

# Understanding IGAD and CAADP

*Common regional interests in a harsh environment?*

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This background paper is part of a series on the Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations (PEDRO). It was prepared in March 2017. In line with ECDPM's mission to inform and facilitate EU-Africa policy dialogue, and financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ, the studies analyse key policy areas of seventeen regional organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so they address three broad questions: What is the political traction of the organisations around different policy areas? What are the key member state interests in the regional agenda? What are the areas with most future traction for regional organisations to promote cooperation and integration around specific areas? The studies aim to advance thinking on how regional policies play out in practice, and ways to promote politically feasible and adaptive approaches to regional cooperation and integration. Further information can be found at [www.ecdpm.org/pedro](http://www.ecdpm.org/pedro).

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# 1. Introduction

This report presents a brief political economy overview of the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) and its role in promoting agriculture and food security, particularly through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) but also IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI). Both address one of IGAD's three pillars, Food Security and environmental protection, and together potentially help contribute to other regional challenges such as insecurity, economic development, and gender equality.<sup>1</sup>

IGAD started out as a regional authority with a focus on drought and resilience before increasing its focus to peace and security and becoming one of the AU-recognised Regional Economic Communities (REC) (see separate IGAD study). However, the major drought hitting the region in 2011 gave a renewed impetus that put resilience high on the IGAD agenda again. At the first Resilience Summit in Nairobi in 2011 on 'ending drought emergencies in the Horn of Africa' Member States (MS), together with development partners, implementing agencies and other stakeholders, committed to the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI). The IGAD Secretariat has taken the lead in coordinating Member States, development and implementing partners in support of implementing this initiative to promote strategic linkages between humanitarian relief interventions and development initiatives

At the same time as the Nairobi Summit, IGAD committed to the continental agricultural development programme through a regional CAADP compact and investment plan. The African Union's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is the main policy framework for promoting agricultural development and food and nutrition security. The CAADP framework aims to stimulate and focus public and private investments in African agricultural development. IGAD Member States Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Djibouti validated National CAADP Compacts between 2009 and 2012. As part of the overall framework, and in acknowledgement that some bottlenecks in agricultural development need to be addressed at a regional level, IGAD formulated a Regional Compact in 2013 and a Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP) validated in 2016, with a package of activities budgeted at USD 118,5 million over a five-year period (2016-2020).

While IDDRSI and CAADP offer potential synergies, they emerge from different processes while at Member State level, there are different approaches and different degrees of political buy-in to agricultural transformation and to the continental and regional programmes.

This report therefore takes the above two regional processes relating to food security to address the following three questions: i) what is the political traction of IGAD in driving or steering the regional food security agenda; ii) what are the interests of member states in using IGAD to address their food security challenges; and iii) which are the specific areas or sectors with most traction for IGAD to address food insecurity at a regional level. This is a desk-report, but drawing on interviews carried out in the region for related work where relevant.

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<sup>1</sup> According to their Mission Statement "The IGAD mission is to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation: i) Food Security and environmental protection ii) Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and, iii) Economic cooperation and integration."

## 2. On the political traction of IGAD in promoting food security

### 2.1. Structural and institutional drivers and obstacles

#### Initial traction of the food security agenda in IGAD

The IGAD region is a food insecure region, with a largely rural population. 80% of the population of IGAD Member States (MS) depend on smallholder agriculture, livestock and fisheries for their livelihoods (IGAD-RAIP). Food security in this region is intricately linked to the complex context in the region with multiple challenges for sustainable and inclusive development such as recurrent droughts, negative effects of climate change and regions in protracted crisis and fragile states. Resilience and livelihood approaches are seen as crucial in any food security strategy in the region.

**Table 1:** Contribution of Agriculture to the economy

Indicator	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
Agriculture as % of GDP	4	43	26	40	15	34	23
Agriculture population (%)	72	77	71	67	NA	71	73
Employment %	10	83	60	71	87	75	72
Smallholder agriculture (%)	17	87	75	80	NA	50	75


**Source:** IGAD CAADP; Computed from World Bank 2015

70% of the IGAD region is arid or semi-arid land (ASAL), also called rangeland or drylands. The livestock sector is a key feature of farming systems in the region, contributing between 10 and 20% to national GDPs and a large share of employment. Apart from economic value, livestock plays an important role providing draft power and nutrients in mixed systems and socio-cultural systems. For the coastal countries of IGAD (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya) marine fisheries are essential in food security, employment and exports.

Farming systems are mostly rain-fed (98%) with irrigated areas mostly concentrated around the Nile-basin in Sudan. There are highly productive areas in the region like these irrigated areas in Sudan and the more temperate and humid highlands in Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia is the main producer of wheat in Africa. Millet and maize are more drought-resistant cereals. Sudan is a big producer of sorghum. These crops provide staple foods and livelihoods for many people, but the variation of food dependence between and within countries in the region is big. The IGAD agricultural sector is around 14% of African agricultural GDP, with Sudan and Ethiopia contributing the highest share of IGAD's GDP and then Kenya and Uganda.

The IGAD region accounts for almost half of the livestock population in sub-Saharan Africa. Rearing and export is overwhelmingly dominated by Ethiopia and Somalia (for camels and cattle), while Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia dominate the export of small ruminants such as sheep and goats. Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda export less than 5000 animals per year (IGAD-RAIP). Trade flows, nationally, within the region and to other regions are a key feature of livestock farming systems in the region. Production and livestock trade from rural to urban centers and export, mostly to the Middle East and North Africa, provides the livelihoods of over 40 million people in the ASALs of the IGAD region (FAO/ IGAD. June 2013. Regional IGAD CAADP Plan). Although as a regional grouping IGAD is centered around the shared challenges concerning droughts and floods affecting the Arid and Semi-arid Lands (ASALs), national agricultural strategies are mostly biased towards commercial agriculture.

**Chart 1:** Livestock population in the IGAD region



All IGAD Member States except Somalia are members of one or two other RECs namely COMESA and EAC, both of which also have regional CAADP processes. Sudan has also institutionalised its relations with the Arab world through Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) (Koroma et al. 2016). Especially COMESA has a widely acknowledged ‘competitiveness’ in promoting commercial agriculture and regional trade, for example through their Seed Harmonisation Protocol and Simplified Trade Regime. Because of its specific mandate on drought and resilience, IGAD has taken a prominent role in the ASAL-oriented food security agenda. Livestock and pastoralism are thus one of the central themes of the IGAD food security agenda.

Different development ‘narratives’ or paradigms on food security in arid regions exist: a livelihood-centered perspective and a more growth-centered perspective. The livelihood-centered approach gives central stage to pastoralism as a crucial feature of livelihoods in arid regions, stressing the importance of (cross-border) mobility and policies that support these livelihoods such as policies around community water and pasture management. The other focuses more on strengthening and formalising trade, intensifying livestock production and focusing on upgrading agricultural value chains.

The starting points of these two paradigms are drastically different. Policies, programmes and projects will be formulated and implemented in very different ways, even though the issues they are aiming to address are ultimately the same. Generally speaking, the CAADP framework hinges on a growth-centered perspective while the IDDRSI takes a livelihood-centered perspective, closely linked to a resilience approach. This includes long term interventions that go beyond agriculture (livelihood, multi-sector, social policy) and more emphasis on natural resource management (NRM).

From its inception in 1986, IGAD has had a strong food security mandate. Until the relaunch of IGADD as IGAD in 1996 it was deemed rather ineffective in addressing these, due to organisational and structural problems. Internal conflicts in Sudan and Eritrea, the civil war and collapse of Somalia and other conflicts around border areas were also making efforts to address the problems of drought and food insecurity increasingly difficult and the relevance of IGAD as a platform to discuss security issues increased. This renewed mandate focusing more on regional security issues did however deflect attention from the original drought, development and food security mandate. Throughout its life IGAD has tried to rally Member States and development partners around a common regional food security agenda but top-down approaches have challenged effective implementation, partly due to a lack of secure funding though also relating to

questions of national interest in a regional approach.<sup>2</sup>

### **IGAD CAADP Regional Compact and Investment Programme**

The process of developing the IGAD regional CAADP compact started in January 2012, partly to link the 2011 IDDRSI to existing continental frameworks, highlighting the potential overlaps of these strategies. IGAD signed its regional compact in June 2013. The IGAD Regional Investment Plan (RAIP) was adopted in August 2016 in Addis Ababa by the Ministers of Agriculture<sup>3</sup> and was validated by different regional stakeholders in October 2016. At this RAIP Business Meeting, serving to bring governments, private sector and donors together, no concrete commitments for funding the implementation of the Investment Plan were made. The reluctance of development partners to commit to the RAIP at the moment of the Business Meeting is probably multi-faceted. Continent-wide there is a growing CAADP-tiredness among development partners. In the IGAD region the lack of clarity, connection and complementarity between the CAADP and IDDRSI framework is reportedly hindering both governments and development partners. Doubts about the 'fundability' of the RAIP could have discouraged potential donors as well. The coming months will have to show if the RAIP regains some momentum.

Apart from coordination and support by the NPCA, FAO is the main technical partner for countries and RECs in developing their CAADP plans and has been involved with the IGAD CAADP framework from the outset (Poulton et al. 2014). The IGAD Secretariat has thus received extensive support in the formulation of the regional CAADP compact and investment plan from FAO through two Technical Support Projects, the first resulting in the regional compact and the second to transform the regional compact into a RAIP and mobilise financial and technical resources to fund its implementation (RAIP, IGAD-FAO 2016). FAO Investment Center also provided financial support to the IGAD secretariat and technical support.<sup>4</sup>

Implementation of the IGAD-RAIP is supposed to be undertaken by the IGAD Secretariat through either a 'dedicated IGAD-RAIP Programme Coordinator' (RAIP) or by an IGAD/CAADP Coordination Unit (Framework for the Implementation Plan). Given overlapping REC memberships, IGAD commits to coordinate its CAADP related activities with EAC and COMESA, link regional interventions to activities implemented at national level, strengthen its internal capacity to lead the IGAD-RAIP implementation process, mobilise financial and technical resources, ensure alignment of public and private investments of 'non-signatory actors' and account for all IGAD-RAIP implementation resources. Considering the limited capacity within the IGAD Secretariat, it is challenging for the IGAD Secretariat to meet these requirements - while FAO have been providing much needed support, the partnership between the IGAD Secretariat and the technical staff from FAO has not been without hiccups, with IGAD staff reportedly often not complete at joint meetings, while writing was mostly done by FAO staff, reflecting a consultant rather than partner role.

An important aspect of the CAADP agenda is intra-regional trade. As discussed in the main IGAD report, IGAD has struggled to progress in advancing the economic integration agenda, especially compared to other RECs like COMESA and EAC. It is a challenging region where regional economic integration is hampered by regional natural resources that are under environmental stress, and socio-economic and cultural conflicts within and among Member States. Support for a regional approach on food security has gained momentum, but the difficult context, differences in perspective on what a regional CAADP approach

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<sup>2</sup> IGAD Food Security Strategy 2005-2008 See [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/drought/docs/IGAD%20Food%20Security%20Strategy.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/IGAD%20Food%20Security%20Strategy.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Resolution of Ministers of IGAD Member States on the IGAD CAADP Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP) 2016-2020.

<sup>4</sup> The FAO Investment Center is a key player in this respect, supporting countries and RECs throughout the continent in the formulation of their national and regional CAADP processes. The Investment Center organised the technical missions for stakeholder workshops, the Ministerial validation meeting and Business Meeting. FAO has also developed a roadmap for implementation that spells out the necessary activities to bridge the gap between the investment plan validated in August and the actual implementation of the plan, e.g. by refining the budget and developing a more elaborate resource mobilisation strategy (Framework for Implementation Plan, IGAD-FAO 2016).

in the IGAD region entails and differing interests and incentives on actual implementation of food security and resilience interventions are limiting the traction of the regional CAADP process.

### **IDDRSI and resilience approaches in the IGAD region**

The severity of the 2011 drought put resilience high on the IGAD agenda. At the first Resilience Summit on “ending drought emergencies, build drought resilience and achieve growth and sustainable development in the Horn of Africa” in 2011, Heads of State of the IGAD and EAC Member States (MS), together with development partners, implementing agencies and other stakeholders, committed to the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI). This gave a clear mandate to IGAD to take the lead in coordinating regionwide drought resilience activities, promoting greater cooperation between the different stakeholders and securing resources for long term activities. IDDRSI has seven priority intervention areas<sup>5</sup> that cut across the four pillars<sup>6</sup> of IGAD's overall strategy. It consolidates the objectives, principles, instruments and tools needed to improve resilience in the IGAD region in one policy document.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the various definitions of the concept of resilience, but because governments and development partners have agreed to take a resilience approach to food security in a sustainable way in the IGAD region, it is important to note that all definitions stress the importance of taking a dynamic, risk management, people-focused perspective rather than physical infrastructure and strengthening adaptive and innovative capacities.<sup>7</sup> Compared to more ‘traditional’ agricultural development approaches this means shifting from short term to long-term investments, better connecting humanitarian aid and development aid, a focus on communities and livelihoods, pastoralism and the contribution of livestock, and social protection systems such as safety nets.

In its introduction the IGAD-CAADP Investment Plan also states that it aims to address livelihoods, vulnerability and declining resilience through ‘(...) investing in land and water management and through targeted investments to increase agricultural production. In addition, investments will target the development of rural infrastructure required for reducing post-harvest losses, increasing food supply and market access.’ The seven pillars of IDDRSI thus share a number of key priority areas with the IGAD Regional CAADP Compact and RAIP. In the RAIP, it's priorities are set out next to the priorities identified by IGAD Member States in the regional compact, the Malabo targets and the SDGs. Surprisingly, considering the visibility of IDDRSI in the region and the coordinating role of the IGAD Secretariat in both frameworks, no overview of how the RAIP Investment Priority Areas align with the IDDRSI Strategy Pillars is given.

**Box 1:** Priority areas of IGAD RAIP and IDDRSI Strateg

<b>IDDRSI Strategy Pillars</b>	<b>IGAD RAIP and Regional Compact Intervention Priority Areas</b>
Natural resources and environment management	Sustainable Natural Resource Use and Management (IPA 1)

<sup>5</sup> The seven priority intervention areas are: i) environment and natural resource management; ii) market access, trade and financial services; iii) livelihoods support and basic social services; iv) disaster risk management, preparedness and effective response; v) research, knowledge management and technology transfer; vi) conflict prevention, resolution and peace building; and vii) coordination, institutional strengthening and partnerships.

<sup>6</sup> The four pillars are: i) agriculture, natural resources and environment; ii) economic co-operation and integration and social development; iii) peace and security and humanitarian affairs; iv) corporate development services.

<sup>7</sup> One definition of resilience is: “The ability of countries, communities, and households to anticipate, mitigate, adapt to, and/or recover from the effects of shocks and stresses in a manner that protects livelihoods, accelerates and sustains recovery, and supports economic and social development” Frankenberger, T., Spangler, T., Nelson, S. and Langworthy, M. (2012) cited in Atyang and Standley, 2014.

Market access, trade and financial services	Improving Rural Infrastructure and Trade-Related Capacities for Market Access (IPA 2) Mobility of livestock, people and goods, and cross-border livestock and goods trade (Regional Compact)
Livelihoods support and basic social services	-
Disaster risk management, preparedness and effective response	Disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation (part of IPA 3) and Strengthening and expanding the existing Disaster Risk Management Programmes (part of IPA 4)
Research, knowledge management and technology transfer	Agricultural Research, Regional Knowledge and Information Management (IPA 4)
Conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding;	Prevention of livestock and fisheries resources induced conflict (part of IPA 4)
Coordination, institutional strengthening and partnerships	Disaster risk management (DRM), tailored to pastoralist area

Source: IDDRSI Strategy, IGAD-RAIP and Afun-Ogidan and de Weijer, 2012

Many stakeholders see each strategy as broader than the other, and partially overlapping. On the one hand the resilience approach of IDDRSI, seen as a cross-IGAD flagship initiative, seeks to encompass different sectors beyond food security, e.g. environmental and climate change and security issues, while CAADP can be regarded as being more narrow, focusing on agricultural development. On the other hand, CAADP is a more comprehensive framework, more geared towards creating favourable policy environments for agricultural development, involving multiple sectors and non-state actors. Three years after launching IDDRSI and the regional CAADP compact, there is still little clarity on how the two frameworks relate to each other. At the same time, it is not clear how much political traction they can each have without clearer thinking on how the different frameworks can synergise on the ground.

### **IDDRSI resources mobilised**

Investments in the the IDDRSI Strategy have been larger than in the CAADP IGAD Investment Plan, suggesting political traction among development partners. IDDRSI has been able to successfully rally high level support and mobilise resources in a relatively short period of time. Since 2013, almost USD 1 billion have been mobilised and committed as investments in the implementation of IDDRSI projects in different countries (IGAD, 2016). The IGAD Heads of State Summits in Nairobi 2011 and Kampala 2014 were successfully used as a platform to renew Member States commitments to IDDRSI as a coordinated regional approach to build drought resilience of vulnerable populations at the highest level. Adoption of the IGAD-RAIP in October 2016 in Addis was at Ministerial level. No pledges were made at the Business Meeting for the regional CAADP, while at national level traction differs between the different IGAD MS. This suggests that IDDRSI has more traction as an approach to address long-term structural issues while CAADP may be less well-suited, or at least is less well supported by MS and donors. One interviewee suggests that IGAD seemed less keen or active in inviting partners to the Business Meeting; perhaps because with resources reaching 1 billion USD for IDDRSI, it is doubtful if IGAD has the capacity or the interest to vigorously pursue resource mobilization and implementation of the RAIP.



**Table 2:** Resource mobilisation to support implementation of IDDRSI in the IGAD region since 2013

RESOURCE MOBILISATION TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF IDDRSI IN THE IGAD REGION SINCE 2013				
Development Partner	Program / Project	Beneficiary / Country	Supported IDDRSI PIA	Total amount millions USD
African Dev. Bank (AfDB)	Drought Resilience & Sustainability Program DRSLP (Phases I, II & III)	Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, IGAD Secretariat	1, 2, 3 & 7	300
World Bank (WB)	Regional Pastoral Livelihoods & Resilience Project (RPLRP)	Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia + IGAD Secretariat for coordination	1, 2, 3, 4 & 7	197
	Regional Development Response to displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP)	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda+ IGAD Secretariat	1, 2, 3, 4 & 7	175
Germany	Regional Cooperation	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia	1, 2, 3 & 7	85
European Union	Regional envelope, 11th EDF, EU Trust Fund (€50million out of €250million pledged)	IGAD Secretariat (Peace & Security)	1, 2, 3, 4, 6 & 7	50
	IDDRSI Cross-border resilience & migration (€90million out of the €400 million pledged)	4 countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan	1, 2, 3, 4, 6 & 7	90
Islamic Dev. Bank	Dryland Project	Djibouti	1, 2 & 3	40
USAID	IDDRSI related Institutional and programme support	IGAD Secretariat: PCU, ICPALD, ICPAC, & CEWARN	4, 5 & 7	22
Denmark	Research & CSO Grant Facilities Grant	IGAD Secretariat	5 & 7	5.9
UNDP	Institutional support	IGAD Secretariat	7	5
<b>Total investment mobilized</b>				<b>958.9</b>

Source: IDDRSI 2017

A significant level of investment has been put into strengthening the institutional capacity of IGAD, focusing on its capacity to coordinate drought resilience efforts in the region. After the Nairobi summit it was felt that institutional development was lagging behind the projected activities and investment plans. A number of the programmes listed above also include institutional and technical support, e.g. the AfDB program, German funds, and Danish support to the IGAD's Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP). A number of resources that include institutional support are not listed such as the support towards the Resilience Analysis Unit (RAU) and Italian and British funds (Atyang and Standley, 2014). The programmes that have a clear regional character and in which the IGAD Secretariat would thus have an important role in guiding implementation are the AfDB funded Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme (DRSLP), the WB funded Regional Pastoral Livelihoods and Resilience Project (RPLRP) and the EU funded Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region.

A large part of the first resources coming in after the launch of IDDRSI were invested in setting up an operational governance structure, with the IDDRSI Regional Platform as central component. The Regional Platform is connected to platforms in each country with different coordination structures, functioning at different levels of functionality, and different levels of clout. A Platform Coordination Unit (PCU) is embedded in the IGAD Secretariat and is responsible for mobilising resources, programming, knowledge management, monitoring and evaluation, capacity building and strengthening partnerships.

The IGAD Secretariat has supported member states in developing IDDRSI Country Programming Papers (CPPs) based on the regional IDDRSI Strategy. All IGAD MS have developed these CPPs and some of them have progressed in translating these CPPs in concrete investment proposals.

**Table 3:** IDDRSI Coordination mechanisms at national level and national level commitments

Country	IDDRSI coordination mechanism	Degree of functionality	Committed/mobilised (USD)
Kenya	National Drought Management Authority (NDMA). CPP integrated into the government of Kenya Vision 2030, translated in Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) program	Strong leadership NDMA, ASAL donor working group. Resource mobilisation challenges	2.4 billion
Uganda	National Disaster Risk Reduction Platform under the Office of the Prime Minister	Has not provided enough leadership to mobilise different ministries and DPs	65 million
Ethiopia	Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries. CPP is being implemented mainly through two donor-funded programs, the DRLSP and the RPLRP	Absorption rate of funds is low	248,5 million (inc 192 million DP funds e.g. AfDB, WB)
Djibouti	Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Livestock, Fisheries and Marine Resources	Seems to be little capacity to implement	433,8 million
South Sudan	Ministry of Environment, temporary arrangement. New coordination mechanism underway, with Min of Environment as chair and Min of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives, and Rural Development as co-chair	Effective implementation compromised due to security situation	
Sudan	Chaired by the President, Secretariat housed within the Ministry of Agriculture	Enabling policy environment	Estimated budget: 619,3 million Gov: 12,7 million DP: 882,4 million
Somalia	Overseen by the Office of the Prime Minister through a Steering Committee of key ministries. National IDDRSI Coordinator for Somalia had not been recruited at time of MTR (2016)	Coordination and alignment of the CPP with other on-going programs in Somalia is relatively weak	Growing interest to support CPP from different DPs

Source: IGAD MTR 2016

## 2.2. Expanding agenda and implementation challenges

Implementation of the food security and resilience agenda by IGAD is hampered by a number of different factors related i) to the way IGAD is structured and funded; ii) to the way staff is working in practice; and iii) because of the underlying interest or not of its MS in implementing this regional agenda.

### **IDDRSI governance structure set in place**

The IDDRSI Regional Platform brings together the different relevant stakeholders to discuss priorities for achieving IDDRSI objectives and to steer and coordinate the implementation of these activities. Member

States, development and implementation partners like UN agencies, NGOs, CSOs and research organisations and the IGAD Secretariat and its specialised institutions are represented in the Platform. The Platform consists of a General Assembly with members at Ministerial level, to give strategic guidance to the Platform and a Platform Steering Committee with members at senior policy level that oversee implementation. The Platform Coordination Unit leads implementation, mobilises resources and is responsible for knowledge management and monitoring implementation. It is currently staffed by nine, based in Djibouti, housed at the IGAD Secretariat.

At the Regional Platform General Assembly private sector and other non-state actors are represented by the regional IGAD NGO/CSO Forum and the IGAD Business Forum. The AUC and EAC are also represented at the General Assembly (EU Action Fiche). The Platform Steering Committee meets twice a year to coordinate between MS, development and implementing partners. At the national level, IGAD Member States have established National IDDRSI Coordination Platforms to coordinate and cover all thematic areas and reach stakeholders from the different domains. Although all MS have established national platforms, according to the IDDRSI Mid-term Review 'coordination of actors at member states level remains weak and the functional linkage between PSC and the coordination forums that deliberate on PSC recommendations is still poor. As a result, member states have failed to act on many of the PSC recommendations.'

The Platform Coordinating Unit (PCU) is embedded in the IGAD Secretariat, linked to the Division of Agriculture and Environment. Tasked with knowledge management and sharing experiences on implementation of IDDRSI, in principle it can draw on the expertise and technical support of different IGAD Divisions and specialised bodies such as the Peace and Security Division for the pillar on conflict prevention and ICPAC for its expertise on early warning systems.<sup>8</sup> The role of the PCU is especially relevant in the implementation of the regional programming paper (RPP) in cross-border areas.

A number of tools have been put in place to monitor progress of project implementation and portfolio management, but there is some scepticism e.g. from the part of FAO technical staff as to the degree of functionality of these tools and how they actually foster lesson learning in the region. Despite its strong role in the IDDRSI implementation strategy (described in the IDDRSI MTR as 'the de facto nerve centre of the drought resilience implementation machinery'), in one of its Action Fiches the EU describes the PCU as lacking in authority and found its contact with other IGAD Divisions and specialised institutions relatively weak. Anecdotally, it is found that the extent of the benefits from IDDRSI to the member countries post country policy-paper and the development of IDDRSI is not clear. At the time of their formulation, it was suggested that IGAD would support each country in developing an implementation programme based on the policy papers, but this operationalisation still hasn't come to fruition.

### **Efforts to strengthen institutional capacity**

IGAD's mandate to work on regional food security and drought resilience is strong, but capacity has long been perceived as weak. After the Nairobi summit it was felt that institutional development was severely lagging behind the projected activities and investment plans. In the last years there have been considerable efforts at institutional investment, including the Joint Financing Agreement (of Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway) and efforts of Germany, USAID, African Development Bank, the World Bank

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<sup>8</sup> "IGAD division of Agriculture and Environment is the focal point for Pillars 1 and 3, while ICPALD provide technical support to this division and focal point for Pillar 3 (Livelihoods support and basic social services) based on their expertise in livestock production. Division for Economic Cooperation and Social Development is focal point on Pillar 2 (Market access, trade and financial services). Division for Peace and security is focal point for Pillar 6 (conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding) due to the immense capacities and programming in cross border conflict and peace building expertise with technical support from CEWARN in terms of sub pillar support. As such, ICPAC was to support and be the focal point for Pillar 4 (Disaster Risk Management, preparedness and effective response) due to its expertise and specialty in climate based early warning technologies." (IDDRSI MTR 2016).

and UNDP, under both IGAD's Institutional Strengthening Action Plan<sup>9</sup> (ISAP) and IDDRSI. IGAD together with the different development partners has invested considerably in setting up institutional structures and coordination mechanisms. It is widely felt however that it has been less effective coordinating implementation of a region-wide strategy for increasing resilience in the IGAD region."

The perceived slow pace of implementation doesn't seem to be a matter of institutional overstretch (as suggested elsewhere e.g. Afun-Ogidan, and de Weijer (2012), for example according to FAO Technical support to IGAD. The capacity issue at the moment according to a number of interviewees is not so much in terms of quantity of staff but in terms of quality and motivation. There is for example a lack of staff that can facilitate policy harmonisation between member states with highly divergent policies or to change slow response from the country teams with regards to CAADP or IDDRSI regional implementation. Good people don't stay long because of brain drain problems (e.g. IGAD is outcompeted by African Union Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resource (AU-IBAR) or development partners). The harsh environment in Djibouti where IGAD has its headquarters is often also quoted as a push factor.

The EU has committed EUR 5m to strengthen IGAD's institutional capacity to implement the regional drought resilience strategy. It proposes a reorganisation of the IDDRSI Platform Coordination Unit and an upgrade of the financial and administrative systems. Resources for this project come from funds reserved for IGAD under the 11th EDF Regional Investment Plan (RIP) and have been transferred to the EU Trust Fund at IGAD's request. A key element of this allocation is the plan to reorganise the PCU, merging it with the existing Project Preparation and Management Unit (PPMU) into a new Planning and Coordination Section, responsible for the overall IDDRSI strategy and overall planning, coordination and budget preparation of all IGAD activities, including its specialised offices. A salient feature of the EU proposal is that IGAD is expected to "commit to absorb the project-funded staff of the new Planning and Coordination Section into its core budget (i.e. by using its own resources) within a four-year timeframe to guarantee continuity and institutional sustainability." To date, the PCU is still functioning in its original form. To what extent this reorganisation is being implemented seems like a politically sensitive issue. Part of the EU support to strengthening IGAD's capacity to implement IDDRSI also supports the process of adopting a treaty for IGAD to provide a stronger legal foundation and a more robust mandate for conducting policy dialogue and providing services in the region.

Accountability structures of both programmes don't seem to be aligned, each framework setting up or having set up its own accountability framework. For the IGAD-RAIP it is still too early to tell to what extent the Results Framework will be a useful tool to track implementation. The IDDRSI Platform is working to a certain extent, relatively high level policy makers showing on a regular basis what progress has been made on their commitments. This accountability mechanism functions relatively well at a national level, but is flawed when it comes to regional accountability, since national level government officials are held accountable for national level activities and not the regional level.

### **Engaging non-state actors**

Part of the potential value added of CAADP is the engagement of private sector and civil society actors such as farmers' organisations. At a regional level CAADP guidelines propose involving regional representation focusing on issues that have a clear regional angle. In the case of the IGAD regional CAADP processes it was seen as an important opportunity to create a space and give voice to pastoralists in the formulation of food security and rural development policies. In many Member States pastoralist associations have difficulty connecting with policy makers. In the consultations towards the regional compact, national level pastoralist associations were involved. A problem signalled was that there was not

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<sup>9</sup> IGAD's Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP) has been supported since 2010 by a group of Nordic countries coordinated by Denmark. A donor working group on Technical Assistance to IGAD formed in 2012/2013, committed to align their support to ISAP (Atyang and Standley 2014).

a regional representation of pastoralists' associations, comparable to the Eastern African Farmers Federation, able to effectively influence the IGAD CAADP agendas at national and regional level.

In the preparation of the CAADP Investment Plan there has been less engagement of pastoralist associations. The Pastoralist Federation of Ethiopia, part of the CSO stakeholder group in the preparation of the regional compact, was not invited to any of the IGAD meetings in the past two years. There are also no other pastoralist associations mentioned in the communiqués and aide-memoires around the adoption and validation of the IGAD-RAIP. Despite FAO and other technical and development partners pushing for greater involvement, it is still difficult to rally PS in this region. Afun-Ogidan and de Weijer (2012) also find 'the degree to which civil society consultation is an accepted component of policy making is very different, with Kenya at one end of the spectrum and Ethiopia on the other.' This can complicate harmonisation of policies even further and widen the implementation gap. Also within the framework of IDDRSI it has proven difficult to meaningfully engage with private sector and civil society organisations.

## 2.3 External drivers and blockers

### Donor coordination

Donor dynamics have shaped the food security and resilience agendas in this region quite strongly. This is particularly so for the IDDRSI, where a Multi-Donor Trust Fund was created to support its implementation. No similar donor coordination mechanisms exist for the regional CAADP compact or investment plan where there is a certain lack of coordination between partners in the region. For example projects implemented by the AfDB, USAID and EU have similar time paths, objectives and geographies.

Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, the World Bank, FAO and the African Development Bank are the development partners that are most active development partners in the cross border areas in the IGAD region. There are several donor groups in the Horn of Africa that promote alignment, coordination and harmonisation efforts such as the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF) and the Global Alliance for Action on Drought Resilience and Growth in the Horn of Africa<sup>10</sup>. The IPF was created in 1997 as part of the formal governance structure of IGAD. The Global Alliance is a donor group formed in 2012 to align the headquarters of a wide range of international development partners around new ways of bringing together humanitarian and development assistance to build sustainable resilience. It's led by USAID and includes IGAD. One of the achievements of the Global Alliance has been the establishment of the Technical Consortium of ILRI and FAO that have support the development of the IDDRSI Programming Papers and Regional Programming Paper. At the same time the Global Alliance for Resilience in the Sahel (AGIR-Sahel) was launched. Due to a lack of activity of the Alliance for the Horn and the growing role of AGIR in the Sahel, it seems that IGAD has been able to integrate the need for this alliance within IDDRSI.

Assessments point to irregular policy meetings and delayed contributions of Member States, causing IGAD to act with insufficient policy direction and financial support.<sup>11</sup> As a consequence, reliance on donor funding has increased rapidly. High-powered donors in the IGAD region have influence to push their own agendas on policies, priorities and strategies. Indeed, the IDDRSI MTR notes that the projects funded by different development partners are formulated by the development partners instead of the countries themselves. This is not only a risk at the regional level, but is also highlighted as a risk at national level, eg. some interviewees note that the recently established Ethiopian Ministry of Livestock is 'funded by donor

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<sup>10</sup> See <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Global%20Alliance%20FactSheet.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> IGAD Systems Audit and IPSAS Compliance Review carried out by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2014); Capacity Survey for IGAD conducted by NEPAD (2014); an internal assessment taking account of the based on earlier reviews (2015); a Performance Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Sustainability of USAID- supported activities at IGAD carried out by Ernst and Young (2015); ISAP I and II Review (2015); GiZ Programme Review (2015); and USAID Programme Review (2015) referred to in EU Action Fiche Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa.

flagships'. Long-term staffing from core funds of IGAD could give IGAD staff a stronger position in this donor-recipient power arena. Current politically influenced selection of staff at IGAD could hinder sustainable buildup of capacity, e.g. the short-term recruitment of IDDRSI Platform Coordination staff (EU Action Fiche on IGAD capacity strengthening).

### **Migration: new donor dynamics?**

Increasing volumes of donor resources are channeled towards the IGAD region 'to tackle the root causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement in the Horn of Africa'. The rise of migration on the European agenda has resulted in an EU Trust Fund that 'secured' EUR2.5b in funding from EU and its Member States. The EU, Switzerland and Germany are amongst those committing extra resources to the region. The increase of these resources can speed up the implementation of a number of cross border projects, since the EU Trust Fund has shown to be fast in approval of funds, as well as contracting of funds.

One year after announcing the Trust Fund, at the end of December 2016, approximately €606m of the fund destined for the Horn was contracted.<sup>12</sup> Eight of the 35 projects contracted at that time are regional. The others target individual countries. The biggest share of individual country projects is targeting Sudan, which had been excluded from EDF funds due to international sanctions. For regional projects, the EU works together closely with IGAD in the design and implementation phase.

One of the first regional projects to have been implemented is the EUR4.1m Research and Evidence Facility<sup>13</sup> that has analysed a number of cross-border clusters. These studies, that were done in a very short time frame form the basis of the largest of regional projects funded under the EU Trust Fund. The biggest of these regional projects is the €63.5m cross border project "Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region – First Phase" within the implementation of IDDRSI, which will be co-managed by UNDP and GIZ due to their extensive experience with managing cross border projects in the region. The IGAD Secretariat is key in cross-border coordination and in monitoring progress of the project. Having transferred €25m of its allocation under the Regional Indicative Programme to the Trust Fund, IGAD is also a major financial contributor to the project. The project will start working on two axes; the first along the Kenya-Ethiopia border and the second one on the Ethiopia-Sudan border (highlighted in Figure 1 below). It will include investments in conflict management and resolution capacities; enhancing and diversifying livelihoods, including livestock, agriculture and fisheries; strengthening basic service delivery; natural resource management; and promoting cross-border trade and private sector development.

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<sup>12</sup> See [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/horn-africa\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/horn-africa_en).

<sup>13</sup> See <https://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/>.

**Figure 1:** Target areas of the EU Trust Fund funded project ‘Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region’



As part of IDDRSI, Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) committed USD 10m for over five years to support cross-border programmes<sup>14</sup>. The programmes will work on animal health, trade and natural resources management coordination and involve community engagement on policy and investment as well as cross cutting areas of work such as conflict, gender and nutrition. The supported programmes will target cross-border in Ethiopia (Liben), Kenya (Mandera) and Somalia (Gedo) and include the watershed of the Dawa River on the Ethiopia-Somalia and Ethiopia-Kenya border. Germany established a Regional Drought Resilience Fund which will be implemented through the German Development Bank KfW under IGAD.

A large part of the EU Trust Fund money<sup>15</sup> is more specifically targeting migration processes, such as the Khartoum process. The weak role of IGAD, IGAD Member States and other regional and continental organisations in the design and implementation of these projects has been criticised. IGAD is not represented in the Steering Committee<sup>16</sup> and the first Informal Working Group and Senior Officials meetings were in Rome, Paris and London<sup>17</sup>. Another IGAD-related project funded through the EU Trust Fund which could benefit from increased coordination within the IDDRSI framework is the €10m-budgeted project *Towards Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance in the IGAD region*<sup>18</sup>. Regularisation of informal movement is an explicit aim of this project. In two years an agreement should be reached between the countries in the IGAD region on the IGAD Protocols on Free Movement of Persons and on Transhumance, along with complementary measures to implement them.

<sup>14</sup> See <http://www.fao.org/resilience/news-events/detail/en/c/416278/>.

<sup>15</sup> €5m is committed for establishing a regional centre, €65m for projects around migration management.

<sup>16</sup> The Steering Committee of the Khartoum Process comprises of five EU Member States (Italy, France, Germany, UK, Malta) and five partner countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan), as well as the European Commission (EC), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the African Union Commission.

<sup>17</sup> [www.khartoumprocess.net](http://www.khartoumprocess.net).


<sup>18</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/trust-fund-projects/towards-free-movement-persons-and-transhumance-igad-region\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/trust-fund-projects/towards-free-movement-persons-and-transhumance-igad-region_en).

### 3. On the political interests of member states in regional food security and resilience

#### 3.1 Traction and implementation challenges for both frameworks

While the previous section suggests a lot of activity and external support for the two frameworks, the question remains to what extent have both frameworks been able to mobilise IGAD member states in implementation of the regional strategy (RPP for IDDRSI and regional compact for CAADP)? Commitment in the countries is limited when it comes down to actual implementation on the ground of both IDDRSI and CAADP related actions. The cluster approach seems promising but the sensitivity around border regions in this region is big and the capacity of the IGAD Secretariat to handle these politically sensitive issues is deemed weak by a number of interviewees. To illustrate, no formal permission for field work was granted by Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea for a cross border study commissioned by EU and IGAD in 2016.

**Figure 2:** Overseas development assistance to the Greater Horn of Africa (2004-2013)



Source: OECD/DAC Online Database (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm>) in IGAD Joint Programming Document for the Resilience Analysis Unit (2015)

According to the IDDRSI Mid Term Review IGAD member states have shown willingness to translate the IDDRSI Strategy into their national level drought resilience programming. IGAD has also been effective in increasing resources and aligning development and humanitarian interventions with the IDDRSI Strategy. At the same time, in all the countries there are low absorption rate of resources for project implementation (IDDRSI MTR 2017). IGAD Secretariat is asked "to liaise with Member States to highlight the low uptake of funds and explore ways of expediting the implementation of resilience projects"<sup>19</sup>. For CAADP processes, there is also concern about a lack of ownership of the regional CAADP at the Ministries of Agriculture, even with the designated national CAADP focal points and technical departments. Progress of IGAD on the IGAD-RAIP is too early to tell, but IGADs progress on the six-month implementation roadmap (prepared with technical support of FAO) will demonstrate how much traction the RAIP has within IGAD.

Analysis of the first 3 years of IDDRSI (Atyang & Standley, 2014) suggests that donors are changing the way they fund regional and national interventions less than expected. 'There has been no major increase in long-term development funding, (...) very little being provided to address critical and transformative issues.' There are a few examples of projects that aim to strengthen national and local institutions and promote

<sup>19</sup> See Communique resulting from the Extra-ordinary General Assembly of the IDDRSI held on 21 January 2017.



multi-scale governance linkages enhance the adaptive capacity of communities. This is also reflected in the more recent IDDRSI MTR, which finds that ‘Certain priority intervention areas (PIAs) receive proportionately less investment than others; as some countries commit less resources to the implementation of IDDRSI compared with others.’ Indeed, the MTR finds that “ending drought emergencies through building resilience and sustainable development still attracts less attention than does the response with emergency relief interventions”.

The 2016 UNDP review of IDDRSI suggests that all resilience-building initiatives at regional and national level should be harmonised under a common IDDRSI programme framework implying that this hasn’t happened yet to the fullest. The same review finds that interventions reaching their objectives are usually the ones with a cross-border and peacebuilding approach, building on traditional institutions and supporting already-existing mechanisms whilst taking into account market incentives and community needs.

### 3.2 Drylands still low on political agendas in the region

Both CAADP and IDDRSI meet similar challenges when it comes to national level implementation. Lack of deep commitment at country level and a lack of political will to invest in agriculture. Despite change in discourse, there is little change in action. "The problem for CAADP is not the funding of DPs, it's the political commitment of governments to invest in agriculture" (FAO technical support to IGAD RAIP).

At the same time, the IDDRSI MTR finds that ‘donors generally performed better than the national governments in terms of fulfilling their respective mandates’. The main strategy proposed in this MTR to bridge the implementation gap is to increase secured funding and support towards the IGAD Secretariat. A more elaborate understanding of what has helped and what has blocked effective implementation at member state level is missing in the literature and reviews available. A clear-cut strategy of the IGAD Secretariat or of FAO as technical partner on how to improve commitment of member states remains weak.

The main reason for this implementation gap on food security and resilience issues in the ASAL regions of the IGAD member states is that it is generally acknowledged that IGAD member states have a strong bias towards high-potential commercial agriculture (Afun-Ogidan and de Weijer 2012). In Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, and to a certain extent in Sudan as well, highland farming activities are perceived as bigger contributors to GDP than pastoralism in the ASALs or rangelands. The difference in policies are big, and differing interests and incentives to harmonise policies can make the implementation of regional approaches more difficult. This differences between IGAD member states are reflected in the progress the IDDRSI MTR reports: in most areas Kenya and Sudan show the most progress e.g. in setting up national coordination structures, with Ethiopia being a bit more advanced in aligning humanitarian responses and development interventions, possibly reflecting higher levels of capacity and high levels of technical support at the Ethiopian Ministries. Somalia and South Sudan show lack of progress on all areas, except concerning IGAD sector level and development partner coordination.

Kenya has advanced its agenda on the ASALs considerably and has been one of the drivers behind the rise of attention for ASALs in the IGAD region. It houses some of the IGAD Specialised Institutes such as the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD), responsible for much of the research that serves policymakers (e.g. managing the consultancy for assessing the total economic value of pastoralism in the IGAD MS<sup>20</sup>). The IGAD Climate Prediction & Applications Centre (ICPAC) is also housed in Nairobi, playing an important role in early warning systems. Despite the institutionalisation of the attention for livestock and pastoral issues (e.g. the existence of a Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands, a Committee of Arid and Semi-Arid Land Counties and the establishment of an effective National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)), there are also institutional weaknesses

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<sup>20</sup> See <https://igad.int/index.php/vacancies/1478-consultancy-to-assess-the-total-economic-value-of-pastoralism-in-kenya>.

around livestock issues, e.g. no reliable data on the number of livestock in the country, it apparently feels self-assured enough to point that 'projects meant to benefit more than one state have been hampered by political ill-will.'<sup>21</sup> Another example of Kenya 'effective implementation' of drought resilience approaches is the Kenya Livestock Insurance Program (KLIP) currently paying out<sup>22</sup> an average of 217 USD per pastoral household based on satellites monitoring drought providing location-specific info on pastures.<sup>23</sup>

In Ethiopia, attention for the ASAL region is still lagging and implementation is problematic. There is a slow shift in focus to acknowledge importance and potential of livestock and lowlands livestock in Ethiopia, but very slow. E.g. in the Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency strategy the priority clusters focus mainly on the highland regions (Ethiopian ATA, n.d.). In policy discourse, livestock has risen on the political agenda, but on the ground, there is poor policy coherence. Livestock policies that do exist tend to focus on commercial livestock keeping, such as dairy or poultry, rather than focus on where the bulk of the livestock is; e.g. in ASAL areas. Ministry of federal affairs promoting settlement of pastoralists around river banks etc while Ministry of Livestock trying to invest in livestock development. It remains to be seen if this recently established MoL (Sep 2015) will have enough political clout and resources to have an impact. Implementation of the first phase of the AfDB funded Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme (DRSLP) in Ethiopia for example has proven to be challenging. Completion of activities was at 20% with only one year left to deliver on its objectives. Another example of policy incoherence is that fact that the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia still doesn't report on the contribution of livestock at household level<sup>24</sup>. Interviewees at the Ethiopian Ministry of Livestock suggest that immediate priorities are not on pastoralism, but mostly on keeping up production of livestock with population growth from a food security perspective and increasing the livestock potential as foreign exchange earners in highland areas. Ethiopia's climate resilient strategy for the livestock sector focuses on replacing cattle with small ruminants for the low and midlands and introducing poultry in the highlands. Investments by the private sector are promoted in fattening, poultry, dairy and feed with policies altering to incentivise the production of feed.

In Uganda, not included in the IDDRSI MTR Progress Dashboard, livestock policies are driven mostly by a settlement agenda, investing in dairy value chains in the highlands and, improving breeds, pasture and water management in the drylands. In Uganda, drought and disaster risk management is quite a localised issue, confined mostly to the Karamoja sub-region (IDDRSI MTR). The attention and investments this region receives depend on the changing political relevance and are influenced by insecurity or favouritism. In 2016 local Karamoja leaders complained about Museveni moving his powerful wife to another Ministry<sup>25</sup>, despite allegations against her of misuse of resources for resilience building in the Karamoja cluster.

The importance of informal cross-border trade in the region, especially in livestock, is stressed in the IGAD-RAIP, estimating its value at over US\$ 60m per year. The RAIP points to the lack of regional regulatory mechanisms controlling animal movement and lack of policies supporting movement certification, and traceability policies and regulation. At the same time, economically Kenya is the smallest livestock exporter of the region and a net importer of livestock through cross border trade (ICPALD Annual Plan

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<sup>21</sup> See <http://allafrica.com/stories/201604291124.html> 'Kenya: African Countries Accused of Sitting On Drought Policies'.

<sup>22</sup> See <https://news.ilri.org/2017/02/21/record-payouts-being-made-by-kenya-government-and-insurers-to-protect-herders-facing-historic-drought/>.

<sup>23</sup> Developed by the Ministry of Livestock, World Bank and Financial Sector Development Kenya, based on model of Index-based Livestock Insurance, it brings together seven Kenyan insurance companies. 'Willy Bett, Cabinet Secretary for Kenya's Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. 'This insurance program is not just an effective component of our national drought relief effort. It's also a way to ensure that pastoralists can continue to thrive and contribute to our collective future as a nation.'

<sup>24</sup> This was already signalled in the Ethiopian review of livestock policy confirming that the national Central Statistical Authority (CSA) has been confined to sedentary farming regions in conducting censuses and sample surveys, excluding pastoral areas. Estimates of sheep and goat populations following this review are 40% and 59% higher than the official CSA estimates.

<sup>25</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201606140506.html> 'Uganda: Karamoja Leaders Cry Out Over Museveni 'Neglect'.

2016-2020). Economic interests will thus differ greatly from countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. Ethiopia as a landlocked country, will benefit from formalising livestock trade across its borders, as a means to increase government revenue. An estimated 60% of livestock exported from Somalia is originally from Ethiopia and crosses the border informally, avoiding government taxation and regulation. Contrary to Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti would benefit from free trade of livestock across the border, as these serve as the main ports of export (Afun-Ogidan and de Weijer, 2012).

All of the above then raises the challenge that IGAD faces in promoting this agenda, not only at the regional level but also in a way that encourages regional collaboration and cooperation.

### 3.3 Decentralisation processes and security issues

Although the IDDRSI MTR finds that 'Decentralisation and devolution across IGAD Member States is contributing to the effectiveness of the IDDRSI framework and strategy', this is not always the case. In the region, for example in Kenya and Ethiopia, governance issues, such as breakdown of traditional institutions, have worsened food security crises. Conflicts (inter- and intrastate, ethnic etc), breakdown of local institutions and conflicting political interests can actually reduce space for community participation and engagement in programming (both development and humanitarian) in the region. Decentralisation processes however also hold a significant risk, as 'development efforts in the ASALs face a formidable challenge by wealthy political elites who variously form cartels that sucks up the bulk of resources, thereby perpetuating marginalisation of their own communities' (ICPALD Strategic Plan 2016-2020).

Countries find it difficult to implement these projects and programmes, also due to the security issues in the project areas. Security concerns may cause countries to prefer to limit mobility of pastoralists and rather control their movements to a larger degree, especially in those areas where pastoralist areas are equated with separatist movements or recruitment zones for terrorist organisations (Afun-Ogidan and de Weijer, 2012). This then underlines the focus in IGAD on peace and security issues (see IGAD general report) but again underlines the difficulty of promoting a regional food security agenda.

## 4. On the areas with most potential traction for regional cooperation

### 4.1 Slow acknowledgment of importance of livestock and pastoralism

Despite the challenges cited above, there are signs that the governments of IGAD member states are slowly acknowledging the importance of the contribution of livestock to the economies of the region. IGAD has played a key role with coordinated research that has helped in strengthening the evidence base to sensitise policy makers on the contribution of the livestock sector to the GDP of IGAD member states. This has led to commitments at Ministerial level to increase public funding towards the livestock sector though mindsets and implementation may be slower to change.

One potential driver of regional livestock value chains is based on the strong (but fluctuating) demand from the Middle East. Although currently, exports from Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia have suffered from bans due to animal health issues (IGAD-RAIP, USAID 2010)<sup>26</sup>, private sector interests are key to moving

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<sup>26</sup> Capacity at national level is effectively strengthened by AU-IBAR VET-GOV programme where IGAD, AU-IBAR, FAO and other partners such as EU work together to move animal health issues higher on national political agendas. The Kenya-Uganda Memorandum of Understanding that allowed Ugandan and Kenyan veterinary officers in cross-border areas to work together in harmonising vaccination campaigns, surveillance and disease control, were at the basis for the cross-border Facilitation Unit at the Karamoja cluster discussed below. Similar activities in training on

regional agendas. They will or are already seeing the opportunities of regional cooperation and markets. In the IGAD region the push from these actors (IGAD Business Forum and NGO/CSO Platform) for more regional integration is weak as are fora engaging private sector and civil society organisations. The fact that livestock trade flows are mostly informal, complicate this necessary private sector push. Efforts to formalise could reduce cross-border trade or push them deeper into informality. There is potentially little interest of these large numbers of informal cross-border traders to call for more formalised regional trade, setting a challenge for formal institutions such as IGAD to address. Policy efforts to regulate informal trade need to be very realistic. Efforts to formalise can increase abuse, corruption and inefficiency.

## 4.2 Cross border initiatives

An example of how IGAD can use the traction of IDDRSI is by implementing RAIP using the already established capacities for implementing the IDDRSI e.g. through the existing Regional IDDRSI Stakeholders' Platform (Framework for Implementation IGAD RAIP, interview). A potential opportunity to synergise between CAADP and IDDRSI objectives on the ground is through the cluster approach that is being implemented through the IDDRSI Strategy. This is relevant in both a regional and cross-border context to ensure comprehensive and simultaneous coverage of all affected communities and sectors.

The 2016 UNDP review of IDDRSI recommends that the regional programming paper should also be translated into an integrated regional and cross-border investment plan. The research conducted over summer 2016 concluded that the initiatives and activities that have achieved the best results tend to be those that adopt a cross-border approach; involve and build on traditional institutions and practices; balance commercial interests and community needs; integrate peacebuilding; take a market approach; and support already-existing mechanisms<sup>27</sup>.

One of the areas with most potential to advance food security and resilience agenda is the launch of a number of cross-border projects. BMZ through GIZ is contributing to the first of a number of cross-border Development Facilitation Units. IGAD and IGAD MS see these facilitation units as an important part of improving the coordination and implementation of the regional aspects of IDDRSI. The Facilitation Unit in Moroto, Uganda is located in the border area of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan called the Karamoja Cluster. IDDRSI is in the lead of the implementation of this unit. The cluster approach offers good potential to synergise on the ground on the objectives of the RAIP and the IDDRSI strategy.

One of the main drivers of the cross-border projects is also the increase of migration-earmarked funds from the EU and EU MS. The reorganisation towards a new PCS to oversee IDDRSI implementation the EU is pushing for, expects the new PCS to 'be essential to secure political support, especially for a new focus on cross-border clusters.' The risk of these projects is that emphasis on migratory and security issues will overtake a more balance development/resilience approach. The high-level representation of member states at the launch of the Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region project 'underlines the sense of ownership of such projects' according to the Executive Secretary of IGAD.

## 4.3 Regional Natural Resource Management - too sensitive?

One of the most sensitive issues in the region that can only be solved at a regional scale and which is closely interconnected with resilience, food security and rural development is the issue of regional water management. Regional natural resource management is a priority area of both IDDRSI and CAADP. According to some IGAD doesn't have the capacity to facilitate a meaningful dialogue on such sensitive

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animal health are expanded, e.g. in the Djibouti-Somalia cross-border areas See <http://icpald.org/smp-ah-joint-national-training/>.

<sup>27</sup> See [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/trust-fund-projects/collaboration-cross-border-areas\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/trust-fund-projects/collaboration-cross-border-areas_en).

issues. The EU and International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have supported IGAD in developing an IGAD Regional Water Resources Protocol<sup>28</sup> but up to date this protocol hasn't landed on the ground or respected as it should. Institutional capacity at MS level to understand, respect and implement the protocol is perceived as problematic. Especially in the context of NRM, better linkages between research, extension, policy makers and communities are crucial. The IDDRSI MTR highlights that collaboration with research institutions is lacking.

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<sup>28</sup> [https://igad.int/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1160:igad-water-officials-on-hydro-diplomacy-training&catid=43:agriculture-and-environment&Itemid=126](https://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1160:igad-water-officials-on-hydro-diplomacy-training&catid=43:agriculture-and-environment&Itemid=126) and [https://igad.int/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1036:igad-regional-water-resources-policy-endorsed-by-sectorial-ministries&catid=43:agriculture-and-environment&Itemid=126](https://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1036:igad-regional-water-resources-policy-endorsed-by-sectorial-ministries&catid=43:agriculture-and-environment&Itemid=126).

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