



Supporting peacebuilding in times of change

Cover - Yaseena Chiu-yun 't Hof

CASE STUDY GERMANY

By Matthias Deneckere and Volker Hauck

September 2018

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms	iii
Acknowledgments	iv
Executive Summary	v
1. Introduction	1
2. Conceptual approach to peacebuilding	4
3. Understanding the concept of peacebuilding: evolution and trends	5
3.1. Civilian crisis prevention: the emergence of a German peace policy	5
3.2. Peacebuilding and networked security: balancing peace and security priorities	6
3.3. New guidelines for peacebuilding under a revamped foreign policy	8
4. Institutional and financial support for peacebuilding	11
4.1. The German government structure as a hurdle for cooperation	13
4.2. The BMZ and GIZ: a developmental approach to peacebuilding	14
4.3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: pursuing stabilisation as a pathway to peace?	17
4.4. The Ministry of Defence: militarising peace?	20
4.5. Efforts to build a cross-ministerial peace architecture remain weak	21
4.6. Civil society and academia: key actors that feed the peacebuilding debate	23
4.7. Concluding remarks: A strong national peace infrastructure is still lacking	24
5. Analysis of the main determinants of support for peacebuilding	26
5.1. Promoting peace is central to Germany's identity	26
5.2. From restraint to responsibility: Germany's evolving sense of its place in the world	27
5.3. New types of conflict set additional challenges for peacebuilding	28
5.4. The silo mentality and political rivalries remain barriers to more effective peacebuilding	29
5.5. Domestic pressures create a leadership vacuum for peacebuilding	30
6. Prospects for transforming peacebuilding support	31
Annex 1: List of interviewees	34
Annex 2: Methodology for the analysis of aid flows	35
Bibliography	36

List of Boxes

Box 1: Key messages on the concept of peacebuilding: evolution and trends	10
Box 2: Trends in peace-related ODA in Germany	11
Box 3: Key messages on institutional and financial support for peacebuilding	25
Box 4: Key messages on the main determinants of support for peacebuilding	31

List of Figures

Figure 1: Germany's potential capabilities for supporting peacebuilding	3
Figure 2 Total German ODA spending (in million USD, 2016 constant prices)	12
Figure 3: German ODA trends for conflict, peace and security and civilian peacebuilding	13
Figure 4: Crisis management and reconstruction, infrastructure budget	15
Figure 5: Budget allocations to special initiatives 2014-2018 (million EUR, commitments)	16

List of Tables

Table 1: The spectrum of meaning in peacebuilding terminology	4
Table 2: Share of ODA allocated to conflict, peace and security and to peacebuilding	12
Table 3: BMZ spending on peace-related activities	14
Table 4: 2014-2018 budget allocations for securing peace and stability	18
Table 5: Germany's commitments to the UN Peacebuilding Fund 2010-2017 (in million USD)	20

List of Acronyms

AU	African Union
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DIE	Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (German Development Institute)
INEF	Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (Institute for Development and Peace)
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ESÜH	Entwicklungsfördernde und Strukturbildende Übergangshilfe (development-promoting and structure-building transition aid)
EU	European Union
EU-CIVCAP	EU's Capabilities for Conflict Prevention
EUR	Euro
FriEnt	Arbeitsgruppe Frieden und Entwicklung (Working Group on Development and Peace)
G7	Group of Seven
G20	Group of Twenty
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation)
GNI	Gross National Income
GPPi	Global Public Policy Institute
HSFK	Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (Hessian Foundation for Peace and conflict research)
IDP	Internally Displaced People
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IS	Islamic State
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
PCA	Peace and Conflict Assessment
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRIF	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
ZIF	Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Centre for International Peace Operations)

Acknowledgments

This initiative was funded by ECDPM with support from its institutional partners and Humanity United. We are particularly grateful to Elise Ford and Alexandra Mairone of Humanity United for their support, feedback and encouragement throughout the process. The authors additionally thank the people we interviewed in connection with this case study. We are grateful for the comments provided by our peer reviewers, the detailed feedback on each case study and the first feedback on the eight factors we identified as influencing support for peacebuilding from the participants at our seminar, in March 2018 (Sarah Bayne, Charlotte Booth, Jörn Grävingholt, Henrik Hammargren, Joelle Jenny, Anna Penfrat, Sonya Reines-Djivanides, Mark Segal, and Natascha Zupan). Their critical comments were very useful. Detailed internal peer review was provided by Emmanuel De Groof. Expert advice on analysing ODA data was provided by Mariella Di Ciommo. It should be pointed out that the analysis remains the responsibility of the authors including all emphasis given and any errors. The infographic was created by Robin van Hontem. Editorial support was provided by Christina Thorngreen and Annette Powell, who also assisted in the study logistics, did the layout. Feedback on the case study can be given to: Matthias Deneckere <mde@ecdpm.org> and more details on the overall project can be found at: <www.ecdpm.org/changingpeacebuilding>

Executive Summary

This paper presents the findings of a case study on how Germany's official support for peacebuilding has been shaped in recent years. It aims to understand how political, bureaucratic and organisational factors (both globally and domestically) have either enabled or obstructed German peacebuilding support over time. It is part of a wider policy-oriented research project on how the environment for the support for people-centred peacebuilding is changing in Europe and what the most significant and consistent drivers of change and continuity are. In this way, the project aims to build a solid evidence base and foster debate on the implications for future support for peacebuilding.

Following a brief discussion on this paper's conceptual approach to peacebuilding in **Section 2**, **Section 3** describes the origins of the German peacebuilding agenda, following German reunification and military involvement in Kosovo and Afghanistan. This agenda put forward a broad, value-driven understanding of security, closely linked to accepted definitions of human security. Driven by a sense of historical responsibility, German peacebuilding policy has traditionally emphasised the primacy of civilian means over military responses. A concrete strategy for operationalising peacebuilding support has, however, never been adopted. Indeed, most peacebuilding practices were initiated by the development ministry and focused on conflict sensitivity. More recent policy papers take a more explicit, interest-driven approach, where forced displacement, migration and violent extremism are considered the main challenges. The 2017 Federal Foreign Office's document 'Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace' demonstrates a continued commitment to 'sustainable peace', prioritising political and preventive approaches to conflict, while not excluding military means as a last resort. Today, the notion of civilian primacy is much more accepted than it was in 2004, and the possibility that military action could become more prominent in German peace policy is seen as a threat to this.

Section 4 describes recently created institutional arrangements and financial support for peacebuilding. This section includes the observation that, over the years, Germany has significantly increased funding in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention and developed a robust toolbox to provide long-term support, mainly by focusing on development. Furthermore, in response to growing violent conflict closer to the EU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has stepped up its conflict-related funding. Its modus operandi can be characterised as reactive rather than preventive, short-term, steered by political priorities, and often insufficiently informed by context analysis and specialist knowledge. Similarly, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (known under its German acronym 'BMZ') – largely driven by political pressures to respond to forced displacement challenges – has shifted its preference towards more flexible and short-term funding arrangements. This risks undercutting advances made towards supporting holistic and sustainable approaches to peacebuilding. Germany has also become a more prominent player multilaterally, through its contributions to the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund and a stronger, more professional policy for personnel secondment to multinational peace operations. Germany has also stepped up investments in military capacity building, as part of its approach to crisis prevention and peacebuilding.

Both political and public support for peacebuilding remain strong, partly because of a small, yet actively engaged peace community, which consists of civil society actors and experts. Nonetheless, efforts to build a cross-ministerial peacebuilding architecture remain unsuccessful. Although an Interministerial Committee for Civilian Crisis Prevention has been created, it has not been sufficiently empowered to implement holistic approaches to peacebuilding, due to a fragmented bureaucracy and

political rivalries. As a result of this, beyond a small community of experts and stakeholders, peacebuilding policy continues to lack visibility as well as political leadership.

Section 5 analyses the main determinants that drive continuity and change in German support for peacebuilding. Germany's commitment to peacebuilding is based on a deep-rooted sense of identity of a peaceful civilian power and is driven by an active, value-oriented peace community. At the same time, a shifting geopolitical order, global events and conflicts close to Europe have changed Germany's perception of its place in the world, leading to a more active and ambitious foreign policy. This has led Germany to adapt its modus operandi to the changing nature of conflicts, for example, by exploring more integrated approaches to peace, including a greater willingness to use military means. Nevertheless, it has been difficult to create a holistic approach to peacebuilding due to political rivalries and limited bureaucratic incentives for cooperation. In this way, peacebuilding largely remains a niche activity for certain departments and staff members, primarily at the expert level. At the same time, political discourse is increasingly framing peacebuilding as instrumental in countering forced displacement and illegal migration, and in pursuing national security interests, as international events affect domestic politics. This has increased the pressure to deliver quick results, at the expense of more structural and transformative peacebuilding support.

Finally, **Section 6** offers future prospects for transforming peacebuilding support. In Germany, support for peacebuilding is at a crossroads. On the one hand, the emergence of a multipolar world order, which threatens existing international institutions and norms and limits the scope for long-term foreign policy planning, paints a bleak picture. Domestically, concerns over security and migration have fed the rise of right-wing populism, which is sceptical of aid and international cooperation. Neither the political nor the bureaucratic contexts seem to be in favour of long-term, context-based, bottom-up and people-centred peacebuilding.

On the other hand, strong public support for peacebuilding and the adoption of relevant terminology offer some opportunities. The process of formulating and implementing the 2017 Guidelines triggered a renewed dialogue within the peacebuilding community, both inside and outside the government, through fora for the exchange of innovative ideas. The main challenge, however, is how peacebuilding supporters can better engage with the political level as well as the wider public. This may require a number of institutional innovations, as well as a new type of communication that can transmit complex and context-specific ideas to a wider audience more effectively. Finally, all these efforts should take into consideration how the peacebuilding agenda can better resonate within today's broader foreign policy priorities.

1. Introduction

Today's rising need for effective responses to violent conflict coincides with the most significant changes in the European and global environment in the last few decades. This has raised concerns that political, policy and financial support for peacebuilding, as a normative agenda, will diminish. Yet, there has been limited independent research on what drives official political and financial support for peacebuilding in Europe and how this support is evolving.

To respond to this gap, this paper presents the findings of a case study on how Germany's official support for peacebuilding has been shaped, in recent years. It is part of a wider policy-oriented research project on how the environment for support for people-centred peacebuilding is changing in Europe. More specifically, the study has three aims:

- To analyse trends regarding **policy and financial support** for peacebuilding;
- To identify the most significant and consistent **factors driving change and continuity**, over time, in European support for peacebuilding;
- In light of these trends and factors, to analyse **implications for the future support for international peacebuilding**.

Today, after over 25 years of international support for peacebuilding, Germany provides a rich evidence base on which to reflect. For this purpose, this project takes a 'top-down' look at how peacebuilding support, among European governments, has been shaped over the years. It does so on the basis of four case studies, which, next to the current one focused on Germany, also cover Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) institutions. This selection was made based on the fact that these countries are some of the most consistent and generous supporters of peacebuilding, in recent decades. Therefore, any change in their support for peacebuilding could have significant implications for global responses to violent conflict.

This case study analyses support for peacebuilding at the level of governmental institutions, and the relation between governmental institutions and non-governmental actors in Germany. Rather than assess the effectiveness or impact of peacebuilding policies and programmes, it seeks to map out how the political and policy framing of peacebuilding has evolved. Furthermore, this case study aims to identify institutional, organisational and meta-level funding trends for peacebuilding activities. This leads us to look at official commitments at the overall foreign policy and development policy levels. In particular, we examine peace, security and development policies, as well as the institutional innovations directly relevant to peacebuilding. Our approach is to analyse why things are, rather than what they 'should' be or what would be ideal for peacebuilding. Therefore, our starting point is the political and bureaucratic context within Germany, rather than the contexts of conflict in which it intervened.

The findings are the result of research conducted between January 2017 and June 2018, using both qualitative and quantitative research methods. First, they draw on an extensive literature review, including government strategy and policy documents, expert analysis and academic literature. Second, this documentary analysis was complemented by interviews conducted in Berlin and Bonn with a number of key experts, government officials, and civil society representatives active in the domain of peacebuilding, conflict prevention or related policy domains (See Annex 1 for the list of interviewees). Third, initial findings and documents were presented and discussed during a one-day expert seminar, in March 2018, with key peacebuilding experts on German, Swedish, British and EU peacebuilding policy. The feedback and comments received during this seminar are reflected in the final version of this paper. Qualitative methods were supplemented by a quantitative analysis of

OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows, with a specific focus on peace-related aid categories.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual approach to 'peacebuilding' taken in this project. Section 3 describes the origins of German peacebuilding policy, how it evolved over the years, and how it relates to other policy domains. Subsequently, Section 4 looks into how governmental peacebuilding policy commitments have been translated into dedicated governance structures, operational mechanisms, financing instruments and funding flows. It also presents observations on the role of civil society and the expert community in shaping the policy dialogue. Building on the previous sections, Section 5 offers an analysis on the main determinants (both domestically and at the global level) influential in shaping German support for peacebuilding. Finally, Section 6 gives a brief overview of future prospects. In addition, it identifies the key risks, opportunities and questions to debate, which shape future peacebuilding support in a radically changing domestic and global environment.

The original project, of which this paper is a product, was conducted by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), under its European External Affairs and Security and Resilience Programmes and is financed by the foundation Humanity United and ECDPM itself. In addition to the current paper, which presents the case study on German support for peacebuilding, three separate papers have been produced, which present the findings and conclusions of case studies focused on Swedish, UK and EU support for peacebuilding, respectively. Moreover, a synthesis report has been published, which presents crosscutting findings and conclusions from the four cases.

Figure 1: Germany's potential capabilities for supporting peacebuilding



GERMANY'S POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES FOR SUPPORTING PEACEBUILDING



Germany is the **4th** biggest economy in the world.¹



829 staff

deployed to **UN peacekeeping operations** as of March 2018.³



In Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴



Germany is the second-largest donor country, **spending US\$23.8 billion** on net official development assistance (ODA) in 2017 (in 2016 prices) which represents 0.66% of GNI. It is the sixth largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provider in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI.⁷

Germany historically developed a strong non-interventionist foreign policy tradition. While the end of Cold War enabled it to play a more active global role, German political culture remained strongly pacifist in nature. Germany also sought to submerge itself in a united Europe and multilateral structures. Recently, Germany has been looking to increasingly translate its strong economic position into European and global leadership for peace, security and development.

Germany's **military expenditure** is ranked ninth in the world (US\$44 billion in 2017 current prices - 1.2% of its GDP) and fourth in NATO.²



The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (**BMZ**) employs around **1,000 staff members**.⁵

The German development agency (**GIZ**), has **19,506 permanent staff** in 120 countries.⁶



Germany is member of

- UN
- EU
- OECD
- OSCE
- NATO

amongst others, through which it **actively engages in peace missions** and **promotes peacebuilding issues**.



3rd in rank among the **top OECD-DAC donors** for civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution over the last 10 years.⁹

1 Source: IMF

2 Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

3 Source: United Nations peacekeeping

4 Source: Federal Foreign Office

5 Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

6 Source: GIZ

7 Source: OECD and DonorTracker

8 Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, Gross disbursements, 2016 constant prices

9 ECDPM analysis from OECD figures, CRS code 15220

2. Conceptual approach to peacebuilding

One of the main challenges from a policy analysis perspective is the absence of a universally accepted definition of the term ‘peacebuilding’. Part of the analysis presented in this paper therefore looks at how peacebuilding is understood in the German context and how it has evolved over time. To do so, this section offers a few conceptual considerations, which provide the basis for a working definition of ‘peacebuilding’.

The origins of the term ‘peacebuilding’ can be traced back to the academic work of Johan Galtung in the 1970s, which builds on the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive peace’ (Galtung, 1976). Yet, the concept only entered policy discourse in 1992, when the United Nations (UN) Agenda for Peace aimed to adapt the UN’s role as a global peace and security actor in the post-Cold War era. An increasing share of violent intrastate conflicts, with the majority of casualties being civilians, led the UN to place greater emphasis on direct intervention, within UN member states, to end conflicts and rebuild conflict-affected countries. ‘Peacebuilding’, in this context, aimed to “solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p.5). Later on, the 2000 Brahimi report, as well as other actors, such as NATO (NATO, 2003), the OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee, 1997) and various donor countries (Smith, 2004), picked up the term.

Table 1: The spectrum of meaning in peacebuilding terminology

← Spectrums of Meaning in Peacebuilding Terminology →	
Focus on post-conflict time span	Focus on all stages of conflict
Narrow focus on specific kinds of activities	Wide focus on a range of activities including peacekeeping, human rights monitoring, mediation, development, education, governance, etc.
Immediate focus on ending direct violence	Long-term focus on addressing root causes of violence, including structural injustices
Outcome-oriented focus on solutions	Process-oriented focus on transformation
Focus on the role of outside experts “intervening” in local conflicts	Focus on the role of insiders and increasing their capacity for building peace
Focus on high level national and international interventions	Focus on all levels of interventions, from the community, regional, and national levels
Focus on military peace operations	Focus on non-military approaches to building peace and security

Source: Schirch (2008)

Nevertheless, the meaning and scope of peacebuilding remains ambiguous. In fact, various spectrums exist according to which definitional approaches to peacebuilding can be identified, as illustrated in Table 1. For example, while the initial use of the term by the UN saw peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity, more recent conceptualisations focus on the full conflict cycle (United Nations, 2016; United Nations Security Council, 2016). In addition, recent approaches to peacebuilding have distanced themselves from the ‘liberal peace’ model focused on the pursuit of rapid democratisation, free and globalised markets, and rule of law through external intervention, in favour of more locally grounded and participatory approaches to peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997).

Another challenge is the existence of various partially overlapping terms. These include 'statebuilding', 'addressing fragility', 'conflict prevention', 'conflict sensitivity' and 'crisis management'. More recently, 'stabilisation' and 'resilience' have been gaining traction in European policy-making. While all these terms relate to responses to violent conflict, they tend to vary in their practical application and focus, e.g. the extent to which they emphasise short-term re-establishment of security over long-term and transformative ambitions. Indeed, some are more oriented towards state institutions than the socio-economic dynamics of peace. Despite these diverse uses of 'peacebuilding', a degree of consensus has been established on a number of features that help define it. In order to review these elements, this paper uses the approach to peacebuilding from the original OECD DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation as a working definition:

"Peacebuilding and reconciliation focuses on long-term support to, and establishment of, viable political and socio-economic and cultural institutions capable of addressing the root causes of conflicts, as well as other initiatives aimed at creating the necessary conditions for sustained peace and stability. These activities also seek to promote the integration of competing or marginalised groups within mainstream society, through providing equitable access to political decision-making, social networks, economic resources and information, and can be implemented in all phases of conflict [...] Peacebuilding involves both long-term preventive measures and more immediate responses before, during and after conflict." (Development Assistance Committee, 1997, p.86 and p.113)

While the document dates back to 1997 and is greatly influenced by a development perspective, this definition forms a good baseline for our analysis because of its combination of short- and long-term perspectives, its broad thematic scope, its focus on all stages of conflict, its inclusion of prevention and its pursuit of conflict transformation, rather than just reconstruction or conflict resolution. The use of this definition is also appropriate as all the case studies (EU institutions, Germany, Sweden and the UK) are members of the DAC, and this definition was agreed at the start of the timespan of the research. Therefore, this definition will inform our analysis, as presented in the following chapters. At the same time, we will explore how terminology, thinking and emphasis have evolved.

3. Understanding the concept of peacebuilding: evolution and trends

3.1. Civilian crisis prevention: the emergence of a German peace policy

Since the second half of the 20th century, Germany's foreign policy follows a strong peace-oriented tradition. The commitment to promote world peace is enshrined in the 1949 German Constitution (Deutscher Bundestag, 2018) and is largely based on the view that the country bears a historical responsibility for worldwide peace, resulting from its role in the Second World War (Bulmahn et al., 2013).

Nevertheless, the country developed a dedicated policy for peacebuilding only fairly recently. In 1980, the Brandt-Report already stated that development policy should be understood as peace policy¹. However, it was only after the German reunification, in 1990, that conceptual thinking on the matter

¹ The North-South Commission of the United Nations, chaired by former Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, published the 'Brandt report', also known as the North-South report, in February 1980. It laid out proposals to better integrate countries in the Global South in the global economy and increase support from industrialised countries. It also lays out proposals for a new global economic order.

gained momentum within the German foreign policy community. This happened as the release from the geostrategic gridlock of the Cold War led Germany to redefine its international role.

German participation in the NATO operation in Kosovo, in the late 1990s, was a turning point (Gießmann, 2004). This first military involvement of German armed forces on foreign soil since World War II implied **a shift away from the post-war doctrine of 'Kriegsverzicht' (renouncement of war)**. Moreover, the involvement in Kosovo, an intervention that was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council, was a departure from Germany's strict reliance on the UN, which had previously been indispensable to secure international support for German reunification. This trend towards greater openness to interventionism was confirmed with Germany's participation in the (UN-backed) military intervention in Afghanistan.

In response to this shift, the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens that took over power in 1998 under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder adopted a **'General concept on civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding'** (Bundesregierung, 2000). The one-page document set out an extended concept of security focused on its civilian aspects, encompassing political, economic, ecological and social stability. By highlighting state as well as societal and individual dimensions of security, it aligned with the 'human security' concept that emerged in international discourse, in the 1990s and 2000s. The events of September 11th, 2001 further fuelled conceptual thinking and triggered a new debate on the causes and consequences of global terrorism. This led the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (now integrated into the *Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*, or GIZ) to develop a working paper, which set out peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict management as a new area of work for its technical development operations (Nopers, 2002).

In 2004, under Chancellor Schröder, the Federal Government adopted an **'action plan for civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding'** (Bundesregierung, 2004). This document crystallised the renewed debate on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Germany. It recognised new challenges had emerged since the end of the Cold War, including intra-state protracted conflicts, state failure, non-state armed groups, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In order to address these, it formulated 163 concrete actions to build capacities for civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding across government ministries, with a focus on, but not limited to foreign, security and development policy. The new measures, which drew on the broader conception of security laid out in the 2000 General Concept, included strengthening state-level institutions and structures (e.g. security sector reform, rule of law and good governance), as well as societal and economic aspects of security, such as strengthening state-society relations, investing in education and media, and support for economic diversification. The document explicitly stressed the **primacy of civilian measures** to peacefully handle conflicts, which some see as a move to counter perceptions of a 'militarisation' of German foreign policy (Brune et al., 2015). In fact, the document did not exclude military action as a means to prevent or end crises, referring to experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Afghanistan and Macedonia (Bundesregierung, 2004).

3.2. Peacebuilding and networked security: balancing peace and security priorities

Inspired by the 2004 Action Plan, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (*Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung*, hereafter BMZ) took steps to better integrate peacebuilding in its development policies and operations. In 2005, it adopted a **'strategy for peacebuilding'**, which formulates guidelines for the use of development aid to better

address the structural causes of conflict, prevent escalation, and support societal and state actors in peacefully resolving conflicts, through more conflict-sensitive development actions (BMZ, 2005).

In 2013, the BMZ replaced this document with the **BMZ strategy paper on ‘development for peace and security’** (BMZ, 2013), which aimed to align German development policy with the internationally agreed ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ of 2011 and its associated Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals. The paper also led to the adoption of a **methodology for Peace and Conflict Assessments** for the development efforts of the BMZ, the GIZ and the KfW (the German reconstruction and development bank), which provides guidance on context analysis, assessments of relevance for peace and security, risks identification and impact monitoring (BMZ, GIZ and KfW, 2014). Such efforts indicate that **the development sphere, in particular, contributed towards the operationalisation of the German peacebuilding policy**. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the term peacebuilding, used in the 2005 document, was replaced by ‘peace and security’ in the document’s title in 2013.

In addition to the BMZ’s own efforts, in 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the BMZ and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) agreed on **cross-departmental Guidelines for a coherent policy of the Federal Government towards Fragile States** (Auswärtiges Amt, 2012). This document formulated a number of conceptual and operational recommendations for a more comprehensive approach towards fragile states, notably through the introduction of country- or region-specific interministerial task forces and strengthening early warning and early action mechanisms. It also illustrates the **increasing prominence of the notion of ‘fragility’ in policy documents**.

Meanwhile, a parallel policy process unfolded in the domain of security and defence, with repercussions for peacebuilding. In 2006, a **White Paper on Germany’s security policy and the future of the armed forces** was published by the MoD and adopted by the Federal Government as a whole. The document introduced the notion of **‘networked security’** (*vernetzte Sicherheit*) (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006). This concept of networked security focused on overcoming the ‘departmental principle’ (*Ressortprinzip*), a concept in German administrative culture by which a high degree of autonomy is granted to individual ministries (see Section 4). Thus, networked security represents a comprehensive approach to build a shared understanding of security across ministries. The White Paper saw the 2004 Action Plan as a part of this networked security agenda. As the White Paper, which contained the concept of networked security, largely functioned as the German national security strategy, some were concerned that the German crisis prevention and peacebuilding agenda would, as a result, be embedded in a more interest-driven national security rationale, instead of being a self-standing value-driven framework.

Yet, the concept of networked security itself has also evolved. While originally introduced to promote civil-military cooperation in the context of military deployment, it evolved into **an approach towards more coherence with international and local, state and non-state actors in conflict regions**. Under this premise, networked security recognises that, in some types or phases of conflict, the military does not play a role at all (Wittkowsky and Meierjohann, 2011). Indeed, the interest of the military in ensuring security and building trust among civilian populations through civil-military quick-impact projects can be in sharp contrast to the equally legitimate interest of civilian actors to protect their relationship with local partners and not be seen as part of a military deployment (Wittkowsky, 2012). In that sense, it has been argued that networked security should not be seen as an alternative to a human security approach, but as an instrument to foster a cross-government security policy that also encompasses civilian peacebuilding concerns.

A new **White Paper on German Security Policy and the future of the German armed forces** drafted by the MoD, in coordination with the MFA, was published in 2016 (German Federal Government, 2016). It provides an updated analysis of the German security environment, identifying the changing international order and diffusion of power (including increasing questions about the Euro-Atlantic order as a cornerstone of peace and stability), as well as transnational terrorism, fragile states and weak governance, interstate conflict, and uncontrolled and irregular migration as key challenges. In addressing these, the 2016 White Paper places strong emphasis on early recognition, long-term prevention and stabilisation and resolution of crises and conflicts, including through capacity building for local and regional security partners in fragile environments. It is another indication of how the MFA and MoD are increasingly working together in defining their respective roles when addressing peace and security challenges.

3.3. New guidelines for peacebuilding under a revamped foreign policy

In 2014, an open consultation process named 'Review 2014' took a critical look at German foreign policy (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018). The process was initiated by then-Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier with the aim of rethinking the country's role in the world in response to global events, such as the civil war in Syria or the conflict in the Ukraine. The wider purpose of the review was to **establish the country as a global actor**, building on its position as a European economic powerhouse. To this end, the Review aimed to address the conceptual and strategic deficit in foreign policy in a country which, for historical reasons, developed a tradition of restraint and where discussion on the *raison d'état* has largely been taboo (Bendiek, 2015).

In addition to Germany's new ambition to play a more prominent political role in foreign policy, a **stronger focus on stability, crises and conflicts** has emerged in recent years. In particular, two concrete decisions demonstrate this. First, the so-called 'Directorate-General S' for crisis prevention, stabilisation, post-conflict peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance was created within the MFA. Second, a broad consultation process under the name 'PeaceLab2016' led to the adoption, in June 2017, of **new Guidelines on 'preventing crises, resolving conflicts, building peace'** at cabinet level, replacing the 2004 action plan (German Federal Government, 2017).

One of the key values of the new document is its updated analysis of global challenges in relation to peace and security, namely:

- Fragile states, which are a breeding ground for violent conflict
- Nationalism, religious fanaticism and violent extremism
- Internationalised conflicts
- Population dynamics, climate change and natural disasters
- Forced displacement and irregular migration

At the same time, it takes stock of the new international framework and is embedded in global agreements, such as the 2030 Agenda, the 2011 New Deal, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and Resolution 2250 on youth, peace and security. It also refers to the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy adopted in 2016, thereby confirming Germany's commitment to the multilateral and European level.

Another innovation of the Guidelines is the inclusion of a vision statement of Germany's peace mission, which puts forward guiding principles on the why and how of Germany's peace policy.

Indeed, the Guidelines are based on a description of **sustainable peace**, which emphasises human rights, participation and individual liberties:

“Peace begins with the absence of organised, physical use of violence. For peace to be sustainable, however, it takes additional elements such as political and social participation, the rule of law, and respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights. Sustainable peace will prevail wherever people are respected in their inalienable rights, irrespective of their origins and life circumstances, and where they have the freedom to shape their own lives.” (German Federal Government, 2017, p. 45)

The statement that **values as well as interests** should lead Germany’s peace mission demonstrates a discursive shift in the Guidelines. The guidelines recognise that conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Libya or Mali, as well as crises in South Sudan and Eastern Ukraine, or ideological radicalisation and terrorism have an impact on Germany and Europe: “What we are seeing now is a world that ‘seems to be unravelling’. There is hardly any crisis whose effects will not also be felt in Europe and in Germany at some point” (German Federal Government, 2017, p. 12). As a consequence, the protection of citizens, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the reduction of irregular migration and displacement, as well as interests in global public goods, such as arms control and non-proliferation, a reliable collective security system and a rule-based global order are now placed at the centre of Germany’s peacebuilding policy. Although this is often interpreted as a shift towards pragmatism and realism, other observers see the elevation of peace policy to a ‘national interest’ as a considerable upgrade of peacebuilding on the political agenda (Nachtwei, 2017).

The specific objectives of the new Guidelines are fully aligned with the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals of the New Deal, and comprise legitimate politics, security (including human security), the rule of law, economic foundations, and state revenue and public services. Within this framework, commitments are made to strengthen capacities in the domains of **mediation, transitional justice and security sector reform**.

The most debated aspect of the document is how it frames the relation between civilian peacebuilding and the military. On the one hand, some voices have argued that Germany’s aspiration to assume global leadership requires not only a more political engagement, but also a greater willingness to engage with military means when necessary (Ero, 2016). On the other hand, other stakeholders, especially from civil society, expressed the concern that a stronger focus on military action would risk superseding the civilian primacy of German peacebuilding policy and thereby challenge the civilian identity of German peace policy (Gildemeister and Burggraf, 2016; Rohde-Liebenau, 2016; Vogler, 2016).

The Guidelines include the notion of **‘primacy of politics and the priority of prevention’** to strike a balance between these two opposing views (German Federal Government, 2017, p. 23). This is further clarified as follows:

“Wherever possible, we will give priority to civilian conflict resolution measures, including the development of civilian police structures. Some conflicts, however, necessitate more extensive steps by the international community in order to avert threats to peace and security or to prevent mass crimes against humanity and genocide. The use of military force permissible under international law remains a last resort for German policy and must at all times be part of a comprehensive, integrated policy approach.” (German Federal Government, 2017, p. 58)

Despite the careful wording, the formulation has been criticised for paving the way for a “militarisation of German foreign policy” (Linksfraktion, 2018; Knabe, 2017). This assertion is founded on the argument that the guidelines offer no specific criteria to assess how and when military action would be warranted. In reality, the wording does not differ much from the 2004 Action Plan, which already stated that “[...] military means as an instrument of crisis prevention and crisis management may be necessary in order to prevent or end the violent waging of conflicts or in order to first establish conditions under which the causes of conflict can be addressed by civilian means” (Bundesregierung, 2004, p.19). Clearly, it is not so much the thrust of the policy documents that has changed, but rather the overall expectations of a broader foreign policy that is often seen as more favourable towards using military means.

By contrast, the Guidelines were lauded for being the **result of a cross-departmental effort** that succeeded in having all ministries agree on a single policy centred around the ‘primacy of politics and the priority of prevention’, including the MoD and the Ministry of the Interior. The document is conceptually strong in its focus on internal conflicts, fragility and framing around a ‘sustainable peace’ concept. The focus on prevention allows it to link up with the UN Secretary-General’s Prevention Agenda and the UN’s ‘sustaining peace’ framework. Other noteworthy elements are the **importance attached to both local and international civil society in peacebuilding**, the prominence of women and youth, as well as the recognition of the importance of monitoring and learning.

Yet, the success of the new Guidelines will depend on concrete operational commitments. While Germany has put a lot of effort into developing conceptual frameworks for peacebuilding and crisis prevention, **a real strategy with concrete operational plans and commitments to capabilities and partnerships – needed in the field – is still lacking**. Indeed, one concern voiced regarding the 2017 Guidelines is that the lack of concrete follow-up actions on how to strengthen and finance civilian peacebuilding and conflict prevention undermine the document’s credibility (Brantner, 2017). Others claim the Guidelines can only gain momentum if additional thematic strategies are developed (e.g. on SSR, rule of law), which outline concrete goals, priorities, resource allocations and actions, and they are shared across the government (Zupan, 2017). In fact, the Federal Government is currently undertaking steps in this direction, including the drafting of a dedicated SSR strategy (König, 2018).

Box 1: Key messages on the concept of peacebuilding: evolution and trends

1. Germany has a strong peace-oriented tradition in its foreign policy, resulting from a historical responsibility arising after the Second World War. This is enshrined in its constitution.
2. A dedicated policy framework for civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding emerged in the early 2000s, largely as a reaction to increasing German military activity abroad, notably in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The peacebuilding agenda regained momentum more recently, largely triggered by new conflicts close to Europe, combined with Germany taking a more ambitious position at the global stage. This resulted in the adoption of new ‘Guidelines on preventing crises, resolving conflicts, building peace’, in 2017, and is also reflected in the 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy. However, a recent innovation is that peacebuilding is now explicitly framed as being a matter of promoting Germany’s values as well as interests. That said, a strong focus on multilateralism and maintaining a rules-based global order remain strong threads throughout German peacebuilding policy.
3. The German peacebuilding agenda has since its emergence introduced a broad security concept encompassing state, societal and individual elements of security. The 2017 Guidelines reconfirmed this in a vision statement for sustainable peace that includes elements of human rights, individual liberties and social and political participation.

4. Despite subsequent conceptual frameworks, Germany has never had a cross-governmental strategy for the operationalisation of its peacebuilding policy. In practice, it was mostly the development ministry that initiated operational innovations, focused on conflict sensitivity in development programming. However, the increasing focus on 'fragility' in policy discourse made the ministries of foreign affairs and defence more aware of the need for more comprehensive action. Particularly the notion of 'networked security' aims to strengthen collaboration between the military, the diplomatic and development sectors.
5. Since its inception, the German peace and security agenda has centred on the notion of the 'primacy of civilian instruments'. While this is often seen as a move to reconcile the stronger stance of German military policy, since the 1990s, with the pacifist identity of post-war German foreign policy, policy documents never completely ruled out military action as part of German peace policy. Today, the notion of civilian primacy is much more widely accepted than it was in 2004, and the possibility that military action could become more prominent in German peace policy is seen as a threat to this.

4. Institutional and financial support for peacebuilding

This chapter offers an overview of the main actors involved in German peacebuilding policy. Furthermore, it gives a detailed account of the institutional arrangements, instruments and human and financial resources available in Germany, as well as the coordination mechanisms for peacebuilding. Finally, it offers a closer look at the role of civil society and academia in influencing the peace debate.

Box 2: Trends in peace-related ODA in Germany

An analysis of OECD creditor reporting system data² reveals that, between 2007 and 2016, German official development assistance (ODA) more than doubled, from USD 8.6 million to 21.7 billion, with especially big increases in 2014, 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 2). These significant increases can, to a large extent, be attributed to the higher in-donor refugee costs and resources needed to address irregular migration and forced displacement. They also came after Germany reviewed its reporting procedures to better include eligible expenditure in these categories, which had previously not been reported (ECDPM and EBA, 2017).

ODA related to conflict, peace and security also saw vast increases, from USD 127 million, in 2007, to 476 million, in 2016. Within this category, a significant share of German ODA was dedicated to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution (see Figure 3). This share saw peaks of well over 70%, in 2010, 2012 and 2016. Although this percentage has not been consistent over the years, it indicates a strong prioritisation of civilian measures within the wider peace and security-related ODA spending package (see table 2). Since 2008, Germany has consistently remained in the top 4 of civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution ODA donors and kept a position of 3rd overall, for the 10-year period.

² See Annex 2 for a description of the methodology for the analysis of aid flows.


Table 2: Share of ODA allocated to conflict, peace and security and to peacebuilding

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Conflict, peace and security as a share of total ODA	1%	2%	4%	4%	4%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%
Civilian peacebuilding as a share of conflict, peace and security ODA	60%	54%	63%	74%	69%	79%	67%	62%	62%	71%

Source: ECDPM analysis based on CRS data (codes 152 and 15220)


Nevertheless, the increase in ODA for peacebuilding needs to be put into perspective. These figures may be the result of a greater political attention to peace-related issues, meaning that a rising share of projects is reported as “civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution”, even if they only indirectly contribute to peace. Likewise, as the section below illustrates, increases in peace- and stability-related spending can, to a large extent, be related to the growing use of ODA resources to address forced displacement and migration. In fact, if peacebuilding is seen as a continuum from hard security to governance and development, increasing ODA figures may well hide the fact that funding is increasingly prioritising the extreme ends of the continuum, leaving fewer resources available for core peacebuilding activities.

Figure 2 Total German ODA spending (in million USD, 2016 constant prices)



Source: ECDPM analysis based on CRS data

Figure 3: German ODA trends for conflict, peace and security and civilian peacebuilding
(in million USD, 2016 constant prices)



Source: ECDPM analysis based on CRS data

4.1. The German government structure as a hurdle for cooperation

A key constitutional and administrative principle of German government is the so-called **'departmental principle'** (*Ressortprinzip*). According to this principle, individual ministers enjoy a high degree of political autonomy and independence in their departments and portfolios. It contributes to the checks and balances in German political and administrative culture, which prevent power from being too concentrated in a single office.³

At the same time, the implementation of the German peacebuilding policy has not been assigned to a single ministry. While the MFA has played a central role in policymaking, it was mainly the BMZ that enabled the operationalisation of the 2004 Action Plan. Several other ministries have been increasingly involved, including the MoD, as well as the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice, due to Germany's involvement in international policing and justice sector reform, e.g. in Afghanistan.

One of the consequences of the departmental principle is that **policymaking and implementation are steered from within individual ministries**, without a tradition or incentives for cooperation, and with limited steering power from the Federal Chancellery. **In this regard, the 2017 Guidelines are an important innovation**, as they are the result of collaborative efforts, notably between the MFA, BMZ and the MoD. Yet, how the joint commitments will be operationalised remains to be seen and depends on the construction of a strong peace infrastructure within the German government.

³ Source: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/BKin/DE/Kanzleramt/Bundeskabinett/bundeskabinett_node.html

4.2. The BMZ and GIZ: a developmental approach to peacebuilding

The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, known as BMZ, has been key in shaping and implementing German peacebuilding policy. In its role as a **supporter of peacebuilding and prevention** activities the BMZ takes a **developmental approach**, including through poverty reduction, supporting social services, economic development, governance and rule of law, promoting human rights, democracy support, and strengthening civil society. As such, the BMZ provides a long-term, structural perspective to peacebuilding, which **focuses on societal and human aspects to create sustainable peace**. In 2016, the BMZ was active in 48 countries affected by conflict. Two-thirds of these countries were facing a high or acute potential for escalation, according to the BMZ Crisis Early Warning System (BMZ, 2017).

The BMZ has a relatively long-standing tradition for financially and operationally supporting peace-related activities, ever since the adoption of the first peacebuilding-related policy frameworks. This has resulted in a sophisticated institutional memory and toolbox to deal with peacebuilding and its linkages with long-term development processes. In this regard, the **Division 323 'Peace and security, disaster risk management'** is an important body, which advises other departments of the BMZ on conflict, peace, security and fragility. It also plays a leading role in global processes, such as the New Deal and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). Finally, the Division plays a key role in mainstreaming conflict sensitivity throughout all development projects managed by the BMZ, although the human capacities of the Division are said to be rather limited.⁴

Through its diverse set of activities, the BMZ contributes to peace in various ways, both directly and indirectly. **To assess its direct and indirect contribution to peace, the BMZ applies a 'peace marker'** that tracks spending on peace-related activities throughout its funding programmes (BMZ, 2013). In the last three years, BMZ spending on 'peace-related activities' has increased significantly, as Table 3 suggests.

Table 3: BMZ spending on peace-related activities⁵

2015	2016	2017
EUR 1.337 billion	EUR 1.9 billion	EUR 2.5 billion

Two important innovations were recently introduced into the BMZ budget. First, in 2012, a budget line was created on **'societal crisis response and stabilisation support'**. It provides flexible funds for civil society organisations (CSOs), churches and political foundations in countries undergoing a political transformation. It was used for the first time in Myanmar to support development towards more political openness and has been mobilised to provide support to Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries (Bundesregierung, 2014). However, as of 2015, this budget line was no longer included.

Second, in 2014 **'development-promoting and structure-building transition aid'**⁶ was introduced, which aims to contribute to the resilience of people and societies in developing countries, with a particular focus on fragile states and regions. This aid category can include projects of one to four years e.g. to support sustainable agriculture, social and productive infrastructure, integration of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), sustainable food security or reconstruction


⁴ Interview with government official, 4 May 2017.

⁵ Figures are based on an interview with a government official, 4 May 2017.

⁶ Entwicklungsfördernde und Strukturbildende Übergangshilfe or ESÜH.

(Bundesregierung, 2014). In 2016, this budget line was relabelled '**crisis management and reconstruction, infrastructure**', which went hand in hand with a significant increase of the budget – up to EUR 710 million, in 2018 – as Figure 4 illustrates.

Figure 4: Crisis management and reconstruction, infrastructure budget
(million EUR, commitments)




Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2018

In the domain of peacebuilding, the **Civilian Peace Service** (*Zivile Friedensdienst, ZFD*) is a better-established instrument of the BMZ. The ZFD is a programme that was founded in 1999 to **send peacebuilding specialists to the field to provide long-term support for local peace structures** in conflict-affected regions. These specialists work in different areas, such as inter-group dialogue, psychosocial support and healing, capacity development and peace education, and dealing with the past. In 2017, more than 300 international experts were active in 43 countries through the ZFD (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2018). Its budget has also been steadily increased during the last decade, reaching EUR 34 million in 2013, and EUR 45 million in 2017 (BMZ, 2017).

Next to the creation of specialised instruments and increased budgets, there is a trend towards more flexible spending mechanisms. This is particularly visible in the increased use of '**special initiatives**'. These are tools to provide **quick and flexible responses to specific challenges through shorter decision-making procedures** (e.g. by excluding negotiation with partners), especially in the context of irregular migration and refugees. In 2014, the BMZ introduced the initiative 'addressing causes of displacement – reintegrating refugees', which aims to address drivers of displacement and its negative effects. Between 2014 and 2016, a total of EUR 1.3 billion was foreseen for this special initiative in three fields of action: reducing the causes of displacement (e.g. through education and employment programmes), stabilisation of host regions (e.g. through infrastructure) and support for refugees and IDPs (e.g. through income-generating activities) (BMZ, 2017). A second special initiative, of a smaller budgetary scale, was created to focus on migration and refugees in the Middle East and North Africa region.

Budget allocations to these special initiatives have seen significant increases during the period 2014-2018, as shown in Figure 5 below. Moreover, the budget for transition support, which, amongst others, covers the reintegration of refugees and support to host societies, has seen a seven-fold increase in 2016 (ECDPM and EBA, 2017). Such trends confirm that the increases in funding by the BMZ, especially for peace and stability-related activities, can, at least partially, be explained by the growing prominence of migration and displacement on the BMZ agenda. This is due to the increased **political pressure to deliver quick and visible results through flexible funding**, as was also asserted by one of our interviewees.⁷ Moreover, the sharp rise in funding channelled through special initiatives accounts for a significant share of the overall increase in peace-related development funding. This suggests a growing preference for more flexible funding arrangements.

Figure 5: Budget allocations to special initiatives 2014-2018 (million EUR, commitments)



Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2018

Critics have pointed out that, under the special initiatives, the timeframe for spending resources remains short (even if it has recently been raised from one to two years), thereby **reducing the prospects of making a sustainable contribution to peacebuilding** (Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung, 2017). In addition, the result of budget increases for the special initiatives also implies a **shift in regional focus towards the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as to the Horn of Africa**. This shift occurs at the expense of Latin American and Asian countries and is a clear consequence of migration trends towards Europe (ECDPM and EBA, 2017).

The *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) is the main technical partner of the BMZ in terms of conflict prevention and resolution, and peace and governance reform. More than half of the countries where the GIZ is active are identified as fragile countries. Consequently, crisis

⁷ Interview with government official, 4 May 2017.

prevention and stabilisation are of increasing importance to the agency's work, as is the support for refugees and host communities (GIZ, 2017). Furthermore, the GIZ has contributed to the peace and security architecture at the AU level, including by constructing a state-of-the-art building for the African Union Commission Peace & Security Department in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Ero, 2016). Despite calls for Germany to take up a more political role in its peacebuilding approach, there is recognition that the GIZ, predominantly guided by its technical cooperation mandate, is facing challenges to act more politically.⁸

4.3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: pursuing stabilisation as a pathway to peace?

The MFA takes a central role in formulating Germany's policy on civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It has been the main ministry responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2004 Action Plan and the drafting of the 2017 Guidelines. However, in operational terms, the MFA is still 'a new kid on the block'. It became more active following the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which led to significant budget increases available to the MFA for peace and security, as Table 4 below shows.⁹

Since 2014, the MFA's peace and security activities were grouped into a single budget line for 'securing peace and stability'. In the past years, they have included contributions to international organisations such as the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe; short-term democratisation support (e.g. to prepare elections) and human rights promotion measures; non-proliferation and disarmament; and to support the development of structures for crisis prevention (e.g. the Early Warning System of the African Union). This budget line also covered the Zivik programme, which provides small grants of EUR 250,000 to support conflict transformation initiatives (which can range from legal advice on criminal justice to strengthening civil society organisations). In 2017, a total budget of EUR 8 million was available for Zivik projects.¹⁰ Finally, a Crisis Fund with an annual amount of EUR 25 million has been established. It facilitates, inter alia, rapid short-term contributions to multilateral peacekeeping or stabilisation efforts (Brune et al., 2015).

⁸ Interview with member of the Bundestag, 10 May 2017.

⁹ Interview with key experts, 22 May 2017.

¹⁰ Interview with government official, 10 May 2017.

Table 4: 2014-2018 budget allocations for securing peace and stability
(commitments, million EUR)¹¹

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Securing peace and security: total	1,486	1,524	2,446	2,680	2,790
Contributions to the UN	574	449	944	652	430
Humanitarian aid	303	475	733.5	1,206	1,500
Stability pact Afghanistan	180	180	180	180	180
Contributions to international organisations and facilities	169.6	168	176	156	153.5
Contributions to support international measures, in the field of crisis prevention, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution	95	95	248.5	316	351
Transformation partnerships Middle East and North Africa	38	33	22	22	20
Other support given to international organisations or facilities	27.5	27.3	33	34	35
Measures for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation	30	30	30	30	30
Democratisation and equipment support, measures for the promotion of human rights	20.7	19.6	25.5	27.5	40.2

The budgetary increases for peace and security, within the MFA, have also come with new administrative structures. A dedicated **Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Assistance** – commonly referred to as the **Directorate-General S** – has been created to lead the ministry's peace and security actions and spend the increased budgets.¹² This has not been without challenges. While the Directorate-General S now has a sizeable staff of some 150 officials, these are mostly rotating career diplomats with relatively limited thematic expertise or experience with budget administration.¹³ Furthermore, in crisis-affected or post-conflict countries, analytical capacities and expertise in peacebuilding and conflict prevention were found to be lacking, at the embassy level, resulting in flawed early warning and action (Bulmahn et al., 2013).¹⁴

Activities funded by the Directorate-General S generally follow a one-year planning and funding cycle. The underlying narrative is that the **MFA, through short-term stabilisation measures** in conflict-affected countries, **aims to pave the way for longer-term programmes funded under development schemes of the BMZ**.¹⁵ Indeed, the term 'stabilisation' is not interpreted by the MFA as a policy objective in its own right, but as an intermediary phase towards sustainable peace (see

¹¹ Figures are taken from the German Federal budget. The 2014 and 2015 figures show expenditures, whereas 2016 and 2017 figures represent allocations.

¹² Before the creation of the Directorate-General S, the Global Issues Division coordinated the implementation of the 2004 Action Plan.

¹³ Interview with government official, 10 May 2017; interview with key expert, 22 May 2017.

¹⁴ Interview with key expert, 3 May 2017; interview with government official, 11 May 2017.

¹⁵ Interview with key expert, 3 May 2017.

also the 2017 Guidelines, p.69).¹⁶ Still, the modus operandi of the MFA has regularly been **criticised for lacking a clear strategy and for being subject to political pressures**.¹⁷ This draws on the observation that the decision by the MFA to engage in crisis situations is usually driven by a number of factors, such as political willingness, the public and political attention a region or crisis receives, relational or historical responsibilities, the availability of funds, and international law considerations (Brune et al., 2015). As a consequence, the MFA's actions tend to remain reactive in nature and structural peacebuilding approaches are rarely the main concern (Grävingsholt and Nachtwei, 2016).

Others have pointed at a contradiction between the short project duration and budgetary cycles utilised by the MFA and the need for sustained support in areas such as security sector reform (SSR) (Friesendorf and Krempel, 2012). Although the MFA increasingly participates in peacebuilding and stabilisation as a result of Germany's ambition to take a more political approach in this field (to counterbalance the rather developmental approach of the BMZ), experts point out that, in practice, the activities of the Directorate-General S are not rooted in a political vision of peacebuilding. Hence, they are not much different from the technical modus operandi of its development counterparts. This is partly because the implementation in the field depends on the same partners, such as GIZ.¹⁸

The MFA has been an important funder of **training and equipment programmes** for several years, especially for police forces in third countries. The 2017 budget introduced a dedicated instrument for training and equipment support, managed by the MFA, to strengthen police forces in partner countries. Notably, support under this instrument, which runs for a duration of four years, includes training measures in the domain of criminal policing and border protection (Bundesregierung, 2017).

The MFA is also leading Germany's **multilateral engagement at the UN level in the domain of peacebuilding**. Germany was a founding member of the UN Group of Friends on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (Crossley-Frolick and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012). Germany has also expressed its support for the UN-World Bank report on conflict prevention (UN; World Bank, 2017) and the prevention agenda of UN Secretary-General Guterres.¹⁹ Furthermore, Germany's multilateral approach is apparent in its **regular campaigns for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council**, which it has had five times since 1977²⁰. Its last term, in 2011-2012, was particularly marked by the success in putting the topic of children and armed conflict on the agenda, as well as promoting climate change and security as important issues. Germany will also be remembered for abstaining in the vote of UNSC resolution 1973, which authorised a no fly-zone over Libyan soil (Höppner, 2012).

Germany will again have a non-permanent seat in the Security Council for the 2019-2020 period, for which it campaigned on a platform of promotion of conflict prevention, stabilisation and post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as justice and UN Security Council reform. In its campaigning efforts, Germany particularly prided itself on its contributions to UN efforts in Mali, where it not only deployed troops and police officers, but also a military reconnaissance team, which supported the implementation of the peace process. Germany's participation in the Syria Support Group and the negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran are other examples of how Germany is stepping up its multilateral game (Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations).

Germany has been an important contributor to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, as illustrated in Table 5, especially in 2016 and 2017, when Germany provided a record contribution of over USD 22 million and USD 26 million, respectively, making it the largest contributor to the fund.

¹⁶ Interview with government official, 10 May 2017.

¹⁷ Interview with key expert, 5 May 2017.

¹⁸ Interview with key experts, 12 March 2018

¹⁹ Interview with government official, 3 May 2017.

²⁰ Source: http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/searchres_sc_members_english.asp?sc_members=42

Table 5: Germany's commitments to the UN Peacebuilding Fund 2010-2017 (in million USD)

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Amount	5	n/a	6.468	0	7.49	3.79	22.25	26.3
Position in donor ranking	2	n/a	5	n/a	4	4	1	1

Source: UNDP, 2018

Germany was the fourth biggest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping during the period 2010-2014 (with a total of EUR 1.6 billion).²¹ The country has recently also **stepped up its peacekeeping deployments**. In March 2018, Germany deployed 766 troops, 15 military experts, 22 police officers and 26 staff officers, in various UN peacekeeping operations. The total of 829 UN deployments is a significant increase from the 429 deployments, in June 2016, 186 deployments, in June 2015, and 194 deployments, in June 2014, mostly due to vast increases in troops.²²

Germany's increased interest in peace missions is also reflected in the recent reform of the **Centre for International Peace Operations** (*Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze*, ZIF). The ZIF was established in 2002, under the authority of the MFA, and is responsible for the selection, training and recruitment of civilian experts to international peace missions (OSCE, EU and, to a lesser extent, UN and NATO). In addition, the ZIF formulates policy advice on the matter.²³ Every year, a number of civilian experts from Germany are deployed in peace operations, mostly focused on political advice and democratic institution building (Irrgang and Wittkowsky, 2015). In 2016, some 124 civilian experts were seconded in missions through the ZIF, and 1,300 experts were included in the ZIF expert pool.²⁴ As such, Germany occupied the position of first contributing country to civilian missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU, alongside Poland, although, relative to its total population, it only took 22nd place among EU member states, in terms of secondees (De Zan, Tessari and Venturi, 2016).

Since its 2017 reform, in an attempt to make deployments more attractive career-wise, the ZIF is able to act as seconding authority, on the basis of an employment contract.²⁵ The ZIF also saw its budget increase significantly, from EUR 2.8 million in 2015, to EUR 10 million, annually, as of 2016, and EUR 15 million in 2018. This demonstrates the significant amount of political energy invested in civilian crisis management operations within Germany's peace policy (Wieland-Karimi, 2017).

4.4. The Ministry of Defence: militarising peace?

When it comes to peace policy in its broader sense, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the German armed forces are involved, primarily, due to their **role in crisis management, peacekeeping and stabilisation efforts**. In terms of operational funding for peacebuilding, the MoD is only a small actor, as it has **no dedicated budget line for peacebuilding or prevention-related activities**. Still, the MoD has different budget lines that are directly or indirectly related to both these domains. The MoD's contributions to prevention include military early warning of emerging crises, implementation of arms

²¹ Figures are taken from the 2008, 2010 and 2014 progress reports of the 2004 Action Plan.

²² Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>

²³ Interview with government official.

²⁴ Figures are taken from the 2014 progress report of the 2004 Action Plan.

²⁵ Before the adoption of the new law, experts were recruited on an independent basis, with limited social benefits. The new legal framework aims to make secondment in a peace mission more attractive. Additional financial resources were made available to the ZIF to be spent on salaries and related costs (interview with government official, 3 May 2017).

control initiatives, imposition of UN sanctions (e.g. military presence), crisis mitigation based on civil-military cooperation, post-conflict stabilisation (e.g. public order maintenance), bilateral cooperation for military dialogue and exercises, and capacity building of states and regional organisations to contribute to peace missions (Brune et al., 2015).

Training and equipment support represents an increasingly important – albeit politically contested – element of Germany's peace and security policy. Since 2016, through the '**Enable-and-Enhance Initiative**', Germany has committed EUR 200 million for three years to support the capacity building of military and other security forces (including the police). As this initiative is **funded jointly by the MoD (70%) and the MFA (30%)** and decisions on spending need to be taken jointly by both ministries, it is one of the rare cases of pooled funding within the German government. Recent measures have included training of security forces and dialogue with civil society in Nigeria, the construction of a logistics school in Afghanistan, training and equipment for border management in Tunisia, and the construction of field operational capabilities and a field hospital in Namibia (Bundesregierung, 2017). The 'Enable-and-Enhance initiative' is planned according to one-year cycles and thus aims to enable rapid short-term political reaction.

Funding for such capacity building initiatives is motivated by the aim to enable partner countries and regional organisations to better manage conflicts independently (Bundesregierung, 2017). Although spending is not considered as ODA, it is seen as **part and parcel of the wider German peacebuilding and conflict response efforts, as confirmed in the recent 2017 Guidelines**. Several peace-oriented civil society organisations have, however, expressed concerns, claiming that providing equipment to military actors as part of a peacebuilding approach pushes the civilian primacy into the background (Liebich, 2016; Fischer, 2016).²⁶ Others have also pointed out that, while there are potential benefits to capacity building support for security forces, this does not occur in a political vacuum. Therefore, support should be provided with a proper understanding of the political economy on the ground.²⁷

4.5. Efforts to build a cross-ministerial peace architecture remain weak

To overcome the strict separation of ministries resulting from the departmental principle (see above), the **2004 Action Plan** aimed to foster coherence through interministerial coordination and intensified cooperation with non-state actors. In light of this, the **Interministerial Committee for Civilian Crisis Prevention** has been established. Chaired by the MFA and made up of representatives from all federal ministries, this committee is mandated to ensure and coordinate implementation of German peacebuilding policy. It meets every six weeks, on average. In addition, a system of **liaison officers** between the MFA, BMZ, MoD and the Ministry of the Interior has been established to foster day-to-day dialogue between respective ministries (Wittkowsky, 2012).

Under the Interministerial Committee, several **working groups** have been created, including on SSR and on secondment of peace personnel in international missions. Further working groups on public relations, rule of law, and 'dealing with the past' are foreseen under the 2017 Guidelines. The cross-departmental guidelines, agreed upon in 2012, further introduced the practice of establishing **interministerial task forces for specific crisis-affected countries, regions or topics**. So far, examples include task forces to promote a networked approach in responding to conflicts in Sudan and in the South Sahel region. Each ministry participates in these task forces by sending experts (Brune et al., 2015). A working group on mediation is also foreseen, with the MFA responsible for

²⁶ Interview with civil society representative, 3 May 2017.

²⁷ Interview with key experts, 22 May 2017

track-one mediation and the BMZ for track-two and track-three mediation (the civil society and grassroots levels) (Zupan, 2017).

The German Federal Parliament also plays an important role. In 2014, it established a dedicated **subcommittee for civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution and networked action**, which monitors progress and feeds the policy debate. One interviewee described a strong sense of community and engagement among the involved parliamentarians and how this cross-party support created new dynamics in the policy process.²⁸ Furthermore, the parliamentary subcommittee played a key role in demanding regular implementation reports to review progress on the implementation of the 2004 Action Plan from the Federal Government and in fostering the development of the new guidelines, thus keeping peacebuilding policy on the government's agenda.

It has been important to establish such institutional arrangements to promote coherent action and put peacebuilding higher on the agenda. Nevertheless, **their success in overcoming the traditional division of labour between ministries remains mixed, at best**. While the Interministerial Committee is mandated to ensure coordination, it does not act as a commanding body with political or operational authority. Within the Committee, the representatives of the ministries are, predominantly, low-level staff, with weak links to senior-level officials (Brune et al., 2015; Stengel and Weller, 2008).²⁹ Moreover, while the MFA, the MoD, the BMZ, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice send their representatives to the Committee meetings regularly, other ministries do not, which limits the potential to mainstream peacebuilding and conflict prevention across all government activities (Wittkowsky, 2012). This is a result of the **little visibility peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy enjoys beyond a community of directly involved stakeholders and experts**.

It remains to be seen to what extent the 2017 Guidelines will result in stronger institutional arrangements. One of the frequent criticisms levelled at the **Guidelines is that they lack specificity with regards to the new modalities and coordination mechanisms to implement the new policy**. Indeed, they merely state that current mechanisms need to be "further developed" and that cross-departmental guidelines will be created with guidance on context analysis, planning, strategic development and implementation (Ziviler Friedensdienst et al., 2017). This is a weakness, especially given the Guidelines' emphasis on cross-ministerial responsibilities (e.g. also involving trade and environmental policy in the peacebuilding agenda), as there is **no clarity as to whom, within the government, is responsible for coordination**. Current plans foresee a rotating presidency of the Interministerial Committee, but experience will tell if this is successful (Soziale Verteidigung, 2017).

While the 2004 Action Plan foresaw resource pooling, **the Interministerial Committee currently does not manage its own resources**. Between 2006 and 2009, the MoD gave the Interministerial Committee a budget of EUR 11.5 million for civilian crisis prevention projects that were decided upon by consensus, across the ministries. The majority of these funds were spent on 'provincial development funds' implemented by the BMZ in Afghanistan, where the German armed forces were active as well (Bundesregierung, 2008). Since 2010, this budget line has been cancelled and the Committee no longer has its own resources.

²⁸ Interview with key expert, 22 May 2017.

²⁹ Interview with government official, 4 May 2017.

4.6. Civil society and academia: key actors that feed the peacebuilding debate

Germany is characterised by a **relatively strong ‘peace community’** within civil society, which consists of several (faith-based and other) NGOs, political foundations, academic experts, and think tanks. They feed the policy debate with research and expertise, create a link between the public and politicians, monitor governmental action, and keep peace on the agenda through advocacy work.

Faith-based organisations, in particular, play a key role. Bread for the World (*Brot für die Welt*) is an example of a development organisation that is globally active in development, relief and peace. Rooted in protestant values and based on cooperation with churches and church-related partners, the organisation is active around the world, including in ‘safeguarding peace as well as the integrity of creation’ (Brot für die Welt, 2016). While, usually, such faith-based NGOs do peacebuilding as part of their work (often development-focused), and do not focus solely on peace, they are key in influencing the debate on German peace policy. Furthermore, they are active promoters of a **value-based approach to peacebuilding and staunch supporters of taking a civilian rather than a military approach to conflict**, as illustrated by their opposition to the concept of networked security and the Enable-and-Enhance Initiative (Hauswedell, 2016; Gildemeister and Burggraf, 2016).

Those civil society organisations that are active in peacebuilding have organised themselves into a number of platforms, such as the **German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management**. This platform connects some 130 individuals, 60 organisations and institutions active in peacebuilding, conflict resolution and mediation, human rights, humanitarian aid, and development cooperation. Its aim is to bring together organisations committed to ‘peaceful conflict management’ to strengthen community building and engage in joint advocacy work and representational activities.

In terms of **research**, Germany hosts a number of think tanks, research centres and foundations with a specific niche in peace and conflict prevention. These include the Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, an independent organisation of around 70 staff dedicated to conflict transformation research, dialogue support, mediation and peace support structures, and peace education and global learning.³⁰ Another example is the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), which conducts independent research on peace-relevant issues and provides research-based policy advice at the national, European and international level. With a budget of over EUR 6.7 million (2015) and a staff of approximately 80 people, it is the biggest peace-oriented research organisation in Germany (PRIF/HSFK, 2015).³¹

In addition, the German Development Institute (*Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik*, DIE), a renowned think tank on global development and international cooperation with close ties to the German Federal Government, has a dedicated department on ‘governance, statehood and security’, which conducts research on stability, violent conflict and state failure. It serves as a recognised source of expertise for ministries on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Finally, the German Foundation for Peace Research promotes peace and conflict research through funding for studies and the organisation of conferences. However, experts have noted that the Foundation remains seriously underfunded, with an endowment of EUR 27 million, far removed from the initial target of EUR 50 million that the Federal Government had set.³²

³⁰ See <http://www.berghof-foundation.org/>

³¹ See <https://www.hsfk.de/>

³² Interview with key expert, 3 May 2017.

The **Working Group on Peace and Development, known as FriEnt** is a key organisation, which fosters dialogue between civil society, academia and government. It does so by bringing together state structures (the BMZ and the GIZ), faith-based organisations (Bread for the World, Misereor), civil society networks (Civil Peace Service Consortium, German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management) and political foundations. FriEnt is financed by the BMZ and functions as a knowledge platform that pools capacities, promotes exchange and collaboration, and provides thematic support and advice for its members. **FriEnt plays a key role in community building among peace-oriented organisations, and in government and civil society.** FriEnt has been one of the main defenders of a more strategic and political approach to peacebuilding.³³

A final key body is the **Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding**, which advises the Interministerial Committee of the Federal Government. It was created in the context of the 2004 Action Plan and consists of 19 representatives from research institutes, NGOs, the private sector, faith-based organisations and political foundations. Next to advising the Committee, it is also the **main body for dialogue between the government and civil society**. In principle, it meets two times a year. The Advisory Board is a key body through which non-governmental organisations can influence the peacebuilding policy debate. However, in practice, **its impact remains relatively limited**. Nevertheless, the **2017 Guidelines** foresee a more prominent role for the Advisory Board, with **a more precise mandate** focused on expert guidance to the Interministerial Committee and its own contributions, with public reports and positioning on federal initiatives, to foster the exchanges with the expert community.

4.7. Concluding remarks: A strong national peace infrastructure is still lacking

The **2004 Action Plan** has triggered the creation of instruments and structures for peacebuilding and crisis prevention that are now well established (Nachtwei, 2014). Still, several observers remain critical of the German government's ability to build an institutional infrastructure that can guarantee a coherent conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy (Nachtwei, 2014; Weller, 2007). Furthermore, subsequent implementation reports of the Action Plan as well as expert analysis have pointed at **both the underfunding of the infrastructure and the weaknesses in the interministerial coordination and exchange**. Specifically, the lack of cross-departmental early warning systems or the absence of a prominent personality to promote German peacebuilding and crisis prevention efforts are often mentioned in this regard (Stengel and Weller, 2008).

In addition, the expert community has also regularly highlighted the absence of a dedicated budget line managed by the Interministerial Committee as a deficiency (Stengel and Weller, 2008). Indeed, its absence **continues to subject peacebuilding activities to the logic and principles of other, better-established policy domains, such as development and foreign policy**, rather than establishing them as a policy domain in its own right. With weak coordination comes the risk of maintaining different interpretations of the term 'peacebuilding' and what it entails.³⁴ As budgets for peacebuilding and stabilisation within the BMZ and the MFA have grown in recent years, the absence of a broader sense of community and stronger institutional incentives for cooperation has led to **increased competition between both ministries**.

Moreover, while coordination between the MFA, BMZ, MoD and, to a certain extent, the Ministry of the Interior has improved, **the German government has, so far, not succeeded in establishing**

³³ Interview with key experts, 22 May 2017.

³⁴ Interview with key expert, 22 May 2017.

crisis prevention as a cross-cutting issue of which all ministries take ownership (Nachtwei, 2014).³⁵ The ministries responsible for trade (including arms trade), promoting social inclusion, environment and climate change, to name but a few, all have a role to play in promoting peace, yet they are currently not sufficiently involved in the debate.

One major criticism of the **2017 Guidelines** is that they fail to provide concrete solutions to these issues, as well as specifics on financing commitments. This is due to the fact that the ‘power of the purse’ resides with the Federal Parliament, yet the lack of specific commitments or targets to provide necessary resources for stronger institutions (e.g. the Interministerial Committee and the Advisory Board) is seen as a major weakness (Soziale Verteidigung, 2017; Brantner, 2017). The failure of the Guidelines to foresee a high-level political leadership position to advance implementation is also seen as a **major shortcoming in lifting the peacebuilding policy higher on the political agenda** and selling it to the wider government and society (Nachtwei, 2017).

Box 3: Key messages on institutional and financial support for peacebuilding

1. The operationalisation of German peacebuilding policy has been steered by several different ministries, often in parallel. Early efforts came particularly from the development ministry, which has significantly increased its budget for peace-related activities over the years. In addition, it created a robust and specialised toolbox to provide long-term support for the human and societal dimensions of peace, through the lens of development.
2. As conflict and instability has come closer to the EU’s borders, the MFA has created dedicated budget lines and structures to engage in short-term stabilisation. Spending on peace and conflict-related activities has seen a steep upward trend in recent years. Despite Germany’s ambition to take a more high-profile approach to crisis and conflict, there is no concrete political vision for peacebuilding policy and actions are further impeded by an absence of leadership and relevant expertise.
3. Due to the changing security environment, the BMZ has been under pressure to channel growing amounts of funding to politically pressing issues (such as migration and forced displacement) through shorter-term and more flexible disbursement schemes. This implies that, despite the increases in available resources, the ‘quality’ of the funding is impacted as scope for long-term financing is more limited.
4. Given the BMZ’s growing preference for short-term, flexible funding, it risks overlapping with the MFA. This could exacerbate a political culture in which the high degree of departmental autonomy is unfavourable to cross-departmental cooperation and coherent and holistic peacebuilding policies. While new structures were set up to allow for interministerial dialogue and coordination, they remain weak in the absence of political leadership, dedicated budgets and stronger incentives for cooperation.
5. Germany has significantly stepped up its game on the multilateral level. It is currently the biggest contributor to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and its personnel secondments to international peace missions have significantly increased, largely through troop contributions. It has also stepped up investments in military capacity building as part of its approach to crisis prevention and peacebuilding.
6. Germany has a relatively rich peace community, consisting of (often faith-based) NGOs and research institutes dedicated to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Expert bodies and platforms allow for regular dialogue between the government and the peace community, although the testimonies on its impact give a mixed picture.

³⁵ Interview with key expert, 10 May 2017.

5. Analysis of the main determinants of support for peacebuilding

The previous sections covered the evolution of and on-going discussion on the support for peacebuilding, as well as the conceptual policy debate and the relevant institutional and financial architectures, within the German government. Building on the previous analysis, this section aims to identify the main factors that drive both change and continuity in German support for peacebuilding, over time.

5.1. Promoting peace is central to Germany's identity

Germany's approach to peacebuilding is guided by a **deep-rooted sense of being a 'civilian power of peace'**. Germany's peace mission is enshrined in its constitution, which states that Germany should "promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe". It is a reflection of Germany's historical and normative duty following the Second World War. In 2013, this was also acknowledged by then-minister of defence, Thomas de Maizière, who described German society as deeply pacifist, with a fundamental scepticism towards all military matters (Bundesregierung, 2013). Furthermore, recent research has confirmed that attitudes towards peacebuilding remain very positive among the German public. A vast majority of Germans (82%) agree that peacebuilding plays a vital role in ending violent conflicts around the world, and 70% agree that Germany should invest more resources into peacebuilding (on both questions, the level of agreement in Germany was around 10% higher than in the UK). Findings also suggest broad public support for investing in long-term and holistic approaches, rather than short-term, reactive and high-level activities (Conciliation Resources, 2017).

The important, often highly value-driven, peace community in Germany reflects the society's pacifist attitude and is also a major driving force in keeping this attitude alive. It does so through advocacy work at the political level and by participating in the wider public debate. For instance, several interviewees described the instrumental role of civil society in pushing for the adoption of the 2004 Action Plan. NGOs that insisted on enshrining civilian primacy in peace policy in an actionable document, to counterbalance the military experiences in the Balkans were eventually successful, despite the initially lukewarm support from the MFA due to its limited capacities to engage in the matter.³⁶ During the PeaceLab 2016 process, which fed into the drafting process of the 2017 Guidelines, the strong interest and engagement of civil society also came as a surprise to many and has kept the discussion on the need to retain civilian primacy alive.³⁷

The Parliamentary Subcommittee for civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution and networked action has also been identified as an important platform to discuss the future of German peacebuilding policy and to include the voice of the public into the debate. The commitment to civilian peacebuilding has, reportedly, significant cross-party buy-in in the Committee,³⁸ but even individual members of parliament can influence the debate. The German mediation initiative, for instance, has been attributed to the unrelenting lobbying of a single member of parliament.³⁹

³⁶ Interview with civil society representative, 3 May 2017

³⁷ Interview with civil society representative, 5 May 2017; interview with key expert, 8 May 2017.

³⁸ Interview with member of the Bundestag, 10 May 2017.

³⁹ Interview with government official, 10 May 2017.

5.2. From restraint to responsibility: Germany's evolving sense of its place in the world

The post-Cold War international system has faced several tests in recent years. Emerging powers are increasingly claiming their role on the international scene, testing old power balances and institutions and challenging the dominance of the West. Talk of a 'return of geopolitics', not least in the context of the crisis in Ukraine, is becoming more frequent and tensions between Russia and Europe have increased. At the same time, the euro-crisis and the impact of the Great Recession have challenged the stability of the European Union. In this context, countries increasingly turn to **Germany to provide leadership, within Europe and on the global scene**, despite its historical reluctance to take a more proactive international role. As one interviewee pointed out, the urgency for more German leadership is further driven by the relative weakness of the EU's foreign policy.⁴⁰

Adapting to global power shifts by translating Germany's economic weight into global leverage was precisely one of the objectives of the 2014 Foreign Policy Review, instigated by then Foreign Minister Steinmeiner. More recently, the presidency of Donald Trump in the US has sparked concerns over the sustainability and reliability of the transatlantic partnership, while the Brexit vote and the rise of populism in Europe have further fed the demand for German political leadership – including from within Germany itself. This is reflected in the **2016 White Paper on German security policy**, which contains a detailed discussion on how Germany should define its global role in the context of a changing international order, diffusion of power, and both internal and external challenges to the Euro-Atlantic order. It concludes, "Germany is prepared to provide a substantial, decisive and early stimulus to the international debate, to accept responsibility, and to assume leadership" (German Federal Government, 2016, p. 22). Furthermore, the 2017 Guidelines state:

"What it means to fulfil this mission for peace laid down in the Basic Law, Germany's constitution, in these times of countless crises, new geopolitical lines of conflict and the increasing challenge of global and regional governance structures is **to take on more international responsibility for peace, freedom, development and security.**" (German Federal Government, 2016, p. 44, emphasis in original)

Germany's move towards a more active political role in tackling conflict and instability is further fed by the changing security environment Germany finds itself in. As conflict and insecurity are edging closer to the EU's external borders, peace and security rank high on the political agenda, not least because of the war in Syria, the rise of ISIS and the conflict in Ukraine. From an organisational standpoint, the impact is visible in the more prominent role assumed by the MFA and the significant increases in available resources for stabilisation and peace-related activities, and the creation of dedicated governance structures. On a conceptual level, it has been a driving force behind Germany's growing ambition to formulate a political approach to peacebuilding (including through mediation and transitional justice). Although, in the absence of a clear political vision on peacebuilding, this approach has, so far, not been fully implemented.

An important feature of Germany's peace policy is that it is **embedded in a strong multilateralist discourse**. While multilateralism and Europeanism have been important features of German foreign policy for decades (due to its reliance on the UN during German reunification), the Brexit vote and Trump's presidency have increased the need for **Germany to reconfirm its commitment to maintaining international institutions and norms, as part of its peacebuilding policy**. Indeed, the 2017 Guidelines recognise the preservation of a rule-based global order and reliable collective

⁴⁰ Interview with government official, 3 May 2017.

security systems as national interests to be pursued through German peace policy. Germany, together with Sweden and Finland, is also actively seeking to increase civilian capacity for conflict prevention and management, within the EU, to counterbalance recent advances in EU military cooperation with non-military capabilities. This shows Germany is driven to take the debate forward, at the European level as well (Wallström, 2018). As discussed in Section 4, Germany also frequently used its UN Security Council seats to put peacebuilding-related topics on the agenda.

Nevertheless, the extent to which Germany is able to set multilateral norms remains to be determined. Despite its ambitions on paper, the references to the EU Global Strategy, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or the New Deal, in the 2017 Guidelines, do not necessarily reflect serious involvement in these European and global processes. As one interviewee pointed out, **the German debate on peacebuilding remains largely detached from global policy processes** and CSOs that advocate for peace have little capacity or ability to garner political will to engage at the international level. For instance, the implications of new European and global frameworks were little discussed during the PeaceLab 2016 process, which led to the 2017 Guidelines.⁴¹ Thus, **the wider peacebuilding policy debate in Germany remains limited mostly to the national level**, and despite some successes in global policy-making, **Germany has faced challenges in setting new norms.**

5.3. New types of conflict set additional challenges for peacebuilding

Another important factor that affects peace and security is the changing nature of conflict, which often results from a shift in the geopolitical balance of power. As discussed earlier, the end of the Cold War, the Rwanda genocide, and the conflicts in the Balkans introduced a new era of intrastate conflicts, which require more 'interventionist' approaches to peace and security, encompassing both military and civilian means. In light of this, the 2004 Action Plan was framed in terms of the emergence of 'new wars', marked by weak or failing state structures and non-state actors. Initially, new approaches to peacebuilding mostly came from the development branch of the German government. Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent increased attention to global terrorism and state fragility in international relations contributed to the Action Plan being fast-tracked.

More recently, priorities changed again, as conflict and crises have come closer to the EU's borders and their impact in Germany has become more visible. The Ukraine conflict, in particular, as well as the war in Syria, and the war on ISIS have been cited as major triggers for the creation of the Directorate-General S in the MFA. It has also led to significant budgetary increases for the peace, security and stabilisation policy areas.⁴²

The changing nature of crises has also thrown the existing approaches to peacebuilding into question. The on-going crises in Syria and Libya are qualitatively different from earlier conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Nepal because of their continued acuteness, and the absence of legitimate actors to work with on the ground. In these cases, developmental and technical approaches to peacebuilding (e.g. livelihood support or cash for work), typically spearheaded by the BMZ and the GIZ, may not be sufficient. Moreover, the aid effectiveness principles that usually underpin development activities, such as ownership and country alignment, may be difficult to apply.⁴³ This is reflected in the 2017 Guidelines' analytical chapter, which includes an in-depth analysis of the concept of fragile states as a breeding ground for violent conflict. Building on the typology of state

⁴¹ Interview with key expert, 22 May 2017.

⁴² Interview with key expert, 22 May 2017.

⁴³ Interview with key expert, 5 May 2017.

fragility prepared by the Advisory Board, the Guidelines aim to adapt policies and instruments to these different types of fragility (Federal Government, 2016, p.21).

The acuteness of today's crises has intensified the quest for synergies between civilian and military peacebuilding. The many acute crisis situations and war-torn areas are increasing the demand for security actors to guarantee stability and safety. Indeed, in his statement during the parliamentary debate on the 2017 Guidelines, Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel claimed that 'peace policy often demands the use of military means'. While this notion is by no means new in the German peacebuilding debate (the 2004 Action Plan already included an opening towards military action), political willingness, discourse and indeed action seem to be shifting nonetheless. For instance, during the 2017 G20 Summit, Chancellor Merkel raised the point that large industrialised countries like Germany should, as part of their development aid, be more open to transferring weapons to African groups in order to counter militant groups. The MoD was also closely involved in drafting the 2017 Guidelines, and its Enable-and-Enhance initiative was specifically framed in terms of this security-development nexus. As such, the military is increasingly being put forward as a crisis prevention actor and a key stakeholder in defining and implementing peace policies.

5.4. The silo mentality and political rivalries remain barriers to more effective peacebuilding

Despite strong support from the public, the lack of political leadership and an unfavourable political and administrative culture have prevented German peacebuilding policy from exploiting its full potential. Indeed, due to **the ministries enjoying significant autonomy, peacebuilding and civilian conflict prevention remains a niche policy domain for certain departments and staff members**, with limited incentives for mainstreaming or cross-departmental cooperation. One visible consequence of this is the limited leverage of the Interministerial Committee to initiate or push for policies, and the lack of pooled funding. The 'departmental principle', within the German federal administration considered a sacred principle under constitutional law, causes problems for cooperation.⁴⁴ Consequently, **the landscape remains fragmented**: there are different cultures and jargons being used and, historically, little effort is made to share the lessons learnt or do joint trainings. This is one of the reasons why attempts to mimic other actors' approaches (such as the UK conflict pool, which is regularly referred to as a best practice) have failed to materialise.

The silo mentality (cultivated by the 'departmental principle'), whereby members of the government are reluctant to share information or knowledge with each other, sometimes risks being **exacerbated by political rivalries between the responsible ministries**. During the last Merkel III coalition, the ministers for Foreign Affairs, Development, and Defence regularly competed for political attention and resources (Weller, 2007). This was illustrated by the increasing joint public appearances of the Ministers for Development and Defence. While it was hailed by some as an important step towards stronger political leadership and better civil-military cooperation, other observers saw it as an example of pre-election party profiling, with both ministers belonging to the Christian-democratic parties in the governing coalition, whereas the social-democratic foreign minister remained absent. It is also illustrative of the continuous struggle for responsibilities among the three ministers, which operate in closely affiliated domains.⁴⁵

At the same time, political rivalries can allow for agendas to be pushed further. Although the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, campaigned for a more outward and forward-

⁴⁴ Interview with government official, 10 May 2017.

⁴⁵ Interview with key expert, 3 May 2017

looking foreign policy in order to depart from his predecessors' opposite stance, he also hoped to regain some of the influence the MFA had lost, as Chancellor Merkel – a political rival of his – increasingly concentrated foreign policy powers in the Chancellery (Techau, 2015). While the influence of party politics is debatable,⁴⁶ political rivalries are still likely to impact relations between the various ministries, and this is likely to continue under the Merkel IV coalition, which assumed office in 2018.

On the other hand, domestic pressures and political competition limit the possibility for peacebuilding approaches to be informed by conflict expertise and knowledge of local contexts. The analysis shows that, despite the MFA's growing ambition in the domain of peace and security, the ministry has not increased its peacebuilding expertise significantly. A number of bodies (such as the advisory board) exist, which can provide policy-makers with their expertise. Yet, while they may be able to influence the choice of language in policy documents, their impact on actual decision-making remains limited. Indeed, the **top administrative leaders and political decision-makers are largely disconnected from the experts on conflict**, which leads them to base their decisions on political priorities and broader foreign policy orientations, in a top-down fashion.

5.5. Domestic pressures create a leadership vacuum for peacebuilding

In recent years, conflict, crises and situations of fragility in Europe's neighbouring regions have led to record levels of forced displacement and irregular migration into Europe. This has caused the agendas for internal, external and border security to overlap. It also supports the argument that investing in peace and development in conflict-affected countries is necessary to reduce migration and displacement flows towards the EU, and to address their root causes. The consequence of this narrative is that peacebuilding is no longer seen as a priority in its own right, but rather as an additional tool to address domestic concerns and interests. The fact that, out of all of Germany's development partner countries, only Colombia and the Philippines have retained peacebuilding as a priority area of cooperation, after several other bilateral peacebuilding programmes were closed down, is indicative of this trend.⁴⁷ Thus, despite increasing resources, peacebuilding is no longer seen as a priority sector in its own right.

In times of increasing competition from populist parties, **the pressure on political leaders to show quick results and domestic benefits has increased, often at the expense of longer-term, more sustainable (but less visible) peacebuilding programmes.**⁴⁸ The large increase in spending through special initiatives, which allow for quick decision-making and disbursement, but include less long-term, predictable support based on partnership and dialogue illustrate this trend (see Section 4). Shifting the attention away from long-term peacebuilding support can have negative consequences for the relationships with local partners, as well as for the quality of the programmes.

Moreover, as the MFA has become more active in terms of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, observers noted the emergence of an informal division of labour, whereby the MFA would take up responsibility for shorter-term stabilisation projects, leaving the longer-term peacebuilding activities to its development counterparts. Yet, with the Ministry of Development under increasing pressure to deliver quick results, this could lead to the two ministries competing with each other, as their responsibilities in the field of short-term stabilisation increasingly overlap. Despite the existing policy

⁴⁶ Interview with government official, 4 May 2017; interview with key expert, 2 May 2017.

⁴⁷ Interview with key expert, 22 May 2017.

⁴⁸ Interview with key expert, 5 May 2017.

commitments, **such rivalry may, in fact, create a leadership vacuum for structural and transformative peacebuilding support** and **exacerbate fragmentation**.

The **challenges that arise from irregular migration and refugees have led to new practices**, such as stronger alignment of transitional emergency support with long-term cooperation. For instance, refugee support in Jordan used to focus on short-term emergency support only. Recently, however, more attention has been paid to the structural barriers to refugee integration (e.g. better integration into the labour market, improvements to basic services, such as waste management), given the potential benefits this holds for peace and stability (ECDPM and EBA, 2017).

Box 4: Key messages on the main determinants of support for peacebuilding

1. Germany has a deep-rooted sense of identity as a civilian power of peace. Its strong and value-driven peace community, which is rooted in civil society, keeps this sense alive and continues to influence peacebuilding policy.
2. The shift in geopolitical interests has caused changes in the way Germany perceives its role in the world. In this context of uncertainty, Germany is increasingly moving from a foreign policy of restraint to one of global engagement and responsibility, including in the domain of peace and stability and its policy remains firmly embedded in a multilateralist discourse. Despite achieving some success in setting international norms, Germany is not an uncontested authority in the domain of peacebuilding. In addition to this, its national debates remain rather detached from global policy processes.
3. Germany is trying to adapt its approach to peacebuilding to the changing nature of conflicts. While, initially, peacebuilding approaches had a developmental focus, more recent conflicts, in Syria, Libya, and others, have caused stakeholders to reflect on how better to tailor approaches to the needs of different situations. These acute and protracted conflicts have also increased political willingness to engage militarily, e.g. through capacity building programmes, as part of a broader approach to peace and stability.
4. An unfavourable administrative culture, built on departmental autonomy, keeps the peacebuilding landscape fragmented. This is exacerbated by political rivalries between ministers responsible for foreign affairs, development and, to some extent, defence, creating a barrier to more holistic and effective peacebuilding practices. Political decision-making tends to be informed by top-down political priorities and foreign policy orientations, rather than by conflict expertise and local knowledge.
5. Record levels of irregular migration and forced displacement to Europe have raised the pressure on political leaders to demonstrate the domestic benefits of aid. This has refocused attention on short-term stabilisation and addressing the root causes of migration, in both the MFA and the BMZ, leaving a potential leadership vacuum for transformative peacebuilding support.

6. Prospects for transforming peacebuilding support

Among experts and practitioners, there is a growing consensus that, given the fast changing global and national dynamics, the future of German peacebuilding support is at a crossroads. Peacebuilding is still subject to the broader trends of the foreign and development policy priorities. In times of dramatic shifts of these priorities, those working on promoting peacebuilding need to find new ways to succeed in the changing context.

It is easy to argue that the future for peacebuilding support looks rather bleak. It is concerning that power politics may become the dominant driving force, in an emerging, multipolar global order, which pushes international norms and value-based agendas, such as peacebuilding, into the background. In the domestic sphere, security attacks and record levels of irregular migration into Europe have caused political priorities to change and the focus of foreign policy agendas to shift onto domestic security interests.

New technologies also have an impact: Stories about the use of social media to influence elections have raised concerns over the resilience of European political systems. It is feared that artificial intelligence and automation could destabilise the job markets. This uncertain and fearful environment provides a breeding ground for nationalist, populist and anti-globalisation sentiments, as illustrated by the rise of the populist, right-wing party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), in the 2017 national elections. As the biggest opposition party in the Federal Parliament, the AfD could have significant influence on the political debate, including through its positions against migration, aid and international cooperation, more generally.

This also poses a particular challenge for the Merkel IV government, which assumed office in March 2018. While the current government is a continuation of the last grand coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), it has been significantly weakened and will have only limited leeway for bold initiatives. Although the coalition agreement included a commitment to implement the 2017 Guidelines, ministries are likely to continue to strive to deliver quick and visible results, favouring short-term transitional forms of aid over long-term, more innovative and transformative approaches to peacebuilding (Bundesregierung, 2018). Some describe what is happening as a co-optation of peacebuilding narratives for policies that are actually influenced by interest-driven power politics, with little space for non-governmental actors. While funding patterns indicate a largely positive trend, in the broader domain of nonviolent peace and security activities, the quality of peacebuilding support appears to be suffering. Both the political and bureaucratic contexts hinder arguing in favour of long-term, context-based, bottom-up and people-centred peacebuilding.

Still, these developments are the consequences of conscious political and bureaucratic choices. As peacebuilding and conflict prevention continue to benefit from a favourable public opinion and quasi-consensual support across political parties, the current context may also offer opportunities. Indeed, the process that led to the adoption of the 2017 Guidelines gave renewed energy to the dialogue between government officials, experts and peacebuilding stakeholders. Currently, this dialogue continues to take place on the PeaceLab platform, which provides a public online forum for a regular exchange of opinions and ideas in relation to the implementation of Germany's new peacebuilding commitments.⁴⁹

However, the main challenge for the peacebuilding community might be to change this dialogue with experts with whom it shares a common commitment, into a multi-stakeholder and multidimensional dialogue. This would require adapting the existing governance structure to the peacebuilding logic, as well as seeking access to a higher political level. Wolfgang Ischinger's idea of transforming the Federal Security Council into a comprehensive coordinating body for foreign and security policy, including in the domain of peacebuilding, with the Federal Chancellery acting as its secretariat, may provide such an opportunity (Ischinger, 2018). Identifying new political champions could also help overcoming the political and bureaucratic deadlock.

The successful promotion of peacebuilding may require linking it better to the broader foreign policy debate. Past experience has shown that even a single member of parliament can have the necessary

⁴⁹ See <https://peacelab.blog/>

leverage to lift peacebuilding higher up on the agenda. The formation of networks and alliances, including with political leaders, opinion makers and greater engagement with civil society could prove instrumental. Yet this raises the question to what extent peacebuilding advocates should engage with public sentiment, for instance by engaging with the narratives on policy responses to domestic events. Nevertheless, a wide coalition would have the potential of broadening the constituency and channelling the 'silent' public support into active advocacy for peacebuilding. When developing their message, peacebuilding advocates need to reflect on what kind of evidence is needed to make the case for peacebuilding more compelling, or whether evidence is necessary at all. Furthermore, they should discuss how social media, which is naturally prone to alarmist messages, could be used more effectively to communicate on the complex and often context-specific ideas surrounding peacebuilding.

In short, while peacebuilding support may seem under threat from various directions, there are also opportunities for peacebuilding supporters to reassert and even boost their case. This would, however, require asking themselves some tough questions. They include reassessing existing relations with other communities and questioning how it can broadcast its message more forcefully at the political level, as well as to the public, at home. Crucially, peacebuilding advocates should examine how their agenda can better resonate with today's world.

Annex 1: List of interviewees

Beatrix Austin, Senior Coordinator, Berghof Handbook & Publications, Berghof Foundation

Marc Baxmann, Coordinator international processes and communication, FriEnt

Dr. Franziska Brantner, Member of the Federal Parliament, Chairperson of the Subcommittee for civilian crisis prevention, conflict management and networked action

Elisabeth Braune, Coordinator West Africa, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Sarah Brockmeier, Project Manager, Global Public Policy Institute

Dr. Martina Fischer, Officer for Peace and Conflict Management, *Brot für die Welt*

Dr. Jörn Grävingholt, Senior Researcher, governance, statehood, security department, German Development Institute/co-chair of the Advisory Board on civilian crisis prevention

Dr. Thomas Helfen, Head of Division 323, Peace and Security, Disaster risk management, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)

Christian Jetzlsperger, Head of Division Crisis Management, Conflict Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Kathrin Lorenz, Programme Manager, GIZ

Dr. Judith Vorrath, Senior Associate, Research Division International Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Dr. Andreas Wittkowsky, Project Leader, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

Natascha Zupan, Head of FriEnt

Annex 2: Methodology for the analysis of aid flows

In the OECD DAC financial reporting system, the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), funding related to conflict, peace and security has one specific purpose code: **code 152 “Conflict, Peace & Security”**. It includes security system management and reform; civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; participation in international peacekeeping operations; reintegration and small arms and light weapons (SALW) control; removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war; and prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers.

Within this code and of interest for peacebuilding is the **code 15220 “civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution”**, which includes funding for two purposes: (i) support for civilian activities related to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, including capacity building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange; and (ii) bilateral participation in international civilian peace missions and contributions to civilian peace funds or commissions.⁵⁰

We made the methodological choice to analyse the evolution of German disbursements for both code 152 and code 15220, over ten years (2007-2016). We chose this approach to provide the most accurate picture possible of German financial support to peacebuilding. Yet, it is not without inherent flaws.

First, OECD-DAC CRS codes 152 and 15220 are not perfect indicators. The former encompasses activities, which some may view as going beyond the realm of peacebuilding, such as SALW control and removal of landmines. The latter may be perceived as too narrow. Second, our focus on ODA limits the scope of our analysis to those amounts that donors actually reported to the OECD-DAC. As a consequence, these figures may give an incomplete picture. For example, the cost involved in engaging politically in peace processes may be left out. Furthermore, certain administrative factors may lead actors to underreport their expenses under the two codes we have chosen for our analysis.

In addition, to avoid double counting, projects are allocated to a single purpose code on the basis of the activities that comprise the largest share of the project. Some ODA spending relevant to peacebuilding may therefore be missed by looking only at codes 152 and 15220.

Despite its flaws, we chose this approach for three reasons: (i) availability and accessibility of data, (ii) the working definition of peacebuilding adopted in this paper and (iii) comparability of figures both over time (corrected for inflation) and between donors. In the future, the authors are open to carrying out further and more detailed research on ODA – should there be a strong demand for such analysis.

⁵⁰ Financing of military equipment and services as well as anti-terrorism activities are excluded from ODA reporting (OECD-DAC, 2016). Thus, code 15220 excludes engagement in military strategy and defence cooperation.

Bibliography

- Auswärtiges Amt, 2014. Review 2014–Außenpolitik Weiter Denken. Berlin (archivierte Seite). <http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/de/themen.html>, letzter Aufruf, 1, 2017.
- Auswärtiges Amt, 2012. Für eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber fragilen Staaten - Ressortübergreifende Leitlinien. Bonn/Berlin. August 2012.
- Bendiek, A., 2015. The “2014 Review”: Understanding the Pillars of German Foreign Policy and the Expectations of the rest of the World. Berlin: SWP.
- BMZ, GIZ and KfW, 2014. Factsheet on the “Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA)” methodological framework. Last updated in September 2014.
- BMZ, 2005. Übersektorales Konzept zur Krisenprävention, Konfliktbearbeitung und Friedensförderung in der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit - Eine Strategie zur Friedensentwicklung.
- BMZ, 2013. Entwicklung für Frieden und Sicherheit. Entwicklungspolitisches Engagement im Kontext von Konflikt, Fragilität und Gewalt. Bonn/Berlin. 2013.
- BMZ. 2017. Entwicklungspolitik als Zukunfts- und Friedenspolitik. 15. Entwicklungspolitischer Bericht der Bundesregierung. Berlin/Bonn: BMZ.
- Boutros-Ghali, B., 1992. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General. UN, 1992. Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/A_47_277.pdf
- Brantner, F., 14 June 2017. Pressemitteilung: Keine Ambition bei Krisenprävention.
- Brot für die Welt, 2016. Annual Report 2015. Berlin: Brot für die Welt.
- Brune, S-C, Kovacs, A., Reding, A & Penny, M., 2015. Crisis and conflict prevention strategies: an international comparison. Cambridge: RAND Europe.
- Bulmahn, E., Giessmann, H-J, Müller-Hennig, M., Schadewald, M. & Wittkowsky, A., 2013. Cornerstones of a strategy for peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2018. Bundeshaushalt – Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. Available at: <https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/#/2017/soll/ausgaben/funktion/230168706.html>
- Bundesregierung, 2000. Gesamtkonzept der Bundesregierung: Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung. Berlin: Bundesregierung.

Bundesregierung, 2004. Aktionsplan "Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung". 12 May 2004. Berlin: Bundesregierung

Bundesregierung, 2008. Krisenprävention als gemeinsame Aufgabe. Zweiter Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Umsetzung des Aktionsplans "Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung". Berlin: Bundesregierung.

Bundesregierung, 2013. De Maizièrre-Interview. „Die Anerkennung für Soldate hat zugenommen“. Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung. Available at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Interview/2013/02/2013-02-25-demaiziere-fas.html>

Bundesregierung, 2014. Vierter Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Umsetzung des Aktionsplans "Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung". Berlin: Bundesregierung.

Bundesregierung, 2017. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Doris Wagner, Omid Nouripour, Agnieszka Brugger, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN – Drucksache 18/11015 – Deutsches Engagement im Bereich der Sicherheitssektorreform. 7 March 2017. Berlin: Bundesregierung.

Bundesregierung, 2018. Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa, eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland, Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 19. Legislaturperiode. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2018/03/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag.pdf;jsessionid=55904D6EB236BE88F45FA4E64EEC8147.s2t2?__blob=publicationFile&v=5

Soziale Verteidigung, 2017. Zu den Leitlinien zur Krisenprävention. Bund für soziale Verteidigung e.V. 28 June 2017. Available at: http://www.soziale-verteidigung.de/fileadmin/dokumente/militaerkritik/Leitlinien_zur_Krisenpraevention_BSV_20170628.pdf

Conciliation Resources, 2017. Public support for peacebuilding. Attitudes towards peacebuilding and dialogue with armed groups in the UK, US and Germany. September 2017. London/Washington: Conciliation Resources & Alliance for Peacebuilding. Available at: <http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Public%20Support%20for%20Peacebuilding.pdf>

Crossley-Frolick, K.A. and Dursun-Ozkanca, O., 2012. Security sector reform and transitional justice in Kosovo: Comparing the Kosovo security force and police reform processes. Journal of intervention and statebuilding, 6(2), pp.121-143.

Deutscher Bundestag, 2018. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. Last amended on 23 December 2104. Preamble and Article 26. Available at: <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>

Höppner, S., 2012. Germany leaves UN Security Council. Deutsche Welle. Available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-leaves-un-security-council/a-16486907>

De Zan, T., Tessari, P. & Venturi, B., 2016. Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EU Member States' Capabilities. Rome: IAI. EU-CIVCAP project DL 2.1.

Linksfraktion, 2018. Friedenspolitik / zivile Konfliktbearbeitung. Themenpapiere der Fraktion. Available at: <https://www.linksfraktion.de/themen/a-z/detailansicht/krisenpraevention-und-konfliktbearbeitung/>

ECDPM and EBA, 2017. Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe. Maastricht: ECDPM.

Knabe, O., 2017. Erklärung des forumZFD zu den Leitlinien der Bundesregierung "Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern" Available at: <http://konfliktbearbeitung.net/initiativen/gut-grundsatz-enttaeuschend-handeln>

Ero. C., 2016. Tough but essential: Germany's political engagement with crisis prevention in Africa. Crisis Group. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/tough-essential-germanys-political-engagement-crisis-prevention-africa>

Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006. White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Government.

Fischer, M., 2016. „Ertüchtigung“ kritisch überprüfen: Keine Militärfinanzierung auf Kosten von Entwicklung. PeaceLab2016.de. Available at: <http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/europaeische-union/article/ertuechtigung-kritisch-ueberpruefen-keine-militaerfinanzierung-auf-kosten-von-entwicklung/>

Friesendorf, C & Krempel, J., 2012. Sicherheitssektorreform und Friedensförderung. Internationale Trends und deutsche Möglichkeiten. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Galtung, J., 1976. Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. In: Ejlers, C. (Ed.) Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, Vol 2. pp. 282-304.

German Federal Government, 2016. White Paper on German Security Policy and the future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence.

German Federal Government, 2017. Guidelines on preventing crises, resolving conflicts, building peace. Berlin: Federal Foreign Office.

Gießmann, H. J., 2004. Deutsche Außenpolitik sollte gescheiterte Friedenspolitik sein. WeltTrends 43 (12): 41-46.

Gildemeister, J. & Burggraf, W., 2016. Reaktion: Gegen den vernetzten Ansatz. PeaceLab2016.de. Available at: <http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/friedensfoerderung/article/reaktion-gegen-den-vernetzten-ansatz/>

GIZ, 2017. "Stabilität schaffen heißt Perspektiven schaffen" – GIZ leistet Unterstützung in schwierigem Umfeld. Available at: <https://www.giz.de/de/presse/55912.html>

Grävingsholt, J. & Nachtwei, W., 2016. Stellungnahme der Vorsitzenden des Beirats Zivile Krisenprävention im Unterausschuss Zivile Krisenprävention des Deutschen Bundestags zur Entwicklung von "Leitlinien für das Krisenmanagement der Bundesregierung". PeaceLab.blog. Available at: https://peacelab.blog/uploads/Stellungnahme_Beiratsvorsitzende_im_Unterausschuss_ZKP_30.05.2016.pdf

Hauswedell, C., 2016. Die Konfliktbearbeitung muss militärische und zivile Mittel klarer trennen. PeaceLab2016.de. Available at: <http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/evaluierung/article/die-konfliktbearbeitung-muss-militaerische-und-zivile-mittel-klarer-trennen/>

Irrgang, A. & Wittkowsky, A., 2015. Zivile Fachkräfte im Friedenseinsatz: Den außenpolitischen Beitrag Deutschlands stärken. Berlin: ZIF.

Ischinger, W., 2018. Krisenmanagement: Nicht kleckern, sondern klotzen. PeaceLab.blog. Available at: <https://peacelab.blog/2018/07/krisenmanagement-nicht-kleckern-sondern-klotzen>

König, R., 2018. SSR-Debatte: Jetzt beginnt der Schreibprozess. PeaceLab.blog. Available at: <https://peacelab.blog/2018/08/ssr-debatte-jetzt-beginnt-der-schreibprozess>

Lederach, J. P., 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace.

Liebich, S., 2016. Deutschlands neue Verantwortung: Konfliktprävention und Konfliktbearbeitung. PeaceLab2016.de. Available at: <http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/friedensfoerderung/article/deutschlands-neue-verantwortung-konfliktpraevention-und-bearbeitung/>

Nachtwei, W., 2014. Lehren aus 10 Jahren Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention – Wie weiter? Contribution to the public session of the subcommittee on civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution and networked action of the German Federal Parliament on 5 May 2014.

Nachtwei, W. 29 June 2017. Meine Stellungnahme zu den Leitlinien Friedensförderung der Bundesregierung: Deutlicher Fortschritt, aber mit Handicaps. Nachtwei.de. Available at: <http://nachtwei.de/index.php?module=articles&func=display&catid=77&aid=1482>

NATO, 2003. AAP-06 Edition 2003, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French).

Nopers, N. 2002. Peace-building, crisis prevention and conflict management. Technical cooperation in the context of crises, conflicts and disasters. Eschborn: GTZ.

Development Assistance Committee, 1997. The DAC Guidelines „Helping Prevent Violent Conflict“. Paris: OECD

Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations. Germany, a voice for peace, justice, innovation, partnership in the United Nations. Germany candidate for the United Nations Security Council 2019-2020. New York. Available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/281592/3a01504b4b19e6397dabd0932060efcd/sicherheitsrat-broschuere-data.pdf>

Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung, 2017. Stellungnahme des SprecherInnenrats der Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung zu den Beratungen über den Bundeshaushalt 2017. „Aus Krisen nichts gelernt - Friedensförderung und Krisenprävention kein Schwerpunkt im Bundeshaushalt 2017“. Available at: http://konfliktbearbeitung.net/sites/default/files/stellungnahme_pzkb_zum_entwurf_bundeshaushalt_2017.pdf

PRIF/HSFK, 2015. Jahresbericht 2015. Frankfurt a.M.: Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung.

Rohde-Liebenau, W., 2016. Militäreinsätze bringen keinen Frieden. PeaceLab2016.de. Available at: <http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/friedensfoerderung/article/militaereinsaetze-bringen-keinen-frieden/>

Schirch, L., 2008. Strategic peacebuilding: State of the field. In South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, Vol. 1(1). 17p.

Smith, D., 2004. Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: getting their act together: overview report of the joint Utstein study of peacebuilding (Vol. 1). Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Stengel, F.A. and Weller, C., 2008. Vier Jahre Aktionsplan „Zivile Krisenprävention “—war das alles?. GIGA Focus Global, (11).

Techau, J., 2015. The Steinmeier review of German Foreign Policy. Brussels: Carnegie Europe. Available at: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=59422>

UNDP, 2018. Factsheet. Available at: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000>

United Nations; World Bank. 2017. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank.

United Nations, 2016. General Assembly resolution, A/Res/70/262 (27 April 2016). Available at: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_262.pdf

United Nations Security Council, 2016. Resolution 2282.

Vogler, K., 2016. Zivile, gewaltfreie Konfliktbearbeitung stärken statt für Militärisches vereinnahmen! PeaceLab2016.de. Available at: <http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/leitbild/article/zivile-gewaltfreie-konfliktbearbeitung-staerken-statt-fuer-militaerisches-vereinnahmen/>

Wallström, M., 2018. Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs. Stockholm: Government of Sweden.

Weller, C. 2007. Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention der Bundesregierung – Jetzt ist dynamische Umsetzung gefordert. Eine Zwischenbilanz nach drei Jahren. Duisburg: INEF.

Wieland-Karimi, A., 2017. “Wir gehen von mehr Friedenseinsätzen in der arabischen Region aus”. International Politik und Gesellschaft. Available at: <http://www.ipg-journal.de/interviews/artikel/wir-gehen-von-mehr-friedenseinsaetzen-in-der-arabischen-region-aus-2211/>

Wittkowsky, A. and Meierjohann, J. P., 2011. Das Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit: Dimensionen, Herausforderungen, Grenzen. Berlin: ZIF.

Wittkowsky, A., 2012. Vernetzte Sicherheit: Begriff, Einordnung und Umsetzung in der Konfliktbearbeitung. Discussion paper for hearing of the subcommittee for crisis prevention and networked security of the Bundestag. Berlin: ZIF.

Ziviler Friedensdienst, Forum Menschenrechte, Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung und VENRO, 2017. Wertebasiert , aber unverbindlich! Gemeinsame Stellungnahme zu den neuen Leitlinien der Bundesregierung: „Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern“. Ziviler-friedensdienst.org. Available at: <https://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/sites/ziviler-friedensdienst.org/files/anhang/aktuelles/zfd-leitlinien-wertebasiert-aber-unverbindlich-28420.pdf>

Zupan, N., 2017. Ein Wunschzettel im Hochsommer... zur Umsetzung der neuen Leitlinien. FriEnt.de. Available at: <https://www.frient.de/news/details/news/ein-wunschzettel-im-hochsommer-zur-umsetzung-der-neuen-leitlinien/>

About ECDPM

The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) is an independent ‘think and do tank’ working on international cooperation and development policy in Europe and Africa.

Since 1986 our staff members provide research and analysis, advice and practical support to policymakers and practitioners across Europe and Africa – to make policies work for sustainable and inclusive global development.

Our main areas of work include:

- European external affairs
- African institutions
- Security and resilience
- Migration
- Sustainable food systems
- Finance, trade and investment
- Regional integration
- Private sector engagement

For more information please visit www.ecdpm.org

In addition to structural support by ECDPM’s institutional partners: The Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Austria, this publication benefits from additional funding from Humanity United.

ISSN1571-7577

ecdpm

Making policies work

HEAD OFFICE
SIÈGE
Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21
6211 HE Maastricht
The Netherlands *Pays Bas*
Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00
Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 02

BRUSSELS OFFICE
BUREAU DE BRUXELLES
Rue Archimède 5
1000 Brussels *Bruxelles*
Belgium *Belgique*
Tel +32 (0)2 237 43 10
Fax +32 (0)2 237 43 19

info@ecdpm.org
www.ecdpm.org
KvK 41077447