

## **The nexus between food and nutrition security, and migration**

Clarifying the debate and charting a way forward

By Anna Knoll, Francesco Rampa, Carmen Torres, Paulina Bizzotto Molina and Noemi Cascone

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## Key messages

Politicians and donors often have a simplistic interpretation of the nexus between food security and migration assuming that investment in agriculture and rural development will automatically curb migration. This is not the case. We need a new narrative on the development benefits of migration for food and nutrition security (FNS); a more nuanced understanding of 'drivers of migration'; a 'Knowledge Agenda' to provide more evidence on the nexus.

Adopting a development approach means increasing the options available to individuals to allow them to pursue better agricultural, rural or urban livelihood opportunities, with safe and regular migration as one of those options. Complex migration dynamics should be mainstreamed into food and nutrition security strategies and initiatives. Donors, starting with the G7, should support transformative actions around the FNS-migration nexus in Africa, with a particular focus on women, nutrition, climate change and environmental sustainability.

Priority should be given to policies and actions that acknowledge human mobility as a pillar of sustainable food systems and inclusive territorial development. Special attention should be given to: smallholder farmers and small service providers; support for mobility of all food system players along better integrated urban-rural territories and (regional) food economies; large investments in infrastructure, especially digital and financial; inclusive governance arrangements centred on local authorities and organisations.



## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .....	iii
Acronyms .....	iii
Executive Summary .....	v
1. Introduction .....	1
2. Food and nutrition security-migration nexus: framing the debate and clarifying its parameters .....	2
2.1. The basic characteristics of the migration-food and nutrition security nexus.....	3
2.2. Towards a deeper analysis of the FNS-Migration nexus .....	5
3. Policy guidance on the FNS-migration Nexus, with recommendations for donors .....	19
3.1. A useful starting point: general ‘methodological’ recommendations .....	19
3.2. ‘Priority areas’ of intervention .....	20
3.3. The role of the donor community: putting into practice the G7 Ise-Shima Declaration through a “Taormina Initiative” .....	25
4. Charting a way forward: building blocks to make human mobility work for sustainable food systems and inclusive territorial development .....	33
Bibliography .....	36

## List of Boxes

Box 1. Terminology on migration .....	2
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## List of Figures

Figure 1	A model of the mechanisms that produce migration .....	6
Figure 2	Migration Decision-Making Process .....	16

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## Acronyms

AAA	Adapting Agriculture in Africa Initiative
ACBP	Africa Climate Business Plan
AFSI	Aquila Food Security Initiative
AfDB	African Development Bank
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
COP21	Paris Climate Change Conference - November 2015, Conference of the Parties
CREWS	Climate Risk Early Warning Systems
CSM	Civil Society Mechanism
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ETLS	ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAO RYM	FAO youth mobility, food security and rural poverty reduction project
FSN	Food and Nutrition Security
G7	Group of Seven
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GSD-FNS	Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition
HLPE	High Level Panel of Experts
ILO	International Labour Organization
INDCs	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LATAM	Latin America
MSMEs	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

N4G	Nutrition for Growth
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PASPED	Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PCSD	Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development
RAIP	Regional Agricultural Investment Programme
PSD	Private Sector for Development
SCN	UN Standing Committee on Nutrition
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SFS	Sustainable Food Systems
SINCE	Stemming irregular migration in northern & central Ethiopia
SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VGGT	Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests
WHO	World Health Organization

## Executive Summary

Migration is fast becoming a key topic in development cooperation. International development efforts, especially in Europe, are increasingly directed towards addressing the 'root causes of migration' in an attempt to curb flows from Africa. In this context, a particular attention has been given to the relationship between food security and migration. However, an overly simplistic interpretation of this nexus - ie investing in agriculture and rural development will significantly reduce migration from rural areas - risks instrumentalising development cooperation for 'securitarian' purposes instead of pursuing genuine objectives for food and nutrition security (FNS) and rural development.

To avoid this, complex dynamics need to be taken into account when addressing migration in the context of FNS policies, and vice-versa. There is a need to rebalance the debate and orientate the narrative towards maximising the migration development benefits for food and nutrition security while addressing related challenges. Donors have an important role to play in addressing the FNS-migration nexus in a comprehensive way. This includes the G7 group of countries, given their political role, their size as donors as well as the fact that four of the G7 are also the four largest economies in Europe, where the debate on the link between migration and food security is currently most relevant.

### Clarifying the FNS and migration nexus and recommendations for the way forward

The paper presents **the limitations of an overly simplified conception of the FNS-migration nexus** that often tends to prevail in donor approaches. It examines in-depth if and how 'agriculture and rural development' (ARD) can reduce large migration flows as well as the potential of migration flows to impact ARD issues. **The paper clarifies the characteristics of this nexus, frames the debate and provides recommendations for further work around ARD and migration interventions.**

Based on an extensive review of the current literature, the paper outlines the possible positive and negative impacts of migration on the resilience and productivity of households and communities, alongside other socio-economic and environmental variables. Policies and programmes targeting food and nutrition security strategies **should draw lessons from existing innovative approaches to enhance the positive impact of mobility and migration in connected rural and urban spaces.** Migration-related interventions targeting rural development should include actions that contribute to providing safe, regular and responsible migration opportunities from rural areas and build the resilience of host communities, also with the contribution of remittances.

**All around the world, and throughout history, migration and mobility have been part of livelihood strategies.** Moving to a place that offers better prospects is an important and common strategy to diversify income and minimise risk, especially for rural households. In certain circumstances, boundaries between voluntary and forced migration are not clear-cut. Additionally, 'root causes' of migration are complex and multiple. A more nuanced understanding of 'drivers of migration' acknowledges that the decision to migrate is taken not only because of socio-economic insecurity, food insecurity, conflict and household characteristics, but also as a consequence of individual aspirations and prospects. **Interventions should therefore take into account the diversity of households, individual needs and strategies, especially those of women, and acknowledge the importance of social networks, especially for youth.** Adopting a development approach towards the FNS-migration nexus should include efforts that help increase the options available to individuals so they can pursue better agricultural, rural or urban livelihood opportunities. Safe and regular migration and mobility should be among those options.



Most importantly, the authors suggest **mainstreaming complex migration dynamics into food and nutrition security strategies. This also means to incorporate the nutrition dimension, currently lacking, into research and interventions objectives.** A way to overcome the migration, development and food security silos would be to systematically integrate migration into ARD and FNS policies, from design to implementation and at monitoring stages. Ultimately this will require different actors to work together which in the past has not always been easy. Yet it would increase policy coherence and the impact of interventions.

Migration flows within the same country and migration flows between African countries are still much larger than migrations flows from Africa towards Europe. Rural migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is often temporary or circular, part of a long-lasting tradition. The 'rural-urban divide' - approaching needs and interventions in rural/urban areas as a dichotomy- should give way to a **new vision of rural urban interdependencies within the broader 'food economy' and 'food system'**, with migration and mobility being key linkages.

Given the need for improved evidence and data on international and internal migration as well as on the food security-migration nexus, a **'Knowledge Agenda' around the FNS-migration nexus can help develop effective synergies between migration and FNS priorities.** Moreover, policies and programmes should focus on **long-term solutions** rather than on short-term interventions for immediate results. Additionally, **the capacity and authority of local institutions should be strengthened** given that they often hold a key position in the ARD policy implementation process.

Considering the important role of donors in linking migration, mobility and development in the context of FNS, the paper puts forward some recommendations on **what the G7 could do under Italian Presidency.** This includes launching at the 2017 Summit an initiative to address the FNS-migration nexus in Africa. Such a **"Taormina Initiative"** could support transformative actions focused on women and on nutrition across the rural-to-urban spectrum and link efforts to improve food systems with international initiatives on climate change and environmental sustainability (given the impact of climate change on food insecurity and on migration).

### **Human mobility as a pillar for sustainable food systems and inclusive territorial development**

Looking beyond the above recommendations, priority should be given to policies and actions that make human mobility a pillar of sustainable food systems and inclusive territorial development. This would also be a way to mainstream complex migration dynamics into interventions targeting FNS. Such policies and actions could include: a sustainable food systems approach to ARD that is migration, gender, age and nutrition sensitive; a focus on inclusive development along the value chains, smallholder farmers and small service providers; support for mobility of all food system players along better integrated urban-rural territories and (regional) food economies; large investments in infrastructure, especially connectivity and financial infrastructure; inclusive governance arrangements centred on local authorities and organisations of smallholders and small service providers for stronger local ownership of comprehensive migration and FNS interventions.

Despite the complexities involved, African governments and other stakeholders, including the donor-community, must not and should not give up on the opportunity to deal with the nexus more maturely and effectively than is currently the case.

## 1. Introduction

The issue of migration is receiving increased attention in development cooperation. There is a stronger emphasis on addressing the underlying drivers of large scale international movements of people, maximising the development potential of mobility, as well as taking into account the needs of international and internal migrants in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals and the negotiations for a United Nations (UN) Global Compact on Migration.

The G7 has informally started discussions to focus more closely on the relationship between food security and migration in the African context. Donors have an important role to play in integrating migration in their development policies and programmes on food and nutrition security (FNS). This is also the case of the G7 group of countries, given their political role, their size as donors as well as the fact that four of the G7 are also the four largest economies in Europe<sup>1</sup>, where the FNS-migration nexus debate is currently most relevant.

This increased attention on migration as a development issue offers opportunities for maximising development benefits and addressing challenges. Yet, the notion of “addressing the root causes” of migration, that has gained prominence particularly among European donors, is often interpreted narrowly as addressing the causes of forced migration in order to curb migratory flows<sup>2</sup>. This risks leading to the instrumentalisation of development cooperation for ‘securitarian’ purposes instead of pursuing genuine food security, nutrition and rural development objectives. To avoid such risk, complex dynamics need to be taken into account when addressing migration in the context of FNS policies; conversely, addressing FNS in the context of migration, refugee and mobility-related policies also requires a nuanced analysis. **This paper thus sets out to provide background research** to investigate the migration and food security nexus; and to **make proposals to guide further debate, policies and action** in this area.

This paper uses the terms ‘migration’ and ‘mobility’ as well as ‘displacement’ and ‘distress migration’ to refer to these different forms of movement, acknowledging that the boundaries between voluntary and forced and the different motives underlying migration are not always clear-cut (as described in Box 1 on definitions). The paper refers to international as well as internal migration as both are important from an FNS-migration nexus perspective.

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<sup>1</sup> These are Germany, UK, France and Italy

<sup>2</sup> Knoll and Sheriff, 2017

**Box 1. Terminology on migration**

A migrant is defined by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence regardless of the person's legal status, the causes of movement, the length of stay or whether this movement is voluntary or not<sup>3</sup>. Although there is no universally accepted definition, irregular migration refers to 'movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries'<sup>4</sup>. Regular migration on the other hand respects those rules and laws and takes place through legal or 'orderly' ways. While migration is seen as a more long-term phenomenon<sup>5</sup>, the term mobility refers to a more dynamic and temporary form of movement.

In policy-circles a distinction is often made between 'forced migration' (or involuntary migration) versus voluntary migration. Yet, this distinction is problematic as there is always a degree of choice in the decision to migrate<sup>6</sup>. Individuals often make decisions based on cost-benefit calculations whether it is better to stay or leave – even in the most destitute situations.

Nevertheless, there are forms of migration and mobility where the choices of individuals and households are severely limited often referred to as displacement. Migration is then used as an attempt to leave these destitute or dangerous situations (such as after disasters or conflict), to seek safety, to broaden opportunities and to improve livelihoods. Apart from the legal definition of refugees crossing international borders<sup>7</sup> different terms are being used to describe such movements depending on the underlying reasons (which can be mixed), the degree of 'choice' and the form that such movement takes. These range from (forced) displacement (e.g. described by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee convention, the Cartagena Refugee Declaration, the Kampala Convention, the non-binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement<sup>8</sup>), survival migration<sup>9</sup>, or 'distress migration' (motivated by extreme economic deprivation, natural and environmental disasters, or forms of gender and social oppression perceived to be intolerable<sup>10</sup>).

## 2. Food and nutrition security-Migration nexus: framing the debate and clarifying its parameters

Much ground has already been covered with regard to unpacking the different dimensions where food and nutrition security and migration connect<sup>11</sup>- especially by research and policy communities<sup>12</sup> that specifically focus on the linkages between the two. Yet, a number of factors have led to the risk of over-simplified debates. First, there are serious data constraints hampering the creation of contextualised knowledge; second, donors face increasing pressure to show relevance and value for how public money is being used, including in the field of development assistance; third, decision-makers are connecting external action to

<sup>3</sup> IOM, 2011

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. At times the wording 'undocumented migration' is also used interchangeably with irregular migration, see PICUM (undated).

<sup>5</sup> E.g. in international statistics an international migrant is seen as someone who has lived abroad at least for one year

<sup>6</sup> Exceptions would be forced deportations, human trafficking or child migration

<sup>7</sup> For an explanation of the classification of refugees, migrants, internally displaced people, etc. see for example an overview in Knoll and Sherriff, 2017.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1998

<sup>9</sup> Betts, 2013.

<sup>10</sup> Mander and Sahgal, 2012; Deotti, L., Estruch, E., 2016

<sup>11</sup> Estruch, Termine, and Atlaw, 2016; FAO, 2016a

<sup>12</sup> A policy community describes a loose connection of officials, interest groups, researchers and consultants who engage in a specific policy field or work on a specific set of policy challenges

national (short-term) interest. This has translated in a questionable approach to the FNS-migration nexus and the migration ‘root causes’ debate.

There are a number of characteristics of the FNS-migration nexus that have become currently “accepted knowledge, basic perceptions and starting points” and which have to a large extent guided donors’ practices of addressing the nexus to date. In section 1.1 we describe these prevailing approaches. Although these are useful starting points, they unfortunately often become overly simplified through the reduction of the FNS-migration nexus to a naive proportional relation in the political discourse. Moreover, they not always do justice to the complexities observed in reality. From here, we thus depart to better clarify the parameters of the FNS-migration debate, with a more articulate conceptualisation of the nexus and reference to more nuanced literature findings and lessons learned (1.2). While some donors and International Organisations have started building their strategies and work on these complexities, in order to understand them better, more needs to be done to integrate them in actual practice. This paper offers in section 2.2 policy guidance for further work based on a deeper analysis. We then put forward some preliminary recommendations on what a ‘G7 Taormina initiative’ could do, based on the findings of the previous chapters, and taking into account, in particular, the Ise-Shima G7 commitments (2.3). Lastly, in section 3 we conclude and chart the way forward towards transformative initiatives that, despite the complexities of the nexus, could make the FNS, migration and development linkages more mutually reinforcing.

## 2.1. The basic characteristics of the migration-food and nutrition security nexus

The prevailing approach to FNS and migration which in many instances underpins donor approaches (e.g. found in policy documents of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or the EU and in academic literature) can be summarised in the following way.

Migration is a normal part of development processes. It acts as a livelihood diversification strategy. Migrants can take the role of agents for development, including for supporting household food and nutrition security. Yet, migration can be involuntary and can have negative implications leading to further destitution and pressure on fragile governance systems. Recently, the notion of “addressing the root causes” of migration has gained prominence, particularly among donors, and especially in the EU. This notion is often connected to the attempt to curb migratory flows (in particular out-of-Africa migration towards the EU). While addressing triggers and causes of ‘involuntary and forced migration’ is a justifiable objective, the wider notion of addressing causes of migration is at odds with the fact that not all types of migration are negative nor should only be looked at from a narrow security perspective.<sup>13</sup>

According to FAO<sup>14</sup> most of the world’s food insecure (more than 75%) live in rural areas and are dependent on subsistence agriculture production. It is in this context that the root causes of migration and the FNS-migration nexus are often conceptualised. Conflicts, violence and natural disasters are among the drivers of migration and displacement, but many migrants, especially from rural areas, are compelled to move also because of economic, political and environmental factors. Accordingly, FAO summarises the ‘**root causes**’ of (rural) migration as follows:

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<sup>13</sup> Knoll and Sheriff, 2017

<sup>14</sup> FAO, 2016a

**Economic causes:**

- Rural poverty, and food and nutrition insecurity in the absence of alternative opportunities to improve livelihood prospects and farming practices (e.g. lack of access to credit or other services that would improve agricultural productivity; lack of access to training or financial services)
- Lack of employment and other income generating opportunities in the rural area of origin in the context of unstable incomes and poor safety nets for agricultural workers and smallholder farmers

**Political causes:**

- Inequality between rural and urban areas and limited access to health, education and basic services as well as to social protection in rural areas. This makes it more difficult to manage risks (social, economic and environmental), and leads to increased fragility and economic hardship
- Conflict and political instability represent significant drivers of migration and forced displacement can be exacerbated by environmental changes and pressure on natural resources.

**Environmental causes:**

- Climate change and extreme weather events that hit smallholder family farmers, fishers and pastoralists the hardest lead to increased food insecurity
- Climate change also contributes to the depletion of natural resources and environmental degradation. It also affects land availability for agriculture and aggravates food and nutrition insecurity. Land degradation can also drive conflicts, such as in the African drylands (especially between pastoralists and farmers).

The basic characterisation of the nexus between food and nutrition security and migration usually includes the following development challenges and opportunities. Those refer to the impact of migration on rural areas and households in the country or region of origin, as well as on hosting communities in terms of livelihoods and food and nutrition security<sup>15</sup>:

1. Supply of labour and skills and demographic composition of population left behind:
  - Opportunities: Reduction of pressure on local labour markets; higher wages in agriculture; female head of households empowered and prioritising food, education and health of family.
  - Challenges: loss of younger and most vital and dynamic share of workforce and loss of productive labour; “brain drain”; female head of household investing less in productive investment.
2. Monetary remittances/diaspora engagement:
  - Opportunities: remittances as safety net: remittances can relax liquidity constraints that exist in rural credit and provide financial insurance in the absence of functioning insurance markets; remittances can foster investment in agriculture and rural economic activities with positive effects on food and nutrition security; investment can be by diaspora and migrants returning home.
  - Challenges: over- reliance on remittances to the detriment of local productive systems.
3. Social remittances/ diaspora engagement:
  - Opportunities: Skill and technology transfers, know-how and social networks that can benefit food and nutrition security outcomes.
4. Migration and food and nutrition security in host and transit countries:
  - Challenges: pressure on the delivery of quality public services for migrant and host population; further strain on natural resources and availability for livelihood generation activities/jobs.

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<sup>15</sup> FAO, 2016a; Lacroix, undated

**Part of the basic understanding of the FNS-Migration nexus is the acknowledgement of the potential of ‘agriculture and rural development’ (ARD) for reducing large migration flows** as well as the potential of migration flows to impact ARD issues. Based on this understanding, approaches so far thus often included: ARD in rural areas of origin; resilience of displaced people and host communities (crisis context); conflict prevention and stability; routes for regular and safe migration (non-crisis); development potential of migration for food and nutrition security (remittances, skills, diaspora investment, etc.).

What also emerges from migration literature is that migration and remittances are no panacea for larger development processes and broader economic or agricultural transformation. Similarly, studies show that poverty eradication policies have had little success in decreasing either rural-urban migration or international migration; and that economic growth can actually increase migration at first before it stabilises when a certain development threshold is reached.<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, starting with the assumption that policies can shape the above-mentioned outcomes of the FNS-migration nexus and address some of the negative underlying causes of displacement, the causal connections and interactions of factors within the nexus unfortunately often become oversimplified. As a result, it is frequently reduced to a proportional relation that can be addressed simply through policies and aid related to ARD: *more rural development and food and nutrition security equals less migration*. The **problem with such oversimplification** is that politicians and the public opinion's perception of the nexus is naive and suggests simplistic if not false solutions, such as the narrow focus on the ‘root causes’ of migration. This, in turn, is putting pressure on international development cooperation with the result that ARD policies and development assistance may be guided by these false solutions.

## 2.2. Towards a deeper analysis of the FNS-Migration nexus

In this section, based on literature review and analysis, we suggest a number of important additional dimensions to this basic conceptual framework. We then look at the particular case of European donors’ responses to addressing the ‘root causes’ of irregular and distress migration in the context of their food and nutrition security work. This will illustrate the risks of simplistic approaches and present opportunities for increased attention to migration in (ARD) development cooperation projects.

### 2.2.1. A deeper conceptualisation of the nexus between migration and food and nutrition security is needed


The notion of addressing the ‘root causes of (irregular) migration’ has become a commonly accepted term used to justify development cooperation, against the background of increasingly large migration flows in the past few years. This notion seems to suggest that by addressing singled-out ‘causes’, migration pressures can be alleviated. We would propose to use a more nuanced understanding of ‘*drivers of migration*’. These are multifaceted and often interact in a complex way leading to migration aspirations and decisions to migrate. The outcome of such decisions is mediated by ‘migration infrastructures’<sup>17</sup> at a systemic level and capabilities at individual level<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> OECD, 2016

<sup>17</sup> According to Carling and Talleraas (2016), the concept of migration infrastructure was developed by Xiang Biao and Johan Lindquist who argue that ‘it is not migrants who migrate, but rather constellations consisting of migrants and non-migrants, of human and non-human actors’ (Xiang and Lindquist, 2014). This is embedded within five dimensions: ‘the commercial (brokers, smugglers), the regulatory (state apparatus and procedures), the technological (communication, transport), the humanitarian (NGOs and international organisations), and the social (migrant networks)’. As result, migration outcomes depend on the interaction of these factors (Xiang and Lindquist 2014; Carling and Talleraas, 2016).

<sup>18</sup> Xiang and Lindquist 2014; Andersson 2014

In the general migration literature, migration decision-making is often understood as function of aspirations and capacities, influenced by norms, collective decisions and opportunity structures. Research has pointed out that while existing conditions, such as socio-economic insecurity, food insecurity, unemployment or lack of social protection<sup>19</sup> can generate a desire to migrate, it is also often the life prospects in the future destination place and a feeling of inescapable stagnation that act as triggers<sup>20</sup>. Socio-economic status, demographic characteristics and resilience capacities of households and individuals determine the vulnerability levels, migration aspirations and patterns. Migration decisions and outcomes, thus, may vary even in (local) populations affected by the same threats<sup>21</sup>.



**Figure 1. A model of the mechanisms that produce migration**

The presentation of the model is developed for the purpose of this report. It draws upon original work by Jørgen Carling, with inspiration from other research as described in the text. See Carling (2002, 2014).

Source: Carling and Talleraas, 2016

As FAO<sup>22</sup> notes, migration is always part of wider development processes and structural transformation. Conceptualising migration as part of such transformations highlights that it is also to be seen as a coping strategy for adapting to changing economic environments (e.g. decline of agricultural sector vs. other sectors). In line with the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM)<sup>23</sup>, migration is often part of a household's risk management and income diversification strategy<sup>24</sup>. It is one of the coping strategies responding to food insecurity and the perceived and actual risk factors influencing the latter, such as rainfall variability and climate change<sup>25</sup>. Other strategies to offset income and food risks encompass

<sup>19</sup> FAO, 2016a

<sup>20</sup> Hernandez-Carretero and Carling, 2012

<sup>21</sup> Zickgraf et al., 2016; Deotti and Estruch, 2016

<sup>22</sup> FAO, 2016a

<sup>23</sup> The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) emerged in the 1980s as a response to the neo-classical migration theory. The NELM theory viewed migration as a risk sharing strategy at the household level. The objective is to diversify resources in order to minimise income risks (Stark and Levhari, 1982). Costs and returns of migration are shared between the migrant and his/her household (Stark and Bloom, 1985).

<sup>24</sup> Herrera and Sahn 201; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark and Bloom, 1985

<sup>25</sup> Warner and Afifi, 2013. Findings by Warner and Afifi e.g. show that migration associated with changing rainfall patterns due to climate change "is often motivated by attempts of [households] dependent on rain-fed agriculture to stabilise [household] income and food consumption" (ibid., p. 6).



changing food consumption patterns, eating less, selling livestock or diversifying income other than through migration and mobility<sup>26</sup>.

Even when the focus of EU policies is on reducing the drivers of forced or ‘distress migration’<sup>27</sup>, it is important to acknowledge that not in all cases the preferred strategy for households is to adapt and diversify risk ‘in situ’. Crush<sup>28</sup> points out that ‘migration is a critical food security strategy for rural households up and down the African continent’. The objective when aiming to ‘make migration a choice and not a necessity’ is thus to ‘make migration [...] one option considered alongside the pursuit of other viable agricultural and rural [or urban] livelihood opportunities’<sup>29</sup> rather than aiming at reducing migration flows per se. Instances in which migration leads to better development and food security outcomes exist alongside examples where migration as coping or adaptation mechanism leads to increased vulnerability<sup>30,31</sup>.

A deeper conceptualisation and better understanding of the nexus between food and nutrition security and migration requires taking into account the following points, which often receive insufficient attention - at least in the European debates.

- **First, the nutrition dimension needs to receive more attention.** The “nutrition part” of FNS is scarcely mentioned in existing literature about the FNS-migration nexus.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, although nutrition insecurity is closely related to food insecurity, it is the latter that is more pressing and therefore likely to trigger migration “in the quest for food”. Nutrition insecurity can happen even in the context of food security, and in general has less urgent and visible manifestations, as its consequences usually begin to show when the condition is severe and has already led to serious health burdens. As a matter of fact, migration is not even mentioned in the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016-2025) declaration and recently drafted work programme<sup>33</sup>, although the importance of urban food environments and “sustainable urban food systems” is lightly mentioned. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed by experts that in Africa, **the nutrition transition<sup>34</sup> and the associated ‘double burden’ of malnutrition<sup>35</sup> are currently occurring in the context of massive rural-urban migration** and rapid urbanisation. It is increasingly acknowledged that this situation represents “one of the major threats to public health in the developing world, and that it impacts the poor – and therefore the most food insecure – to the greatest extent”<sup>36</sup>. The same nutrition transition occurs in the case of international migration, as migrants usually shift to “more affluent”, less nutritious, diets<sup>37</sup> in developed destination countries. For instance, according to a study published in The Lancet Global

<sup>26</sup> See Connolly-Boutin and Smit (2016) for adaptation strategies to food insecurity and changing climate in Sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>27</sup> Betts, 2013

<sup>28</sup> Crush, 2012

<sup>29</sup> Deotti and Estruch, 2016, p.40 Addressing rural youth migration and its root causes: A conceptual framework. FAO

<sup>30</sup> Rademacher-Schulz et al., 2013; Warner and Afifi, 2013

<sup>31</sup> A debate exists in the academic literature on whether migration is a ‘positive’ adaptation measure (or a chosen risk management strategy), or whether it is a sign that adaptation *in situ* is less and less feasible (involuntary migration) (see Warner and Afifi, 2013).

<sup>32</sup> This could be due to the fact that there is less evidence and/or less awareness on the topic of nutrition than on food security, which has been more largely researched.

<sup>33</sup> The United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition, 2017

<sup>34</sup> The Nutrition transition is the shift in dietary consumption and energy expenditure that coincides with economic, demographic, and epidemiological changes. Specifically the term is used for the transition of developing countries from traditional diets high in cereal and fiber to more “Western pattern” diets high in sugars, fat, animal-source, and processed food.

<sup>35</sup> Today the world faces a double burden of malnutrition that includes both undernutrition and overweight, especially in developing countries. Hunger and inadequate nutrition contribute to early deaths for mothers, infants and young children, and impaired physical and brain development in the young.

<sup>36</sup> Crush, J. et al., 2011

<sup>37</sup> “Affluent diets” are characterised by a marked increase in fat, especially saturated fat, cholesterol, and calories, which is often consumed in wealthier nations.



Health in 2015, people in Mali, Chad, Senegal and Sierra Leone enjoy healthier diets than their counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan or Canada<sup>38</sup>.

- **Second, a variety of factors interact to produce migration decisions.** The decision to migrate depends on the combination of contextual factors (such as rural poverty, (food) insecurity or lack of income generating opportunities), characteristics of the household (such as size, composition, household head, asset base) as well as individual preferences (mediated by age, gender, ethnicity, aspirations etc.)<sup>39</sup>. **Perception, culture, social challenges and personal aspirations also play an important role**, yet often do not receive adequate attention<sup>40</sup>. It is important to add social and cultural factors to the economic, political and natural drivers of migration as part of the 'standard framework'. Existing social structures and networks may also regulate access to resources that can improve the chances of making any migration strategy successful - and thus influence decisions to migrate<sup>41</sup>. Perceptions and mindsets, especially of young people, are also important when designing policies aiming at providing alternative rural livelihood opportunities in the agriculture and farming sector<sup>42</sup>. African societies for instance may create risk perceptions in a different way than European societies. The seemingly high - risk endeavours of intercontinental migration can in essence be interpreted as the result of diversification strategies by their social units that feel compelled to send some of their members abroad, in order to improve their chances. Similarly, research in the area of climate change and migration has shown that "*environmental mobility cannot be treated as a strictly rational behavior based on actual vulnerability, as if local populations' perceptions of environmental threats and changes necessarily correspond to meteorologically observed climatic trends or their causes*"<sup>43</sup>. This may be similar in the context of migration decisions due to food and nutrition security and agricultural production challenges due to climate change.
- **Third, internal and intra-African migration dynamics are important.** In the literature as well as in migration policies, much focus is concentrated on international migration. Yet, a far greater number of people migrate within countries, particularly from rural to urban areas<sup>44</sup>, or find protection from armed conflict, or from climatic stressors in neighbouring countries. Internal migrants account for almost two thirds of the total number of migrants, while migration flows across developing countries are still larger than migration flows from developing to developed countries<sup>45</sup>. It is key when designing policies to clarify that the nexus is relevant to out-of-Africa migration (into EU) but even **more importantly to intra-African migration**. Internal (rural-urban) and regional migration within

<sup>38</sup> Using self-reported diet surveys from 187 countries that are home to 89% of the world's adult population, researchers led by Fumiaki Imamura from the University of Cambridge analysed the intake of healthy foods such as fruit, vegetables, legumes, whole grains, and fish, as well as foods containing fiber and omega-3s. They also looked at the consumption of unhealthy foods such as sugary drinks, saturated fats, sodium, and processed meats. Taken all together, Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly West Africa, ranked better than wealthier regions in North America and Europe, probably because of a diet comprised of lean meats, vegetables, legumes, and staple starches, with less processed foods than countries that ranked worse (Imamura et al. 2015).

<sup>39</sup> Deotti and Estruch, 2016

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Morrissey, 2008

<sup>42</sup> For example, the REVA ('Retour vers l'agriculture') project in Senegal has shown the difficulties in changing the held mindsets of youth about the attractiveness of farming and agriculture jobs. (see Sall, 2012; Andersson, 2014, p. 41). Such changes can come about when they can connect not only to economic opportunities but also help to achieve certain status valued by young people. Proctor and Lucchesi (2012) point out that "aspirations are not just about economic opportunity - status is important: agriculture is unappealing to young people because it does not bring status regardless of economic outcomes" (p.35). The fact that the REVA farming allowed for income generation which in some instances allowed the building of cement houses helped to improve the perception of farming. Nevertheless many young people involved remain doubtful about farming (Sall, 2012; Andersson, 2014).

<sup>43</sup> Zickgraf et al., 2016, p.18

<sup>44</sup> Deotti and Estruch, 2016

<sup>45</sup> IOM, 2016a

Africa is more profound - many African countries are host and origin country or both<sup>46</sup>. Different studies show that the majority of African migrants are not going to Europe, but remain within the African continent<sup>47</sup>. Kenya and Ethiopia are second and third leading host countries in the world for refugees in relation to the size of their economies. West Africans are among the most mobile populations in the world: intra-regional mobility is almost seven times greater than the volume of migration from West Africa to the rest of the world. West African migration forms the basis of strong social and business networks, and these networks contribute to the regional integration of agribusiness markets such as the maize market<sup>48</sup>.

- **Fourth, the migration context and household specific characteristics play a role in the impact of migration on FNS.** In order to meaningfully integrate migration dynamics into FNS and ARD interventions, it is important to understand the **different types of migration that are part of diversification and livelihood strategies, as well as the contexts in which they take place (origin, transit, destination areas)**. Their success in terms of strengthening food and nutrition security as well as the characteristics of households using them should also be considered when designing specific interventions. As noted above, migration decisions can be highly complex and case-specific. International migration can take place legally, yet is often substantial in its undocumented form. Moreover, circular migration is widespread and encompasses diverse and mixed flows (concerning gender, age, income and education level, etc.)<sup>49</sup>. Warner and Afifi<sup>50</sup> researched eight case studies, which included Ghana and Tanzania, and explored how climatic stressors impact migration decisions and outcomes, including food security. The study analysed the conditions under which migration improves households' adaptive capacity (e.g. making them more food secure), or affect households' vulnerability levels (exacerbating food insecurity). Their analysis shows that four types of household's profiles of 'resilience' and 'vulnerability' in relation to migration outcomes can be distinguished. 1. The first type, 'successful households' (those that improve their resilience through migration of a household member), already had some access to various livelihood options and some social, political and financial assets, despite being poor, which enabled a degree of resilience to stressors. For them migration led to successful risk diversification. 2. The second group of households uses migration as survival strategy but they do not further flourish through it. 3. The third group in fact experiences a further erosion of livelihoods when migration is used as strategy since resources are too low to make it a success. These are usually already landless or land scarce poor households with little options to diversify livelihoods away from crop and livestock production. (Their household members also often compete for lower skilled labour in rural and urban settings). 4. The final household profile are those that are 'trapped' as they do not have the necessary assets to migrate and cannot access this option to cope with food insecurity. Lacroix<sup>51</sup> further notes that poorer households tend to opt for internal migration and may receive lower remittances flows that may not in all cases off-set negative implications, e.g. loss of labour, for agriculture and food and nutrition security outcomes.
- **Fifth, evidence is not always conclusive and many gaps in the evidence persist.** There are often more nuances to consider when conceptualising the interaction between migration, food (in)security and development, which are however still largely unexplored in literature.<sup>52</sup> Building on

<sup>46</sup> Historically, migration was an established trait of Sub-Saharan African agrarian societies to solve or mitigate ecological, demographic, and political problems by re-allocating people in slowly changing productive contexts to guarantee their access to resources (Carvalho et al., 2015).

<sup>47</sup> Schoumaker et al., 2015

<sup>48</sup> SWAC, 2016

<sup>49</sup> Crush, 2014

<sup>50</sup> Warner and Afifi, 2013

<sup>51</sup> Lacroix, undated

<sup>52</sup> The effects of out-migration on development are not only diverse, but often contradictory. Money transfers from emigrants (remittances) could alleviate poverty but at the same time foster dependence. High-skilled emigration

the overview outlined in section 1.1., it is useful to consider potential **impacts from migration a) at the household** levels (remittances as safety net, loss of labour for farming, etc.) and b) on the agriculture and the economy from a **more macro perspective** (farm investments, impact on the labour force, agricultural production, food prices etc.). Moreover impacts and interactions can be categorised as immediate, or medium to long-term. An example of nuanced findings relate to the impacts and use of remittances:

- From a household perspective, it is relevant to consider how remittances are being used to achieve food and nutrition security. Previous studies found that remittances are often used for daily consumption and food purchase (e.g. in Kenya between 13-14% of remittances have been found to be spent on food)<sup>53</sup>. Remittances can represent a good strategy to ensure access to food when facing adversities, such as low agricultural productivity or climatic events. What is less explored is what type of food habits and consumption habits are favoured. Some highlight that remittances are used for ‘bad food consumption habits’ such as ‘junk food’<sup>54</sup>. Understanding the impact of remittances on FNS from a nutritional standpoint is therefore crucial to adjust, for instance, policies and determinants of food choices in these contexts.
- From a systemic perspective, evidence has shown that migration and remittance flows to rural areas are important for all developing regions and play a significant role for the economic development of rural areas<sup>55</sup>. Remittances invested in farm and nonfarm activities and increased income may also lead to increased employment opportunities. However, the potential of migration and remittances for food and nutrition security and agricultural production should not be overestimated and crucially depends on the general governance and policy context. Therefore, in different situations the impact of migration and remittances can go in totally different directions, as suggested by existing evidence. While remittances are correlated with multiple positive effects, they are also subjected to economic and other external shocks, and if they need to be facilitated, there should not be an overreliance on remittances to finance development. Additionally, it has been noted that the influx of remittances may create dependency, cause a decrease in agricultural production, foster inequality and decrease social cohesion, along with other negative impacts for agricultural systems, which can increase the risk of food insecurity<sup>56</sup>. On the other hand, based on a number of case studies, including countries in Africa, Lacroix does not find ‘any sizeable influence of migration on labour markets and land use in rural areas’; neither does it seem to affect wage levels. Other findings suggest however, that rural households that receive remittances have better farming equipment and facilities than non-migrant households, which suggests that remittances can benefit agricultural production and productivity in origin areas. The environmental friendliness of such investments depends on the degree to which the increased income through remittances is used for unsustainable or harmful methods.
- Social remittances and skill transfers, though increasingly acknowledged in the discussions are often less prominently discussed. They however play an important role.
- Another aspect that often receives less attention is the implication for inequality and household income differentials caused by differences in the type of migration (rural-urban, rural-rural, internal, international etc.). Migration can lessen inequality at community-level if poorest and landless households receive remittances. However, migration represents an investment and as

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could lead to “brain drain” in some sectors, but also stimulate subsequent return of human capital. Migration of women could produce vulnerability in the short term, but have positive effects on gender relations in the long run (Carling and Talleraas, 2016).

<sup>53</sup> Lacroix, undated, p. 21

<sup>54</sup> However, it can be questioned whether this should be ascribed to the system of migration and remittances or is in fact caused by other systemic and cultural factors.

<sup>55</sup> Vargas-Lundius, et al., 2008

<sup>56</sup> Carvalho et al., 2015

a result, it is often not the poorest that migrate. If poorest households do not migrate, then remittances will also not go to the poorest. More wealthy households tend to engage in international migration often associated with higher remittances, potentially contributing to income inequalities. The propensity and possibility for migrant households to invest as well as the type of investment (agriculture/farming; urban housing etc.) also depend on the migration pattern: internal migration is often undertaken by poorer households. As a result, remittances tend to be invested in their daily needs (food, consumption, etc.), while (wealthier) international migrants can afford to use their remittances for productive investments. Yet, internal migrants households also tend to invest more in farming than urban international migrant households (as found in case studies exploring remittances in Zambia and Kenya, such as in the research carried out by Lacroix<sup>57</sup>).

- **Sixth, focusing on mobility in broader ‘food economies’ is key.** Research has been carried out on the impact of migration from rural areas on rural development<sup>58</sup> and possible solutions. This is understandable given that more than 70% of the continent’s poor live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihoods<sup>59</sup> and that a ‘large share of migrants originate from rural areas’<sup>60</sup>. Yet, **it is important to go beyond the rural-urban divide and also focus on cities and urbanisation trends** as well as on the role that migration plays in the context of urban food (in)security and within the broader ‘food systems’<sup>61</sup>:
  - With towns and cities being home to nearly 50% of the West Africa region’s total population<sup>62</sup>, an urban transition is underway in the region.<sup>63</sup> "Urban food insecurity is a real problem, the scale of which is likely to increase as urban populations expand"<sup>64</sup>. The focus on rural outward migration diverts attention away from the fact that ‘many poor urban households in African cities are made up entirely or partially of migrants’<sup>65</sup>- many of which rely on food remittances from rural networks<sup>66</sup>.
  - Furthermore, migration is not a one-way phenomenon from rural areas to cities. Rather, there exists a degree of ‘circulation’ between African rural and urban areas connecting different households. These circular migration patterns play a role for their food and nutrition security, in particular by allowing livelihood diversification. In Africa, a network of small and medium-sized cities is developing which ‘increasingly connect urban and rural populations’<sup>67</sup>. Rural areas or small and larger towns do not sit in isolation. Smaller towns depend on each other and on the interactions between their citizens, organisations and firms with the rural surroundings. Urban business and local economies depend on resource-based rural activities. Rural areas, small towns and larger cities are inextricably linked to economic activity and food and nutrition security. This also translates in migration patterns. To achieve a good understanding of the migration and food security nexus<sup>68</sup>, the reality of ‘highly mobile urban and rural populations,

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<sup>57</sup> Lacroix, undated

<sup>58</sup> Nickanor, Crush and Pendelton, 2016

<sup>59</sup> Rural Poverty Portal. Undated.

<sup>60</sup> FAO, 2016a, p.6. In the Horn of Africa, despite the fact that pastoralists and agro-pastoralists contribute significantly to national and regional food security, government policy often apportions inadequate resources towards developing these sectors (Fre and Tesfagergis, 2013)

<sup>61</sup> Estruch et al., 2017

<sup>62</sup> SWAC, 2016

<sup>63</sup> Yet, Africa is still the least urbanised continent in the world (SWAC, 2016).

<sup>64</sup> SWAC, 2016

<sup>65</sup> Crush, 2012

<sup>66</sup> IIED, 2017; Adow, 2008. The remitting of goods, and especially foodstuffs, is often overlooked, but research shows there are important links between these informal food transfers and urban-based household food security (IIED, 2017).

<sup>67</sup> SWAC, 2016, p. 15

<sup>68</sup> Crush, 2012

coupled with complex fluid households' need to be taken into account,<sup>69</sup> both between rural and urban areas but also in an urban-urban context. Even those who migrate temporarily or permanently, and those who can earn most income from non-farm activities, in some cases hold on to land in rural areas. Assuming a causal relation between increased rural-urban migration and consolidation of farm size (e.g. people leaving creating space for bigger, economically more viable farm sizes) would ignore this dynamic. Rather than a dichotomy, we can better conceptualise these interactions as rural-urban dynamics in which both migration and a variety of local on-farm and off-farm activities are part of food economies and of rural and urban transformation. "The effect of urbanisation on the rural space can no longer be summarised as migratory exodus"<sup>70</sup>.

- Above-described dynamics have implications for food and nutrition security. Demand for processed food high in fat and sugar and animal-source food seems to have increased both in rural and urban areas with rising income, leading to intake of food with less nutritional value and producing a second 'silent emergency' in a region traditionally marked by persistent undernutrition problems: overnutrition or obesity. At the same time, these diets are frequently largely dependent on food imports from outside the continent, which makes households more vulnerable to price fluctuations<sup>71</sup>. In this context, income generation and access to food have become a larger issue than increasing production or availability of food. The implications of rural-urban dynamics also require new approaches to FNS governance, such as taking into account the potential of spatial data to improve the evidence base of food system planning and targeting social protection programmes or equitable service provision for example.
- Rapid urbanisation and rising urban poverty characterise much of Sub-Saharan Africa in the 21st Century<sup>72</sup>. In the urban context, food and nutrition insecurity is more a problem of access to (nutritious) food and changing consumption patterns than of insufficient food production. Food and nutrition insecurity in Africa is an increasingly urban problem that requires different responses from those applied to rural populations<sup>73</sup>.
- **Seventh, policy coherence in support of better livelihood** (or Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development, (PCSD). Policies in the field of migration, investments, finance, etc. can have an impact on food security.
  - Offering income-generating opportunities for **migrants** in destination areas is key to achieve food security for them and their family. Even when legal frameworks provide forcibly displaced with the rights to access services, access to land or natural resources may be restricted<sup>74</sup>, which curtails options for pursuing income generating activities.
  - **State-sponsored resettlement schemes** at times act as **food and nutrition security strategies** and lead to (in)voluntary migration to designated resettlement areas (also at times termed development-induced displacement). In the case of Ethiopia, it has been pointed out that such schemes are extremely controversial, both because the voluntary nature of movement is questioned by human rights groups as well as because they "have been problematic in terms of providing essential social services and reliable source of livelihoods"<sup>75</sup>. Such projects, often related to cases of large-scale land acquisition can exacerbate food insecurity. One positive aspect that can be mentioned is that in some instances (such as in an urban resettlement in

<sup>69</sup> Hosegood and Timaeus, 2005

<sup>70</sup> Global Donor Platform, Undated

<sup>71</sup> CFS, 2016c

<sup>72</sup> Nickanor, 2013

<sup>73</sup> Crush, and Battersby, 2016

<sup>74</sup> Research and Evidence Facility, 2016, p.15

<sup>75</sup> Research and Evidence Facility, 2016, p.9; DEVCO, 2016b

Bahir Dar, Ethiopia) the people who resettled to other locations have gained legal land rights, which were previously not held<sup>76</sup>.

- **Geopolitics** can influence food and nutrition security of migrant households. In the case of Kenya, it has been pointed out that climatic changes push pastoralists to search for better opportunities in neighbouring countries. As borders are being closed in response to rising irregular migration flows (and with the incentives provided by donors for more strict border policies), pastoralists move to urban peripheries instead with ‘emergency aid’ being their ‘main system of livelihood’<sup>77</sup>. Border closures between Eritrea and Ethiopia affect communities through changing local food prices or wage labour rates and availability<sup>78</sup>, which in turn can impact food and nutrition security.
- Anti-terrorist financing legislation has made it more difficult for remittances from UK to reach poor households in Somalia, with negative impacts on food and nutrition security of those households<sup>79</sup>.
- **Eight, youth and gender dimensions need to be taken into account** in the food and nutrition security- migration nexus since distress induced migration seems particularly acute for rural youth and affects women differently:
  - **Youth:** Rural youth (aged 15-24) are more likely to migrate as a result of the lack of employment and entrepreneurial opportunities in agriculture and rural economic activities. Youth culture<sup>80</sup> plays a role in employment and migration choices. Young people are often not attracted by subsistence agriculture and under such circumstances are more likely to be “*reluctant to consider farming as an employment option*”<sup>81</sup>. This is because it is perceived as not bringing status and a good lifestyle as opposed to (perceived) urban lifestyles. Rural youth thus account for a large proportion of migrants yet have specific vulnerabilities. Perceptions and aspirations play an important role for migration decisions specifically for young people. The decision to migrate should thus not necessarily be seen as a rational, or as a response to, specific economic vulnerabilities. In many places in Africa, there exists a youth culture of (international) migration. This reference is most often made in the general migration literature, for instance in West Africa where migration is part of adulthood and where ‘adventurous’ or ‘risk takers’ engaging in migration are seen as successful in life<sup>82</sup>. In other parts of Africa, such as northern Somalia or Morocco it is also seen as ‘rite of passage’ “through which youth can acquire recognised adult status within society”<sup>83</sup>. Access to cultural and entertainment services is important for young people. They may stay in smaller cities or rural areas if they feel they are not marginalised or isolated from the wider culture in the country or region, including in the field of culture and entertainment.
  - **Gender:** Globally, women make up 48% of migrants<sup>84</sup> and the rate of female migration is growing faster than male migrants in many countries that receive large numbers of migrants. The percentage of female migration however decreased in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Africa and most starkly in Middle Africa, Northern Africa, possibly because of conflict and increased vulnerability. In West Africa, migration has a particular men/youth dimension. “Men are usually the first to leave, as in collapsing social contexts, the mother-child dyad is the last relationship to

<sup>76</sup> Research and Evidence Facility, 2016, p.36

<sup>77</sup> Adow, 2008

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.*, p.20

<sup>79</sup> Lowery and Ramachandran, 2015

<sup>80</sup> Youth culture is understood as the way young people live, and the norms, values, and practices they share, as opposed to the culture of older generations. For certain countries, migration represents a sort of rite of passage to adulthood (Loprete, 2016).

<sup>81</sup> Deotti and Estruch, 2016, p.7

<sup>82</sup> Loprete, 2016

<sup>83</sup> Deotti and Estruch, 2016, p.14

<sup>84</sup> IOM, 2016a

break down"<sup>85</sup>. On the other hand, in the case of high-skilled migration, it is often African women working in healthcare who migrate (for instance, in 2005, 22,3% of Malawian nurses were working in OECD countries according to Fleury<sup>86</sup>). This “brain drain” can have negative consequences on communities of origin, e.g. on the level of health care services. Positive effects of female migration include improvement of autonomy, human capital, self-esteem, women’s authority and worth in their families and communities. Traditional norms can change under the influence of female migration. Women remaining behind can also benefit from migration, gaining control and authority in their households when they act as decision-maker on family matters and finance. They are also more likely to receive remittances, although in African countries the pattern is more varied. A slight increase in women’s assets, education and income can have immediate positive multiplier effects such as increasing agricultural productivity and reducing child malnutrition. However, migration can also put negative strains on families staying behind. Gender dimensions are important when addressing agriculture and rural development in the context of migration dynamics. African women are often confronted with discrimination regarding land rights, access to credit or ownership and tenure rights. Outward migration of men can increase pressure on female-headed households when “women are left to deal with increased workload and responsibilities, but without equal or direct access to financial, social, and technological resources”<sup>87</sup>. Rural as well as urban food and nutrition security also have a gender dimension as female-centred households are generally poorer and more food insecure than other types of households<sup>88</sup>.

- Ninth, **adopting long-term FNS strategies for displacement and humanitarian situations** is crucial. Donor strategies have in the past years increasingly included the need to better understand the effects of protracted internal displacements and changing settlement patterns on food and nutrition security, to better tailor long-term strategies to the needs of refugees and internally displaced people.<sup>89</sup> Yet, still much needs to be done to overcome policy silos, and create further incentive structures for bridging humanitarian and development approaches in practice. As noted in the following section, the current refugee ‘crisis’ has provided impetus towards these efforts.

Lastly, two broad transversal considerations are important:

- Many of the vulnerabilities noted above in terms of agricultural production and food and nutrition security are exacerbated by **climate change/weather patterns**. Indeed climate change has devastating effects on vulnerable communities in rural areas that depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Climate change and extreme weather events (slow onset changes or sudden shocks) can lead to failed crops, ailing livestock and localised conflicts over resources that in turn can motivate migration as a livelihood diversification strategy. E.g. in West Africa recurrent droughts are influencing traditional pastoralist migration patterns, that combined with increased population pressures and weakening (traditional) institutions, can result in increasing conflicts with negative impacts on food security. The relationship between environmental changes, socioeconomic vulnerabilities, resilience and migration decisions is complex.
- There are major **data gaps** when it comes to the various interlinkages between FNS and migration, especially at a disaggregated level (gender, age). While a number of studies look at the way FNS can have an impact on migration decisions in specific regions and countries, there is no comprehensive data about how food and nutrition insecurity is a driver of migration. Neither is there a large set of data about how migration improves or renders more challenging the achievement of food and nutrition security. As a result, it is difficult to establish univocal statistical relations between the drivers of migration, the types of migrants and the characteristics of their households and FNS. From a research point of view, it is also difficult to establish a simplistic cause-effect relationship

<sup>85</sup> Carvalho et al., 2015

<sup>86</sup> Fleury, 2016

<sup>87</sup> IOM, 2012

<sup>88</sup> Frayne and Pendleton, 2009; IOM, 2012

<sup>89</sup> Nickanor, 2013; Frayne, and Pendleton, 2009; CFS, undated a; European Commission, 2016


between migration and food (in)security as this would mean that these two factors can be isolated from the whole range of factors that intervene at different levels in both phenomena. There is moreover a lack of monitoring and evaluation of specific interventions by donors and the governments to enhance food and nutrition security and their implication for migration decisions. Finally, existing data is often patchy and not sufficiently reliable. In Africa for example, census data with information on migration is often outdated and difficulties of estimating the number of irregular migrants persist.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> IOM, 2016b



Figure 2 Migration Decision-Making Process



### 2.2.2. European donors' responses to addressing the 'root causes' of irregular migration in the context of improving food and nutrition security: lessons from recent practices

The increased attention that migration has gained in development policies and cooperation projects, carries both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, it is helpful as more financial resources are being programmed for development-oriented programmes in transit, origin and host countries. It does so by integrating the migration dimension into food and nutrition security interventions and focusing on specific triggers of distress migration. *"This can provide a real push for beneficial investment in regions that have struggled economically and politically in the past"*. On the other hand, it risks diverting funds from long-term programmes that aim at structural solutions towards shorter-term projects that aim to prevent acute movement under a logic of migration control<sup>91</sup>. In the past years, the European Union has acted out of a "crisis mode" with expectations for development cooperation to provide immediate solutions to European migration challenges. International cooperation has become more explicitly interest-oriented in its response to migration.

So far, donors have, to a large extent, reacted by putting a number of interventions in thematic areas, such as food and nutrition security or job creation, under the umbrella of 'addressing root causes of migration' without necessarily meaningfully building them on strong knowledge of mobility and migration patterns or their underlying drivers. A recent exploration of 5 case studies of European donors has shown that *"many of the 'new' projects under the 'root-cause' language are in fact thematically similar to previous development approaches, yet presented under a new narrative or 're-labelled' rather than having undergone a substantive change"*<sup>92</sup>. This may be undergoing change as donors seek to more thoroughly tackle the migration dimension in development interventions. Yet, the contradiction between, on the one hand, aiming to maximise the positive benefits of migration while reducing its challenges (development perspective) and on the other hand the aim, to reduce irregular migration flows (predominantly security objective) is often not resolved. The question is to what extent (at the technical level and in the results frameworks / indicators) the new initiatives or funds relate to migration, and in what way do they do so. The above noted study found that success indicators in result frameworks of development programmes often continue to relate to the improvement of development and resilience aspects (including for migrants) rather than integrating the reduction of migration flows as a measure of success. This is welcome since a reduction of (irregular) migration and displacement flows per se is ambivalent from a development and resilience perspective as the discussion in the previous section has shown.

The migration dimension plays a role in the allocation of funding, both at national level (as funding is used for priority countries important from a migration perspective) and at sub-national level (as funding is allocated to areas either hosting a large amount of refugees and migrants or being a source of migrants). This, on the one hand can be justified with Agenda 2030 and the principle of 'leaving no one behind', including migrants and vulnerable populations at risk of forced displacement. On the other hand, and in combination with the **EU's focus on international migration towards the EU, it may skew funding towards countries and areas that are relevant for migration towards the EU but may not be the most relevant areas for migration and food and nutrition security, resilience, or fragility within Africa. There is thus a risk that 'securitised' agendas aiming at reducing international irregular migration become the predominant starting point for development interventions.**

The current migration situation has also helped to break down silos between different development actors. Most prominently, this is the case between the humanitarian and development actors which can also bring

<sup>91</sup> Knoll and Sherriff, 2017, p. 51

<sup>92</sup> Ibid

opportunities for advancing food and nutrition security in the context of protracted displacement situations and treat such situations both as a humanitarian as well as a more structural development challenge as has been noted in the previous section. Concerning the provision of disaster food relief, it is well established in the literature and available evidence that “understanding migration, mobility and development” is important both for “how [food] assistance is delivered” as well as for “the type of assistance provided”<sup>93</sup>. Beyond this, linking short and long term food and nutrition security aspects is important when addressing displacement crises, e.g. through linking to and embedding humanitarian FNS interventions in government activities or potential social protection programmes<sup>94</sup>. A global consensus is emerging that building resilience and capacity to absorb food shocks in contexts of protracted crisis, including displacement, is key when addressing food and nutrition security<sup>95</sup>.

Even though approaches to bring humanitarian and development actors closer together have been discussed for decades, current developments can be described as a ‘*game changer*’ as finally concrete efforts are put into realising this agenda by a number of donors. There are more endeavours to establish greater coherence such as devising joint strategies and combining funding. More understanding and opportunities also seem to open up between ministries of interior and development actors, e.g. in Italy, with the former making more references to the SDGs and being interested in development questions, which provides openings for bringing different agendas together.

Yet, there often still exist disincentives of institutional or financial nature that prohibit rather than motivate joint approaches and cooperation between the humanitarian and development field<sup>96</sup>. At the European level, these relate amongst others to a lack of common understanding, different timeframes and methods, diverging tools and funding modalities as well as high transaction costs to bring different approaches together<sup>97</sup>. It would need to be further explored what the breaking down of the silos between interior and security ministries and those of development cooperation actors mean in concrete terms and what risks and opportunities could emerge.

An important issue is to follow the lessons learned from engaging in fragile situations and to achieve effectiveness of aid. These point to the need of building projects on local knowledge and awareness of the existing political economy drivers as well as to create local ownership for implementation. Some projects under the European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa have been criticised for not paying strong attention to such integration of local dynamics into programming identification or formulation. While the ambassadors of African countries benefitting from the different EUTF windows participate in the EUTF Committee Meetings, this coordination at headquarter level cannot be equated with successful local partnerships at the level of project implementation. Building on local knowledge of relevant political dynamics and economic needs can be enhanced by working with local NGOs and involving local communities. As above analysis on the influence of cultural and political factors has shown, this is also important in the area of food and nutrition security and migration, especially when it comes to Agriculture and Rural Development interventions and other governance interventions.

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<sup>93</sup> Hammond, 2005

<sup>94</sup> Hamann, 2013. p.10

<sup>95</sup> FAO, 2016b, p.4

<sup>96</sup> Mowjee, Garrasi, and Poole, 2015

<sup>97</sup> Medinilla, and Herrero Cangas, 2016.

### 3. Policy guidance on the FNS-migration nexus, with recommendations for donors

Taking into account the complexity of the FNS-migration nexus as well as the risks emerging from the oversimplification of the debate, in this section we provide policy guidance in order to approach the issue more effectively, i.e. coherently with the SDGs and human rights frameworks and with regard to international development cooperation practices.

When zooming into the role of donors, we focus in particular on what a G7 initiative to be possibly announced at the Taormina Summit of late May 2017 could do, based on the findings of the previous chapters, and taking into account the Ise-Shima G7 commitments.

#### 3.1. A useful starting point: general 'methodological' recommendations

A number of recommendations on 'what to do' relate to methodological aspects applied to the FNS-migration nexus. These are for example summarised by the FAO core functions<sup>98</sup> that are also relevant to addressing migration, mobility and FNS<sup>99</sup>:

- Build more evidence and data on international as well as internal migration, its root causes, and its ARD contributions.
- Strengthen institutional capacities to deal with large movements of migrants from ARD/FNS perspective.
- Disseminate the lessons learned and the best practices to scale up innovative solutions.
- Facilitate policy dialogue and coherence at national, regional and global levels.
- Strengthen partnerships between governments, development partners, civil society and the private sector and engage in advocacy.

There are a number of specific migration-related interventions that receive attention that have a more direct focus on factors in the FNS and migration debate, such as:

- Targeting smallholder family farmers and increasing options for alternative livelihoods (e.g. diversification to off-farm activities, rural education, inclusive social protection (flexible and shock-responsive) and financial inclusion in rural areas).
- Building resilience of host communities and displaced persons through decent rural employment opportunities, integrating migration into disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies and early warning, as well as working on providing rights to access land to displaced persons. Prevention of conflicts related to food and natural resources (e.g. between pastoralists and farmers).
- Providing safe, regular and responsible migration opportunities from rural areas, including options for seasonal migration, that respect human and labour rights.
- Support the development potential of migration through a reduction of the cost of remittances, financial inclusion, diaspora mobilisation, reintegration support, monitoring food status of migrant populations, and providing access to services for vulnerable migrants<sup>100</sup>.

<sup>98</sup> For FAO core functions see FAO 2013

<sup>99</sup> Deotti and Estruch, 2016 and FAO, 2016a

<sup>100</sup> See for example FAO, IFAD and EU approaches (e.g. EU Trust Fund for Africa) concerning the FNS-migration nexus.

### 3.2. Priority areas of intervention

Above-described complex dynamics between migration processes and food and nutrition security suggest that building policies and programmes on the assumption that FNS and ARD interventions lead to a linear reduction of migration drivers is too simplistic. Building on existing experience to date, a more comprehensive approach is warranted that can take the described complexities and nuances of the FNS-migration nexus into account.

**An integral element of this would be to more clearly distinguish between a) migration specific interventions** related to the governance of migration flows (facilitation of safe and regular migration as part of the Agenda 2030; e.g. rural-urban labour migration dynamics) **b) other migration-related dimensions** (remittances, diaspora investment etc.) **and c) general ARD/FNS interventions** that take the migration dimension into account. The latter means paying more attention to meaningfully **mainstreaming<sup>101</sup> complex migration dynamics into interventions targeting food and nutrition security<sup>102</sup>** beyond a focus on ‘root causes’.

This would be: i) a better way of linking migration and FNS agendas, by addressing more maturely the nexus; ii) a better way to address migration, in a more encompassing way (including intra-national and intra-regional migration, which are quantitatively more important than migration to the EU). It can also further help bridging policy silos<sup>103</sup> and provide clarity about the ultimate objectives of interventions in relation to migration (e.g. halting migration vs. encouraging peaceful, orderly and successful migration). Currently, there seems to be a strategic deficit with different - at times contradictory - expectations being put on projects in the area of FNS in terms of influencing migration dynamics. In particular, the current EU focus on reducing international migration towards Europe may divert funding to countries and areas that are relevant for migration towards the EU in the short term, but may not be the most vulnerable areas from a FNS, resilience, and fragility perspective<sup>104</sup>. As previously pointed out, it is not necessarily the poorest people who migrate to Europe. Therefore, the instrumentalisation of the EU-funded FNS interventions to curb irregular migration risks not only leaving the most food and nutrition insecure and fragile regions and households with less support, but may also have a long-term negative effect on vulnerabilities, destitution and displacement.

**Dealing in a more systematic and effective way with the nexus, both in origin, transit and host countries, and fostering a mutually reinforcing relation between FNS and migration would require the following:**

- **A new narrative is needed in the policy discourse.** There is a need to construct a new narrative for migration and mobility in Europe, its neighbourhood as well as globally, in order to create a better understanding within the public discourse as well as to develop a more accurate and nuanced narrative. This could open policy options to other avenues towards a better migration reality than the

<sup>101</sup> Mainstreaming means that relevant migration issues are systematically integrated into development strategies, and at each stage of development planning.

<sup>102</sup> OECD, 2017

<sup>103</sup> Mainstreaming migration into ARD and FNS policies can help overcoming policy silos between migration, development, and FNS processes and policies. While the current migration situation has helped to break down a number of policy silos, there are still barriers. In the past, FNS and migration interventions have largely existed separately without taking each other much into account (Crush, 2012). While organisations such as FAO, IFAD or IOM are making efforts to integrate both dimensions, there is still a long way to go to fully acknowledge migration and mobility in the discussions and policy processes about rural and urban food (in)security.

<sup>104</sup> So far, there is a strong effort to reduce irregular international migration flows, which however is still often balanced with a focus on vulnerable areas. The implication of the shift in narrative towards addressing migration-prone areas would need to be monitored.

current aim to reduce migration flows<sup>105</sup>. The current narrative is strongly built on a fear communicated as crisis of migrant numbers heading to Europe and has been described as a classic case of “perception versus reality”: it often builds on a misperceived understanding of the volume of migration and its economic effects. As these fears influence political decisions and start to guide development interventions and allocation of ODA sources<sup>106</sup>, it is key to confront the current ‘migration crisis’ discourse to facts. One assumption is that there has been an increase in the volume of global migration flows as well as those of refugees. While displacement figures are at an all-time high, the number of people living outside their country of birth has been relatively stable as a percentage of the world’s population<sup>107</sup>. **Climate change** and food and nutrition insecurity mostly drive **internal migration, not migration to the Global North**<sup>108</sup>. Almost all displacement and distress migration due to climate change affecting food availability occurs within developing regions (e.g. Horn of Africa, Lake Chad and Nile Basin, etc.).

- One way of rebalancing the discourse is to **highlight positive stories of migration and the role that development cooperation** can play in addressing its dimensions, including in the context of food (in)security. This does not necessarily have to be framed solely in addressing the causes of migration with an aim to reduce flows but more broadly in enhancing understanding of the role that migration and mobility play (in a rural, urban and international context, including to Europe) both in its positive and challenging forms for food and nutrition security systems. There are already examples e.g. in Italy, where the government started working with NGOs in order to bring new data and raise awareness among people<sup>109</sup>, through highlighting cases where migration positively contributed to the Italian society (e.g. because migrants have become entrepreneurs and created jobs).
- Following the above-noted issue of **Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)**, more attention has to be paid to the specific interactions of a variety of policies. The current efforts by donors to address root causes of migration put a very strong emphasis on the role of development cooperation. Broader considerations of PCD are not strongly emphasised. Yet, a number of donor policies impact migration and food and nutrition security dynamics, such as policies that support agricultural production, policies that liberalise trade, or policies focused on energy and environmental aspects. Support to ARD can be steered by strong vested donor interests, especially if donor funding makes up large parts of national agricultural budgets. The principle of policy coherence is also important in developing countries themselves when it comes to the interplay of a variety of policies relevant for the nexus. The Agenda 2030 and the agreed SDGs provide a good basis for a better coherence of a variety of global, regional and national policies, including those of the developed countries. Policy coherence also needs to play a stronger role in assessing unintended implications of current migration and asylum policies of the global community as well as international cooperation that aims at reducing migration, e.g. the current focus of the EU on reducing irregular migration through bilateral agreements. There is a clear conflict of interest between the demand for migration opportunities among people in low-income countries and the political will of high-income countries to close their borders. The interaction between regional and global policies in the area of migration has for example exacerbated the vulnerable livelihoods and food and nutrition security of Somali refugees. Kenya has recently aimed to take measures to close the Dadaab refugee camps,

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<sup>105</sup> Knoll, 2017

<sup>106</sup> Knoll and Sherriff, 2017

<sup>107</sup> Connor, 2016

<sup>108</sup> Butler, 2017

<sup>109</sup> Speech delivered by the Director of the Italian Development Cooperation Agency at the VI International Forum on Migration and Peace, Rome on 21-22 February 2017, (Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, 2017).

where 270.000 Somali refugees have been living in semi-permanent conditions<sup>110</sup>. Combined with (the prospect of) Trump's measure to stop or reduce resettlement of Somali refugees and with the drought emergency taking place, Somali refugees have seen their vulnerability increase<sup>111</sup>.

- **Politically smart and strategic approaches are needed when mainstreaming migration into FNS may be necessary.** As noted above, mainstreaming activities require different policy actors to work together and coordinate approaches. There are often political economy factors that may block effective cooperation. Other times capacity on migration-related dimensions is scarce. This is one of the lessons learned from existing activities of mainstreaming migration into FNS activities and addressing specific 'root causes', such as the FAO youth mobility, food security and rural poverty reduction project (FAO RYM) implemented in Ethiopia and Tunisia<sup>112</sup>. Despite these lessons learned, often concrete plans for activities addressing political economy factors that block better coordination are lacking. Activities that can enhance the policy dialogue and cooperation between different ministries and stakeholders to achieve concrete action are often not foreseen either.
- **Other lessons could be drawn from the innovative approaches applied in a number of projects,** for instance those that Italy started in Senegal and Ethiopia and that are now being continued with EUTF funding. The *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal* (PASPED) project in Senegal aims to 'reduce illegal migration through the support to private sector and job creation in Senegal'. The project stimulates entrepreneurship, actively involving the Senegalese diaspora (earmarking 20% of funding to Senegalese diaspora back to the country) and using innovative blending mechanisms in partnership with the *Cassa Depositi e Prestiti*, and the Senegalese Ministry of Finance and Programming, local finance institutions and private sector. It prioritises support to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in the agricultural and agro-industry sector. In Ethiopia, the Stemming irregular migration in northern & central Ethiopia (SINCE) project<sup>113</sup> focuses on livelihood support, vocational training, income generating activities and promoting youth and women entrepreneurship by facilitating access to microcredit. The project will target specific areas that show a high incidence of irregular migration, both origin and transit, mostly small cities, rural towns and Addis Ababa. Doing so, it will build on and complement the activities of an ILO implemented action that has been relatively successful in supporting the reintegration of returnees. Building on strong knowledge of the context at grassroots level and innovative and locally adjusted solutions, involving private sector and diaspora, by effectively promoting entrepreneurship and private sector development, these projects could combine migration-related objectives with more core policy objectives of inclusive economic development and sustained poverty reduction. It will be difficult however to measure the impact these projects will have on migration flows, especially when the objectives of the projects are blurred. So far few monitoring and evaluation findings exist that rigorously evaluate the success of such projects in providing alternatives to migration (if the aim is to address 'root causes') or that assess to what extent the interconnections between migration, mobility and FNS have been successfully supported. This scarcity of knowledge at scale makes it difficult to generalise findings on lessons learned. This is not only an issue in relation to FNS/ARD and migration projects, but is valid for migration projects in general. Often findings pertain to the very specific projects and contexts only. It will be increasingly important to be critical regarding how different policy impacts are analysed, especially concerning the causal relationship between development and migration and mobility decisions.

<sup>110</sup> In February 2017, Kenya's High Court has eventually blocked the government's bid to close the world's largest refugee camp. This order would have led to the return of thousands of Somalis to their war-stricken homeland (BBC, 2017)

<sup>111</sup> Frouws, 2017

<sup>112</sup> Estruch, Termine, Atlaw, 2016

<sup>113</sup> DEVCO, Undated



- More meaningful integration of migration in agricultural and rural development planning and implementation starts with **better management of rural labour migration**, for example by fostering rural-urban linkages, supporting existing mobility and promoting investments of remittances in rural farm and off-farm activities. It also asks for support to African policy makers to do this, e.g. through capacity development, technical support, putting in place the right incentives, and supporting knowledge sharing mechanisms to learn from good practices on facilitating informed, well-managed and regular seasonal agricultural migration. A number of innovative programmes exist that aim to support mobility in order to improve food security outcomes and prevent seasonal hunger. The NGO Evidence Action, for example, currently provides poor households in Bangladesh with small subsidies to finance seasonal migration. Results have shown that in the lean period (period between planting and harvesting, which coincides with scarce job opportunities and low income levels) such subsidies as travel grants can help reducing hunger. The individuals who accepted the incentive and migrated experienced significant positive developments for them and their households. These included increased food and non-food expenditures, increased food intake, increased household income during the lean season, and indirect spill over benefits to other villagers who did not directly benefit from the subsidy. These improvements have also proved to be more sustainable than short-term programmes such as hunger relief interventions. Circular migration represents opportunities by allowing migrants to move back and forth more easily thereby maintaining links with their own land. This can help preventing the loss of collective memory and foster persistence of remittances. Another suggestion would be to facilitate the access to credit for return migrants who seek to invest in agriculture.
- More time and interventions need to be put into **long-term solutions** rather than focusing on short-term interventions with the expectation of immediate results<sup>114</sup>. In this context, ARD approaches need to take into account specific needs, challenges and opportunities young people face when they aspire to build rural livelihoods instead of seeking insecure opportunities elsewhere, be it the nearest city or Europe<sup>115</sup>. But it is not enough to 'make agriculture sexy', i.e. a more viable and profitable business. Other structural improvements are needed, such as improved domestic resource mobilisation e.g. through effective taxation, which can then function as a flying wheel of economic development. Statistical analyses show that corruption is a significant push-factor for migration<sup>116</sup>. Anti-corruption measures can thus improve the perspective of potential migrants that want to build a livelihood through education or entrepreneurship and encourage diaspora investments, migrants' integration and the reintegration of returnees.
- Moreover, support to the nexus between FNS and migration needs to **go beyond a pure focus on ARD**, and also focus on **rural-urban and urban food and nutrition security** and its link to migration. The approach to food and nutrition security, in the context of urban-rural linkages needs to be based on a holistic support to value chain development (both upstream such as input supply and seeds, and downstream such as processing and trade) which goes beyond agricultural production/ARD only. There is an increasing need for territorial approaches<sup>117</sup> that can address "interrelated challenges of achieving food security and nutrition across rural and urban areas"<sup>118</sup>. Another way forward could be to integrate rural issues into governance approaches that aim to tackle urban food and nutrition security challenges, or **designing food interventions in the context**

<sup>114</sup> This is one of the fundamental tensions and contradictions of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, which is tasked to address emergencies and provide immediate support while having as objective to deal with long-term structural issues that cannot deliver results on migration or development dynamics in a short-term.

<sup>115</sup> IDS, 2016

<sup>116</sup> Dimant et al. 2013

<sup>117</sup> Territorial approaches are characterised by the development of a territory, which can include both rural and urban areas, while addressing multiple sectors.

<sup>118</sup> CFS 2016c, p.17



**of city-region food systems**, for example through rural-urban partnerships<sup>119</sup>. Supporting the development of a thriving local private sector that can produce and process nutritious African food and facilitating intra-regional trade, in particular to feed and nourish growing African cities, can immensely boost economic opportunities in both rural and urban parts of Africa. The value of informal markets that link more directly smallholder producers with poor urban consumers through a network of small-scale transporters, traders and processors, is of increasing importance due to the evolving rural-urban dynamics<sup>120</sup>. Given that mobility is relevant for food and nutrition security in both urban and rural areas, the rural-urban divide should give way to a new vision of rural urban interdependencies with regards to food and nutrition security and economic activity - with migration and mobility being the link.

- **Local institutional capacity and authority should be strengthened.** It has been found that approaches need to go beyond the state level and include regional and lower institutional level entities, which also often lack capacities<sup>121</sup>. They should be strengthened as they often hold a key position in the policy implementation process. Furthermore, some cities face sudden and/or large migration inflows which can be challenging to manage, especially if there are pre-existing vulnerabilities such as food insecurity, poor or limited basic services, scarce livelihoods opportunities, high poverty levels and ethnic segregation<sup>122</sup>. It is hence of great importance to strengthen local administration capacities to ensure a better implementation of policies, an easier absorption of migration flows, and provide basic access to social services to all town dwellers, migrants included. Specific efforts exist to recognise and better assist the role of municipalities and other local authorities for improving food security, coordinating food policies and making food systems more sustainable and territorially cohesive. These frameworks, such as the 'Milan Urban Food Policy Pact'<sup>123</sup>, as well as their successes and challenges, should be shared more widely and also supported internationally (including by donors).
- **Adapting interventions to different household contexts, characteristics and migration strategies is important.** Interventions that aim to reduce stress-induced migration in the context of food insecurity need to take the nuanced context-specificities and differences of households into account. In certain areas, migration options can be encouraged as a viable resilience strategy in the context of climatic changes (e.g. persistent droughts). Other households may however first need increased resilience support in the absence of access to assets and resources that could make migration a successful endeavour. It is important to not contribute to creating 'trapped populations' through reducing migration opportunities, and also to not neglect already trapped populations, especially when targeting 'high-migration' areas to reduce flows. Interventions can also be more targeted, by taking into account the differences in the way migration is used by households, and the challenges and benefits it can bring. Targeted support should be given to female-headed households, especially when men migrate and women are left to deal with increased workload and responsibilities, but without access to resources. Gender-sensitive safety nets and more structural policy reforms (for example, land tenure and agrarian reforms) are important to support African households FNS, and are particularly crucial in the case of female-headed households.
- **More ownership<sup>124</sup>** of FNS and ARD interventions at the local level should be created. External partners could more strongly work with and align to African policy frameworks that already exist in

<sup>119</sup> Such approaches have been called 'smart systems' by the Asian Development Bank.

<sup>120</sup> IIED, 2016

<sup>121</sup> Finding from EU Action Fiche 'The Greater Stability in Eastern Sudan through better and more informed Decision-Making in Food Security' (DEVCO, 2016a).

<sup>122</sup> UNDP, 2017

<sup>123</sup> This Pact was signed by 138 cities worldwide, many of which in Europe and Africa, (Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, Undated)

<sup>124</sup> Creating local ownership of food and nutrition security is a strategy to involve communities in the early stages of FNS interventions so that they define own goals and allocate resources.

these areas (CAADP, for instance). Even more importantly ownership could be built by encouraging participation and consultations with local stakeholders and the communities who benefit from these interventions from the programme design stage. This is especially important when programmes aim to address the social and cultural dimensions of the nexus (perceptions, youth-related issues, etc.). In particular, the organisations representing smallholder farmers and other currently marginalised value chain players could play a central role when designing and implementing interventions to make migration and FNS more mutually beneficial through territorial approaches and the development of shorter and more sustainable food value chains.

- Finally, all the above observations point to a **“Knowledge Agenda” around the nexus**, to be pursued, coordinated and supported if the migration and FNS priorities need to be effectively synergised. Specific and deeper research, especially about intra-national and intra-regional migration in Africa, can help build a more mature debate, beyond the oversimplified interpretation of some of the FNS-migration links. More regular and more disaggregated data collection as well as better sharing of information among institutions and experts is needed for the analysis to overcome the typical “noise” in migration and FNS data. FAO for instance started deeper statistical analysis around the nexus, and this effort should be enhanced and supported by donors, also to understand which countries could be targeted by aid in order to foster a mutually reinforcing relation between FNS and migration. Another example could be using more widely and systematically the World Bank household surveys data that sometimes contain information on migration decisions. A “Knowledge Agenda” would also lead to a better understanding of what ‘impact’ could be expected in the short, medium and long term from different types of suggested interventions around the nexus, while at present this is blurred with often too high expectations on the possibility of short term impact from structural actions requiring long time.

### 3.3. The role of the donor community: putting into practice the G7 Ise-Shima Declaration through a “Taormina Initiative”

The donor-community interested in FNS and in linking migration and development has a role to play to deal more maturely and effectively with the complexity of the nexus. This is particularly the case of the G7 group of countries, given their political role, their size as donors as well as the fact that four of the G7 are also the four largest members of the EU<sup>125</sup>.

The Italian G7 Presidency could launch at the 2017 Summit an initiative in Taormina with the aim to address and be based on the FNS-migration nexus. Given its political weight, the G7 can contribute to change the (narrow) narrative on migration and better link migration priorities and interventions to FNS ambitions and priorities. Concretely, this means that a Taormina Initiative could include the priority areas of intervention outlined in section 2.2, building also on and operationalising the Ise-Shima Declaration.

The G7 Ise-Shima Declaration makes commitments in the area on food security and nutrition with priority focus on empowering women within agriculture and food systems, improving nutrition through a people-centred approach and ensuring sustainability and resilience within agriculture and food systems. The Ise-Shima Declaration does not explicitly refer to migration dynamics in the context of commitments on food and nutrition security. Through a Taormina initiative, the G7 can add value by enhancing global efforts and solidifying impacts by:

<sup>125</sup> The European Union has participated fully in the G7 since 1981 as a “nonenumerated” member. It is represented by the presidents of the European Council, which represents the EU member states’ leaders, and the European Commission.

1. Supporting **transformative actions for agriculture and food and nutrition security** that are also migration sensitive. In line with Ise-Shima Vision for Action and with FNS challenges arising from or exacerbated by migration, these transformative actions should pay particular attention to a) empowering **women** within agriculture and food systems, and b) improving **nutrition** across the rural-to-urban spectrum, creating synergies with international initiatives on this cross-cutting priority issues.
2. Given in particular the impact of climate change on food insecurity and migration, creating strong synergies between such agriculture/food systems improvements and international initiatives on **climate change and environmental sustainability**, specifically in African countries, while taking above-noted migration dynamics into account.

### 3.3.1. Supporting transformative actions for agriculture and food and nutrition security in Africa

In the Ise-Shima Declaration<sup>126</sup>, the G7 prioritised the development of **local and regional value chains for FNS** by “fostering linkages in agriculture and food value chains across the rural-to-urban spectrum and within regions”, and reaffirmed its focus on supporting **smallholder farmers** to contribute to resilient and sustainable local and global food systems. This paper has shown the importance of going beyond pure ARD interventions to address the migration-FNS nexus, in particular by moving from sectoral agricultural interventions to a value-chain and territorial approach, building on rural-urban existing dynamics, in particular migration dynamics.

The G7 could commit to politically support the implementation of the African Union (AU) Malabo Declaration and to contribute to funding the “CAADP 2.0” launched in Malabo (in 2014), given such renewed efforts by African countries for food and nutrition security (including the 2016 “Seize the Moment Campaign for Securing Africa’s Rise through Agricultural Transformation” that explicitly calls for support by the G7 in 2017<sup>127</sup> and has attracted substantial financial commitments by individual African governments, African Development Bank (AfDB) and African companies). While the G7 Declarations in 2015 and 2016 only made indirect reference to CAADP<sup>128</sup>, here it is proposed to fully back the Malabo Declaration and to exert leadership by G7 within the development partners community supporting the “CAADP 2.0”: beyond merely “seeking collaboration with CAADP”, the G7 could use bilateral and multilateral ODA to co-finance the CAADP investment plans and align to the additional Malabo targets (compared to the 2003 AU Maputo Declaration when CAADP was launched) on intra-African trade, enhancing resilience of livelihoods and improving nutritional status, etc. Depending on the views of G7 countries, as well as demands by and dialogue with African partners, in 2017 the G7 could also commit to contribute to specific Malabo targets and the related sub-thematic African initiatives:

- “Enhancing resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and other related risks” for instance by investing in social security for rural workers, in many cases migrant workers that would benefit greatly from better working conditions.
- “Tripling intra-African trade in agricultural goods and services by 2025” and support the African Regional Economic Communities that are leading the related sub-regional initiatives (i.e. going beyond institutional strengthening of the AU and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and strengthening platforms/spaces at different policy levels where smallholders and other small-scale actors like traders can meaningfully engage in the development of policies that aim to support them).

<sup>126</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016

<sup>127</sup> “Key Campaign Moments” include a “global campaign leading up to the G7 in 2017” (AUC, NEPAD, AfDB, AGRA, 2016)

<sup>128</sup> The Ise-Shima Declaration states “G7 will seek [...] collaboration with regional efforts and fora such as the CAADP”; in Elmau the language was very similar.

- “Strengthen inclusive public-private partnerships” and clarify what the G7 public and private sectors will do to support the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) endorsed policy outputs<sup>129</sup>, such as the implementation in Africa of the “Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems” and the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT)”<sup>130</sup>. Besides encouraging responsible public and private investment, CFS recommendations also call for encouraging the provision of other forms of adequate financing, including official development assistance, that supports implementation of sustainable agricultural development, particularly for smallholders.
- “Strengthen national and regional institutional capacities for knowledge and data generation and management that support evidence based planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation”, especially on evolving urban-rural dynamics and the contribution of migration to agriculture.

Moreover, in line with CFS recommendations<sup>131</sup>, the G7 could promote a fair global agricultural trading system and the importance of involving smallholders in policy processes. Local, national, and regional markets are key in increasing the resilience of smallholders and local communities. Trade is an important element in support of sustainable agricultural development for food security and nutrition, but value chains that become longer and more global do not automatically benefit smallholder farmers and other small (informal) value chain actors. Lower levels of bargaining power of smallholders in these global value chains can reduce their resilience, while the use of standardised technological inputs in larger scale farming systems can harm fragile ecosystem systems. Often those who benefit are commercial farmers that are already better off. The role of public policy in investing in infrastructure and technology that is adapted to the needs and challenges of smallholders is important. In trade agreements there should be policy space for governments to implement food security programmes and institutional procurement programmes.

Finally, the 2017 G7 processes could be characterised by a strong outreach with African stakeholders and an enhanced presence of African and AU leaders in Taormina, which would contribute to ownership and success of a G7 Initiative. This could include also the G7 Agriculture Ministerial, where Italy could show its own progress for a modernised and ‘Italy-Africa’ approach to sustainable agriculture and food and nutrition security (e.g. through the Africa Act currently discussed in the Italian Parliament, and other possible initiatives such as launching a Think Tank specialised in assisting Italian stakeholders to promote sustainable food systems development in Africa).

Given the key issues within the FNS-migration nexus highlighted in this paper, three areas seem particularly important to effectively and strategically support transformative actions for agriculture and food and nutrition security in Africa: gender, nutrition and rural-urban linkages.

- Concerning **gender**, in the Ise-Shima Vision for Action the G7 commits to empowering women within agriculture and food systems. As the FAO estimates, giving women the same access as men to resources could raise the total production in agriculture and food systems in developing countries by 2.5-4%, reduce the number of hungry people in the world by 100-150 million people, and have long-lasting effects on poverty reduction. This is particularly crucial in female-headed households, and in the context of (men) migration. Therefore, the G7 could operationalise Ise-Shima commitments to i) promote women’s equal rights and access to resources, particularly land; ii) increase economic opportunities with higher and fair returns, both on- and off-farm; and iii) create an enabling environment for women to participate in economic activities.

<sup>129</sup> CFS, Undated b

<sup>130</sup> The Elmau and Ise-Shima Declarations only refer to these, without clear commitments nor focus on Africa: “G7 welcomes further efforts in leveraging private investments such as that demonstrated in the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)”...“G7 support implementation of RAIs / further carry out outreach programmes on the VGGT and the CFS-RAI”

<sup>131</sup> (CSM Connecting Smallholders to Markets Working Group 2016)

The G7 must ensure coherence with broader action on women's empowerment, as well as the UN High-Level Panel on Women's Economic Empowerment. The G7 could re-commit to Ise-Shima pledges on gender and operationalise them<sup>132</sup>. Additionally, in line with gender-related issues within the FNS-migration nexus highlighted in this paper, the G7 could support the establishment, improvement and enforcement of legal, regulatory and social protection systems ensuring women's targeted support (social welfare, safety nets, etc.) to female-headed households affected by (men) migration.

Moreover, and in line with CFS 2016 Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (GSF-FNS), the G7 could actively promote women's leadership and strengthen women's capacity for collective organising, especially in the rural sector; and involve women in the decision-making process with regards to national and international responses to national and global challenges to food security and nutrition and agricultural research. Finally, the G7 could follow the GSF-FNS recommendation to support the adoption of safety-net programmes including home-grown school feeding and school gardens, which encourages girl's attendance at school and links economic empowerment of women smallholders, food security and nutrition of girls in school, and improved education outcomes.

- The Ise-Shima Vision for Action also calls for improving **nutrition** through a people-centred approach. The G7 recognises the effectiveness of taking a people-centred approach, which focuses on diverse needs of vulnerable individuals suffering from all forms of malnutrition, throughout individuals' lives and **across the rural-to-urban spectrum**. The G7 also aims to address the main determinants of malnutrition at the population-level through multi-sectoral and integrated efforts. In so doing, the G7 aims to ensure coherence with the Rome Declaration on Nutrition<sup>133</sup> and the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition, while enhancing collaboration with other relevant initiatives and stakeholders and providing leadership at Nutrition for Growth (N4G) summits to achieve greater impact.

On the one hand, the G7 could operationalise Ise-Shima commitments on nutrition<sup>134</sup>. On the other hand, in light of the findings of this paper, as well as the recent FNS Civil Society Mechanism<sup>135</sup>

<sup>132</sup> Ise-Shima commitments on **gender** are: i) promote secure land tenure for women in line with the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT); ii) support the establishment, improvement and enforcement of legal, regulatory and social systems ensuring women's equal rights and access to resources and productive assets including financial and extension services; iii) support the creation of decent employment opportunities with equitable economic returns for women in agriculture and food systems including selection, processing, distribution and sales of agricultural products, and equipping women with needed skills through vocational education and training; iv) promote infrastructure, better services and the use of context-adapted technologies that will free up women's time, including irrigation, multiple-use water systems, increased energy access and innovative and sustainable agricultural production and processing technologies; and v) promote the use of metrics for women's empowerment, and systematically disaggregate results by sex.

<sup>133</sup> Adopted at the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) in November 2014

<sup>134</sup> Ise-Shima commitments on **nutrition** are: i) strengthen support for national governments to formulate nutrition policies, carry out effective multi-sectoral actions and plans, set realistic targets and implement monitoring frameworks; ii) support multi-stakeholder initiatives to raise new, notably domestic, investments, and encourage innovative financing for nutrition, while aligning G7's investments with partner governments' priorities, and strengthening donor coordination, particularly by engaging with the SUN Donor Network; iii) strengthen support for national governments to develop capacity at multiple levels, including through training health, nutrition and extension workers, and enhancing food and nutrition education; iv) enable the scale up of nutrition-specific interventions that promote healthy growth and development especially during the first 1000 days of life, alongside nutrition-sensitive activities that promote good nutrition across different areas, including agriculture, health, education and social protection; and v) support the collection and application of SDG2 indicators, in particular the expansion of the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) to improve disaggregation of data, including by sex and rural and urban location; promote the inclusion of indicators of dietary diversity, especially among children and women of reproductive age, in household surveys.

<sup>135</sup> CSM, Undated

(CSM) and CFS recommendations/policy outcomes and HLPE reports, the G7 could support policies and initiatives that:

- Put a stronger focus on food and nutritional problems in urban areas, resulting from rural-urban and international migration dynamics, in particular by supporting effective policies to address the nutrition transition and the "double burden of malnutrition" occurring in developing countries, and in particular in Africa. This concretely means supporting urban-tailored nutrition sensitive and nutrition specific interventions to tackle urban food insecurity.
- Recognise gender equality and the realisation of women's rights as central to achieving good food and nutrition outcomes. This will imply giving special attention in policies that shape both supply- and demand-oriented food systems interventions for good nutrition, to: i) promoting gender equality and women's empowerment throughout sustainable food systems; ii) safeguarding and increasing women's access to, and control over, incomes, natural resources and agricultural inputs; iii) recognising the importance of mother and child nutrition, with a special focus on undernutrition; iv) promoting effective interventions that take into account the actual roles of men and women, including nutrition education.
- Go beyond nutrition specific policies and take a "food systems approach to nutrition". In its 43rd session, the CFS committed to address food systems and value chains as an early priority<sup>136</sup>, recognising the need for a holistic, interdisciplinary and inclusive approach to nutrition that bridges all relevant sectors. This will imply, in particular, going beyond nutrition policies and a medicalised approach to nutrition, and giving special attention to all sectoral policies that shape both supply- and demand-oriented food systems interventions. The G7 could support policies and interventions promoting the farming, processing, commercialisation and access to more nutritious food, i.e., policies aiming at reshaping food systems to improve nutrition and enable healthy diets. This calls, in particular, for a renewed emphasis on the importance of agro-biodiversity, and requires an explicit and continued policy focus in promoting diversified, balanced, sustainable and healthy diets, one that demands the convergence of the food, health and environmental policy dimensions of nutrition<sup>137</sup>.
- Taking a "food system approach to nutrition" also implies tackling the socio-political-economic determinants of malnutrition, recognising that food systems shaped by the objectives and actions of many actors, with the private sector playing an important role. Improved health and nutrition is only one of the objectives of the many actors that are involved in food systems, from small scale producers and processors to large companies that operate at multinational level, with possible tensions between sometimes conflicting objectives such as nutrition and profitability. The G7 could therefore commit to strengthen policy coherence<sup>138</sup> between sectoral policies and programmes for better nutrition outcomes. This means, for instance, supporting putting in place policies and robust safeguards to protect nutrition and health against potential conflicts of interest.
- This will require working in close coordination with CFS, the UN Standing Committee on Nutrition (SCN) and the World Health Organization (WHO), in conjunction with the Sustainable Development Agenda.
- Finally, the G7 could support policies and initiatives aiming at strengthening **urban-rural linkages** (spatial development and infrastructure policies, for instance), **and developing regional food value-chains and markets**. Africa is the fastest urbanising region in the world, and this poses many challenges but also opportunities for FNS and ARD. On the one hand, the G7 could support

<sup>136</sup> CFS, 2016b

<sup>137</sup> CSM Nutrition Working Group, 2016

<sup>138</sup> There is actually no legitimate body other than the CFS that is responsible for policy coherence (with the UN charter and the human rights framework) on nutrition (CSM Nutrition Working Group, 2016)

structural policies aiming at ensuring urban FNS, in particular by feeding the booming urban populations with **local and regional food supplies**. Policies in this direction could strengthen and support the development of regional nutritious food systems, from farm to fork. This is particularly important, not only for urban FNS and for rural ARD, but also to reduce the African increasing food import bill and provide decent and formal jobs for those who leave agriculture. In other words, “feeding the cities” is actually an opportunity for agricultural, rural, and regional development. The G7 could therefore support policies and initiatives aiming at creating value-addition and employment in food value-chains, and removing bottlenecks for the free movement of people and goods. This concerns production, trade, industry, infrastructure, and other sectoral policies, and implies a regional/spatial approach where small and medium intermediary cities and clusters/growth poles play a crucial role.

The G7 could commit to contribute to specific actions in this sense:

- In particular, given the importance of temporary, circular and seasonal migration of African farmers for livelihood diversification, the G7 could support actions to make access to small, medium and large towns easier. Better connecting rural areas to intermediary/secondary cities by developing stronger linkages and connections between rural and (intermediate) urban areas would support farmers to develop alternative sources of income.
- Moreover, the G7 could support initiatives to develop small and medium towns, so that they function as “rural hubs”, making life in rural areas easier, and as regional growth centres aiming to reduce migration to large and metropolitan cities.
- Regional growth can also be promoted by supporting the ongoing development of clusters that can connect rural and urban spaces by providing a focal area for investments in hard and soft infrastructure<sup>139</sup>. Storage facilities for smallholders can help reduce post harvest losses and strengthen bargaining positions in the value chain. Small-scale processing can benefit from the increasing demand of higher-valued, processed foods for urban and regional markets, whilst creating much needed off-farm employment opportunities<sup>140</sup>. Such a cluster or growth pole can also improve the access to advisory and financial services and strengthen the capacity to innovate of urban and local communities bringing together people, ideas and activities.
- The G7 could also support the implementation of African regional policies for regional (food) value-chains development (Regional Agricultural Investment Programme (RAIP) and regional ARD policies under CAADP framework) and the movement of people and goods along and across the rural-urban spectrum (for example, ETLS in West Africa).
- Growing urban population and demand, coupled with increasing purchasing power and rural-urban mobility and synergies, offer unprecedented opportunities for regional development, job creation and FNS in Africa. In West Africa, for instance, according to SWAC (2016), 67% of total food demand comes from urban areas, and 93% of food consumption is supplied by regional producers, while only the remaining 7% is imported. Nevertheless, food networks in the region are still largely informal and face many bottlenecks. The G7 could contribute to tackling the “Africa feed Africa” and “Feeding African cities” challenges, with positive outcomes for FNS and international migration.

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<sup>139</sup> Engel et al., 2016

<sup>140</sup> Hussein and Suttie, 2016

### 3.3.2. Creating strong synergies between agricultural transformation and international initiatives on climate change and environmental sustainability in Africa

In the Ise-Shima Vision for Action, the G7 stressed in particular the need to enhance research and development, knowledge exchange, application and dissemination of sustainable agriculture practices<sup>141</sup>. It also emphasised the need to enhance the resilience of the livelihoods of those engaged in the agriculture sector and that of agriculture and food systems against climatic shocks and protracted crises.

In relation to climate change, the G7 decided in particular to: i) mainstream climate-smart practices in agriculture and food security programmes and support the development of methodologies for effective monitoring of environmental and agricultural impacts; ii) support existing mechanisms, platforms and institutions that enhance research and development, and knowledge exchange for climate change, natural resource management and agriculture; iii) increase the focus on responsible investment to establish and improve environmentally-friendly and disaster-resilient quality infrastructure, across food value chains, emphasising the reduction of food loss and waste and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while taking into consideration the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030<sup>142</sup>; and iv) promote climate risk management approaches for the most vulnerable households and communities, including through social protection measures, the Climate Risk Early Warning Systems (CREWS) Initiative<sup>143</sup>, and the Climate Risk Insurance Initiative<sup>144</sup>. Climate and Disaster related frameworks such as the Sendai Framework or initiatives such as Nansen<sup>145</sup> acknowledge the contribution of migrants to the resilience of communities and encourage governments to adopt policies that address human mobility in the context of disasters or slow-onset climatic changes.

The G7 could commit to work together to support climate policies and use climate funds in order to make the greatest impact on climate change resilience, adaptation (including mobility) and mitigation of agriculture and food systems in developing countries, thus filling what many consider a serious neglect of agriculture in the Paris Agreement. This could take the form of one or more deliverables:

- Approximately two-thirds of all Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) prepared by countries for COP21 and the Paris Agreement recognise the climate-agriculture linkages and include climate change adaptation and mitigation measures in agriculture sectors. The G7 could commit to specifically support implementation of such food-related parts of the INDCs of developing countries. This could be done through: i) the design and implementation of climate-sensitive policies (for instance, to encourage new climate-robust seed varieties and livestock breeds; to reduce soil quality depletion and promote sound water management; to ensure that distribution and consumption of food does not negatively impact the environment or increase the carbon footprint of the food system, etc.); and ii) building bridges between experts and stakeholders, to enable climate change and energy experts to collaborate with food systems experts and agriculture value chain stakeholders in a multi-sectoral manner, helping to break down traditional sectoral silos that today are key bottlenecks in addressing the challenge of climate change.
- Meeting the Paris target of keeping global warming well below 2°C will require profound emissions reductions in all sectors, including agriculture. Scientists estimate that agriculture must achieve

<sup>141</sup> In the Ise-Shima Declaration the G7 explicitly mention climate-smart agriculture (CSA) and the Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture (GACSA). The authors are aware of the controversies around the concept of CSA (see [ecdpm.org/bn80](http://ecdpm.org/bn80)). Referring to its use in some G7 documents does not imply the authors of this paper promote it over other approaches and practices aimed at making food systems more resilient.

<sup>142</sup> IFRC, 2015

<sup>143</sup> The website of this initiative is still under construction (Climate Initiatives Platform, Undated a)

<sup>144</sup> BMZ, 2015 and Climate Initiatives Platform, Undated b

<sup>145</sup> The Nansen Initiative, Undated



annual emissions reductions of 1 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e/yr<sup>146</sup> to contribute to the 2 degrees Celsius target without compromising food security (Wollenberg et al. 2016). The G7 could further specify the above deliverable on supporting INDCs with such specific quantitative target of emissions reductions.

- As largest contributors to Climate Finance mechanisms envisaged by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, the G7 could commit to dedicate an agreed percentage of allocations of the Green Climate Fund (GCF)<sup>147</sup> to sustainable agriculture and food systems in developing countries. This commitment could extend to:
  - G7 actions to simplify procedures of the GCF, which at present are too cumbersome for developing countries to access and implement the urgently required adaptation and mitigation actions.
  - G7 encouraging private sector from G7 countries to align to this needed focus of climate finance to contribute to sustainable food systems in developing countries, given that the Paris finance target includes private investments<sup>148</sup> (and that environmental sustainability and climate resilience are increasingly seen as a key driver of international competitiveness and investments<sup>149</sup>).
  - G7 making a specific commitment to facilitate use of a share of the GCF to support the strategic and effective disbursement of: the US\$16 billion to be raised by the Africa Climate Business Plan (ACBP)<sup>150</sup>; and the Adapting Agriculture in Africa Initiative (AAA)<sup>151</sup>; possibly with a focus on countries/areas more affected by climate change and more prone to climate induced migration.

### 3.3.3. Beyond migration, the importance of a Taormina Initiative on FNS

It is important to realize that, despite the importance of the above recommendations, **a number of issues may make their application difficult** during the Italian G7 Presidency in 2017. In case of any new financial commitments by G7 in Taormina, for instance, the size of the pledge would determine the type of interventions that could be covered and geographical scope/number of 'developing' countries to be assisted. But not all G7 countries may agree on up-scaling ODA around the FNS-migration nexus, nor share the same priorities on which country to assist. Moreover, some broader geopolitical considerations will have to be taken into account:

- Overall declining amounts and appetite for ODA all over the world.
- The most powerful and influential member of G7 recently elected a new administration that is well known for criticising international cooperation and ODA, so both G7's initiatives on development and new pledges in Taormina are unlikely to be a priority in USA.
- Elections in France, Germany and UK.
- The G7 tend to be traditionally divided on geographical scope of support to developing countries, with e.g. Japan wanting to support Asia, USA-Canada, Latin America and The Caribbean, and the EU countries focusing on Africa. Indeed, a fundamental difference between EU and non-EU G7 members vis-à-vis the FNS-migration nexus is that Africa and Europe have stronger, longer-term and geographically-determined commonalities (against a background of an ageing Europe and a youthful Africa and in an interconnected world where distances tend to fade).

<sup>146</sup> 1 gigatonne of carbon dioxide equivalents per year (Carbon dioxide equivalent is a measure used to compare the emissions from various greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential)

<sup>147</sup> Green Climate Fund, Undated

<sup>148</sup> At least \$100 billion per year will be mobilised from public and private sources to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change by 2020.

<sup>149</sup> Despite two years of crashing prices for oil, natural gas, and coal, investments in renewable energy broke new records in 2015 and the sector is now seeing twice as much global funding as fossil fuels (Bloomberg, 2016)

<sup>150</sup> The World Bank, Undated

<sup>151</sup> AAA, Undated

If these or other dimensions make it impossible for the G7 to agree and launch a specific FNS-migration nexus initiative, **a possible Taormina Initiative on FNS more broadly** would still be very useful and welcome, if certain strategic and policy directions are included. As shown in the previous two sections, taking into account the centrality of food and nutrition security and climate-ARD linkages for sustainable development, the Italian Presidency could still propose a strong focus of the 2017 Development Dossier of the G7 on supporting: i) transformative actions for agriculture and **food and nutrition security**; ii) strong synergies between such agriculture/food systems improvements and international initiatives on **climate change and environmental sustainability** iii) **African countries** in particular. In addition to **operationalising existing G7 commitments** such as the Elmau “G7 Broad Food Security and Nutrition Development Approach”<sup>152</sup> and the Ise-Shima Vision for Action, such Taormina Initiative could build upon the spirit, partners and positive outcomes of the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI)<sup>153</sup>, launched by the G7 under the Italian Presidency in 2009. The G7 could **upgrade AFSI** (i.e. an “AFSI 2.0”) in line with the important innovations that occurred since 2009: adoption of SDGs (sustainable food systems cutting across several Goals); increasing attention on linkages between climate change and agriculture (including within the UNFCCC processes); agricultural growth and enhanced food and nutrition security efforts in Africa, especially with stronger roles of intra-African food trade (including negotiations for the Continental Free Trade Area) and public-private approaches. **These deliverables could have two important benefits:**

- Demonstrate leadership by G7 on the SDGs 2030 Agenda and concrete modalities to make the SDGs integrated and Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development a reality<sup>154</sup>;
- Linkages could be made with the migration dossiers, given that climate change will disproportionately impact agriculture and food and nutrition security in Africa. Hence addressing it could avoid the risk of climate change threatening the mid- to long-term vulnerability of African economies and societies, leading to further migration and mobility.

## 4. Charting a way forward: building blocks to make human mobility work for sustainable food systems and inclusive territorial development

Despite the FNS-migration nexus complexity highlighted in this paper, governments and other stakeholders of both origin, transit, and host countries, including the donor-community, should not give up on the opportunity to deal with the nexus more maturely and effectively than now, by supporting transformative initiatives to make FNS, migration and development more mutually reinforcing.

In a nutshell, a way forward could be to select a few building blocks that, while taking into account complexity, would **prioritise policies and actions to make human mobility a pillar of sustainable food systems and inclusive territorial development**. Only food systems that are renewable, resilient, equitable, diverse, and healthful (in other words sustainable from the economic, social and environmental points of view), can guarantee food and nutrition security. Only linking all the actors in the food system and including them all in the opportunities of growth can allow the full territory to develop, along the continuum

<sup>152</sup> The “Elmau target”: “aiming to lift 500 million people in developing countries out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030”

<sup>153</sup> From La Maddalena to L’Aquila, 2009

<sup>154</sup> These deliverables could provide systemic contributions to SDGs 1 (no poverty), 2 (zero hunger), 3 (good health), 8 (decent work), 12 (responsible consumption), 13 (climate action) and 14/15 (protect ecosystems). PCSD starts from the premise that an array of policies across dimensions of sustainable development will be needed to deliver the SDGs and that, given the integrated nature of the goals and interdependencies among targets, it will be important to examine interactions among different policies (O’Connor et al. 2016)

from rural areas to small and medium towns to big cities. And both types of improvements require people, not only information and capital, to move. Thus making human mobility a pillar of sustainable food systems and inclusive territorial development could also be a way to mainstream complex migration dynamics into interventions targeting food and nutrition security. Considering the analysis and the recommendations in this paper, such building blocks of a more virtuous nexus could include the following:

1. **Adopt a sustainable food systems approach to agricultural and rural development that is migration, gender, age and nutrition sensitive:** everyone, local, national and international actors, should work together beyond agriculture and rural development, having as central overarching goal not only improving food and nutrition security but more broadly creating sustainable food systems (SFS). SFS should have the following features, hence policies and investments should target the related transformations.
  2. **Concentrate on inclusive development along the value chains, focusing on smallholder farmers and small (informal) service providers** (taking into account the diversity between households and between small entrepreneurs): from an agency, or actor, perspective, more centrality should be given to smallholder farmers and small service providers and their (capacity to) transformation into entrepreneurs. It is their share within total population, including currently poor population, the sustainability of their farming and trading practices vis-a-vis the environment, their growth potential and their proximity to expanding urban areas (compared to food imports) that should make them the protagonists of SFS and Private Sector for Development (PSD). But small-scale farmers and informal operators and their households are not all the same. They face different constraints and opportunities. Understanding this diversity is key for effective policies and value chain initiatives. Targeted, inclusive and participatory public and private investments and institutional innovations are needed to overcome the challenges small players face. If successful, increased profitability and sustainability of small players can have a positive multiplier effect for the food economy, both upstream, increasing effective demand for knowledge, inputs and services, and downstream, increasing jobs and potential for value addition in processing, logistics and distribution. Inclusive development also means empowering young people and women within the entire food system. Gender equality and the realisation of women's rights (in particular control over land and other resources) are central to achieving good food and nutrition outcomes.
  3. **Adopt a territorial (and regional) food system approach:** from a geographical perspective, SFS requires inclusive territorial development. The full integration of territories along the urban-rural continuum, linking all the actors in the food system, from producers to consumers, through both better infrastructure and information systems, enables in particular smallholders and small operators to better supply urban and regional demand, thus taking advantage of burgeoning African food economies (i.e., supplying increasing food demand coming in particular from urban areas, given urbanisation trend, increasing purchasing power, and the resulting changing diets with higher consumption of high-value food products). In some cases, a territorial food system approach may require the integration of a regional food economy across different countries, hence the need to have better regional mobility for SFS (between cities belonging to different countries). Adopting a territorial food systems approach also means putting a stronger focus on the increasing food and nutrition insecurity in urban areas, resulting from rural-urban and international migration dynamics, in particular by supporting effective policies to address the nutrition transition and the current "double burden of malnutrition" in Africa.
- Strengthening the ability of smallholders to invest in human and financial capital to create more competitive and sustainable farms will lead towards more profitable off-farm activities as well as the provision of services within the full continuum of the whole food economy.

4. **Invest in infrastructure, especially connectivity and financial infrastructure:** from a financing perspective, priority should be given to accessing markets and credit. Smallholders and informal operators such as small traders are major investors in the food economy but their access to markets is limited due to poor rural road infrastructure. Access to financial services remains the most tenacious problem in developing sustainable and inclusive agricultural value chains. Extremely high interests rates, a perceived high risk of agricultural investments, and issues around land tenure rights and loan collateral are but a few of the persistent problems that need innovative solutions, both from African governments and from development partners' support to PSD (including aid). Blending mechanisms should target private credit markets to be able to reduce interests rates (possibly drawing lessons from micro-credit success stories).  
Better connectivity and financial infrastructure can facilitate the mobility between rural and urban areas, which plays a key role for their food and nutrition security, in particular by allowing livelihood diversification. Non-farm income sources are increasing and crucial to the resilience of rural households. Investing in transport and communications infrastructure can also bring down the costs of travel and sending remittances. It facilitates information on employment and business opportunities and can thus contribute to successful circular and temporary mobility.
5. **Adopt an inclusive and multi-level governance approach:** SFS also have a strong governance dimension, i.e. from a process perspective, not only incentives and institutional mechanisms should be established to overcome policy silos between migration, development, and FNS; local authorities and organisations representing smallholders and small service providers should be central to the governance arrangements that could promote and facilitate the transition to more SFS. The need for stronger local ownership around comprehensive migration and FNS interventions discussed in this paper should translate not only in donors' alignment to African owned national plans like CAADP, but also into local authorities and small players organisations becoming the protagonists of the identification, formulation, implementation and monitoring of SFS policies and investments. For instance, the promotion of community participation in the selection and implementation of local infrastructure development projects like roads and market centres, are key for an inclusive territorial approach.

All of this requires facilitating (and better governing), not blocking, human mobility from rural to urban areas and back, as well as a clear focus on intra-African flows, not predominantly extra-Africa migration. **This starts with a transformation of the narrative, including at political level, and a coordinated “knowledge agenda”, to support mobility of all food system players along better integrated urban-rural territories and (regional) food economies underpinning more SFS.**

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### About ECDPM

ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM's key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

### Thematic priorities

ECDPM organises its work around four themes:

- Reconciling values and interests in the external action of the EU and other international players
- Promoting economic governance and trade for inclusive and sustainable growth
- Supporting societal dynamics of change related to democracy and governance in developing countries, particularly Africa
- Addressing food security as a global public good through information and support to regional integration, markets and agriculture

### Approach

ECDPM is a "think and do tank". It links policies and practice using a mix of roles and methods. ECDPM organises and facilitates policy dialogues, provides tailor-made analysis and advice, participates in South-North networks and does policy-oriented research with partners from the South.

ECDPM also assists with the implementation of policies and has a strong track record in evaluating policy impact. ECDPM's activities are largely designed to support institutions in the developing world to define their own agendas. ECDPM brings a frank and independent perspective to its activities, entering partnerships with an open mind and a clear focus on results.

For more information please visit [www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org)

### ECDPM Discussion Papers

ECDPM Discussion Papers present initial findings of work-in-progress at the Centre to facilitate meaningful and substantive exchange on key policy questions. The aim is to stimulate broader reflection and informed debate on EU external action, with a focus on relations with countries in the South.

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The logo for ECDPM, featuring the lowercase letters "ecdpm" in a white, sans-serif font on a blue rectangular background.

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