European Centre for Development Policy Management
ecdpm

Discussion Paper

No. 183
December 2015

Stepping up?
Best Practice in Joint Programming and Prospects for EU Joint Cooperation Strategies

by Damien Helly, Greta Galeazzi, Asmita Parshotam, Cecilia Gregersen, Willy Kokolo and Andrew Sherriff

www.ecdpm.org/dp183

Stepping up?

Best Practice in Joint Programming and Prospects for EU Joint Cooperation Strategies

Damien Helly, Greta Galeazzi, Asmita Parshotam, Cecilia Gregersen, Willy Kokolo, & Andrew Sherriff[1]

December 2015

Key messages

EU Joint Programming (JP) processes and their outcomes (such as Joint Programming Strategies) have the potential to give the EU and Member States a more effective say in international cooperation and achieve better development effectiveness. Yet, the current application of JP is uneven as it is stuck in the middle of a crossroads.

To drive Joint Programming forward the EU and its Member States need to do more homework at HQ on: 1) practical capacity 2) flexibility of instruments 3) institutional coherence 4) political interest. In the field, there needs to be a recognition that: 5) personalities matter 6) JP is possible in fragile contexts 7) engagement with national governments needs to happen at the right time and 8) collective EU political vision at the country level is necessary.

Renewed political impetus, high level leadership, prioritisation, and rebranding of EU Joint Programming into Joint Cooperation Strategies is necessary to give new stamina to the processes, while keeping the exercise locally-led and with a clear eye on adding value.

[1] With contributions from Alisa Herrero Cangas and Anna Knoll.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements vi
Acronyms vii
Executive Summary viii
1. Introduction 1
1.1. The key figures of Joint Programming in 2015: Where does JP stand? 1
1.2. Structure of this Discussion Paper 3
2. Methodology: Clarifying what Joint Programming is about 5
2.1. Typology of Joint Programming phases 5
2.2. Profiling EU Member States and institutions' behaviours 9
2.3. Clarifying key variables in country contexts 12
3. Stuck in the middle of a crossroads? Best practice and new lights on Joint Programming 14
3.1. Stuck in the middle: progress and regression in Joint Programming 14
3.2. Best practice in Joint Programming 16
3.2.1. Best practice observed at headquarters' level 17
3.2.2. Best practice observed at the country level 19
3.2.3. Best practice to pioneer 21
3.3. EU Member States and Joint Programming: need for a refresh 22
3.4. EU institutions' behaviour in Joint Programming 25
3.5. Findings on key variables in country contexts 26
3.6. Misleading intuitions on country contexts? 31
3.7. Use of Consultants 31
3.8. Key Don'ts of Joint Programming 33
3.9. Summary of main findings: JP at the crossroads 33
4. The future of Joint Programming 34
4.1. Joint Programming potential in the SDG context 35
4.2. Joint Programming and EU institutional EDF/DCI/ENI programming 36
4.3. Joint Programming and Joint Implementation 38
4.4. Monitoring Joint Programming: towards joint impact assessment tools? 40
4.5. Scenarios for the future of EU Joint Programming: 41
4.5.1. Scenario 1: EU Joint Cooperation Strategies Deliver Value 43
4.5.2. Scenario 2: Pragmatic but Less Ambitious: Stuck in the Middle 43
4.5.3. Scenario 3: A Free Riding World with Dramatically Increased Bilateralism 44
5. Conclusions and options for action: Towards Joint Cooperation Strategies 45
5.1. Options for action 46

Annex I - Member States and EU institutions profiling tables and scoring on key indicators 48
Austria and Joint Programming 48
Belgium and Joint Programming 50
Denmark and Joint Programming 52
Finland and Joint Programming 54
France and Joint Programming 56
Germany and Joint Programming 58
Ireland and Joint Programming 60
Italy and Joint Programming 62
Luxembourg and Joint Programming 64
The Netherlands and Joint Programming 66
Portugal and Joint Programming 68
Spain and Joint Programming 70
Sweden and Joint Programming 72
United Kingdom and Joint Programming 74
EU institutions and Joint Programming 76
Annex II - Mapping and profiling methodological approach 78
Research design 78
Elements of the matrix 78
Analytical matrix with scoring 78
The indicators 79
Overall coherence of the mapping 83
Scoring methodology and choices 84
Annex III - Country Case studies factsheets 85
Dealing with Context - Joint Programming Experiences in Ghana 85
EU Joint Programming in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 86
Annex IV - Indicative Interview questionnaires (profiling & country specific) 89
Indicative interview questionnaire for profiling 89
Indicative interview questionnaire (country specific) 90
Bibliography 93

List of Boxes

Box 1: Best practice and lessons learnt: Cambodia 18
Box 2: Best practice and lessons learnt: Occupied Palestinian Territories 22
Box 3: Lessons learnt: Bolivia 26
Box 4: Joint Programming in Ghana 30

Box 5: The Don'ts of Joint Programming 33
Box 6: Joint implementation diversity at sector level 39
Box 7: Monitoring Joint Programming: Cambodia 40

List of Figures

Figure 1: EU Joint Programming – Key Figures 2015 3
Figure 2: Typology of Joint Programming phases 9
Figure 3: Country contexts and what they mean for Joint Programming 13
Figure 4: Which country process in which phase? 16
Figure 5: Member States and EU institutions in Joint Programming: profiling 24
Figure 6: Is this a conducive environment for JP? 30
Figure 7: Joint Programming and Joint Implementation 39

List of Tables

Table 1: Number of partner countries where an EU Member States is involved in EU Joint Programming ... 2
Table 2: Variety of Joint Programming definitions 5
Table 3: Profiling behaviour towards Joint Programming 11

Acknowledgements

This study was initiated by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)'s Strengthening European External Action Programme. The research has also benefitted from engagement from key current and former EEAS and DEVCO officials with direct responsibility for Joint Programming. We are grateful for feedback received on an earlier draft of this report also from the Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs who co-sponsored this work.

Special thanks also go to Annette Powell for providing excellent support in layout and production of this document and Stéphane Bonnet at DP Consultants for supporting work on infographics.

ECDPM would also like to thank the over 50 people in member states Ministries' and agencies, partner governments, and other stakeholders including those located in countries visited for this study who were generous with their time and forthright with their opinions. It was part of ECDPM's methodology to do this anonymously so they cannot be listed in person, but we are extremely grateful for the time given.

All opinions expressed in this ECDPM Discussion Paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to ECDPM or any other agency.

ECDPM welcomes feedback on this Discussion Paper No. 183 which in the first instance can be directed to Dr Damien Helly, Deputy Head of the Strengthening European External Action Programme, who led the research process. ECDPM e-mail: dhe@ecdpm.org

In addition to structural support by ECDPM's institutional partners Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland this work also benefited from additional support from Directorate-General for International Cooperation of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Acronyms

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AMICI	Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	DG International Cooperation and Development
DE	Germany
DG	Directorate-General
DK	Denmark
DP	Development Partner
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FI	Finland
FR	France
GOE	Government of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HoC	Head of Cooperation
HoMs	Heads of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
JP	Joint Programming
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MIP	Multilateral Indicative Programme
MS	Member State of the European Union
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NEAR	DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
VC	Video Conference

Executive Summary

In a more globalised and competitive world the need for more effective international and development cooperation has only become more urgent and consequences of inaction more apparent. To meet the recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) all actors including EU actors will have to 'raise their game' to work together better. The **European Union's institutions and services and its Member States**, have the potential to have a **stronger influence in international cooperation because of Joint Programming** (JP).[2] With a more systematic adoption and application of Joint Programming documents in partner countries, as the result of JP processes, they could be even stronger. **Rebranded as Joint Cooperation Strategies, JP would fit well under the 2016 EU Global Strategy and a revised European Consensus on Development** matching the new global agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite a waning interest in the application of development effectiveness principles, JP could also help addressing long identified and persistent challenges in the external action of the EU and its Member States.

Joint Programming already has a proven track record: it is a unique vehicle for the EU and its Member States to implement development effectiveness principles, the Lisbon Treaty vision and commitments on the EU's more coherent role in the world and offers promise for the new SDG agenda. If undertaken in a strategic way, JP merges, in a flexible and adaptive fashion, aid effectiveness principles methods to achieve universal development objectives with attempts to give Europe a stronger collective influence in increasingly competitive global affairs. Many Member States (but not all of them) and EU institutions have already endorsed and committed to this strategic vision. Yet application of it varies. **There is some fatigue with Joint Programming and significant need for revitalised political support for this modality**. Some Member States doubt its benefits or 'return on investment', misinterpreting its transformative power or being simply disillusioned by the EU institutions' instrumental rigidity which they see as not empowering JP.

ECDPM in this research has **sought to simplify the meaning of Joint Programming** process by dividing it into 5 phases:
Phase 1: Debates on whether or not embarking on Joint Programming.
Phase 2: Adoption of joint roadmap to Joint Programming.
Phase 3: Adoption of a Joint Programming strategy.
Phase 4: Implementation of a Joint Programming strategy.
Phase 5: Adjustments to future Joint Programing.

ECDPM analysis shows that:
Four years after its most recent launch, **JP has not met its full potential and needs to be vigorously refreshed by its rebranding into Joint Cooperation Strategies** because:

- Only one third (20 out of 55) of the envisaged partner countries have seen the adoption by the EU family of a Joint Programming strategy.[3]
- In another third, Europeans are still blocked by policy dilemma or hampered by intractable local contexts meaning that they are stuck in phase 1.
- In the rest, they are still trying or pretending to be successful (phase 2).
- Joint monitoring and joint implementation as a result of recent Joint Programming strategies (phases 4 and 5) only occurred in Kenya and Cambodia.

[2] In this Discussion Paper, Joint Programming and JP are used interchangeably.
[3] N.B. based on data retrieved during the first half of 2015.

In analysing **where there has been success in JP there is some key insight** to **enabling environments** both **within EU Member States** and **in the context of the country** itself.

EU Member States and EU Institutions have themselves to create an enabling environment for Joint Programming and particularly on four key aspects of: 1) practical capacity, 2) instrumental flexibility, 3) institutional coherence, and 4) political interest. When EU Member States are serious about putting in place the right procedures internally (which have a lot to do with administrative flexibility, delegation of powers to field offices and dedicated and motivated staff), they can become effective Joint Programming champions. When they fail to do so, their national/HQ apparatus does not really enable joint programming or at worst becomes a hurdle. Our comparative profiling of these four aspects shows that each Member State has something to improve and work on to better promote and enable Joint Programming, possibly also by learning from each others' best practice.

The EU institutions and services (DEVCO and EEAS) play a central role in Joint Programming. Obviously EU Delegations perform better when they are sufficiently staffed. There is hope for JP when EU Delegations act as champions in a sensitive manner. **Yet when EU institutions do not apply Joint Programming to their own cooperation programming, including at critical junctures when they review their programming priorities, it jeopardises the whole credibility and success of the process**. Despite good and dedicated work done at the technical level inside DEVCO and the EEAS without clarity on its prioritisation amongst the senior management there can be little progress. Indeed we also indicate in our profiling of EU institutions that there is work to be done particularly on instrumental flexibility and practical capacity but also institutional coherence and, to a lesser extent, political interest.

ECDPM's research indicates that **Member States are interested in Joint Programming when it decreases their transaction costs, does not threaten their bilateral cooperation objectives and gives them more influence**. Some Member States (particularly France and Germany among others) have clearly managed to take advantage of JP. Member States with less diplomatic presence and staff and fewer development funds may at times feel quite frustrated with and even worried about the implications of Joint Programming. Even more so when they see EU institutions imposing their own priorities in "Brussels language" or being unable to efficiently deliver in the step of actual joint implementation.

That different country contexts influence the success of Joint Programming is perhaps unsurprising but ECDPM research gives some clues as to why this is specifically. **The national context in developing and transition countries is essential in Joint Programming** for at least four reasons:

1. First, **personalities matter**. The presence, departure or negative attitude of a single individual or a certain groups within the European Heads of Cooperation in a country can make a real positive or negative difference in JP processes. Getting buy-in and an Esprit de Corps among key personalities on the value of JP is crucial.
2. Second, **JP can work in all contexts except when the situation is simply too much in an immediate crisis situation**. Our research found that Joint Programming is both possible and desirable even in a fragile context as long as there is a minimum level of stability.
3. Third, **there is actually no need for the partner government to be on board at the very start** of a Joint Programming process. However, and importantly there is no way to adopt a Joint Programming strategy without timely and politically sensitive consultations and policy dialogue with partner authorities.
4. Fourth, Joint Programming's success relies on a shared consensus (if not unanimity) amongst Europeans about its political rationale at the country level (preferably amongst the Heads of

Mission (EU HoMs). This local **political vision is as necessary as any contribution JP may bring to existing international and development cooperation coordination frameworks** or achievement of development effectiveness principles.

ECDPM's research indicates that the best practices in the box below greatly facilitate Joint Programming.

Key best practices identified that can make Joint Programming happen

1. **Sustained political commitment** and clear direction and prioritisation from EU institution and Member State leadership.
2. **Dedicated staff** in the EU institutions and Member States capitals with advisory and support role.
3. Flexibility, **context-sensitivity and specificity in the application of EU Joint Programming** while promoting a shared understanding of the process.
4. **Monitoring EU Joint Programming progress with updates** from the country offices and overall monitoring from headquarters.
5. Promotion of **EU Joint Programming via technical and regional seminars, consultants and facilitators.**
6. **Identifying windows of opportunity** to re-launch the process when it is stuck.
7. Leadership and **commitment by the EU Delegations.**
8. **Acknowledgemen**t that **the "division of labour" and synchronisation would never be perfect** and clean but should be realistic and pragmatic.
9. **Adequate empowerment of and incentives to human resources** in the field and in the capitals (at MS and EUD level).
10. **Promote buy-in by MS and pooling of resources** by dividing tasks (e.g. drafting of JP documents, analysis, sectors leads, etc.) among a select task group.
11. **Invest in quality policy dialogue** to identify the national partners' potential interests in JP at the right time.
12. Promote consensus within non-EU donors (and other donors groupings) that Joint Programming, while being an EU process, brings added value to international coordination and aid effectiveness in the country.
13. **Independent, neutral and informed facilitation of JP retreats** and dialogue between EU Member States and the EU Delegation.
14. **Efficient decentralisation / deconcentration of power to the field level** by involving as appropriate the country desks.

EU Joint Programming currently stands at a crossroads. ECDPM has identified three possible scenarios for its future. Firstly, a reinvigoration phase to assist on JP delivering on its potential through its rebranding into Joint Cooperation Strategies and its progressive merge with other programming exercises; secondly, more of the same, meaning patchy progress and some potential but overall remaining stuck in the middle of a crossroads; or thirdly an increasing bilateralism with the EU institutions and its Member States tending to work less together than in the past with resultant loss of both EU influence and progress on development effectiveness principles and therefore results.

If the collective ambition of the EU is still to work better together and achieve development effectiveness then a more systematic adoption and application of rebranded Joint Programming Strategies in partner countries offers potential. **In 2016, Joint Cooperation Strategies could replace Joint Programming as an essential tool** for the EU to enhance its international cooperation and external action. Joint Cooperation Strategies would fit well under the 2016 EU Global Strategy and a revised European Consensus on Development matching and assisting the delivery of a global agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite a waning interest in the application of development effectiveness principles JP could also help addressing long identified and persistent problems committed to by the EU and its Member States.

For this to happen, ECDPM's research would point to a number of potential initiatives that could be undertaken by the upcoming EU Presidency of the Netherlands and throughout 2016.

- Under the leadership of the High Representative/Vice President and Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, **inclusion of Joint Cooperation Strategies as a priority in the upcoming 2016 EU Global Strategy**, a revised European Consensus on Development and other relevant sub-strategies. Adoption of new Council conclusions (or more ambitiously a Council decision) on Joint Cooperation Strategies (replacing the wording "Joint Programming"), with an action plan reflecting changes induced by the 2030 SDG agenda.

- **Renewed public commitment made by Member States and EU institutions** to systematically mutualise joint analyses, adopt Joint Cooperation Strategies. **Merge Joint Programming with programming** processes taking advantage of specific opportunities to adopt more flexibility in Mid-Term review of European Financial Instruments upcoming in 2017, and even the discussions that will begin on the next EU financial instruments post-2020.

- **Member States and EU institutions looking at the DG level** at what kind of homework and change is feasible to make progress on practical capacity, instrumental flexibility, institutional coherence and what would revive political interest in Joint Programming/Joint Cooperation Strategies in their own organisations.

- Specific and early policy thought and operational direction on **how Joint Programming can assist in delivering an effective division of labour and a more strategic EU approach to achieve the SDGs**. This needs to occur at the EU institution and EU member state headquarter level as the policy and institutional implications of SDG agenda are currently being thought through. A first seminar bringing together SDG and JP technical experts could be organised.

- Inclusion of **Joint Cooperation Strategies seminars in the rotating EU Presidency agenda** to socialise the concept and engage relevant staff more frequently.

- Increased investment in joint contracting of external consultants whose assignments would primarily be to ease, as impartial facilitators, joint programming/Joint Cooperation Strategy processes at country level, and providing administrative support, rather than on substituting EU and Member States' staff obligations and roles.

- **Capitalise on lessons learnt evaluations of Joint Programming** recently launched by EU institutions.

- **Set-up of a virtual lessons learned mechanism on Joint Cooperation Strategies hosted by the accessible EC administered Capacity4Dev web-page platform** to strengthen communication on their benefits and on joint implementation.

- **Promote co-working on Joint Programming documents through secure web platforms** to make such processes less bureaucratic, more efficient and user-friendly.

1. Introduction

Joint Programming is a process through which the European Commission (EC), the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Member States and other relevant EU bodies (all described here as EU family)[4] jointly determine a development response strategy for a particular partner country and draft a joint country strategy document, ideally to be used in lieu of bilateral country strategies. The process also involves decisions on 'who does what' through a division of labour of sectors among donors which takes into account the EU donors' commitments to concentrate their aid in a maximum of three sectors in each developing country they choose to support. It was originally agreed back in 2005. Joint modalities for delivering aid, including pooled funds, co-financing or delegated cooperation, are not necessarily part of the Joint Programming exercise.[5]

The concept was mentioned in the European Consensus on Development (2005)[6] and in the Council Conclusions on the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (2009)[7] and was already trialled in Haiti (2010)[8] and South Sudan (2011).[9] EU Member States emphasised EU Joint Programming as a means to contribute to the internationally-agreed aid effectiveness goals[10] in the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union for the 2011 Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness. They also mention it in their endorsement, in May 2012, of the EU's policy framework for EU development and cooperation.[11]

Joint Programming is being promoted as it is seen as a modality that can contribute to the implementation of the development effectiveness agenda[12] and a unique and specific EU commitments to realising the 2005 Paris and 2011 Busan Declarations and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.

More than three years after its latest official launch in 2011 and following experiments by EU institutions and Member States in over 50 countries, this study provides and independent stock taking of lessons learnt from the latest phase of attempts at EU Joint Programming (JP).[13]

1.1. The key figures of Joint Programming in 2015: Where does JP stand?[14]

In total, the possibility to start JP has been considered in 55 countries, most of which (26) are in Africa. Joint Programming has also been foreseen in a number of Asian (10) and Latin American and Caribbean (7) countries, together with 12 Neighbourhood (South and East) and Middle Eastern countries. The list of countries also includes one Pacific country, Timor Leste. Nine non-EU organisations are also currently part

[4] EU family", in this Discussion Paper, encompasses EU institutions and bodies (including the European Investment Bank), EU Member States institutions and agencies (including development agencies, or other bodies working at arm's length from government with some legitimacy to be involved in Joint Programming), independent consultants recruited by EU institutions and Member States and other European stakeholders involved in Joint Programming processes.

[5] Galeazzi, G., Helly, D., and Krätke, F. 2013. All for one or free-for-all? Early experiences in EU Joint Programming (ECDPM Briefing Note 50). This study benefits from financial support of ECDPM institutional donors with additional resources from Netherlands.

[6] Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union. 2006.

[7] See Council of the EU (2009).

[8] See République d'Haïti – Union Européenne (2012).

[9] See South Sudan (2011-2013).

[10] See Council of the EU (2011).

[11] See European Commission (2011).

[12] See OECD (2005).

[13] The original commitment to Joint Programming predates 2011 with some coming back as far as 1970s.

[14] Key figures are based on data retrieved in the first half of 2015.

of Joint Programming**.** Out of 55 countries, 31 have seen the creation of a joint roadmap towards JP, joint analysis took place in 23 of them, and joint strategies have been achieved in 20 cases.[15] Brussels-based EU institutions have promoted Joint Programming by providing guidance to EU Delegations and Member States and by organising technical and regional seminars with them. However, EU Delegations and Member States' offices and embassies have been the ones leading the actual exercise in partner countries.

Most of the JP endeavours have involved the same dozen of EU Member States who are traditional ODA donors. Table 1 summarises the number of partner countries where a given Member State is involved in JP. Our study specifically focused on fourteen of them on the basis of their participation in JP.[16]

Table 1: Number of partner countries where an EU Member States is involved in EU Joint Programming

Ranking	EU Member State(s)	Number of partner countries where involved in EU JP
1	France	46
2	Germany	42
3	Italy	31
4	United Kingdom	27
5	Sweden	22
6	Denmark	20
7	Netherlands	18
8	Belgium / Spain	17
9	Ireland	13
10	Hungary	12
11	Finland	11
12	Poland / Austria	10
13	Czech Republic / Luxembourg / Slovakia / Romania	9
14	Lithuania	5
15	Estonia / Latvia / Portugal	3
16	Slovenia	1
17	All other EU members (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Malta)	0

Data retrieved in the first half of 2015, Source: EU's JP Tracker.

[15] Overall JP information was extracted and processed early 2015 from the EU Joint Programming Tracker data. The Joint Programming Tracker is a living tool set up by EU institutions to trace progress in Joint Programming processes. Most of the data on EU Member States profiling was processed in Spring 2015 with some adjustments in November 2015. Data on Ghana and Occupied Palestinian Territories was collected during field missions in September 2015 and October 2015. Earlier data came from previous research done in 2013 on Joint Programming, and a mission to Tanzania and Ethiopia (November-December 2014). Data on Cambodia and Bolivia was collected via remote interviews over the summer of 2015. Due to the fluid nature of the data collection process and of Joint Programming processes, figures provided here indicate main trends rather than immutable facts. A few JP processes in individual countries might have evolved slightly.

[16] Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Figure 1: EU Joint Programming – Key Figures 2015



Against such background, this **study addresses the following questions**:

- Do all European JP stakeholders have the same understanding of it?
- Has the process led to a more joined-up EU approach in development cooperation?
- Have EU institutions and Member States made efforts commensurate to their commitments?
- What did EU institutions and Member States learn from the past four years and did some best practices emerge from experiences in more than 50 countries?
- What are the key incentives and disincentives for EU institutions and Member States to engage or not in Joint Programming?
- Is there a future for this practice, and if there is, what should be done about it?

1.2. Structure of this Discussion Paper

In the **next and second chapter**, **we build up a methodological framework** to better understand Joint Programming and to analyse it more thoroughly. We created a generic and archetypical tool to clarify what Joint Programming is: a sequenced, yet not necessarily linear in practice, typology showing the key stages of a Joint Programming process (including risks of regression and variety in approaches). Another knowledge gap to tackle concerned Member States' and EU institutions overall attitudes towards JP, beyond anecdotal stories from country cases. To bridge this gap, we made the choice of building up a comparative profiling tool providing a quick overview of a number of the most active European governments' (and EU institutions') behaviours vis-à-vis JP. The purpose of the tool is to better inform Member States and the EU institutions on the space for improvement in their own national systems.

Thirdly, since there was little data on the real impact of country contexts on JP, we decided to document it further to address clichés and prejudices. The case studies offer also a strong basis for lessons learnt, informing the future of Joint Programming.

The **third chapter** provides readers with **key findings obtained by using our analytical toolbox**. It starts with an overview of progress made in since early 2012 and a dozen best practices in Joint Programming. To explain incentives and disincentives towards Joint Programming, the second part of the chapter zooms in EU Member States and EU institutions profiling, showing that EU institutions and each Member State can learn from others' experience and specificities. Joint Programming needs to be refreshed and EU institutions will have to walk the talk for the modality to remain attractive to Member States. In return, Member States have to deliver on this process themselves. Lessons learnt from country case studies are available in this chapter. The last sections of the chapter clarify what really matters for Joint Programming in country contexts and the role of external consultants. It concludes by stating that JP is at a crossroads.

Filling these knowledge gaps was necessary to refresh minds and think ahead in the **fourth chapter**. **We narrowed down a number of key factors for the future of JP, and built-up three scenarios** to sketch out the options for policy-makers who think Joint Programming (or Joint Cooperation Strategies, as we suggest it to be renamed) should still be a priority for external action and the EU's collective development cooperation in the context of the Agenda 2030. **The conclusions and options for future action can be found in in the fifth chapter.**

2. Methodology: Clarifying what Joint Programming is about

This chapter presents the methodological framework used in this Discussion Paper. It provides a simplified typology of phases in Joint Programming, focuses on the profiling of behaviours towards Joint Programming, and frames assumptions on the key variables influencing Joint Programming in a given country.

2.1. Typology of Joint Programming phases

Joint Programming is commonly defined by the 2014 *EU Guidance Pack* as a process comprising a set of elements to be developed along a policy making sequence. However, no single Joint Programming process model has been developed by EU institutions so as to respect the specificity of each country context.

An overview of available definitions of Joint Programming displays a diversity of interpretations of what it is. Some definitions (such as in the EU JP Guidance pack of 2014) are explicitly on development cooperation while others do not specify the nature of cooperation (beyond development aid). There are nuances in the meaning of Joint Programming as compared to Joint Programmes: the 2011 study by Benfield and O'Riordan refers to the EU definition of a joint programme as including joint implementation. Other definitions (for instance in the French guidelines) focus on the strategic and comprehensive nature of the approach.[17]

Table 2: Variety of Joint Programming definitions

	JP definition	Stages	Key components	Stakeholders
EU Common Position for 2011 Busan Forum	"process whereby the EU takes strategic decisions based on a comprehensive view of European and other donors' support to a given partner country"	- joint analysis, joint response - division of labour - indicative financial allocation	- respect sovereign choice of Member States - JP is kept simple and pragmatic - The EU is the driving force	-- Partner country - EU institutions - EU Member States - Like-minded non-EU donors
EU JP guidance pack 2014	- joint planning of development cooperation by the EU and development partners - does not replace DPs bilateral programming docs	joint strategy (broad) - joint analysis - joint response - framework for monitoring	- division of labour - indicative financial commitments - synchronisation	- Partner country + CSOs/PS - EUD - EUMS embassies - Like-minded non-EU donors
2011 study by Benfield & O'Riordan	"A joint programme, as defined by the EU (see Commitments section below), involves the EU donors operating in a given country undertaking a joint country analysis and then formulating and implementing a		- a commitment by donors to agree, at the same time and for the period of the national development strategy, the specific contributions that each will make to that strategy - a change to donors' existing bilateral strategies and cycles a clear division of labour between donors	

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Finance, Lignes directrices aux postes sur l'implication de la France dans la programmation conjointe, 2014.

	common programme of support on the basis of this, aligned behind the government's national plan and timetable" (p. 14)		- specific details on what is going to change and the new rules that are going to be applied - signature at donors' headquarters level to lock in the agreed commitments	
French guidelines	- cf. Busan 2011 = a process whereby the EU takes strategic decisions based on a comprehensive view of European and other donors' support to a given partner country - meant to replace bilateral programming document	variable forms but common items: - joint analysis - joint response - progressively towards joint implementation	- division of labour - indicative financial commitments	- wary of non-EU DPs' involvement for fear they would blur EU's message
German guidelines		- joint analysis - joint response	- DoL - objectives and results - indicative financial allocation - synchronisation	- partner country - EUMS - non-EU donors
Danish guidelines	- cf. Busan 2011 = a process through which the EU jointly determines a joint development response strategy for a particular partner country and drafts a joint strategy document, ideally to replace bilateral country strategies	- joint analysis - joint response - possibly joint results framework - no joint implementation, but JP paves the way for it	- DoL - synchronisation - indicative financial allocations	- other donors - partner country - EUMS - CSOs and private sector
Swedish guidelines	No definition, but stated commitment to JP, and mention to "EU joint programmes"			

Not all definitions clearly specify the various stages of the Joint Programming process in the same way. The Guidance Pack provides the most recent detailed understanding of the Joint Programming phases which, contrary to the 2011 JP study, does not encompass joint implementation. In certain interviews, some experts actually deem the distinction between Joint Programming and joint implementation as a "non-issue" since, according to them, the ultimate goal of JP is precisely to implement jointly.[18]

Yet, despite existing efforts towards Joint Programming, some confusion still remains in the minds of many regarding financial commitments made by Member States in the framework of Joint Programming strategies. Existing guidance states that financial commitments should be indicative. However some Member State representatives fear for their aid budgets to be cut if they have to delay or shorten their disbursements – thereby contradicting their national obligations - because of imposed synchronisation of programming cycles. While some consultants directly involved in facilitating JP clearly argue in favour of disconnecting strategic sector prioritisation from binding budgetary commitments, this possibility has not yet been widely understood.[19]

[18] Interview with JP consultant, 17/07/2015.
[19] Interview with JP consultant, 14/07/2015, Interview with European official in HQs, 02/10/2015.

The time span or shelf-life of a Joint Programming strategy is also quite confusing for practitioners and Member States development agents working overseas: some JP strategies are, in reality, either a snapshot of the current EU donor division of labour, or a vision of its future, or both. This diversity of interpretations has contributed to some misunderstandings or misinterpretation among JP stakeholders. While a JP strategy provides the EU family with a compass, there are many roads leading to joint implementation, and applying Joint Programming is a constantly evolving and non-linear exercise.

There is no one size-fits-all template to steer Joint Programming, and presenting it only as a linear process leading practitioners, along a top-down thread, from strategy to implementation, comprises potential misinterpretation. Practice has shown that Joint Programming is equally undertaken bottom-up: in Kenya, current joint endeavours or sector-based activities were taken as the starting point for JP processes.[20] The same approach has been adopted in the occupied Palestinian territories.[21]

The **absence of rigid Joint Programming models** and templates to follow **is a guarantee for flexibility**, as mentioned very early in the JP process.[22] As a consequence, while in many countries JP discussions progressed in various ways, **it became more and more difficult to keep track of the overall process**. The creation of a Joint Programming Tracker[23] brought interesting results but does not meet all monitoring needs.

Monitoring progress in Joint Programming is possible if the understanding of the process is clarified and simplified. To that end, the **study team created a flowchart summarising JP processes in 5 main phases numbered from 1 to 5**, associated with simple monitoring indicators. We used information gained from the JP tracker (information updated as at December 2014/early 2015), various Head of Mission (HoMs) reports, and information gained from interviews to map the progress across partner countries where JP discussions have taken place. Between each phase, European policy makers and senior operational staff have to make decision at critical junctures on whether to pursue Joint Programming towards the next phase.

Importantly, the methodology behind the typology of phases reflects, according to our information, the most current phase in a partner country.[24] As such, if JP in a given country is recognized as being in stage four of Joint Programming, it is assumed that the previous three stages were successfully completed, yet the process may also have stagnated (if not regressed) for some months. **We have identified five phases for Joint Programming**, as detailed in Figure 2:

- In **Phase 1** stakeholders **get to know Joint Programming and make the decision to embark or not** on the process.
- In **Phase 2** usually the EU Delegation and some Member States start working on a **methodology, roadmap and a joint analysis**. Joint analysis may include a bottom-up mapping of existing joint implementation initiatives. They often hire consultants to be supported in this phase, but not always.
- In **Phase 3** the stakeholders work to move from a **joint analysis to a Joint Programming strategy/document**. This phase may comprise several stages till the adoption of a joint strategy.

[20] EU Heads of Missions Progress Report for oPT, Interview with JP consultant, 17/07/2015.
[21] See case study on Occupied Palestinian Territories in annexes.
[22] Joint Multi-Annual Programming: Final Report. Herts: HTSPE, 2011.
[23] The Joint Programming Tracker is a living tool set up by EU institutions to trace progress in Joint Programming processes.
[24] This is also the methodology used for countries where the JP tracker provides information such as “follow up with field offices”. Where this information exists, together with other information from HoMs reports, preference is given to the HoMs report, and such countries are categorised according to the most recent phase in Joint Programming activities instead. Recent HoMs reports processed by EU institutions over summer 2015 could not be consulted.

- In **Phase 4** the **Joint Programming document starts to be implemented**, aligned with the partner government's national development strategy and in synchronisation with its programming cycle. This phase may consist of revolving exercises of joint planning, joint implementation including monitoring mechanisms, depending on the local context and the degree of advancement.
- **Phase 5** is the **future of Joint Programming with the potential to transform** it into a variety of new processes, initiatives or phases including institutionalisation, merging with EU programming phases, etc.

Figure 2: Typology of Joint Programming phases



2.2. Profiling EU Member States and institutions' behaviours

Joint Programming exercises **imply significant internal changes** within national and EU development policy and planning systems at all levels. To better understand how EU Member States and institutions have reacted/adjusted towards JP and whether they have incorporated changes in their administrative systems and behaviour, **we identified 18 indicators split into 4 main dimensions** relating to political commitments, institutional coherence, instrumental flexibility and practical capacity. The list of indicators associated to each dimension is presented below. A note presenting the approach, choices and limitations of this methodology is available in the annexes.

The **profiling approach** offers a number of advantages. It **allows comparisons between Member States on the basis of common criteria**; however, national situations are so diverse that it would be inappropriate to speak of a level playing field. There are limitations to quantifying complex policy processes; yet, the profiling aims to present simple and user-friendly ways to ease policy interpretations and decisions. The profiling is therefore an indicative tool to aid discussion and analysis but is not the definitive interpretation of where Joint Programming 'is' within each partner country. This would be a more substantial piece of work that this study allowed.

The use of infographics and the presentation of all Member States in Figure 5, page 24 provides an overview and stimulates all stakeholders to think of singularities, similarities, differences and common challenges.

Table 3: Profiling behaviour towards Joint Programming

Dimensions	Sub-dimensions	Indicators	
P *Political interest (5)*	**P.1** *Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)*	**P.1.1** *Explicit commitment to JP (1)*	
		P.1.2 *Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)*	
	P.2 *Internal instructions / guidelines (1)*	**P.2.1** *Existence of a document with JP guidelines / instructions (1)*	
	P.3 *Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)*	**P.3.1** *Political statement about EU JP as a power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)*	
		P.3.2 *Successful / effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)*	
I *Institutional coherence (5)*	**I.1** *Internal coherence at HQ (2)*	**I.1.1** *Existence of a focal person for JP in HQs (1)*	
		I.1.2 *Existence of coordination practices within HQs (1)*	
	I.2 *Coherence between HQs/and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)*	**I.2.1** *Existence of an established decentralisation / deconcentration policy on JP (1)*	
		I.2.2 *Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)*	
If *Instrumental flexibility (5)*	**If.1** *Flexibility in combining the priority sectors and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)*	**If.1.1** *Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)*	
	If.2 *Possible use of a JP document for bilateral programming (1)*	*Reference to JP in bilateral programming documents*	**If.2.1** either/or *(1)*
		JP as "umbrella" document	
		Substitution of bilateral programming document with JP document	
	If.3 *Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)*	**If.3.1** *Synchronisation with the partner country's cycle(1)*	
		If.3.2 *Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)*	
Pr *Practical*	**Pr.1** *Training & knowledge management policy on*	**Pr.1.1** *National trainings, seminar / modules organised*	

capacity (5)	*JP (3)*	*(1)*
		Pr.1.2 *Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)*
		Pr.1.3 *Contribution to EU & member states technical /regional seminars (1)*
	Pr.2 *Human resources (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)*	**Pr.2.1** *Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)*
		Pr.2.2 *Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)*

2.3. Clarifying key variables in country contexts

This section examines how country contexts influence Joint Programming. Since its inception, JP has been an EU-driven endeavour for the purposes of internal coherence and enhancing aid effectiveness. Our comparative profiling of EU and Member States institutions' behaviour towards JP focuses on the domestic or internal dimension of "Joint Programming making". The country context in which JP occurs is understood in this study as an external variable that strongly influences EU institutions and Member States' attitude towards Joint Programing in very specific circumstances that are the combination of local and international factors, including policy dialogue with partner governments.

There are **two main sets of variables** (summarised in Figure 3 below) influencing the undertaking of Joint Programming in partner countries: the behaviour of EU (and international) donors on the one hand, and the country environment (more or less conducive) on the other.

Figure 3: Country contexts and what they mean for Joint Programming



Firstly, the **collective behaviour (and potential leadership) of the EU family itself** - EU institutions and Member States - towards JP essentially results from a set of conditions related to **political interests, institutional coherence, instrumental flexibility and practical capacities** that we examined in our analysis of EU Member States and EU institutions' attitude towards JP.[25]

Secondly, this study aimed at identifying the main factors in the partner **country's environment** that actually influenced progress in Joint Programming. We considered six potential factors in the country environment that could have influenced progress in Joint Programming:

1. The level of stability allowing international cooperation to happen.
2. The partner government's political behaviour towards Joint Programing.
3. The status of Middle-Income-Country or the level of aid dependence.
4. The size of donor's aid budgets.
5. The number of European donors present in a country.
6. The relation between the EU family and wider donor coordination frameworks.

[25] Incentives and disincentives resulting from differences in programming procedures between the EU and Member States (timing, programming for results vs. programming in sectors, different sector definitions) are not treated here.

3. Stuck in the middle of a crossroads? Best practice and new lights on Joint Programming

This chapter presents the findings of the study, based on the methodology presented in chapter 2: typology of phases and incentives for EU institutions and Member States. It **first emphasises, through a review of best practices, how Joint Programming can be successful in achieving the adoption of a joint strategy** in a given partner country. The second section provides a comparative **overview of Member States' individual behaviour towards JP** and then extracts some learning about EU institutions' role in JP as well. The third section focuses on the **key factors of a country environment** that influence Joint Programming, challenging pre-conceived ideas in that matter. The following section looks at the specific role – in particular impartial facilitation - played by external consultants in Joint Programming. The final section, **by using the typology of Joint Programming phases**, summarises to what extent progress was made in JP up until now in 55 partner countries.

3.1. Stuck in the middle: progress and regression in Joint Programming

Joint Programming processes across partner countries differ greatly. Not only are processes in partner countries divided between the **five phases** detailed in figure 4 below but, in addition, there are some processes that have experienced lack of progress, or even a regression.

Phase 5 is the most advanced stage in Joint Programming processes, and JP processes **have reached this stage in two countries: Kenya and Cambodia**. In Kenya, the EU family seem to have reached the joint implementation stage[26] of Joint Programming, whilst in Cambodia, JP is already at the stage of reviewing the first annual monitoring for the implementation of Joint Programming within the country. This marks a very interesting development for the typology of phases, as the monitoring mechanisms and processes in Cambodia should hopefully offer some insight into potential best practices and offer some guidance for other partner countries on the "dos and don'ts" for Joint Programming at stage four and five.

Phase 3 can be understood as the most intermediate of phases, whereby **the EU and its Member States have a draft or finalised joint strategy in place in around 20 partner countries**, but are yet to begin Joint Programming implementation. Although it is encouraging to see that many countries are at phase 3, the real challenge for Joint Programming in the immediate future would be to implement these joint strategy documents. In comparison, phase 4 refers to measures taken towards implementation of Joint Programming processes, and the use of Joint Programming analysis and strategies. For instance the EU and France have already engaged in joint implementation in the governance sector in the Comoros. In Ethiopia, the EU and Member States have started Joint Programming implementation in specific sectors such as nutrition and food security.

Moreover, our research showed that there were (i) a number of countries where HoMs' discussions have led to Joint Programming not being embarked upon in certain places (such as Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe), and (ii) regression and/or halting in JP processes in some countries, despite HoMs reports from 2012 or 2013 initially citing a country environment as ready for Joint Programming in the near future. In addition, JP activities had been delayed owing to a change of personnel previously engaged on JP (as partially the case in Ghana). Regression in processes has most often occurred as a result of rising civil

[26] For an explanation of what is joint implementation please refer to section 4.3.

unrest within a country. States that have suffered from a regression in JP activities include Egypt,[27] Somalia, and Libya. In particular, South Sudan is a telling case study: originally well on track for Joint Programming, a joint strategy had been completed as early as 2011, for the period 2011 to 2013. The second joint strategy was meant to align with the 2013-2016 national development plan; however, subsequent domestic political instabilities have prevented JP in South Sudan from progressing further, and all Joint Programming activities have been placed on hold until the country stabilises. Similarly, the JP tracker reveals that in some countries "follow up in field offices" is required.[28]

[27] Specifically, our research shows that Burkina Faso, Egypt, Libya, Malawi, South Sudan (for period 2013-2016), and Timor Leste are all countries that have experienced a halting in their envisaged joint programming processes because of domestic civil unrest.

[28] These include: Haiti, Sierra Leone, and the Philippines. These are countries for which this indicator ("follow up with field offices") is the only information we have for them.

Figure 4: Which country process in which phase?



3.2. Best practice in Joint Programming

Of course, despite difficulties and challenges present in Joint Programming processes, this does not mean that important lessons and positive impacts have not been observed. Indeed, there are a number of key best practices that this report identifies. We have identified these **best practices** as measures that have been **taken or implemented at two levels: at headquarter level** and at **partner country level**. In addition, there are also a number of other practices that EU Member States could look towards implementing, in order to further ensure the better implementation of Joint Programming processes.

The best practices need to be contextualised in the overall fact that EU Joint Programming is – and needs to be understood as – a process. Outputs like the joint strategy lose meaning if they do not express the results of a deep consultation and actually have real ownership otherwise they can merely be paper exercises. Therefore time, communication, dialogue, and strategic vision are key elements for undertaking EU Joint Programming in a sound manner.[29]

[29] Acknowledged in numerous interviews in Palestine and in the Country Joint Programming Factsheet, Regional workshop on Joint Programming for Asia, April 2015.

3.2.1. Best practice observed at headquarters' level

1. **Sustained political commitment and clear direction and prioritisation from EU institution and Member State leadership** that trickles down to the operational level and continued visibility for EU Joint Programming. Knowledge of the political commitments of the EU and Member States about JP is quite widely shared. Technical and regional (East and West Africa) seminars organised by the EEAS, DEVCO and like-minded Member States (Germany, Sweden, Belgium) are a case in point: they targeted staff both at headquarters and field level, gathering staff with different responsibilities and knowledge of Joint Programming. Another example of best practice in this realm also includes political commitment from HQ level - for example, holding regular meetings with staff HQ level and regular meetings with field office staff located across the various partner countries.

2. **Dedicated staff in the EU institutions and Member States capitals with advisory and support role**. One of our key findings is the presence of a local contact person/ focal point at HQ level can help field office staff in having a consistent person to whom they can direct such questions. Countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Austria all have contact persons at HQ levels whose job description includes leading on all JP-related matters and whom are known to personnel in the field. Some Member States such as the Netherlands have seconded nationals to the EEAS to be the contact points in charge of Joint Programming in the development cooperation coordination division.

3. **Flexibility, context-sensitivity and specificity** in the application of EU Joint Programming while promoting a shared understanding of the process. This particular best practice is essential where there are strained or difficult working conditions for EU Member States and EU institutions in partner countries. Being context-sensitive and context-specific while posted in capital or in Brussels is particularly useful where a government might be distrusting of JP processes, or view it as a way for the EU to impose further demands on the local government. Since 2013 EEAS and DEVCO staff in charge of promoting JP have deliberately chosen a "hands off" approach and to listen what their colleagues posted abroad have to say about context specificity. This is a practice appreciated by EU and MS in Occupied Palestinian Territories.

4. **Monitoring EU Joint Programming progress** with updates from the country offices and overall monitoring from headquarters. The JP Tracker has proved a valuable tool for EEAS and DEVCO staff to have an overarching outlook of JP process. Regular consultation between HQ and country offices, for instance reports from Heads of Missions, is another way to contribute towards swifter implementation and functioning. In Bolivia, through consultations with EU institutions and Member States at capital level (meeting of Bolivian desks), the EU family present in this country smoothed the way towards JP. Although this step added extra work it was judged as a positive contribution.[30] In Palestine the request to provide HoMs reports on EU Joint Programming to headquarters helped to set up the pace on the dossier. Technical seminars on Joint Programming organised by EEAS and DEVCO Brussels staff contribute to monitoring progress and to move JP processes forward.

5. **Promotion of EU Joint Programming via consultants and facilitators**, production and dissemination of guidance, to sensitise staff in the EU and Member States. Part of this best practice includes using the EU JP guidance pack or, in the case of Member States, broad guidelines that have been issued to all country office / field office staff (France). Although many people we spoke to regard JP as an organic process that unfolds differently across partner countries and is driven by the

[30] Interview with JP consultant, 14/07/2015.

country offices (for example, in Austria[31] and Sweden),[32] there has been some level of support for an explanatory session, at initial stages, on what JP is and what it entails. This has been particularly the case where expectation of field office staff is high but because of a lack of guidance from HQ, the progress made is "one step forward, two steps back".[33] Holding regular meetings with other EU donors in complicated working environments (for example, Guatemala), can also assist in coordinated donor efforts and development cooperation at an operational level,[34] thereby improving JP processes on the ground and ensuring its successful implementation.

6. **Identify windows of opportunity to re-launch the process when it is stuck**. There are various windows of opportunity in JP processes: the launch of a new national development strategy by the partner country (2013 Joint Response Strategy in Rwanda, Ethiopia in 2016), changes in government, staff rotation in EU Delegations or among Member States, the start of a new programming cycle for influential donors, joint analysis on a specific issue of interest to all (budget support, specific sector). In Ghana, following a period of frictions amongst development partners as well as with the government, there were signs of opening in 2015 (and pressure from two Member States requested by their headquarters to move forward), which contributed towards the EU Delegation to consider the option to re-engage in Joint Programming discussions. That said, the dilemma is still between "widening" and "deepening" the JP process that is supposed to lead to the full-fledged EU JP in 2016.

Box 1: Best practice and lessons learnt: Cambodia

- The main outputs in Cambodia have been:[35] the drafting and adoption of a joint strategy; the intention of replacing bilateral strategies with the joint strategy expressed by two donors; the adoption of a joint monitoring system (joint result framework).
- Key factors for the success of the process have been: (i) good working relations; (ii) strong levels of commitment and motivation; (iii) retreats for EU staff to interact with each other and reflect on the process; (iv) sector division amongst EU Member States; (v) European Member States' alignment with Cambodia's national development strategy; (vi) Use of joint policy briefs to enhance joint analysis; (vii) flexibility (not hiding behind the rules) and determination amongst Member States and European Union Delegation (EUD) staff in their approach towards Joint Programming; (viii) absence of UK and World Bank from the country are important factors that made Joint Programming efforts in Cambodia a success.
- Joint Programming has also led to improved and better focused policy dialogues between the European partners and the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), resulting in (i) the election of the EU as the lead donor for coordinated donor facilitation in Cambodia for the next two years; and (ii) the RGC hosting annual consultative meetings with the European partners to review the implementation of the joint strategy. Speaking with one voice and emphasizing collaboration between the EU and the RGC was one way that the EU was successful in dispelling the RGC's initial perceptions of Joint Programming as a means by which donors could "gang up" on the government.
- Successful working relations with non-EU donors (such as Asian Development Bank and the United Nations) can also promote and further facilitate Joint Programming processes.

31 Interview with European official in HQs, 22/09/2015.
32 Interview with European official in HQs, 03/07/2015.
33 Interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015.
34 Interview with European official in HQs, 03/07/2015.
35 Joint programming in Cambodia, Presentation, 2014.

3.2.2. Best practice observed at the country level

1. **Leadership and commitment by the EU Delegation**. Strong yet sensitive leadership from the EUD is of utmost importance in moving JP processes forward, and some European officials have called for stronger capital-led support for JP.[36] The importance of personality and personal attitudes towards JP cannot be overstated. Our research has consistently revealed that positive attitudes from field office staff and HoCs/HoDs make a huge difference in the mind-set and approach towards JP processes, particularly in partner countries with tense working conditions. A good HoD is essential for gathering personnel[37] - Georgia (until recently), Mali, Senegal and Cambodia and Palestine have been cited as countries with strong and enthusiastic EU leadership.[38] In its current stage, there is a need for JP to be revitalised through strong political support from EEAS and DEVCO leadership where direction is needed if JP is really a top priority, or simply one priority amongst many that key EU Delegation staff have to deal with.

2. **Acknowledging that the "division of labour" and synchronisation would never be perfect and clean but should be realistic and pragmatic**. This was specifically acknowledged in the Cambodia case[39] - existing practices of division of labour need to be taken into account in joint programming processes. However, division of labour and synchronisation have, across all countries, required concerted efforts and discussions amongst all EU Member States to find a balance suitable for all parties. Finding a division of labour that best suits all participating EU Member States within a partner country requires high levels of consultation amongst themselves and a willingness to make concessions for the better fulfilment and implementation of JP processes. Increased partner government involvement such as in Rwanda[40] could potentially assist with advancing JP processes within a country.

3. **Adequate empowerment of and incentives to human resources in the field and in the capitals (at MS and EUD level).** Having sufficient human resources (for instance, the interview with Finland indicated the perception that there is good capacity to deal with JP)[41] in the field is one of the ways by which to cultivate a good working ethic on JP. In Ghana lack of adequate staffing for multiple priorities was also identified as holding JP back. Motivating staff to engage in JP requires sound knowledge management but also explicit incentives. For instance, Sweden has encouraged its staff in embassies to take part in regional seminars (although this country does not use staff performance based assessments as such to create incentives on specific issues similar to Joint Programming).[42] Staff's job descriptions and staff assessment software (mentioned in the case of Belgium) may also be used to insert incentives towards JP. In Ghana it was also mentioned that Joint Programming was only one amongst many priorities for most staff and there was a lack of clear incentives or instructions to European staff (EU institutions and MS) on how much of a priority it really was.

4. **Promote buy-in by MS and pooling of resources by dividing tasks** (e.g. drafting of JP documents, analysis, sectors leads, etc.) among a select working group or task force which then reports to the whole EU JP family. Buy-in of Member States is critical for JP. The very essence of this exercise relies on Member State active participation, cooperation, pooling of resources and

[36] Interview with European official in HQs, 03/07/2015.
[37] Interview with European official in HQs, 03/07/2015.
[38] Interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015.
[39] Country Joint Programming Factsheet, Regional workshop on Joint Programming for Asia, April 2015.
[40] Interview with European official in HQs, 18/09/2015 (A).
[41] Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015, Interview with European official in HQs, 03/07/2015.
[42] Sweden and Joint Programming, Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2014.

dividing of tasks. In OPT, working with a "coalition of the willing" of committed EU and MS staff in a participatory and inclusive manner ensured buy-in from Member States and avoided fostering an antagonising dynamic. Similarly, in Cambodia, buy-in within the EU family was a driving force behind JP implementation in the country and one of the lessons learnt was to work in smaller groups of donors.[43] Engagement amongst Member State field office staff occurred at all levels, with frequent exchanges at technical levels, agreements on joint EU positions on all policy issues with the RGC or other development partners, and also undertaking joint missions and country analytical work.[44] JP processes need not be linear, and often working on divergent workstreams can contribute towards a more successful process on the ground. In Kenya, EU countries engaged in several processes simultaneously, which facilitated joint implementation and the implementation of the joint strategy: ad-hoc working groups and sector groups identified joint actions to work on, thereby ensuring that once the joint strategy was signed, EUDs could move forward with identified joint action points, working fiches and joint actions and a work plan.[45]

5. **Invest in quality policy dialogue to identify the national partners' potential interests in JP** and in analysis, including political economy analysis, to identify the right timing to engage with national authorities, as well as potential evolutions impacting on JP processes. The "right moment" to begin JP (i.e. phases 1 and 2) in a partner country differs greatly. Typically, the right timing is when the host government launches its national development strategy (synchronisation). In 2014, the EU Delegation in Ethiopia anticipated such window of opportunity two years ahead, knowing the next Growth and Transformation Plan (GTPII) would be started in 2016. In Cambodia, the EU family had to prove the relevance of JP to an initially distrusting government. This was achieved through (i) providing regular information on JP processes to the RGC and (ii) producing a joint strategy that was useful and received positive response from the government.[46] Similarly, in Bolivia, the government was also included in JP processes, which helped to contribute towards the success of its implementation in the country, whilst in Kenya, dialogue with the Ministry of Finance was relatively open.[47] Experience in Ghana in 2013 – 2014 show that EU JP processes suffered the fall-out from a more fundamental deterioration in government – donor community relations, yet when these relations improved more opportunities existed.[48]

6. **Promote consensus within non-EU donors (and other donors groupings) that Joint Programming, while being an EU process, brings added value to international coordination and aid effectiveness in the country.** Many EU officials we spoke to emphasised the importance of speaking with one voice and engaging as a collective body with the partner country government. In Cambodia, sustained political commitment and engagement with government officials resulted in the EU Member States present in Cambodia to be the lead donor in the country for the next two years, despite the fact that this role would ordinarily be fulfilled by the UN or World Bank.[49] The importance of good working relations with non-EU donors should not be under-estimated: both Norway and Switzerland have been strong participants in EU JP processes, whilst other donor groupings such as development banks (World Bank and EIB) have been quite involved in specific projects in partner countries relating to infrastructure. Therefore,

[43] Country Joint Programming Factsheet, Regional workshop on Joint Programming for Asia, April 2015.
[44] AE Feasibility study for EU Joint Programming in Cambodia, 2012.
[45] Interview with JP consultant, 17/07/2015.
[46] Interview with European official in Cambodia, 19/08/2015.
[47] Interview with JP consultant, 17/07/2015.
[48] See Ghana case study summary in annexes.
[49] Interview with JP consultant, 21/08/2015.

the challenge going forward is to maintain a balance between JP being an EU-driven process, and accommodating the inclusion of external donor organisations, tailored to needs in-country.[50] The key question of where EU JP adds value to that of other multi-donor processes needs to be answered.

7. **Independent, neutral and informed facilitation of JP retreats and dialogue between EU Member States and the EU Delegation** to allow EU and MS Heads of Cooperation to concentrate on the big picture. Consultants have also been identified as useful facilitators for knowledge dissemination, generating trust, as well as facilitating engagement within the EU family.[51] In such cases, consultants are able to help move JP processes forward because of their unique role as independent agents. Retreats were organised in Cambodia and Ethiopia, among others. Obviously the quality, specific knowledge and skills of the consultant are paramount and consultants not performing well can actually 'do harm' as was also clearly indicated to us during field interviews. Consultants also being tasked to or trying to take on roles that can only be performed by official staff can also seriously damage ownership. The whole JP process cannot and should not be sub-contracted to consultants.

8. **Efficient decentralisation / deconcentration of power to the field level** by involving as appropriate the country desks. We have identified this as a best practice for the reason that country offices need to have the freedom to engage in JP processes on the ground, and the ability to make unhindered decisions on the best way forward. For instance Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain and are, inter alia, some of the countries with decentralisation towards JP. One such way towards effective decentralisation would be to provide for this measure in national country guidelines, as Germany has done. Moreover, empowering field offices to sign off on documents, to take decisions, to inform HQ on events on the ground and make recommendations accordingly[52] all contribute towards good working relations between headquarters and field offices, and also assist towards ensuring the smooth implementation of JP processes.

3.2.3. Best practice to pioneer

Our analysis would seem to indicate that the following practices although not applied currently would provide additional incentives to move JP forward.

1. **Staff incentives and capacity to contribute to JP**. Human resources factor is highly relevant for the successful undertaking of Joint Programming. A few Member State staff have displayed high levels of proactivity in Joint Programming exercises due to the awareness of the political commitment of its government. To have a more consistent engagement across Member States, some interviewees[53] have suggested that Member State staff should be incentivised to work on JP and/or to work with EU and fellow Europeans (e.g. in individual performance assessments). From the 14 countries reviewed, only two Member States (Belgium and Portugal) have started to consider incentivising their staff working on JP. Moreover, not all interviews feel their own government bureaucracies have sufficient human resources to work across their partner countries. Therefore, the importance of sufficient staff (both in terms of headcount and expertise) should not be underestimated and could be addressed more directly.

[50] Interview with European official in HQs, 18/09/2015 (A).
[51] Interview with European official in Cambodia, 19/08/2015.
[52] Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015.
[53] Interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015; Interview with European official in Palestine, 8/10/2015 (A).

2. **Modernise Joint Programming by including other cooperation financing modalities in it.** Many Member States contribute to cooperation with partner countries via multilateral agencies and organisations. Non-aid cooperation funding is provided by the EU to partner countries where Joint Programming has taken place. Other non-aid European agencies, in particular the European Investment Bank but also large national development banks such as German KfW and French AFD, are potentially very relevant stakeholders of Joint Programming. In the Mediterranean area around 80% of financial flows for investment and growth from donors happens via loans and investment programmes and banks.[54] These ways of channelling funds are not always taken into account in Joint Programming exercises. Including such cooperation has been proposed, at a later stage,[55] in order to have more comprehensive overviews of development funding in a country. The additional challenges should however not be underestimated – for instance the limited representation at country level of some development finance institutions, or discrepancy with Member States who do not have such national development banks.[56] It is therefore important to tailor the broadening of the exercise to the specific objectives that the EU delegation and MS aim to achieve.

Box 2: Best practice and lessons learnt: Occupied Palestinian Territories

- The participatory approach adopted by the EU representation - that involves Member States' offices on the strategic reflection on Joint Programming and defines collectively concrete tasks and steps - creates a dynamic by which MS staff needs to give a certain amount of priority to Joint Programming tasks.
- Working with a "coalition of the willing" of committed EU and MS staff in a participatory and inclusive manner ensures buy-in from Member States and avoids fostering an antagonising dynamic.
- The importance of the support (guidance, seminars, etc.) of EU headquarters' thematic units dealing with Joint Programming has been recognised. The request by EU headquarters for HoMs reports on Joint Programming helped to set up the pace on the dossier.
- On the other hand, EU Joint Programming in the oPT benefited from the "hands off" approach by headquarters that allowed locally based stakeholders to shape the process.
- The process has been brought forward locally, though a consultant was employed at the beginning to facilitate the adoption of a roadmap for Joint Programming.
- **For context and a fuller analysis please refer to Annex III.**

3.3. EU Member States and Joint Programming: need for a refresh

Our research shows some diversity in the way EU Member States directly involved on Joint Programming have behaved towards this policy exercise. **Only half of Member States are strongly engaged in JP exercises**, according to the JP Tracker in early 2015. They are usually large aid donors with a long history of development cooperation, and some with lingering colonial ties. Member States that are less engaged either have smaller aid budgets, limited institutional capacity or limited local presence via embassies or cooperation offices. To date, **JP has mostly been of concern to EU bilateral aid donors and the EU institutions** and much less to other Member States who invest in EU external relations in a different way. Yet it happens that some Member States with no presence in a given country, or with limited stakes in development cooperation, are encouraged to sign up to Joint Programming strategies.[57]

[54] A southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative (AMICI): Promoting an enhanced EU coordinated approach to investment in the region. Regional workshop on Joint Programming for Neighbourhood East and South, 29-30 January 2015, Brussels.

[55] For instance in Egypt, see HoMs report on Egypt.

[56] More research is needed on the potential game-changing role of large development banks in Joint Programming.

[57] Interview with JP consultant, 21/08/15. Czech Republic for instance has not engaged deeply in JP in Ghana but signed the initial JP document.

Individual profiling fiches for each of the fourteen Member States covered by this study are available in annexes. They detail the assessment of each Member State on each indicator, and provide methodological remarks and evidence. Because of resource and capacity constraints, it was not possible to write a detailed narrative for each individual Member State and it is believed that profiling fiches actually provide a more efficient tool than lengthy texts to streamline and compare Member State's performances.

A cross-cutting analysis of our data point at seven key take-away findings as regards Member States' behaviour towards Joint Programming:

- There is a **clear convergence on political commitments towards JP, with a couple of innovative best practices**, yet the belief (still firm in some countries where acting as a bloc is seen as an incentive)[58] in and understanding of JP's virtue and added value **needs to be refreshed and revitalised.** Combining foreign policy interests with JP commitments is not always a given, especially in the countries covered by the EU Neighbourhood Policy where Member States may disagree with partner countries on cooperation priorities,[59] or disagree or compete among themselves on foreign policy objectives.[60]

- Some MS (usually those not having the largest aid budgets) are worried about Joint Programming as they **see a risk of constraining (if not relinquishing) bilateral programming** for a variety of reasons. Other MS (including smaller donors) have engaged strategically in the process and carefully exploit Joint Programming to enhance their niche role, visibility, and bilateral relations.

- Among the main **EU donors, the establishment of incentives for institutional readiness to cope with JP is uneven** but generally strong though based on very different assumptions or rationales.

- **Instrumental flexibility is possible and applied, but only by a core group** (usually largest donors), leaving some room for improvement in that realm.

- **Member States generally punch below their weight in terms of practical incentives towards JP** and practical measures still have to be taken to ensure JP is translated into daily business in Member States systems.

- The invisible data: beyond the dozen of main donors analysed here, **fourteen other Member States remain very remote from JP** for the following reasons: (i) limited presence in partner countries; (ii) limited development funding and interventions – often carried out by national NGOs or involving technical cooperation or the concession of scholarships. There is a political rationale to have these Member States sign up to (or at least being aware of) Joint Programming documents: their participation would strengthen the EU position by increasing the size (and potentially its political weight) of the "EU family" in partner countries. The challenge is therefore to: (i) make JP understood among these MS; (ii) identify concrete ways in which these MS would wish to engage on JP so that is mutually beneficial to all parties involved.

[58] Georgia, Belarus, OpT, to some extent Egypt, Cambodia.
[59] This point was made regarding Ukraine and Moldova in internal EU documents.
[60] Interventions in the field of support to political activism and human rights in the Neighbourhood is a case in point.

Figure 5: Member States and EU institutions in Joint Programming: profiling



3.4. EU institutions' behaviour in Joint Programming

EU institutions play an essential role in Joint Programming: the size of EU institutions development cooperation budgets and their global presence places them at the core of the policy exercise. Together with Member States, they give traction to it, or not. In partner countries they represent EU collective interests and chair EU coordinating meetings. At HQ level they support Member States' capitals, field offices and EU Delegations in their efforts to better understand and implement Joint Programming. Beyond anecdotal evidence related to the diversity of country contexts, seven key factors have emerged from profiling of EU institutions' behaviour towards Joint Programming.

1. EU institutions score globally well except perhaps on instrumental flexibility, a dimension in which their capacity remained largely unexploited. The methodology used for this study looks at whether EU institutions have used their capacity to use their instruments flexibly. The fact that JP was not merged with Programming shows this capacity has not really been used yet, resulting in very limited instrumental flexibility. Yet the potential for improvement is certainly there.

2. On Joint Programing, DEVCO[61] and the EEAS dedicated JP staff have demonstrated coherence and convergence, creating favourable conditions for the exercise to move forward at the HQ level. The Guidance pact, the JP tracker and technical and regional seminars made Joint Programming a reality.

3. The main challenge for EU institutions lies with another type of institutional coherence: a **"relative disconnect" between Joint Programming and EU development programming processes**. Both processes "lived parallel lives".[62] While lower levels of decision-making in Brussels or in EU Delegations strove for Joint Programming, the merge with EU Programming processes hardly happened systematically. These inconsistencies created a context in which **Joint Programming and EU programming cycles synchronisation was not consistently championed by DEVCO leadership**. It resulted in JP instructions being presented as only one amongst a large number of instructions given to Heads of Cooperation, which it made it difficult to gauge how much effort should be put in or taken from other processes. That situation consequently translated into a lack of flexibility in EU programming cycles. Member States would expect that the EU institutions sets the example - **the lack of use of JP documents and processes in European Development Fund/Development Cooperation Instrument / European Neighbourhood Instrument programming exercises may consequently have a reputational cost for the EU institutions** and thereby jeopardise JP efforts altogether.

4. Personality factors within EU institutions are game changers in Joint Programming. Processes were kick-started or got blocked because of staff turnover.[63] The **quality of the relations established between the Head of EU Delegation, the EU Head of Cooperation (HoC) and Member States' representatives is paramount**.

5. Both in Headquarters and EU Delegations, one can witness **notable efforts on the practical side**, particularly on knowledge management and socialisation of JP amongst the EU family. This has

[61] Given the recent transfer from DEVCO to NEAR of certain cooperation services, it was not possible to draw conclusions on the specific role of DG NEAR on Joint Programming so far.

[62] Herrero, A., Knoll, A., Gregersen, C., Kokolo, W. 2015. Implementing the Agenda for Change: An independent analysis of the 11th EDF programming. (Discussion Paper 180). Maastricht: ECDPM.

[63] Cambodia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana inter alia. Interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015, HoMs reports on JP 2013.

materialised with technical and regional seminars as well as with bilateral consultations with specific stakeholders in partner countries.

6. Interviews with Member States' representatives however indicate **there are still communication gaps between EU institutions and them**, especially those with limited aid budget and presence overseas or those not always accustomed to "Brussels language".

7. Upcoming **Mid-Term Reviews and the use of other programming phases** will be a test for EU institutions' ability to mainstream JP across the board but also a huge opportunity to offer incentives.

Box 3: Lessons learnt: Bolivia

- Context: EU Joint Programming in Bolivia takes place in a context of changing aid priorities. Some donors are planning to exit the country but uncertainty is high since decisions can be reversed due to domestic policy changes. An open question is whether commitments taken in the framework of EU Joint Programming are respected.
- Discussion within the EU+ group (Switzerland is included) have led to the drafting of an EU Joint Programming document. The document, still to be finalised, is innovative in the provision of comparative tables with the "division of labour" after EU Joint Programming.
- At first only the EU donors were involved in the Joint Programming working group, and would discuss with the government. Then the decision was made to involve the government in some meetings, to ensure alignment and ownership. The government is reportedly positive with this initiative which allows it to know in advance what is in the pipeline.
- Consultations with EU institutions and Member States at capital level (meeting Bolivia desks) were carried out to smooth the way towards Joint Programming, by having prior agreement. This step, while adding extra work and potentially cause discussions, is judged positively by stakeholders involved. However more decentralisation of power to the field offices – as well as increased human resources – would be welcomed and would probably create more buy-in for Joint Programming.

3.5. Findings on key variables in country contexts

Variable 1: Fragility and instability

Our research shows that **stability or uncertainty in a given country is one of the factors shaping the points of views on Joint Programming** within the EU family. However, it is not possible to discern a systematic causal relation between instability and the potential to achieve Joint Programming or not. As a matter of fact, Joint Programming – and attempts towards it - has already started (sometimes quite successfully) in fragile or volatile contexts such as South Sudan, Haiti, Mali or the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Yet a **situation of serious open crisis** (as in the case of Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Lebanon or Egypt) **creates some hurdles for partner country's leadership or even engagement in Joint Programming**. EU donors specifically mentioned the lack of clear priorities of the government (who often change quickly) often signalled by a lack of national development plan or similar document.[64] However according to the overall JP guidance and some member states' approaches[65], the lack of the document cannot be a justification not to do Joint Programming. Indeed, alignment is to be understood as alignment to the country priorities rather than the document.

[64] Homs Report on Ukraine, 2012; HoMs Report on Georgia, 2013.
[65] Interview with JP consultant, 14/07/2015; Interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015.

Officials involved in JP in unstable contexts point at the rapid turnover of interlocutors in governments, raising questions about priorities and the capacity to embark on policy dialogue.[66] They emphasise the challenge to include humanitarian aid in the joint analysis and response planning while not hampering flexibility, reactivity and neutrality.[67] They also recognise the difficulty to adjust JP to contexts where EU donors do not have cooperation with the government, which is not seen as a legitimate interlocutor, but operate through NGOs and civil society.[68] Interviewees expressed concerns about the need to combine flexibility, reactivity and visibility of interventions with rather inflexible multi-annual strategic Joint Programming commitments in some crisis contexts.[69]

Stable environments are unlikely to present these particular hurdles although even in countries such as Ghana when the overall donor-government relationship deteriorated JP suffered collateral damage. However the need for coordination and knowing what other donors do is judged to be even greater in post-conflict countries (often showing signs protracted crisis and fragility).[70] In that case, fragility and instability become incentives to engage in Joint Programming and it is no surprise that the JP guidance presents some of the potential benefits of doing Joint Programming in these contexts.[71]

From the above, one may conclude that **Joint Programming requires a minimal level of stability to be pursued, but is not necessarily hampered by instability or fragility**.

Variable 2: Government Attitudes

In addition, to what extent is the country's government's attitude towards Joint Programming instrumental in its progress? We found **that it can actually create obstacles as much as to push donors to work together**. Available data shows a range of attitudes from partner governments that create conducive or less conducive environments for Joint Programming.

At best, governments encourage donor coordination, including Joint Programming initiatives.[72] In fact the multiplicity of interlocutors can put a strain on national administration, often with limited capacities.[73] The benefits of synchronised planning cycles can be an important selling point of Joint Programming towards partner governments.[74] In other countries, government authorities may be sceptical or afraid of block-building.[75] Government officials have also been sceptical of overall EU cohesion being maintained through joint programming. Therefore **the government can express, more or less subtly, hostility towards Joint Programming, which puts a brake on the EU exercise**[76] without necessarily fully stopping it. Sometimes EU stakeholders mention the lack of working mechanisms for coordination between donors and the government - often in post-crisis countries - as a challenge to start Joint Programming, since there are no structured fora for dialogue.[77] However this point has been strongly

66 HoMS Report on Tunisia; JP Factsheet on Tunisia, 2014.
67 Interviews with European official in HQs, 28/07/2015, Phone interview with European official in Palestine, 10/07/2015 (B), HoMs report for Mali, 2013. This point is particularly relevant where the EU donors attempt LRRD approaches.
68 See HoMs reports from countries where it was decided not to embark on JP.
69 Interview with European official in Palestine, 06/10/2015 (B), See also JP factsheet for Ukraine, 2014.
70 Interviews with a European official in HQs, 28/07/2015, a JP consultant, 15/07/2015, a European official in oPT, 10/07/2015. See also the JP guidance.
71 See also the JP guidance.
72 Interview with JP consultant, 26/06/2015.
73 Interview with JP consultant, 26/06/2015.
74 Interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015.
75 Interview with a European official in Ethiopia, 26/11/2014. Interview with JP consultant, 15/07/2015. A point already made in HTSPE. 2011, Joint Multi-Annual Programming: Final Report. Herts: HTSPE.
76 Cambodia according to interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015, 2012 HoMs note on Ethiopia 2012.
77 HoMs Report on Ukraine, 2012; JP Factsheet on Cote d'Ivoire 2014.

questioned by EU HQs who argue that partner government's passivity or absence does not prevent JP at the start up phase.[78]

In the vast majority of contexts interactions between Europeans (as Member States or as the EU institutions) and partner governments take place very regularly and at various levels, especially when EU Member States and the EU institutions carry out consultations on aid programming but also on-going joint activities and cooperation. However, **in most cases analysed for this study, it seems clear that the role of the partner governments in phase 1 and 2 of Joint Programming is quite limited**.[79] As a matter of fact, phases 1 and 2 consist very much of inward-looking exercises for the EU family, resulting in a decision to start a political and strategic process as a bloc.[80]

The government's attitude shapes the EU and MS views and buy in on Joint Programming. It is not instrumental in the kick-off of the process itself, in which it is participating to a limited degree. This means that **it is possible to start Joint Programming when a government remains quite indifferent to it or has limited capacities to engage in donor coordination**.[81]

Although the quality of policy dialogue between Europeans and governments on JP is not really the main trigger of JP dynamics, it matters too but later on in the process. Once the decision to launch a JP process has been made, engaging the government can take very different forms depending on the division of political and policy labour agreed on by Europeans. Partner governments' behaviour evolves over time and is also an outcome of interactions in dialogue with Europeans. Ghana is a case in point in that respect: Joint Programming was hampered after a major fall-out between Development Partners and the government before better prospects reappeared once that relationship improved.[82]

That being said, **the role of the government may become more prominent in other phases of JP than phases 1 and 2**. Indeed, case studies (see our various boxes on lessons learnt and best practice) show how various the ways are to involve the partner government - and other country partners, like local authorities, private sector, and civil society - in Joint Programming.

The general finding here is **that there is a balance and a right sequencing to be found** between first reaching a coherent EU proposal on Joint Programming (when the government is either favourable or even indifferent) and then involving the partner government in the process at a point to ensure sufficient ownership.[83]

Variable 3: European attitudes towards Joint Programming

The third variable in a country context is the collective attitude of Europeans towards Joint Programming, as the sum of Member States and EU institutions' behaviours that are analysed more in depth in sections

78 Interview with EU officials, 22/09/2015.
79 Interview with JP consultant, 26/06/2015.
80 Incentives for Joint Programming are not very much linked to the interests of partner countries: 60% of an ECDPM survey respondents said this was least important. See Herrero, A., Knoll, A., Gregersen, C., Kokolo, W. 2015. Implementing the Agenda for Change: An independent analysis of the 11th EDF programming. (Discussion Paper 180). Maastricht: ECDPM, p. xiii.
81 See for instance Bolivia and Palestine.
82 Interviews in Ghana, 2015. Yet it should be noted that this was not the only challenge hampering JP.
83 Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015. In some cases, ownership is actually difficult to identify: an interviewee mentioned the fact that the Ugandan government kept shifting the starting dates the new national development plan, which made synchronisation particularly challenging. Interview with a European official in HQs, 02/10/2015.

3.3 and 3.4 of the report and presented synthetically in figure 5). The collective EU stance on JP in a given country therefore results from the combination of political interests, institutional coherence, instrumental flexibility and practical capacity in each of the Member States present in the partner country.

While some general features on how an individual EU Member State has been behaving towards Joint Programming may be observed (figure 5), it is not really possible to draw generalised lessons on European attitudes towards Joint Programming in all partner countries because of context specificity.

Variable 4: International donor coordination and EU Joint Programming

The final key variable to consider when looking at the country context is the articulation between international donor coordination happening in a given country and EU Joint Programming initiatives. A conducive environment for JP relies on the **degree of consensus among EU donors in accepting to combine an EU Joint Programming process with locally existing wider donor coordination efforts**. In other words, it is about the legitimacy, added-value and complementarity of JP locally vis-a-vis international aid coordination and relations with specific international partners such as the World Bank, the US or other partners. Some **EU Member Sates argue that Joint Programming needs to add value to existing - wider-donor coordination and to avoid creating parallel or double processes**.[84] It is noteworthy that two non-EU aid donors, Norway and Switzerland, often take part in JP processes.[85]

To summarise the main drivers of Joint Programming to be looked at by Europeans when assessing whether a given country is in a conducive environment for JP, the study team created a figure (see figure 6) summarising the four main criteria to take into account before embarking on Joint Programming in a given country.

[84] See HoMs report on Morocco, 2013, interviews with European officials in Palestine, October 2015, in Mali, March 2015, in Tanzania, March 2015,interview with a European official in HQs, 28/07/2015.

[85] Due to time and resource constraints, this study could not elaborate on the role and behaviour of these two donors.

Figure 6: Is this a conducive environment for JP?



Box 4: Joint Programming in Ghana

- Context: Initial optimism coupled with a significant investment among a group of well-motivated European Heads of cooperation led to a joint EU multiannual indicative programme for the period 2013-2016 being signed in Ghana in June 2014. This was seen as an important step toward a second phase of 'full-fledged' EU JP from 2016 onwards.
- 2015 was to be critical juncture for the EU JP process in Ghana but EU development partners highlight several contextual challenges that have hampered the EU JP process after its initial success. These include a strained relationship between the Government of Ghana and the wider Development Partners (DP) group, the changing paths of EU DPs as some phase out or downgrade their engagement and the resulting lack of shared analysis or shared approach among EU member states.
- The challenge that the EU JP process currently faces is whether to "widen" or "deepen" the exercise which is supposed to lead to full-fledged EU JP in 2016. A few EU member states are pressed by HQs to move forward while others are still gauging their interest to continue in the process with limited instruction of indifference from HQs.
- Momentum is found within a 'core' JP group that has some interest in moving forward including at the sector level where the benefits are more tangible and steps more concrete.
- **For context and a fuller analysis please refer to Annex III.**

3.6. Misleading intuitions on country contexts?

In addition we have found some misleading intuitions that were not actually substantiated or were significantly challenged while undertaking the research that are worthy of consideration.

The number of EU donors present in the country does not automatically facilitate or impede Joint Programming. One may assume that is easier to launch a Joint Programming process with a handful of EU donors than with a copious group of them.[86] However a small set of EU donors is not a guarantee for Joint Programming to happen and can also raise doubts about the added-value of the exercise.[87] Conversely, a huge number of donors, such as in Palestine, does not hamper starting and carrying out Joint Programming. Here the state of relations between EU and MS offices in the field prior to Joint Programming plays an important role.

Aid dependence as a pre-condition for the partner government to accept and engage in Joint Programming: This study found no evidence that "development aid dependence" as such has a direct impact on how Joint Programming is undertaken in a given country. Macro economic data about the share of aid on the national budget (including the fact that a country has graduated to a MIC status) are useful to understand and categorise various national economies but they actually tell us very little about a) the diversity of development levels in various parts of a given country, b) what the host government does about development aid and donor coordination c) how donors actually position themselves towards the country. In the case of Joint Programming, what matters mostly is the responsiveness of the national institutional set up for development and/or relations with external donors and the overall political attitude towards development (aid), international cooperation, Joint Programming and donor coordination within the government.

The financial size of European - EU or MS - cooperation envelopes does not seem to be a sufficient explanatory factor to understand the engagement of EU stakeholders in local Joint Programming dynamics.[88] What could be instrumental is the degree of power exerted by a limited number of European donors over other European aid providers and over the hosting country's bodies responsible for aid coordination.[89] For instance in 2012 the EUD in Ethiopia approached the largest European donors first to kick start JP on this assumption.[90]

3.7. Use of Consultants

Overall, **qualified, flexible, credible, and knowledgeable consultants are generally viewed as positive contributors and facilitators** for getting the EUDs and EU Member States to engage in Joint Programming activities in partner countries. Our interviews revealed that these consultants have different jobs: some are hired by the Commission's headquarters to promote, together with the EEAS, Joint Programming work in several partner countries, whilst others are locally hired by EUDs to support them in steering Joint Programming efforts and are designated for long-term work within a particular country alone.

Although useful, this is not to say that the use of consultants is the only way by which the EU and MS can successfully start or progress on Joint Programming initiatives. Palestine is an example of the successes

86 Interviews in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana.
87 See Moldova, Morocco HoMs reports.
88 With sometimes large aid envelopes, the UK has not shown strong political and practical dedication to Joint Programming, as confirmed by our profiling and evidenced by interviews.
89 This seems to be the case when Germany and France "team up" with EU Delegations to promote Joint Programming.
90 Interview with European official in Ethiopia, 12/04/2013.

experienced in Joint Programming endeavours in the absence of consultant involvement, apart from a short involvement to draft the initial roadmap. Similarly, the levels of commitment and dedication from those staff involved in Joint Programming, and not simply the presence of an external coordinator, is equally important.

Some consultants recognise their job as administratively intensive and not necessarily requiring higher skills, thereby reinforcing the idea that their role is to make HoC and field office staff's jobs easier and to support them in fulfilling their responsibilities. Moreover, consultants and EU officials recognise that there are still opportunities to learn from one another, and to share their varying experiences in Joint Programming, which should be encouraged in the form of shared knowledge and seminars amongst themselves.

Consultants contribute substantively to Joint Programming by handling some of the groundwork. Consultants fulfil the time-consuming role of undertaking administrative groundwork (facilitating meetings, collating documents, etc.) that many EUD or MS staff simply have neither time nor capacity to undertake, as a means towards ensuring the successful implementation of Joint Programming. This is extremely important where consultants have been working in a partner country over a lengthy period of time, as their involvement in Joint Programming processes from the beginning serves as institutional memory for the EU group.

They also act as **an independent "mediator" or facilitator and help to manage personalities**. Consultants are often referred to as individuals that are trusted by all parties, particularly in mediating relations between the various EU Member States and EUDs (because the quality of their interaction can either hinder or promote processes on the ground). Reports also point at the way consultants facilitate Joint Programming process on the ground without exerting undue pressure on the individual European Heads of Cooperation. It is also admitted that they encourage flexibility and engagement at various levels within the EU family as representative contact points to whom EU field office staff can turn to in cases of strained relations. The fact they are seen as impartial individuals capable of sharing confidential information in appropriate ways is appreciated.

It is less clear though to what extent consultants have managed to promote a common and consistent understanding of Joint Programming amongst the Commission, EEAS, EUDs and MS by shaping diverse ideas amongst these stakeholders. They still play an information sharing role, particularly by bringing EU and MS headquarters' attention to events happening within partner countries and at times consolidating views within the EU family.

Some Member States and EU officials have, in a few occasions, also cited concerns over the levels of involvement displayed by the consultants, particularly in relation to their lack of harmonisation in their approach towards Joint Programming or in their internal working relations.[91]

There is a need for consultants to promote a consistent and common understanding of joint programming within the EU family, as a failure to do so results in staff being confused about Joint Programming and/or receiving ambiguous information about the processes involved in Joint Programming.

Concerns surrounding the impartiality and independence of EU-contracted consultants (usually by DEVCO) remain, as it is questionable whether they would promote the views and political stances of specific individuals or the view of EU headquarters rather than a collective EU view.

[91] Interviews with European officials in capitals and in partner countries.

3.8. Key Don'ts of Joint Programming

In addition to the positives that arose from ECDPM's research there were some recurring themes that can be articulated as the key don'ts of Joint Programming. These are because they are counter-productive, suck energy away and are likely to lead to false starts.

Box 5: The Don'ts of Joint Programming

1. Inconsistency between commitments made by Member States at capital level and staff behaviour towards JP at field level.
2. Lack of synergies between EU Joint Programming and other processes, in particular bilateral programming leading to an overload of consultations and duplications of activities (e.g. analysis).
3. Process started without a solid analysis of opportunities and risks, leading to missed opportunities for other more promising EU joint activities.
4. Limited human resources and/or limited incentives to dedicate human resources to take part in EU Joint Programming.
5. Exclusive focus on bureaucratic templates guiding JP processes with "Brussels language".
6. No or too little communication between EU Brussels HQs and EU Delegations and Member States' overseas offices about country contexts and what they mean for JP practice.
7. Host government cycles or fragile contexts used as defaults to always delay JP and synchronisation without critical reflection whether that is really the case.
8. Investing in EU Joint Programming without explaining or demonstrating its added value to wider donor coordination aid effectiveness efforts.

3.9. Summary of main findings: JP at the crossroads

Joint Programming, as a new cooperation modality **has become a reality in more than 20 countries,** and is the result of established good practice in terms of political commitments, institutional coherence, instrumental flexibility and practical capacities. Member States have developed a variety of good practices that could be shared more regularly and more widely. The **EU family has also acquired knowledge and experience on how to make Joint Programming successful**. The push for JP ultimately came from within Member States' systems capable of pursuing internal policy change and taken over by motivated individuals. In the EU institutions, the personality factor, together with the role of EEAS and DEVCO senior management, are essential for encouraging the prioritisation of Joint Programming. Managing the European diversity of interests and outlooks has often – but not always - been facilitated by impartial external consultants while EU Delegations acted as conveners, if not champions.

The decision to embark on JP in a given country is mostly a European one. Encouraging partner governments engagement only comes as a second step, once the EU family is united around common purposes and a shared understanding of the stakes and of the process in country. However, **Joint Programming has not yet become the rule or usual practice. While it is still being pioneered it is already suffering some kind of fatigue,** especially among some of the Member States staff interviewed for this study**.** This state of play is reflected in the profiling results we found and that are presented in sections 3.3 and 3.4. DEVCO has not really succeeded in synchronising its main programming exercise with JP. **Member States still wonder about its added value** and in two thirds of those countries considered for Joint Programming, Europeans have hardly been able to produce a joint strategic analysis of international cooperation. Joint Programming is thus at the crossroads, at times stuck in the middle.

4. The future of Joint Programming

Conceived as the EU response to the Busan aid effectiveness agenda, Joint Programming might appear to some as an obsolete tool in a context where development cooperation under the new SDGs goes beyond aid. However, according to our interviewees, it remains an extraordinary powerful lever to achieve both aid effectiveness and European coherence abroad. The problems created by the lack of adherence to aid effectiveness principles and diminishing influence of individual European actors remains and if anything have become more prominent since 2011.

In an increasingly challenging context for the European project, Joint Programming is seen by interviewees for this study as one of the few convincing tools to demonstrate the added value of European external action in international development cooperation. In a best-case scenario, it can be cost neutral (in the sense that it does not lead to significant budget increases); it is still early – and probably hard - to prove that it would be cost efficient, since the outcomes of JP in terms of aid effectiveness (as other aid coordination efforts) may not be fully detectable until several years have passed, with assessments carried out against clear baselines. As a response to the criteria of the Busan agenda, JP brings along aid effectiveness benefits. It has potential to be easily communicable to domestic European constituencies, and it combines national and European visibility - if well communicated. Joint Programming is an enabler/means (not an end in itself) for coherent European external action (and development policies).

Joint Programming is designed to be, in the long run, a mutually beneficial policy process for Member States and EU institutions; according to the HTSPE 2011 study, it is also a low hanging fruit for European donors' visibility that can be harvested in the short term.

Joint Programming has become a reality in European international cooperation practice and it is supported by most of European stakeholders as evidenced by this research. Yet, **despite repeated official commitments to it, it has not become a strongly established – if not binding - European norm** due to the multiplicity of practices, leaving it to Member States and EU institutions as a potentially vulnerable heritage.

This chapter delves into the **challenges ahead of Joint Programming** as well as the opportunities it may open in the coming years. First, the SDG agenda 2030 now frames international cooperation debates in a slightly different way from Busan, and some adjustments to Joint Programming might have to be considered. Closer in time, the main test will be with EU institutions who will have the opportunity to decide whether and how they plan to synchronise EU programming cycles with existing Joint Programming strategies. The third section focuses on how EU institutions and Member States may want to consider ways to combine more efficiently Joint Programming and Joint Implementation. Lastly, the longer-term question of monitoring in Joint Programming is raised.

4.1. Joint Programming potential in the SDG context

The link between Joint Programming and the SDGs is its early days but the connection is being made.[92] As the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda takes shape, it has become clearer that international cooperation with developing countries will no longer revolve only around the "aid axis" and that a "paradigm shift" needs to take place to adapt to the new realities.[93] Against this backdrop, we have tentatively asked ourselves which major changes related to the SDG agenda on the global scene might impact on Joint Programming and what will have to be done to keep it fit not just to survive the post-2015 but to be seen to be instrumental to its implementation. Will Joint Programming need to undergo any transformations to add value beyond the "EU aid bubble", and be better at delivering on the ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty (cf. a more coherent, efficient, effective, political and visible EU external action).

The EU committed to Joint Programming as part of its engagement in Busan aid effectiveness agenda. These commitments are still valid for most of the stakeholders of EU Joint Programming and the problems of fragmentation, lack of strategy and sector concentration still are very real. However, five years down the line, amidst dwindling public resources and increasing pressure from taxpayers to account for public money spent and domestic pressure to spend ODA money at home on migration and refugee issues development cooperation is undergoing a profound transformation. Joint Programming is now a mix of two styles of international cooperation: on the one hand, a rather technical view on aid based on the assumption that optimal division of labour within sectors, synchronisation and significant aid volumes to sectors will lead to better results; on the other, a more political European approach focused on interests and values and investing in a single voice for stronger and broader cooperation results. Reconciling these two sides of Joint Programming will now have to be undertaken in the new context of Sustainable Development Goals. While aid coordination efforts at sector level will still be necessary, under the lead of line ministries and in the framework of global donor coordination efforts, EU joint strategies could bring significant value, if they were designed to support the transition to meeting sustainable development goals in partner countries in a politically savvy and integrated manner.

In practice and on the basis of Agenda 2030, the **EU will have to consider whether it wants to combine Joint Programming with the new SDGs framework in at least four areas**, depending on potential review processes of existing policies.

First, it will be **need to combine or articulate EU joint strategies** with or around the three pillars of the SDGs, i.e. economy, equity and ecology – as much as they inspire partner government development plans - to avoid a piecemeal approach around sectors only and contribute to each of the three pillars. Such an approach would put JP at the juncture of EU's external action country cooperation strategies and SDGs implementation.

Second, **Europeans could take additional steps to devise a coherent EU joint approach** – yet respecting Member States' specific strengths - to political economy analysis (at country and sector level), pooling resources and capacity. In-depth analysis is key to better understand how the EU and its member states together could better support national political change processes that promote sustainable development-oriented reforms, in line with SDG 16 on governance and inclusive societies. It could include, as already experienced in some cases, a territorial dimension.

---

92 See http://ideas4development.org/en/the-exhaustive-nature-of-the-sdgs-what-impacts-for-development-agencies/ & http://www.euractiv.fr/sections/aide-au-developpement/lexhaustivite-des-odd-quels-impacts-pour-les-agences-de-developpement/

93 For discussion on delivering the SDG agenda beyond ODA see, European Report on Development 2015.

Third, **joint analysis could translate into the adoption of thematic, multi-sectoral, approach to Joint Programming documents in sync with the holistic variety of SDGs**. Europeans could (as they have started to do in certain cases) broaden, where appropriate, the Joint Programming framework to create synergies with other non-development policies and EU investors (e.g. decent work agenda; trade, investments in and support to private sector, knowledge sharing, science & technology; CSR).

Lastly, **Joint Programming strategies will also have to incorporate sustainable development finance** (beyond specifying the financial allocations per sector) to match SDGs targeting means of implementation. That could be undertaken by reflecting on how EU aid complements and meshes with other types of development finance (including public-private partnerships, blending and other modernised modalities), and how the EU supports the regulatory policy environment necessary to mobilise broader development finance in a given country.

4.2. Joint Programming and EU institutional EDF/DCI/ENI programming

In phases 4 and 5 of Joint Programming, **Europeans make use of their joint cooperation strategy** and their joint analysis in their policy dialogue with the partner government and in the conduct of their bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

While it was noted earlier that there is no perfect Division of Labour, there may also be no perfect synchronisation, yet in phase 4, clear convergence towards synchronisation is sought and foreseen because all Europeans try to use their programming instruments in a flexible fashion by either shortening or prolonging some of their programming rounds to match the national planning cycle of the partner country.

Given the size and scope of EU cooperation funding, the behaviour of EU institutions in that matter is likely to strongly influence the rest of the EU family (and Member States in particular, who have expressed surprise or disappointment about the EU's lack of flexibility) and thereby the future of Joint Programming per se. If that is true, next opportunities to review, adjust or revise EU programming strategies will have a strong impact on Joint Programming as a whole. Therefore, they have to be seized as ways to revitalise Joint Programming efforts. How this could be done and what it implies is examined below.

In the **near future there could be a window of opportunity to do Joint Programming** with the reviews of the EU ENI "Single Support Frameworks" (which are, where possible synchronised with partner country cycle). The review happens however "when necessary" including "in light of the EU periodic reports".[94] At the same time the on-going review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) casts some shadows on the possibility to start new processes in Neighbourhood countries.

2014-2020 EDF traditional programming Mid-Term Reviews (MTRs) will also be critical moments for synchronisation, flexible adjustments and reinvigorated Joint Programming initiatives. Recent reports point at internal debates within DG DEVCO on a reform of MTRs, with options for further flexibilisation. As long as such measures lead to stronger EU instrumental flexibility and a higher likelihood for overall EU synchronisation, they are welcome.

Merging EU programming and Joint Programming processes means first and foremost to use the Joint Programming document as the EU bilateral programming document (MIP/NIP). For this to happen, JP strategies ought to be fully compatible with EU programming procedures (DCI/EDF/ENI) and respect the templates of the programming documents, while also being compatible with MS (national) procedures and

[94] Interview with European official in HQs, 27/07/2015.

positioning towards Joint Programming. Existing EU legal frameworks for development cooperation (DCI, EDF and its annexes on the EU-ACP agreement, ENI, all allow merging programming and Joint Programming.[95] Doing this of course raises particular challenges.

First is the **question of timing and synchronisation of EU Joint Programming with EU DCI/EDF/ENI programming**. Since JP involves the whole or a large part of the EU family as well as back and forth consultation between field offices and Headquarters (where inter-service consultations may take place) in Europe, the process may require at times lengthy dialogue, data collection, collective efforts and accommodation with country contexts. At the beginning of the last EU programming cycle planned for 2014-2020 that did not always coincide exactly with the working pace of the European institutions programming their international cooperation for the next seven years. As a result, synchronisation (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Namibia, Guatemala) as much as disconnect (Chad, Ghana, Rwanda, Togo) in time have been reported. However, delays are not seen as insurmountable obstacles.

Second, the **question of templates compatibility has been raised**. Reportedly, MS in Mali accepted that the JP documents follow the MIP/NIP structure to facilitate their use as programming document by the EU. Still, the EU approved also its bilateral MIP/NIP. For a JP document/strategy to be EU programming compliant, a number of steps, criteria and conditions have to be met. In principle, EUD Heads of cooperation are in charge of EU programming documents as well as Joint Programming strategies. The compatibility between the two templates is thus achievable, provided EUD Heads of Cooperation have enough incentives to work on this convergence.

The third challenge relates to **compliance with EU programming standards**. EU Programming documents must meet compulsory requirements in terms of timing, financial and administrative procedures, planning details and monitoring indicators. According to DEVCO, some JP documents presented by fall 2014 in several countries would not fully meet all requirements to be considered as acceptable EU programming documents. Consequently, in some countries, the EU cooperation community worked on two parallel documents (an EU Joint Programming document and an EU programming document) that had strong connections but could eventually not be merged.

The existence of parallel but complementary documents is not issue as such, as long as they contribute to the same joint strategy. However, the degree of divergence and the width of gaps between EU programming documents and Joint Programming strategies must be carefully looked at and diminished as much as possible.

A fourth identified challenge has to do **with the relevance of consultations with external actors**. Depending on country and policy contexts (see sections 3.5 and 3.6 in this Discussion Paper on country contexts), the timing and meaning of consultations with the government, non-state actors and non-EU donors may vary. At the end of the day, consulting with external interlocutors in a EU Joint Programming boils down to include them in a sensitive internal EU negotiation process in which EU stakeholders do not necessarily present a united front in the first place. Heads of cooperation and heads of mission will have to agree on sound sequencing and wise use of existing bilateral and EU external consultations – including in their joint analysis as well as on the added value of JP to existing efforts in division of labour and joint assistance strategies in the wider donor community.

Fifth, Joint Programming strategies at some point have to be consistent with EU and national regional strategies. The challenge here is to **ensure coherence and efficiency amongst all EU stakeholders in**

[95] Joint programming. Integrating bilateral and joint programming – Quality requirements, Presentation by EEAS and DEVCO at the Joint Programming Technical Seminar, 13-14 November 2014, Brussels.

country, in EUD with regional mandates and in HQs managing regional programmes, assistance or cooperation modalities.

Finally, the **signature process of Joint Programming strategies still differ from the one followed in the case of EU DCI/EDF/ENI programming documents**. EU programming documents go through a series of steps involving the approval of EU hierarchies (DG DEVCO/EEAS, EDF committee, etc.) or an information sharing ("*prise de connaissance*") phase with other EU bodies (such as for instance the European Parliament). There is also an approval and signature process of the partner government (Minister or National Authorising Officer) for EDF countries. Joint Programming "signature" practices seem more diverse and ad-hoc. In **certain Member States, each national ministry has different approval procedures but at least two countries (France and Germany) have indicated that Joint Programming documents can substitute their bilateral strategies**. The involvement in the signature of Member States that are not present in the partner country has also not really been codified yet but would certainly give more strength to Joint Programming strategies wherever they are enforced.

4.3. Joint Programming and Joint Implementation

Joint Programming (as described in the EU guidance) is the preparation of a joint strategy of the EU and MS in a country, with a clear division of labour (sectors) and financial allocations by EU and MS. According to the EEAS and DEVCO joint implementation[96] can be "hard" - if there are binding agreements like mechanisms for common funding or joint monitoring frameworks - or "soft" - when it is more about concentration or joint analysis, etc.

The reasons to do joint implementation vary. For instance doing a mapping of the geographic distribution of donors within sectors - as done in Mali - can lead to the identification of gaps and overlaps, and to the promotion of better complementarity and less duplication. Avoiding small fragmented initiatives is another reason, as the transaction costs for partner governments with low capacity are huge - for instance having the same reporting requirements and indicators eases the administrative burden. For donors, having a joint approach in a sector can lead to more political weight and leverage to promote reforms - this is the case for the donors participating in the joint basket fund in the education sector in Palestine. Joint implementation can promote a smarter use of resources, leading to lower costs if analysis or evaluations are done jointly for instance. A comprehensive discussion of the benefits of Joint Programming (and implementation) can be found in the HTSPE 2011 study on Joint Programming.[97]

In the case of Palestine, joint sector analysis and division of labour in policy dialogue are used as a bottom-up approach to Joint Programming. A joint results framework with indicators has been agreed for 6 pilot sectors, between the EU, MS and the Palestinian Authority.

In Ethiopia, some joint implementation initiatives have sprung up following the work on the Joint Cooperation Strategy. A core group of EU and MS donors are preparing a roadmap for the nutrition sector. The first step is the planning phase, which includes analysis and identification of priorities and responsibilities, but joint accountability and communication approaches are also envisaged. An informal EU+ group for the "Green Sector" is launching of joint mapping of activities, need assessment, gap analysis. There are discussions about EU and MS supporting health through sector budget support.

[96] In this section "joint implementation" means "joint" between donors (different from "joint" implementation between a donor and one or more local partners).

[97] HTSPE. 2011. Joint Multi-Annual Programming: Final Report. Herts: HTSPE. See also Galeazzi, G., Helly, D., and Krätke, F. 2013. All for one or free-for-all? Early experiences in EU Joint Programming (ECDPM Briefing Note 50).

In Kenya, the JP document itself - signed on 9 May 2015 - covers visibility strategy, joint results, indicators and "also covers joint implementation". Through the process of doing JP, EU stakeholders actually analysed all the options for joint implementation through ad-hoc working groups and sector groups. When the JP document was signed a number of joint implementation initiatives were ready to be endorsed.[98] In Bangladesh, it was reported that the most effective form of "Joint Programming" is at sector level and during the design of co-funded programmes (e.g. Chittagong Hills Tracts, nutrition) where most of the policy dialogue happened.

This brief overview of joint implementation practices and motivations shows that there are **in fact several ways of using and pursuing joint implementation**, which can be used on the basis of the context and objectives sought in the sector or country (see box 4 on joint implementation diversity at sector level for a non exhaustive list). Past EU's work on the division of labour can provide additional information. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between cases when joint implementation resulted from or inspired Joint Programming exercises, as shown by Figure 7.

Box 6: Joint implementation diversity at sector level

- Joint implementation approaches / aid modalities through, inter alia: (Sector) budget support, joint co-financing modalities: pooled / basket funds / trust funds, co-financing, delegated cooperation, Technical Assistance pooling/sharing.
- Efficient use of expertise according to different donors' strengths/specialisation (instead of all investing resources to build new expertise, or maintain minimum expertise in many different sectors)
- Sectoral joint analysis and response, including sector mapping (including geographic) and gap analysis (who does what, allocations), and sector dialogue (division of labour, managing entry/exit).
- Division of labour for policy dialogue (lead donor, active donors, silent donors).
- Joint results frameworks: joint goals / indicators (based on those of the partner country); joint monitoring, evaluation, reporting.

Figure 7: Joint Programming and Joint Implementation



[98] Interview with JP consultant, 17/07/2015.

4.4. Monitoring Joint Programming: towards joint impact assessment tools?

In this study we tried to build up a monitoring toolbox to help policy makers to clearly assess progress made by the EU family in Joint Programming processes. This work was based on data gathered from the EU Joint Programming Tracker, internal EU documents and individual qualitative interviews.

When **Europeans reach phase 5 of Joint Programming, they need a toolkit to carry out another type of monitoring: to monitor the impact of the Joint Programming process on development effectiveness results** (poverty reduction, aid fragmentation, etc.). Decisions on joint impact assessment require a common understanding of what should be measured (aid fragmentation, donors' transaction costs, quality of policy dialogue), against which benchmarks and according to which criteria and methodology (existing donors' results frameworks, new ones). With the adoption of the SDGs, new targets and benchmarks are likely to be put in place and JP monitoring processes will have to adjust to them. Another dimension of monitoring Joint Programming relates to its impact on EU's external action effectiveness.

Joint monitoring will therefore require a consultation and negotiation process amongst Europeans to establish a common monitoring framework. In this phase, different synchronisation questions may arise as well as dilemma regarding the nature and the timing of policy dialogue with the partner government in relation to the monitoring of Joint Programming's impact.

As much as in the Joint Programming process itself, current joint implementation initiatives may provide with useful experiments to conceive or get inspiration from existing joint impact assessment tools already being used by Member States or EU institutions.

Over the last three years, the international cooperation landscape has dramatically evolved and will be increasingly shaped by the agenda 2030. **Joint Programming is at a crossroads**. In the short term, there is still wide room for manoeuvre towards progress in Joint Programming in the following areas: the merge of EU programming with Joint Programming; the search for more efficiency in joint implementation and how to plug it into Joint Programming; the creation of politically and technically suitable monitoring frameworks and methodologies. Yet the level of progress achieved in Joint Programming so far requires some more thinking on its very existence and how it can best fit in the EU external action tool box.

Box 7: Monitoring Joint Programming: Cambodia

- Having already engaged in joint implementation since early 2015, at the end of October 2015 Cambodia will embark on its first joint annual monitoring process and, during the course of November 2015, the findings of the draft monitoring report will be discussed at a HoMs retreat. A mid-term evaluation for 2016 will assess the impact of the Joint Strategy and cater for necessary adjustments.
- In this regard, Cambodia is creating precedent because EU HoCs and HoMs will be responsible for creating a results framework - one of the first in EU Joint Programming. The monitoring report is predated by collective efforts amongst EU Member States to work together in collecting data as well as reviewing and updating the results framework.
- Importantly, Monitoring of the Joint Strategy is undertaken on an annual basis, and is linked to the RGC's reviews of its National Strategic Development Plan. In this way, EU Member States are completely synchronised with the RGC's work plan.

4.5. Scenarios for the future of EU Joint Programming:

The previous section elaborated on how, in practice, Joint Programming will depend on the way EU institutions (and Member States) manage to synchronise their programming cycles with partner countries and how Europeans will adjust to the SDG agenda. This Discussion Paper also identified key best practices at HQ and country level to achieve a Joint Strategy. In the **longer term, the ability of Europeans to act jointly in international cooperation, using Joint Programming or not, will be determined by progress on a number of key factors**.

1. ***Progressive merge of existing EU and Member States cooperation strategies and programming exercises***
   The obvious continuation and outcomes of Joint Programming strategies is their merge with existing EU and Member States cooperation strategies and programming exercises. Until this point is reached in a given country, the future of Joint Programming will be stuck at phase 2 or 3 and the process will remain limited. For instance, Member States will either a) make a reference to the joint strategy in their bilateral strategy; b) use it as a broad umbrella strategy of shared principles while having a more detailed strategy; c) use the JP strategy instead of their own strategy (while having a document explaining their bilateral activities). Similarly, EU institutions would merge their programming documents with the Joint Programming documents. Therefore the sustainability of Joint strategies will be at two occasions: the mid-term reviews of EU/MS programming to synchronise with the national development plans and changes in national domestic politics in EU Member States.

2. ***Continued support from Member States at capital level and from EU institutions leadership trickling down to field level.***
   Joint Cooperation Strategies will highly depend on the willingness of Member States' capitals to maximise this opportunity for their own national benefit, while strengthening the EU's voice abroad. At the end of the day, the future of Joint Cooperation Strategies will depend on a well-balanced degree of context-specific decentralisation/deconcentration (via instructions but also incentives such as criteria in staff performance assessments) from European capitals to staff in partner countries.

3. ***Intensification of Joint Programming socialising initiatives such as regional and technical seminars***
   Joint Programming has taken off the ground as a result of a socialisation process (by which individuals learn how to belong to a community of practice while bringing something to it, beyond the mere promotion by Brussels Headquarters) held through a variety of technical and regional seminars, country retreats and capitals' desk officers in charge of a given country. The future of Joint Cooperation Strategies will be highly reliant on such interactive socialisation dynamics amongst Europeans that have to be adequately supported and resourced.

4. ***Stronger communication on the benefits of Joint Programming to make it more politically attractive***.
   The future of Joint Cooperation Strategies will be linked to their convincing power. Joint Cooperation Strategies will have a future if their promoters communicate widely about their benefits for Member States, Europe and the partner societies in countries abroad. As for joint implementation, some stakeholders could also make its stronger case, to bring evidence of its added value and thereby preach the sceptics.

5. ***Sustained instructions from Member States, DEVCO and EEAS towards enhanced flexibility in programming cycles.***
   Flexibility is certainly a keyword in the future of Joint Cooperation Strategies that will be determined by a mindset shift and bold actions from within DEVCO, the EEAS and Member States in the way they "synchronise their interventions commitments" and programming cycles to those of partner governments.

6. ***Increased investment in the contracting of external consultants supporting Joint Programming in partner countries***
   This research has found that external consultants played a central role in promoting and socialising Joint Programming and in supporting the emergence of Joint strategies in conducive environments. Any endeavour towards Joint Cooperation Strategies will be dependent on the availability of independent facilitators able to move these processes forward all over the world. The progress made by Joint Programming is likely to be commensurate to the investment allocated to external services. The future of Joint Programming will therefore depend as well as on the quality and consistency of external expertise in Joint Programming facilitation, which at times was questioned by some interviewees.

7. ***Results of an independent evaluation on JP commissioned by DEVCO and the EEAS to be launched in late 2015-early 2016.***
   A lot will depend on the ToR of this evaluation. If the ToR focus on the impact and results of JP in aid effectiveness terms as much as in political terms, the results of this evaluation might become instrumental in defining the future of JP. However, experience has shown that evaluations are not necessarily taken up by DEVCO[99] and ultimately the decision on the future of Joint Programming will be a political one.

8. ***Technological innovations making Joint Programming more user-friendly***
   In its initiating time, with all the learning curves implied, Joint Programming so far has been a rather heavy, cumbersome and bureaucratic process for most of its stakeholders, while supposed to reduce transaction costs. In a time of staff shortage, the future of Joint Cooperation Strategies will also be determined by their level of attractiveness and user-friendliness and consequently by user-friendly new technologies, such as online information sharing clouds.

9. ***Existence of a monitoring mechanism assessing progress made in Joint Programming***
   Now that Joint Programming has become a common practice, its future needs to be decided on the basis of its development (aid effectiveness and SDGs) and EU political coherence results. Such assessments will only be possible if robust monitoring mechanisms are set up. The EEAS and DEVCO appear to be already on the right track with their complementary monitoring systems.[100] It is therefore important the resources are allocated to these activities as necessary and to promote information sharing and joint efforts between EEAS and DEVCO staff involved.

By clustering the factors identified above, the study team **has identified three generic scenarios** for the future of Joint Programming that are laid out in somewhat exaggerated terms for effect:

[99] Bossuyt, J., Shaxson, L., Datta, A. 2014. Assessing the uptake of strategic evaluations in EU development cooperation: Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAid's strategic evaluations into development policy and practice. Brussels: EuropeAid.

[100] The EEAS monitors the achievement of drafting a single joint strategy in each country where a Joint Programming exercise is undertaken. DEVCO is exploring the possibility to monitor sector concentration, as an indicator of less aid fragmentation, before and after Joint Programming.

4.5.1. Scenario 1: EU Joint Cooperation Strategies Deliver Value

In this scenario, Joint Programming is renamed as EU Joint Cooperation Strategies, which become a strategic priority for High Representative/Vice President Mogherini in the 2016 EU Global strategy, any new EU development policy and the revised EU Consensus on Development. The Development Commissioner Neven Mimica sees this as a clear opportunity to deliver on the direction of, "Working with Member States to enhance the EU's contribution to international cooperation and development and to further co-ordinating policies"[101] given in his mission letter from Commission President Juncker a**nd issues clear and ambitious instructions to prioritise it**. It is a rebranded European norm referring to a Treaty legal base (article 21 of the Treaty), entrenched in Council Conclusions, with an action plan dedicated to it (or to be bolder, a Council decision). While most of Member States comply with it, some opt-outs are negotiated with the most reluctant ones.

Joint Cooperation Strategies become gradually merged with EU and MS programming exercises, with overall EU synchronisation of programming cycles in partner countries. Increased decentralisation of negotiating powers on Joint Programming steadily takes place, with Member States traditionally opposed to it operating a policy shift. Joint Cooperation Strategies are widened to regional programming. A robust monitoring mechanism is set up, including convincing incentives and rewards for 'good pupils.'

Potential Trade-Offs: Would require some expenditure of political capital and moving up in terms of prioritisation in an already crowded agenda. While some transaction costs increase over the shorter term, and there is some loss of margin of manoeuvre for all actors, over the longer run the benefits in addressing aid fragmentation, Busan and SDG commitments and promoting strategic EU leverage have a better chance of being realised.

4.5.2. Scenario 2: Pragmatic but Less Ambitious: Stuck in the Middle

This configuration looks very much like the current status quo, with significant political and policy commitments made, and genuine efforts conducted in a number of countries on an ad-hoc basis. Yet the European Commission remains inflexible on the synchronisation of its own programming cycles with partner countries' and Member States', thereby severely jeopardising the credibility of Joint Programming. **No new effort is made to alleviate JP from one of a number of priorities to a more serious priority** and no resources are made available to hire more JP external consultants or free up time. With no leadership from the HR/VP or Development Commissioner, the EEAS and DEVCO remains powerless and does not manage to promote JP further; its dedicated staff leave their positions. **In the absence of renewed political commitments and conceptual rebranding, Joint Programming becomes an old-fashioned concept** - too much associated with traditional aid effectiveness agendas - **revived at times by believers, newcomers or opportunists in a group of "eternal pilot countries".**

EU institutions and Member States explore alternative ways towards coordinated aid effectiveness outside EU formats through select donor groups, bilateral or ad hoc partnerships. EU institutions and Member States not only shift from aid coordination imperatives but do not act jointly to pursue new strategic priorities such as economic diplomacy, investment promotion, blending and teaming up with large development banks. The rules of the game change and new cost efficiency methods replace Joint Programming.

Potential Trade-Offs: All actors can carry on pretty much business as usual allowing other priorities to be dealt with. EU aid and non-aid cooperation continue to be fragmented and EU external action leverage is

[101] For Commissioner Neven Mimicia's "Mission Letter' from Commission President Juncker see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mimica_en.pdf

limited, with joint cooperation happening on an ad hoc basis. Larger donors and European powers with international coverage play solo, widening the gap between them and other Member States that have limited international presence.

4.5.3. Scenario 3: A Free Riding World with Dramatically Increased Bilateralism

The EU project dramatically declines (potentially with some Member States leaving the EU or the Eurozone) including in development cooperation as does meaningful follow through on development effectiveness principles. EU's inability to manage other internal (financial crisis and political instability) and international challenges (such as for instance migration) has negative consequences on its external action writ large. **Member States work actively to avoid any sort of new collective endeavour in foreign and development affairs** including following through on commitments to promote the SDG 2030 agenda in an all of EU approach.

Some Member States actively reject and fight against the concept of Joint Cooperation Strategies and do not reiterate their political support to Joint Programming either. Most of them see it as a threat to national foreign policy and development interests. As a result, Member States and EU headquarters quietly disengage from Joint Programming and institutional coherence towards this practice vanishes.

The capacity of the EEAS, DEVCO and EU Delegations to promote Joint Programming is decreased. Member States' capitals instruct their field offices to avoid coordination initiatives and to pursue their bilateral priorities, while primarily forging alliances with non-European partners. Other provisions on the EU external action in the Lisbon Treaty are less and less applied, leading to a general rolling back and increasing irrelevance of the EU as an international actor including in both foreign affairs and development effectiveness.

Potential Trade-Offs: EU aid and cooperation become more fragmented and while some Member States feel they may have more freedom of action, EU collective leverage is significantly undermined. In the long term, all Member States are worse off, for transaction costs to forge common positions vis-à-vis partner governments increase. EU as much as Member States' individual visibility is also jeopardised.

5. Conclusions and options for action: Towards Joint Cooperation Strategies

Joint Programming is a unique vehicle for the EU and its Member States to implement the new global agenda for Sustainable Development Goals and the Lisbon Treaty: it merges, in a flexible and adaptive fashion, latest aid effectiveness methods to achieve universal development objectives with attempts to give Europe a stronger political clout in increasingly competitive global affairs. Many Member States (but not all of them) and EU institutions have realised that. They already endorsed this strategic vision**.** Yet **there is a Joint Programming fatigue and huge needs for revitalised political support for this modality**, with some Member States doubting of its benefits, misinterpreting its transformative power or even disillusioned by the EU institutions' instrumental rigidity.

More than three years after its launch, Joint Programming has been only partly successful, with only one third (20 out of 55) of envisaged partner countries seeing the adoption by the EU family of a Joint Programming strategy (phase 3). In another other third, Europeans are still stuck by policy dilemma or hampered by intractable local contexts (phase 1). In the rest, they are still trying or pretending to be successful (phase 2). Actual follow up to JP strategies leading to joint monitoring and implementation is the exception (taking place only in a couple of countries).

Success stories tell us a number of truths about best practice in Joint Programming. First of all, as in any other policy process, personalities matter. **A lot depend on people's willingness to implement existing political and policy commitments**.

When EU Member States are serious about putting in place the right procedures internally (which have a lot to do with administrative flexibility, delegation of powers to field offices and dedicated and motivated staff), they can become efficient Joint Programming champions. When they failed to do so, their national apparatus does not really deliver or at worst becomes a hurdle. **Our comparative profiling shows that each Member State has something to improve and work on to better promote Joint Programming**, **possibly by learning from others' best practice**.

The EU institutions play a central role in Joint Programming**.** If EU Delegations are not staffed properly or if they do not act as champions, there is no hope for JP; if **EU institutions do not apply Joint Programming to their own cooperation programming,** including at critical junctures when they review their programming priorities, **it jeopardises the whole process**.

Member States are interested in Joint Programming when it decreases their transaction costs, does not threaten their bilateral cooperation objectives, demonstrates more impact, and give them more influence. Some Member States (France and Germany more particularly but not only) have clearly managed to take advantage of JP. Member States with less diplomatic presence and staff and fewer development funds may at times feel quite frustrated and worried, even more so when they see EU institutions imposing their own priorities in "Brussels language" or being unable to efficiently deliver in joint implementation.

When things worked well at country level, very often – there are always exceptions - independent consultants played a crucial facilitating, mediation and socialising role within the EU family.

Joint Programming is context-specific because of at least four main reasons:

- First, **personalities matter**. The presence, departure or negative attitude of a single individual can make a positive or negative difference in JP processes.
- Second, JP **can work in stable or fragile contexts** as long as EU actors collectively deem there is a minimal level of stability to undertake JP processes.
- Third, **there is no need for the partner government to be on board to start** Joint Programming and reach phase 2 (roadmaps and joint analysis). However, **there is no way to reach phase 3** (adoption of a Joint Programming strategy) **without** timely and politically sensitive consultations and policy dialogue with **partner authorities to find the "good fit"**[102].
- Fourth, **Joint Programming's success relies on a shared consensus amongst Europeans about its political rationale (based on a variety of political tactics and compromises among Member States and EU institutions) as much as on its added value to existing donor coordination frameworks**. With one of the above-mentioned ingredients missing, a country context might not be ripe for launching Joint Programming.

5.1. Options for action

With mixed results and current critical appraisals, the future success of Joint Programming in delivering real results is under threat. According to our forecast, there are very likely alternative scenarios (downgraded ambitions and free riding, see chapter 4). **Keeping Joint Programming afloat requires bold measures from Member States and EU institutions in a dozen of key policy areas** (listed below) that will influence the future of this cooperation modality. In the best case, these measures will contribute to our scenario 1 (institutionalisation of EU Joint Programming as Joint Cooperation Strategies), if a critical mass of these measures are not implemented ECDPM's analysis leads to other less positive scenarios unfolding.

- Renewed all-of-EU political impetus rebranding Joint Programming into Joint Cooperation Strategies to sustain its attractiveness as a concept, a mindset, a practice and a potential norm with a legal base.
  Options for action: Under the leadership of the High Representative/Vice President, inclusion of Joint Cooperation Strategies as a priority in the upcoming 2016 EU Global Strategy,[103] a revised Consensus on Development/Agenda for Change and other relevant sub-strategies. Adoption of new Council conclusions on Joint Cooperation Strategies (replacing Joint Programming), reflecting changes induced by the post-2015 SDG agenda.

- Progressive merging of existing EU and Member States cooperation strategies and programming exercises.
  Option for action: Renewed public commitment made by Member States and EU institutions to systematically mutualise joint analyses, adopt Joint Cooperation Strategies. Merge programming exercises with Joint Programming, taking advantage of the upcoming reviews of programming cycles as well as the preparation of next financial instruments post-2020.
- Member States and EU institutions looking at the DG level at what kind of homework and change is feasible to make progress on practical capacity, instrumental flexibility, institutional coherence and what would revive political interest in Joint Programming/Joint Cooperation Strategies.

[102] The idea of the good fit has been developed for instance in Levy, B., Working with the grain: integrating governance and growth in development strategies, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
[103] For some background on the EU Global strategy, see the dedicated website and publications at http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union.

- Member States and EU institutions assessing at the DG level what kind of homework and change is feasible to make progress on practical capacity, instrumental flexibility, institutional coherence and what would revive political interest in Joint Programming/Joint Cooperation Strategies.

- Exploring the link between delivery of SDGs and JP.
  Option for action: Specific and early policy thought and operational direction on how Joint Programming can assist in delivering an effective division of labour and a more strategic EU approach to achieve the SDGs. This needs to occur at the EU institution and EU Member State headquarter level as the policy and institutional implications of SDG agenda are currently being thought through. A first seminar bringing together SDG and JP technical experts could be organised.

- Intensification of Joint Programming socialising initiatives such as regional and technical seminars.
  Option for action: Inclusion of Joint Cooperation Strategies seminars in the rotating EU Presidency agenda to socialise the concept and engage relevant staff more frequently.

- Increased investment in the contracting of external consultants supporting Joint Programming as neutral facilitators in partner countries.
  Option for action: Increased investment in joint contracting of external consultants whose assignments would primarily be to ease, as neutral facilitators, Joint Programming/Joint Cooperation Strategies processes at country level, and providing administrative support, rather than on substituting EU and Member States' staff obligations, which would be counter-productive.

- Results of an independent evaluation on JP commissioned by DEVCO and the EEAS to be launched in late 2015-early 2016.
  Option for action: Capitalise on future evaluations of Joint Programming provided they are carried out in a transparent and participatory manner with four complementary objectives: a) contribution to Member States and the Union's interests; b) creation of a monitoring mechanism assessing progress made in JP including the contribution to aid effectiveness, c) contribution to EU coherence as per the Lisbon Treaty, d) assessment of JP potential contribution to post-2015 agenda.

- Stronger communication and learning on the benefits of Joint Programming and joint implementation.
  Option for action: Set-up of a virtual lessons learned mechanism on Joint Cooperation Strategies hosted by Capacity4Dev to strengthen communication on their benefits and on joint implementation.

- Technological innovations making Joint Programming more user-friendly.
  Options for action: Creating one-stop shared secure web platforms to jointly work together on draft documents in real time at the country level rather than endlessly commenting on circulated drafts.

Annex I - Member States and EU institutions profiling tables and scoring on key indicators[104]

Austria and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1[105]	2	4
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		0[106]	0	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1[107]	2	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		1		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at headquarters (HQ) (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1[108]	2	5
		Existence of coordination practices / meetings within HQs (1)		1[109]		
	Coherence between HQs and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1[110]	3	
		Effective delegation of power to field offices to participate in JP (2)		2[111]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1[112]	1	4
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/ or	1[113]	1	

[104] An explanatory note "Mapping and profiling methodological approach" is available in the annexes.
[105] Austria is a strong supporter of a European approach towards development, particularly Joint Programming and joint implementation (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[106] Austria has no guidelines at present.
[107] Austria views the EU as a way to enhance its participation in EU development policies (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[108] Austria favours strategic reference points in its regional planning in form of a contact person at HQ level.
[109] We were informed that Austria has good channels of communication between HQ and their field offices regarding reporting exercises, strategic issues and the like (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[110] Austria is highly decentralised, following a "whole of government" approach.
[111] Austrian field offices are empowered to sign documents and provide recommendations to HQ on JP processes in partner countries (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[112] HQ witnesses a positive push towards sector concentration and division of labour and provided examples of cases where Austrian sector choices were reviewed based on JP discussions (Interview with a European official in HQ, 22/09/2015).
[113] We were informed that JP is included in preparing partner country strategies.

		JP as "umbrella" document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		1[114]	2	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1[115]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1[116]	3	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		1[117]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1[118]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		1[119]	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		0		

[114] Austria has bilateral country strategies with each of its priority countries/regions (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[115] JP has reinforced decentralisation within Austria, and has strengthened the role of HoCs vis a vis HQ, leading to further devolution (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[116] We were informed that Austria conducts training for its JP staff, although the focus of training seminars is limited to its priority countries (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[117] Our research revealed that knowledge management focuses on the dissemination of EU documents.
[118] Austria is positive about participation in EU seminars, and encourages its HoCs to participate in regional EU workshops (Interview with a European official in HQs, 22/09/2015).
[119] We were informed that Austria HQ finds the JP workload to be manageable.

Belgium and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	5
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1	2	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		1		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1[120]	1	3
		Existence of coordination practices/meetings within HQs (1)		0		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		0[121]	2	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		2		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		2[122]	2	3
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/ or	1	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country’s cycle (1)		0	0	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		0		

[120] There is no official focal point for JP but a person designated to follow it up as an add-on (at some point there were 2 dedicated staff on JP for several months when Belgium engaged in JP).

[121] JP has influenced the overall Belgian legal framework for development cooperation and the reform of the national programming system, which already included delegation of power to field offices. However, no explicit guidelines or instructions - in spite of their public announcement in 2014 - have been developed and some interviews report that field staff feel a gap in that regard. (Interview with European officials in HQ, 24/09/2015).

[122] Awareness that JP may need shifting towards non-traditional sectors of Belgian cooperation (Belgian inputs to the 2014 Stockholm JP seminar).

PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)	1	2	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)	0		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)	1		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)	1	2	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)	1		

Denmark and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	5
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1	2	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		1		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	1	4
		Existence of coordination meetings within HQs (1)[123]		0		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1[124]	3	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		2		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		0	0	2
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either /or	1	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country’s cycle (1)		1[125]	1	

[123] There are regular coordination meetings with embassies, but JP is “not an agenda point in itself”. In Spring 2015 there was an internal seminar on JP with EEAS, DEVCO and 9 embassies taking part via Video Conference, which is more about knowledge management than regular coordination on JP. (Interview with European official in HQs, 02/10/2015).

[124] Denmark HQ confirmed that the decentralised Danish system means that “it is really up to embassies” how to engage. (Interview with European official in HQs, 25/09/2015).

[125] Serious efforts have been made in Uganda but because of uncertainty from the Uganda side, it proved difficult for Denmark programming to synchronise. (Interview with European official in HQs, 02/10/2015).

		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)	0[126]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)	1	2	2
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)	1		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)	0[127]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)	0[128]	0	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)	0		

[126] There is limited flexibility in the 5 year-long cycle, also coming from a new approach consisting of programming holistic/multi-sectoral bilateral programmes. Furthermore, the understanding of JP is that JP is also about planning financing commitments (NB a point that is subject to interpretation), which makes synchronisation too difficult because of the constraints imposed by national financial cycles. (Interview with European official in HQs, 02/10/2015).

[127] Although information and knowledge on JP is shared, some embassies didn't have resources to take part to regional seminars. (Interview with European officials in HQ, 02/10/2015).

[128] It is felt that resources at country and HQ level were not sufficient to deal with general JP processes and that the focus of embassies is mostly on immediate local and practical support. (Interview with European officials in HQ, 02/10/2015).

Finland and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1[129]	2	3
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1[130]		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1[131]	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		0[132]	0	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		0[133]		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2	4
		Existence of coordination practices / meetings within HQs (1)		1[134]		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		0[135]	2	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		2[136]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1[137]	1	3
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either /or	1[138]	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				

[129] According to the Finland 2012 Policy Statement, involvement in JP is encouraged.
[130] According to the Finland 2012 Policy Statement, division of labour and joint practices amongst EU donors is encouraged.
[131] There is a one document in place, although according to our interview with a European official in HQs, the change of government in April 2015 means it remains to be seen if current policies on JP will change.
[132] Finland has a positive view on JP processes from an aid effectiveness, but is more focused on influencing JP according to Finnish interests (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015).
[133] According to our interview with a European official in HQs, Finland views JP as complementary to its national development policies.
[134] Finland engages in discussions and dialogue on an ad-hoc basis between HQs and the various embassies (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015).
[135] We were informed that although aid administration in Finland is very centralised (HQ would be responsible for approving processes and making key decisions), in practice embassies have a lot of freedom to lead operations in the field on a day-to-day basis (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015).
[136] Country officers and embassies have the lead, utilising these processes as best as possible (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015).
[137] According to our research, Finland engages with both Nordic plus and EU group.
[138] Existing Finnish programming documents mention EU JP documents. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015 and 30/11/2015).

		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)[139]	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		1[140]	1	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1[141]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1[142]	2	3
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		0		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1[143]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		1[144]	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		0		

[139] In January 2005 the decision was made that a larger review and reformulation (for example changing sector level outcome objectives) can be made when the partner country decides upon a new policy or national plan, or when government policy changes in Finland (which is aligned with the FI government) to the partner country cycle.

[140] As a result of a new cycle of country programming for 2016, Finland has not yet finalised its synchronisation plans (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015).

[141] Finland takes its own bilateral programming processes as the basis for its partner country engagement (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015).

[142] We were informed that Finland participates in EU regional seminars.

[143] We were informed that Finland participates in technical seminars.

[144] Finland has good HR capacities for JP processes (Interview with a European official in HQs, 23/07/2015).

France and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	4
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1	1[145]	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1	1[146]	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		0		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2[147]	5
		Existence of coordination practices/meetings within HQs (1)		1		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation/deconcentration of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1	3	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		2		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1	1	4
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/ or	1	1[148]	
		JP as “umbrella” document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country’s cycle (1)		1	2[149]	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1		

[145] Interview with European official in HQs, 22/07/2015.
[146] As explained in the guidelines (Interview with European official in HQs, 22/07/2015) This has been confirmed by several interviews with French officials in third countries.
[147] Several actors (EU directorate, thematic units, geographic units) are involved in Joint Programming at the HQs level. (Interview with European official in HQs, 22/07/2015).
[148] As envisaged in the guidelines. (Interview with European official in HQs, 22/07/2015).
[149] Programming is already aligned with national policies. (Interview with European official in HQs, 22/07/2015).

PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)	1[150]	3	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)	1[151]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)	1		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)	1	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)	0		

[150] Modules on Joint Programming for embassies and agencies' staff, and for new staff, were organised. (Interview with European official in HQs, 22/07/2015).

[151] Provision of guidance to field staff. (Interview with European official in HQs, 22/07/2015).

Germany and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	5
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1[152]		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1[153]	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1[154]	2	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		1		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1[155]	2	4
		Existence of coordination practices / meetings within HQs (1)		1[156]		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1[157]	2	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		1[158]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1[159]	1	4
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/ or	1	1	

[152] According to the 2014 BMZ Guidelines, Germany strongly supports JP and division of labour processes.
[153] Germany has institutional guidelines that make clear reference to EU JP processes and clarifies the situation under which JP can substitute country programming documents (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015).
[154] According to the 2014 BMZ Guidelines, Germany views JP as a means to increase German significance in development cooperation.
[155] The BMZ Strategy Department has a focal contact point for JP who is responsible for in-house training, writing the guidelines and being the resource person for JP documents. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015)
[156] We were informed that Germany holds regular information sessions on joint programming within HQ. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015).
[157] The 2014 BMZ Guidelines indicate strong decentralisation where respective BMZ country units and teams are closely coordinated; country teams in partner countries are included in the JP processes at an early stage and the respective BMZ country units offers directives on the German Guidelines. The BMZ country unit then decides due to its competency how suggestions and comments are taken into consideration.
[158] HoCs act quite autonomously, even though they report back to the country department on JP processes: (i) HoCs has responsibility to ensure all other ministers are informed on JP and to align and (ii) country divisions in HQ decide on the levels of engagement in JP within partner countries (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015).
[159] The 2014 BMZ Guidelines stipulate that "If Germany has to exit a sector this should only take place following the explicit wish of the partner country."

		JP as "umbrella" document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		1[160]	2	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1[161]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1[162]	2	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		1[163]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1[164]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		1[165]	2	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		0[166]		

[160] The 2014 BMZ Guidelines provide that JP processes are designed in accordance with the priorities of the partner countries and the local conditions. Synchronisation with partner country planning cycles should be taken up early on in consultation with the partner country government.

[161] According to our research, Germany is flexible and considers synchronisation and division of labour as the most important factor.

[162] Although Germany regards its JP "staff" as its Heads of Cooperation, it holds training sessions on joint programming for outgoing HoCs and also includes sessions on JP in the annual HoC meetings in different regions. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015).

[163] Germany makes use of the EU-JP knowledge platform. In practice, knowledge management is undertaken by one person in the strategy department responsible for joint programing, and responsibilities include providing guidance to staff in HQ and the field offices, as well as accompanying the various JP-processes. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015).

[164] Germany co-hosted (together with EEAS and DEVCO) a two-day JP training seminar in Myanmar, April 2015. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015).

[165] Although Germany acknowledges that JP processes are extremely time intensive, they are happy to invest in these processes (Interview with a European official in HQs, 27/07/2015).

[166] We were informed that there are no specific JP incentives offered to staff.

Ireland and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	3
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1[167]	0	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		nd		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		0[168]	1	3
		Existence of coordination practices/meetings within HQs (1)		1		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1[169]	2	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		1		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1	1	4
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either /or	1	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country’s cycle (1)		1	2	

[167] “Increased coordination and progress on Joint Programming are part of the new vision of EU development policy, ‘An Agenda for Change’ (available at
). This policy commits the EU and its Member States to the goal of eradicating poverty, and places human rights, good governance, democracy and inclusive and sustainable growth at the heart of EU development efforts. Our goals are very much aligned to this collective effort.” One World, One Future: Ireland’s Policy for International Development (2013).

[168] However Ireland has a focal person for all EU development policy and a focal person for all aid and development effectiveness matters.

[169] Decentralised system according to written exchanges and interview. (Interview with European official in HQs, 27/08/2015).

		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)	1		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)	1	1	2
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)	0		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)	0		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)	1	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)	nd		

Italy and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1[170]	2	3
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		0[171]	0	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1[172]	1	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		0[173]		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1[174]	2	2
		Existence of coordination meetings within HQs (1)		1[175]		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		0[176]	0	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		0[177]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1	1	3
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/or	1[178]	1	

[170] Guidelines of the Italian Cooperation for 2014-2016.
[171] Italy does not have national guidelines. (Email correspondence with a European official in HQs, 08/10/2015)
[172] Donor coordination and division of labour are positive processes from the donor's perspective. JP remains first of all a tool to ensure aid effectiveness and provide better assistance to our partner countries. (Email correspondence with a European official in HQs, 08/10/2015).
[173] We were informed that this is currently subject to an internal evaluation.
[174] Italy has a focal point for JP, situated in the Development Cooperation Policies of the EU, within the Italian MFA.
[175] Italy engages in constant dialogue with the Italian Cooperation Offices on JP processes. An annual meeting with the Heads of the Technical Cooperation Offices takes place every year. (Email correspondence with a European official in HQs, 08/10/2015)
[176] The ongoing reform of the Italian Development Cooperation system is meant to contribute, among others, to efficient decentralisation and delegation of power to field offices.
[177] We were inform that these issues will be dealt next year by the new institutional Italian Development Cooperation set-up. The Italian law on Development Cooperation adopted last year, foresee the creation of the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation that, starting from the January 2016, will operate under the political oversight of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation. (Email correspondence with a European official in HQs, 08/10/2015).
[178] For instance in the case of Ethiopia, the Joint Cooperation Strategy was the reference for the bilateral strategy. Italy also makes reference to the EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack. (Email correspondence with a European official in HQs, 08/10/2015).

		JP as "umbrella" document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		1	1	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		0[179]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1[180]	3	3
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		1[181]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1[182]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		0[183]	0	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		0[184]		

[179] We were informed that this is currently under evaluation.
[180] A session on the JP activities is organized every year at HQs level to promote an exchange of views with the Heads of the Italian Technical Cooperation Offices. (Email correspondence with a European official in HQs, 08/10/2015).
[181] Notwithstanding the absence of formal guidelines, the HQs are in dialogue with the field offices, for instance in the case of Bolivia and Kenya, to help clarify issues related to EU joint programming.
[182] We were informed that Italian Heads of the Cooperation Offices have attended the regional seminars organized by the EC.
[183] Depending on the field office, some have dedicated joint programming staff while other experience shortages.
[184] No incentives offered to staff involved in JP. (Email correspondence with a European official in HQs, 08/10/2015).

Luxembourg and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION (derived from the mapping fiches)	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	3
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		0	0	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		0	1	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		1		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2	5
		Existence of coordination meetings within HQs (1)		1		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1	3	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		2		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		2[185]	2	5
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document[186]	either/ or	1	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country’s cycle (1)		1	2	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1		

[185] According to our interview, Luxembourg is very specialised sectorally and often only engages in a limited number sectors. In several cases they are the lead donor in in their sector of expertise. There are also examples where Luxembourg has shown flexibility to leave one sector in favour of another during joint programming and division of labour discussions. (Interview with European official at HQ, 06/10/15).

[186] According to the Annual Report of Luxembourg’s development cooperation in 2013, Luxembourg has taken an active role in joint programming, including through its lead role in the “vocational training” sector. See pages 31, 34, 38.

PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)	1	3	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)	0		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)	1		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)	1	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)	0[187]		

[187] "En ce qui concerne les "incentives", nous n'avons pas un système spécifique."

The Netherlands and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	5
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1[188]	2	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		1[189]		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1[190]	2	5
		Existence of coordination practices/meetings within HQs (1)		1[191]		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1[192]	3	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		2		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1	1[193]	3
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/or	1	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				

[188] http://www.government.nl/issues/development-cooperation/documents-and-publications/reports/2013/04/30/a-world-to-gain.html

[189] Dutch staff in HQs and in field offices in Mali, Senegal and occupied Palestinian Territories remarked that promoting joint programming is and objective for the Dutch foreign and development policy. An European diplomat in Ethiopia remarked that big actors like Netherlands do not have the same calendars as the other Europeans (November 2014). Tensions are present because although NL has four big priorities in development cooperation, which enables JP process through their specialisation, the new agenda is increasingly centralised and not integrated into JP processes, thereby reducing predictability and transparency for embassies and partner governments. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 13/10/2015).

[190] Yes, within the bureau for international cooperation.

[191] Embassies are required to report back to HQ. HoC meetings were held in June 2013 and in December 2014 in the Hague to discuss policy implementation, and the one in June 2013 was a special session to discuss JP. We discuss JP and although this can happen on a more regular / structured basis. It’s not very structured but it’s still happening. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 13/10/2015).

[192] Reports indicate that the Netherlands has a strong decentralisation approach towards joint programming.

[193] No major overhaul of priorities when a new minister for development came into office, after a new government was formed after the elections. However the choice was made to prepare new Multiannual Strategic Plans (MASPs) even though the option to update the previous ones existed. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 09/07/2015) Four key priority sectors have clearly been identified. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 13/10/2015).

		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		0[194]	1	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1[195]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1[196]	3	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		1[197]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1[198]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		1	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		0[199]		

[194] Whilst supporting the flexibility of MAPs, this hasn't translated into readjusting programming cycle to partner country's programming cycle, and it remains government related. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 09/07/2015).

[195] Our research indicates that the Netherlands does have capacity for this, and in some countries, HQ has showed willingness to adjust its bilateral programming cycle. Similarly, although JP processes can be adjusted and there is a level of flexibility available, the MASP are "cast in stone" and the annual review process offers more flexibility and the possibility for exceptions to be made to a MASP. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 13/10/2015).

[196] According to the NL Guidelines, regular information sessions were organized at HQ, with EEAS and DEVCO. Participation in EU (regional) training sessions / expert meetings has been encouraged.

[197] Good knowledge of joint programming by field offices interviewed in 2014 and 2015. Intention expressed by HQ to further monitor how its offices are contributing to implementing joint programming. Regional workshops as well. (Interview with a European official in HQs, 09/07/2015).

[198] Our research reveals that regular information sessions were organized at HQ, with EEAS and DEVCO. Participation in EU (regional) training sessions / expert meetings has been encouraged.

[199] We were informed that there are no incentives offered to staff working on JP processes. (Interview with European official in HQs, 13/10/2015).

Portugal and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1[200]	2	3
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1[201]		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		0[202]	0	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1[203]	1	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		0[204]		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2	4
		Existence of coordination practices/meetings within HQs (1)		1[205]		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1[206]	2	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		1[207]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1[208]	1	3
	Possible use of JP document in bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming documents	either /or	1[209]	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				

[200] Interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015.
[201] Portugal views JP as a positive tool for coordination (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).
[202] Portugal does not have any specific guidelines / technically developed guidelines, according to an interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015.
[203] Portugal values JP as a way to learn more about their EU partners and to deepen its interactions with EU MS partners (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).
[204] Although Portugal is committed to JP processes, our interview with a European official in HQ raised concerns as to whether the endeavour could have negative impacts for Portugal’s relations with its partner countries because of it’s small status as a donor country.
[205] We were informed that JP meetings are held when specifically requested by field offices (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).
[206] Portugal has close working relations between its field offices and HQs (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).
[207] We were informed that Portugal has focal points for each partner country, to service the bilateral relations and specific JP processes (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).
[208] Our research reveals that Portugal is still engaged in its traditional sectors of work, together with engaging it its traditional Lusophone partner countries.
[209] According to our research, Portugal signed onto the Joint Strategy for Ethiopia.

		Substitution of bilateral programming document with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		1[210]	1	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		0[211]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1[212]	2	3
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		0[213]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1[214]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		0[215]	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		1[216]		

[210] According to the Multiannual Programming Report of 2011, Portugal is flexible and willing to adjust its programming cycles to match the national planning cycle of its partner countries.

[211] Regarding synchronisation, Portugal still priorities bilateral programming for the immediate future (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).

[212] We were informed that Portugal engages in internal meetings with line ministries and internal sharing of knowledge with colleagues in the field offices (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).

[213] The European official we spoke to voiced concerns that Portugal does not have a structure in place, and that the limited capacity development in the form of attending meetings in Brussels does not suffice and is ineffective.

[214] Our research shows Portugal has attended JP conferences in Addis Ababa and conferences in Brussels.

[215] Portugal has voiced concerns over capacity issues for its staff (interview with a European official in HQs, 26/08/2015).

[216] The European official at HQ spoke positively of Portugal using JP as a tool to grow embassies and incentivise staff members to participate in JP processes.

Spain and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	4
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1[217]	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1[218]	1	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		0[219]		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2	4
		Existence of coordination practices / meetings within HQs (1)		1		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1[220]	2	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		1[221]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1[222]	1	4
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either /or	1[223]	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country’s cycle (1)		1[224]	2	

[217] Spain released new guidelines on JP shortly before the summer break of 2015.
[218] 2015 Spanish JP Guidelines.
[219] The 2015 Spanish JP Guidelines envisage ways to coordinate bilateral programming and JP programming.
[220] Spain is split between political and technical units, and the contact point for JP exists in the technical unit (Interview with a European official in HQs, 18/09/2015 (B).
[221] All operations are led in field and harmonized processes exist in all partner countries, but operations remain coordinated in HQ (Interview with a European official in HQs, 18/09/2015 (B).
[222] The 2015 Spanish JP Guidelines envisage ways to coordinate bilateral programming and JP programming.
[223] According to the 2015 Spanish Guidelines, Spain can make reference to the JP document.
[224] Spain engages in complete alignment with a partner country’s programming cycle (Interview with a European official in HQs, 18/09/2015 (B).

		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)	1[225]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)	1[226]	3	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)	1[227]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)	1[228]		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)	1[229]	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)	0		

[225] The 2015 JP guidelines explain how to coordinate bilateral programming with JP.
[226] We were informed that training at capital level and meetings with coordinators have taken place, although Spain has not yet undertaken any field level trainings (Interview with a European official in HQs, 18/09/2015 (B).
[227] We were informed that Spain offers training from the development agency. 18/09/2015 (B).
[228] Spain co-organised the first Joint Programming Seminar in Latin America, in Guatemala in 2013. 18/09/2015 (B).
[229] We were informed that staff understand JP processes well. 18/09/2015 (B).

Sweden and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1[230]	2	3
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		0	0	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		0[231]	1	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		1[232]		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2	3
		Existence of coordination meetings within HQs (1)		1[233]		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		0	1	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		1[234]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1[235]	1	4
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/o	1[236]	1	

[230] The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed their commitment to EU Joint Programming and the Swedish guidelines on results strategies from July 2013 confirm this commitment.

[231] Although interviews with employees stationed in embassies have highlighted the need to speak with one voice through the EU as an important factor for EU Joint Programming in partner countries. (Phone interview with European official in Palestine, 10/07/2015).

[232] Although Sweden's commitment to EU Joint Programming is clear from their results strategies guidelines and in the perception of other actors', Delputte and Orbie (2014) indicated that there is some tension between the Nordic+ groups' identity corresponding more with wider multilateralism than with being an EU donor.

[233] Needs-based meetings are held between Sida and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at HQ level.

[234] While the note "Sweden and Joint Programming" (2014) and interviews confirm that for Sweden EU JP is a field driven process, some interviews in partner countries have indicated the lack of coherence between the political interest in JP and signals from headquarters about operational practice. (Interview with European officials in Tanzania, 23/02/2015).

[235] The Swedish results strategy guidelines emphasise the need for flexibility in programming and that the process should comply with EU Joint Programming, however some negative signs of flexibility on this point were indicated in interviews and detracted from giving the full score of 2 points. (Interview with European officials in Tanzania, 24/02/2015).

[236] Based on information in the study by O'Riordan, Benfield and de Witte (2011).

		JP as "umbrella" document	r			
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		1[237]	2	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1	3	4
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		1[238]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		1	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		0[239]		

[237] Based on information in the study by O'Riordan, Benfield and de Witte (2011) yet the "Sweden and Joint Programming (2014) note indicates that because many partner country strategies were implemented in 2013 and 2014 full synchronisation has not been achieved. Furthermore, interviews in partner countries have indicated some difficulties in the practical implementation of synchronisation. (Interview with European officials in Tanzania, 23/02/2015).

[238] Although no internal guidelines on Joint Programming exist, Sweden has shown other indicators of effective knowledge management practices through for example the technical seminar on Joint Programming organised in collaboration with EEAS and DEVCO in Stockholm in September 2014.

[239] In Sweden there is not a tradition for staff assessments at all and as such this rarely exists for civil servants.

United Kingdom and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1	2	2
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		0	0	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		0[240]	0	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		0		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2	5
		Existence of coordination practices/meetings within HQs (1)		1[241]		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1	3	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		2		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		2	2	4
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/ or	0	0	
		JP as “umbrella” document				
		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country’s cycle (1)		1	2	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		1		

[240] "Although we support proposals for ensuring better division of labour amongst donors to increase aid effectiveness and efficiency, we do not support the European Commission proposal for Joint Programming if it involves the Commission playing a leading role in coordinating the work of Member States with a better track record than its own. We do support Joint Programming by consensus where the Commission is operating alongside bilateral donors, thereby reducing transaction costs for recipient countries.” House of Commons, International Development Committee. 2012. EU Development Assistance Sixteenth Report of Session 2010–12 Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. HC 1680 Published on 27 April 2012.

[241] According to our interview with a European official in HQs on 28/07/2015, the UK engages in processes of ongoing discussions, cooperation and information sharing with other donors and governments. They also have active networks which regularly share information and experience.

PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)	0	1	2
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)	1[242]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)	0		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)	1	1	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)	?		

[242] The UK has "Yammer" groups that help staff to engage on common issues, which can include exchanging experiences of working with other donors or doing joint work. They also have platforms on specific issues, case studies, and policies- all of which are accessible to all staff (Interview with a European official in HQs, 28/07/2015).

EU institutions and Joint Programming

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSION	ITEMS/INDICATORS		I	S-D	D
POLITICAL INTEREST (5)	Political commitment and track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)	Explicit commitment to JP (1)		1[243]	2	4
		Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)		1		
	Internal instructions/guidelines (1)	Existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions (1)		1	1	
	Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)	Political statement of EU JP as power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)		1	1	
		Successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)		0[244]		
INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE (5)	Internal coherence at HQ (2)	Existence of focal person for JP in HQs (1)		1	2	4
		Existence of coordination practices/meetings within HQs (1)		1		
	Coherence between HQs/ and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)	Existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP (1)		1	2	
		Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)		1[245]		
INSTRUMENTAL FLEXIBILITY (5)	Flexibility in priority sector choices and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)	Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)		1[246]	1	2
	Possible use of JP document for bilateral programming (1)	Reference to JP in bilateral programming document	either/ or	1[247]	1	
		JP as “umbrella” document				

[243] Commitments to European joint programming have been outlined in a number of EU development policies since 2011, including financing instruments regulations.

[244] EU delegations are not necessarily seen as neutral players in EU JP as they have their own bilateral programming interests that may come into play in EU JP processes. Furthermore, some respondents pointed out that those units responsible for EU JP in HQ are small units that may not necessarily represent the perspectives of the whole Directorate Generals of the EC (DEVCO, NEAR) or the EEAS.

[245] The interference of Brussels head quarters in the 11th EDF programming process demonstrated the limits of effective delegation of powers to EU Delegations. See Herrero, A., Knoll, A., Gregersen, C., Kokolo, W. 2015. Implementing the Agenda for Change: An independent analysis of the 11th EDF programming. (Discussion Paper 180). Maastricht: ECDPM.

[246] Several respondents criticised the EU for not being flexible with regards their own bilateral programming procedures and that EU JP processes lost legitimacy in some cases where directions from Brussels superseded local consultations on division of labour. See also Herrero, A., Knoll, A., Gregersen, C., Kokolo, W. 2015. Implementing the Agenda for Change: An independent analysis of the 11th EDF programming. (Discussion Paper 180). Maastricht: ECDPM.

[247] Several respondents have raised criticisms of the EU not taking the lead in terms of substitution of the EC’s own bilateral programming documents with EU JP documents. However, the EEAS and DEVCO launched a new initiative on the question of substitution of programming documents and discussed it at technical seminar on 12 November 2015.

		Substitution of bilateral programming documents with JP document				
	Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)	Synchronisation with partner country's cycle (1)		0[248]	0	
		Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)		0[249]		
PRACTICAL CAPACITY (5)	Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)	National trainings/seminar/modules organised (1)		1[250]	3	3
		Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)		1[251]		
		Contribution to EU & Member States technical/regional seminars (1)		1		
	Human resource (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)	Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)		0[252]	0	
		Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)		0		

[248] Several respondents noted that the EU programming itself is less flexible in terms of synchronisation than some EU member states. Partner government and EU cycles are not in sync (Interview June 2015).

[249] The indicator points at past experience and whether capacity was made available or not. "In some countries synchronisation is a problem and often the EC is the main problem, not the EU MS." (Interview July 2015) and "The EUD don't control their timelines. They don't have any flexibility." (Interview February 2015).

[250] Feedback loops are in place between HQ and EUDs and EEAS/DEVCO and EUDs have organised a number of retreats both in Brussels and regionally.

[251] See note above.

[252] Several respondents noted that EU Delegation human resources and in particular Heads of Cooperation are stretched when it comes to EU JP as it is a time consuming exercise that is seen by many as 'additional' to other priorities, e.g. "The reason number 1 why EU JP is not moving forward is lack of time to dedicate on something that requires a lot of interaction" (Interview September 2015). Also, according to some consultants, "JP has been used as an excuse to cut down staffing in Delegations. This is a very bad idea. We need qualified officials who can participate in policy dialogues." (Interview June 2015).

Annex II - Mapping and profiling methodological approach

Research design

To carry out the profiling of the member states according to their degree of engagement in JP as evidenced in the last 3 to 4 years, we have constructed an analytical matrix that grasps the full spectrum of how JP has been taken on board by EU member states. The matrix is comprised of four dimensions. that are split into various sub-dimensions, the latter then split again into a set of indicators. Indicators all point at incentives towards JP.

This profiling is carried ex-post and based on evidence at our disposal on Member States' behaviour since 2011. It is not exhaustive and can be subject to discussion, as any other methodological framework in social sciences. Future research could potentially focus on refining the methodology presented here.

Elements of the matrix

Identifying elements for the matrix has not been an easy task. In particular, we faced the challenging task of identifying relevant sub-dimensions and robust indicators for what appears to be uncomplicated dimensions. It is these elements that are further described in this section. The table below gives an overview of the matrix.

Analytical matrix with scoring

Dimensions	Sub-dimensions	Indicators
P *Political interest (5)*	**P.1** *Political commitment & track record on JP toolkit (e.g. Code of Conduct, etc.) (2)*	**P.1.1** *Explicit commitment to JP (1)*
		P.1.2 *Proven track record in JP elements (sector concentration, division of labour, joint implementation, etc.) (1)*
	P.2 *Internal instructions / guidelines (1)*	**P.2.1** *Existence of a document with JP guidelines / instructions (1)*
	P.3 *Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy (2)*	**P.3.1** *Political statement about EU JP as a power multiplier (i.e. EU JP as a platform for enhancing Member State (MS) role in development cooperation) (1)*
		P.3.2 *Successful / effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests (1)*
I *Institutional coherence (5)*	**I.1** *Internal coherence at HQ (2)*	**I.1.1** *Existence of a focal person for JP in HQs (1)*
		I.1.2 *Existence of coordination practices within HQs (1)*
	I.2 *Coherence between HQs/and field offices / Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP (3)*	**I.2.1** *Existence of an established decentralisation / deconcentration policy on JP (1)*
		I.2.2 *Effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP (2)*

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="6">If
Instrumental flexibility (5)</td><td>If.1
Flexibility in combining the priority sectors and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP (2)</td><td colspan="2">If.1.1
Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP (2)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">If.2
Possible use of a JP document for bilateral programming (1)</td><td>Reference to JP in bilateral programming documents”</td><td rowspan="3">If.2.1
either/or
(1)</td></tr>
<tr><td>JP as “umbrella” document</td></tr>
<tr><td>Substitution of bilateral programming document with JP document</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">If.3
Flexibility in bilateral programming cycles (2)</td><td colspan="2">If.3.1
Synchronisation with the partner country’s cycle (1)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">If.3.2
Capacity to flexibly adjust bilateral programming cycle (1)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Pr
Practical capacity (5)</td><td rowspan="3">Pr.1
Training & knowledge management policy on JP (3)</td><td colspan="2">Pr.1.1
National trainings, seminar / modules organised (1)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Pr.1.2
Effective JP knowledge management practice (1)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Pr.1.3
Contribution to EU & member states technical /regional seminars (1)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Pr.2
Human resources (HR) capacities to engage in JP (2)</td><td colspan="2">Pr.2.1
Perception of sufficient staff to fulfill JP tasks (N.B. 0 points given when HR limitations to engage in JP were mentioned, 1 point for non-mention) (1)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Pr.2.2
Incentives in staff assessment related to JP (1)</td></tr>
</table>

The indicators

Each of the sub-dimensions is split into various indicators.

The P.1 sub-dimension (political commitment & track record on existing EU mechanisms) is comprised of 2 indicators.

- the P.1.1 indicators refers to “explicit commitment to JP”. Here, member states that explicitly state their national commitment to JP will score 1 point. Such commitment can be expressed through political documents, high level speeches, or political orientations that de facto support JP. It thus is a rather straightforward indicator.
- the P.1.2 indicator refers to “proven track record in JP elements”. This indicator refers to the policy actions member states have undertaken prior to the coming into being of JP. Indeed, JP rests on several principles such as complementarity, division of labour, joint implementation, donor coordination, programming cycles synchronisation, and sector concentration. The bulk of those principles have already been laid down in key EU documents, prominent among which are the EU consensus on development (2005) the Code of Conduct on complementarity and division of labour (2007), and the Toolkit for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour (2009).

Respect for those principles need not be associated to engagement in JP. Some member states may indeed have a good track record in the respect of those principles and yet not be very inclined to engage in JP. The opposite may also be true: JP could trigger more positive policy actions on the part of reluctant member states. Finally, some member states could have a positive track record that trickles down to JP engagement. The aim of this indicator is not to assess the coherence with regards to those principles through the time: it merely evaluates whether those principles find an echo in member states policies.

The P.2 sub-dimension (internal instructions & guidelines) is comprised of a single indicator.

- the P.2.1 indicator refers to "existence of document with JP guidelines/instructions". While this may seem rather easy as an indicator to quantify, the difficulty lies in identifying what kind of documents are deemed relevant to count as guidelines or instructions. Indeed, different political structures in member states imply different ways of conceiving how guidance should be transmitted. As such, we have considered a variety of documents, ranging from very strict instructions to loosely defined guidance. Below are three examples of documents we have considered when attributing scores for this indicator:
- National programming instructions which specifically request indications of opportunities for EU JP = NL (as opposed to national strategies for international cooperation with only a reference to EU JP or not mentioned at all = SE + IE + UK).
- Letter of information/sections in national manuals to staff as to how to cope with national programming together with JP = ES + FI.
- National legislation enshrining JP processes in the overall national programming framework.

The P.3 sub-dimension (Relationship/interplay between JP and foreign policy objectives) is comprised of 2 indicators.

- the P.3.1 indicator refers to a "political statement about EU JP as a power multiplier". Development policy is defined in the EU treaties as a parallel competence, meaning that member states on the one hand, and the European Commission on the other implement their own development policy. Consequently, a myriad of EU development policies coexist. Whether those policies are mutually reinforcing largely depends on whether member states view EU channels as power multipliers or rather as an impediment to their own achievements. . This also applies to JP as a specific development policy of the EU. As such, member states that tend to consider the EU as a power multiplier, a framework through which their action becomes more efficient, are more likely to engage in JP. To quantify this indicator, and because it is part of the political dimension, we focus on political statements ascribing such a role to EU Joint Programming.
- the P.3.2 indicator refers to "successful/effective combination of EU JP interests with national interests". This indicator is the translation of the previous one into political action. It assesses whether member states' national interest is combined with the goals of JP in an effective way. JP and national interests are not processes that are cast in stone. Rather, they are more to be seen as evolving frameworks that guide policies. Such conception is obvious for JP insofar as it is a newly created EU approach that is still in its infancy. As such, each stakeholder tries to shape what JP means and what it implies in practice. Conceiving national interest as an evolving framework might seem less obvious. Yet, one should keep in mind that priority sectors can be adapted through changes of circumstances, expertise building, and political leadership. As such, the aim of this indicator really is to evaluate whether member states implement their development policy in a way that brings both JP and their national interest into the same track. If it is effective, such implementation is expected have tangible results. This indicator is mostly assessed through qualitative interviews.

The I.1 sub-dimension (internal coherence at HQ) is comprised of 2 indicators.

- the I.1.1 indicator refers to "existence of a focal person for JP in headquarters". This is a straightforward indicator: member states will score 1 if they have at least one person in charge of JP in their institutions dealing with development policy. This is a favourable criterion towards JP as it enshrines JP in institutional organograms and fosters the development of an expertise related to JP.
- the I.1.2 indicator refers to "existence of coordination meetings within HQs". With this indicator, we assess whether the various institutional bodies dealing with JP to a certain extent are coordinating. We are aware that much of the need to have such coordination practices depends on the number of staff working on JP at headquarter levels as well as whether different bodies are actually involved in JP. This is likely to be linked to the importance JP has for the MS at hand and the size of its institutions in charge of development cooperation. We however understand JP processes as requiring a change of mindsets breaking with the only focus on bilateral programming. As such, JP is supposed to trigger a new awareness amongst the different bodies involved, be they numerous or very few. For instance a Member State scoring 1 indicates that this country has applied good practice that could inspire other JP stakeholders.

The I.2 sub-dimension (Coherence between HQs and field offices/Efficient decentralisation of responsibilities to field offices on JP) is comprised of 2 indicators.

- the I.2.1 indicator refers to "existence of an established decentralisation/deconcentration policy on JP". JP is a process that cannot be fully implemented from the headquarters; it needs to involve actors on the field. As such, decentralising or de-concentrating the authority from headquarters to field offices is key to the success of JP. This is best achieved if a policy exists, otherwise the process could be erratic and counterproductive.
- the I.2.2 indicator refers to "effective delegation of power to participate locally in JP". Member states can score up to 2 points on this indicator. Contrary to other indicators for which criteria are fulfilled (1 point) or not (0 point), this one allows MS to score 0, 1 or 2 points depending on the level of achievement. This has mainly to do with the wording of the indicator and the mention of the effectiveness of the delegation of power. Most of our indicators are rather straightforward since they dwell on material evidence: existence or non-existence of a document, involvement of staff or not, etc. Those are mostly quantitative indicators. The I.2.2 indicator could have followed the same logic if it had been labelled 'delegation of power to participate locally in JP'; in that case, there would have been a delegation of power (1 point) or no delegation at all (0 point). We hold such delegation of power to be crucial to the success of JP: it has indeed been pointed out by various key stakeholders that JP managed from headquarters and implemented following a top-down approach is doomed to fail. It is thus our contention that staff on the ground need to be empowered. But then, assessing the effectiveness of the delegation of power bring a qualitative component to the indicator, hence the need to resort to a 2 points scale. If there is no delegation at all, the member state at hand will score 0. If there is a delegation of power, the member state will score 2 if it is very effective, and only 1 if it is partially effective. The assessment of the effectiveness is primarily based on primary data we collected during qualitative interviews.

The If.1 sub-dimension (flexibility in priority sectors and engaging in coherent division of labour through JP) is comprised of a single indicator.

- indicator If.1.1 refers to "Effective engagement in division of labour and sector choices at partner country level through JP". Priority sectors are defined by each member state in order to limit the focus of engagement. They are based on existing in-house expertise as well as political leadership

(see indicator P.3.2). Here, the focus is placed on the flexibility characterising the choice of priority sectors. Engaging in JP may mean that member states need to adjust their priority sectors in order to respect the principles of donor complementarity and coordination and effective division of labour at partner country level. Being able to engage in new priority sectors on the basis of existing and planned EU and MS engagements is definitely an attitude that is favourable to JP. At the same time, sticking to one's priority sectors may also make it easier for other member states to adjust their development programmes. It is then not a straightforward indicator as the effectiveness of flexibility heavily depends on the context of the countries where development programmes are implemented. To account for such complexity, member states can score up to 2 points on this indicator.

The If.2 sub-dimension (possible use of JP document for bilateral programming) is comprised of a single indicator that is tripartite.

- indicator If.2.1 refers to "reference to JP in bilateral programming documents", "JP as "umbrella" document", and "substitution of the national document by the JP one". Those three items are used following an either/or basis, that is to say that if at least one of the item exists, a full score will be ascribed to the indicator. JP documents are meant to ease the overall process to coordinate actors engaged in JP in a given country. But different programming habits in member states means different importance given to formal documents. Some member states could well be fully engaged in JP without having a document dedicated to JP. Hence this either/or basis.

The If.3 sub-dimension (flexibility in bilateral programming cycles) is comprised of 2 indicators.

- indicator If.3.1 refers to "synchronisation with the partner country's cycle". Synchronisation is most often referred to as a prerequisite for engaging in JP. The underlying assumption is that only when cycles are synchronised development policies can have their fullest impact by defining programmes that are implemented over the same timeline, and with the same priorities, as that defined by the partner country.
- indicator If.3.2 refers to "capacity to flexibly adjust the bilateral programming cycle". In order to achieve synchronisation, most member states need to adjust (most often through shortening) their programming cycles. Because such cycles are determined in advance for quite a long period of time, being able to adjust them is evidence of instrumental flexibility.

The Pr.1 sub-dimension (training & knowledge management policy on JP) is comprised of 3 indicators.

- indicator Pr.1.1 refers to "national trainings, seminars and/or modules organised". This indicator is rather self-explanatory while being all-encompassing at the same time. We indeed mention trainings, seminars as well as modules since the format of such events may vary from member states to member state. However, their rational is the same, namely to organise sessions for the relevant staff to gain deeper knowledge and understanding of the JP process and socialise with other JP stakeholders. Those events might last half a day to several full days. What is important here is not so much the length of the session as its very existence. Whenever at least one national training, seminar, or module has been organised by a member state, the latter will score fully in this indicator (i.e. 1 point).
- indicator Pr.1.2 refers to "effective JP knowledge management practice". Because JP is a complex process that is still being developed at EU and member states levels, knowledge management is critical in achieving progress. Once expertise is being developed, it needs to be preserved and expanded, hence the importance of knowledge management.

- indicator Pr.1.3 refers to "contribution to EU and member states technical & regional seminars". A series of seminars have been organised at the EU level as well as by some member states. Those seminars aim to provide guidance on JP as a process, to make all actors' views converge on JP, and to facilitate socialisation among stakeholders. Because participation is not mandatory (as JP works on a voluntary basis), a member state taking part in those seminars clearly indicates that it supports JP or at least is willing to learn more about it. Here, the indicator focuses on the financial contribution made by the member states, which goes even further than mere support, as it shows stronger commitment in a context of institutional funding crunch.

The Pr.2 sub-dimension (human resources capacities to engage in JP) is comprised of 2 indicators.

- indicator Pr.2.1 refers to "perception of sufficient staff to fulfil JP tasks". This indicator is a very practical one as it assesses whether member states consider they have enough staff to perform tasks related to JP. This may seem rather subjective as it could be argued that staff shortage is a permanent challenge in any organisation or that member states have varying needs when it comes to staff, depending on their size and also their degree of engagement in JP. We have thus decided to score 0 only if staffing issues had been raised during interviews or were mentioned in existing materials. Otherwise, 1 is the default score given to member states.
- indicator Pr.2.2 refers to "incentives in staff assessment related to JP". This indicator is closely associated to the previous one in that it translates staffing issues into actions. The coming into being of JP may have triggered staff modification (most likely expansion as opposed to downsizing) in some member states. The assumption is that if more staff has been recruited or tasked to work on or promote JP, this is a positive attitude that fosters JP.

Overall coherence of the mapping

The different indicators making up the overall mapping can be classified in different categories:

- "existence" indicators
- "effective" indicators
- "static" indicators
- "dynamic" indicators

The existence indicators are straightforward and easy to quantify as they refer to the existence (or lack thereof) of given documents, persons, etc. The indicators falling into that category are the following: P.1.1, P.2.1, P.3.1, I.1.1, I.1.2, I.2.1, If.2.1, Pr.1.1, and Pr.1.3.

The effective indicators are more complicated as they involve a certain degree of subjectivity, or at least some qualitative understanding of the problem at hand. The sources are more often than not qualitative interviews, but documents have been used as well. The indicators falling into that category are the following: P.1.2, P.3.2, I.2.2, If.1.1, and Pr.1.2.[253]

The static and dynamic indicators work as a pair. Indeed, they tackle the same problem but in a different manner: If.3.1 (static) works with If.3.2 (dynamic) and Pr.2.1 (static) works with Pr.2.2 (dynamic).

It does not come as a surprise that half of the indicators (9 out of 18) are existence ones. Indeed, the robustness of such mapping comes from the quantification of the indicators that is expected to be as objective as possible. Then the static/dynamic pairs also prevent from having too subjective an

[253] The last two indicators are 2 points ones; because this category of indicator is fairly complex, it could have made sense to have all those indicators as 2 points ones to ensure more variability in the scoring, yet preference was given to keep the number of units at a round figure, i.e. 20.

understanding as they split a complicated problem into two components that are easily quantifiable. They add up to the overall objectivity of the mapping and bring the numbers of straightforward indicators to 13 out of 18.[254]

Scoring methodology and choices

The analytical value of this matrix allows us to navigate through three levels, from the most concrete (i.e. the indicators) to the most abstract (i.e. the dimensions). Each dimension has been scored according to a 5 points scale, and the dub-dimensions and indicators are thus scored so as to match the overall scale. We could have decided to keep the 5 points scale for each dimension and still base the in-depth scoring (sub-dimensions and indicators) on a wider scale; this would have given more importance to the indicators as we would have started tour reasoning from them. Yet, this would have also meant that an algebraic formula would have been needed to match the in-depth scoring with the dimension. Let us take the P dimension as an example, a dimension that is made up of 3 sub-dimensions and 5 indicators (see table at the beginning of this methodological note). We have followed the following logic:

> P = 5 points, so those 5 points need to be split between the sub-dimensions and the indicators. This is why P.1 = 2, P.2 = 1, and P.3 = 2, with 2 + 1 + 2 = 5. The same holds true for the indicators.

But we could also have decided to start the scoring with the indicators in order to ground our reasoning on the importance each of those indicators have. Such methodology would have followed a different logic as the overall scoring derived from indicators might have totalled more than 5 points. Then, two options would have been possible. First, we could have decided to rank each dimension according to the scoring based on their respective indicators. This would have rendered the profiling much more complex as all the dimensions would have had a different scale. Moreover, this would have rendered the visualisation not user-friendly. We have thus ruled out this option. Second, we could have decided to equate the indicators' scoring with a 5 points scale so that each dimension has the same value. But this requires mathematical calculations, and no unique methods could have been used. This study doesn't aim at outstanding accuracy when it comes to the realism of its findings. We have made choices that makes it somehow subjective. The major aim was indeed to provide a clearer vision of where all member states stand. For this reason, we have also ruled out option 2 and have kept to a more simple way of scoring indicators.

The bulk of the indicators are 1-point ones, which makes it fairly easy to quantify. Two of them nonetheless are 2-points ones, which means member states can score 0, 1 or 2 points on them. As explained earlier, this choice was partly derived from the need to equate the indicators' scoring with the 5-points scale of the dimensions and to keep the overall number of indicators at 20. Yet, those indicators that are 2-points are also complex ones that require more nuancing in their scoring.

[254] In the case of indicators pointing at effectiveness, subjectivity is required. One refining option could thus have been to make those more systematically score 2 points, yet preference was given to keep the number of units at a round figure, i.e. 20.

Annex III - Country Case studies factsheets

Dealing with Context - Joint Programming Experiences in Ghana

Ghana was selected as one of the first generation of countries where EU JP was to be launched in 2012. With initial plans for a Joint Framework Document to serve as a strategic framework for overall EU-Ghana relations put Ghana at the forefront of plans to ensure greater EU coherence in external action.

With initial optimism and significant investment amongst a group of well-motivated European Heads of Cooperation a joint EU multiannual indicative programme for the period 2013-2016 was signed with the Government in June 2014. This was seen as an important step towards a second phase of 'full-fledged EU JP' from 2016 onwards. While a Joint Framework Document was also prepared locally it was not ‘signed off’ at HQs.

2015 being a critical juncture for the EU JP process in Ghana, EU DPs highlight several contextual challenges that have hampered the EU JP process after its initial success and makes reaching the ambitions of full fledged EU JP by 2016 challenging:

- Development Partner (DP) relations at large have suffered from a strenuous relationship with the Government of Ghana after different perspectives on the macro economic policies and health of the economy which lead to the suspension of budget support during 2013/14.

- A following divergence in DP behaviour created tensions both within the DP group and added to the difficult political dialogue between DPs and the government. EU JP was seen to have been a victim of these tensions as "it changed the focus and political energy" and as a result the "dialogue suffered a lot".

- The lack of demand for EU JP from the government side was seen to be a real weakness for the EU JP process in Ghana.

- Another factor to consider is that some European DPs are downgrading their engagement as a result of Ghana's middle-income country status and/or cuts in aid more generally.

- This has resulted in there no longer being a shared analysis or similar approach among EU member states with some feeling that they are "speaking another language" as they struggle to find connections between each others' respective priorities and overall approach.

- As a result EU JP is currently facing a challenge of whether to "widen" or "deepen" the exercise that is supposed to lead to the full-fledged EU JP in 2016.

Relations with the Government of Ghana and DPs improved in late 2015 with some pointing to it being a more conducive environment for JP. Some MS are pressed by HQs to move forward while others are still gaging their interest to continue in the process with limited instruction or indifference from HQs. There are concerns about the lack of 'return on investment' in EU JP as incentives are not seen to be high nor measurable in the short to medium term. Yet a 'core' JP group is keen to move forward including at the sector level where the benefits are more tangible and steps more concrete.

EU Joint Programming in the Occupied Palestinian Territories[255]

As highlighted by the recent evaluation of the EU development cooperation in Palestine,[256] development practitioners have to come to terms with some key dilemmas. More than 20 years after the Oslo Accords, many donors are questioning whether development aid is supporting the objective of state building of Palestine and the Palestinian aspirations, in the framework of the two states solution, or perpetuating the status quo. Still, other donors defend the provision of basic services, the technical exchanges, the construction of infrastructure, and promoting reforms in the Palestinian Authority on the grounds of preparing the structure for when the two-state solution could be implemented.

These divergences intersect with political views of EU Member States governments on the Israeli-Palestinian question. There is a strong awareness that aid is "100% political" in Palestine and that domestic policy changes are reflected in development cooperation.

In this context, the EU Representative Office[257] has done an excellent job - recognised across the board by most MS - to adapt the Brussels concept of Joint Programming in an operational way that is useful to most EU+[258] donors on the ground.

The EU delegation and MS had already tried out some coordination tools before the Joint Programming exercise. A EU Local Development Strategy was developed endorsed by HoMs in October 2011 and sector fiches had been developed, though it was recognised they were long documents and not operational. The choice was made by the EU delegation to adopt a participatory approach to EU Joint Programming since 2013. The process has been inclusive, participative, with a strong involvement by some Member States, in particular The Netherlands and Denmark.

The main achievements of the Joint Programming exercise so far have been:

- The revision of the EU Local Development Strategy in 2013.
- The revision and update of 16 sector fiches, making them more operational. Each sector is assigned to an EU+ donor that provides analysis, monitors progress on the sector, identifies challenges, and addresses key issues with the Palestinian counterpart and in relevant donor coordination meetings. The lead donor reports back to the whole EU+ group (Heads of Cooperation) according to an annual calendar.
- In 2015 a joint monitoring framework, a results-oriented framework, was agreed with the Palestinian Authority through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The aim is monitor progress in 6 pilot sectors and to provide the EU+ donors with a common basis of data and analysis. In each sector the leading EU+ donor is in charge of dialoguing with the Palestinian counterpart to receive data on progress and to report back to the EU+ group.

The sector fiches and the results-oriented framework aim to contribute to the next step for EU Joint Programming, by providing shared analysis and data and by creating a collaborative working environment. The next step is the drafting of an EU development strategy or EU Joint Programming document, that could eventually be the main frame of reference for the EU institutions' own programming of aid.

[255] Interviews were carried out with EU, MS, national partner, development partners and donor coordination mechanisms. In total 11 remote interviews were carried out in June-July 2015 and 16 face-to-face interviews were carried out in October 2015 in Jerusalem and Ramallah.

[256] Particip. 2014. The Evaluation of the European Union's co-operation with the occupied Palestinian territory and support to the Palestinian people - Country Level Evaluation.

[257] The EU Representative Office to the West Bank, Gaza and UNRWA, based in Jerusalem, can be assimilated to an EU Delegation in terms of structure and functioning.

[258] Norway and Switzerland, though not EU Member States, are associated to the joint programming. In the annex "EU+" designates the EU institutions, MS, Norway and Switzerland.

The main criticism that was mentioned is that EU Joint Programming in Palestine needs to become both more operational and more strategic. Due to the political differences across MS, the challenge is to identify areas where is possible a common approach which is more than the lower common denominator.

The case study confirmed several assumptions and led to the following **lessons learnt**:

- The **participatory** approach adopted by the EU representation - that involves Member States' offices on the strategic reflection on Joint Programming and defines collectively concrete tasks and steps - creates a dynamic by which MS staff needs to give a certain amount of priority to Joint Programming tasks.
- Working with a **"coalition of the willing"** of committed EU and MS staff in a participatory and inclusive manner ensures buy-in from Member States and avoids fostering an antagonising dynamic.
- The importance of the support (guidance, seminars, etc.) of EU headquarters' thematic units dealing with Joint Programming has been recognised. The request by EU headquarters for **HoMs reports on Joint Programming** helped to set up the pace on the dossier.
- The process has been **brought forward locally**, though a consultant was employed at the beginning to facilitate the adoption of a roadmap for Joint Programming. In addition to a facilitation or "kickstarting" role, there is interest to exploit the administrative support that consultants could offer.
- While sharing broadly the same principles, **Member States and the EU representation display their own understanding of what EU Joint Programming is or should be**. For some Member States the aspect of speaking with a collective EU voice is highlighted while for others aid effectiveness is at the forefront. Reducing costs and increasing efficiency is also very much present in the approach of some MS. The differences, in turn, influence views about what the outcomes of EU Joint Programming should be (joint strategy; joint programmes; joint or common funding mechanisms; etc.).
- EU Joint Programming in the oPT benefited from the "hands off" approach by headquarters that allowed locally-based stakeholders to shape the process. The challenge now is for the **EU Joint Programming in Palestine to continue to be a "laboratory" for experimentation**. The first critical juncture will be the Heads of Cooperation's retreat in November 2015.

In addition, the case study looked at **three context variables** and what they influence is on the process: the degree of stability; donor coordination dynamics; the role of the partner government.

Stability: this case shows that Joint Programming can be attempted and can bring usefulness even in a context of minimum stability. The situation in the occupied Palestinian territories is rather peculiar as the conflict is frozen but experiences outbursts of violence from both sides, as was the case in September and October 2015 and the 2014 Israel-Gaza war. Working together as donors is recognised to be even more relevant in crisis contexts by several EU donors. However some EU donors highlight that in light of the limitedly stable context they need to be able to respond flexibly therefore the EU Joint Programming should take this aspect into account.

Donor coordination: the donor coordination system is under review. As of November 2015, the coordination of development partners is carried out in the framework of the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS). The need to work in synergy with the donor coordination system is recognised, for instance by sharing analysis and documentation. The EU donors and the EU Joint Programming are seen as aid effectiveness frontrunners, since the EU Joint Programming exercise is conducted in transparency with the LACS, the national counterpart, and the other donors.

Partner government: the national counterpart, the Palestinian authority, is fully aware of the exercise being undertaken by the EU donors working in the occupied Palestinian territories and has participated in EU Heads of Cooperation meetings. A restructuration of the units dealing with development planning and aid is ongoing - the Ministry of Planning (MOPAD) has been dissolved and units will be located in the Ministry of Finance, for operational matters, and in the Prime Minister's cabinet for strategic and policy matters. Therefore capacities risk being easily overstretched at this stage. Leadership from the national counterpart has been recognised as limited yet national counterparts are ready to take up a leadership role in aid coordination, including by having strategic discussions with key players.

Annex IV - Indicative Interview questionnaires (profiling & country specific)

Indicative interview questionnaire for profiling

These questions were designed to obtain answers to the profiling sheets created for each EU Member State. As such, interviewees were asked broader questions relating to the overarching experiences of EU Member States in Joint Programming, and thereafter questions focused on each EU Member State's respective institutional capacities, flexibility to adapt to the needs of JP processes, and their experiences in implementing JP processes within partner countries. The questionnaire is also aimed at identifying potential sources of tensions in relationships between EU Member States directly, and within countries at a headquarter and field-office level. Lastly, interviewees were also asked to provide us with key take away messages, and insights into how they saw the future of Joint Programming playing out, and what steps could be taken to collectively revitalise JP processes.

General Questions

1. How would you assess the Joint Programming process/exercise thus far? What is working well, and what is not?
2. What is in your view the main aim of Joint Programming? (Where do you set the limits of Joint Programming?)

Political interest

1. What is the value of participating in JP? Does your country see participation in Joint Programming as a way to increase its role in EU development policy and to further enhance its role and positioning / grow its prominence as an EU development aid actor?
2. Has your country headquarters issued internal guidelines / instructions for Joint Programming?
3. Would you regard Joint Programming as having provided a way for your government to successfully combine its own national interests with broader EU interests?
4. What are the incentives and disincentives for your country's participation in Joint Programming?

Institutional coherence

1. Is there the presence of focal personnel to handle all Joint Programming related enquiries within your headquarters?
2. With respect to field offices:

    (i) How effective has the delegation of powers to field offices to participate in JP within the chosen partner countries been?
    (ii) How efficient and frequent are the channels of communication between your headquarters and the field offices?
    (iii) Is there efficient decentralisation of responsibilities from headquarters to field offices?

3. With respect towards their headquarters, what are the kinds of difficulties experienced by field offices in implementing Joint Programming? How are these operational constraints addressed?
4. What are the personal dynamics between HoMs and Capital / HoMs and Brussels?
5. Does your MFA hold regular meetings within its headquarters to discuss Joint Programming or, if not specifically meetings, are there any other form of coordinated practices amongst the various

branches of government that would contribute to a coherent approach towards Joint Programming within headquarters?

Instrumental Flexibility

1. Have your field offices made use of any guidelines? If so, what kind have been circulated to your staff based within partner country embassies?
2. In your opinion, does your country have a flexible approach towards combining its own priority sectors in chosen partner countries with its engagement in EU Joint Programming activities?
3. What are the key factors playing a role in selecting priority sectors when participating in JP?
4. Has there been a synchronisation of your country's programming cycle with its partner country cycles? If not, on what basis is your MFA undertaking its programming within partner countries?
5. For some interviewees, Joint Programming is complementary to bilateral programming (which express national priorities). Is Joint Programming compatible with bilateral programming?
6. What is your country's approach towards bilateral programming? In your opinion, is there sufficient flexibility from your country towards adjusting its bilateral programming cycle?

Practical capacity

1. Could you tell us more about the national trainings or seminars that have been organised for headquarters / staff in field offices?
2. Does your country have a knowledge management practice?
3. Have your staff in HQ and field offices participated / contributed in technical and regional seminars hosted by other EU Member States and the EU itself?
4. In your opinion, do you think your country's field offices and embassies are adequately staff to fulfil their job descriptions in partner countries? Do you know if the staff has a clear understanding of what Joint Programming means and what it entails?
5. How are the staff working on Joint Programming incentivized? Have provisions been made for staff assessments or something similar in this regard?

JP in the Future - forward looking questions

1. How do you see the future of Joint Programming? Are there any lessons to be learnt from the experience that can be used to improve Joint Programming?
2. How would you describe the general trend in Joint Programming? Has the process become generalised, or is Joint Programming at a stalemate?
3. In your opinion, what are the key variables that will influence the future of Joint Programming? What are the critical junctures in Joint Programming processes?
4. Is there a need for a stronger political and legal incentive (from EU Member State headquarters, EEAS and/or DEVCO) to ensure that Joint Programming will become the norm?

Indicative interview questionnaire (country specific)

Is the political, economic, social environment conducive for EU Joint Programming?

1. Is there a crisis / instability (do EU / MS need flexibility / reactivity?)
2. Is the country high / low on the EU & MS agendas / international agendas (impacts on the number of donors, but can create opportunities for donor coordination)?
3. What is the level of development of the country (LDCs, MICs, UMICs)?

What is the approach and attitude of the government towards Joint Programming?

1. Does the government have a position on Joint Programming?
2. What is the approach (and role) of the government towards donor coordination system? Does that approach (and role) influence the government's position on Joint Programming?
3. Do the national counterparts (government) have the capacities to take part in Joint Programming? Does the government system for dealing with donors facilitate (or not) Joint Programming (e.g. a single point of entry for all donors in the government)?
4. In case of absence of this document, is Joint Programming feasible and how?
5. Is the country aid dependant? Does the country's aid dependency shapes the position of the government on EU Joint Programming?
6. What is the role of the partner government in the Joint Programming process? What is the role of non-state actors in the Joint Programming process?
7. The involvement of the government and the non-state actors is a requirement of programming procedures (hence is a necessary step to transform Joint Programming in programming). How can their involvement be ensured without damaging the EU Joint Programming dynamics?

What is the degree of consensus on JP in the EU family? N.B. Questions that complement the general ones.

1. Does the number of EU donors present in the country makes JP more or less easy to start and follow through?
2. Does the presence of powerful non-EU donors (in terms of financial weight and/or political leverage) influence the consensus on EU Joint Programming?
3. Does the unequal leverage (political/financial) among EU donors play a role building the consensus on EU Joint Programming?
4. What is the role of personalities of HoCs in creating consensus or not for Joint Programming?
5. What is the influence of previous socialisation of JP / other joint processes (e.g. HoC/HoD/MS having served where JP was tried out; Human Rights strategies; DoL initiative, etc) on the creation (or not) of a conducive environment for Joint Programming?
6. Do existing EU & MS (or donor) coordination practices in development aid and delivery ("joint implementation", delegated cooperation, trust funds, etc) influence the consensus for JP?

Is there consensus among international donors and partners on the legitimacy of Joint Programming?

1. Are there other donor coordination framework / initiatives? To what extent have they been accommodated in the plans of JP?
2. What is the added value of EU Joint Programming compared to other donor coordination frameworks?
3. Does (can) EU Joint Programming contribute or not to the overall donor coordination and how?
4. What are the factors that drive or prevent non-EU donors to take part in Joint Programming?
5. Do existing EU & MS (or donor) coordination practices in development aid and delivery ("joint implementation", delegated cooperation, trust funds, etc) influence the consensus for JP?

Forward looking questions on JP

1. How would you describe the general trend in JP? Is it becoming generalised and making progress, or is the process stuck?
2. What are the key variables that will influence the future of JP?
3. Can you identify phases and critical junctures in JP processes?
4. How does and will joint implementation play a role in Joint Programming?

5. Is there a need for a stronger political and legal incentive (such as Council Conclusions) to ensure that JP will becomes the norm?
6. What solutions can be found to human capacity shortage in JP?
7. Merging programming and Joint Programming: how do you understand that? Is it feasible and how in your view?
8. The division of labour is based on the identification of the “added value” of each donor (EU Member States + EU). How is that carried out in practice? How should that be carried out to avoid conflicts?
9. What solutions can be found if there is no appetite for a joint strategy?
10. What solutions can be found if there is no appetite for “division of labour” - in particular the commitment to have no more than 5 donors per sector is hard to translate in practice in cases where donors all want to support the same sectors (e.g. agriculture and rural development in West Africa). Is the “division of labour” in policy dialogue a useful solution in your view?

Bibliography

AE Feasibility study for EU Joint Programming in Cambodia, 2012.

A southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative (AMICI): Promoting an enhanced EU coordinated approach to investment in the region. Regional workshop on Joint Programming for Neighbourhood East and South, 29-30 January 2015, Brussels.

Bossuyt, J., Shaxson, L., Datta, A. 2014. Assessing the uptake of strategic evaluations in EU development cooperation: Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAid's strategic evaluations into development policy and practice. Brussels: EuropeAid.

Council of the EU. 2007. EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy – Conclusions. (9558/07).

Council of the EU. 2009. Council Conclusions on an Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, Brussels. (18 November 2009).

Council of the EU. 2011. EU Common Position for the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 3124th Foreign Affairs Development Council meeting. (14 November 2011).

Delputte, Sarah., Orbie, Jan. 2014. Exploring the role of the EU in donor coordination on the ground: perspectives from Tanzania and Zambia. Gent: European Journal of Development Research.

EC\EEAS. 2011. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – *Global Europe: A new Approach to financing EU external action*, Brussels, 7 December 2011, COM(2011) 865 final

European Commission. 2011. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EESC and the CoR: Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change. COM(2011) 637.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf

Galeazzi, G., Helly, D., and Krätke, F. 2013. All for one or free-for-all? Early experiences in EU joint programming (ECDPM Briefing Note 50).

Germany: 2014 BMZ Guidelines [for Joint Programming]?

Herrero, A., Knoll, A., Gregersen, C., Kokolo, W. 2015. Implementing the Agenda for Change: An independent analysis of the 11th EDF programming. (Discussion Paper 180). Maastricht: ECDPM.

HM Government, 2013. Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Report, London

House of Commons, International Development Committee. 2012. EU Development Assistance Sixteenth Report of Session 2010–12 Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. HC 1680 Published on 27 April 2012.

Levy, B., Working with the grain: integrating governance and growth in development strategies, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Finance, Lignes directrices aux postes sur l'implication de la France dans la programmation conjointe, 2014.

Netherlands: A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment, January 2014,http://www.government.nl/issues/development-cooperation/documents-and-publications/reports/2013/04/30/a-world-to-gain.html

One World, One Future: Ireland's Policy for International Development (2013)

O'Riordan, A., Benfield, A. and de Witte, E. HTSPE. 2011, Joint Multi-Annual Programming: Final Report. Herts: HTSPE.

Particip. 2014. The Evaluation of the European Union's co-operation with the occupied Palestinian territory and support to the Palestinian people - Country Level Evaluation.

About ECDPM

ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM's key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

Thematic priorities

ECDPM organises its work around four themes:

- Reconciling values and interests in the external action of the EU and other international players
- Promoting economic governance and trade for inclusive and sustainable growth
- Supporting societal dynamics of change related to democracy and governance in developing countries, particularly Africa
- Addressing food security as a global public good through information and support to regional integration, markets and agriculture

Approach

ECDPM is a "think and do tank". It links policies and practice using a mix of roles and methods. ECDPM organises and facilitates policy dialogues, provides tailor-made analysis and advice, participates in South-North networks and does policy-oriented research with partners from the South.

ECDPM also assists with the implementation of policies and has a strong track record in evaluating policy impact. ECDPM's activities are largely designed to support institutions in the developing world to define their own agendas. ECDPM brings a frank and independent perspective to its activities, entering partnerships with an open mind and a clear focus on results.

For more information please visit www.ecdpm.org

ECDPM Discussion Papers

ECDPM Discussion Papers present initial findings of work-in-progress at the Centre to facilitate meaningful and substantive exchange on key policy questions. The aim is to stimulate broader reflection and informed debate on EU external action, with a focus on relations with countries in the South.

In addition to structural support by ECDPM's institutional partners Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland this work also benefited from additional support from Directorate-General for International Cooperation of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ISSN 1571-7577

European Centre for Development Policy Management

ecdpm

HEAD OFFICE
SIÈGE
Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21
6211 HE Maastricht
The Netherlands *Pays Bas*
Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00
Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 02

BRUSSELS OFFICE
BUREAU DE BRUXELLES
Rue Archimède 5
1000 Brussels *Bruxelles*
Belgium *Belgique*
Tel +32 (0)2 237 43 10
Fax +32 (0)2 237 43 19

info@ecdpm.org
www.ecdpm.org
KvK 41077447