Addis-Nairobi link is under development (World Bank, 2014). A further element of bilateral infrastructure cooperation was added in January 2013 when ministers signed a contract to construct a pipeline to supply drinking water from Ethiopia to Djibouti City. Ethiopia has also launched extensive road and rail construction to link producers and consumers in border cities with Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Somaliland, and Kenya. The Government of Ethiopia has prioritised the transport corridor to Berbera Port in Somaliland, with the potential to enhance economic development in the eastern part of the country and Somaliland (World Bank, 2014).

Ethiopia has also established strong diplomatic ties with newly formed South Sudan, beginning even before its independence. These relations have been formalised: already in July 2008, for example, the Ethiopian government agreed to allocate 50 percent of its cement production for export to southern Sudan" (Love, 2009). In late February and early March 2012, a joint ministerial committee signed a series of agreements to co-operate in the areas of transit, transport, export, communication, education and capacity-building. "They are also actively promoting increased trade" (Mekonnen and Lulie, 2014).

Although these bilateral agreements may be seen as undermining the regional approach, IGAD supports several of these initiatives and often facilitates bilateral meetings on a range of topics, representing a pragmatic approach given the challenges of operating regionally and that it may eventually manage to 'regionalise'.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ See <http://venturesafrica.com/ethiopia-sudan-bilateral-relations-a-model-for-regional-integration/>

⁶⁵ <http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2014/04/23/ethiopia-slowly-opens-up;>
[http://allafrica.com/stories/201211250386.html;](http://allafrica.com/stories/201211250386.html)
<http://www.mfa.gov.et/weekHornAfrica/morewha.php?wi=1340#1335>

⁶⁶ The challenge of operating regionally is regularly mentioned in presentations of a range of different programmes, e.g. Kabayo, 2014
http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/8.%20Partnerships%20to%20implement%20IDDRSI.pdf

A recent example is the IGAD-convened meeting between Kenya and Ethiopia on cross-border pastoral issues under the guise of the World Bank financed Kenya-Ethiopia Cross-Border Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project, part of IDDRSI.⁶⁷ Similar meetings have been held between Kenya and Uganda for the Karamojong Cluster, around similar themes. While, scores of Somali cadets have been trained in Ethiopian military and police colleges in recent years, the level of bilateralism appears higher in economic than peace and security-related affairs.

The literature and interviewees are divided on the implications of such developments for regional integration. While some suggest that increasing bilateralism can be seen as a way to build regionalism upwards, starting small around key areas of bilateral interest where IGAD can and does also play a supporting role, others point to IGAD's limited organisational capacity, particularly on trade and economic matters, that may imply such bilateralism may be intended to bypass IGAD, thus undermining its role. Again, much of the impetus for these agreements appears to come from Ethiopia, due to its centrality in the region, but ostensibly also as a choice by the Ethiopian government to use this approach rather than regional approaches through IGAD with the exception of the Berbera Corridor, where Ethiopian interests have been adopted by IGAD.⁶⁸

Part of IGAD's work on sub-regional and cross-border integration relates to efforts to formalise currently informal trade networks. According to some authors, the success and versatility of informal trade networks in the IGAD region may offer an alternative path to future regional economic integration outside the framework of formal institutions (e.g. Healy, 2011). In particular Love (2009) states that "from the vantage point of the capital cities, however, the borderlands look less like a hub of vital economic interaction than a probable source of trouble". As such, the Ethiopian government reportedly gives short shrift to proponents of pastoralist development, routinely dismissing 'anthropologists and foreigners' and accusing them of romanticizing the nomadic way of life. Nonetheless, Ethiopia has licensed informal traders in some of the large border trading towns such as Moyale (for Kenya), Tug Wajale (for Somaliland) and Metema (for Sudan).

This again then points to the existing and growing forms of regional economic integration, but where the IGAD institutions are not (at present) a driving force. More broadly, this highlights that formal institutions only frame part of regional integration, potentially also offering a path to more formal regionalism by building on these practices.

4.3. Actors and incentives

The progress or lack of it in economic integration ultimately relate to the interests of countries and groups within countries and whether they aim to address these through regional processes. As interviewees regularly pointed out, IGAD is neither given capacity to deliver nor empowered to enforce implementation of commitments made. In particular, Ethiopian government policies often appear to define the speed and degree of implementation of the IGAD agenda there and among other countries. While its bilateral approach to neighbouring countries also defines the economic integration taking place and may undermine regional processes, it may also offer an opportunity for future regionalisation of these, if IGAD member states can agree or accept that they form a suitable basis.

⁶⁷ http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1104:igad-convenes-ethiopia-and-kenya-to-meet-over-cross-border-pastoral-issues&catid=43:agriculture-and-environment&Itemid=126

⁶⁸ In infrastructures, IGAD spent "most of its allocation of the 10th EDF [Regional Indicative Programme] funds on Berbera Corridor studies" and for the next planned period of EU infrastructure funding, "the Berbera Corridor was the only IGAD prioritized project" (IGAD, 2014). See IGAD (2014) presentation http://slministryofplanning.org/images/7HLACF/15_IGAD_Berbera%20Corridor.pdf

Although scholars highlight the important role of the private sector and/or civil society as demandeur for greater regional integration (e.g. Mattli, 1989), in the IGAD region these groups have generally not been visible in pushing for greater IGAD integration in spite of both an IGAD Business Forum and an NGO/CSO Platform. There is little evidence of these playing a role either in channelling private sector and CSO concerns to the regional level, or in stimulating interest in regional markets. This partly relates to the similar fora in the EAC and COMESA regions, but also to the fact that for the majority of private sector operators, though not all, Kenya is a target market but not the rest of IGAD, especially given the volatility of the region and risks involved.

In general terms this suggests that IGAD is somewhat detached from the economic interests of the private sector, highlighting the need to better understand where some critical mass of economic interests might be leveraged to further strengthen the cause of regional economic integration in the region, or where IGAD can play a specific role – its role in facilitating investment into Somalia was mentioned, for example.

4.3.1. Ethiopian 'national interests'

While much may depend on the relationships of leaders, particularly given their prominence in the way IGAD institutions operate, Ethiopian politics emerge as being particularly important for what economic integration takes place. According to Verhoeven (2015), “the Ethiopian government re-embraced huge regional ambitions under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who governed Ethiopia from 1991 until his death in 2012.” This was to fulfil a vision of a Great Ethiopia “finally” fulfilling its historical destiny. “On the one hand, Meles understood that forging alliances and acquiring international legitimacy would boost the Ethiopian economy and consolidate ERPDF rule. On the other hand, he saw a domestically secure Ethiopia as uniquely capable of ridding Africa of the epithet “the hopeless continent.” (Verhoeven, 2015). As such, “Meles, his successor Hailemariam Desalegn, and the party’s powerful politburo cast their vision of a Great Ethiopia in terms of benign regional hegemony: What is good for Ethiopia is good for the Horn of Africa” (Verhoeven, 2015). This has meant that Ethiopian increasingly projects itself through the regional organizations that Addis Ababa dominates.

In line with this interpretation, Ethiopia recently took over the chairmanship of COMESA despite not implementing the COMESA FTA. After chairing and hosting the 18th COMESA summit in March 2015, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister referred again to the need for “the speedy implementation of COMESA’s regional integration programmes, particularly the establishment of a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa’ while underlining the relevance of “Inclusive and Sustainable industrialization” as a theme for regional discussions.⁶⁹ Ethiopia is also chairperson of the AU High Level Trade Commission (interview - AUC), ostensibly signalling interest in the regional trade agenda, while also hosting the Eastern Africa Power Pool. However, as flagged above, sceptics dispute that Ethiopia is interested in trade liberalisation, even suggesting that a low liberalising IGAD FTA might even be in Ethiopian interests in order to control the speed at which it takes place and avoid competition from the likes of Egypt and other COMESA members.

This then highlights the regional aspirations, but also the tensions that are created in attaining these while satisfying a potentially fragile political settlement. As Verhoeven (2011) points out, “The ERPDF’s legitimacy rests on delivering rapid economic growth, while ensuring it is more widely shared than in the past to meet the population’s newly raised expectations.” At the same time, Verhoeven (2011) also highlights that internal factors in Ethiopia constrain its emergence as a regional leader, particularly in terms of its willingness to liberalise its economy.

⁶⁹ The 18th Summit Communiqué “Commends Ethiopia on its commitment to join the COMESA FTA” (COMESA, 2015).

It is possible that part of Ethiopian reluctance to liberalise is based on sound economic logic. The Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority estimated that current revenue from exports to COMESA members amounted to 4.2% of total export revenue, and the cost of imports from COMESA members amounted to 3.7% of total import costs (Mekonnen and Lulie, 2014). Significant imports from COMESA member states include tobacco (15% of total imports), soap and polish (12%), petroleum (8.2%), and fertiliser (7%). While these volumes are small, some of these imports – notably petroleum and fertiliser – are essential. The rents from COMESA trade are therefore relatively small, although Healy (2011) suggests that Ethiopia's weak tax revenue performance, at 9.9 percent of GDP compared with 20.9 percent in Kenya, means that "Ethiopia is much more wary about the loss of duties that would result from forming a customs union [or FTA]". Further, Ethiopia's manufacturing sector is still weak, even among COMESA countries, raising concerns about its ability to compete with cheaper imports (Ethiopia MoT, 2011).

Mekonnen and Lulie (2014) also cite work on the implications of Ethiopia implementing the TFTA. Based on one analysis, they find that "Given that its manufacturing sector lacks competitive advantages, it would probably contract if tariffs were reciprocally reduced by member countries. This contradicts the industrial focus of the current Growth and Transformation Plan." This final line then offers a clear insight into how and why Ethiopia behaves as it does in terms of defining and implementing the regional trade agenda.

Ethiopia also has growing economic interests tied to neighbouring Sudan. This partly relates to Sudan becoming a significant oil exporter in 1999 with production of some 450–500,000 barrels per day, thus supplying 80 percent of Ethiopia's needs. In exchange, Sudan receives Nile waters for irrigated agriculture and hydroelectric power: "Ethiopia provides the power, Sudan grows the food and Egypt brings the cash'. One might add, 'South Sudan provides the oil'" (Verhoeven, 2011). At the same time, Sudan's National Congress Party (NCP) sees dependence on Ethiopian power as a 'national security risk', meaning that any bargain along these lines might be seen as recognising the superiority of Ethiopia's hydro-strategy which might compromise its own plans for a dam-building strategy, intended to recalibrate Sudan's political economy (Verhoeven, 2011). South Sudan's independence has also somewhat regionalised the issue of oil outputs so that tensions over revenues between Sudan and South Sudan also affect Ethiopian interests.

4.3.2. From Kenya to the region

Beyond Ethiopia's centrality, Kenya has a strategic position in the regional transport and trade network and a strong private sector with potential interest in serving regional markets within and beyond the EAC (See EAC Study). This is due to the pivotal role of the port of Mombasa in the transit network for landlocked EAC states meaning that 80 percent of Uganda's transit traffic passes through Mombasa port (Nathan Associates 2011) while South Sudan's land-locked nature also creates conditions on paper for greater physical connectivity.

Kenya is central to many key regional initiatives as it seeks integration and cooperation as a way to advance its own economic prosperity. Not only does Kenya seek to be a maritime gateway for South Sudan, Uganda, and southern Ethiopia, but it also views these countries as markets for its good and services. Indicatively, Kenya's Medium Term Plan to implement Vision 2030 contains 16 mentions of Ethiopia (GoK, 2012) compared to zero mentions of Kenya in Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plan (GoE, 2010). Kenya's development of the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project has the potential to bring development to large parts of its arid and underdeveloped northern territories while providing a potentially more cost- efficient alternative to Mombasa for South Sudan and southern Ethiopia. The first phase may involve extending an oil pipeline to Juba (World Bank, 2014).

4.3.3. 'Private sector interests'?

Despite the existence of an IGAD Business Forum (IBF), private sector interests in IGAD markets are seemingly varied and dispersed. Awareness of the IBF remains low among organised business not to mention informal business, while its own institutional weaknesses reportedly make it unattractive for potential funders (Interviewee). As cited, companies in the region tend to see the EAC Business Council and the COMESA Business Council as stronger and more relevant in terms of representing their interests and offering market opportunities (interviewee, Uganda).

The weak private sector voice in IGAD economic issues also goes back to the central role of Ethiopia and its government's slow, controlled approach to economic opening. While neighbouring countries appear interested in the large Ethiopian market, government control of key sectors and a strategy of slow opening means that the current opportunities are limited, with Ethiopian policy essentially dictating the speed of economic liberalisation in the region. Ethiopian firms, and consequently its government, are also wary of Kenyan competition. Ethiopia does engage with cross-border trade promotion through investment fora and business-to-business joint councils (interview) but again this is done at a bilateral level, not through regional approaches, something that may reflect the nature of the Ethiopian private sector and its willingness or ability to compete and to influence government policy.⁷⁰

Perhaps more fundamentally, talking to Ethiopian private sector representatives they are clear that while there is rising investment in South Sudan and Sudan, for the majority of private sector operators, Kenya is a target market but not the rest of IGAD, especially given the volatility of the region and risks involved.

Further, the "commanding heights" of the Ethiopian economy are in the hands of state-owned enterprises and business elites closely wedded to the EPRDF project (Verhoeven, 2015). Woodward (2013b) cites World Bank studies estimating that "nearly half of the business sector of the economy was controlled by EPRDF-affiliated companies operating in fields such as telecoms, transport, cement, construction and pharmaceuticals, with financial terms from the banks". One conglomerate linked to the party is the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), and the group of companies led by Ethio-Saudi businessmen Mohammed al-Amoudi, especially in agriculture. This close alliance between key business sectors in Ethiopia and the ruling party largely rules out the Ethiopian private sector as a driver of greater economic liberalisation through pressure on government. Further, a recent study finds that Ethiopian businesses are less competitive than their COMESA, again lowering the interest in opening up to foreign investment and competition (Ethiopia MoT, 2011).

Beyond Ethiopia, South Sudan is an oft-cited opportunity for regional trade and investment, with many businesses from the IGAD region already entering, particularly from Uganda but also Ethiopia. Forty percent of South Sudan meat supply is said to come from Uganda, for example. However, as South Sudan is attempting to enter the EAC and COMESA, the role of IGAD as a facilitator let alone a driver of this process is limited. Sudanese investors are said to be increasingly attracted to Ethiopia, although at the same time one interviewee stated that "the Sudan labour market is driven by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates" through migrant labour, reflecting economic interests outside the IGAD region.

At a more micro level, private sector interests are increasingly investing in extractive resources in the region. Although therefore not relying on any regional frameworks, investments in the Karamoja region, for example, has reportedly reduced pasture for grazing and water resources, in an already water-scarce region. This then increases the role of IGAD, both in terms of conflict but also in terms of its role in promoting the interests of pastoralists through the likes of IDDRSI, discussed in Box 1 above.

⁷⁰ Interview, Ethiopian Embassy, Brussels.

Love (2009) also points to the importance of informal livestock trade for Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djibouti and southeast Eritrea. The economic viability of Somaliland and Puntland both depend heavily upon traditional livestock trade, of which some 50–60% is estimated to originate in Ethiopia, mostly in informal cross-border trade. Port duties for exports and imports are thought to contribute to over half the small revenue of the Somaliland government, which in 2008 totalled only \$51m. Puntland is also heavily dependent on livestock export, which possibly contributes around 40% of GDP and traditionally draws on supplies from. As Love (2009) states, “Its dominance has given traders and merchants, predominantly of the Isaaq clan, a key role in eventually stabilizing the political situation.”

As this short summary highlights, there are a wide range of distinct business interests operating between countries, but also according to ‘sector’ within countries, not least between formal business and the informal trade networks. On that basis, and given COMESA membership of most IGAD members, it is unsurprising to find the relatively limited demand from the private sector for a greater role for IGAD on economic integration.

4.3.4. Port and corridor rivalries

As discussed above, the large Ethiopian market combined with its loss of an outlet to the sea since 1998 has led to large shifts in trade flows in the region, with interest in numerous corridors in the region. In 1997, Eritrea was handling 80–85 percent of Ethiopia’s international traffic with only 15 to 20 percent passing through Djibouti - the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict pushed goods passing through Djibouti from 1.7 million tonnes in 1997 to 3.1 million tonnes in 1998, and 4.2 million tonnes in 2002 (Love, 2009). Port Sudan and Berbera are also emerging as important ports for Ethiopian exports while completion of the LAPSSET also brings Kenya’s Lamu into the competition. Revenues from ports are a key rent in the region, with their importance highlighted by the case of Somalia where al Shabaab militants fighting Somalia’s transitional government are believed to raise at least \$35m per year from port revenues, including taxation of sugar imports through the port of Kismayo destined for Kenya, (Healy, 2011). As the economies in the region continue to grow, import-export corridors and sea routes are ever more important (e.g. World Bank, 2014).

The ports and the associated road corridors are of particular strategic importance for Ethiopia, whose Government is keen to expand the country’s limited maritime access. Berbera, which is almost the same distance as Djibouti from Addis Ababa, is well placed as an alternative port to serve Ethiopia and its neighbours. Djibouti, Berbera and Port Sudan are all cited as target ports in Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11-2014/15 (GoE, 2010).

It is suggested that routes will become increasingly competitive with one another as Berbera strives to draw more of Ethiopia’s trade away from Djibouti and Ethiopia seeks competition among alternative routes. At present Somaliland benefits from trade with Ethiopia largely from informal cross-border activities, from which the Somaliland government extracts income through port fees but which tend to evade Ethiopian dues (Love, 2009). The more Ethiopia succeeds in regulating trade and in integrating its Somali Region into the rest of its economy, the greater will be the competition faced by Berbera from Djibouti, in due course Assab, and eventually even Bossaso (Love, 2009). Kenyan news sources talk about the competition Ethiopia’s interest elsewhere may create for Lamu when it reaches completion.⁷¹

Djibouti holds a critical position as main port for Ethiopian exports and imports but is also highly dependent on this trade. Since the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia has been increasingly using Port Sudan’s facilities to diversify from its overdependence on Djibouti (which costs an average of \$700 million in port fees

⁷¹ See: <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-shrugs-off-growing-competition-for-Ethiopian-cargo/-/1248928/2881422/-/68vyecz/-/index.html>

annually). This may change again with construction of the Djibouti- Addis Ababa railway, already underway with support from Chinese funding (Dersso, 2014) and new investments to vastly expand Djibouti's port with five new terminals planned for 2017.⁷² That Djibouti agreed to give Rwanda a 20-hectare plot in its port this year also suggests the regional reach of their ambitions, potentially benefiting from the Kampala-Juba-Addis Ababa-Djibouti Corridor which has reportedly been identified for development.⁷³

While competition among these corridors and ports might ostensibly serve Ethiopian interests, Woodward (2013a) also sees them as sources of tension in the area of Djibouti, Somaliland and northeast Ethiopia. The overlap between port concessions and wider international relations is underlined by on-going disputes over the Port of Djibouti, where the government removed the concession from Dubai Ports amidst claims of corruption, causing a rift in Djibouti-UAE relations. At a domestic level, similar complaints surround the tendering process at Mombasa port and Berbera port where large multinational firms such as Maersk, and Bolloré Logistics (also bidding on Mombasa and with subsidiaries in Djibouti and Port Sudan) are carrying out their own competition to tie up the African ports market.⁷⁴

While these dynamics might suggest a role for a regional body to oversee regional ports, competition and harmonising procedures, it is not clear that IGAD can play such a role despite its importance for regional economic integration. Further, there may be tensions regarding which REC has a mandate for looking at trade facilitation along these corridors. The latest COMESA Summit made note of the implementation of the cross border infrastructure projects in the Horn of Africa and endorsed the COMESA Council decisions on establishing the Djibouti Corridor Authority and the implementation of One Stop Border Post along the corridor. While not necessarily undermining IGAD in its role, the issue of overlapping mandates nonetheless comes back once again.

Box 6: LAPSET and competing interests

One concrete sub-regional (this time trilateral) undertaking to link countries in the region is the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSET) Corridor, one of Africa's largest planned infrastructure projects. Originally conceived in 1975 and launched in 2012, the LAPSET aims to foster transport linkage between Kenya, Southern Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia. It includes an improved road, proposed railway and pipeline linking Kenya and Ethiopia and South Sudan, respectively, aimed at achieving "Dynamic promotion of regional socioeconomic development along transport corridor especially in the hitherto under served Northern, Eastern and North-Eastern parts of Kenya", which are also part of the ASAL region (Government of Kenya, Vision 2030).⁷⁵ Feasibility studies for corridor components and the design of three (3) berths and associated facilities in Lamu are complete. Although not an IGAD coordinated project, its regional nature and potential importance in linking Kenya South Sudan, Ethiopia and beyond mean the dynamics behind it are interesting for looking at economic integration.

Spearheaded by Kenya, the location and ambition of the project clearly links to those of IGAD - Kenya-South Sudan transport connectivity is seen as one of IGAD's 6 regional priority road corridors (World Bank, 2014). Infrastructure linkages are a key area of the IGAD agenda, with an IGAD infrastructure master plan currently being developed with the support of AfDB for the region.⁷⁶ While LAPSET therefore fits with IGAD strategy and ambitions, and IGAD officials state that IGAD is and has been involved, the fact that it is not IGAD-driven again points to the hybrid approach to regionalism of sub-regional projects within a broad regional framework.

⁷² See: <http://www.portdedjibouti.com/doraleh-multi-purpose-port>

⁷³ See: <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/East-Africa-s-future-The-pull-of-the-north/-/2558/1898914/-/view/printVersion/-/dfaph8/-/index.html>

⁷⁴ See: <http://www.slnnews.com/2015/02/somaliland-after-bolloré-dp-world-is-also-interested-in-berbera-port/> and <http://www.somalilandpress.com/somalilandthe-bolloré-port-deal-lacks-transparency/>

⁷⁵ See: http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/pillars/project/macro_enablers/181

⁷⁶ See: <http://www.ildc2conference.org/custom-content/uploads/2013/08/IGAD-ALMATY.pdf>

In political-economic terms, some suggest that South Sudan agreement to export its oil through LAPPSET is critical to its economic viability given current underfunding. Interestingly, all IGAD member states with exception of Somalia, have significant financial interest in where the pipeline from South Sudan's block B, mostly located in Jonglei State is built (ICG, 2014). Kenya and Uganda sit atop new oil finds and the pipeline infrastructure to export their oil might allow South Sudanese and its transit fees, to flow through East Africa rather than a proposed alternative pipeline traversing Ethiopia to Djibouti. Total Oil is a major stakeholder in Ugandan oil and a proponent of also linking Uganda and the South Sudan pipeline to an outlet in Kenya (ICG, 2014) although oil firms reportedly are pushing for an outlet to Mombasa rather than Lamu, citing security fears.⁷⁷

While principally a Kenya-led project, the regional nature of the project ostensibly offers opportunities for IGAD to play a role in further encouraging regional economic integration, perhaps highlighting the importance of champions, aligned interests between countries, and the benefits of a light institutional approach to integrating economies.

4.3.5. External actors

The recently launched Horn of Africa Initiative by the World Bank (2014) with the EU, UN and other actors focuses on economic integration. This again aims to promote integration by supporting connectivity through regional transport infrastructure, and increased access to broadband, along with improved enabling environments to encourage a competitive private sector market; fostering cross-border growth and stability through support for local governance, border management, and trade facilitation; and supporting the regional development of the extractives sector through pipeline development and expansion of tertiary education. While valuable, the fact that donors have looked at IGAD as a REC and attempted to promote its role as regional economic community through formal agreements and institutions appears not to have led to greater economic integration. In contrast, the above discussion of member state interests also suggests that these will ultimately determine the success or not of such initiatives.

4.4. Section conclusions

As this section highlights, there are a diverse range of interests at play in the IGAD economic integration agenda. 'National interests' are key in shaping the regional economic agenda. While Kenya and Uganda largely seek their economic agendas through the EAC, Ethiopia is seen as a blocker to either IGAD-COMESA or IGAD-EAC relations, while its state-led approach to development may favour keeping IGAD as a smaller and ultimately more flexible economic integration tool that can progress at a speed it determines. At the same time, Ethiopia is establishing bilateral agreements with nearly all IGAD members covering transport, trade, investment, mining and tourism. Cross-border electricity, oil and water deals, and the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor all represent sub-regional approaches to economic integration. While IGAD has a limited role in these, they may represent opportunities for IGAD to build a future role.

Beyond country interests, economic integration has mobilised little collective demand from private sector firms and groups due to their great diversity. Ethiopian business interest is primarily limited to Kenya, and increasingly South Sudan and then the Middle East, Europe and China, with ongoing conflicts and risk in other IGAD economies limiting the degree of explicit private sector demand for economic integration. Kenya pursues its economic goals through the EAC although it and the other IGAD members all appear

⁷⁷ See <http://www.africaintelligence.fr/LOI/dossier/oleoduc-petrole-kenya-ouganda-lamu-mombasa-kenyatta-museveni-total-tullow-oil-africa-oil-cnooc-toyota-tsusho?did=108017245&eid=221183> and <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Kenya--Uganda-leaders-agree-on-route-for-oil-pipeline/-/2558/2827804/-/bcbwe8/-/index.html>.

interested in Ethiopian markets when Ethiopia is ready. The high numbers of informal cross-border traders, particularly in livestock, may be more interested in remaining outside formal regional channels than holding regional leaders to account in implementing formal regional integration commitments. The challenge to policy-makers is therefore to understand how to link to and build on the range of business interests, resilience and pastoralist livelihoods issues and the broader regional economic integration agenda to support economic well being across the region.

A key question then relates to how IGAD countries might collaborate further on the economic integration agenda, how IGAD institutions might harness potential business interests to promote the regional economic agenda, and how this might take place given the strong role and specific path of Ethiopia's economic policy. At present, and despite Ethiopia's reliance on its neighbours for access to the sea, economic, not least rents from ports, seem to suggest that this is unavoidable. That then raises the question of whether those donors financing IGAD are also willing to accept such a situation and adapt policies accordingly.

5. Overall conclusions

Summary

This report has sought to understand the main political economy actors and factors that determine how IGAD sets and implements its agenda in the Horn of Africa. Focusing on the areas of peace and security and economic integration and using the five lenses described in the introduction, it identifies the most important within-country and between-country historical, structural and institutional factors, and provide evidence on how these influence IGAD institutions as they do.

The findings suggest that the combination of IGAD's original circumstances, donor finance and continental objectives create pressure for IGAD to 'look like a REC'. However, in spite of having many of the institutional *forms* that go with that, member state interests dictate that their *function* is often secondary to more *ad hoc* processes that involve frequent, personalised meeting Heads of State, with little systematic, institutionalised approaches to addressing regional common interests. This is particularly so in the field of peace and security. So while IGAD has been set up "to reflect comparable regional developments elsewhere in Africa, such as ECOWAS and SADC" (Woodward, 2013), it is quite different from other RECs in the way it operates. Plans to replace the current establishment agreement with a treaty seem unlikely to alter this.

Nonetheless, IGAD is found to serve an important purpose to Member State leaders in addressing some of the most pressing issues faced in the region, most notably peace and security. It may yet provide the basis for greater future integration that builds on the gains made so far, particularly if current bilateral and sub-regional approaches can be built upon at a regional level.

Key Findings

The analysis finds that while numerous structural factors support the logic of regional integration, this is undermined by facts on the ground. More specifically, common environmental challenges, the presence of three landlocked member states and growing economic ties of interdependence in infrastructures for water, energy and roads suggest important regional benefits, but these are often mitigated by the long-run historical conflicts and tensions in the region.

The analysis also highlights the centrality of Ethiopia to the region both physically and metaphorically. With borders with all other IGAD member states except Uganda, and as an 'emerging hegemon', much of what takes place in the IGAD region involves Ethiopia and Ethiopian interests, and so is shaped by Ethiopia's developmental strategy of slow and controlled economic opening. This then determines much of IGAD's room for manoeuvre, both in a positive and negative sense. This is particularly so in the realm of economic integration and trade. At the same time, Ethiopia has long been the only Member State to regularly pay its IGAD contribution on time. While suspicions are voiced about the role of Ethiopia in defining and driving the IGAD agenda, IGAD originally was, and still is seen as an effective neutral platform to address bilateral tensions and rivalries among specific members and (at least partially) offsetting the influence of specific member states such as Ethiopia, or external parties.

Progress in developing cross-border infrastructures for transport, electricity, oil and water has been greater than for trade integration, reflecting geopolitical interests among IGAD member states and the more aspirational nature of the trade agenda. Member state politics mean that where progress on economic integration is taking place in the IGAD region, it is often on the basis of bilateral agreements, again often

led by Ethiopia, with Nile River waters Ethiopia's growing electricity generating capacity a key part of this. IGAD members also use COMESA and the EAC to pursue their economic goals, with IGAD committed to supporting COMESA in its trade agenda, though this may change with a new strategy. Kenyan and Ugandan membership of IGAD emerges as being (currently) related more to security than economic concerns. While institutional forms exist to engage a broader cross-section of private sector and civil society actors around the IGAD agenda, these are relatively weak. The actors that might drive market integration are not well organised, whether in terms of formalised private sector actors or informal cross-border traders.

Conflict resolution and management is the one area where IGAD has managed to build on common interests among member countries, partly due to the political cost of cross-border conflict spillovers. However, steps to further institutionalise the peace and security architecture are seen as potentially undermining the freedom of Heads of State, who may prefer the current *ad hoc* approaches to conflict resolution and management. While political appointments to the IGAD Secretariat and the distribution of IGAD specialised institutions among Member States is criticised as inefficient, this reflects the reality of inter-state bargaining and can be seen as raising member state ownership of the IGAD agenda. IGAD has managed to play an important role in neutralising 'national interests' from any one country that might have come to dominate regional security relations. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains instrumental, hosting all Peace and Security related institutions, chairing IGAD since 2008, and playing a key role in South Sudan mediation efforts.

From its inception, IGAD(D) has been heavily funded and influenced by donor finance. While playing an important role in realising IGAD's programmes, reliance on donor finance creates heavy reporting costs and reduces autonomy for the IGAD Secretariat to target resources to areas where it sees the need, unless in line with donor interests and (often earmarked) funding plans. Further, donor finance is seen to be partly to blame for the focus on developing IGAD's formal institutions rather than focusing on their function in practice.

Implications

The above findings suggest that supporting IGAD as though it were operating solely according to formal mandates and institutions will lead to frustration with progress, as is currently frequently voiced by some donors and other interviewees. Trying to *alter* the influence of foundational factors and the lack of inter-state trust and willingness to cooperate regionally will be challenging in the short to medium term. However, by understanding the different interests within and between states, and why progress is made in some sectors and not others – with Ethiopian interests clearly key for IGAD – may offer opportunities to *adapt* policy reform or support to current interests and constraints, to somehow *avoid* clear blockages to reform related to current circumstances, and may even suggest *awaiting* more propitious political-economic circumstances. This suggests a need for policy-reforms and interventions to take these '4 As' into account in establishing realistic policy ambitions, brokering partnerships and identifying champions, discussed in turn below.

In particular, the analysis suggests the need for policies to *adapt* to the IGAD context and incentives that countries, their leaders, and the potential beneficiaries of regional integration face. This is not to deny the importance of formal regional structures, but rather suggests that further progress in IGAD integration must rely on a combination of support for top-down, state-led processes and building on bilateral, national, informal and *ad hoc* processes. This is in line with Healy (2011), who argues for a less state-centric

approach to regional integration that could capitalise on the strengths of informal cross-border relationships. This latter possibility is also referred to by the EU (EC, 2011) and the World Bank (2014).

Fisher (2014) suggests international actors should fund more regular, high-level summits at the regional level, rather than the everyday activities of the IGAD secretariat and other bureaucratic organs, “as there is widespread sentiment that these bodies lack independent authority and are highly vulnerable to capture from regional hegemons” (Fischer, 2014). The analysis here also underlines the important role such high-level summits seem to have played, particularly in conflict mediation. The challenge may lie in how a formal regional institution can or should engage more proactively with such informal dynamics.

Other ways of adapting to current incentive structures might relate to the political traction around corridors as vehicles for promoting wider, regional reforms in the IGAD region. By focusing attention on infrastructure corridors and ports, regional policy-makers and donor supporters can further build on and promote growing economic interdependency. Moreover, this way they also can encourage private sector investment around key transport routes, potentially through business and trade fora that link with donor private sector engagement strategies, simultaneously creating a constituency with an interest in furthering the economic integration agenda. Ethiopia is clearly at the centre of any such efforts in the IGAD region.

The report also highlights the great difference in political salience between IGAD peace and security and regional economic concerns. At root seems to be the clear and present danger of cross-border spillover of conflicts, with clear costs to inaction, that stand in contrast to the far more opaque, aspired to objectives of trade or economic integration. Infrastructures appear to offer more visible political gains, giving this political traction, at least at the sub-regional level. If indeed the strengths of current IGAD systems are their adaptability, this then should be recognised as a strength, with support to build policies around that.

Beyond attempts to alter – or adapt to – the hard to change incentives facing governments and other actors involved in regional integration, policy-makers and those supporting them can also attempt to bypass or avoid current incentives through alternative approaches. To some extent this is what the plethora of bilateral agreements does, avoiding the potential tensions of regional approaches. While regional policy-makers might want to think in these terms to achieve their regional objectives, there is nonetheless a danger in losing political legitimacy and creating multiple, potentially overlapping structures.

Finally, the report also highlights the importance of timing, with key events sometimes altering circumstances in unforeseen ways - the brief discussion of Egypto-Ethiopian relations around unforeseen political changes in Egypt is a case in point. This is to say that it may sometimes be better for policy-makers to await propitious conditions for achieving regional goals, requiring some opportunism but also preparation or plans and coalitions for when the moment comes - history is made of critical junctures, and policy-makers must be ready for when conditions suddenly align so that key interests can be recognised and aligned.

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Annex 1: IGAD Governance

The Council of Ministers, formed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and a designated minister, is tasked with making policy recommendations to the Assembly, and supervising the work of the Secretariat. Importantly it is also tasked with monitoring implementation of the regional agenda and to approve the IGAD budget among other broader roles such as promoting peace and security, monitoring and enhancing humanitarian activities and following up on political and security affairs (IGAD, 1996).

The Committee of Ambassadors is formed of member state ambassadors to Djibouti, with the principle role of advising and guiding the Executive Secretary of the IGAD Secretariat. This is chaired by H.E. Suleiman Dedefo Woshe, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti. As a permanent representative body set up to watch the IGAD Secretariat, the Committee of Ambassadors is sometimes seen as intrusive, regressive and unprofessional in its intervention. Partly, this comes from the fact that they heavily influence the decision of their capitals on matters IGAD presents to the Member States.

IGAD has staff members from all Member States. The Executive Secretary is not conferred with the power to appoint directors, who are instead traditionally allocated to each MSs: Agriculture-Djibouti, Economic integration-Sudan, Legal Counsel-Kenya, Peace and Security-Ethiopia, IDDRSI-Uganda, CEWARN-Kenya, ICPAC-Somalia, Finance and Administration-Uganda. As a result there are situations where directors may be more responsive to their home country than to the Executive Secretary or IGAD as a whole.⁷⁸ The other lower ranking positions are filled by open vacancy and competition among nationals of MSs.

Generally speaking, the role of Executive Secretary on substantive agenda decisions is limited while each member state champions a specific area.⁷⁹ However he does have an important role in setting an agenda, resource mobilization, taking decisions on non-emergency and issues outside the field of peace and security. Thus the Executive Secretary has to work closely with MSs separately on separate issues. Internally, the Executive Secretary is considered very popular and supported by his staff members for his decentralized management style which empowers experts to run their professional work without interference, and his fund raising capacity, having succeeded in tripling the IGAD budget in his tenure. While the relations between the Executive Secretary and Committee of Ambassadors are generally smooth (except regarding discussions of member state arrears) he is also said to have close and cordial relations with the Council of Ministers with very few disagreements.

Two additional substantive management bodies are the IGAD Focal Points and the IGAD Strategic Implementation Committee (ISIC). The first is composed of focal points from Member State Ministers of Foreign Affairs and mostly technical and serving also as liaison persons between IGAD and Member States to inform the position of the Member States. The ISIC, currently not functioning and with no strategic relevance was supposed to be a technical body mainly drawn from the Secretariat plus the Focal Points but it also invites donors from time to time. The main challenge in this arrangement is seen as the Committee of Ambassadors overstepping its mandate in a manner that interferes in the independence of the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat, and the mismatch between the positions of members of the CoA and their respective focal points and in some instances with the principals in the capital.

⁷⁸ During the Ethiopia-Eritrean border war, a friction reportedly erupted between the Director of Peace and Security, from Ethiopia, and the Executive Secretary from Eritrea.

⁷⁹ These include: Ethiopia - infrastructure; Sudan - trade and migration; Kenya - drought and resilience; Uganda - security (interview).

Table 4: IGAD Specialised Institutions and offices⁸⁰

Organisation	Location	Head	Areas
ICPAC IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre	Nairobi, Kenya	Dr. Guleid A. Artan (Somalia?)	Timely early warning climate information and sector applications to enable the region cope with various risks associated with extreme climate variability and change. ICPAC also provides climate applications for poverty alleviation, environment management and sustainable development for the IGAD member countries.
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2002)	Dir. Richard Barno	Three clusters areas: the Karamoja Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda); the Somali Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Ethiopia and Kenya) and Dikhil Cluster (covering the cross-border area of Ethiopia and Djibouti).
ISSP ⁸¹ IGAD Security Sector Programme (replaced ICPAT ⁸² - IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2011)	Commander Abebe Muluneh, (Ethiopian)	Counter Terrorism, Maritime Security, Transnational Organised Crime, Security Institutions Capacity Building.
ICPALD ⁸³ IGAD Center for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development ⁸⁴	Nairobi, Kenya (2012)	Coordinator Dr. Solomon Munyua	
SFO Somalia Facilitation Office (Office of the IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation ⁸⁵)	Addis Ababa (2008)	Amb. Mohamed Abdi Affey - Kenya)	
Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan ⁸⁶	Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Office in Juba, 2013	Amb. Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo, Kenya; Gen. Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi, Sudan	
IRAPP	Kampala, Uganda, 2007	Improving regional	

⁸⁰ Info gathered from IGAD website, and IGAD Facebook Page and other websites as mentioned in relevant footnotes

⁸¹ This is essentially a restructured IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), launched in 2011. <http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/about-us-main-menu/background>

⁸² <http://www.icpat.org/index.php/home-mainmenu-1>

⁸³ <http://www.igadportal.com/index.php/executivesecretary/1241-icpald-strategic-plan-workshop-press-release>

⁸⁴ ToR for setting up ICPALD - http://igad.int/attachments/433_ICPALD%20STRATEGY2.pdf -

⁸⁵ http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=250&Itemid=180

⁸⁶ <http://southsudan.igad.int/index.php/about-us>

IGAD Regional HIV and AIDS Partnership Programme		collaboration and implementing interventions that add value to the efforts of each individual country.	
ISTVS IGAD Sheikh Technical Veterinary School and Reference Centre	Sheikh, Somaliland, affiliated to Makerere University in Uganda since 2009.		
IGAD Sudan Liaison Office	Khartoum, Sudan		
IGAD Liaison Office to South Sudan	Juba, South Sudan		
IGAD Kenya Liaison Office	Nairobi, Kenya		Multilateral development organisations
IGAD Liaison Office to the African Union	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia		African Union Commission
IGAD Resilience Analysis Unit ⁸⁷	Nairobi, Kenya (2014)		FAO, WFP, UNDP, EC
Technical Support Unit (TSU)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia		
Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ?	Khartoum (2009)	Special Envoy	
IGAD Business Arbitration Center ⁸⁸	Djibouti, Djibouti (TBC)		

⁸⁷ <http://resilience.igad.int/index.php/news/255-the-launch-of-the-resilience-analysis-unit-rau> Under IDDRSI.

⁸⁸ <http://www.wardheernews.com/djibouti-headquarter-igads-business-arbitration-center/>

Annex 2: List of Interviews

Abdi Roble, IGAD Coordinator Development Partners, Djibouti

Ahmed Habbane, Director of Planning & Coordination, IGAD, Djibouti

Aklilu Desta, Swedish Embassy focal point for IGAD (Addis)

Alba Ruben, EEAS Djibouti (EUD liaison for IGAD)

Alex Mukubwa, Foreign Service Office, IGAD Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uganda

Amb Tewolde Gebremeskel, IGAD Director of Peace and Security Unity, Addis

Ambassador Abu Zeid El Hassan, Head of IGAD Liaison Office to the AU, AUC

Azhari Abdele Karim, PM, Transport, Communications and Telecommunications, Adviser to Division of Economic Cooperation IGAD, Djibouti

Bantihun Getahun Emiru, Counselor II, Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the Benelux, Baltic Countries and the EU, Brussels

Batanai Clemence Chikwene, Trade Policy Officer, African Union Commission, Addis

Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS, Addis

Bineta Diop, AUC Chairperson's Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security

Jean-Bosco Butera, Chief of Staff of AUC Chairperson's Special Envoy on Woman, Peace and Security

Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, Senior Political Officer (AJOC Facilitator), AU Liaison Office in Sudan (AU-LOS)

Bruck Woldermariam - Danish Embassy - IGAD focal point, Addis

Camilla Bengtsson - SIDA, Addis -

Camilla Petra - EEAS Djibouti

Cleopas Ndorere, Principle Commercial Officer/External Trade/Bilateral Agreements – Uganda Ministry of Trade, Cooperatives and Industry

Cyprian Dihkusooka, Principal Disaster Management Officer, IDDRSI Focal Point, Uganda Office of the Prime Minister

Daniel Yifr, IGAD Advisor on P&S (Addis)

Désiré Assogbavi, Head of Oxfam International Liaison office to the AU

Elizabeth Choge, AUC-REC Coordination Officer, Peace and Security Department, AUC

Elsadig Abdallah, Director Economic Cooperation IGAD, Djibouti

Emmanuelle Guerne Bleich, FAO Country Director, Djibouti -

Fantu Farris, Programme Officer, Economic Integration and Trade, Regional Cooperation, Embassy to Sweden, Addis Ababa

Fatima Karroum, Adviser to Djibouti Ministry of Justice, Djibouti

Francis Ben Ataba (MP), Chairperson, Committee of Water Resources and Irrigation, South Sudan National Legislative Assembly

Getachew Regassa, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations, Addis Ababa

Hannah Tsasik, Resident Representative, Life and Peace Institute

Helen Hailu, IGAD Policy Officer, Djibouti

Henry Nyakojo, Advisor, EIF, Uganda Ministry of Trade, Cooperatives and Industry

Jean-Francois Hasperue, First Counsellor, Peace and Security Section, EU Delegation to the AU

Johnston Summit Oketch, Political Affairs Officer, UN Office to the AU

Joseph Clifford Birungi, Principal International Relations Officer, EAC Liaison Office to the AU

Ethel Sirengo, EAC Program Officer

Kagwe Mutahi, IGAD Liaison Officer to AU (Addis)

Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, Program Manager, Africa, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Legawork Asefa, Coordinator, Africa Peace Facility Fund, IGAD Secretariat.

Mehari, Taddele Maru, Independent Consultant

Mekdes Kebede, Financial Support Staff, Peace and Security Department, AUC

Michael Galabuzi, SG, Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, IGAD Business Forum Secretariat

Mike Bugason, Advisor the AU Special Envoy for LRA issues

Mohammed Moussa, IGAD Director of Agriculture & Environment

Moses Chrispus Okello, Conflict Analyst, Head of CEWARN-IGAD

Pascal Yao Konan, Officer, Conflict Management Division, Department of Peace and Security, AUC

Peter Lassen, Danish Embassy (Denmark as lead donor to IGAD Joint Financing Arrangement), Addis -

Prof Herman Musahara, Director of Research and Capacity Building and Dr. Abiye Daniel, OSSREA

Raymond Kirungi, Disaster Preparedness Officer, Office of the Prime Minister, Uganda

Sarah Mujabi, Programme Officer, Drylands Programmes, UNDP Uganda

Seth K. Fianya, Military Training Officer, Peace and Security Department, AUC

Shibeshi Bettemariam, SG, Business Development, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association

Stephen Kamukana, Senior Trade Officer, External Trade, Uganda Ministry of Trade, Cooperatives and Industry

Solomon Dersso, Project Leader Senior Researcher Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis, ISS

Teresa Ayenew, M&E Regional Coordinator, Nile Basin Discourse

Tom Waako, Projects Officer, Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat

Yayehyirad Abate, SG Member's Services, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association

Zouli Bonkouno, AU PIDA Adviser, Addis

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