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Thematic Focus:

"CAADP and Food Security"

International food prices have been on the rise for most of 2012, with the cost of corn and soyabeans hitting an all-time high this summer. It is since the global food price crisis in 2008 that agriculture and food security are back to centre stage. And the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative, launched in 2009 by a large coalition including the G20, African countries and the whole UN Family, (re)positioned those issues at the core of international development processes. Africa's approach was particularly bold, as countries revitalized the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), originally launched in 2003, with substantial progress in the design of national food security compacts and investment plans. The CAADP, widely supported by the international community, has made great strides in terms of African ownership, aid predictability and coordination, and robust plans for mutual accountability.

Despite these efforts, many of the factors behind the 2008 crisis and the persisting levels of hunger throughout the world are still there: low levels of technology, droughts, abrupt changes in input prices, slow supply response due to poor infrastructure and market integration, and export bans. The current food crisis in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel reminds us how particularly serious the situation is in many parts of that continent.

Given its centrality for poverty reduction and its profile in development debates, this special issue of *GREAT Insights* focuses on food security, covering some of the 'outstanding issues'. Representatives from farmers organisations and development partners write about, amongst others, the relation between regional cooperation and food security, particularly relevant for CAADP, as *GREAT Insights* has highlighted systematically in previous issues. Recent security threats capturing the headlines (Somalia, Mali, Kenya) show that regional crises require more regional solutions, such as food trade, wiser transboundary water management, etc.

The political dimension is one particular aspect worth emphasizing here, because it underpins many of these 'outstanding issues' that limit faster progress on food security, as it also emerges from experiences with CAADP. Most politicians think about the 'next elections', hence short-term measures, rather than about



the 'next generations', through long term and structural solutions. Well conceived policies and investment plans do not attract vital private sector investment due to remaining political bottlenecks, such as non-implementation of land reforms, or because governments do not really build multi-stakeholder partnerships. The CAADP target of mobilizing 10% of public expenditure for agriculture is missed in so many African countries also because politicians often are not involved in CAADP.

The lack of 'policy coherence for development' on the side of the richer countries, supporting food security with aid, but hampering it with other measures, is also related to political choices, like domestic subsidies that undercut poor farmers' markets, or the idleness in the fight against food prices speculation and international land grabs.

Politics must do better. In terms of CAADP, for instance, political feasibility should be more prominent in the design and implementation of policies and investment plans. A special AU Heads of State Summit to mark the 10th anniversary of CAADP in 2013 would also be a good idea, with the objectives of: sustaining political momentum at highest level; renewing CAADP goals, making them politically more attractive (e.g. employment, not only agricultural productivity); and enhancing accountability and transparency in public and private action for food security, including through better involvement of politicians and parliaments.

That is why ECDPM will not only continue to work on regional dimensions of CAADP, but also on the political economy of food security and the political attractiveness of proposed solutions, including by facilitating frank policy dialogue among interested stakeholders.

Interview with Martin Bwalya, Head of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), in the NEPAD Agency

In a few words, what have been the major successes and key challenges facing CAADP over the last decade? How is 'CAADP success' defined?

We are looking at success in two ways, pointing to what has actually been achieved, and the concrete value behind these results.

On the surface, you will hear about or see the overall number of countries that have signed compacts or elaborated investments plans. But, through developing the compacts and investment plans, countries are also engaging at the levels that enable some in depth examination and internationalisation of the CAADP principles like inclusiveness, the building of shared visions on agriculture development, prioritisation, inter-sectoral collaboration, evidence-based review of policy and institutional environment. The result is that, emerging "behind" the investment plans is growing capacity and ability to reform planning and working models, including growing entrenchment of mechanisms, systems and tools for accountability

A lot of these results and value are not tangible per se, i.e. and you will not capture this when you are just counting the number of compacts signed. There is real change emerging in terms of how business is done. African governments and indeed the public are increasingly demanding value and results, ultimately in terms of wealth creation, jobs and incomes, poverty alleviation and food security. In this sense, the focus goes beyond just delivering the "at least 6% annual agricultural productivity". It clearly and deliberately reflects the focus on strengthening the local/systemic capacity necessary to sustain delivery of the 6% and more. This is a different way of looking at things.

So you are saying that CAADP's results are also to be seen in terms of capacity building?

I am reluctant to use capacity building because it does not seem to reflect the comprehensive and fundamental reforms achieved in the "way we do business". Yes, capacity development is an integral and central part of the CAADP reform implications. But implementing CAADP

also is in very clear ways challenging traditional practices: it is stimulating change in mind-sets, new practices as well as new frameworks for collaboration and partnerships. Countries are embracing this change and learning from it.

The situation could be in "small doses" and could be fragile, but it is happening and part of the efforts in supporting CAADP implementation is to recognise these changes and support them to strengthen and expand to critical mass. You see countries asking themselves questions in new ways on accountability, synergies, value for money and the general state of policies and institutions.

In terms of result of the process, we also see several things: compared to some years back, CAADP is stimulating the establishment of strong foundations for accountable institutions, evidence based planning, inclusive dialogue, collective responsibility, synergies and complementarities in determining collaboration and partnerships. What is emerging is real systemic ability to stimulate and sustain a socio-economic growth agenda. Many of these issues are not necessarily new, but the way and context in which they are being asked is innovative.

These foundations are fragile. They can disappear very rapidly, for example, from interventions maintaining the status quo and undermining reform efforts. NPCA is engaging all concerned players and stakeholders to build up support to "notice", consolidate and expand these small strides of change – success efforts in policy, institutional reforms, in planning, forms of partnerships, empowerment of communities to participate in national dialogue, etc.

NPCA is at the moment leading a continental effort to identify the bold set of actions that will be necessary to 'sustaining the CAADP momentum' over the next 5, 10, 30 years. It is clear that the interest and commitment of countries on CAADP will be enhanced when the CAADP implementation process is demonstrating tangible results. This brings to the fore issue of implementation capacity for effective and competitively executing and delivering results and impact. The NPCA, in liaison with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and other stakeholders

are also supporting countries to identify and showcase the successes, scale them up to a critical mass and use these experiences for peer learning.

Is CAADP success happening in a particular country or is it happening in pockets in different countries?

Our focus is less on trying to find problems to be solved. Rather, we are working with key stakeholders at the national level, to find what is working and how these successes can be scaled up. With this in mind, we do not see one particular pattern across countries. Instead, we find different patterns across countries, across levels, across issues. But while the patterns are different, the trend I have highlighted above is the same. In Rwanda for example, we see evolving remarkable success in developing accountability system running all the way down to the grassroot communities.

In some countries, an example would be in the form and quality of dialogue taking place. Take fertiliser subsidies, a very sensitive topic in many countries. Before, this would have been off the table; the issue was considered too political. Now, we see it brought to the table by governments themselves, because the public sector is more confident to have an objective evidence-based discussion on the matter.

What is the Sustaining CAADP Momentum about?

One of the things we are doing in the sustaining CAADP momentum exercise is coming back to the process side of things. If we are going to go another five years, what is it exactly we want to deliver, and how do we see it in terms of process, tracking, and the result itself? This relates back to accountability systems.

One of the things emerging in the "sustaining momentum exercise" is that, while keeping our eyes on the vision as defined in the whole CAADP process, in the next five years, let's do what we say, with clear focus on concrete results. We want process and result indicators so we can check the two as we move. Both for purposes of tracking and assisting progress and

performance, as well as building knowledge/information base, the institutional memory, and drawing lessons, understanding why things are happening the way they do. So we are building mechanisms to make decisions, determine actions and track results.

The sustaining CAADP momentum exercise is about three things: one is wanting to look back in the last ten years and dig out the successes, and what is driving them? And then look at the next 5, 10, years, and ask ourselves how do we scale and deepen them, and build a strategy, a set of action we need to do to achieve that. Then we will set them up in a clear, trackable process indicators.

Can you give concrete examples of these indicators?

Well, countries having a defined process for developing and managing capacity for evidence based analysis, for example. Is there an in-country monitoring and evaluation system? How do we strengthen it? How do we align it towards the vision and objective defined in the CAADP process? And then, how to go about refining it in terms of systems for data generation and analysis, going back to inform policy in situ.

A prominent example of this is that in any one country there is more than one monitoring/data generation system, and most of these generate massive amounts of data, only a partial amount of which is actually used. How do we make data more purpose-built and more integrated for impact assessment?

Another side is what is happening to the 6% in terms moving beyond to connect to impact issues including job creation, poverty alleviation and food security. In the public space, 6% is not the matter; the matter is food security and jobs. We should be clear about how our targets translate in jobs and other concrete impacts.

CAADP has been criticised for turning into a technocratic exercise, where the big political questions surrounding agricultural transformation have sometimes not been addressed openly. How can CAADP confront politics more openly, and secure 'political will' from country governments?

This is a very interesting issue. One of the reasons for how we got to where we are today is that the political space has not just allowed the process to happen but actively stimulated it and actually participated. Countries that are doing well are those where you can see clear political leadership.

Leadership is critical and is non-negotiable for success. What you also see, and sometimes not adequately acknowledged, is the transformation in the governance of economic and political systems, which is then providing the enabling environment for a transformation process.

But, to come back to your question, yes, we have the political will, probably more than ever before. The resolve in the regional and continental fora including the Ministers conference¹ and Africa Union Summit is clear and strong. But can we use this political will better at the technical level? In policy design processes, for example? That is what we need to examine within specific countries or regional bodies.

We also need to consider that this political will needs to be "fed" in order to sustain it. We have to continually "cultivate it". This is where CAADP's flexibility is an asset to address particular issues and move them forward. Delivering tangible results and impact, which also address political objectives, such as job creation and food security, will be the "feeding" to sustain the political will.

What is being done to ensure that non-state actors, especially farmers' organisations are involved in investment plans and concrete deliverables?

The country CAADP implementation process provides an opportunity for engagement, buy-in and internalisation. The more time and energy are spent on this, the better the quality of the engagement and collaboration. It is also important to move away from 'number of attendants at a workshop', or 'numbers of farmers' at this or that meeting, to looking at the quality of the engagement, involvement and participation, linking to, for instance, the development of a shared vision, a trustworthy relationship, etc...

Where the quality of engagement is good stakeholders realise that they are, in the end, aiming for the same thing. The question then becomes how to move together.

CAADP also works at the regional level. This entails a specific way of working with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). How do you go about that?

First, what are we trying to pursue at the regional level? There is massive advantage Africa can embrace out of its size, in terms of markets, economies of scale, etc. So there is a clear reason and rationale, economically and socially, for going beyond the national

borders. This is a well-known argument. This is why we are working at the regional level with the RECs.

How do we make it happen and bring it to scale? How do we make it self-sustaining, and systemic? When we talk about the quality of a given national investment plan, we also look at extent to which the investment plan has examined and developed evidence-based thinking on opportunities and related avenues for regional trade engagement. We believe that you are not going to have a quality investment plan if it does not define how that country is going to deal with the "beyond the borders issues".

In 2006 in Abuja, the African Union Heads of State and Government endorsed what is described as strategic commodities, according to Africa's main ecosystems. If my country is more competitive on livestock, why would I invest in crop production? We are talking about this in IGAD for example, an inherently pastoralist region. How do we build from that, and strengthen it, instead of starting something else that is not in line with the local ecosystem and political economy circumstances. The process to develop and implement the investment plans provides the "space" for informed dialogue on such matters. It is not only a regional level discussion: regional markets discussions should initiate nationally.

Finally, you should also place sovereignty questions side by side with cost effectiveness, efficiency and competitiveness. Regional integration has to be an integral part of national agricultural development plans. And it should not come as a last topic on the agenda.

How does CAADP bring all aspects of food security together?

The question is do we have the tools in the framework that allow countries to bring all these aspects together into an integrated and comprehensive manner? If you look back ten years, massive shifts have taken place on key factors that can hinder or drive development. For example, the way that we understand climate change has moved on massively. Advances in ICT are another example impacting on agriculture development.

Can CAADP help countries pick up these changes? Do we have the knowledge base on the continent that is going to inform the response to these issues? Do we have the institutions that are going to generate knowledge and innovation for agriculture development?

These are issues CAADP deals with by providing the tools to inform decisions and actions to different, and widely changing, aspects of food security. Then, the response is going to be contextualised, from country to country, from community to community. CAADP is about the instruments informing the response, and then assisting the countries to engage with them and localise the decisions and actions.

How will the G8 New Alliance on Food security and CAADP be coherently pulled together?

First, let us consider how this issue comes into the changing scene of development financing. CAADP has an agenda around financing. In fact, the financing aspect is inherent in the whole vision and agenda of CAADP. That is why the 10% mark is one of the key parameters to measure progress in terms of public sector contribution to agriculture. Now, when we talk about results and impact, countries will require appropriate levels of investment financing. It is clear from current trends globally that the future development financing architecture is going to be significantly different. Some of the financing instruments and associated decision-making tools and processes may change dramatically. Africa itself is also asking questions on the quality of the financing partnerships and engaging more at the level of investment financing partnerships. It can be stated that whether we like it or not the volumes in development aid funding to Africa will diminish.

Within the CAADP framework, Africa is having a dialogue on what this means for Africa. How can we get sustainable financing for development in agriculture? What opportunities do we need to explore to raise funds domestically and move beyond development aid? To what extent can Africa's agricultural sector generate its own investment financing? What will be the policies to incentivise this?

For long, we have heard the mantra about the importance of the private sector. It is now finally on the table. We are all convinced that collaborating with the private sector is important, but do we have the enabling environment to make this partnership work? This is where the New Alliance and Grow Africa come in. These initiatives come at an opportune time, when Africa is already trying to engage with the private sector in agricultural development.

How do these new initiative fit in the CAADP framework? Does CAADP have a structure to engage with the Private Sector?

Well, we are not building a 'CAADP structure' in countries. The value of CAADP is that it works in already existing country systems. It is integral in national systems. The value is that implementing CAADP improves the already existing structures and mechanisms. Where the New Alliance comes in is that it is going to finance investment programmes coming out of the CAADP process. The country CAADP implementation process provides the country-led systems along which initiatives such as the New Alliance should engage.

The CAADP implementation process is not only about "putting in money", but also putting it in the right place, in terms of national priorities and quality programmes. CAADP provides the assurances for credible institutions; predictable planning and decision-making processes essential in building the trust that would underline financing public-private partnerships. The private sector can therefore be confident that it will be putting in money in a stable, credible and manageable process where the government is a much stronger partner than before.

Who are the real beneficiaries when these large private sector companies come in?

Agriculture in Africa is, by and large, smallholder based. You cannot talk about private sector investment without having an understanding of how it is - or should be - interacting with that smallholder base. This is very clear in our minds.

Smallholder does not mean unviable. They are a key component of sustainable growth: wealth distribution, employment, etc. The big private sector has to be sensitive to this as an inherent feature of the domestic environment they are coming into.

What are the mechanisms in place to ensure this?

The independent technical review of the investment plans is one of these mechanisms, peer review systems another. We have various guidelines for evidence-based dialogue and inclusive consultations, building local knowledge base and analytical capacity, more inclusive policy design processes...

CAADP and emerging actors: are there opportunities to engage with them, or plans in the pipeline?

Well, you have to look at Africa as an emerging actor itself in the first place. This strengthens its position when talking with emerging actors. Having said that, we collaborate with emerging actors, but not as a beggar or a charity case. Africa should talk business partnerships with them.

In NEPAD, we have just been to China to talk about CAADP, looking at opportunities for joint research in agricultural development. We are engaging with Brazil and others, with letters of agreement and memorandum of understandings around shared areas of interest.

Note

1. The African Union Joint Conference of Ministers of Agriculture and Ministers of Trade scheduled for 29th October – 2nd November 2012 at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Martin Bwalya is Head of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), in the NEPAD Agency.

CAADP in a Nutshell

Dolly Afun-Ogidan

Brief overview of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme's rationale, principles and objectives

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is a continent-wide agriculture initiative of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is the strategic economic development framework of the African Union (AU). Established by the AU assembly in 2003, CAADP's goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 percent of their national budgets and raise agricultural productivity by at least 6 percent per annum. CAADP identifies four key pillars for food security improvement and agricultural investment: (1) Sustainable Land and Water Management; (2) Market Access; (3) Food Supply and Hunger; and (4) Agricultural Research.

The CAADP is centred around the definition of national and regional plans ('Compacts' and 'Investment Plans'), an agreement between all stakeholders (public, private, non-state actors and development partners) serving as a framework for partnerships, alliances, and dialogue to design and implement the required policy interventions and investment programmes. The formulation of national and regional investment plans is one of the most important activities to implement CAADP after the definition and signature of the Compact. To date 30 countries in Africa have signed the national CAADP compacts, and more than 24 have reviewed investment plans. One regional CAADP compact and investment plan has been launched in West Africa, while other regions are currently making efforts to develop and launch similar compacts.

CAADP therefore is not a (donors') programme, it is a common framework for stimulating and guiding national, regional and continental initiatives on enhanced agriculture productivity and food security which each region and country can develop and implement as preferred. CAADP is the first 'Africa led, Africa owned, Africa wide' agriculture and food security initiative. The endorsement of CAADP by African heads of states renewed interest in and prioritized the continent's agriculture agenda, as well as put food security objectives at the fore of national, regional, continental and even global processes. With CAADP, governments and regional economic communities (RECs) are more inclined to initiate, take ownership and commit to being responsible for their own national and regional agricultural development actions.

The process of introducing, developing, launching, implementing and eventually monitoring CAADP, holds great potential to serve as a rallying point for a wide range of stakeholders. A broad range of actors drives formulation and implementation of CAADP-related initiatives. CAADP being a continental framework, the AU, and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), is tasked with its coordination. RECs facilitate the formulation and implementation of a regional compact and a regional agricultural investment plan, while supporting their member states with CAADP initiatives on the national level. At the national level, governments facilitate the formulation and implementation of a national compact and investment plan. Bilateral and multilateral donors, and private sector partners with African stakeholders, to provide financial and technical support to CAADP processes and investments.

The CAADP process is organized in a way that key stakeholders meet once a year at the CAADP Partnership Platform (PP) meetings, to mutually review progress and challenges around CAADP at all levels- national, regional and continental. This is followed by a CAADP Business Meeting, half way to the next Partnership Platform meeting. In addition to these platforms, development partners who support CAADP come together through the CAADP Development Partners Task Team (DPTT), to promote dialogue, shared learning and harmonization among development partners on their support to African CAADP process and institutions. The DPTT operates on the basis of a concrete workplan and exchanges information through regular phone conference meetings.

One specific financial donor vehicle to support the CAADP processes (not investments), is the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MTDF) hosted at the World Bank. The MTDF aims to strengthen institutional capacities of African drivers of CAADP, particularly on the continental and regional level, to effectively lead, implement, monitor and evaluate CAADP processes. Resources from the MTDF are allocated to CAADP institutions, such as the NPCA and RECs through 'Child Trust Funds'. Financing for the investment plans could be mobilised through public sector funding, development finance, private sector partnerships and applications to the multilateral financing mechanism, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP).

Traction around the regional dimension of CAADP has also gradually increased. There is widespread consensus in most African regions that the value of regional CAADP lies in strategic regional action and investments that individual countries, acting alone, cannot achieve or afford. Most stakeholders concur that regional compacts would serve to accelerate individual country agricultural growth by enabling them to benefit from regional spillovers and economies of scale in technology, human and policy development, as well as in trade and investment. Currently, processes are underway to launch compacts in IGAD, COMESA, EAC and ECCAS.

As CAADP approaches its 10-year mark, the priority for African stakeholders is to sustain the momentum, by focusing on policy and investment decisions that will help the continent transform its agriculture sector and ensure food security. The next stage of CAADP seeks to move away from the process of developing compacts towards mobilizing concrete sustainable investments for the priorities identified in the compacts¹. In this respect, and in order to strengthen the performance and competitiveness of the continent's agriculture sector, the focus will be on increasing public sector budgets for agriculture and exploring partnerships with the private sector, beyond development finance, for countries that are now at the investment stage. At the regional level, trilateral cooperation (development partners, governments and private sector) is also seen as a way to finance cross-border agricultural development initiatives and contribute to overall regional integration and regional food security.

(For more information: www.caadp.net)

Notes

1. More information available at: <http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/>
2. NPCA. 2012. CAADP- Sustaining the momentum into the next decade: Implementation report. Draft report. July 2012. Midrand: NPCA

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Joint Action for Food and Nutrition Security: The Challenge

David Nabarro



The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon has issued a challenge - global zero hunger by the time he leaves office¹. This is an achievable goal. The political will to tackle hunger and increase access to food and the technical ability to deliver increased food production have never been stronger.

We should not underestimate the scale of the challenge. By 2030 the world will need to produce around 50 per cent more food and energy, together with 30 per cent more fresh water. Access to water, energy and food is challenged by demographic and climate changes, increasing resource scarcity coupled with greater demand from a growing middle class.

We have seen what demand can do to food prices. The recent food price spike tipped millions into poverty. Food prices have sparked riots and have prompted close interest in the relationship between civil unrest and the availability of affordable food.

The 2010 State of Food Insecurity issued by Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has noted there are 22 countries affected by protracted crisis. In these countries, the distinction between 'humanitarian response' followed by 'development assistance' is not useful. Without the simultaneous delivery of immediate support and longer term investment to enable greater economic growth it is hard to see how the situation can improve.

It is clear that getting to zero hunger is not going to be easy. It is clear that we will not get there simply through business as usual. It will require extraordinary effort and clear focus.

What are the prerequisites?

First: the demand for change. People in countries facing food insecurity will demand coherent plans that make widespread hunger a thing of the past. Civil Society following up on the June 2012 Rio declaration on the right to food, the need for action to increase productivity and to take action to curb price volatility.

Second: harness technology and investment. We are a long way to from realizing the potential for production. For example in sub Saharan Africa average smallholder yields are at 1.2 MT/ha compared to 3MT/ha elsewhere in the developing world. Getting technology to the 80% of farmers in Africa who work less than 2 ha could have a major

impact on hunger. Minimizing food losses along food value chains from farm to fork is also key. Systematic investment, well directed, must be put at the forefront of actions. We must radically increase the investment in agriculture.

Third: supporting the emergence of coherent national plans for agricultural investment and growth that contain clear goals for the reduction of malnutrition at their heart. This means that while investment will usually be directed to areas of high potential, we should not forget those who struggle on marginal land. A number of Governments have done so, for example through the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) or the 3N programme in Niger (les Nigériens Nourrissent le Niger).

It is in responding to the demand for action that the UN has much to offer.

What will the International Organizations do to help deliver the global change that is needed?

Firstly, help change the narrative. We need to accept that a large number of the most acutely food insecure face recurrent food crises. The International Organizations need to stand with country governments as they face the inevitable uncertainties and setbacks. Assistance should be focused on helping people become more resilient, offering viable livelihoods that can be sustained.

Secondly, accept that food crises will not go away overnight. The international system needs to anticipate crises and scale up responses early enough to preserve livelihoods. The tried and tested response mechanisms must remain on offer to countries and communities that need them.

Thirdly, respond coherently and in a way that is accountable to those most affected. This means supporting the production of comprehensive long term national and regional plans that have the political support of communities who can hold their Governments accountable. Where this is not possible, plans need to be made with input and consent from affected communities.

Fourthly, ensure decisive support, financing national plans, sharing technology and managing markets to control excessive price volatility.

Under the umbrella of the United Nations Secretary General's High Level Task Force on Global Food Security, the International Organizations are delivering the needed change. It puts political and technical weight behind the aspirations of governments and people who are seeking to end hunger.

The International Organizations can also help by providing a forum and technical expertise for a process to adjust the norms and rules as to how assistance is delivered. The divide between 'development' and 'humanitarian' funding is increasingly seen as unhelpful in situations of recurrent crisis, but there are real political and practical problems about changing to a system of funding to a way of working where action is long term, uncertain and wide ranging.

While the International Organizations have sometimes in the past received a bad press for being too locked into their own silos of expertise, times are changing. Increased coherence of the International Organizations is a reality, a necessary reality to be able to rise to the zero hunger challenge. It is happening now. Join in.

Note

1. Rio+20: Secretary-General challenges nations to achieve 'zero hunger'. Available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42304>

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Food Security in East Africa From a Trade Facilitation Perspective

Scott Allen

If markets worked in East Africa, food insecurity could be significantly reduced. Unfortunately, market failures or government policy failures underlying market failures, in addition to infrastructure constraints, prevent this.

Impediments to trade in agricultural products in the EAC

The East African Community (EAC) is frequently affected by food shortages and pockets of hunger although the region as a whole has a huge potential and capacity to produce enough food for regional consumption and a large surplus for export to the world market. There are many factors leading to this state of affairs but the most critical are: (i) inadequate food trade between times and/or places of abundant harvest and those with deficits; and (ii) high variability in production caused by high variability of weather. The EAC Food Security Action Plan designed to address these constraints is aligned to the continental Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework and principles focusing on Pillar 3 on Food Security.

Kenya generally has a structural food deficit while Tanzania and Uganda typically have surpluses of basic food commodities. It should be simple for food surplus areas to supply food deficit areas but this is rarely the case because of persistent protectionist tendencies.

Transport costs in East Africa along the Northern Corridor (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern DRC and South Sudan) are among the highest in the world and double those of the U.S. and a third higher than better performing African corridors. To its credit, East Africa has recently prioritized investment in infrastructure, particularly roads. Unfortunately, rail in East Africa remains moribund and plays an insignificant role in trade in the region. The major port in East Africa, Mombasa in Kenya, has operational efficiency problems and although efforts to correct these are underway, progress has been slow. With projected increases in trade growth, a crisis of major proportions will arise in the medium-term in East Africa unless supportive hard and soft infrastructure is urgently put in place, which will have a major impact on food security.

Smallholder livelihood focus: a dead-end

Although I am not a food security expert, I have worked on food security and related programs for almost three decades. I am saddened that the situation has not improved significantly despite billions of dollars being invested by donors and African governments over the last few decades. I attended an international food security meeting in East Africa a few years ago. During the meeting, the list of problems and recommended solutions were discussed. I walked out of the meeting because it was the exact same verbiage I had heard twenty years before apparently with little progress having been made during that time. There seems to be a mentality that food security means food self-sufficiency and that providing marginal assistance to marginal smallholders/subsistence farmers in marginal areas will make them marginally better smallholder/subsistence farmers. The consequence of trapping millions of smallholder/subsistence farmers in low yield production has and will continue to be disastrous from an economic, political and social sense.

It would be interesting to see East Africa and the CAADP program implement a new paradigm that focuses on income being the key to achieving food security rather than trying to help millions of smallholder and subsistence farmers who are stuck because of limited employment and income opportunities. Using regional economic integration as the platform to accomplish this will go a long way to achieving success. Each economy in East Africa is relatively small, however, combined it has a regional population of 133 million and a regional GDP of \$173 billion. Many believe that it is through regional economic integration that East Africa has a chance to increase economic growth and broad-based sustainable development. Efficiently integrating agricultural, manufacturing/industrial and service markets throughout East Africa will exponentially boost opportunities for farmers. The agricultural sector, which has largely been ignored in the past, despite rhetoric to the contrary (witness the small number of



countries achieving the CAADP target of 10% of budgets allocated to agriculture), could become the driving force for economic growth and poverty reduction by improving market access for farmers and creating income and employment opportunities for the millions of smallholder and subsistence farmers who are currently stuck in abject poverty.

Conclusion

TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) is a not for profit company, whose principal mandate is to support and facilitate regional economic integration in East Africa, which we implement through a demand-driven innovative arrangement of regional and country programs, all of which are aligned to the EAC and Partner State development plans. We currently have a budget of \$465 million with our principal focus on reducing the time and cost of transport along major corridors in East Africa and increasing intra-regional trade. We are in the process of getting more involved in market development, particularly agricultural processing, with the EAC Secretariat and EAC Partner States. We look forward to working with others to develop innovative regional approaches, e.g. designing and implementing harmonized and mutually reinforcing national and regional commodity programs, to alleviate poverty and improve food security through more efficient trade and markets in East Africa.

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A Donor Perspective on Supporting CAADP to Promote Regional Markets for Food Security

Monique Calon and Hubert Blom

The need for concerted action at the regional level only emerged in recent years as a key element of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). Regional integration and promotion of intra-African trade were also the main themes of the last two AU summits. In the context of CAADP, development partners are called upon to step up support for regional policy formulation processes, leading to solid investment plans at the regional level to promote intra African agricultural trade and to contribute to their implementation.



Has Africa failed to deliver on intra-regional agricultural trade?

Africa as a continent has the lowest level of intra-regional trade, estimated at less than 10% of its official trade volume. By comparison, trade within Europe represents 60% of the total. The African Union is rising to the challenge of promoting intra-regional trade. The Deputy Chairperson, H.E. Erastus Mwencha, recently noted that 'There is a strong consensus among African leaders that regional integration is indispensable to unlock economies of scale and sharpen competitiveness; and promoting intra-African trade has emerged as a top priority, in recognition that the African market of 1 billion consumers can be a very powerful engine for growth and employment'¹.

The international community and partners in Africa are engaging to promote trade corridors, production and market sheds and regional input and commodity markets. Reports by the World Bank² and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)³ have highlighted the urgency to increase efforts at the regional level if food security goals are to be met. The Netherlands government has recognized this in its own development strategy for food security. Promoting international, regional and domestic agricultural trade is part of the Netherlands's four pronged approach to achieving food security⁴. The CAADP is the platform on which initiatives to improve intra-regional agriculture related trade could be launched. Regional trade promotion is part and parcel of the CAADP agenda. It features

as one of the four 'pillars' of the CAADP framework⁵. Although the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are working toward eliminating barriers to trade, progress has been slow.

The high cost of cross border trade in Africa has been well documented. In addition to formal and informal tariff barriers, poor infrastructure adds to the high cost of regional trade. The African Union has recently launched a continent wide infrastructure development program (PIDA, Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa) to complement existing initiatives to promote regional trade. Although tariffs do affect cross border trade, nontariff barriers, including poor infrastructure and poor investment regimes, often play an even more important role in restricting trade. PIDA has great potential to unlock regional markets, but does not yet have a specific focus on agricultural markets. The African Union Commission (AUC) and the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA) are making specific efforts to ensure that infrastructure for regional agricultural markets feature as a key component of this program.

As a follow up to the recent AU Summits, the AUC and NPCA have established a joint working group with stakeholders, including the RECs and development partners. The working group will explore how CAADP can better address issues related to regional trade and infrastructure development. In this article some options for donors to move the regional trade agenda forward are proposed.

Rationale for promoting intra-regional agricultural trade

Efficient food systems depend heavily on markets that transcend borders. Agricultural production networks and food markets are not confined within national boundaries. The potentials of the wide diversity of agro-ecological zones common to Africa can only be fully exploited through promotion of regional markets. Dynamic markets for agricultural inputs and technology, and for commodities and processed products not only encourage producers to produce and invest more but also allow consumers to access the products they need for healthy lives. At the national level there are constraints that limit the effectiveness of domestic markets in improving livelihoods and food security.

Both input markets and consumer markets would benefit from stronger regional integration

Moreover, in many African countries national markets are too small to give the necessary impetus to increase production and allow specialization in crops and commodities. Both input markets and consumer markets would benefit from stronger regional integration. The volume of informal cross-border trade,

estimated at almost 90% of formal trade, shows that there is a huge potential to further develop regional markets, especially in food commodities, within Africa. The growth of urban markets, especially those catering to the emerging middle class, creates huge opportunities for producers and small scale agribusiness operators, but only if they can access these markets at affordable costs. For many producers nearby markets may be 'across the border'. Trade barriers limit access to these markets.

Developing regional markets is not a choice but an imperative to deal with food security in areas vulnerable to drought. The crises in the Horn of Africa and, more recently, in the Sahel, provide ample evidence that hunger has no borders when natural disasters and conflicts occur. The absence of effective regional markets has exacerbated the devastating effects of these natural and man-made disasters.

The absence of effective regional markets has exacerbated the devastating effects of natural and man-made disasters

Regional Economic Communities hold the key

The RECs are the key actors in CAADP processes. They have two roles namely, supporting development of country level agricultural and food security policies and programs on the one hand, and designing regional programs on the other. One of the main challenges is to ensure coherence between the two and ensure that regional programs add value to national efforts and vice versa.

Although much progress has been made by the RECs to develop trade within the various regions⁶, and most RECs have developed programs to support agricultural development, the linkages between these programs and the impact on agricultural development and food security are not sufficiently explored and taken advantage of. The recent AU Summits are proof that the political will to promote regional trade exists among African leaders. The challenge is to translate this into specific measures by the

RECs to develop regional agricultural markets, complementing national market development strategies.

Way forward: possible roles of donors

Donor coordination around a clear agenda for regional trade in the context of CAADP could be improved. Donor working groups are active in most countries, but less so at the regional level when it comes to trade related agricultural development and food security issues. In West Africa the development partners led by Spain have established a regional donor working group to coordinate their support to the ECOWAS agricultural programme, ECOWAP/CAADP. This kind of coordination structure is yet to be replicated in other regions.

Another priority is to ensure that national and regional CAADP related policies and programs are aligned. It is only through vertical integration of agricultural development and food security related market development programs that the goals of CAADP at any level can be achieved. The RECs need to build confidence among their member states that they can deliver goods and services needed to develop national and regional agricultural input and food markets. Donors could focus more explicitly on exploring the linkages between national and regional markets.

At the headquarter level, development partners exchange information, coordinate and define support to the CAADP process at all levels, through the CAADP Development Partners Task Team (DPTT). The DPTT has initiated research and analysis to better understand the constraints RECs face when developing regional policies and programs.⁷ Direct support to African institutions in setting the agenda at the continental and regional level is provided through a multi-donor trust fund. The trust fund has been, and will continue to be, an important tool to assist the RECs in designing regional market development programs. However, there is also need to explore how donors can contribute financially to their implementation.

Donors could provide assistance for an inventory of donor supported programs and 'lessons learned' and support policy dialogues within each REC and between RECs to further develop regional policies and programs. The Netherlands, for example, contributes to an ECOWAS and UEMOA program to develop a regional input market. Donors, including The Netherlands, are also actively involved in trade corridor development and reducing trade barriers through improved legislation and regulation. Many donors support business

climate reforms to facilitate cross border trade. There are valuable lessons to be learned from these experiences.

Last but not least, donors should continue to support private sector initiatives and regional farmers' organizations involved in cross border market and trade development. Agriculture is, by definition, a private sector activity. The private sector, including farmers, has a stake in improved regional markets. Donors, governments and the RECs need to capture these dynamics and build on their strengths to improve the overall effectiveness of regional food systems.

Notes

1. EEAS, Link!, Number 17, 2012, Addis Ababa
2. World Bank, 2012, *De-fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional Trade Integration in goods and Services*, eds Paul Benton and Gözde Isik
3. FAO, Trade and Markets division, 2011, *Why has Africa become a Net food Importer?* Exploring Africa agricultural and food trade deficits.
4. The four pillars of the Netherlands food security policy are (1) increasing production, (2) improving nutrition, (3) improving markets and (4) improving the business climate. See Knapen and Bleker, 2011, Letter from Ben Knapen, Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation, and Henk Bleker, Minister for Agriculture and Foreign Trade, to the President of the House of Representatives of the States General on the government's policy on food security.
5. The second pillar of CAADP focuses on 'improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access'
6. Including for example the tri-partite agreement between the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
7. In 2011, the DPTT requested ECDPM to undertake a mapping of regional CAADP in various RECs. More information available at: www.ecdpm.org/dp128

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Investment Priorities for the CAADP:

The Eastern Africa Farmers Federation's perspective

Mainza Mugoya

From the onset, the Eastern Africa Farmers' Federation (EAFF) has embraced the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) initiative. EAFF commends the African Union Heads of State for making bold commitments towards addressing food insecurity on the continent, and has taken an active role to contribute to the process.



Over the years, EAFF has made inroads into the various processes linked to CAADP at the continental, regional and national levels. EAFF is one of the signatory farmer organizations at the regional level for the Regional CAADP Compact for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)¹ and the East African Community (EAC). EAFF member organizations are signatories at the national level in Burundi, DRC, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. These are significant political achievements. EAFF now intends to translate this political opportunity into tangible investments and programs that have very clear direct impacts at the farm level.

Checking the 10% claims

To achieve this, in 2011, EAFF commissioned national studies to scrutinise the national budget allocations to the agricultural sectors in the five member states of the East African Community. The study revealed several interesting findings. Firstly, only Kenya has "supposedly" reached the CAADP target of allocating at least 10% of the national budget to agriculture. The calculation of the allocation to this sector in Kenya, and in all other EAC countries, is still questionable. This is because the calculation for the allocation does not follow the CAADP budget tracking criteria² for expenditure on agriculture. There is a need to review the budget amounts based on the CAADP criteria. The criteria clearly explain how to treat key expenditure items such as large government multi-sectoral projects, debt-service payments, and expenditure on agriculture-related public enterprises and state corporations. Overall, the study found that these criteria are not usually followed when calculating budget allocation to the agriculture sector.

Moreover, an increase in allocation to the sector does not necessarily translate to improved performance of the sector. This is due to various reasons. In some countries, a large portion of the budget is utilized as recurrent expenditure. For example in the

2008/09 financial year, Tanzania Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Co-operatives allocated 60% of the total budget toward recurrent expenditure, compared to only 18% for the equivalent Ministry in Uganda that year. Another reason is the low absorption rate of the funds that are allocated to the sector. The absorption capacities vary significantly in the region. In the 2009/2010 financial year, the Agriculture ministry in Tanzania absorbed up to 98% of the funds that were released by the Treasury. In 2009, the Ministry of Agriculture in Burundi absorbed about 25% of the development budget (sometimes called the investment budget). This rate - though significantly below the average absorption rate in the ministry with ranges between 80% and 95% - clearly signifies a big problem. This low absorption rate is explained by the lack of enough well-trained staff in the ministry, bureaucratic red-tape related to the release of the funds, and late release of the funds from the development partners.

Enabling farmers to shape the process

Producer organizations at all levels including national and sub-national level, have a key role to play in the budget-formulation and tracking processes. In most cases, the government opens up the process to the public, but due to lack of information and lack of capacity to formulate proposals, the participation of the farmer organizations in these processes is weak. EAFF's strategy is now to build capacity of the farmer organizations at the national and sub-national levels to engage effectively in these processes. This capacity includes the identification of priorities, formulation of proposals in response to these priorities, and lobby and advocacy skills.

Defining priority investment areas

At the regional level, EAFF initiated a consultation process and commissioned a study to formulate proposals for regional

investments for submission to the regional economic communities. This article highlights five key regional investment areas that were identified during the consultation exercise. These investment areas respond to a myriad of challenges that are inhibiting agricultural development in the region. These investment choices have been discussed and validated by EAFF member organizations. The next step is for the EAFF leadership and management to present these regional investment proposals to the relevant regional economic communities. EAFF is specifically targeting the EAC and COMESA.

There is need for a regional investment in fertilizers, seed and other improved agricultural inputs

Investment in agricultural inputs: There is need for a regional investment in fertilizers, seed and other improved agricultural inputs. This is because the utilization of improved inputs in the region is significantly low. With the exception of parts of Kenya, fertilizer usage in the region ranges between 5kg/ha to 20 kg/ha, which is far lower than the minimum target of 50 kg/ha that was set during the Abuja summit.

Investment in regional agro-industry: There is a significantly low degree of value addition and processing of agricultural commodities in East Africa. A good example of this shortcoming can be seen in the coffee industry. Coffee is an important regional crop as most countries in Eastern Africa grow it. In 2007, the five countries of EAC accounted for about 5% of global coffee production. One of EAFF's member organizations from Uganda,

The horticulture industry in Kenya has demonstrated that small farmers in the rural areas can produce high quality products that meet international standards, and receive a fair reward for their work

the National Union for Coffee Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises (NUCAFE) estimates that coffee farmers who sell their coffee as red cherries receive one hundredth of the price of that coffee after it has been roasted and is ready for sale. The price they receive can increase two-fold if the farmers dry their coffee before selling it; ten-fold if they grade the coffee before selling it; and forty-fold if the coffee beans are roasted before being sold. There is need to identify commodities for which value can be added in various ways, and invest in a regional facility that can add value to these commodities. Such an investment would be most appropriate for commodities that are produced by several countries in the region.

Investment in training/capacity strengthening for farmers on sustainable agri-business enterprises: Agriculture is the most important economic activity in Eastern Africa, contributing up 80% of direct employment in some countries in the region. There is a need to invest in the capacity of farmers and farmer organizations to improve their engagement in sustainable agribusiness enterprises. A large number of farmers in the region are engaged in their trade at a subsistence level. This is because of the weak infrastructure and facilities that inhibit the commercialization of the sector. Farmers need to be trained and exposed to opportunities that will trigger a business mind-set at the rural farming house-hold level. These opportunities exist through effective collaboration with private sector enterprises. The horticulture industry in Kenya has demonstrated that small farmers in the rural areas can produce high quality products that meet international standards, and receive a fair reward for their work. This model is sustainable and should be replicated in other locations and for other commodities.

Investment in climate-smart agricultural practices: Unpredictable changes in the climate have had adverse effects in the region in terms of reduced yields due to prolonged droughts, shifts in the cropping cycles, high incidence of pests and diseases due to warmer conditions, shifting of pests and diseases to areas that are now warmer than before, and reduced water for production as a result of drying up of rivers. There is an urgent need to identify new production models and options for farmers that are appropriate for the various agro-ecological zones in the region. The benefits of such interventions have been demonstrated by one of EAFF's member organizations, Ligue des Organisations des Femmes Paysannes du Congo (LOFEPACO), a women farmer organization located in Butembo in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Women farmers received training on integrated soil fertility management for application on their rice farms. As a result, the rice yields increased three-fold leading to improved food security at the household level.

The overall goal is for the region to transition from emergency food security responses to long-term economic development strategies

Investment in regional food reserve facility: Eastern Africa is one of the regions in the world that faced the most severe food shortages and famines. Yet, the region has also demonstrated that it has the potential to significantly increase food production. In Uganda, rice production has increased by 100% from 109,000 metric tonnes in 2000 to 218,000 metric tonnes in 2010. This increase has been a result of a deliberate government awareness strategy to farmers to start cultivating upland rice. There is need for a regional facility that will absorb bumper harvests from surplus areas in the region and sustainably distribute those surpluses to food deficit regions. This facility is intended to reduce vulnerability and exposure to future food security shocks. The overall goal is for the region to transition from emergency food security responses to long-term economic development strategies.

Conclusion

In summary, the Eastern Africa Farmers' Federation has embraced the CAADP initiative at both the regional and national levels. Findings from recent research clearly indicate that there is still a lot of work to do at the governmental programming level to ensure that funds allocated to agriculture are effectively utilized to realize benefits for the stakeholders. In addition, there is a significant amount of work that needs to be done by the farmer organizations at all levels to ensure that they are effectively participating in the CAADP process as well as the budget-making processes at their respective levels. This is only way that the political will triggered by the AU Heads of State will translate to tangible improvements in the food security situation in Africa.

Notes

1. Together with the Southern Africa Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU)
2. NEPAD. 2005. *Guidance Note for Agriculture Expenditure Tracking System in African Countries*. Midrand: NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency

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Agricultural Research in Africa: Why CAADP should follow IAASTD

Karin Ulmer

CAADP, the Comprehensive African Agricultural Programme for Development is shaping African agricultural development programmes. The lead agency for implementing the fourth pillar on agriculture research, technology dissemination and adoption is Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), Ghana. The agricultural model that FARA research promotes is not, however, without its problems.



Based on broad research that assesses to which extent agricultural research under CAADP addresses the needs of smallholder farmers and promotes good agricultural research policies, APRODEV and PELUM (Participatory Ecological Land Use Management) argue that CAADP should follow the approach of the IAASTD, the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development¹. Sustainable development is translated by IAASTD as equitable, diverse, local and democratic farming systems, which has the potential to ensure food security and supply local food markets.

Orphanhood of African agriculture

The background and context of agriculture in Africa is bleak. Structural adjustment programmes have led to the neglect and underinvestment in agriculture and to the dismantling of public extension service, infrastructure and research facilities. It has resulted in a situation where Africa's food import bill has risen four-fold between 1994 and 2009.² Plans to revitalise African agriculture have been led by NEPAD and its promotion of CAADP in 2002. Subsequently, African heads of states committed themselves to spending 10 per cent of national budgets in agriculture and to achieve at least 6 per cent annual agricultural growth. However, commitments by African member states to double investment in agricultural research and support to productive agricultural systems have not been met. This leaves African agriculture like an orphan left to market forces.

Promoting an outdated farming model

CAADP aims to increase agricultural productivity principally by promoting conventional industrial farming models associated with the Green Revolution. This model often prioritises practice of monocropping, crops for export markets, expensive external input such as chemical fertiliser, pesticides and purchasable 'improved' hybrid seeds. Often, this approach is provided

in packages to farmers, sometimes in contractual agreements with companies, often with improved access to credit and privatised extension services (for example, extension networks run by local agro-dealers paid by agribusiness companies). Farmers are often encouraged to borrow money to invest in high-tech inputs, this increasing their costs of production, on the assumption that increased sales in local markets will be more than enough to repay their debts.³

This not only presents pressure on individual farmers and a risk of becoming poor contract farmers. It is also an increasing burden for African economies. Production models that lower input costs, increase the diversity of farming systems, and, importantly, increase production levels are viable options. They must be taken on board.

a continuation of an industrialised approach, which puts efficiency and control over resilience and diversity.

The use of pesticides by farmers is responsible for widespread contamination of ground water and for millions of cases of poisoning a year. The use of chemical fertilisers often increases yield, but reduce natural soil fertility and degradation of farmland. Contribution to climate change by conventional agriculture is responsible for around 60 per cent of nitrous oxide emissions from chemical fertilisers mainly,⁴ expensive hybrid seeds that undermine reproductive seed rights and increase dependency of farmers on external inputs and intellectual property rights (IPRs). There is a risk to lose biodiversity, the main insurance for resilience and adaptation to climate change, which has grown over 10 000

of years and been cultivated and owned by farmers. The solution by AGRA, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, is less of a 'new vision for agriculture' but simply a continuation of an industrialised approach, which puts efficiency and control over resilience and diversity.

Lopsided stance on GMOs

CAADP has a lopsided stance on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and FARA advocacy for strong IPRs regimes is biased towards companies and threatens farmer's rights to retain and exchange their traditional seeds.

GMOs are judged contentious by IAASTD with variable yield gains of 10 to 33 % as well as yield declines in other cases. IAASTD states that biotechnological research and development involving IPRs frameworks can 'concentrate ownership of agricultural resources' and that there is 'particular concern that present IPR instruments eventually inhibit seed-saving, exchange, sale and access to proprietary material necessary for the independent research community to conduct analyses and long term experimentation on impacts'.⁵

Experiences on GMOs growth in the Americas and Asia show that these do not provide long-term solutions to sustainability challenges, but rather increase royalties for Trans-National Corporations (TNCs). Moreover, transgenic proliferation has led to the de-valuing and abandonment of traditional knowledge and diverse breeds, which are an asset for the future.

Reproductive seed rights

Traditionally, seeds business is women's business. Women have invariably been responsible for food and nutritional needs of their families. They have acquired traditional knowledge of the species and ecosystem that surround them and have been critical to seeds selection, breeding, planting, harvesting and food or medical use. However, women's

traditional reproductive seeds rights are increasingly put at risk and undermined by the new, capital-intensive vision that is being promoted in Africa.

While CAADP notes that special attention must be given to role of women, FARA is weak in analysing and elaborating on gender specific policies and technologies. On the whole, women farmers are paid little more than lip service in CAADP programmes, even though women grow 80 per cent of the staple food in Africa and account for over 70 percent of agricultural workers and 80 per cent of food processors.⁶

The right to full and meaningful participation

Farmer organisations, farmer-to-farmer networks and their support organisations should partner with researchers and be in the driving seat on identifying agricultural research priorities. An mapping by INcluding Smallholders in Agricultural Research for Development (INSARD) found that agricultural research for development agendas narrowly focus on interests of the private sector and a few commercial farmers.⁷ This means handing over responsibility 'from seed to the plate' to a few private sectors and technology driven firms to help the many.

there is only limited evidence that stakeholder participation in CAADP implementation is generating the required representativeness and the desired substantive contributions to policy design and implementation

CAADP itself concludes that there is only limited evidence that stakeholder participation in CAADP implementation is generating the required representativeness and the desired substantive contributions to policy design and implementation, particular from non-state actors.⁸

The future belongs to agroecology

IAASTD calls for investment in sustainable, low-input farming systems, urging for the promotion of 'biological substitutes for agrochemicals' and alternatives to chemical pesticides. It argues that 'technologies such as high-yielding crop varieties, agrochemicals and mechanisation have primarily benefited the better resourced groups in society and transnational corporations, rather than the most vulnerable ones'.⁹

Documented evidence shows that sustainable agro-ecological food production can achieve long term yields equal to or greater than conventional farming. Studies found that average yield increase was around 79 per cent across a wide variety of systems and crop types, and leguminous cover crops could fix enough nitrogen to replace the amount of synthetic fertiliser currently in use.¹⁰

Monocropping and high tech input are increasing dependency and vulnerability to climate change and economic crisis. Practices such as crop rotation¹¹ and inter-cropping increase the availability of food throughout the year, increase diversity of food production and use seeds and breeds with higher tolerance to climate extremes and pest when compared to conventional farming.

Public research for public goods

Research into common goods may need less high technology. But it will need a better understanding that we as humans are part of nature, and need to refrain from dominating and destructing the Planet. Experiences show that private sector shape research agendas that may generate high profit margins while locking out solutions that may be less costly but very efficient, simply because they do not provide high returns on investment. Sustainable and lasting solutions therefore lay with public independent and participatory research policies close to farming communities and their needs, and that put farmers – not laboratories and monopolistic enterprises – at the centre of attention.¹²

Time has come to invest in farmers, and to put food production back into the local social and ecological context in which it belongs. For this, a change of mind-sets is needed that embraces diversity and localised decentralised adapted farming models. CAADP should incorporate a strong focus on agro-ecological innovation areas in its research, extension and curriculums of training institute that value farmer's knowledge. An encouraging development is the declaration by 2nd African Organic

Conference held in Lusaka, Zambia in May 2012 'calling on the African Union, CAAPD and NEPAD to initiate and guide an African Union-led collation on sustainable organic and agro-ecological farming systems'.¹³

Notes

1. See APRODEV and PELUM briefing paper "Agricultural research in Africa: Why CAADP should follow IAASTD", available at http://aprodev.eu/files/Trade/aprodev_pelum_briefing_on_caadp_final2012.pdf. The IAASTD analysis is available at www.agassessment.org
2. FARA, Regional Policy Dialogue: Promoting Access to Regional and International Markets for Agricultural Commodities in East and Southern Africa. Workshop report, March 2010:15.
3. See film "Bitter Seeds" by Micha Peled, 2012 and "Le monde selon Monsanto" by Marie-Monique Robin, 2008
4. IAASTD, Agriculture at a crossroads: Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report, 2009: 6,8.
5. IAASTD, Agriculture at a crossroads: Volume V: Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009:2,98.
6. INSARD, Mapping EU-SSA agricultural research for development: CSO engagement and resource allocation processes, 2011.
7. CAADP, Highlighting the Successes, 2010:23
8. IAASTD, Agriculture at a Crossroads: Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report, 2009: 6; and Global Summary for Decision-Makers, 2009:21,23
9. Jules Pretty, Agroecological approaches to agricultural development, Background paper for the World Development Report 2008:3; Catherine Badgely et al, Organic agriculture and global food supply, renewable agriculture and food systems, 22(2), 2007/
10. APRODEV/FoEE/IFOAM/PAN, Crop rotation: Benefiting farmers, the environment and the economy, 2012.
11. Gaetan VanLoqueren et al, How agricultural research systems shape a technological regime that develops genetic engineering but locks out agroecological innovations, 2009, published in Elsevier Research Policy 38 (2009) 971-983
13. www.africanorganicconference.com/index.php/news/50-conference-declaration.%C3%82, and African Union Heads of State and Government Decisions on Organic Farming, Doc. EX.CL/631 (XVIII)

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Researching the Politics and Economics of Agriculture in Africa: The Case of Tanzania

Interview with Brian Cooksey

Brian, you've been doing research on Tanzanian agricultural policy. What's the background to your study?

The project is called the *Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa* (PEAPA). It's funded by the U.K. and Irish governments and implemented by the *Future Agricultures Consortium*, under the coordination of Colin Poulton of the School of Oriental and African Studies (London). We're asking how economic liberalisation and democratisation since the 1980s have affected farmers in a selection of African countries: Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Burkina Faso.

So how has economic liberalisation affected Tanzanian farmers?

Farmers growing export crops like cotton, coffee, and cashew haven't done well. Externally-driven liberalisation after 1985 succeeded in eliminating exchange rate distortions and re-established macro-economic stability, but the preconditions for a rapid and sustained supply response--in particular policies actively promoting competitive markets--were never put in place. Liberalisation was only partial and it wasn't sustained. The previously demoted marketing boards and cooperatives were subsequently re-empowered, with largely negative consequences for farmers' incentives. As a result, Tanzania has lost market share to its global competitors across the board. But the country no longer depends on foreign exchange earned from 'traditional' crops as it did after independence. Minerals, tourism and manufacturing now account for 80 percent of exports by value. So arguably, the country's ruling elite allows the agricultural bureaucracy, the boards and cooperatives, to control export agriculture in exchange for political loyalty. This carries serious economic costs.

But Tanzania's rulers can't afford to treat food in this way. As well as meeting subsistence needs, commercial production of maize and other foodstuffs feeds the growing urban population. Consequently, liberalisation

has meant the virtual privatisation of these markets, which are relatively efficient, though high transport costs make urban food more expensive than it could be.

Tanzania held its first multiparty elections in 1995. To date, CCM (the ruling party) has yet to be seriously challenged at the polls. So how does democratisation influence agricultural policy?

We looked for evidence that agricultural policy has become more 'pro-farmer' under a competitive political regime by examining two major initiatives, the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP) and the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS). The ASDP was Tanzania's framework policy initiative of the 21st century. It was overwhelmingly state-centred, focusing on improving productivity through the provision of public goods, in particular small-scale irrigation projects up to a value of \$50,000. Since only relatively few projects could be funded, it is not obvious that vote-capture was a major objective of the ruling elite. Rather, given that projects were selected bureaucratically, it is likely that patronage was a more plausible policy driver. The decision to expand the irrigation component of ASDP was made by President Kikwete after the 2005 elections which brought him to power, which again suggests a patronage rather than a programmatic or a vote-seeking intention.

By contrast, the Voucher Scheme was promoted by the ruling elite for avowedly electoral purposes. NAIVS targeted small-holder maize and rice producers with subsidies worth fifty percent of the value of the inputs. Subsidies had been phased out under liberalisation, but were reintroduced in 2004. NAIVS began in 2008 and peaked in 2010--the year of the latest elections--when roughly two million smallholders were targeted, and half the agriculture budget was spent on subsidies.

But it is unlikely that many smallholders actually received vouchers. Most were probably captured by large farmers.

Commercial farmers using ox ploughs and tractors and hiring labour constitute perhaps 20 percent of all maize growers. They are likely to be well connected to the local power brokers, politicians and government officials, indeed they may be the same people! So we shouldn't be surprised if there is massive diversion of the subsidies to this group. Media reports and recent survey results suggest that few small-holders receive vouchers: either they cannot afford them or their allocations are diverted somewhere along the distribution chain--the allocation process is controlled by committees of officials from Dar es Salaam down to the village. Some farmers are paid to sign for vouchers they don't receive. One study found that elected village officials received about 60 percent of the distributed vouchers. Finally, roughly half the subsidies have gone to the four southern highlands regions, Dar es Salaam's main source of maize, and to Iringa region--a CCM stronghold--in particular. Subsidising Dar es Salaam's maize supply in an election year makes political, but not much economic, sense.

I conclude that whether patronage or voter-drive, agricultural policies are unlikely to deliver benefits to the mass of the farming population that might encourage them to vote for the ruling party. This is the farmers' view too: when asked in a 2007 REPOA survey what benefits they received from the government, three-quarters of all farmers said 'nothing', but 15 percent of the least poor mentioned subsidies as a benefit, compared to almost none of the poorest. Despite considerable additional spending on agriculture in the last few years, few farmers see any improvements in state services and most complain of worsening input prices, unavailability of credit, the poor state of rural roads, and so on.

The 2010 elections revealed growing dissatisfaction with the ruling party among the rural majority, traditionally the most loyal CCM supporters. Factionalism in the CCM camp, growing dissatisfaction with unfulfilled electoral promises and a perception of universal corruption in the

exercise of state power have played into the hands of a resurgent opposition. Now would be the time for pro-farmer policies, but the more urgent demands of patronage prevent such a thing from happening. With few concrete benefits to offer farmers, the ruling party has no option but to resort to vote buying, ballot rigging and intimidation to bring in the rural vote.

You also said you were interested in the impact of foreign aid on policy. What are your findings?

Donors play contradictory roles. On the one hand they advocate for a more market-driven policy regime, yet at the same time they finance projects which support ineffective state-led interventions. Donors initially objected to the ASDP on the grounds that it was heavily focused on public goods provision, an approach which had failed repeatedly in the past. They also opposed the reintroduction of input subsidies on both equity and efficiency grounds. They perceived that in both projects the 'private sector' was accorded only a subsidiary role. Yet in both cases the World Bank broke ranks by supporting ASDP and NAIVS with projects worth well over USD 300 million! It is well known that reaching disbursement targets drives much World Bank lending, and these seem to be cases in point. Some see a 'virtual conspiracy' between the government and agencies like the World Bank to implement projects that fail on multiple grounds, yet are declared 'satisfactory' by both sides. Aid supports the agenda of the state, not the private sector.

So what recommendations would you offer to government and donors to transform Tanzanian agriculture?

Neither government nor donors take much notice of independent research findings, unless they are compatible with their interests! But in fact, the scenario I've just described is being rapidly overtaken by events. External factors, namely rising global food and oil prices, have prompted global agribusiness conglomerates to take an interest in African countries with supposed land surpluses, including Tanzania, Mozambique and Ethiopia. For a decade, Tanzania has sided with the United States in its global 'war on terror'. Tanzania is one of the first three countries to develop a cooperative framework agreement for the US government-led *New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition* that was launched at the G-8 summit in May 2012. As part of the agreement, Tanzania commits to policy reforms to create incentives for private sector (i.e. agribusiness) investment.

Donors play contradictory roles. On the one hand they advocate for a more market-driven policy regime, yet at the same time they finance projects which support ineffective state-led interventions.

Tanzania's latest national agricultural policy initiative -Kilimo Kwanza ('agriculture first')- is promoted as the product of Tanzania's private sector, not the central government or donors. One ambitious recent initiative -the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT)- brings together the government and more than twenty global agribusiness interests and international organisations in an ambitious public-private partnership. Local agribusiness cartels in food buying, processing and import-export that have flourished under liberalisation may be challenged by the imminent arrival of big foreign competitors keen to share the potential rents. In this emerging context, bilateral donor agencies -US, UK, Norway--are under pressure to align themselves more closely with their national agribusinesses, and to carry some of the initial investment costs and risks.

Consequently, the steady reassertion of state control of agricultural marketing that we have observed since the late 1990s may be reaching its limits. It remains to be seen whether a new state-agribusiness-aid troika can forge a coherent alternative to the traditional

government-donor duopoly. Growing international and local opposition to 'land-grabbing' to produce biofuels and food for export and to the introduction of GM seeds will assure a stormy ride for the emerging drivers of agricultural policy in Tanzania, and across the African continent.

Aid supports the agenda of the state, not the private sector.

PEAPA's next task is to map this new constellation of forces in both national and regional contexts, factoring in the new players mentioned above, plus CAADP (the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme), AGRA (the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa) and a number of other high-profile and ambitious initiatives.

The full report of the Tanzanian case study is available as Working paper 040, FAC Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa, March (www.future-agricultures.org).

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Challenges, and Great Potential, for Mobile Technology in African Agriculture

Sarah Bartlett

There is increasing acknowledgment of the transformative role that mobile data services can play in developing the agricultural sector in Africa. But the deployment and business models haven't always been clear: who should build these new technologies, how should they be deployed, and how can they scale? A technology and services company in Accra, Ghana, Esoko has been learning along the way.



A number of factors have driven agriculture back to the top of the global agenda, including an expanding global population, food price volatility, climate change and persistent and chronic rural poverty. But despite growing concern and countless interventions, African agriculture remains mostly anemic. As many as 600 million hectares of suitable arable land lies underutilized. Decent inputs, best practices, and reliable output markets remain out of reach for the majority of the 500 million people who rely on agriculture for their livelihood.

At the same time, mobile rates are rising rapidly across the continent – today 40% of Sub-Saharan Africans have a mobile phone, and 80% of the population is covered by a mobile signal. At the convergence of this mobile phone proliferation and the lackluster agricultural sector lies the enormous opportunity to use mobile phones as a sort of rural media channel, sharing critical data with hard to reach communities. Esoko is chasing that opportunity.

Understanding the Market

Esoko was originally established in 2005 as a small software project, allowing smallholder farmers to receive market prices via SMS and improve their negotiating power, and we pushed for what we thought would be a simple consumer model. We imagined users would be comfortable and confident enough to take this different technology, use it, and share it with others. But we soon learned that such an entirely new service wouldn't actually spread virally - not immediately at least. Just like many other new technologies, reaching critical mass can be a challenge.

This led us to a more 'social network' oriented approach, not only targeting individuals as clients but also targeting already established organizations who work with, and who are

trusted by, those individuals. And as we really began to understand where the information gaps were in those organizations we became even more convinced of the need to create a toolset of mobile applications for them. What we saw is that as the demand for food increases and as food prices rise, businesses are increasingly looking to build their supply chains.

But in Africa, you can't simply setup huge plantations as has happened in other parts of the world - we still have 90% smallholders and land rights can often be complicated. To accelerate food production, businesses are collaborating with local communities, creating inclusive business models that share revenues on outputs, and providing them with input credits, advice, monitoring and a guaranteed output market. This all requires management, and managing dispersed smallholders in rural communities is a fantastic opportunity for mobile. With these new mini-databases, you can inform, monitor and transact with rural populations.

Today Esoko plays the role of an information/media tool used by a wide range of clients in 16 countries. Individuals (farmers, traders, and researchers) can still subscribe to Esoko for prices, offers and advisories. But the business-to-business model has given us more clarity, and more users. Businesses (outgrower schemes, warehouse managers, agri-processors, and buyers) use Esoko for its toolset to be able to push out or pull information to and from the field. NGOs and organizations use Esoko to advise their beneficiaries of best practices, training reminders, preventative activities, crop compliance, or to track perceptions and activities in the field. Governments use Esoko to track data in the field and to advise citizens on specific data types like market prices, weather, or general extension services and advisories.

Early Successes

There are compelling stories beginning to emerge from Esoko users, and we've seen initial impacts for everyone from farmers to buyers to agribusinesses. Farmers are negotiating better prices, timing when to sell, and take their goods to new markets. Sara Maunda, in Malawi, recently shared her story of receiving an Esoko SMS telling her that the price for groundnuts in Lilongwe, less than 40 miles away, was more than 4 times the price a local vendor was offering. She travelled to Lilongwe and sold 150 kg earning about \$130 dollars after costs – if she had sold to the vendor she would have made just \$27 dollars.

Public and private sector working together

Financing and supporting these activities – technology production and testing, data collection, farmer training, marketing, monitoring and evaluation and more – requires an inventive mix of public and private investment and partnerships ranging from mobile operators to multilaterals, investment firms to research institutions. Success and profitability of truly innovative initiatives takes time, and only those with patience, secure capital and good internal assessments and monitoring can be successful. The public and private sectors can and should find new ways to partner together and help small, dedicated businesses like Esoko survive the first few challenging years.

Author


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Food Security in Africa:

Trade theory, modern realities and provocative considerations for policymakers

Raymond Saner, Charles Tsai and Lichia Yiu

Recent publications from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) clarify how price “shocks” recorded for globally traded agricultural goods have led to tangible negative consequences for food security on a global level, but with pronounced effects on Africa (See Box 1).



This article takes a provocative perspective vis-à-vis mainstream trade policy thinking about food security in Africa, arguing that thinking around price volatility has yet to take the weight that it deserves in trade policy circles.

This piece will first review the standard conceptualisation on trade and food security as articulated by Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, and argue that the challenges facing food security today are different than those in the past. These new challenges require different thinking on the question of what policymakers may consider in designing institutional mechanisms for policy governance particularly those relating to the trade and food security in Africa.

Mainstream thinking on agricultural trade

Lamy addressed the relationship between global trade and food security during the course of a speech delivered on 21 February 2011 which highlighted key structural shifts that had taken place in global agricultural trade over the past half-century.³ These are:

- From 1960 through 2011, the value of total global trade represented by agricultural products plummeted from 50 to 6%.
- During the same period, Africa experienced a consonant decline in its agricultural exports as a proportion of total merchandise exports from 42 to 6%.
- In the 1980s Africa transitioned from being a net food exporter to a net food importer.

According to Lamy, these facts demonstrated that the declining relative importance of agriculture in Africa's merchandise exports could be linked with broader global trends. In discussing the potential complementarity between trade openness and food security Lamy underlined two key arguments namely “(1) colonial patterns of trade, that have locked Africa into commodity exports; and (2) macroeconomic and trade policies aimed at import-substitution and food self-sufficiency, that have achieved the exact opposite of their goal.”⁴

These arguments resonate with well-known explanations regarding the poor performance of African agricultural trade. Tariff escalation in rich countries, where higher tariffs are placed on imports of production with increasing levels of value addition has negatively impacted the possibilities for African economies to increase the value of their agricultural exports. Likewise, failed policies of import substitution, and, later, poorly implemented structural adjustment regimes that led to the privatisation of national agricultural resources, created policy environments un-conducive to investment in the agricultural sector.

In short, this approach to thinking about food security on trade underlines how mainstream thinking serves to distract attention away from structural impediments that keep the situation in Africa from improving. This distraction only makes structural problems more acute.

Theoretical complementarity between trade and food security

Lamy cited the economic theory of comparative advantage and the benefits of specialisation - if countries could specialise in the products in which they have comparative advantage, all countries could theoretically benefit from improved productive agricultural capacity at the global level.

Mainstream thinking serves to distract attention away from structural impediments that keep the situation in Africa

Africa had substantial scope for improving food security by implementing supportive investment policies in their agricultural sectors, which have been neglected in recent decades and held back by taxation to subsidise development in the industrial sector. Increasing trade between African countries particularly between net food exporting and net food importing ones was also expected to provide a clear way for trade to enhance food security.

Lamy also cited an estimate that 80% of trade in agricultural produce and food within the East Africa region remained unrecorded in national statistics. The absence of such data constrained the efforts of policymakers to develop more reliable institutional frameworks to enhance food security via improved trade and domestic policy governance. In short, many impediments remain for African countries to find and harness their comparative advantage in agriculture.

The modern reality of trade means growing volatility in global agriculture

Essentially unaddressed in Lamy's speech and perhaps an even greater impediment to African countries' attempts to identify their comparative advantage is the relatively

Box 1. Recent FAO figures

- For 36 years from 1969-71 to 2005-07 the proportion of malnourished people in the world has declined consistently over time by more than half from roughly 33 to 16%.
- From 2005-07 to 2008, however, this trend reversed with the number of people experiencing malnutrition around the world increasing by roughly 2%.
- Whereas the number of malnourished people in Asia declined by over 10 million persons from 2006 through 2007, Africa experienced during the same period an increase of 2 million suffering from malnutrition.
- The reversal gained momentum in Africa with a dramatic increase of nearly 10 million additional people affected by malnutrition from 2007 through 2008 while Asia had seemed able to halt the reversal during the same period.^{1,2}

novel challenge posed by growing volatility of prices in global agricultural trade. Africa's status as net food importer remains key to understanding the food security challenge facing African countries where the proportion of total expenditure on food can be as high as 50%.

This challenge is underlined at a time when both prices for internationally traded agricultural products and export earnings from primary commodities are forecasted to rise in volatility for the foreseeable future. Uncertainties facing developing countries, particularly net food importers, are considerable and uncertainties created by non-agricultural policies have and continue to affect agriculture in Africa. These include most importantly biofuels, but others as well including SPS and other policies that are often used as surrogate trade protectionist devices with disproportionate negative impacts on low income countries.

Recent publications by the FAO articulate the enormous difficulties posed by volatility in global market for agricultural goods.^{1,2} Enhancing trade openness between net food exporting and net food importing countries within Africa regionally could certainly serve to reduce food insecurity. But broadening domestic agriculture's exposure to global trade is increasingly dangerous, given the negative impacts resulting from 'alternative' energy policies currently being applied internationally. The case of biofuels in particular has been the subject of at least five significant economic studies including by the US Federal Reserve and the World Bank which have linked biofuel subsidy programmes to increases in global food prices ranging widely from 12 to 75% (respectively) over the period from 2006 through 2008.³

Biofuel subsidies amplify volatility in global agricultural trade. Biofuel subsidy programmes are normally based on proportional requirements to blend petroleum and biofuel substitutes meaning that the demand for feedstock (normally substitutes for food or intermediate food imports such as corn) is unresponsive to price increases. In practice their effect is to literally shift the burden of reducing demand to sectors of the global market *that cannot afford the price increases*. Such policies, if durable, seem set to institutionalize unprecedented increases in the structural volatility of global agricultural trade.

Perspectives towards better policymaking for food security

Kostas Stamoulis, Director of the FAO Agricultural Development Economics Division, underlines three areas to focus policy responses to increased volatility in global agricultural trade.⁶ The first is creating a

policy environment conducive to investment in the agricultural sector. After decades of neglect and taxation to support industrial development, the renewed importance of national agricultural capacity and productivity has created an important focus for efforts to revitalise this long neglected sector of economic activity particularly in Africa.

Secondly, the avoidance of unilateral measures is a key principle that must be adhered to. Unilateral policy responses to combat food insecurity at home can contribute to it on a global level. Export bans on agricultural products are a case in point.

developing countries most vulnerable to the multiple shocks of the current world agricultural trade and markets, should be supported by research and monitoring of global food and agriculture market transactions.

The third and perhaps most important short- and long-term focus of policymaking effort should be directed towards increasing transparency and coordination among national agricultural policies. The responsiveness of policymakers in Africa as reflected in launching of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and the progress made in clarifying its relationship with Regional Agricultural Policies is a good indication that food security through increased transparency and coordination both within and among the various economic regions of Africa is being given the attention it deserves.

Moreover, developing countries most vulnerable to the multiple shocks of the current world agricultural trade and markets should be supported by research and monitoring of global food and agriculture market transactions for instance through an independent organisation outside of mainstream organisations like WTO/FAO/WB. A food & agriculture observatory, monitoring price movements by key market makers like large transnational food companies, by key commodity speculators and by monitoring global supply and value chain shifts in agro commodity exports and global food processing market developments. Such an

observatory could advise them proactively on the formulation of policy in the face of anticipated scarcities and support them in forward planning of their agriculture and commodity exports. It could also advise vulnerable economies on the magnitudes of impact that catastrophic weather conditions could have on global food prices and food stock availabilities thus supporting increased precision in the design and improvement of food security policy infrastructures.

This article is based on previous papers by its authors: *The implications of trends in food production and of trade rules on agriculture and food security for all*, CSEND, 2008; *Report on the conference on WTO rules and the food crisis in the LDCs*, WTO, 2008; *Commodity Development Strategies in the Integrated Framework* (UNDP, 2009); *The Planet Earth: Agriculture and Food security*, Fundación R. Areces, 2010.

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Africa and Brazil: Strengthening and Broadening South-South Agricultural Cooperation

Marco Farani and Pedro A. Arraes

Brazil has been increasingly engaged in South-South Cooperation and tripartite initiatives with Africa, especially in the field of agriculture, where its successes in sustainably increasing production and productivity, without significant expansion of cultivated land, became of high interest for agricultural-based economies.



The Brazilian Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries (CGPD)

Coordinated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), the CGPD goes well beyond financial contributions. Its aim is to share Brazilian knowledge and successful experiences in various areas, especially agriculture. The main pillars that guide the CGPD's strategy are to be driven by demand from the partner countries, aiming to build capacity for autonomous development.

Hence, CGPD is naturally aligned with the national, regional and continental initiatives in which the partner countries are engaged, such as the NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP).

ABC reaches out and partners with various Brazilian organizations and institutions with proven expertise on a given field in order to jointly elaborate and implement the technical cooperation projects with partner countries. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) is ABC's main partner in the field of agriculture and agricultural research.

Embrapa and the Brazilian International Technical Cooperation

Embrapa is a federal, public organization from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) founded approximately 40 years ago. It has played a major role in agricultural development in Brazil, with 47 different research centers and more than 2,400 researchers spread all over Brazil.

Embrapa has created the knowledge and technologies leading to a growth of more than 200% in agricultural production and productivity in the past four decades. The development of soil, crop, forest and livestock management techniques, the development and adaptation of new crop and grass varieties, improved livestock breeds and nutrition, and the rational use of the natural resources, allowed Brazil to expand its agricultural area to the Brazilian Savannas ("Cerrados"), previously considered not suitable for agricultural production. The Cerrados now account for a highly significant share of total agricultural production in the country.

With this past experience and track record in mind, the exchange of knowledge and experiences between Embrapa and its counterparts in Africa might contribute positively to the agriculture development in that continent given the similarities in ecosystems between Africa and Brazil.

In coordination and with financial support from ABC and other international partners, Embrapa co-developed various tools of technical cooperation in order to respond efficiently to the needs of the partner countries and to maximize potential positive impacts. Currently, these tools include:

- Structural Projects: 3 to 5-year projects co-led by the National Agricultural Research Organization and Embrapa, and designed to support the strengthening of the national agricultural research systems. These projects are aligned with the national, regional, and continental priorities and include activities ranging from proposals for institutional re-structuring, test and validation of new varieties of crops, to the rational use of natural resources. These projects typically include a permanent physical presence of Embrapa in the partner countries.
- Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace: an international partnership co-led by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) and Embrapa created to fund, in a competitive basis, 2-year collaborative projects between African-based public and private institutions and Embrapa research centers. Projects are funded on thematic areas defined in consultation with FARA and its constituents in alignment with CAADP goals. There are currently 30 projects funded in these thematic areas in 11 countries in Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa;
- Capacity Strengthening Program: a portfolio of training courses developed based on African countries demands by Embrapa Studies and Capacity (Cecat), a specialized Embrapa center, and offered regularly in Brazil to African countries. Since its foundation in 2010, Cecat trained more than 250 African professionals from various countries in more than 9 different courses;

- Short term projects: 1 to 2-year focal projects, typically involving capacity strengthening activities not contemplated in the scope of the other initiatives and designed to respond quickly to point source demands.

The Future

The keystone philosophy of the Brazilian technical cooperation with developing countries is to be driven by demand from the partner countries, aiming to build capacity for autonomous development with no conditions attached. More than with financial resources, the Brazilian Technical Cooperation aims to contribute to global development and food security by sharing knowledge and successful experiences.

Agriculture is and will remain an important sector of the economy of most developing countries and, therefore, an important engine for growth and for the elimination of hunger, poverty and food insecurity.

Brazil is strengthening its institutions and creating innovative mechanism of technical cooperation in order to respond efficiently and effectively to the increasing demands from the partner countries in alignment with their national and regional programs such as, for example, the CAADP.

As the 6th largest economy in the world and a major agriculture exporter, Brazil is expected to play an increasing role in the global policy-making process, broadening and strengthening its partnerships and significantly contributing to global development.

More information on the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and Embrapa is available at: www.abc.gov.br, www.embrapa.br. Information about the Africa-Brazil Agriculture Innovation Marketplace is available at www.africa-brazil.org

Authors


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Getting Ready for Take-off: Cross-cutting Lessons for Regional CAADP

Dolly Afun-Ogidan

Starting in February 2012, GREAT Insights has published a five part series to share findings from a mapping exercise of regional Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which assessed the major challenges and opportunities for the design and implementation of a regional CAADP compact and investment plan. The articles highlighted key lessons learned from four African regions- ECOWAS, COMESA, EAC and SADC¹.

Drawing from the experiences in the various regions, this final article summarizes and presents a synthesis of key crosscutting lessons from the regions and a number of ideas on how to address common challenges to make the regional CAADP compact more effective.



Regional action on food security

A key message emerging out of the mapping exercise shows that in all regional economic communities (RECs) there is increasing recognition of the importance and potential added value of regional action on agriculture. All RECs, in general, recognize agriculture development as a priority, but the manner in which regional action on this thematic area is taken forward, and degree of progress differs from REC to REC. Most RECs have developed separate regional food security strategies, policies and programmes, but they are now embracing CAADP as a comprehensive tool to complement existing efforts to address regional agricultural challenges. Although still in early stages, most RECs - COMESA, EAC and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa - have followed the example of ECOWAS and are actively working towards launching a regional CAADP compact and investment plan. Experiences from the regions show that a regional approach to food security can catalyze political and investment traction, attracting important stakeholders from all sectors to the regional cooperation processes.

Articulating the national-regional nexus

Despite the peculiarities of each region, all RECs share a common challenge of how to better articulate the national-regional nexus and ensure coherence between national compacts and investment plans and regional CAADP food security initiatives. There is

consensus in all regions that the substance of a regional compact, i.e. policies, investments and actions of various actors, should complement the substance of CAADP compacts in the member states of that REC. However, this vertical coherence (between regional and national levels) is not yet quite visible. So far, no analysis has been conducted in any region to better articulate the coherence between national compacts and (existing or possible) regional compacts, as well as identify gaps where a regional compact could complement national efforts. As these RECs engage on the regional compact process, their regional CAADP approach should be designed in a way that is coherent with ongoing national efforts and fosters synergies between the two levels of intervention.

Regional integration and the multi-dimensional nature of CAADP

Experiences across all RECs also show that there is a need to ensure horizontal coherence and create synergies between different regional strategies, policies and programmes that are relevant for food security. Many stakeholders in all regions realize the importance of linking a regional CAADP to ongoing initiatives on agriculture and rural development, trade, infrastructure and natural resources. While some linkages will naturally emerge, such as on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 'agriculture trade corridors', irrigation as well as existing regional agricultural programmes and institutions, other synergies will need to be carefully analyzed, to identify the opportunities

for horizontal coherence between regional CAADP and other regional thematic areas (e.g. information and communication technology, financial/ monetary integration, etc). The implementation of regional CAADP has the potential to significantly contribute to overall regional integration and cooperation efforts. But because agriculture is inherently linked to other sectors, experiences in all RECs show that slow action on regional trade, infrastructure, and other related regional initiatives have consequences for regional food security and agricultural development. Assessing the progress made by the other policies and programmes relevant to food security, understanding their strength, weakness and bottlenecks, is crucial to avoid duplication and identify opportunities and challenges for the creation of synergies with regional CAADP. It is also important to identify how the regional CAADP processes can build on progress in other sectors and possibly contribute to removing current obstacles to other regional initiatives.

Multi-stakeholder approach and participation of non-state actors

While the CAADP process promotes a multi-stakeholder approach, non-state actor (NSA) involvement so far differs across countries and regions. From the national CAADP processes, it was clear that in some cases a genuine dialogue took place, while in others NSAs had difficulties to have their voice heard. In order to ensure a strong sense of ownership among regional actors and proper implementation of the regional CAADP compact and later on the

investment plan, lessons from the national process show that it is particularly necessary to identify the right stakeholders who participate in the development of the compact, and clarify roles, responsibilities and differing views on the quality and substance of the regional compact. Arguably, farmers and other private sector actors are very important pieces of the CAADP puzzle, and need to be involved in the design and implementation of regional CAADP policies and investments, both as key contributors to food security and as beneficiaries of support programmes. The formulation of a regional compact should guarantee stakeholders' ownership and aim at gathering support for its implementation. The regional CAADP process therefore should: be inclusive and transparent; effectively take into account the different points of view of all relevant stakeholders; and include the design of mutual accountability mechanisms allowing for the monitoring of stakeholders' implementation responsibilities and the evaluation of food security impacts.

Role of Regional Economic Communities

Lessons from the mapping exercises raised the importance of clarifying the respective roles and responsibilities of RECs, ensuring that structures for regular information exchange and coordination are in place and function effectively, and that a sphere of duplication of efforts and competition is avoided. As a general rule, RECs are responsible for overall coordination and implementation of regional policies. But the political will and ability to drive a regional initiative such as CAADP is a major determining factor for the success of CAADP at the regional level. Both the ECOWAS Commission and COMESA Secretariat are commended by national and regional stakeholders for providing effective and timely assistance to member states with the identification of their food security needs and coordination of external support to them, especially during the national CAADP process. It was recommended in all RECs that strengthening the institutional capacity of these regional organizations will go a long way to enabling the REC support its member states.

Development Partners' support, coordination and harmonisation

The mappings also clearly showed opportunities for and challenges of development partners' support to the regions' effort to strengthen agricultural development and food security. It is generally recognized that CAADP provides a useful rallying point for donors (and other actors) to align and harmonize their support. Nevertheless, it emerged that donor efforts still need to be stepped up to improve aid effectiveness around

regional agriculture, including establishing or strengthening regional donor coordination mechanisms, strengthening linkages between donor initiatives on agriculture and other regional cooperation sectors, as well as between donor headquarters, regional and national donor offices; and moving away from a plethora of programmes and projects towards further alignment and harmonisation, possibly through joint programming.

Ideas for faster progress and REC-specific roadmaps

While there is consensus in most regions that implementation of CAADP at the regional level could be a significant contribution to the regional integration agenda of the RECs, it is clear that the complexities and dynamics of regional actors would influence regional policy directions and overall efforts to strengthen the regional dimension of CAADP.

All RECs share common challenges but the status of regional CAADP implementation, likely pace of progress, economic and political dynamics as well as possible solutions are very different across the four RECs. While lessons can be shared across RECs, region-specific approaches are required. Going forward, each REC will need to stimulate regular and targeted dialogue among stakeholders on how and what they can contribute to the development and effective implementation of regional CAADP. In this sense, progress on the regional CAADP would require that all key regional stakeholders come together to agree on a 'roadmap' specific to each region, identifying the roles and contribution of each actor along the regional compact process. This 'roadmap' could bring together clear statements from each actor on what role they intend to play, better focused strategies and action points (or milestones), as well as improved coordination mechanisms.

Following the recently concluded 8th CAADP Partnership Platform meeting, discussions around developing a roadmap for the design and implementation of a regional CAADP is taking place in certain regions (EAC, COMESA, ECOWAS). For those RECs where the regional compact process is new, the roadmap should help regional CAADP stakeholders focus on strengthening both the process to finalize and implement the regional compact and the content of the compact, which clarifies a number of policy issues.

It is also important that the roadmap enables the regional CAADP to tap into the real business-led developments in the RECs such as infrastructure corridors, trade and investment joint ventures between neighbours, foreign direct investment flows, etc. This may require as

'specific actions' a combination of: institutional strengthening, more dialogue platforms, more investment, better policies but also more analysis, e.g. to understand the impact of poor business and trade facilitation on specific agricultural value chains with respect to intra-regional trade, and how small and medium enterprises/ farmers could better benefit from regional CAADP and related sectors such as trade corridors.

Another key area of the roadmap should be the relation between implementation of CAADP at regional level and the overall regional cooperation efforts in the specific REC. The regional CAADP compact should be an overarching framework that: i) gives guidance to, and fast-tracks, a number of interventions for food security which are already in place (e.g. regional work on SPS, or value chain development); ii) promotes new regional policies and investments where gaps exist; iii) clarifies synergies and coordination among ongoing and new regional initiatives in several sectors relevant for food security.

Note

1. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

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EPA Update

Melissa Dalleau

This section covers recent EPA developments in the EAC, Caribbean, Pacific and SADC regions. Stay tuned for coverage of negotiations in other regions.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Experts continue discussions over market access issues

Following the meeting of the SADC-EU EPA joint technical working group (TWG) on Market Access (24-25 May), and the joint SADC-EU EPA Senior Officials meeting that was held in Pretoria, South Africa from 29-30 May 2012, discussions continued over the summer to progress on the details of the EPA market access (MA) offer in goods.

After a SADC EPA technical working group meeting on those issues, SADC and EU technical experts met in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 18 and 19th of July to discuss ways and means to progress in the MA negotiations, as well as “comfort measures” that could be integrated in the revised MA offer by the SADC EPA states. Despite some progress, notably following the presentation by the EC of comprehensive trade and production data aimed at informing decisions towards a potential agreement, major bottlenecks still remain to be addressed.

Indeed, the details of the SADC EPA market access in agriculture continue to remain a serious topic of contention in the negotiations. The EU insists that the region should improve its offer on those goods where the region may be a net importer. Discussions seem to focus mainly on a few products of interest to both parties, i.e. cereals, swine and bovine products, dairies and processed agricultural goods. As mentioned above, new supporting figures seem to have been presented by the EC in Johannesburg – data that the region will consider further to build their response and counter proposals.

SADC member states, apparently willing to find areas of compromise, are now in the process of refining their positions that should be consolidated at the regional level, before submission to the EC in the course of September. South Africa’s inputs on where concessions could be made and “comfort measures” sought and Namibia’s stance on the important issue of derogation for tuna and right of first refusal will be critical. For information, contentious issues in the negotiations also include Non Agricultural Market Access (NAMA); the last offer tabled by the countries of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) having been judged insufficient by the EU.¹

Similarly the issues of export taxes, agricultural safeguards, the so-called “new issues” (good governance in tax matters, and provisions related to “sustainable development”), and the question of Geographical Indications continue to oppose parties in the negotiations. The MFN clause also remains subject to controversy despite recent progress.

“Despite some progress, notably following the presentation by the EC of comprehensive trade and production data aimed at informing decisions towards a potential agreement, major bottlenecks still remain to be addressed”

Finally, rules of origins, notably cumulation, require major work in order to be finalised in a way agreeable to all parties. These should be addressed during a specific technical meeting on this subject in early September.

The next joint Senior Officials meeting is currently foreseen for the first week of October.

East African Community (EAC)

Further progress at technical level for finalisation of an agreement by year’s end

Following the 12th EPA negotiations session of the Technical Officials of the East African Community (EAC) and the EC that was held in Mombasa, Kenya from 8-12 May 2012, EAC and EU technical officials met in Brussels, Belgium from 9-13 July 2012 to address some of the remaining outstanding and contentious issues in EPA negotiations, and continue progressing towards the finalisation of an agreement, foreseen by the end of the year.

The Economic and Development chapter (EDC), polished during the Mombasa session, seems to have been finalised at technical level – a clear advancement that sources close to the negotiations want to interpret as a genuine sign of commitment.

Similarly, considerable progress has been made on the joint Agriculture text, with agreement on Geographical Indications. The chapter would be close to completion, if it was not for the sensitive question of EU domestic support and export subsidies. It is worth recalling that the region, like many other EPA negotiating regions across Africa and the Pacific, has expressed its concerns about the potentially disruptive nature of EU subsidies on trade and agricultural production in the region. – a statement that the EU not only refutes, but also considers to be raising policy issues that should be dealt with at the *multilateral* level.² It is worth recalling that the EU submitted revised texts on this question last April, addressing transparency in domestic support and including a commitment to discontinue export subsidies on liberalised products. However this offer is conditioned on the removal by the EAC on the text on “distortions”, all issues being presented as part of a “package”. The EU position is to be communicated to EAC Senior Officials for their consideration.

Despite the progress highlighted above, discussions over some of the ‘traditional’ contentious issues hit a snag: the questions of export taxes and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause continue to remain unsettled and have been deferred to the Senior Officials level. In addition, according to our sources, the EU indicated it would like to see the EAC Market access offer reformatted to ease the implementation stage – a suggestion which rose some concerns among EAC technical officials, worried that such change could de facto alter the degree of liberalisation/exclusion of certain products.

Similarly less progress seems to have been achieved on the question of Rules of Origins (RoO): whilst new proposals, informed by prior internal/domestic consultations, have been submitted by the region on Annex II, those needs now to be further examined by the EU before further negotiations. Protocol 1 of the EPA rules of Origins was also discussed in details in Brussels, and while there seems to be some clear mutual agreement on most aspects of the text, some disagreements remain, for instance on the definition of “other ACP states” that the EU is proposing to replace with “other EPA states”, as well as Annex II pertaining to products originating in South Africa and excluded from cumulation. RoO for fisheries also remain unsettled. In the same vein, no agreement could be reached regarding new issues introduced by the EC in the negotiations, namely obligations/

consequences arising from Customs Unions Agreements concluded with the EU, and the issue of good governance in the tax area (which according to sources close to the negotiations should cover, inter alia, issues of transparency, exchange of information and “fair tax competition”), the EAC being in the process of holding internal consultations. Likewise, the EAC informed its EC counterpart of its will to undertake consultations on provisions related to “Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development”, insisting on this question to be negotiated with other Trade-Related Issues as part of the Rendez-Vous Clause, whose timeframe remains to be jointly defined.

Finally, on Dispute Settlement (DS), Institutional Arrangements, and Final Provisions, whilst most of the text seems to be consensual among the parties, experts in Brussels failed to reach agreement on the non-execution clause, the type of dialogue and cooperation to be handled in the framework of the EPA Consultative Committee, as well as the question of whether issues related to the financing for development cooperation should fall within the scope of DS, deferring those therefore to Senior Officials. A few additional issues (eg. instances where the EPA Council could amend some parts of the agreement, rules of procedures and code of conduct for arbitrations, ...) should moreover be the focus of more discussions in upcoming negotiating sessions.

Expert meetings have therefore been planned in Brussels in the 3rd week of September to address RoO as well as outstanding issues related to the Institutional Arrangements, Dispute Settlements and Final Provisions. Depending on the progress made at this occasion, Senior Officials from both parties should meet in Mid October in the EAC region.

Caribbean

Coordination and Networking Meeting of CARIFORUM EPA functionaries convened ahead of the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Trade and Development Committee

A preparatory meeting of CARIFORUM EPA National coordinators and Heads of EPA National EPA Implementation Units was held from 2 to 3 August in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.³ This meeting allowed all actors that have a stake in EPA implementation to report on their activities and progress, as well as to share the main challenges encountered when it comes to actual implementation of commitments.

The questions of financial support for implementation was also addressed during this meeting held incidentally at a critical moment in time.⁴ It was indeed a good opportunity to draw attention on the different 10th EDF-funded programmes aimed at supporting CARIFORUM States in their implementation endeavours at a time where the EPA Standby Facility is about to be officially launched. It also represented the chance to discuss possible items to be put on the agenda of the 2nd meeting of the CARIFORUM-EU Trade and Development Committee (TDC), currently foreseen on 27 September in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. The TDC should be followed by a meeting of the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council (highest institution in the context of the EPA) meeting tentatively scheduled on 26 October, in Brussels.

Pacific

PACP Leaders meet in the margins of the Pacific Islands Forum

The 43rd Pacific Islands Forum was convened in Rarotonga, Cook Islands from 28 to 30 August 2012. The Pacific-EU EPA was among the topic discussed in the margins of the Forum, with Pacific ACP (PACP) leaders calling on the EU to show flexibility in the negotiations in views of the vulnerabilities of PACP countries. They also insisted on the importance of regional agreements among Forum island countries to ensure that Pacific economies are well-equipped to engage under the EPA with the EU.⁵

In Rarotonga, PACP leaders shared their will to convene a special PACP Leaders Meeting, where they would express their “final determination on the signing of the comprehensive EPA”⁶, in line with the statement of Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Tuiloma Neroni Slade who insisted in his Opening Remarks that EPA “be concluded this year in accordance with Leaders’ directives”.⁷

The next negotiation of the PACP-EU EPA could be held at technical level on 1-5 October 2012 to address some of the remaining outstanding and contentious issues in the negotiations. These joint technical working groups should ideally be followed by a joint ministerial meeting aimed at providing further directions for the successful conclusion of the EPA.⁸

Notes

1. As a result, it is worth noting that the EU is currently arguing for the issue to be left out of the table of negotiations for the time being – a position not shared by the region.
2. See Which way forward in EPA negotiations? Seeking political leadership to address bottlenecks for more information. ECDPM Discussion Paper 100. Produced in cooperation with International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty (iLEAP). Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management.
3. CARICOM Secretariat (2012). EPA Implementation Bulletin. Vol 2. No 4. July/August 2012.
4. The EPA Standing Facility is a € 3.5M flexible capacity-building initiative, administered by the CDB and financed under the 10th EU EDF, that aims at supporting national entities/agencies in charge of EPA implementation in implementing commitments under the Agreement. See for more information: St Hillaire (2012) The EPA Standby Facility under the 10th EDF Programme of Support for EPA implementation in Cariforum. EPA Implementation Bulletin. Vol 2. No 4. July/August 2012.
5. PIFS Press Release. PACP Leaders encouraged to conclude EPA negotiations. Press Release (105/12) 28th August 2012
6. PACP Leaders urge EU to show flexibility in EPA negotiations. PIFS Press Release (106/12). 29 August 2012
7. PIFS Press Release. PACP Leaders encouraged to conclude EPA negotiations. Press Release (105/12) 28th August 2012
8. PACP Leaders urge EU to show flexibility in EPA negotiations. PIFS Press Release (106/12). 29 August 2012

ACP-EU Trade Calendar

September

- 11-12 Consultative Meeting of Non-State Actors to discuss the CARIFORUM-EU Consultative Committee, Trinidad and Tobago
- 17-21 Ad hoc EAC-EU Technical Level Meetings on Rules of Origins and Dispute Settlements, Brussels, Belgium.
- 20 Meeting of the ACP-EU JPA Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade, Brussels, Belgium
- 27 Joint CARIFORUM-EU Trade and Development Committee meeting, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago
- 27-28 Pacific ACP Trade Officials meeting, Brussels, Belgium
- TBC SADC-EU EPA technical meeting on Rules of Origins (venue, TBC)
- TBC ESA-EU IEPA Committee inaugural meeting, Brussels, Belgium (TBC)

October

- 1-5 Pacific-EU Technical negotiating session (venue tbc)
- 5-6 COMESA Council of Ministers, Kampala, Uganda
- 6-7 COMESA Business Forum, Kampala, Uganda
- 8-10 2nd Meeting of the ACP Inter-Regional Coordination Committee, Brussels.
- 8-12 Central Africa- EU Technical meeting, Brussels, Belgium (TBC)
- 22-26 ACP Ministerial Trade Committee and Joint ACP-EU Ministerial Trade Meeting
- 26 Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council meeting, Brussels, Belgium
- TBC SADC-EU joint Senior Officials' negotiating sessions (venue TBC)
- TBC EAC-EU joint Senior Officials' Meeting, EAC Region (TBC)

November

- TBC 24th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Paramaribo, Suriname TBC

Resources

Supporting Infrastructure Development in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Learning from Experience, Stephen Jones and Simon Howarth, Oxford Policy Management, August 2012

Approaching Post-2015 From A Peace Perspective, Saferworld Briefing, September 2012

The Doing Business Indicators, Economic Growth and Regulatory Reform, Marek Hanusch, Policy Research Working Paper 6176, World Bank, August 2012

Are Natural Resources Cursed? An Investigation of the Dynamic Effects of Resource Dependence on Institutional Quality, Donato De Rosa and Mariana Iuotto, Policy Research Working Paper 6151, World Bank, July 2012

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