

Release the pressure on governance practitioners

Frauke de Weijer and Volker Hauck

1. Introduction

Practitioners within development agencies are facing strong pressure to show results and value for money.¹ This is understandable from the point of view of donor countries, whose domestic constituencies want to see the most effective and efficient use of tax revenues spent on international development. At the same time, there is recognition that effective institutions and transparent and accountable systems of governance in developing societies are fundamental to results, and that changes in governance are long-term processes. These circumstances place great pressure on practitioners, especially those working in complex or fragile settings. The context and their own sense of responsibility pushes them in one direction, while incentives in the system push in a different one. How can individuals cope with these pressures and what can be done to realign the incentives?

This article aims to paint a picture of the different types of pressures that practitioners operate under, with a focus on fragile settings. It uses as its starting point practitioners who are in the position of governance advisor, change management or capacity development advisor, in a government ministry in a fragile state or other complex developing country environment. These pressures apply not only to practitioners with a specific mandate for issues of governance, they apply to practitioners in all fields who engage in processes of policy reform and institutional change. To a large extent the same pressures also apply to an advisor working in the office of a development agency in a fragile state. They apply to national and international advisors alike, perhaps with differences in the relative strength of the different pressures. Both authors have operated for long times in such settings and are thus basing this analysis as much on their own experience and studies,² as on existing literature.

We aim to show how these pressures – in addition to placing unmanageable pressures on the individuals in these positions – are leading to worse outcomes, where context sensitivity suffers the most. We then ask what policy makers

in a development agency can do to reduce these pressures by rebalancing the various forces affecting the work of practitioners. Without aiming for a comprehensive list, we will present a number of levers and tools that policy makers and practitioners currently have at their disposal.

However, we will argue that more is needed. In order for governance practitioners to be able to function effectively and work towards realistic and context-specific governance improvements, we need a much more fundamental redefinition of their role in order to make them more fully equipped – and better enabled – to accompany a transformational change process, deeply rooted in contextual realities, and maintaining a balance between demonstrable results and robust institutional change.

2. The dilemma: quick results versus deep institutional change

There is a general consensus that governance reforms, which frequently imply behaviour changes in organisations and societies, are long-term processes. The World Development Report (WDR) speaks of them taking at least a generation (World Bank, 2011) and other research shows even longer timeframes (see for instance Pritchett and de Weijer, 2010). Furthermore, there is an increasing recognition that pathways towards improved governance can have ups and downs and setbacks can be expected (Cliffe, 2014; Ur Rahman Mayar, 2014; da Costa, 2014).

There are risks associated with pushing too hard for results. In certain situations there may be a negative relationship between quick results and the sustainability of these results, as sustainability is derived from effective institutions that are able to uphold the delivery of results and adapt to changing circumstances. Pritchett and colleagues have described the risks of creating paper tigers. Pushing for “too much too soon” can lead to a recurrent dynamic of failure and a capability trap. When an organisation is overloaded with tasks it cannot perform the temptation is strong to retreat behind a façade of reforms that only exist on paper, and are not rooted in the institutions. With increasing stress on the system, the gap between *de facto* and *de jure* capability widens. As a result the real capability and robustness of the organisation deteriorates, and it gets stuck in a capability trap (Pritchett and de Weijer, 2010).

At the same time, particularly in post-conflict settings, it is crucial to show some results quickly, either through immediate improvements in basic living conditions (think water, electricity) or through low-hanging fruits in governance. After a conflict or a crisis there often is a sense of urgency and a hope that everything will be different now. Expectations are high and patience often relatively low, which leaves the new government only a short window of opportunity to gain the confidence of the people and to buy time for the more long-term and painful reforms ahead.³


The key question then becomes how to combine the need for quick results with long-term institution building and avoiding capability traps. How can governance practitioners manage this dilemma? What role should they play and do the pressures placed upon them allow them to play that role?

3. Pressures placed on the practitioner

There are three types of pressures that governance practitioners face in complex contexts, pulling them in different directions. These are: rigid accountability frameworks, best practice bias, and the realities of complex and multi-layered contexts.

As Figure 1 illustrates, the incentives built into practitioners' work tend to pull them upwards towards best practice and upward accountability. The complex realities of the environment in which practitioners operate make it very difficult for them to be strongly grounded in the realities, and to base their actions firmly on these realities.

Figure 1. **Pressures faced by practitioners**



1) **Best practice bias**

Until recently, international best practice was the standard to which reforms and programmes were held. Countries are judged against these standards, which are often highly ambitious and not very context specific. Best practice bias tends to disregard the different shapes and forms

governance systems can and do take – even within Europe the differences are great. It leads to a continuing reliance on predetermined approaches and strategies, which may not suit the specific change context in that country. In recognition of these problems, the discourse is now slowly shifting to “best-fit approaches”.

Regrettably this does not yet solve the problems associated with best practice bias. There is a strong mental component to this bias. Policy makers and practitioners are educated in a certain discipline and equipped with the “state of the art” knowledge in their field. This knowledge is deeply infused with the worldviews in which it is embedded, and leads practitioners to believe that certain practices are objectively the best whereas they are in fact quite deeply ideologically driven. This was made painfully clear to one author⁴ on a number of occasions where different donors were fighting it out over the best approach. For instance, in one case in Afghanistan, the United States was arguing for a private-sector driven agricultural system while the EU was pleading for a livelihoods-based system.

Policy makers and programme designers still tend to identify strategies that are proven to work elsewhere and aim to apply these in different contexts. The focus continues to be on “what works” rather than “what works in what context”. This automatically reduces the legitimacy of alternative forms of governance that may not meet Western standards, but may fit the context very well. It also reduces the credibility of certain reformists, whose ideas for reform do not match international best practice, but could still serve the country well. They are at risk of being seen as “spoilers of the reform process” rather than as holding one of the keys to a solution.

So in spite of the shift in discourse to best-fit approaches and the rhetoric of context-specific solutions, this best practice bias continues to effectively reduce the scope for finding genuine context-specific solutions. Unfortunately, this bias is not limited to international advisors; national advisors, and even reform-minded leaders within national institutions, are often trained in western institutions or influenced by information shared rapidly in a globalised world. They are also keen to apply best practice lessons, while seeing alternatives founded in alternative practices as second best.

One of the key challenges that the international development community currently faces is figuring out how to get to these best-fit solutions, because they actually require a blending (or at least an understanding) of different worldviews, which few individuals – let alone institutions – are well able to do. Furthermore, even if they do find the right solution, they would have to battle incentives within the system, which requires a good deal of courage and personal risk-taking, to which the next section will turn.

2) Pressure to show visible results

Over the last decades, there has been an increasing demand on development agencies, pushed by their parliaments, to show transparency, cost effectiveness and the impact of the money spent. This drive for a stronger focus on results tends to lead to the relatively rigid use of accountability frameworks, whereby accountability is based on a linear prediction of specific inputs leading to specific outputs leading to specific outcomes. This implies a predictability that is often not realistic in complex settings, and practitioners may thus become bound to an implementation strategy that they discover to be ineffective or even harmful. This is compounded by the often long time lag between conceptualising a programme and its implementation. The programme may no longer be fit for purpose but it is often difficult to adapt midway through. Practitioners face high pressures to continue to produce these results, in spite of their reservations.

Monitoring and evaluation is intended to account for money spent, rather than for the purpose of learning. Monitoring for learning purposes would ask different types of questions,⁵ the answers to which would be used to fine-tune or rethink the strategy and its implementation in search of better outcomes. The direction of the accountability is mostly upward, to the domestic constituencies of donors, rather than to the citizens of the country where the assistance is applied. This reduces the flexibility needed to adjust a given strategy in complex and less predictable settings. It creates incentives for the practitioner to focus on programme outputs and to disregard the bigger picture. Practitioners also have an additional accountability requirement towards the local partner institution. This is also often a complex relationship that needs to be managed carefully and for which they need space to manoeuvre.

Further pressures on practitioners relate to the need to execute the budget and to show results. This combination of factors creates a situation in which it is easier to continue to generate visible outputs by implementing the same, well-known, type of programme, even if there is no evidence that these programmes have generated real outcomes or made any impact. Doing the converse is a lot harder. Often, the root cause of a particular problem is deeply political and relates to issues of power. Solving these would require not just a good power analysis, but upsetting these power relations. This will generate friction and resistance, and may even seem to upset local ownership; or rather a superficial interpretation of what local ownership entails. It would lead to less visible results in the short run, budgets left unspent and counterparts upset. Clearly not a situation the current incentive mechanisms reward.

Lastly, there tends to be a lack of realism among donor agencies⁶ as well as government partners on how much can be achieved within a short time frame, which further heightens the pressures for quick results. Actual governance outcomes are relatively difficult to measure, and relatively slow to change. This leads to a pressure on the practitioner to focus on what can

be measured, notably formal outputs such as formulating glossy strategy papers, developing action plans or setting up new organisational structures or institutions. There is much less pressure to focus on the process of changing behaviour and organisational culture that is so fundamental to deep institutional change. This pressure is often exacerbated by leaders in national institutions who also want to show concrete and demonstrable results, and have less patience for the slower dimensions of reform.

3) Complex and multi-layered contexts

Practitioners operating in fragile settings are working in complex sociopolitical environments. Different institutional regimes overlap, with informal and formal institutions operating in conjunction or independently from each other, and power and influence is often mediated through shadow systems. Changing formal systems or devising new policies do not therefore automatically lead to real changes on the ground. Practitioners mostly operate in the formal sphere and so tend to be isolated from the real realms of power, influence and behaviour. They are therefore continually confronted with a lack of any real progress. Their relative isolation does not help them in gaining a deeper insight into these dynamics.

Furthermore, different societal groups hold different expectations and visions for the future. The idea of “one vision” and “whole-of-society ownership” is therefore somewhat illusory in many post-conflict settings. In Western societies our democratic institutions serve as vehicles for constructive deliberation, but in fragile settings the mechanisms for constructive deliberation will not yet be functioning well, and may themselves be the subject of contestation. Gaining a consensus on the best way forward, and a broad-based support for reforms, is therefore fraught with difficulties. Practitioners who have been taught to consult and “listen to the people” are caught within a myriad of perspectives, and struggle to find a way through the maze.

Also the internal environment – the government organisation with or within which the practitioner works – will be complex and fragmented. Even if, hypothetically, the “whole-of-society” agreed on the reforms that are necessary, there could still be resistance to reform within state institutions. Leaving aside the sometimes obvious issues of power relations and opportunities for rent seeking, any process of restructuring will always lead to winners and losers, and will create fear among some. The necessary changes in organisational culture can affect people’s sense of security, status and identity. The capacity for change in an organisation is highly dependent on how the process is framed and guided by the leadership at the top, something over which the practitioner has little control.

These factors place strong pressures on the practitioner, who is expected to show progress in the institution to prove his own performance.

4. What can policy makers and practitioners do to rebalance these forces?

How do practitioners cope with these pressures? Individuals find their own ways of coping. Some simply follow the rules as per the incentives created within the system. Others, however, are not satisfied with this strategy, and end up being two-faced. They show their headquarters or the donor what they want to see, but in the meantime try and find the space to be more rooted in reality and do what circumstances demand. This strategy can go a long way, but in the end can lead to cynicism or even burnout. This leads the best people to leave, which is clearly an undesirable outcome. In addition to the human cost, it is the context sensitivity that suffers. Burnout significantly reduces the ability of the international community to work towards context-specific solutions that manage in the most optimal way possible the dilemma between short-term results and sustainable institutional change.

The purpose of this section is to find ways to loosen the springs pulling practitioners up in Figure 1, and strengthening the strings pulling the person down. We will give some pointers to what policy makers can do to rebalance these forces. Without aiming for a comprehensive list, we will present a number of levers and tools policy makers currently have at their disposal, as well as interesting research that can help the rebalancing. Figure 2 shows how these suggestions can serve to tighten or loosen the pressures, although most of them work at more than one level simultaneously or strengthen each other at different levels.


1) Continue and deepen research on sequencing governance reforms in specific contexts

The general belief that governance matters for development led to a long list of institutional reforms that had to take place for development to take place. Grindle challenged this point of view and coined the concept of good-enough governance suggesting that not all governance deficits need to (or can) be tackled at once. Instead, fewer, more useful and more feasible interventions should be targeted. Improved analytical frameworks should be used to decide which governance interventions should be undertaken in particular country contexts (Grindle, 2004, 2007). The need for this type of research is still very relevant, as practitioners cannot be simply left with the catchphrase “it depends on the context”.

Recently efforts have been made to map the characteristics of contexts for which particular aspects of governance seem particularly relevant, based on political economy analyses. Black boxes, such as neo-patrimonialism and rent-seeking, are being opened up in order to gain deeper insights into the particular opportunities for governance improvements they may provide.⁷ Such research may give practitioners more guidance on what can

work in a given context, by breaking down which type of strategies may be more suitable to contexts with which characteristics. Policy makers and practitioners can draw on this type of research to argue for fewer, more context-specific and more realistic governance reforms, and push back on “good governance” best practice. It allows also for better-informed decisions on how to prioritise and combine actions towards achieving short-term results with measures aimed at long-term transformation.

Figure 2. **Possible tools and levers for rebalancing the forces placed on practitioners**



2) Articulate the potential of a given context to change, and reduce ambitions accordingly

Not all sociopolitical contexts are equally open to change. Existing power relations and socio-cultural patterns tend to perpetuate the status quo. The different institutional regimes at play (including the shadow power dynamics described in the previous section), and specifically the elites, play an important role, although disruptions to the existing context can create opportunities for change.

Political economy analysis and conflict analyses have now become commonly accepted as important tools for developing more context-specific programmes. Unfortunately research shows that in many cases the analysis has little influence on the subsequent scope and content of programming. Policy makers could promote the use of political economy analysis⁸ to understand and articulate the change potential of a given context. They can further insist on the development of a theory of change based on this change potential. This articulation of the context for change and what may be realistically feasible can then be used to push back against the overly high ambitions that tend to be imposed from above.

Matt Andrews, in his book *Limits of Institutional Reform*, outlines different scenarios in which disruptions can lead to more or less fundamental change (Andrews, 2013). The most important contextual factors are 1) the severity of the disruption; 2) the presence of an alternative institutional logic that could replace the currently dominant one; and 3) the presence of actors that can facilitate the shift. When these factors are all strongly present, the chances of transformative change are higher.⁹ Another useful framework is the one presented in the World Bank publication *Institutions Taking Root* (Barma et al., 2014). It describes different potential pathways for change for reform-minded national agencies, influenced primarily by the degree of alignment between the agency's objectives and elite incentives. Frameworks such as these can be used by policy makers and practitioners to make the change context explicit and use it as the basis for the theory of change. This should not form part of a one-off exercise, but become part of the DNA of a more iterative way of working.

3) Promote a way of working that is based on “accompanying a process of change”

As described above, a reform-minded agency (an organisation or an individual) needs to relate to the complex sociopolitical context it inhabits, and find a way to manoeuvre through it. Within a given context it seeks to identify and work with change agents, build alliances and coalitions of like-minded people, align incentives between likely or unlikely bedfellows, and aims to strengthen collective action. This implies a constant process

of scanning the arena, seizing opportunities when they arise, holding firm where possible and compromising when necessary. This is not a process of predefining outputs and then implementing them; it is a process of finding one's way through a maze. A practitioner needs to be enabled to accompany this process of change, in order to be effective.

Policy makers need to find ways to promote this way of working, in spite of the constraints imposed by current management systems and accountability frameworks, which are not conducive to this approach. One relatively practical way of doing this is to use a problem-centred approach. Rather than aiming for reforms directly, they can be approached tangentially. For instance, infrastructure is a relatively value-neutral proposition. A practitioner can use the momentum created by the desire for, say, a bridge to develop a more inclusive decision-making process and strengthen the institutions. An active, multi-stakeholder engagement centred around the bridge can help build capacity within institutions, streamline and institutionalise processes, and embed systems of mutual accountability. This clearly begs for a closer connection between governance advisors and those working in technical fields, as well as a strategic engagement promoting sustainable transformational change while going for the low-hanging fruit in the short term. This is particularly important in fragile settings, where dimensions of social contract, legitimacy of and confidence in state institutions, state effectiveness and systems of accountability are so central.

4) Shift the onus for decision making onto recipient countries and foster local expertise

A key precondition for development assistance to be more rooted in reality is to move the onus of decision making onto recipient countries. The current emphasis on local ownership and whole-of-country visions in policy discourse, provide opportunities to strengthen these processes. Practitioners need to transform consultations from the box-ticking exercises with the usual suspects (organised civil society as we know it) that they often are to a genuine process of constructive deliberation between the various societal groups and their perspectives. This, however, should not be taken lightly. Local ownership is not something that is latently present, it is something that needs to be forged through a difficult and lengthy process, particularly in more socially fragmented environments.

Only by spending lengthy periods of time within a given context, and by discovering where the margins for manoeuvre are, can a practitioner effectively contribute to processes of institutional change. Networks, coalitions, strategic partnerships and alliances are the essential ingredients of pathways of change, and require time to build up and build trust. Practitioners therefore need long-term engagement, ideally based in-country. Provision could also be made for individuals who have spent considerable

time on the ground to stay engaged on a more arm's-length basis for a longer period, for example in the form of a counselling function. This will also help address the pressing issue of a severe lack of institutional memory, particularly in fragile contexts where there is a high turnover of staff.

Further decentralisation of decision making, and transferring more discretionary powers to embassies and field offices can contribute to a more effective way of monitoring the change context and identifying and making use of opportunities for change when they arise. This will help contribute to an environment in which “development entrepreneurship” can thrive.¹⁰

Moreover, investment in local policy analysis, management and organisational development analysis, and local think tanks can help foster independent and locally grounded expertise. Practitioners should be given incentives to build connections with these institutions and groom young talent, for instance through smart twinning of advisors with young talent, or through (co-) teaching at local universities. They can serve as bridge builders between international best practice and local conditions, and can over time build up the institutional memory and learning that is required to build up “local best practice”. Fostering such local expertise and critical analytical skills is a value in itself, as it helps contribute to a more informed and deliberative society that can effectively weigh and debate policy options.

5) Enhance flexibility and adaptability in planning, monitoring and evaluation

None of the suggestions above can work without changing planning, monitoring and evaluation systems. They need to shift from a linear input-output-outcome model to one that incentivises accompanying the process of change. This requires frameworks and tools that are more geared toward learning, flexibility and adaptation. Innovative and more process-oriented monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methods have been developed in recent years, such as developmental evaluation, and theory-of-change based methods. Mixed evaluation methods, including for instance “most significant change” stories or “outcome mapping”¹¹ are increasingly accepted.

Recent years have also seen a renewed interest in learning as a distinct process that is more internal and self-reflective in nature than M&E. A less explored, but potentially very interesting avenue, is to hold programmes (or practitioners) accountable for how well they critically reflect and also for how well they “learn” (de Weijer, 2012). This creates incentives for practitioners to continuously scan the context, identifying change opportunities and building and adapting strategies based on these opportunities, and for a continuous exchange on how best to achieve the desired results. Not just the practitioners but also those holding the purse strings would then be held accountable for their ability to respond effectively to a given change context.

Time and resources need to be built into the design of a programme to permit for a more context-specific and adaptive process. A number of development agencies, such as the European Commission, have specific guidance on how to work more flexibly in fragile situations (European Commission, 2014). Practitioners are advised to search for and make use of such provisions, which are often not overly publicised. Certain approaches are more optimised for process accompaniment than others. Problem-centred approaches, such as the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation approach promoted by the Harvard Center for International Development (Andrews et al., 2012) but also the multi-stakeholder approaches used by many multilateral and non-governmental organisations (NGOs),¹² take a specific problem and identify and aim to solve specific (governance-related) bottlenecks. Policy makers and practitioners are encouraged to promote and make use of such approaches.

5. Can we release the pressure?

How can practitioners really make a difference, when they are under so many pressures and need to manoeuvre through such a highly complex and multilayered, multi-perspective environment? How can we release some of these pressures on the practitioner?

First and foremost, practitioners need to be provided with the space to act creatively, to act on opportunities for change as they arise, to facilitate change indirectly by supporting local change agents or development entrepreneurs¹³ and their organisations, and not be bound to effect reforms for which the change context is not conducive.

Parallels can be drawn with mediators who are brought in to mediate peace processes. They are not judged by the results, they are judged on how well they manage to steer a complex process. They are given the space to operate, without being held to preset outputs, and often not even to preset outcomes. Viewing practitioners as mediators – not just in governance but in every field that involves policy reform and institutional change – can open up new ways of thinking, and new ways of holding them accountable. It can perhaps help delink them from the need to show results, and instead to report on how they engaged and have engaged others for change. This can further contribute to a deepening of our understanding of how external actors can accompany processes. Hopefully this learning can be of assistance to less experienced practitioners who are about to dive into this highly difficult field of work, for which they are currently unprepared, unequipped, and are not given the space to do it well.

In the article we have provided a number of suggestions on how policy makers and practitioners can start to rebalance the forces that place the practitioner in such a conundrum. But will these suggestions provide

practitioners with sufficient space to accompany processes of change in a way that is in tune with the change context? The answer is that they may, but it is rather unlikely. Past efforts to bring about more transformational change in the way international agencies work have shown that many of the above suggestions risk becoming neutralised when brought into the bureaucratic management process that international development has become, and may instead end up maintaining the status quo.

Effectively, change is thus necessary in two dimensions. First, fundamental changes need to be made to the way the system operates, in order to really reduce the pull from the upward springs and to allow the above proposals to have a chance. Second, practitioners need to be better equipped to accompany processes of change in a way that is in tune with the change context, in other words to become an “institutional change mediator”.

Becoming an institutional change mediator is not easy. It has taken the authors of this article more than ten years to understand what “accompanying a process” really means, and they still find it very hard. It requires certain competencies that can to some extent be taught. It requires individuals to free themselves from the ideological and technocratic ballast that has been loaded onto their shoulders, while at the same time clarifying their own orienting values. They must have an affinity with the deeper structures of societal dynamics and an empathy for those living within them. They must be able to hold multiple points of view simultaneously and aim to build bridges between these. It requires a different type of intelligence, best articulated by Scott Fitzgerald in his statement: “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function”.¹⁴

If equipping practitioners with the competencies and mindsets to become institutional change mediators is tough, changing the way the incentives work within the development system is tougher. Only marginal progress can be made towards reducing these pressures unless we are ready to embark on a full revision of the way we define and use accountability. Let us be realistic enough to recognise that governance advisors cannot be expected to do the impossible. But let us be bold enough to create an environment for them in which they can do their utmost. Let’s help the practitioners out of the conundrum they are caught in.

Notes

1. Practitioners are understood in this article as staff mobilised from different regional and cultural contexts, including nationally recruited staff working with international co-operation agencies.
2. See publications on our website at <http://ecdpm.org/volker-haucks-publications> and <http://ecdpm.org/people/fraukedeweijer/>.

3. The same can be true for developing societies not emerging from conflict and severe fragility, though the situation is generally more politically stable, allowing for more space and time for reform.
4. This refers to Frauke de Weijer's personal experience in Afghanistan.
5. Such as do our strategies work? Are our predictions regarding the potential for reform correct? Are our outputs indeed leading the governance outcomes we would like to see? Do we need to make adjustments to our proposed outputs, intermediate outcomes, implementation strategies? Are we indeed striving towards the correct goal?.
6. Please note that donor agencies themselves are under pressure from domestic parliaments and the broader public opinion, who also expect visible results quickly.
7. See for instance the work done by the Africa Power and Politics programme, www.institutions-africa.org.
8. For a good overview see "Political economy analysis (old)", GSDRC website, www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis-old/tools-for-political-economy-analysis (GSDRC, undated).
9. See Andrews (2013), pp. 49 to 52, and in particular the table on p. 51.
10. Development entrepreneurship is the term used by Faustino and Booth to describe an iterative and politically informed way of working with development assistance (Faustino and Booth, 2014).
11. See for instance the different approaches presented at the Better Evaluation website, such as http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/outcome_mapping (Better Evaluation, undated a) and http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/most_significant_change (Better Evaluation, undated b).
12. See for instance the multi-stakeholder processes Knowledge Co-creation Portal at www.wageningenportals.nl/msp/.
13. The term "development entrepreneurs" is used by Faustino and Booth (2014).
14. F. Scott Fitzgerald, "The Crack-Up" (1936).

Bibliography

- Andrews, M. (2013), *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions*, Cambridge University Press.
- Andrews, M., L. Pritchett and M. Woolcock (2012), "Escaping capability traps through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation", *CID Working Paper*, No. 240, Center for International Development, Harvard University, http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/files/bsc/files/240_andrews_pritchett_woolcock_beyondcapabilitytraps_pdia_final.pdf.
- Barma, N.H., E. Huybens and L. Viñuela (2014), *Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts*, World Bank, Washington, DC, <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20030>.
- Better Evaluation (undated a), "Outcome mapping", Better Evaluation website, http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/outcome_mapping.
- Better Evaluation (undated b), "Most significant change", Better Evaluation website, http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/most_significant_change.
- European Commission (2014), "Operating in situations of conflict and fragility", *Tools and Methods Series*, Reference Document No. 17, European Commission, Brussels.

- Cliffe, S. (2014), "Promoting governance and inclusive development", *GREAT Insights Magazine*, Vol. 4(1), <http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/promoting-governance-inclusive-development/>.
- Da Costa, H. (7 April 2014), "New deal for fragile states needs time and political commitment to flourish", the Guardian Poverty Matters blog, www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/apr/07/new-deal-for-fragile-states-needs-time-political-commitment.
- de Weijer, F. (2012), "Rethinking approaches to managing change in fragile states", *Working Papers*, No. 58, Center for International Development, Harvard University, http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/files/bsc/files/58_de_weijer_fragile_states.pdf.
- Faustino, J. and D. Booth (2014), "Development entrepreneurship: How donors and leaders can foster institutional change", *Working Politically in Practice Series*, Case Study No. 2. The Asia Foundation and ODI (Overseas Development Institute), London.
- Grindle, Merilee (2007), "Good enough governance revisited", *Development Policy Review*, Vol.25(5), pp. 553-574.
- Grindle, Merilee (2004), "Good enough governance: Poverty reduction and reform in developing countries", *Governance*, Vol. 17(4) pp. 525-48.
- GSDRC (undated), "Political economy analysis (old)", GSDRC website, www.gsdr.org/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis-old-/tools-for-political-economy-analysis.
- Pritchett, L and F. de Weijer (2010), *Fragile States: Stuck in a Capability Trap?*, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9109/WDR2011_0001.pdf.
- Ur Rehman Mayar, H. (2014), "The role of the New Deal in supporting countries transition out of fragility: A g7+ perspective", *GREAT Insights Magazine*, Vol. 4(1), <http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/peacebuilding-statebuilding/role-new-deal-supporting-countries-transition-fragility-g7-perspective/>.
- World Bank (2011), *World Development Report 2011: 'Conflict, Security, and Development*, World Bank, Washington, DC.