A New EU Strategic Approach to Global Development, Resilience and Sustainability

by Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

ABSTRACT

The new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Agenda provide an opportunity for the EU to refresh its global approach to development cooperation. The EUGS could promote resilience through coherence between internal and external policies, in line with the 2030 Agenda. The EUGS could establish a new EU approach to development combining resilience, development and conflict sensitivity. As a multi-diplomacy umbrella document fostering policy coherence, the EUGS will have to acknowledge and encourage a series of adjustments to be made in EU development diplomacy and cooperation to contribute to the universal and transformative SDG agenda.

European Union | Development | Resilience | Global governance | Agenda 2030

keywords
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Introduction

The new EU Global Strategy is a great opportunity for redefining EU “development activities” that were mentioned in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). The EUGS can expand the EU global vision on some key issues related to development (i.e., resilience, the migration-development nexus, interconnections between internal and external security and state fragility) from a dual perspective. On the one hand, development diplomacy and international cooperation may be fully harnessed in a strategy for EU external action. On the other hand, following the 2030 Agenda’s approach on SDGs, the EU may elaborate an integrated approach linking internal resilience with all the aspects of its external action, being aware that development is both a technical and political matter and hence should not be disconnected from the other dimensions of EU foreign policy. The EUGS can further institutionalise an approach focused on preventive action and can help address the root causes of insecurity and poverty. Policy coherence for sustainable development, could, if rigorously defined and measured, play a determining role when it comes to creating fruitful synergies between peace, security and development. Accountability and monitoring are part of the development effectiveness agenda and will be paramount for the success of the SDGs.

In this first section we discuss development diplomacy and international cooperation in the framework of the elaboration of the EUGS focusing in particular on resilience and development in fragile contexts. In the second section we explore what 2030 Agenda specifically means for EU development diplomacy and international cooperation and how the EU will need to frame its development policy and practice to ensure that the principles of universality, shared responsibilities, and policy coherence for sustainable development are systematically interwoven.
1. Harnessing development diplomacy and resilience in the EU Global Strategy

1.1 An EU approach to development?

The 2011 communication from the Commission *Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change* is the main guiding document for EU development programming choices in the period 2014-2020. It will probably be revised on the basis of the commitments made by the 2030 Agenda, as discussed in the second section of this paper, together with the EU Consensus on Development and the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Action, which date back to 2006 and 2008 respectively.

The Agenda for Change is a short but comprehensive document that includes some important “adjectives” of development presented in the following paragraphs which should continue to be relevant for the EU. Firstly, it contains the reference to inclusivity: “The EU must now [...] promote a more inclusive international development agenda.” Secondly, it extensively refers to human development – the human-centred approach to development pioneered by Amartya Sen in the early 1990s: “The EU should take a more comprehensive approach to human development. This involves supporting a healthy and educated population, giving the workforce skills that respond to labour market needs, developing social protection, and reducing inequality of opportunity.”

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1 This section took its first steps following the conference “The EU and the Global Development Framework. A Strategic Approach to the 2030 Agenda” that took place at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Rome on 7 March 2016. The conference was organised in the framework of the review of the EU Global Strategy by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in cooperation with the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Compagnia di San Paolo, with the contribution of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). IAI and ECDPM would like to thank the Ministry for its interest and support.


6 Ibid., p. 7.
Thirdly, human rights have a prominent role in development policies. A human rights-based approach is present thorough the document, even if not explicitly mentioned. If fully interpreted and applied, it could be a crucial point for development diplomacy and international cooperation as part of the EUGS. In fact, rights-based approaches could stop people being perceived as “needy,” “victims,” or simply as “beneficiaries.” Instead, it enables the same people to understand themselves to be dignified people, possessed of rights, who can be part of a process of empowerment: “it moves them from being the objects in somebody else’s sentence to being the subject of their own free speech.”

Moreover, the human rights discourse may be able to “take the real struggle for rights to the heart of politics and policy-making in governments, corporations, and public opinion.” It also means to abolish “the development enterprise as a neo-colonial program of correction administered from rich to poor and replacing it with a common political project that recognizes everyone’s equal rights and judges the behavior of all on the basis of how they realize or violate these rights.” The intrinsic links between economics and human rights has also led some scholars and practitioners to affirm that if strategies of economic development and policies to implement human rights are united, they will reinforce one another and improve the human condition. Human rights also make a contribution to the governance agenda. This highlights the importance of state-citizen linkages, combining a focus on developing the capacity of states to deliver on human rights commitments with citizens’ awareness and capacity to claim their entitlements. Additionally, human rights contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of aid. Finally, development and human rights organisations together can take steps to reduce conflict and improve human rights outcomes, as discussed in the next section.

An approach to development based on the “human discourses” and human dignity (as worded in the 2030 Agenda) will help the EU to synchronise its policy objectives with the 2030 Agenda, building consistency among different areas, such as financing for development, climate change, and trade as well as internal peace and security.

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8 Ibid., p. 4.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
1.2 The resilience and development nexus in the EU Global Strategy

The EUGS bridges the gap between EU and external policies, going beyond the 2003 European Security Strategy’s mere acknowledgement of the interconnections between internal and external security. To do so, the EUGS will build on the concept of resilience, a notion absent in the 2003 European Security Strategy. The implementation of the EUGS focused on resilience “as a postmodern form of governance” will have to be informed by knowledge and learning from the implementation of existing resilience-based policy practices, both within the EU (including Member States) and abroad.

The concept of resilience has been increasingly used in recent years both among scholars and policy-makers. Resilience has entered into the political vocabulary from literature on the adaptability of ecological systems. Ecological resilience emphasises that changes can bring different situations of stability, consequently multiple stable states are possible. Therefore, resilience represents the ability to withstand shocks, but also supplying the capacity for adaptation and renewal. Resilience also offers the potential to bring “with it a different way of thinking about change:” “Thinking in terms of resilience shifts the emphasis to the creation of conditions that foster greater adaptability and innovation, and seeks to enhance self-organisation and the emergence of adaptive behaviour rather than the design of tightly managed programmes. It leaves more space for careful manoeuvre in a system that is inherently difficult to gauge and takes a more iterative approach to change.”

According to a widely used EU definition, resilience is “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks” such as violence, conflict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising long-term development. Resilience should therefore encompass assistance to countries so that they integrate risk management into their development programmes, and to target these at building the capacities of the most vulnerable people. The main goal is to support people and communities to withstand and recover from increasing shocks and stresses by helping them build their resilience.

This approach based on “resilient societies” and change is paramount, but it is not the only possible application of the concept of resilience. In fact, some alternative

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uses (or risks) in applying the resilience approach to policymaking are possible. Firstly, the term entails a risk that it may be co-opted by current ways of thinking about change, i.e. it could end up being used in a very linear manner, where change is controllable from the outside and follows a linear path. Secondly, too much emphasis could be placed on the resilience of state institutions, thus ignoring sources of resilience outside the state. Finally, there is a risk that demands may be piled up on fragile states: apart from having to be effective, legitimate, transparent and accountable, fragile states will now also have to become resilient, placing them in an even more negative light. Sophisticated and context-sensitive understanding and practice of enhancing local ownership and “constructive leadership” may help to complement potentially flawed bottom-up approaches.

In the humanitarian sector, the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020 gave energy to the Communication of the previous year and set out the way forward for a more effective collaborative action on building resilience, bringing together humanitarian action, long-term development cooperation and on-going political engagement. The document is particularly focused on disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, social protection and food security. Interestingly, the European Commission communication on resilience and food security as well as other initiatives such as SHARE and AGIR consider resilience as “part of the development process,” “at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance” and even connected to the political dimension. It views resilience-focused processes as context-based, country-owned, country-led and based on an equitable people-centred approach.

Current debates on migratory fluxes to the EU are indeed about the EU’s resilience to migratory shocks as well as human rights protection. The 2003 European Security Strategy looked at migratory flows only as a security threat linked either to climate change or to organised crime (illegal migration). Migration is a significant factor

17 Frauke de Weijer, "Resilience: A Trojan Horse for a New Way of Thinking?", cit.
20 The EU’s initiative Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience (SHARE) was born out of the 2011 Horn of Africa food crisis and aims to boost resilience in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia. The Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR) was launched on 6 December 2012 to strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable across nine countries in the Sahel region of West Africa. The Goal of AGIR-Sahel is “Zero Hunger” in the next 20 years.
22 For instance, on SHARE the EU is committed to “a long-term commitment to address structural issues and to build long-term resilience. Depending on the specific national and local context, several themes and sectors will be treated as priorities for EU funding over the period 2014-2020. These could include: livestock health and development, natural resource management, DRR, national and regional trade, nutrition, governance, research and technology transfer, and population flows.” Ibid., p. 6.
of development around the globe and it has always been a way for people to seek a better life and overcome poverty. At the same time, it can disrupt development processes, notably through the emigration of highly skilled workers. Migration is therefore a key policy area at the intersection of internal (home and justice affairs, border management, intercultural integration, identity) and external policies (development diplomacy and international cooperation, human rights promotion), as discussed in the second section of this paper.

1.3 Development in fragile contexts: conflicts and security

State failure was one of key threats presented in the 2003 European Security Strategy but the concept of state fragility was not used as such. The 2003 documents asserted that security was a precondition for development, while its 2008 implementation report recognised the interdependent nature of security and development. Peacebuilding, state-building and the building of resilience in societies needs therefore to be integrated into or soundly sequenced with development activities in fragile or conflict-prone contexts.

The importance of linking peace, security and development policies is stressed by several official documents. The Lisbon Treaty clearly states the objective “to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security.” The European Consensus on Development (2006) recognises the need for conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding and for “addressing the root causes of violent conflict, including poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality.” The Agenda for Change highlights that the “EU’s development, foreign and security policy initiatives should be linked so as to create a more coherent approach to peace, state-building, poverty reduction and the underlying causes of conflict.”

The Agenda for Change also states very clearly the importance of the development-security nexus: “the EU must intensify its joined-up approach to security and poverty, where necessary adapting its legal bases and procedures;” and “should ensure that its objectives in the fields of development policy, peace-building, conflict prevention and international security (including cyber security) are

25 Article 21, TEU.
27 European Commission, Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change, cit., p. 11.
28 Ibid.
mutually reinforcing. It should finalise and implement the requested Action Plan on security, fragility and development.”

The Communication on EU Approach to Resilience also reinforces the security-development nexus: “In unstable and fragile countries, where resilience is often weakest, it is also important to ensure that policy initiatives take into account the security-development nexus.”

As a matter of fact, this human security narrative has already been prominent in the EU’s official discourse in the last 12 years as an attempt to complement a narrow view of security, understood only as hard security.

What is new is that the 2030 Agenda avoids treating fragile or conflict-affected countries as a group with distinct needs. This may lead to a stronger approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding through global long-term, consistent policies. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 and its accompanying targets provide an important guide for such efforts. However, there are also key peace-related targets under other SDGs.

In that regard, the wording of the EUGS could also use the term “conflict sensitivity.” The central component of conflict sensitive practice is conflict analysis as it provides the foundation to inform conflict sensitive programming, in particular in terms of understanding how best an intervention can be tailored to the specificities of a particular context. Finally, flexibility and longer timeframes for cooperation and risk management are also important components of development programmes in conflict prone or conflict affected countries and regions. Despite significant progress made by the EU in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, sharper political strategies and clearer partnership priorities are still required to improve the EU’s performance.

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29 Ibid., p. 6.


31 The concept of human security was first used by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994 in its Human Development Report. It emerged in the post-Cold War era as a way to link various humanitarian, economic, and social issues in order to alleviate human suffering and assure security. Human Security focuses primarily on protecting people while promoting peace and assuring sustainable continuous development. It therefore refers to the security of individuals and communities, expressed as both "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want."


2. Reviewing EU development diplomacy and international cooperation in response to the 2030 Agenda

Six months after the launch of the 2030 Agenda and the COP21 Agreement on climate change, the EU will adopt its first EUGS and will need to ensure that all its commitments in global processes have been taken into account at all policy levels and in all policy realms. The text of the EUGS and its implementation will revolve around a number of key concepts (cf. resilience, interconnection, complexity) opening venues for a more integrated approach to, inter alia, development diplomacy and international cooperation, conflict prevention and peacemaking, migration management, climate diplomacy, and economic diplomacy. There is increased recognition that the EU’s challenges are global, multidimensional and interconnected. There is also consensus that global challenges require effective global collective action.

The EU is set to play a major role in global collective action. Beyond international solidarity considerations, the European Union has an interest in ensuring that global solutions to global challenges are found. Peace, prosperity, low-carbon development and greater equality beyond Europe’s borders mean positive spillovers with regards to the EU’s objectives in security, migration, economic growth and sustainable development. Today, the EU and its Member States remain the world’s main development assistance provider; they are the leading trade actor and main power in global economic action (WTO, G20); the EU is the most ambitious block for climate action; and it considers itself as an international role model in the fields of human rights, democracy, social protection and regional integration. Yet, the EU is still caught in an unprecedented economic, financial, social and political crisis. This crisis risks undermining EU’s credibility and ability to deliver on its ambitions with regards to sustainable development and worldwide poverty eradication.

2015 was a threshold year for global collective action and international cooperation. In July 2015, global leaders met in Addis Ababa to define the financial tools that are needed to deliver on the new post-2015 development agenda. In September, the international community agreed on a global agenda and 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In December 2015, COP21 was concluded with a new

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universal and legally binding climate agreement in Paris. The SDGs will only be achieved if a highly ambitious climate agenda is pursued, and if financial and non-financial means are mobilised effectively to support the global transition to sustainable development and adapt to the negative impacts of climate change.

The EU and its Member States have at their disposal the whole range of diplomatic and cooperation tools to work on synergies between commitments to climate change mitigation and adaptation (climate diplomacy) on the one hand and sustainable development on the other (development diplomacy and international cooperation, security policies, trade policies etc.). To live up to the SDG and COP21 ambitions, the EU will have to work towards adapting its internal and external policies in a way that honours commitments, and ensure the convergence and compatibility of several separate monitoring frameworks for SDGs, for the implementation of the COP21 agreement and for the implementation of Europe’s 2020 strategy and 2020 Climate and Energy Package.

2.1 The 2030 Agenda and what it will mean for all EU policies

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been criticised for being too narrow and reductionist. Issues such as equity, sustainability and climate change, the quality of public services and poverty as capability deprivation, were not sufficiently addressed by the MDG framework. Too much focus was put on aid and too little on addressing the international drivers of poverty, the role of policies and global governance and the meaning of what wellbeing is.

To address these shortcomings, the SDG framework introduces several key transformations:

• *It sets a universal, yet differentiated agenda.* The 2030 Agenda is universal in that it applies to all countries, regardless of their development status. It is also a differentiated agenda, because countries’ responsibilities will differ depending on their specific circumstances, their respective development statuses and the means available to them, at three different levels: (i) responsibilities for domestic development outcomes;38 (ii) responsibilities for assisting other countries;39 and (iii) responsibilities for supporting progress towards global common goods.40

38 Governments assume responsibility for improving the situation of their own citizens (e.g., nationally-relevant poverty and/or inequality-reduction targets).
39 Countries bear an appropriate burden in helping others to achieve their national development outcomes and SDG targets (e.g., by providing financial assistance and taking part in broader international cooperation to benefit one or a specific group of countries).
40 Governments play a role in international efforts to safeguard common goods (e.g., making commitments in international fora for the benefit of the planet and global community as a whole, such as CO₂ emission reductions).
• It puts a strong emphasis on economic dimensions and the private sector as a key engine for sustainable and inclusive growth.

• It brings in new wording on global development, focusing on resilience, human dignity, prosperity, peace and people.\textsuperscript{41}

• It broadens the remit of international development diplomacy and international cooperation. There is a clear consensus that aid alone is not sufficient to address development challenges, and that there is a need to overcome the traditional North/South dichotomy. The 2030 Agenda is less focused on “financial transfers” from developed to developing countries, and much more on sharing innovation, technology and knowledge, and promoting policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD), global governance, mutual accountability and inclusive societies and resilience. There is also growing expectation that emerging economies will contribute more to sustainable development.

• It puts more emphasis on domestic policies to mobilise sustainable development finance. Although aid will continue to play an important role in fragile and least developed countries, this will not suffice. Governments are responsible for domestic development outcomes, and in this regard, they will need to make the right policy choices (cf. to improve domestic resource mobilisation, attract private investment and ensure an effective use of finance for sustainable development).

On financing for development, one of the challenges for the EU and its Member States will be to combine more effectively its various sources of development finance at the EU level (European Investment Bank, Commission’s financial assistance), Member States’ level (national development banks such as KfW or Agence Française du Développement, taxation policies), micro level (micro-credit, remittances), private sector (blending, public private partnerships and clarification of debates and potential of innovative financing) and global level (Commission and Member States’ contributions to global funds).

The assumption is that all national-level actions will add up to the ambitious global objectives to effectively achieve sustainable development. Yet, translating the universal SDG goals and targets into national actions, commitments and responsibilities is a considerable challenge, and requires an accountability system that respects national priorities and specificities, while at the same time builds

\textsuperscript{41} For instance, the preamble refers to “transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path.” Point 7 states as part of the vision a “world where human habitats are safe, resilient and sustainable.” Two goals directly refer to resilience in the title: Goal 9 (Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation) and Goal 11 (Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable). The specific use of resilience refers to climate change, natural disasters and humanitarian crises. The only direct reference to resilience and development is point 9(a) of Goal 9: “Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development in developing countries through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States.”
incentives to encourage ambitious contributions from all. This will, in turn, require setting up an equitable, pragmatic and flexible system of differentiation, that includes nuanced differentiation criteria, commensurate with national circumstances, capacities and capabilities. Differentiation should not be static but remain open to change over time. This will require provisions allowing for shifts in responsibilities and commitments, and a review of the differentiation of targets, embedded in a sophisticated monitoring and review system.42

The 2030 Agenda framework is voluntary and contains no binding or legal commitment. In order to build in accountability, comparability and incentives, it could be helpful to devise common rules or guidelines that leave some room for self-determination while at the same time allow for revising levels of ambition.43

The 2030 Agenda could inspire EU external policies, such as trade, fisheries or agriculture. In 2015 the EU adopted a new Trade and investment strategy (Trade for All) and in 2016 it is expected it will renew its Aid for Trade strategy. The Agenda encourages an open and non-discriminatory global trade system. Although free trade agreements are by nature discriminatory, the EU has the opportunity to lead by example in the dozens of trade agreements it negotiates, in better integrating sustainability dimensions in its trade policies and agreements, one of the pillars of its Trade for All strategy. As for investment growth and job creation, coherent EU policies aligned with sustainable development would benefit from a bolder and more unified and coherent European economic diplomacy that better integrates sustainability objectives (at home and abroad).

The SDG framework has already sparked some criticism. The 17 goals and 169 targets are thought to be too wide and cumbersome, and embedded in an old-fashioned climate-unfriendly industrial model unlikely to deliver the transformations needed for sustainable development. The drivers of world poverty and rising inequalities (cf. unfair trade regimes and investment agreements, the need for greater regulation of financial markets; illicit financial flows; the issue of debt) are evaded or vaguely addressed.44 Monitoring progress will be a daunting task.

42 For example see the proposals for a review system by the UN Secretary General’s Synthesis Report.
43 In areas where global standards are lacking, national processes of determining target levels, benchmarks and commitments may be valuable. The guidelines could incorporate options and criteria for how, and on what basis, baselines and benchmarks could be set nationally. With inputs from relevant international organisations and the UN statistics division, these baselines and benchmarks could provide invaluable tools for countries to use in setting and prioritising their national-level targets.
44 See the thought provoking LSE blog contribution: Jason Hickel, “Five reasons to think twice about the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals”, in South Asia @ LSE Blog, 23 September 2015, http://wp.me/p6htYG-1lA.
2.2 What does the 2030 Agenda mean for EU development diplomacy and international cooperation?

The Agenda for Change is EU’s development strategy to deliver high-impact aid. It has guided aid programming choices for the period 2014-2020. The Agenda for Change introduced a number of innovations in EU development aid. First, aid is targeted where the needs are greatest. This means that EU aid concentrates on least developed countries (LDCs) and fragile countries. Second, the EU aid needs to focus on two broad policy priorities: (i) human rights, democracy and good governance; and (ii) inclusive and sustainable growth (which includes support to sustainable agriculture, energy, social sectors and employment). Finally, EU aid must concentrate on a maximum of three sectors per partner country (or four in the case of fragile countries).

The EU will need to be sharper in defining the added value of Official Development Aid (ODA) in the broader sustainable development funding and policy landscape in different country contexts. The EU’s post-2015 position paper confirms this view, adding that ODA should target least developed countries, and adds that “ODA remains an important and catalytic element in the overall financing available for developing countries, in particular to those most in need.” The EU also wishes to ensure that ODA can be used as an enabler to “boost other means of implementation”, such as improving tax and fiscal policies, or unlocking infrastructure projects through the use of blending and public-private partnerships.

If the EU is serious about the 2030 Agenda, it will need to fine-tune its development policy and practice, to ensure that the principles of universality, shared responsibilities, and policy coherence for sustainable development are systematically weaved in. What could this mean in practice? Recent research by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) on the 11th EDF programming process provides some concrete answers:

- Fine-tuning EU differentiation and aid allocation criteria, taking into account the current global geography of poverty and a more nuanced understanding of sub-national inequalities, including in emerging economies. There is increasing evidence that EU aid could still play a catalytic role in non-aid dependent countries, i.e. emerging economies (for instance through a territorial development approach that allows the scaling up of innovative policies from the local to the national level). There is also the question whether in a broadened post-2015 understanding

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of international cooperation, the use of ODA should include support to research, innovation and knowledge-brokering activities that could help emerging (non-aid dependent) economies deliver on the global public goods agenda.

• Having a real debate on where EU aid fits in with partner country strategies for securing their own sustainable development finance in the longer term. There is evidence that EU aid programming is not yet embedded on a solid analysis of sustainable development finance in different country contexts. This would require a thorough reality check against countries’ regulatory frameworks, and how EU aid can best complement and leverage private finance sources for sustainable development. Blending is not a magic bullet.

• Supporting sustainable development in partner countries may also require a different way of programming aid. One of the major novelties of the EU budget for 2014-2020 is the commitment to spend at least 20 percent on climate-related activities and to mainstream climate finance in all major EU policies, including ODA. Although the European Commission is also committed to spending at least 20 percent on human development, there seems to be a trend whereby social sectors have not been systematically prioritised at the country level. If the EU collectively wants to support the transition to sustainable development at the country level, it may need to develop an integrated approach to programming that supports the transition to sustainable and inclusive development more coherently. In most countries, division of labour responds to donor policy priorities rather than to a holistic view of country needs in terms of sustainable development. This raises the question whether sector programming is actually the best strategy to achieve results and deliver impact, and whether other innovative approaches to programming (cf. results-oriented, thematic and multi-sectoral) may be more promising.

• Finally, delivering high-quality and high-impact aid in a post-2015 context will depend on whether the EU is well equipped to deliver on its ambitions. The issue of “doing more with less” needs to be looked at beyond the requirement to reduce costs, at a more strategic level. This means that ambitions may also need to be revised by looking more carefully at how the EU’s international cooperation fits within the EU’s broader (and more political and interest-driven) external action agenda in partner countries. Adopting a more politically informed approach will need the engagement of multiple governmental and non-state actors in Europe and developing countries to robustly hold it to account. This is a precondition to ensure that a more realistic yet politically visionary agenda to sustainable development is pursued, but not one that is driven by the short-term political, economic, and security self-interests of the EU.

2.3 What does the 2030 Agenda mean for EU migration and development policies?

The first EU document mentioning migration and development (M&D) is the conclusions of the 1999 Tampere European Council, but effective engagement with M&D issues really started in the mid-2000s with the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) and Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations published in September 2005.\(^{49}\) With the latter document, the European Commission put forward some new initiatives to improve the impact of migration on development. It has developed a package of practical measures based on various themes, namely: remittances; enhancing the role of diasporas in the Member States; encouraging circular migration and facilitating return to the country of origin; and mitigating the adverse effects of brain drain.

The GAM was revised in 2011 to become the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).\(^{50}\) It proposed new ideas beyond the four “traditional” areas of the EU agenda mentioned above and broadened the understanding of both M&D and their inter-linkages.\(^{51}\) South-South migration, the explicit inclusion of forced migration, the promotion of a “migrant-centred approach,” the mainstreaming of migration in development strategies and EU development cooperation and the inclusion of migrants’ human rights along the migration cycle as a cross-cutting issue are some of the innovations introduced.

The European Commission’s document entitled A European Agenda on Migration,\(^{52}\) highlights the necessity to overcome emergency measures and invokes a European framework for a common migration policy. Despite its merits, the document does not outline any specific strategy, and “its vague recommendations can hardly favour a closer cooperation among EU member states.”\(^{53}\) The document is missing a thorough analysis on the reasons why a large number of migrants are willing to take huge risks in search of a better life when they cannot access legal channels of migration, on what could be done in their countries of origin, as well as on diversity of migration patterns across the countries.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{51}\) ICMPD and ECDPM, Migration and Development Policies and Practices, cit.


\(^{54}\) Ibid.
Following the Lampedusa disaster of 2013 and the rising death toll of migrants trying to reach European shores from Turkey, the EU’s migration policies have come under scrutiny and forced the EU to reconsider its approach. However, despite concerted efforts to deal with this humanitarian crisis (including the EU-Africa Valetta summit in November 2015 and the agreement with Turkey in March 2016), the EU’s vision continues to revolve around the objective of containing unwanted (illegal) migration, with the assumption that this can be done by addressing the so-called “root causes” of migration and reducing the “push factors” through development cooperation. However, this assumption remains under-researched and possibly over-simplistic.

The EU has taken a number of steps towards improving coherence between migration policies and development objectives. Yet, there is scope for more action regarding policies, inter-institutional coherence, and coherence between policies of different Member States. In fact, on the consistency between Member States’ policies it should be recalled that paragraph 1 and 5 of article 79 of the Treaty of Lisbon state that “the Union shall develop a common immigration policy.” Concerning inter-institutional coherence, a significant obstacle is represented by the fact that the EU faces a dichotomy between a more liberal view on immigration management, represented by the European Parliament and the European Commission, and a more conservative approach held by the Council of the EU through the Member States. And, of course, the final challenge that the EUGS should tackle is the lack of a coherent approach between different policy areas and institutional stakeholders.

Adapting the EU’s approach to dealing with the migration challenge in a way that is comprehensive and aligned with SDG principles will require several measures.

First, a sophisticated and rights-based policy will ensure that migration and asylum issues do not all fall under the category of “irregular migration.” Refugees have legitimate needs and deserve international protection, as do migrants. The root causes for migration are complex and certainly those fleeing from conflict cannot easily be “disincentivised” in the same way as those who choose to migrate for other reasons.

Second, a comprehensive approach to migration using available EU financial instruments and tools – from humanitarian aid to development assistance, from border security and crisis management instruments to pre-accession and neighbourhood policies – can be followed to address migration-related challenges. Policies focused mainly on readmission and return issues and ways to discourage migration will be effective only if they are coupled with other less repressive interventions at all stages of migration journeys.

Third, linkages between migration and other EU policies like trade (provisions in free trade agreements), fisheries (fishery agreements provisions on the use of territorial waters and risks of substitution to local livelihoods through overfishing),

consumption and taxation (taxation of remittances, technical assistance in public finance management) can also be made. All these have an impact on the livelihoods of potential migrants and influence migration dynamics. Conflicts and violence that displace people are intertwined with “transnational drivers” of conflict such as illicit arms flows, the drugs trade and the global economic system.

The EU’s contribution to the 2013 UN High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, developed in the GAMM, defined migration as a phenomenon that can improve development in the countries of origin and destination, and benefit migrants themselves provided it is well governed. There are risks that the EU is taking a step back from looking at migration as an economic opportunity to be harnessed, and is missing an opportunity to move forward with one of the key pillars of the 2030 Agenda: Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.

2.4 How compatible are ACP-EU relations with the 2030 Agenda?

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) is coming to an end in 2020. Discussions on the future of the ACP-EU partnership are in full swing, and one of the questions that needs to be looked at is how the CPA fits into the SDGs 2030 Agenda.

At first sight, the key principles underpinning the Cotonou Agreement (equal partnership, joint management, common principles of aid conditionality, etc.) seem relevant for the type of collective action required by the new SDG agenda. Yet evidence suggests that these principles have not been consistently and effectively applied in the current ACP-EU partnership, in the sense that they were not adequately translated into practice.

Some of the premises on which the CPA is based do not seem to be compatible with the new “software” of the SDG agenda. For instance, it reflects an exclusive partnership with a group of countries, with whom the EU has historical ties, and in this way reflects an essentially North-South partnership, revolving very much around aid, development diplomacy and international cooperation and conditionality, rather than on effective collective action on non-aid EU policies.

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that may affect ACP interests.

Despite attempts to integrate the global agenda into the partnership – migration, climate change, and food security – there is little evidence that the CPA was an effective vehicle to push forward these agendas, beyond ad hoc dialogues and formal declarations. The most visible outcome was the allocation of funds to work on these issues, through the European Development Fund. ECDPM research suggests that there are other policy frameworks and multilateral arrangements that are better suited to support collective action than the ACP-EU partnership. A number of scenarios to replace the CPA will be discussed in the next few years to inform the decision on a possible replacement of the CPA. Such scenarios include a modernised regional focus on Pacific, Caribbean and African groupings, a revisited ACP group, or a reform centred on thematic relevance (trade, development, climate). Various options of legal modalities (binding agreement or not) will also be explored.

Concluding remarks: EU multi-diplomacy in the EU Global Strategy looking towards the 2030 Development Agenda

The EU Global strategy is a multi-diplomacy umbrella document combining various types of EU diplomatic action: traditional diplomacy, economic diplomacy, climate diplomacy, development diplomacy, security and defence diplomacy, culture, science and public diplomacy.

In 2015 the EU and its Member States continue to be the world’s largest aid donor, while there is an increasing pressure to “deliver more with less.” Despite the relative decline of the EU in the global scene, the aspiration of being a global political actor remains, with the clear aim of promoting democratic and human rights values and principles, and leading on the transition to a low-carbon economy. However, when confronted with concrete situations that require coherent and urgent action – being migration, or energy and climate change – the European Union shows great difficulties in ensuring coherence and reconciling its objectives and policies.

The 2030 Agenda articulated around 17 goals and 169 targets and may be difficult to manage and implement. It is a diversified and complex agenda, requiring the commitment and coordination of a wide range of actors. Since it is not legally binding, the question of its impact upon EU institutions and Member States relates to the latter’s actual internal and global political agenda. The adoption of the EU Global Strategy and the setting in motion of 2030 Agenda are mutually reinforcing policy processes and opportunities for the EU to build up a modernised European development diplomacy, hand in hand with climate diplomacy and economic diplomacy.
References


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ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM’s key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

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