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## Bridging the credibility gap Challenges for ACP-EU relations in 2011

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ECDPM's annual Challenges Paper seeks to identify important debates that can be expected in the coming year and beyond and to sketch the backdrop against which these will unfold. The aim is not to predict outcomes, but to situate debates concerning the ACP-EU partnership so that as wide a group of stakeholders as possible can follow and participate in them.

### I. Introduction

Relations between the European Union and its partners in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) are in a parlous state. Past readers of this annual review will know that we regularly refer to ACP-EU relations as being at a critical juncture, and this is certainly true at the start of 2011. Yet no real movement is evident from past years, and it is hard to discern signs for optimism in the year ahead. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) negotiations are blocked. On climate change, no real dialogue or solution is in sight. No solid common agenda has emerged on governance issues. Aid budgets are stagnating, and the EU is grappling with internal problems of its own. The EU's credibility in much of the ACP is at an all-time low, and in the EU many seem to have lost faith in the future of the partnership with the ACP. Moreover, there is a collective failure to recognise that in the face of such inertia, new thinking is essential and business as usual is no longer possible. The lack of a coherent and daring response strategy is a particularly worrying aspect. We have just passed the mid-way point of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. There is another 10 years to go. But if relations do not improve soon there will be little

basis on which to negotiate a follow-up agreement by 2020.

Where could new response strategies come from? What could bring back the required political traction, dynamism and creativity to overcome the current stalemate on both sides of the equation?

Several 'windows of opportunity' to revitalize cooperation between the EU and the ACP and with Africa (as a continental entity involved in process of pan-African integration) are explored in this paper, each of them presenting various challenges to be addressed in the near future.

#### Institutional changes on both sides

The first window of opportunity is of an institutional nature. In the EU, the European External Action Service (EEAS) is being established and there is new political leadership. The EEAS is intended to give the EU the tools it needs to become a more coherent actor externally. Considerable time and effort went into laying the groundwork for the EEAS in 2010. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was appointed in late 2009, as well as a whole new Commission in early 2010. They spent

2010 sorting out the practical details of how to work together. By year's end, the European Parliament and Council had approved the new arrangements. So 2011 will be the point to get down to work. The EU has no time to waste. It needs to table proposals to revive the conduct of its relations with developing countries in the post-Millennium Development Goals world. Further analysis of the implications of the Post-Lisbon system on ACP-EU relations is provided in section 4 below.

In the ACP, the new Secretary General of the ACP Secretariat, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, has direct experience leading a regional grouping (ECOWAS). Chambas has promised to rejuvenate the ACP. Already under his leadership the Committee of Ambassadors has established the Standing Committee on the Future of the ACP Group, which is reflecting on the core interests and priorities of ACP member states and regions in light of the challenges facing the Group. A new ACP strategic plan (2011-14) has been finalised, emphasising five key priorities: (i) fostering international trade relations, (ii) promoting growth and sustainable development, (iii) mobilising resources for development, (iv) deepening political dialogue and (v) promoting cultural cooperation.<sup>1</sup> In a statement<sup>2</sup> to the

Council of Ministers, the Secretary General underlined that the ACP Group cannot simply continue to do more of the same. It must concentrate on niche areas of comparative advantage. The new strategy and fresh resolve will provide a good basis for the ACP to move forward and offer real opportunities to go beyond business as usual.

These new individuals and new institutional configurations bring modest opportunities. It is therefore critical to seize the moment and take advantage of openings. Bold leadership is now required in the ACP as much as in the EU, backed by a willingness of governments and other actors in both of these complex groups of countries to accept the need for new thinking and allow themselves to be led down paths that may perhaps be unfamiliar. It will be imperative to take decisions quickly so that real advances can be made. Lengthy internal discussions on how best to organise and protracted arguments over plans and priorities will delay and hamper progress.

### Shifting powers at the global stage

The second window of opportunity comes from major changes in the global context for international cooperation, which will continue to affect the very nature of the ACP-EU partnership.

In many ACP countries Europe has lost much of its former influence. China and emerging powers such as India and Brazil are increasingly seen as more reliable, or at least easier, partners. Europe has not quite worked out how to tackle this, particularly in Africa. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the EU has tended to view<sup>3</sup> Africa purely in development and humanitarian terms, rather than as a continent with enormous potential for growth and global weight. Although the EU continues to maintain its position as Africa's main trading partner, recent data<sup>4</sup> suggests that it is slowly but surely losing influence and trade

advantages to other global actors, such as the emerging powers. If Europe wants to be relevant, coherent and remain (or become again) the preferred partner, it must quickly move beyond its preoccupation with internal rearrangements and start to use its new political structures to inform these aims and be present and proactive on the global stage. It is encouraging to see European actors take note of African appreciation of the way some emerging economies conduct their external relations. This has even led to some debate in Europe about whether the development model the EU currently follows is indeed the right one.

In Africa, a subtle shift has taken place. Europe is no longer seen as Africa's key external partner. A gap is perceived between what the EU says and what it does. The rhetoric is one of partnership and support, but actions tell a different story. On various fronts, from trade flows to aid and remittances, Europe remains important, but by the close of 2010 Africa's confidence in Europe had significantly wavered. A palpable souring of the atmosphere is discernable across the Mediterranean. Many observers trace the start of the problem to the prolonged negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which many informed Africans blame for embittering relations between the two continents. However, various other aspects of the changing global context have accelerated the trend that the EPAs started: the financial and economic crisis of the past few years, the rise of emerging powers as partners for Africa, the continent's own improving prospects, and Africa's increasing success in dealing with some of its own problems, despite the fact that others remain, and external recognition of this achievement. All of these factors have built Africa's confidence in its own ability to go it alone and produced a realisation that close links with Europe are not necessarily as vital.


Europe's challenge in maintaining close relations with the ACP and Africa is partly explained by its internal problems: the

EU's drawn out process of renewing its institutional structures, its very real difficulties with the financial crisis, the increasing uncertainty about the EU's future felt by many ordinary Europeans, and changes of government in various countries. Member states that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007 are less interested in Africa than the older members. In short, Europe is entering an age of austerity in which many of its old certainties no longer look as firm as they once did. As a result, it has less time and fewer resources to devote to being a solid partner to the ACP and Africa. These evolutions on the global stage may induce the EU to rethink the nature of its cooperation with its development partners along more honest and realistic lines, as examined in the sections 2 (with regard to the ACP) and section 6 (with regard to Africa in the context of the Joint-Africa-EU Strategy) below.

### The search for a post-MDG development discourse

The third window of opportunity relates to the ongoing search for a new international development agenda, which moves beyond the traditional aid debates (focused on poverty eradication, aid delivery, the Paris and Accra aid effectiveness agenda) and fully embraces the global agenda for international cooperation (focused on issues such as climate change, security, trade and migration).

A concrete momentum to "modernise" European development cooperation is provided in 2011. Openings for policy renewal are expected from a series of consultation processes based on "Green Papers" written by the European Commission in late 2010. To take advantage of these opportunities, it will be important to establish a new EU external action policy that seriously tackles and reconciles some of the difficult interfaces between development and other sectors, such as climate change, energy, growth and trade. In each of these areas, the EU must be

<p><b>October</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ASEM 8 Summit, Brussels (4-5 Oct)</li> <li>EC Green Paper on Budget Support (10 Oct)</li> </ul>	<p><b>November</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EC Green Paper on EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development</li> <li>EC Communication on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (10 Nov)</li> <li>G20 meeting, Seoul (11-12 Nov)</li> <li>15<sup>th</sup> EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting, Lilongwe (19 Nov)</li> <li>3<sup>rd</sup> Africa-EU Summit, Tripoli (29-30 Nov)</li> </ul>	<p><b>December</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COP 16, Cancun (29 Nov -10 Dec)</li> <li>ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Kinshasa (2-5 Dec)</li> <li>European Development Days, Brussels (6-7 Dec)</li> </ul>	<p><b>January</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consultation on EC Green Paper on Sustainable growth ends (17 Jan)</li> <li>EC Communication on raw materials</li> <li>16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (30-31 Jan)</li> <li>Referendum Sudan (9 Jan)</li> <li>Elections in Nigeria (22 Jan)</li> </ul> <p> <b>Hungarian EU Presidency</b></p>
<b>2010</b>			<b>2011</b>

frank and honest about what it can and cannot do, while also striving to meet ACP concerns halfway. It is not just a question of updating and modernising EU development policy, but of breaking down barriers between development and other policy sectors, maximising the use of the funds available, and at the same time seeking to ensure that development goals are still met. Adjustments will of course also be required on the ACP side, not least a recognition that EU funding is not limitless and that, while EU taxpayers are generally supportive of development, they also want to see that funds are well spent. In an era of austerity at home their tolerance for spending on external aid will be more constrained. For further analysis, see section 3 (on the evolving development agenda), 5 (on the modernisation of European development cooperation) and 7 (on the future of the economic partnership agreements).

## II. The changing global context

### The global financial and economic crisis

The effects of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 continue to deeply affect the international economy. For Europe in particular, many analysts predict that more trouble may be ahead. Certainly the aftermath of the crisis will continue to be felt for many years. A number of the weaker euro countries continued to face economic problems throughout 2010. Greece and Ireland required a large joint EU-IMF rescue package. This was a first serious test of the single European currency. Some European governments are moving to take drastic preventative action to reduce state expenditure and address the burgeoning problems of ageing populations and

inadequate pension resources. This has brought the European model of state-backed welfare and social provisions under attack across the continent. As the economic debate between Keynesians (favouring stimulus packages) and anti-Keynesians (supporting drastic fiscal adjustments) rages on, policymakers must navigate a path through the dominant economic ideologies and improvise to calm financial markets and their potential destabilising forces.

In Africa, poor communities have been hard hit by rises in global prices, especially of fuel and food crops. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has warned<sup>5</sup> that world food prices are again nearing their 2008 peak. Rising unemployment in Europe has caused migrants to lose their jobs, leading to a fall in remittances to Africa. Stagnating levels of official development assistance (ODA) from Europe are also starting to be felt. However, at least in terms of overall national economies, Africa appears to have weathered the crisis reasonably well. While average growth rates on the continent fell from highs of 5–6% before the crisis, they did not completely collapse, and analysts expected African growth rates to average around 4% for 2010–11. There were regional variations, however, with southern Africa doing generally worse and eastern and northern Africa doing better. It must also be said that where growth rates have held up, this has often been combined with rising inequalities within countries. Nonetheless, economists and those in certain commercial circles<sup>6</sup> feel that Africa, along with other developing regions, is providing a degree of dynamism that will contribute to economic recovery at the global level.

The 2008 financial and economic crisis thus adds another dimension to the international debate. It revealed the relative fragility of industrialised economies while showing that certain developing countries are already emerging as real engines of global growth. In the

future, global challenges such as poverty eradication, security and climate change therefore need to be tackled jointly and in a different manner. They affect everyone, rich and poor nations, industrialised and agriculture-based economies, fragile states and emerging powers.

### Favoured partnerships in the changing global context

Africa is growing in confidence, and it is building pan-African and regional institutions step by step to provide a strengthened platform from which the continent can effectively project itself. Yet inevitably this poses a challenge for the ACP Group. The Group was born out of a Caribbean and Pacific wish to be part of a larger group in negotiations with Europe. But as African nations have increasingly emphasised their own continental structures, the wider ACP construct not surprisingly has received less attention. This is compounded by other problems experienced by the Group, such as the divisive effects of the EPA negotiations. To remain relevant, the ACP Group must reorient itself. It is vital that the outcome of the work of the Standing Committee on the Future of the ACP clearly define the ACP's core principles and added value, and that it find a *raison d'être* beyond Europe to realise the goals of the Georgetown Agreement. What is more, the future of the Group rests largely in African hands. The Caribbean and Pacific nations – with their smaller numbers, smaller states, greater distance from Europe and unique regional geopolitical realities – cannot lead the whole of the ACP into clearer waters. From the start, it has been the African members of the ACP Group that have carried the greatest weight and had the most substantial relationship with Europe. The Group is essentially built around that reality. It is the Africans that need to decide which direction they want to go and whether the dual structures of the ACP and the African Union (AU) both have added value and are complementary, or whether

<b>February</b> EC Staff Working Paper on the EDF Performance Review EC Roadmap for low carbon energy system by 2050 EC Proposal for a Regulation applying the scheme of GSP as from 1 January 2014 European Council (4 Feb) BRICA Summit, Cape Town Elections in Cape Verde	<b>March</b> EC Communication on migration and development EC Communication on a joint EU-Caribbean Strategy Elections in Benin	<b>April</b> AU-EU Ministerial Meeting, Brussels BRIC Summit, China EU-Japan Summit Elections in Djibouti	<b>May</b> EC to table proposals for next Multiannual financial framework (MFF) ACP-EU Ministerial Council EU Foreign Affairs Council with a development focus 4 <sup>th</sup> UN conference on LDCs, Turkey (30 May–3 Jun) ACP-EU JPA Budapest (16–18 May)
<b>2011</b>			

they feel compelled to choose between the two.

If the EU and ACP want to keep their special relationship, both need to be reassured that it offers mutual gain. The EU is becoming more blunt<sup>7</sup> in expressing its own interests and in pushing for influence through the various “strategic partnerships” it is developing and revisiting with continental groupings and emerging powers outside of the ACP. Yet the language found in the partnership with the ACP and Africa is very different, focused as it is on EU core values and emphasising the longstanding nature of the alliance. ACP officials perceive EU interests as often far removed from this official rhetoric, which makes an open debate difficult. On the EPAs, the EU has put its interests on the table. Should it not do the same elsewhere? Even if this leads to resentment, it does open up the debate to set out clearly identified interests on both sides. but then the EU should also recognise the inconsistencies in its position. This is surely what real partnership needs.

### III. The evolving development Agenda

A decade ago at the UN Millennium Summit the international community agreed that poverty eradication should be at the centre of international development cooperation. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were formulated to translate that global agreement into action, and they have since served as the spearhead for a remarkable concerted worldwide effort. This effort will continue into the next decade, despite the sobering realisation that ultimately the goals will be hard to achieve by the 2015 target date. The MDG Review Conference at the September 2010 UN General Assembly recognised that performance has been mixed. World leaders, nonetheless, reiterated the importance of the goals

and stressed the need for greater effort to achieve them. The MDGs, although insufficient in themselves, remain important as they have produced major advances in many places. But performance varies widely both within and between countries, and the focus on country-level indicators obscures huge within-country disparities.<sup>8</sup> There is also a large number of poor in emerging economies and middle-income countries.


Donors have accepted the Millennium message of the importance of “more and better” aid. ODA levels have gone up, the Paris and Accra aid effectiveness agendas have been closely followed, and renewed interest has been expressed in rights-based approaches to development. Recognition has also grown of the inability of development cooperation to work on its own. Policy coherence for development (PCD) is now viewed as a necessity, though this understanding is still not being effectively carried by the system.

By 2011 it will be evident that development aid, as we know it, is changing. First, it is clear that Europe will not meet its ODA commitments under the Monterrey Consensus given the economic crisis and its implications for the European economy. The European Commission will do its next assessment of European ODA levels in April 2011, but the 2010 assessment made for sober reading. There was a small increase from 0.40% to 0.42% of ODA/GNI, but in an era of falling growth this has still meant that the absolute amount fell by €49 billion.<sup>9</sup> Various EU member states including some that have been strong donors, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland, reduced their allocations, though a few others, like the United Kingdom, have been able to continue raising their amounts. Several governments are changing the nature of their ODA, indicating their intention to use more loans as well as grants even though this carries the risk of debt levels rising once again. Similarly, an increased elasticity of ODA is likely as governments seek to use ODA allocations to cover an increasing variety of expenses

such as the cost of receiving refugees, expenditures on security sector reform and provision of student scholarships. Donors are also emphasising the role of the private sector, as is evident in, for instance, the priorities of the coalition governments in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. While development is certainly about basic needs, social services, and poverty targeting, it must also be about growth and the creation of employment. Markets and private investment have a role to play, as does encouraging regional integration and trade. Development cooperation must become adept at harnessing and encouraging such processes, using aid in conjunction with loans as a catalyst and to prime the pump.

The aid effectiveness debate is on the wane, yet the issue remains topical, particularly in the context of stagnant aid resources. Donor approaches to the Paris Declaration agenda have at times been rather technocratic. The Accra High-Level Forum in 2008 pushed strongly for more ownership, which is essentially a political issue, but donors have continued to see this as a technical question of improving the use of aid. While such improvement continues to be needed, it is time to move on and think in terms of *development effectiveness* – and not just aid effectiveness. A more rounded approach will be required, cast in terms of the development result to be achieved and not just the best technical way of delivering assistance. In many ways, effectiveness has become too narrow a concept. It still appeals to the traditional aid community, but a wide stream of actors want to deepen the concept by making a link with global agendas and their impact on development outcomes. There are, of course, vital tasks still to be done to improve aid delivery – reducing the fragmentation of aid, making use of country systems, and harmonising and clarifying the division of labour to name just a few.

From these various strands of argument it is possible to discern the contours of a new international development agenda.



**BOX 1. DIVISION OF TASKS BETWEEN THE EEAS AND DG EUROPAID DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION (DEVCO) IN 2011**

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, heads the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is the diplomatic corps responsible for putting into practice an effective and consistent EU foreign policy. In line with the objective of bringing all EU external action together under one roof, in January 2011 the geographical desks for all third countries will be transferred to the EEAS from the Commission Directorates General of External Relations, Enlargement and Development. The EEAS will programme the European Development Fund (EDF) and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), as well as other instruments. The External Relations Directorate will cease to exist, as its role is being taken over by the EEAS. The EEAS will comprise staff from the European Commission, the Council Secretariat and the diplomatic services of the member states.

Prior to Lisbon Andris Piebalgs, the EU Commissioner for Development, was responsible only for ACP countries. He is now responsible for formulating development policy in relation to all developing countries, though staff dealing with geographical relations is situated in the EEAS. While EDF and DCI programming is prepared by the EEAS, it is under the responsibility of the Development Commissioner, which will allow him to ensure that development objectives are taken into account. The High Representative and the Commissioner for Development have to jointly submit programming proposals for the EDF and DCI to the College of Commissioners. Thematic programmes, for example, on food security or migration, remain the sole responsibility of the Directorate General for Development<sup>9</sup>. The Development Commissioner is also responsible for what was previously the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO), which will now be merged with the Development Directorate General and called DEVCO.

This agenda moves beyond the MDGs and aid effectiveness concerns, albeit without neglecting them, to also include global challenges such as climate change, security, trade and migration. While the effects of these global challenges on development have been recognised for some time, this process has to be deepened. It is not just a question of linking disparate sectoral policies but of shifting to modes of operation whereby all programmes in each policy area are designed to address both their own concerns and poverty and development. This constitutes a fundamental shift. It will require, much more than before, alignment of development objectives with other internal and external policy objectives. PCD therefore has to be recognised as a serious imperative for all governments if the development dilemma is to be solved. Solid PCD work requires political coalitions across party lines, as time is needed to adapt policies and achieve real results. The lifespan of single government mandates is often not long enough. A key question for all international actors, therefore, is how PCD can be ensured on a sustained basis. But a further step is also required; that is, European countries have to be far

more honest about their own priorities and motivations in their dealings with the ACP. The European Union has a particular problem in its tradition of emphasising partnership in international cooperation but when it comes to trade following a strict own-interest agenda without willingness to recognise the contradictions. This has led to a serious loss of EU credibility among African governments. Recognising the reality of these contradictory interests and being willing to face up to them and find solutions must be at the heart of a more mature dialogue.

The MDG Review Assembly in September 2010 was the kick-off for a year-long global conversation on the future direction of the international consensus on development. The dialogue will effectively go on at least until the Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, in November 2011. The recent G20 session in Seoul added a further dimension by moving beyond its initial concern with global financial management to also tackle development issues. The session produced the *Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth* which emphasises investment in infrastructure in developing economies

while downplaying the importance of aid. The focus is thus on growth and investment and on moving away from traditional development aid thinking. The statement is all the more noteworthy because the G20 is a new forum in which the traditional donor community is counterbalanced by major developing countries and emerging donors. Beyond 2011, the UN Rio+20 Conference will provide another opportunity to update the global consensus on sustainable development.

**IV. The post-Lisbon European Union and ACP-EU relations<sup>10</sup>**

Post-Lisbon, the EU would like to become a more coherent actor on the world stage. In light of this goal, it is slowly taking steps to modify EU institutions. This has implications for the ACP.

The European Commission has maintained that the Lisbon Treaty seeks primarily to improve the internal organisation

<p><b>October</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EC Initiative to modernize EU development policy</li> <li>EC Communication on Enhancing Growth and Competitiveness in Partnership with Business</li> <li>Joint ACP-EU Ministerial Trade Committee meeting (JMTC)</li> <li>AU-EU Ministerial Meeting</li> <li>Final report on the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration</li> </ul>	<p><b>November</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EU Foreign Affairs Council with a development focus</li> <li>COP 17, South Africa (28 Nov-09 Dec)</li> <li>4<sup>th</sup> High Level Forum on aid effectiveness, Busan, Korea (29 Nov - 1 Dec)</li> <li>ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Sierra Leone (21-22 Nov)</li> </ul>	<p><b>December</b></p>	<p><b>January</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monterrey Meeting, Brazil</li> <li>7<sup>th</sup> LAC-EU Summit in Chile</li> <li>Rio +20 Earth summit</li> <li>COP 18</li> </ul> <p> <b>Danish EU Presidency</b> <b>Cyprus EU Presidency</b></p>
<b>2011</b>			<b>2012</b>



of EU relations with third countries and has no immediate implications for the EU partnership with the ACP. Yet representatives of the ACP and AU are still unconvinced. When it comes to the Lisbon Treaty, officials perceive it more as a threat and problem than as an opportunity for better managed relations. The ACP Secretary General noted in May 2010, ‘the ACP Group is concerned about the impact of this Treaty on the long-term development partnership with the EU’<sup>12</sup>. This is despite EU assurances that the Lisbon Treaty will make the EU a better partner.

### Changing responsibilities within the EU

The High Representative Catherine Ashton heads the EEAS and is responsible for coordinating EU external action and formulating EU foreign policy (under the guidance of the European Council). The EEAS also allocates and programmes the geographical development funds, however responsibility lies with the Development Commissioner. It is this Commissioner’s task to ensure that development objectives are safeguarded. But as the geographical staff is located in the EEAS, this responsibility may be difficult to act upon. As Ashton and her Service set the overall agenda for political relations with all third countries, the Development Commissioner

may have less room than before to influence decision-making regarding political relations with Africa and the ACP. A positive outcome of the new structures could be closer cooperation between the EU’s development arm and its foreign policy arm, as the former focuses on addressing the roots of crises and the latter on managing short-term crises. Provided they are well coordinated, a productive combination of foreign and development policy approaches might be achieved. This would make the EU a more coherent and predictable partner for the ACP and Africa – provided that the commitment to eradicating poverty enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty stays on equal footing with other foreign policy objectives and that the wishes of partner countries are respected in the spirit of true collaboration.

The Lisbon Treaty changes the role of the European Parliament (EP) as well. The EP is now a stronger player in EU external action, as the areas in which it is allowed to co-legislate have been widened to include energy security, agriculture, fisheries, and migration, among others. For instance, in trade, the Parliament has co-decision powers on the future of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). It further has to consent to international agreements and has (more) access to confidential documents. If the EDF is made part of the EU budget in 2014, Parliament will gain a democratic oversight role on strategies concerning ACP countries,

which are eligible for the EDF (it already plays this role for the DCI countries). Influential parliamentarians could thus become key partners for the ACP in raising awareness on policy proposals that affect development objectives.

Exactly how Ashton and the EEAS will work with actors in other EU institutions should become clearer in 2011, as the EEAS really starts to operate. For more consistency in external relations, European institution officials will represent the Union externally, eliminating the role of the rotating EU Presidency abroad. Table 1 presents the changing arrangements in EU representation before and after Lisbon and the interim solutions until the post-Lisbon set-up is fully in place.

### Taking forward relations with the ACP and Africa

Within the EEAS, three separate departments will manage relations with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and there will be no ACP unit. This would appear to be a further indication of the “regionalisation” of EU relations with the ACP, following on the separate strategies developed with or for the three regions (the EU-Pacific Strategy in 2006, the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy (JAES) in 2007, and the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy in 2010). Yet the AU’s wish for Africa to be

Table 1. Changing EU representation before and after Lisbon and interim solutions

	PRE-LISBON SITUATION	INTERIM SOLUTION (2010 and partly 2011)	PLANNED POST-LISBON SITUATION
<b>Summits of Heads of State and Government</b>	EU Presidency	EU Presidency or President of the European Council and President of the European Commission	President of the European Council and President of the European Commission
<b>Ministerial Meetings with ACP and AU</b>	Troika of previous, current and future EU Presidency	EEAS*	EEAS (though this is not yet certain)**
<b>Country-level Meetings</b>	EU Presidency (where there is no embassy or member state otherwise available)	EU Presidency or EU Delegation***	EU Delegation (where there is no EU Delegation, an EU member state)
<b>UN General Assembly</b>	EU Presidency	EU Presidency	EU Delegation as an enhanced observer?****

\* On a case-by-case basis, the High Representative has asked the Commissioner for Development to represent her.  
 \*\* There are rumours that relations with the ACP and Africa may continue to be seen as “development” partnerships and could thus be managed by DG DEVCO.  
 \*\*\* In a number of countries, EU Delegations note that they lack staff to fulfil the function of EU representation and do not yet know how many more staff they will receive post-Lisbon.  
 \*\*\*\* Reconsideration of the EU’s status, currently as observer, is not expected to resume until mid-2011. As an enhanced observer the EU could not vote, but would have the right to speak, make proposals, submit amendments and circulate documents.

Table 2. Focus of visits to ACP Countries by Ashton and Piebalgs, January to November 2010

	March	April	May	June	September	October	November
Ashton	Haiti		Kenya Tanzania Seychelles			South Africa Mauritius	
	<i>Earthquake</i>		<i>Piracy</i>			<i>Piracy</i>	
Piebalgs		Haiti	Ethiopia	Ethiopia Burkina Faso	Rwanda		Libya
		<i>Earthquake</i>	<i>Progress in AU-EU Partnership</i> <i>Financial agreements</i>	<i>AU-EU COM meeting</i> <i>Sign revised CPA</i>	<i>Aid impact</i> <i>Financial agreements</i>		<i>Third Africa-EU partnership summit</i>

treated as one is still unlikely to be fulfilled in institutional terms, as the EU Commission continues to deal with northern African countries in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Catherine Ashton has so far left relations with the ACP and Africa largely to Development Commissioner Piebalgs. Insiders say that development cooperation is not an area she is comfortable with. Reportedly, she has tended not to put forward her own policy proposals on development in the Foreign Affairs Councils but rather has expected input from member states. Some interpret her past decisions not to attend meetings with ministers from the ACP and Africa as a sign of de-prioritisation of political relations with these regions in favour of countries such as India and China. Piracy was the focus of her visits to Africa in 2010 (Table 2). Next year, it is hoped that with more staff (and staff with development and ACP expertise) she will not only collaborate with the Development Commissioner, but also emphasise the creation of synergies between development and external relations for Africa, which is one of the key responsibilities of her EEAS. If the EU wants to show that it values its relationships with Africa and the ACP, it will be important for Ashton to be present at some of the meetings in the region, to be well informed and to seek ways to address the issues. Because Piebalgs will no longer have geographical desks, it will be nearly impossible for him to conduct political relations with Africa and the ACP. Ashton fought for the EEAS mandate to allocate and programme development funds. This implies that she will have to assume responsibility for relations with developing regions that go beyond foreign policy concerns. Relations with the ACP and Africa should not be left to the Development Commissioner alone, as this would not

send the right signal for a more political partnership of equals, nor would it protect or further the EU's interests.

#### Opportunities for change in the EU-ACP relationship post-Lisbon

Provided there is a willingness to revisit current practices, the way the EU conducts political dialogue could be reviewed and changed post-Lisbon. Under the current system, ACP officials often perceive the EU as exploiting political dialogue to discuss the conduct of ACP countries rather than allowing for open dialogue on political issues of concern to both. The Lisbon Treaty strengthens the role of the Heads of EU Delegations in ACP countries and gives them more political weight in dealing with Brussels, because they represent the entire EU and member states endorsed their nominations. Moreover, the EEAS and its delegations are charged to ensure consistency between EU internal and external actions. Political dialogue may therefore widen in scope to include, for example, migration and employment. The EEAS further has a remit to act on its findings. The delegations will each gain at least one additional staff member to work on political relations. This is partly a result of Ashton's decision to have every delegation monitor the human rights situation in a given country.

On the world stage, as well as at the country level, the EU's wish to play a fortified role reflecting its political weight could be to the advantage of the ACP and Africa. Yet in the UN in September 2010, EU diplomacy received an important reminder of the need for others to agree that it should play a stronger international role, when the CARICOM Community, supported by many African states, succeeded in passing a motion to delay consideration of

the EU's status by the UN General Assembly. At the global level, the ACP and EU, and Africa and Europe, are far from reaching the potential that they could achieve together. On global governance, for example, most Africa-EU cooperation focuses on challenges in Africa, rather than on how Africa and the EU could work together on, for instance, UN reform, reform of the World Bank and IMF, the G20, and climate change.<sup>13</sup> Africa recently gained a seat on the executive board of the World Bank but remains underrepresented. How might the two regions address global challenges jointly?

#### Budgetisation of the EDF<sup>18</sup>

The Lisbon Treaty no longer includes an annex stipulating that the European Development Fund (EDF) should be outside the EU budget, as previous treaties did. Commissioner Piebalgs has said on several occasions that he favours the incorporation of the EDF into the EU budget, as does the EP. ACP-EU relations thus once again face a debate on the implications of EDF budgetisation for the ACP. Whether or not budgetisation materialises in 2013 ultimately depends on the position of EU member states. Incorporation of the EDF into the budget would increase the contribution of a number of countries to the EU budget more than if a separate EDF were maintained. For the current larger contributors this could mean a reduction in their share; an attractive prospect for cash-strapped EU economies. EU states that have publicly declared their opposition to an increase in the EU budget could oppose the EDF's inclusion simply to make the figures look better to the public.

EDF budgetisation has supporters in post-Lisbon Europe for a number of reasons. Some see it as a way to reduce the

**BOX 2. KEY FEATURES OF THE 2010 REVISION OF THE COTONOU PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT<sup>14</sup>**

The second revision of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU and the ACP was concluded in March 2010. Both parties agreed to a “light” review, the major focus being to adapt the agreement to changes in ACP-EU relations and international developments.<sup>15</sup>

**Provisions on economic and trade cooperation:** The introduction of EPAs - though most remain under negotiation - render some provisions in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement outdated. ACP-EU trade is now de facto governed by multiple regimes, including the EPAs, interim EPAs, the Generalised System of Preferences (+), and the Everything but Arms (EBA) arrangement. This has two implications. First, most provisions relating to the EPA preparatory period were deleted from the text. Second, the revised version no longer makes reference to commodity protocols and related declarations,<sup>16</sup> with no new mechanism created for all commodities, as requested by ACP countries in their draft mandate. Despite the current coexistence of multiple mechanisms governing EU-ACP trade relations, the 2010 text merely highlights the need for the parties to ‘take all the necessary measures to ensure the conclusion of new WTO compatible EPAs’. It makes no mention of any other possibility, despite the fact that alternative schemes are being applied (such as the Generalised System of Preferences). Hence, ACP-EU trade relations are no longer necessarily governed by the Cotonou Agreement, though trade was previously a key component.

**EU financial assistance to the ACP post-2013:** For the first time, the Cotonou Agreement contains no indicative level of EU financial assistance to the ACP in the upcoming multi-annual financial framework period (starting in 2014). The Cotonou Agreement’s next revision is scheduled for 2015, which leaves a gap of two years without financial commitments. However, the signing of the revised agreement was accompanied by a political agreement to make a resource commitment after the mid-term review of the 10th European Development Fund, which is expected to be finalised in 2011.

**References to regional integration:** Regional integration, including at the continental level, receives strong recognition in the fundamental principles (art. 2) of the new text. Specific reference is made to political dialogue pertaining to regional and continental integration. Furthermore, the revision resulted in a re-arrangement of the chapter on regional cooperation and integration, which now goes beyond the economic and free movement dimension to put more emphasis on the political dimension, in particular, in terms of peace and security and regional policies to manage transnational development challenges. To support this broadened scope, the revision introduces a new article 30 on strengthening the capacities of ACP regional integration institutions and organisations, including the African Union. Related to peace and security,<sup>17</sup> ACP regional organisations and the African Union are to be fully involved in dialogue on peace and security, whereas in the previous wording they were ‘associated’ with it. Also mentioned is the key role of the African Union in peace building and conflict prevention and in tackling security threats. The African Union is now specifically named as eligible for funding from the intra-ACP envelope.

**Intra-ACP cooperation:** Provisions for intra-ACP cooperation have been significantly upgraded.

influence that traditional colonial powers exercise over development funds. It could also help to mainstream EU support to ACP countries and make contributions to it obligatory for the new EU member states which lack a tradition of development cooperation with the ACP.<sup>19</sup> Another argument for budgetisation is to facilitate links with cooperation in regions where assistance is already funded from the EU budget. For instance, current financial cooperation with Africa is split across the EDF for sub-Saharan Africa; the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement for South Africa (TDCA); and the European

Neighbourhood Instrument (ENPI) for North Africa. The European Commission argues that budgetisation would overcome this split and promote consistency in EU support to Africa as a whole. Perhaps it is useful to look closer at what budgetisation would change and how Lisbon alters the debate. The existence of the EDF as a separate fund has made it possible to implement traditional “Cotonou principles”, such as co-management (with both the National/Regional Authorising Officer and the Head of Delegation agreeing to all decisions) and joint decision-making (in the ACP-EU Development

Finance Cooperation Committee). It has also provided security of funds over the full multi-annual period of each EDF. These features are less obvious in cooperation funded through the EU budget, which is closely controlled by the Council and the EP. Special provisions would therefore probably be needed so that these benefits are not jeopardized. Although the EP is generally seen as ACP-friendly, its right to co-decide may subject the EDF to political conditionalities and deals. This would be a particular concern in an economic context such as at present, with parliaments scrutinizing more than usual all financial resources spent outside of Europe.

The Commission’s proposals on the next multi-annual EU Financial Framework (post-2013) will come out in May or June 2011 and will likely include the proposal to budgetise the EDF. The ACP may then want to query the EU on how and to what degree it would be possible to ring-fence funds for the ACP and maintain specific features of the EDF, such as the predictability and security of funding, co-management, joint decision-making and multi-annual programming. The debate on budgetisation is likely to go on for some time, as the actual decision may be taken late in the final negotiations.

Early in 2011 the Commission is expected to publish a staff working paper on the performance review of the 10th EDF, which will also feed into the discussion on the next Financial Framework. This will probably also address the continued existence of funding for ACP countries and for the organisation of pan-African activities from both the inter-governmental EDF and the normal EU budget.

## V. European development cooperation revisited

Against the backdrop of post-Lisbon adjustments and their possible implications for the ACP, changes are also on the horizon in the focus of EU development cooperation. These relate to discussions on the future of development in the G20 and preparations for the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (set for November/December 2011).

In late 2010, the Directorate General for Development published a Green Paper to launch a debate on how the EU can improve the impact of its development policy, promoting inclusive growth and sustainable development.<sup>20</sup> Comments are invited until 17 January. Partly based on



the outcomes of this public consultation a Communication on “modernising” EU development policy is planned for October 2011. The Commission is then expected to decide whether to review its 2005 European Consensus on Development. Development officials in member states have expressed concern about the timing of this debate. They question whether the coming year – in which development budgets are being cut, European governments are reviewing national priorities, the EEAS is being established, and development policy is having to assert its place in overall EU external action – is the right time to “modernise” development policy.

The Green Paper covers a range of areas. But Commissioner Piebalgs’ speeches<sup>21</sup> seem to indicate that the Commission’s particular interests are inclusive growth, aid as a catalyst for other forms of financing, climate-proofing development funds, renewable energy and agriculture/food security. The need to deliver results and show impact runs through the entire paper. Addressing the ACP Council of Ministers,<sup>22</sup> Piebalgs urged the ACP to work together with him to raise the leverage of aid, to improve aid effectiveness and governance, and to develop partnerships for inclusive growth and joint strategies on renewable energy. The ACP will want to consider whether and how they would like to cooperate with the EU in these areas.

The Commission’s interest in “modernising” EU development cooperation can be understood in the light of a number of factors. First, the Lisbon Treaty’s promotes closer integration among external and internal EU policies. “Europe 2020”, the EU’s internal strategy for the coming decade, has a major focus on growth. But it too must be viewed in the current overall context of a Union under financial pressure. The EU tends to emphasise that aid is not the only answer when budgets are tight and likely to become even tighter. EU development policy is under pressure from the European Parliament and citizens to show that it is effective and an efficient way to spend tax money. This then seems an opportune moment to call on the private sector to get more involved and request partner countries to do their homework on governance. While the development sector widely recognises that closer cooperation with the private sector has advantages, some express concern about such cooperation becoming too close and purely promoting European business interests.<sup>23</sup> Given the current situation, the development sector needs to come to grips with its fears of working with the private sector. More productive would be to formulate criteria to guide governments

and private sector actors in working together to promote sustainable growth in both Europe and the ACP, without simply sliding back into tied aid.

Though intending to lay the groundwork for a debate on modernising EU development cooperation, the paper regrettably does not situate the discussion in the larger context of Europe and the current state of the development sector. In the post-MDG era, Europe’s cooperation with other actors calls for a more profound rethink than this paper provides. As it stands the Green Paper does little to encourage a break with the past. There is no political economy analysis and no in-depth questioning of how the EU would like to conduct its development business in the future. A profound rethink would have required examining what incentives and structures can explain the current gap between EU policy and its implementation. In addition, the European Commission is not known for its work with the private sector. Making this the focus of its future strategy thus suggests a need for a more profound debate on procedures and the comparative advantages of the Commission in relation to those of the member states and the European Investment Bank. A paper that puts working with the private sector at the centre would have needed a refined actor analysis, stating how exactly it aims to work with the private sector and other actors like civil society to implement this new approach. PCD is mentioned in the paper, but not as an overarching framework that would give development funds leverage over other areas such as climate and energy.

ACP countries are well-advised to follow these EU debates on the new foci of development cooperation closely as they will influence the programmes developed for the post-2013 Financial Framework.

## VI. The joint Africa-EU Strategy

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), as agreed in 2007, aimed to provide a new political framework of cooperation for Europe and Africa based on the principle of partnership. Yet three years into its implementation, the JAES has had limited effect in transforming the nature of relations between the two continents. Neither have the principles that the JAES aspired to been fully embraced. For instance, the quality of political dialogue between *partners*, which was at the centre of the process, has not improved. Although some progress has been registered (e.g.

greater EU acceptance of and support for the AU Commission’s role on peace and security) most stakeholders feel that the dialogue could be further strengthened and, as planned, move beyond concentrating only on Africa’s problems. At times it has seemed that Africans and Europeans have different expectations of the JAES. Europeans have emphasised dialogue as the main priority, while Africans have suggested that a strategy without funding to back it has little value.

A number of reasons have been advanced to justify the weak substance of dialogue under the JAES: (i) a tendency to confine political dialogue to biannual troika meetings<sup>24</sup> (with overloaded agendas and limited time for matters other than peace and security); (ii) the EU’s choice to bypass the JAES framework in dealing with various sensitive matters (e.g. the EPA process); (iii) difficulties on the African and to a lesser extent on the European side to elaborate and agree upon regional and continental agendas; (iv) difficulties experienced by development-oriented parts of the European Commission in pushing for substantial political dialogue on non-development issues managed by other parts of the Commission, and (v) member states in Africa and Europe not seeing it as in their interest to fully engage and align with the JAES and African regional economic communities (RECs) having only a marginal role. Effective implementation of the JAES has also been undermined by its uneasy coexistence with prior policy frameworks (e.g. the Cotonou Partnership Agreement), as well as by its heavy institutional and management structure.

At the Third Africa-EU Summit in November 2010, the rather optimistic hope was that European and African Heads of State would demonstrate that the JAES spirit had been well tested and that EU-Africa relations had entered a new era. Yet the preparatory process leading up to the Summit as well as the final communiqué<sup>25</sup> indicated that business as usual had largely prevailed. Various efforts were made to avoid debates on fundamental issues, for instance, regarding the EPAs and the financing of JAES implementation. On the EPAs, despite the African position formulated in Kigali earlier in the month, the final communiqué merely stated that the negotiations would be concluded in 2011. No reference was made to the arguments put forward by the Africans. The communiqué further contained no firm commitments on the question of JAES financing, an issue seen by many as undermining the strategy’s legitimacy and relevance. The Summit made no move to align existing EU programming and financial instruments

to the JAES, nor was a clear timetable set to achieve this. Rather, the conclusions only noted the availability of existing committed funds totalling €50 billion. The dialogue therefore did not push the limits to take into account the concerns of the parties involved. Nonetheless, this will have to be undertaken during implementation of the second phase of the JAES and the next Action Plan 2011-2013. Those in official circles have seen the first phase of implementation as a stepping stone – a period of institutional teething to prepare the ground. The next phase and implementation of the second JAES Action Plan will test the relationship between the continents, not least because EU cooperation is increasingly being seen against the backdrop of what is perceived in Africa as the more tangible and concrete cooperation offered by emerging powers. For Europe, the next phase will be an opportunity, yet also a test, to fill the credibility gap and to strengthen partnership with Africa. For Africa, it will be a chance to clearly articulate its demands and develop the dialogue beyond one based on demands for financial resources.

If the JAES is to remain believable as a framework of cooperation, it will have to strike a fine balance between political aspirations and ability to deliver on Africa's wider developmental needs. Whether the second phase of implementation can move beyond the rhetoric and really start to deliver will be decisive for the Strategy's future. Having high-level thematically focused EU-Africa political dialogue with tangible outcomes such as evidenced in the field of energy (in September 2010) or peace and security, provide an indication of how this may be achieved.<sup>26</sup> Equally, some of the existing dialogue spaces created in the context of the JAES – such as the Platform for Dialogue on Governance and Human Rights – represent innovative opportunities to address at least some of the challenges.

## VII. The future of the Economic Partnership Agreements<sup>27</sup>

Eight years after the start of the EPA negotiations between Europe and the ACP only 25 countries have confirmed their commitment to the EPAs. Meanwhile, negotiations towards the conclusion of other EPAs are progressing very slowly at best, and in a context of increased tension.

The EPAs have become a divisive force between Europe and the ACP and also between African countries. Even though

their aim was to strengthen the economic relationship between Europe and the ACP, their effect now seems to be the opposite. A number of ACP countries have come to resent the EU's insistence on pressing for domestic reforms and ambitious commitments as part of the comprehensive economic and trade agreements.

Though some countries in Africa have indicated a desire to conclude the EPAs in the course of 2011, the risk of stalled negotiations remains real. Both sides in the negotiations have failed to outline ways forward to allow for movement on key contentious issues. On the ACP side, neither the Ministerial Trade Committee, held 20–21 October 2010 in Brussels, nor the African Union Ministers of Trade Meeting in Kigali, 1–2 November, was able to articulate a clear and forward-looking position. Instead, the ACP and AU policymakers gathered at those meetings simply repeated their long-held concerns over an extensive list of market access provisions pushed by the EU, as well as what they perceive to be a lack of adequate development support.

On the EU side, the Commission and the trade and development ministers of EU member states, who met, respectively, in September and October 2010, have continued to lament the lack of enthusiasm from African and Pacific actors for a comprehensive EPA agenda. The EU has reluctantly accepted that it may have to lower its ambitions if EPAs are to be concluded at all. It has also promised flexibility in addressing ACP concerns. In practice, however, the EU has yet to formulate any specific concessions or plans to move forward and get the negotiations out of the doldrums.

While a coherent approach on EPAs should be preserved across countries and regions, it is important to recognise the diversity of situations and interests. Various options can be followed in different regions or countries based on their driving strategic objectives and specific development needs. However, one of the overarching objectives of the EPA process is to strengthen regional integration in the ACP. While the EPA process cannot substitute for endogenous regional agendas, the EPAs should not undermine ACP regional integration processes. A key concern is thus to construct EPAs that strengthen regional integration. For this, a reality check is needed to assess what type of agreement is most likely to effectively support the regional integration objective, where possible. The EU has the means to flex its muscles to speed up the conclusion of final EPAs. Similarly, it is high time for ACP countries and regions to

evaluate whether they want to conclude a final EPA. If so, then they must decide by when and under what conditions. Reaching an agreement will require concessions from both sides.

Last but not least, parties must recognise that the EPA process is first and foremost a political one, not a technical one to be left to trade negotiators. Political leaders will need to guide any possible technical remedies advanced by negotiators, especially on contentious issues. The EPAs have been presented as advanced and far-reaching instruments for binding trade and development. Failure to deliver on this development promise would be a serious setback for the EU trade and development agenda, including in the context of the WTO Doha Round. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the EPAs have had severe political repercussions for relations between the EU and the ACP, especially Africa. The EPA process is too serious a matter to be left to trade specialists alone. A more strategic view of the ACP/Africa-EU relationship is vital.

## VIII. Conclusion

Few major set-piece events and deadlines are planned for 2011 that might concentrate minds and accelerate political compromises. Nevertheless, the year will be one of challenges for EU-ACP relations. It will be a year of possibility too, which offers some scope to move out of the stagnation and setbacks that have marked the recent past. This is precisely where the greatest task lies: in rising above the tendency to conduct business as usual and set a course towards a more mature and honest relationship that bridges the credibility gap.

The opportunities reside in building on the groundwork laid in 2010. The new leadership in both the EU and the ACP are settled in and have had time to find their feet and set out their ideas internally. The EEAS is established and will start to function in earnest in 2011. EU Development Commissioner Piebalgs has launched a number of consultation processes, which should provide a basis for new policy formulation during the first months of 2011. The Third Africa-EU Summit is out of the way and, while it did not provide breakthroughs in mutual understanding, it did agree on a second action plan for the JAES, which in turn provides a basis for the JAES Partnerships to advance.

On the horizon, beyond 2011, there are a number of important events and deadlines

for which to prepare. Chief among these in EU terms is the formulation of the next multi-annual EU Financial Framework for 2014 and beyond. This is always a major and protracted negotiation. On the back of the financial crisis in Europe it will likely prove more tendentious than usual. With the EEAS in place, a landmark debate can be expected on the financing of EU external action, with the new service putting forward its own ideas for the first time. One Commission proposal will be on the budgetisation of the EDF. This will reopen an old debate and launch a discussion that could last up to two and half years as on past record, EU member states are unlikely to take a decision before the closing stages of the Financial Framework discussion. That could well take it into December 2013.

In these increasingly difficult times it is hard to be optimistic about ACP-EU relations. In terms of the financial crisis in Europe, the coming year will be a defining one. Aid levels are likely to stagnate, and debate will continue on the evolution of the international development agenda and how development interrelates with other global challenges such as climate change. In such a context, the ACP Group may well find it difficult to persuade Europe to be amenable to increasing the level of the next EDF or to making other changes that it might want. Both the ACP and the EU need to reflect seriously on what is important to them in the relationship and focus their attention on the political and substantive issues at the core of these priorities. The EPA negotiations are stagnating, and there seems little prospect of them moving in the near future. Yet the longer they remain hanging, the longer they will continue to cast a long and perhaps deepening shadow over the whole relationship. This is in no one's interest. Resolving the EPA issue would remove a thorn from the relationship and allow discussions on other issues to move forward in an improved atmosphere. Thereafter, a further boost would be provided by a solid agreement to work together on one of the most difficult issues currently facing both groups. Close collaboration on climate change and the dilemma of achieving inclusive growth and development in a carbon-constrained world would be a major achievement on which to build a stronger relationship in the years ahead. This could feed into another important event on the horizon, the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development or 'Rio+20 Earth Summit'. Are both parties ready to stand up to the challenges of our time and accelerate the process of fundamentally adapting the strategies, approaches and tools of international cooperation so as to move decisively beyond aid?

## NOTES

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## List of acronyms

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific	FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization (United Nations)
AU	African Union	GNI	gross national income
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market	IMF	International Monetary Fund
COM	Commission	JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument (EU)	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
DEVCO	DG EuropeAid Development and Cooperation	ODA	official development assistance
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	PCD	policy coherence for development
EDF	European Development Fund	RECs	regional economic communities
EEAS	European External Action Service	TDCA	Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement
EP	European Parliament	UN	United Nations
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement	WTO	World Trade Organisation
EU	European Union		

## INFORMATION SOURCES

Information on ECDPM's work on ACP-EU cooperation  
[www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org)

News and resources on the JAES  
[www.europafira.net](http://www.europafira.net)

Information on ACP-EU trade issues  
[www.acp-eu-trade.org](http://www.acp-eu-trade.org)

ECDPM's weekly e-newsletter  
[www.ecdpm.org/weeklycompass](http://www.ecdpm.org/weeklycompass)

ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly  
[www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/10\\_01/default\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/10_01/default_en.htm)

ACP Secretariat  
[www.acpsec.org](http://www.acpsec.org)

African Union  
[www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org)

Official site of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy  
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[http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/index_en.htm)

European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office  
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm)

European Union Trade Issues  
[http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/index_en.htm)

European External Action Service  
<http://eeas.europa.eu>

European Parliament, Committee on Development  
[www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/deve\\_home\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/deve_home_en.htm)

Council of the European Union  
[www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/index.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/index.htm)

Lisbon Treaty  
[http://europa.eu/lisbon\\_treaty/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm)

Hungarian EU Presidency  
<http://www.eutrio.hu>

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