The year 2015 will be a threshold year for international cooperation and global development, with both Europe and Africa in positions to play pivotal roles. Long-running global policy processes will culminate in four decisive meetings during the year, two of them in Africa, one in Europe and one in New York at the United Nations (UN).

First, policymakers from around the world will converge on Addis Ababa in July for the Third UN International Conference on Financing for Development. Their main task will be to define financial tools for delivering on the new post-2015 global development agenda.

Then, in September, at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, global leaders are expected to endorse new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs proved a good catalyst for mobilising progress on social development – reduced poverty, hunger and disease; strides in maternal health and access to clean water; and shared starting points for dialogue and cooperation – but the goals were not fully achieved. Moreover, the world has moved on. Our understanding of the multidimensional nature of poverty and of fragility has evolved, and major geopolitical and economic changes have occurred. The SDGs are expected to reflect a more up-to-date, qualitative and, as the name suggests, sustainable approach to development that incorporates both North and South, as they have grown increasingly interdependent. Moreover, the participative approach that has characterised the SDGs’ formulation could well carry forward the dynamism initiated with the MDGs, maintaining their momentum.

Third, in December 2015, Paris will host the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) under the UN Framework for Combating Climate Change (UNFCCC). Progress on agreeing a deal has been slipping but a basic agreement was reached at COP 20 in Lima that permits further proposals from government during the course of the year.

In Paris therefore leaders will be called upon to build on these proposals and agree on a global deal to underpin and guide efforts to combat climate change. A legally binding framework, with a strong rules-based system, in the view of the European Union (EU), is probably the only way to achieve the greenhouse gas reductions necessary to stave off a more than 2°C rise in global temperature (Neslen 2014). Not only does the world need new impetus to deal with the potentially catastrophic changes to the global climate, but any agreement made by the COP 21 will also need to complement whatever framework is finalised for the SDGs at the UN. As noted by the EU in its Communication A Decent Life for All: From Vision to Collective Action, global development cannot be sustainable without all three aspects of sustainability being covered: social, economic and environmental.

Finally, also in December, the World Trade Organization (WTO) will hold its 10th Ministerial Conference in Nairobi—for the first time in Africa. Following the breakthrough at the 9th conference, which agreed to finally implement the Bali Package (Box 1), the upcoming meeting will be crucial for the Doha Development Round. The coming year could also prove to be a turning point for the global trading system. The WTO celebrates its 20th anniversary on 1st January 2015. Given the shifts in global trade dynamics – the recent trend towards mega-regional negotiations, the protracted difficulties with the Doha Round and now the concluded Bali Package – this may well turn out to be a major milestone for the organisation.

The importance of these four meetings for tackling global challenges cannot be overstated. In just one year the international community will seek to reach agreements on climate change, global trade, sustainable development goals and financing for development. All these deals are needed to achieve a transformative agenda and if they are all concluded, the impact on global development would be far-reaching.
Box 1. EU-Africa trade relations

With a more explicit emphasis on win-win economic relations, the EU can become a more beneficial trading partner for Africa and take advantage of the continent’s rapid growth and economic transformation. Europe’s new trade relations with Africa are now taking shape (see figure 1) but Europe also needs to dedicate more effort to addressing development challenges coherently and beyond aid alone.

Progress is being made. Policy coherence for development (PCD), a notion that originated in development circles, is slowly being embraced by a wider circle of diplomats and policymakers. This will become all the more important in 2015, in the wake of Europe’s successful conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with regional organisations in western, eastern and southern Africa. The trade deals represented by these EPAs – following long and difficult negotiations – will help stabilise trade relations between Europe and Africa. But trade is not an end in itself. It is a means to foster better political interactions, boost economic ties and stimulate development. To be launched in 2015, the TFTA involves the Common Market for intra-Africa trade. To be launched in 2015, in the wake of Europe’s successful conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with regional organisations in western, eastern and southern Africa. The trade deals represented by these EPAs – following long and difficult negotiations – will help stabilise trade relations between Europe and Africa. But trade is not an end in itself. It is a means to foster better political interactions, boost economic ties and stimulate development.

Concerning the multilateral trading system, there is also much to be done. Europe and Africa will have to work together to rescue the 2013 ‘Bali Package’, in particular, the commitments on trade facilitation. India and the United States have ended their standoff over New Delhi’s food security programme, breaking an impasse described as the biggest crisis to hit the global trade body in two decades. The deal calls for New Delhi to allow the implementation of a global trade facilitation agreement to cut red tape at international borders. In exchange, the United States will extend a ‘peace clause’ – due to expire in 2017 – that rules out any challenges at the WTO to India’s subsidies to farmers to provide food for the poor.

In an address to the AU Conference of Ministers of Trade, WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo stated, ‘African nations stand to benefit from the recent WTO decisions on the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which would support your efforts at regional integration in a very practical way... [T]he Agreement will reduce trade costs by up to 15% in developing countries. ... For the first time in the WTO’s history, this Agreement states that assistance and support should be provided to help developing countries achieve the capacity to implement it. So, for those countries with less-developed customs infrastructure, the Agreement will mean a boost in the technical assistance that is available to them.’ (Azevêdo, 2014)

International agreements can have dynamic effects, changing actors’ incentives and unleashing forces for change, some unanticipated by the drafters. The trade facilitation agreement is perhaps the first genuine deliverable of the promise that Doha is a ‘development round’, suggesting that trade treaties will now be done at the WTO in a development-friendly way, with a flexibility that reflects the diversity of the membership and the complex and fast-changing environment of globalization. Cooperation on the potential impact of mega-trade deals, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), should feature high on EU and African agendas.

Figure 1: New Trade Regimes by Region

![Diagram showing New Trade Regimes by Region](https://www.ecdpm.org/dossiers/challenges/)

*North African countries are not involved in EU trade negotiations. However, for the purpose of African continental integration schemes, the trade regimes applicable to North African countries are included in this note.

*Graphic design: Y. Chiu-van’t Hoff, ECDPM*
Recognising the vital importance of these four meetings, the European Commission has declared 2015 the ‘European Year for Development’. To make the most of this potential, the EU’s new College of Commissioners, led by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, must get off to a running start. Major global changes are afoot. Along with others, the EU will be called upon to prove its relevance and effectiveness, to its own citizens, to its neighbours and to the world. As the European Think Tanks Group (ETTG) has argued in its recent report Our Collective Interest (ETTG, 2014), the EU’s aspirations for its own citizens – prosperity, peace and environmental sustainability – cannot be disassociated from the EU’s global responsibilities and opportunities.

European and African leaders have some positive momentum to build on in the coming year. There will be ample opportunity to implement a more balanced partnership that pragmatically serves Europe and Africa’s joint interests. To make the most of this, follow-up is needed on the good intentions expressed at the Fourth EU-Africa Summit, held in April 2014. In particular, new mechanisms of engagement should be sought that incorporate the private sector and civil society.

Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, will be for the international community to work effectively together on these issues, despite the disruptions and political tensions caused by conflict and fragility.

Much of the current turmoil on the world stage affects the European neighbourhood and involves other major global players. Its impact on the post-2015 policy processes could therefore be especially disruptive from a European point of view. Crises such as those in Ukraine or the financial fallout from the recent drop in petrol prices tend to push countries apart, possibly making agreements in global policy processes more difficult to reach.

Whether the global community is really ready to negotiate the post-2015 agenda is thus an open question. The crises in Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, the Sahel, Libya and the South China Sea, and the strong-armed approaches they represent, may mean that the individual concerns and allegiances of powerful states will dominate the agenda of the UN, drawing political energy away from global development and towards crisis management. At the same time, the Ebola crisis (Box 2) effectively pulls in the other direction. The common effort to combat the disease has helped foster some global unity. The rapid spread of the epidemic also underscores global interdependencies and vulnerabilities and points to the continuing need for a rigorous, comprehensive and sustainable global development framework focused on lifting as many countries as possible out of the limbo of fragility, which in many ways enabled the disease to spread out of control in the first place.

Box 2. Ebola

The Ebola epidemic in West Africa is the largest and most devastating outbreak of the virus to date. In addition to the 8,000 deaths and many disrupted families these have created, the crisis has brought economic life to a halt, isolated remote communities, disrupted cross-border trade and raised concern about food shortages (FAO, 2014). The three hardest-hit countries, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, were already heavily reliant on food imports. Price increases since the onset of the epidemic have put food out of reach for many of the most vulnerable households in these countries.

Before the scale of the Ebola crisis was fully grasped, leaders at the Fourth EU-Africa Summit had agreed to pursue deeper political dialogue and cooperation, complemented by regular high-level contact between Africa and Europe on challenges and crisis situations (European Council, 2014b). With the Ebola crisis before us, much remains to be seen of this commitment and its potential impact in terms of coordinated responses.

African Union Health Ministers and the WHO discussed Ebola at a ministerial meeting in April and the Peace and Security Council then followed the crisis with the Commissioner for Social Affairs coordinating efforts. An initial USD 1 million was released from the AU’s Special Emergency Assistance Fund, which also prompted a generous contribution from the African business community and other sources. In October, EU Heads of State and Government pledged to increase their financial contribution for Ebola to €1 billion and appointed the new Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Christos Stylianides, as the EU Ebola response coordinator. Nonetheless Europe’s fragmented institutional set-up has still impeded its response. (Desmidt, Hauck, 2014).

Ebola requires a different assemblage of responses than usual. The longer-term aspects of the crisis call for resilience measures, in addition to immediate necessities like military assets and logistics support. The EU’s newly appointed Ebola coordinator, Commissioner Stylianides, head of DG ECHO, has been tasked to address these needs and coordinate action with his colleague Neven Mimica, the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development.

The broader devastating impacts of the Ebola outbreak will become clearer in 2015. Beyond the health and humanitarian concerns, many fear additional strain on stability, statebuilding and security in the region (International Crisis Group, 2014). This is especially true of Liberia, where leaders have repeatedly pleaded for urgent action to prevent the country from slipping back into conflict (Al Jazeera, 2014a).

But there are success stories amidst this crisis. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, has managed to avert a full-blown epidemic and recorded only eight deaths. Its handling of the disease could offer a blueprint for other African governments and donors. Ebola surfaced in Nigeria as far back as July 2014, yet by October the country was declared Ebola-free. Nigeria’s health system is fragile, but it does have a comparatively large complement of trained health workers and an effective polio surveillance system backed by an emergency command centre. It was this network that helped to prevent an exponential spread of Ebola. The lesson here is that given the resources, countries can be better prepared with plans in placeto combat Ebola if it resurfaces.

Abbreviations

ACP
AGA
AGPSA
AU
COP 21
DG DEVCO
EDF
EEAS
EPA
EU
ICT
African, Caribbean and Pacific
African Governance Architecture
African Peace and Security Architecture
African Union
21st Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC)
Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EUROPEAID
European Development Fund
European External Action Service
Economic Partnership Agreement
European Union
information and communication technology
JAES
MDGs
NEPAD
ODA
OWG
PCRD
SADC
SDGs
TFTA
UN
UNEOCA
UNFCCC
WTO
Joint Africa-EU Strategy
Millennium Development Goals
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AU)
official development assistance
Open Working Group (UN)
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU policy)
Southern African Development Community
Sustainable Development Goals
Tripartite Free Trade Area (Southern and Eastern Africa)
United Nations
UN Economic Commission for Africa
UN Framework for Combating Climate Change
World Trade Organization
A summit to renew relations

In the run-up to the Fourth EU-Africa Summit held in Brussels in April 2014, Europe-Africa relations appeared shaky at times, with many questioning the value of the partnership. At the Summit, however, a business-like approach emerged. Though both Unions have wider interests, the Summit confirmed the continued commitment of each to the objectives set out in the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The more than 60 leaders in attendance agreed that the Joint Strategy’s implementation should be further improved and that cooperation should be more results-oriented. To that end, the Summit adopted a ‘Roadmap’ to frame EU-Africa relations for the 2014–2017 period. (European Council 2014a). The Roadmap sets out five priorities for joint action: (i) peace and security; (ii) democracy, good governance and human rights; (iii) human development; (iv) sustainable and inclusive development, growth and continental integration; and (v) global and emerging issues. In 2015, the new tone set in Africa-EU relations will need to be translated into deeds.

EU-Africa relations and assistance

In the months leading up to the Fourth EU-Africa Summit, several long-standing issues re-emerged, such as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (see Box 1) the International Criminal Court, continued friction around participation of certain African leaders (Vines, 2014), alongside newer irritants. The issue of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights brought enduring tensions to the surface, in what many see as Europe’s imposition of its values on the African continent’s politics.

The EU as a group is still the world’s largest donor. With €12 billion allocated to Africa in 2012, the continent remains the major recipient of EU assistance. Beyond aid, however, there are other policy tools with which Europe engages with the continent. Trade and financial relations are also key, as are Europe’s long-standing political, technical and financial engagements in African peace and security and the EU’s strong presence in much of Africa, assured by its wide network of delegations.

Both sides of the EU-Africa relationship have expressed scepticism about the EU’s ability to build a partnership not based solely on money. Nonetheless, the new European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, has reiterated the EU’s intention to be a ‘player’ and not just a ‘payer’ (Vogel, 2014). There is also growing appreciation of the mutual interdependence between the EU and Africa and the need to work jointly to promote each other’s growth and prosperity. The Juncker Commission as a whole also seems ready to invest in the relationship, with four different Commissioners and the High Representative tasked to engage in various aspects of the African partnership.

Though the EU-Africa Summit took place back in April, major institutional changes within the EU inevitably delayed follow-up. A new European Parliament was elected in June and a new College of Commissioners started work in November. Now, however, it is time to take up implementation of the EU-Africa 2014–2017 Roadmap in earnest. Moreover, the African Union (AU) itself will see major institutional changes in just over a year. A new AU Commission will be appointed in early 2016, making the 2015 window for progress rather short.

How the AU connects with Europe will influence the degree to which the Roadmap endorsed by the Summit is effectively implemented. On a day-to-day basis, the AU Department of Economic Affairs is in charge, but at the Summit the AU Commission Chairperson and her team played a key role. The Chairperson of the AU Assembly can also have a major influence and the next incumbent could well be President Mugabe of Zimbabwe. It is the Southern African region’s turn to nominate the Chair and he is already the chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), giving him a platform to be nominated to the AU position in 2015. While this could be difficult for Europe, it does come at a time when relations between Zimbabwe and Europe seem to be improving after sanctions were eased earlier this year (European Council, 2014b). Also in 2015, the AU Foreign Affairs Committee will be chaired by Chad. These tenures could bring opportunities, but they also present challenges, at least until the roles are confirmed and the incumbents indicate their interests. Until this is clarified, delays in the political dialogue can be expected.

### October

- Deadline for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), Africa (1st Oct.)
- DAC High Level Mandate on Development Finance, Paris (7-8 Oct.)

### November

- New EU Commission takes office with a new High Representative and Vice President of the Commission, Europe (Nov 1)
- G20 Leaders’ Summit 2014, Brisbane (15-16 Nov)
- Conference of the Parties (COP 20) of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, Lima (1 - 12 Dec)

### General events

- Deadline Year for the UN MDGs, Global
- European Year for Development
- AU Year of Women’s Empowerment, Africa
- Chad Parliamentary Election (2015 TBC)
- Libya Presidential Election (2015 TBC)

### 2015

End of 2014
A key year for action on the JAES?

A rethinking of the institutional system buttressing the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) emerged from the EU-Africa Summit. Much criticism of the Joint Strategy has concerned its over-bureaucratization. Moreover, little political dialogue has taken place within the JAES framework, happening instead in other intergovernmental fora. Even on peace and security, which is one of the most successful areas of the JAES cooperation, political dialogue has generally taken place outside the JAES architecture, between the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee. The task for 2015 will be to build on the momentum of the EU-Africa Summit and hold a high-level JAES ministerial dialogue that is more than just a formal gathering. Exactly how such a dialogue will be managed is still unclear but it will be important to have the right people there with the right powers. Meetings are envisaged between the EU and AU on the margins of international events. More concretely, the JAES Joint Task Force meetings will be replaced by this ministerial-level Joint Annual Forum, the first of which is set for Addis Ababa in February 2015. This will be the new Juncker Commission’s first Africa-EU meeting, and an initial test of its commitment to implement the Summit Roadmap and the Joint Strategy (European Commission, 2013).

Whether the Joint Annual Forum does succeed in reducing bureaucracy and providing space for broader participation remains to be seen. Its benefit will be enhanced if efficient ways can be found to bring in the technical expertise needed to implement the 2014–2017 Roadmap and still balance this with the high level dialogue. The challenge will be to identify the working mechanisms and structures required to implement the actions agreed efficiently and yet also create space for informal multi-stakeholder dialogue and platforms for increasing synergies among officials, the private sector and civil society.

Here again, there is a general sense that EU-Africa dialogue is not currently a priority at the higher political tables. European leaders are distracted by crises in the neighbourhood, while African leaders are grappling with internal issues and other partnerships. The new Pan-African (PanAf) Programme has been aligned to the Summit declaration and the Roadmap. This relatively new EU financing instrument will support existing continental and regional activities, such as the African Governance Architecture (AGA). The PanAf envelope will follow EU Budget procedures and be managed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Commission.

Migration: an unresolved dilemma

Following the 2013 tragedy in Lampedusa, 2014 was another appalling year in which thousands of migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean to reach EU shores. In 2014, more than 207,000 people — increasingly Syrian and Eritrean asylum seekers — have made the perilous crossing. Over 3,400 migrants having lost their lives. Catastrophes like Lampedusa have kept migration on the agendas of both European and African leaders, and the EU-Africa Summit pledged action in a joint declaration on migration and mobility (European Council, 2014c). The text was not particularly innovative, nor did it constitute a great step forward in thinking on effective migration policy. However, it does commit leaders on both sides to take action against illegal migration, to address the migration-development nexus and to make headway in developing structures for legal migration (Bekele, Knoll, 2014a).

Europe itself is far from an integrated response. There is at present an imbalance between the EU Mediterranean Task Force’s activities to prevent and curb illegal migration and efforts to create safe and legal channels for migration. The continuing movements of people in the Mediterranean region challenge the EU to demonstrate more ambition and exploit innovative and potentially more effective policies and practices (Bekele, Knoll, 2014b). In parallel, Europe has a part to play in addressing the complex emergencies that propel many migration flows today.

The EU-level Operation Triton, which replaces Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum, has radically reduced the scope, mandate and financing of EU maritime search and rescue work to protect vulnerable migrants crossing the Mediterranean. The reduction has been strongly criticised by the UN as a morally unjustified abandonment of responsibilities and a misguided downplaying of the circumstances underlying migration (BBC News, 2014a). Yet, stark divides between EU member states on how to tackle the migration crisis, especially burden-sharing in receiving refugees (Wall Street Journal, 2014a), prevented the previous EU Commission from reforming European migration policy. The new Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, has suggested that refugees should be allowed to apply for EU asylum abroad, an idea that was floated before, but not well received by member states. Whether Avramopoulos will succeed in this and other initiatives depends on reforms of the out-dated European Common Asylum Policy and similar overhauls of the migration policies in many EU member states (Wall Street Journal, 2014b).

Migration represents a vital area of cooperation that affects European and African citizens in a very immediate way. Uncontrolled and illegal migration as a result of conflict, climate and economics is a problem on Europe’s doorstep. European fears are often exaggerated, fuelled by media misinformation and stoked by populist politicians. Even so, there is as yet no process with sufficient political leadership and resources to meaningfully confront the problem and engender fuller cooperation on migration among EU member states. However, on 12 December 2014 the EU Foreign Affairs Council concluded that “EU action on migration and development should comprehensively address the full range of positive and negative impacts of migration on sustainable and inclusive economic, social and environmental development in countries of origin and destination” and called for the European Commission to develop operational guidance by the end of 2015 which may prompt some further policy change.

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**January**
- WTO Deadline for work programme to conclude Doha Development Agenda: Global (1 Jan)
- 24th AU Summit: Women’s Empowerment and Agenda 2063 (Jan 30-31)
- Zambia Presidential By-Election (20 Jan)

**February**
- First EU-Africa Joint Annual Forum, Addis Ababa (Feb 11)
- High Level Thematic Debate on Means of Implementation for Post-2015 Development Agenda, New York (9-10 Feb)
- European Report on Development on Financing and Means of Implementation for the post-2015 agenda Published (Feb; TBC)
- Nigeria General Election (14 Feb)

**March**
- The new Secretary General of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States takes up office, Brussels (1 Mar)
- Africa Progress Panel Report on Climate Change, Energy, Agriculture and Jobs, Africa (March TBC)
- Estonian Parliamentary Elections (1 Mar)

**April**
- 2015 Spring Meetings of World Bank and IMF (Apr 18)
- Finnish Parliamentary Elections (19 Apr)
- Sudan General Election (2 Apr)
The post-2015 policy processes and development goals

The future we want

Negotiations towards a new post-2015 development agenda are entering their final stretch. In July 2014, the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) published its proposal for 17 post-2015 goals (OWG, 2014). These range from ending poverty and hunger to conserving the oceans and promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. The UN Secretary-General has since produced a synthesis report (UN 2014), which brings together the results of the different streams of work to facilitate the concluding deliberations of the UN General Assembly in September. Europeans and Africans have provided various inputs to the process. Leaders from both continents were members of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and both the EU and AU have issued statements on the SDG process and proposal.

The Secretary-General’s synthesis report endorses the OWG proposal, confirming the importance of a broad sustainable development agenda that is integrated, inclusive, transformational and universal in application – and not just for developing countries to implement. Albeit cautiously, the Secretary-General’s report resists the suggestion to reduce the number of goals and targets, which some countries have lobbied for. Rather it recommends keeping the 17 goals and 169 targets, though proposing rearranging these into six focused and concise ‘clusters’: Dignity, Prosperity, Planet, Justice, Partnership and People.

The synthesis report does suggest a technical review of the targets to make each ‘specific, measurable, achievable and consistent with existing United Nations standards and agreements’ (UN 2014: 38), while preserving the political balance they represent. This is a delicate undertaking. While some of the targets would benefit from a stronger and more concise formulation, the protracted discussions within the OWG demonstrated that this is a highly political process, not just a technical fix. Pushing too far or opening negotiations on sensitive goals may lead governments to suggest dropping them altogether. The synthesis report, moreover, calls on all countries to scale up their ambitions and introduces practical recommendations for the way forward. Operationalising the principle of universality, in particular, will be a major challenge.

On specific issues, discussions in the OWG revealed how contentious the inclusion of peace and security among the SDGs remains. Initially, the EU advocated two separate goals – one for stable and peaceful societies and a separate one for good governance, rule of law and accountable institutions. Nonetheless, the preservation of one goal on these aspects, now endorsed by the synthesis report, can be considered an achievement. It was clear from the outset that taking up peace and security aims in a development agenda would cause unease, especially within the UN, which views its Security Council as the absolute authority on such matters (Dukulé, 2014).

A final contentious and so far unresolved issue with respect to the SDGs is the ‘means of implementation’ debate. Alongside the 17 SDGs, the OWG has outlined means of implementation targets for achieving each. These were controversial from the start. However, pressure from developing countries and emerging economies appears to have won the argument in favour of retaining the concrete targets, which they hope will promote fuller implementation of the ambitious agenda (Knoll, 2014). The Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF) has produced a useful statement (August 2014) on potential costs and suggested a strategy for SDG financing based on nine principles – the first of which are SDG financing based on nine principles – the first of which are country ownership and leadership. The EU, for its part, supports the “important political balance that the OWG proposal represents” (Council of the European Union, 2014a). At the time of writing, the AU had not yet articulated a position on this debate. Yet, as African countries on the whole promote inclusion of means of implementation in the goals and targets, the AU will no doubt feel pressure to follow suit.
Financing the post-2015 agenda

To consider how to resource the post-2015 agenda, the UN will hold its Third Intergovernmental Conference on Financing for Development in July 2015. A key item on the agenda will be the stagnating levels of official development assistance (ODA) and scope for achieving the 0.7% ODA/gross national income target. But the conference will not just be about raising new funds, efficient use of resources and appropriate policies to support finance and policy coherence will be very much parts of the required formula (ERD, forthcoming). Conference delegates will also be looking for signs of political will to achieve collective agreements and strong messages on mobilising resources to pave the way for successful SDGs.

What then should African countries expect from the Financing for Development conference? New agreements on the availability of ODA and other forms of external assistance, including South-South cooperation, will obviously be important. However, taking their lead from the lower middle-income countries that have been most successful in poverty eradication during the past decade, Africans will likely also be seeking ideas and support for strengthening mobilisation of their own domestic resources for development. This may be through knowledge sharing and using ODA to build tax capacity and via stronger international agreements on transparency in financial flows and curbing illicit flows. Private investment and finance can be powerful drivers of growth, with domestic and international development partners contributing through a range of incentives, instruments and initiatives (such as the ‘blending’ of loans and grants)(Bilal, Krätke,2014). Here again, the aim will be to determine what international agreements can do to help stimulate private engagement with a greater focus on sustainable and inclusive outcomes (UNECA, 2014).

Africa is therefore giving greater attention to its own funds to implement its development plans and needs. Key sources include remittances, sovereign wealth funds, mineral earnings, government tax revenues and market capitalisation – all of which outweigh foreign direct investment, ODA, debt relief and illicit financial flows (Figure 1). From better contract negotiations for extractive and other natural resources to improved tax systems and effective use of sovereign funds and reserves, Africa has been short-changed in the past by a lack of appropriate policies and regulatory frameworks both locally and internationally. A major challenge now is to ensure that these are in place, to provide investors with the right conditions and steer investments towards critical sectors (Fassi, 2014).

Tax revenues, in particular, could far exceed any other source of finance for Africa’s development. While tax revenues are increasing in Africa and some countries are approaching OECD tax to GDP ratios of 35% in other African countries this ratio is still as low as 17% (African Development Bank, 2014).

Development finance institutions and other development banks could also be instrumental in funding the post-2015 development agenda in Africa. Europe will have to adjust and probably strengthen the role of the European Investment Bank (and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and seek greater coordination and coherence with member states’ development finance institutions and other development cooperation mechanisms. The potential of African development finance institutions and regional development banks could also be better harnessed. At the international level, this will be important for effective operationalisation of global funds, such as the UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund and the World Bank’s newly established Global Infrastructure Facility, which seek to increase the pool of resources for global sustainable development (UNE, 2013). With a few exceptions, recipient countries have a long way to go in establishing attractive vehicles for these funds (Lopes, 2014).

Figure 2: Africa’s Financing for African Development

<table>
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<th>Source</th>
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<td>Securitization of Future Receivables &amp; Diaspora Bond</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Relief</td>
<td>$114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from different sources and years as indicated in the footnotes
1 & 4 African Economic Outlook - 2013
2 Calculation based on: 1: AFA Institute - 2013
3 & 5 NEPAD/UNECA - 2013
4 UNECA/AU - 2013
5非洲 Economic Outlook - 2012
6 OEDE - 2012
7 African Economic Outlook - 2013
8 OECD - 2012
9 UNECA/AU - 2014
10 ONE - 2014

9 UNECA/AU - 2014
8 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEB%20dec%202010%20%28avril%202011%29_AEB%20dec%202010%20%28avril%202011%29.pdf
7 African Economic Outlook - 2013
6 UNCTAD - 2013
3 & 5 NEPAD/UNECA - 2013
1 & 4 African Economic Outlook - 2013
9 UNECA/AU - 2014
8 http://www.one.org/international/issues/debt-cancellation/
7 African Economic Outlook - 2013
6 UNCTAD - 2013
3 & 5 NEPAD/UNECA - 2013
1 & 4 African Economic Outlook - 2013
9 UNECA/AU - 2014
8 http://www.one.org/international/issues/debt-cancellation/
7 African Economic Outlook - 2013
6 UNCTAD - 2013
3 & 5 NEPAD/UNECA - 2013
1 & 4 African Economic Outlook - 2013
9 UNECA/AU - 2014
8 http://www.one.org/international/issues/debt-cancellation/
Reconciling different perspectives in the debate

The post-2015 global development agenda will have to bring together African, European and international perspectives and priorities to endorse universal goals and targets that can be applied in different national contexts with varying levels of development. Both the AU and the EU accept the principle of universality of the goals, but just how ‘universal’ the goals will be and how they may apply to or be interpreted by developing, emerging and developed economies alike remains to be seen (Leong, 2014). The EU has its Europe 2020 Strategy, agreed back in 2010 as a response to the financial crisis, but so far little attempt has been made to consider how this strategy or any successor plan might provide a vehicle for the EU to implement universal goals agreed as part of the post-2015 agenda.

The European Foreign Affairs Council issued Conclusions on the post-2015 agenda on 16 December 2014 (European Council, 2014e), which provides a basis to guide European delegates in the further UN negotiations. It reconfirms the key principles, priority areas and potential targets presented in the Commission Communication from June 2014, entitled A Decent Life for All: From Vision to Collective Action. That Communication presents a universal, human rights-based and people-centred framework, integrating the three dimensions of sustainable development mentioned earlier – the social, the environmental and the economic. The EU has furthermore sought to develop partnerships, including with the AU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States (ACP, 2014) (see also Box 5).

Box 3. Agenda 2063

Agenda 2063 is a new development framework drafted to mark the 50th anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity. In essence, it provides Africa’s own vision of where the continent could be 50 years from now. Agenda 2063 presents an overall strategy for optimising the use of Africa’s resources ‘for the benefit of all Africans’ (AUC n.d.: 13). The AU currently intends to implement it through consecutive 10-year action plans that provide concrete guidance to, for example, Africa’s regional economic communities, African countries, the private sector and civil society. An initial draft was published in early 2014, with further consultations continuing throughout the year. A final version is expected to be adopted at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2015.

Agenda 2063 sets out seven ‘aspirations’ that encapsulate where Africa wants to be by 2063:

- A prosperous continent, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development;
- An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of pan-Africanism;
- An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law;
- A peaceful and secure continent;
- A continent with a strong cultural identity, values and ethics;
- An Africa whose development is people-driven, especially relying on the potential offered by its women and youth;
- A strong resilient and influential global player and partner.

To achieve this a number of strategic initiatives have been proposed, on industrialisation, building human capital, regional integration, agricultural development, natural resource management, reduction of conflicts and promotion of common African positions.

The next challenge lies in more precisely defining the Agenda’s targets. This process will first and foremost be about including the pertinent stakeholders in the consulting and drafting of continental implementation strategies. These strategies will then need to be linked to existing national development plans and an adequate monitoring tool put in place to track progress and enable periodic adjustments.

The Common African Position

The Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda was adopted by the AU General Assembly in early 2014 (African Union, 2014a). This was no small feat, given the multiplicity of agendas and diversity of priorities across the AU’s 53 member states. Like the EU Communication, the Common African Position provides a framework for coordinated African inputs to the international discussions on the post-2015 development agenda. Two overarching goals are proposed: poverty eradication and human development. These are anchored on six pillars through which the goals are to be achieved.

One of these pillars is peace and security. Another is economic transformation and inclusive growth, which prioritises growth, trade and infrastructure (Hollander, 2014). While the Common Position stresses the continued importance of the 0.7% ODA/GNP target, it also acknowledges that Africa cannot just rely on development aid for its transformation agenda. Rather, it must move towards more resilient private investment and domestic resource mobilisation, leveraging the effects of ODA on development dynamics and capitalising on other sources of finance. The AU is also in the final stages of its ‘Agenda 2063’ brainstorming exercise, which is expected to link the global post-2015 debate to longer-term continental and national development plans (see Box 3).

In the lead-up to the UN General Assembly in September, the AU will need to develop greater clarity on the ‘pillars’ of its Common Position and how these translate into specific goals and targets. Moreover, the EU and AU will have to decide whether and how they could and should try to align the post-2015 process with the 2014–2017 Roadmap. European and African leaders did discuss post-2015 matters during the recent EU-Africa Summit, but this did not lead to a joint position. The Common African Position reiterates the call for a shift away from the existing development paradigm of aid and externally driven initiatives towards economic growth and transformation funded by domestic initiatives.

A climate change deal to support the post-2015 agenda

The Emissions Gap Report 2013 of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) calls Africa ‘a vulnerability hotspot’ for climate change. Not only will coastal areas be affected by sea level rise, but a 3°C rise in temperature would render virtually all of the current maize, millet and sorghum crop areas across Africa unviable, leading to rapidly expanding malnourishment. Adaptation costs in Africa are expected to reach US $50 billion by 2050, so climate finance and the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund are crucial for African countries.

Despite this, the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and many less-developed countries (LDCs) still need to be convinced that a transition towards a low-carbon economy is a feasible alternative to high-carbon models, though China did recently signal its commitment to climate action in partnership with the United States (BBC News, 2014b). Some progress has also been seen in Eastern and Southern Africa, with projects like the Africa Clean Energy Corridor by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).

At the UNFCCC’s COP20 in Lima in late 2014, some limited progress was made resulting in the ‘Lima Call for Climate Action’. All nations are now asked to make plans to curb their carbon emissions, these ‘intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ would provide the basis for a deal at COP21 in Paris. However, doubts remain on the feasibility of an agreement and small vulnerable countries have criticised the agreement as weak. A lot depends on major CO2 emitters making serious proposals during the course of the year.

Europe is generally considered a climate frontrunner, willing to cut emissions and lead by example, encouraging other parties to follow suit (e.g. with the Emissions Trading System). For instance, the latest EU Energy Package from October 2014, commits the Union to a 40% carbon emissions’ reduction by 2030. While Europe’s climate leadership diminished somewhat after COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the EU still hopes to play a positive role in multilateral climate action. In addition to making serious proposals itself, it could play a valuable diplomatic role by rallying support for an ambitious climate change agreement among LDCs, vulnerable countries and Africa’s emerging
economies. The EU could, furthermore, seek to engage countries in intensified dialogue on climate change, with the EU delegations playing a prominent role in dialogue- and partnership building. With a strong demonstration of leadership and engagement in such ‘climate change diplomacy’, the new High Representative Federica Mogherini and the EEAS might generate sufficient synergies among EU institutions and stakeholders to mainstream sustainable development across EU foreign policy (Herrero and Knaepen, 2014). This could go a long way towards building the international partnerships that will be essential for a strong agreement in Paris.

Climate change is a top priority of EU-Africa dialogue (European Commission, 2014) and features prominently in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) with some important projects such as the ‘Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative’ that aims to combat desertification. Yet, the EU’s position ahead of the Lima COP20 on an eventual climate agreement in Paris (Council of the European Union, 2014b) was criticised by a number of African countries as unbalanced, giving more weight to mitigation and insufficient attention to adaptation and climate finance. There are concerns that divergent interests between Europe and Africa may hamper reaching a joint climate position in the run-up to Paris COP21.

The European Year for Development (Box 4) coincides with the culmination of the post-2015 debate. This should provide some stimulus to produce new ideas, flag key issues and raise sufficient awareness for promoting discussion on the implications of the universality principle for the EU and for strengthening the so far weak proposals on research and technology transfer for climate adaptation and mitigation. Access to affordable and environmentally sound technologies will be crucial to fuel the desired systemic shifts in vulnerable countries’ agriculture and food supply systems. Farmers will need stronger scientific support that builds on their traditional knowledge if sustainable agriculture is to become more than another buzzword.

Sustainable agriculture and nutrition
Agriculture and food security was the theme of the June 2014 AU Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. At that Summit, African Heads of State adopted a declaration (African Union, 2014c) formalising their commitment through a series of ambitious targets to be met by 2025, including ending hunger in Africa by then. In addition to confirming that 10% of national budgets should be allocated to agriculture, they also pledged to triple intra-African agricultural trade and strengthen private-public partnerships for priority agricultural value chains. This political decision raises agriculture’s priority on the African agenda while also recognising the need for strong institutions and more effective translation of continent-wide goals and commitments into national policies and actions.

Although the EU-Africa Summit two months earlier produced little more than high-level dialogue on the importance of transforming African agriculture, the agreed EU-Africa Roadmap does offer the

The Commission has set three objectives for the European Year for Development 2015:

- Inform citizens about EU development cooperation highlighting the achievements of the Union, acting together with the member states,
- Foster direct involvement, critical thinking and active interest of Union citizens and stakeholders in development cooperation,
- Raise awareness of the mutual benefits of EU development cooperation, while achieving a broader understanding of policy coherence for development and fostering a sense of joint responsibility, solidarity and opportunity in an increasingly interdependent world. (Capacity4Dev, 2014)

The European Year for Development 2015 offers a high-profile platform for the new Commissioners for International Cooperation and Development and for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management to operationalise the priorities outlined in their mission letters and parliamentary hearings (Sherriff, Gregersen, 2014). The momentum generated could help with more difficult tasks that require political will, such as achieving institutional coherence and effective joint action within and between the Commission and EEAS and with the member states. It could also help to reinvigorate the EU-Africa strategic partnership and create another platform for EU-Africa alignment on the post-2015 agenda, linking in with discussions on cooperation in the post-Cotonou era (see also Box 6).
Testing the new EU leadership

The EU has seen major changes in recent years. The Treaty of Lisbon brought new institutional and governance structures, and though the EU has taken steps to strengthen its economy and currency, the Eurozone crisis has continued to drag on. The new European Parliament held its first session in July and a new College of Commissioners took office in November. Commission President Juncker has moved swiftly to introduce new, and potentially more coherent and flexible approaches to management.

One innovation is the clustering of certain Commission members in designated policy areas. These clusters – known as ‘project teams’ – will each be led by one of the vice presidents. The External Relations project team will be coordinated by Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini, who is also the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and thus also in charge of the now well-established EEAS.

Nonetheless, Mogherini’s references to Africa during her confirmation hearing in the European Parliament were predominantly in relation to conflict, crisis and migration, and it is clearly the EU neighbourhood at large rather than Africa that is her geographic priority. It was apparent, however, that she wants to see not only Africa’s problems but also its potential in terms of democracy, population, energy, trade and human development. Where Africa is concerned, the EU has spoken in similar terms for some time, but follow-through and a shift of mindset has been slow within the EU institutions, in the absence of political sponsorship from the very highest levels.

The Africa-EU strategic partnership got a lift with the well-attended EU-Africa Summit last April, and Juncker seems to have picked up on this. The Commission President mentioned strengthening the EU’s strategic partnership with Africa as a priority in his mission letters to Commissioners across four portfolios: International Cooperation and Development; (ii) Trade; (iii) Migration and Home Affairs; and (iv) European Neighbourhood Policy. On paper this constitutes much more Commission-wide attention to Africa than in the past. With the Pan-African Programme funding now part of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the new Commission seems well equipped to support the JAES.

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Two other vice presidents, former minister of foreign affairs of The Netherlands, Frans Timmermans, and former EU humanitarian affairs commissioner Kristalina Georgieva, have been put in charge of overseeing all commissioner portfolios from the angle of, respectively, better regulation and the EU budget.

Rising to the leadership challenge?

EU Delegations are instrumental in shaping the EU’s image abroad and as such are under particular pressure to show results in this area. Since the Lisbon Treaty, they have gained a greater role in coordinating the EU presence on the ground. They are expected to substantiate a ‘whole-of-EU’ approach that is to complement EU member states’ individual diplomatic efforts to advance their particular agendas. Yet in practice, recent ECDPM research (Helly et al., 2014) focusing on EU Delegations suggests this role often still needs to be built up and Delegations could benefit more from working in synergy with member state embassies. However, in the Sahel, EU Delegations are finding ways to encourage coherence and coordination between short-term and long-term interventions for security, development and humanitarian assistance aims (Helly, Galeazzi; 2014). This is one of the regions where the EU began testing its so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ even before finalisation of the Commission’s 2013 Communication on the topic of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises. This involvement has confirmed the value of pragmatic efforts to bring all relevant actors to the table to share information and coordinate actively. A potential key opportunity to further test the ‘comprehensive approach’ could be the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), set to regulate all conventional, and small arms and light weapons. The EU and its Member states have been strong proponents of the Treaty (UNODA, 2014), which entered into force in December 2014, and it will depend both on the EU institutions and the Member States to successfully implement the Treaty from early 2015 onwards.

An adequate framework for EU international cooperation

The programming of EU development cooperation for 2014–2020 is well under way, for the first time guided by Europe’s 2011 strategic document on development assistance, Agenda for Change (EC 2011). Multiannual indicative programmes have been signed in a number of ACP countries. Grounding the design of programmes on solid context analysis has allowed identification of ‘drivers of change’ and broad engagement strategies with multiple actors, including civil society and local stakeholders, to support those who can make change happen (Hudson, Leftwich; 2014). Yet the process has not been without challenges, especially regarding the sectors chosen, ownership of the programming process and dialogue within partner countries.
Much of the programming has been done jointly with EU member states to encourage more complementarity in the overall EU development effort. Nonetheless, doubts have remained about whether EU institutions (e.g., EEAS, DG DEVCO and the EU delegations) really have the capacities to maintain these ambitious but necessary joint processes. Joint programming aims to increase country ownership and reduce aid fragmentation.

It has been welcomed by some as a major achievement, while other stakeholders, especially those in the field, continue to have reservations about the concrete results. One challenge in the coming years will be to incorporate lessons from these initial experiences into EU development cooperation policy more broadly.

The European Consensus on Development (EU, 2005) marks its 10th anniversary in 2015. This document was the first in 50 years of EU cooperation to define common principles by which the EU and its member states would implement their development programmes in a complementary manner. The Agenda for Change provides European actors further detail for delivering on the Consensus, adapting the way the EU delivers aid in a fast-changing global environment.

The adoption of new global development goals in 2015 will be an opportune moment for the EU to look back and review both documents. Europe will need to align its goals and tools with the new global framework, and many in the international community will look to the EU for commitment and innovation in implementing the new agenda.

There is, however, an inherent danger in revisiting the Consensus, as some parties may seek to water it down. Nonetheless, reviewing it in 2016, building on the post-2015 agenda, would add stimulus for Europe to maintain a high bar of expectation and ambition. It would, furthermore, set a strong policy basis for the reviews of other key EU tools for development scheduled over the next few years, for instance, during the formulation of the next multi-annual financial framework in 2018 and in anticipation of the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 (Box 5).

At his confirmation hearing, the new Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development expressed the view that Europe is on the verge of a paradigm shift toward more coherence and partnership between developing and developed countries. It remains to be seen whether changes in the Commission structure, aimed at breaking down ‘silos’ and moving away from static structures – and the title of Mimica’s portfolio (stressing international cooperation) – will indeed bring about more integrated approaches to global challenges from EU institutions (Vogel, 2014).

Certainly at the level of EU member states, some have become increasingly explicit in articulating their own economic interests in their engagements with Africa, seeking to pursue these simultaneously and yet coherently with development objectives. Such ‘enlightened self-interest’ is not without challenges in terms of conflicting interests and priorities. Nonetheless, it may well help to set the EU on track towards more honest and mature relations with developing countries, extending beyond aid, giving Europe new opportunities to reconcile its values and interests to reinvigorate the EU-Africa partnership.

The EU’s neighbourhood has seen enormous and radical changes in recent years – will indeed bring about more integrated approaches to global challenges from EU institutions (Vogel, 2014). The EU’s neighbourhood has seen enormous and radical changes in recent years. The EU is on the verge of a paradigm shift toward more coherence and partnership between developing and developed countries. It remains to be seen whether changes in the Commission structure, aimed at breaking down ‘silos’ and moving away from static structures – and the title of Mimica’s portfolio (stressing international cooperation) – will indeed bring about more integrated approaches to global challenges from EU institutions (Vogel, 2014).

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The EU’s neighbourhood has seen enormous and radical changes in the past decade, and the relationship the EU wants to have with its

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**Box 5. Planning for a post-Cotonou era**

The final five-year cycle of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement starts in 2015, and the agreement is set to expire in 2020. The Cotonou Agreement is the last in a series of successive cooperation agreements between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. Over the years, these agreements have ensured both continuity and adaptation to changing conditions, within and outside of the partnership. Lauded for its comprehensiveness (as it encompasses politics, aid and trade), its joint management and its contractual nature, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and the Lomé Convention before it, were long considered a model for North-South cooperation.

The possibility of a third revision of the agreement in 2015 has been dropped to concentrate on the period beyond the 2020 expiry date. This reflection process is gaining momentum on both sides. It is already clear that the parties are interested in a thorough review of ACP-EU relations and that negotiating new arrangements for the post-Cotonou era will usher in major changes.

In the EU, reflections on the future of this long-standing partnership have so far been rather informal and low profile. A working group established in 2012 by the European Commission’s DG DEVCO and EEAS has not had much profile. Nonetheless, incoming Commissioner Mimica has identified the future of ACP-EU relations as one of three key priorities for this legislative period. He also announced the launch of a broad consultation and dialogue process on the subject, stressing that ‘the question is not whether ACP countries are still important to the EU or not, but about how to best design our cooperation in the future’. The focus is thus likely to be on how a new agreement might best serve respective EU and ACP interests, rather than simply how to adapt Cotonou to the changing environment.

On the ACP side, reflections on the Group’s future and its relations with the EU have been under way for some time. The Ambassadorial Working Group on the Future Perspectives of the ACP was established in 2010 and held consultations with various EU-based think tanks. To deepen and broaden these reflections beyond Brussels, an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) consisting of 12 representatives from across the ACP was established in March 2013. That group took stock of the ACP’s achievements and shortcomings and organised consultations in each of the six ACP regions. Speaking to the Southern African regional consultation in September 2014, EPG Chair, Olusegun Obesango, was optimistic about future prospects concluding from the consultations that ‘there is adequate political will for the ACP Group to continue to exist but reinvented in line with the new world paradigm and focusing on a few core and niche areas… in line with the principles of subsidiarity and comparative advantage’. The report of the EPG will be presented to the 8th ACP Heads of State Summit scheduled for 2015.

Despite the occasional tension between the ACP and EU in international affairs, sustainable development and climate change continue to be seen as an opportunity to find common ground. In June 2014, the ACP Group and the EU signed a joint declaration on the post-2015 development agenda. Any future ACP-EU cooperation is thus likely to reflect the outcome of the post-2015 debate.

Informally, the prevailing mood within European circles is to question the relevance, role and objectives of the partnership. Over the past decade, the EU has become more inclined to seek common agreements with groups of particular types of countries – such as LEDCs, small island developing states and fragile states – or with established political groups such as the AU or ASEAN. These have typically involved demonstrations of clear interest in forming a productive relationship with the EU or internal political dynamism. ACP member countries could decide to maintain a relationship with the EU based on a similar if updated raison d’être. Or, member states might establish new formations, in line with their needs and preferences. The key is recognising the added value of the partnership for both sides, and promoting ownership of the process.

While the EU still channels substantial resources through the ACP-dedicated European Development Fund (EDF), it increasingly pursues its political interests through a patchwork of regional and continental frameworks. Moreover, Europe has been said to have a declining interest in the Caribbean and Pacific. EU enlargement has brought in more member states without historic relationships with the ACP, who tend to see Cotonou as a postcolonial relic (Keijzer, Lein, Negre, Tissi, 2013). The question of bringing the EDF into the overall EU budget will, as in the past, add another dimension to the reflections on the EU side (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014). Newer EU member states, whose strategic vision is towards the European neighbourhood and the East, may contest the EDF, yet at the same time many fear they would pay more if the EDF were ‘budgetised’. 

neighbours currently poses major challenges. Commissioner Hahn’s mission letter asks him to ‘take stock and suggest a way forward’ on the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) within his first year in office.

But looking eastward and southward, it seems clear that the EU will need to respond to some of the challenges more immediately than that. HR/VP Mogherini will probably spend much of her first year addressing the most volatile situations, for example, in Ukraine, Libya and the Sahel, as well as in Syria and Iraq, where some EU members are participating in joint air strikes as part of a ‘global coalition’ against Islamic State. The review of the ENP is thus likely to be one of the major EU foreign policy reviews in 2015 and, as it also covers North Africa, this is likely to impact on EU relations with Africa as a whole.

This array of crises may also prompt calls for a review of the 12-year-old European Security Strategy (ESS). That strategy was formulated in the aftermath of 9/11, when the focus was mainly on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failures and regional conflicts, most at some distance from Europe. With the drawn out and deepening conflict in Syria, the question of jihadi fighters, the standstill in Libya and the strong-armed foreign policy of Russia, the crises are now more complex and closer to Europe. However, as with the Consensus on Development, reviewing the ESS at a time when European sentiment is on the wane risks it being watered down. Much, therefore, will depend on whether the new EU leadership succeeds in restoring a measure of confidence and dynamism to the European project. Mrs Mogherini indicated in her confirmation hearing that she might launch a broad public process of reflection on the ESS, possibly starting with a White Paper.

Box 6. AU leadership on Burkina Faso

In October 2014, Burkina Faso’s president Blaise Compaoré was swept from power by a popular uprising after 27 years of rule. Compaoré announced his resignation as hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets protesting against plans to further extend his rule. However, two rival military leaders then declared themselves in charge. At its 3rd November meeting, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a communiqué, firmly stating that the military takeover was unconstitutional (African Union, 2014). The communiqué went further to recognise the right of peoples to rise up peacefully against oppressive political systems. The AU gave Burkina Faso’s military rulers a two-week deadline to hand power over to a civilian ruler or face sanctions (BBC News, 2014c). The military heeded the communiqué, announcing the country’s new interim civilian leader on 17 November, within the timeframe set (Al Jazeera, 2014b).

This handling of an African leadership crisis represents an AU coup of its own in terms of the Union’s ability to position itself with authority. In responding to the popular uprisings in North Africa, the AU had felt constrained by its Constitutive Act, which allows it to condemn unconstitutional changes of government but does not mention popular uprisings. In the Burkina case, however, the AU statement cited recognition of ‘the right of peoples to rise up peacefully against oppressive political systems’, demonstrating the Union’s capacity to learn from its past experience.

Earlier in 2014, the Peace and Security Council had in fact requested the AU Commission to revise the framework guiding the response to unconstitutional changes in government. This revision, invoked in the Burkina case, is a practical illustration of the AU’s current efforts to link the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Each of these ‘architectures’ is made up of the various continental instruments to promote, respectively, (i) peace and security and (ii) governance, both key areas of AU leadership on the continent.
Africa is taking ownership of its own development and policy frameworks and becoming more assertive on the global scene. Rapid economic growth and the commodity boom have generated increased confidence among many African countries to focus on their own resources to finance their economic transformation and development. Sound macroeconomic management combined with a robust economic recovery following the 2008 global financial crisis has also contributed to this new assertiveness.

Fostering economic transformation for sustainable and inclusive growth in Africa will require enhanced domestic production capacity, greater value creation, and better quality jobs and increased linkages with regional and global economies. Accordingly, government interventions will need to provide regulatory, institutional, and infrastructure frameworks to connect domestic and international market forces, as these will ultimately determine the geographical constellations of regional and global value chains. Beyond these, more proactive policies will be called for in pursuit of pragmatic approaches to industrialisation, harnessing the potential of the extractive sector to help upgrade regional and global value chains.

Though the current AU Commission leadership will hold office for one more year, the January 2016 AU Summit will see the election of the next chairperson and College of Commissioners. In the meantime a number of African countries are set to hold general or presidential elections in 2015, including Zambia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Burkina Faso and Libya (National Democratic Institute, 2014). Of course, elections in Africa are regular occurrences, but polls in large or rich countries, like Nigeria and Libya, can have a major influence on continental politics as well. In some post-conflict and post-crisis countries, a great deal depends on peaceful and legitimate transitions of power. With several long-serving African leaders still in place and questionable constitutional attempts to consolidate power still possible, the EU faces the question of how to position itself on any efforts by incumbents to force continuation of leadership mandates (Jeune Afrique, 2014). In such cases it needs to maintain the legitimacy of EU cooperation with the country, while also seeking to ensure EU values and interests continue to be respected. However, the AU is increasingly showing leadership in this area and its firm handling of the Burkina crisis sent a message across the continent (Box 6). For the EU, the AU’s strong stance on Burkina Faso served as a reminder of the value of its relationship with the AU and an encouragement to continue the cooperation.

**African leadership on governance and peace and security**

The 2014 EU-Africa Summit reaffirmed peace and security as a joint priority (European Council, 2014a). Given the continuing unrest on the continent, this focus will likely be reinforced in 2015, especially with peace support, crisis management activities and peacebuilding efforts. Yet, gaps are already appearing in peacebuilding initiatives where insufficient attention is given to reconstruction and development as well as governance issues. A case in point is the lack of resources for the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy, compared to the substantial amounts dedicated to peace support operations. The focus thus continues to be on military aspects and military responses to crises as they arise (Lucey, Gida; 2014). Though the PCRD is a fundamental element of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), it has seen limited implementation to date. EU support to the APSA changed somewhat from the 9th to the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), putting greater emphasis on support to the PCRD (Hauck, 2015). This emphasis, however, is absent from the EU-Africa Summit Roadmap, in which prioritisation of the military and operational aspects of the APSA trumps post-conflict reconstruction, mediation activities or conflict prevention measures.

There is growing awareness that good governance is often the missing element in peace and security emergencies. The African Governance Architecture (AGA) is the AU’s overarching framework to address the governance deficit in Africa, by promoting and sustaining democracy, governance and human rights. It complements the APSA, as both structures acknowledge democratic governance and peace and security as interdependent, mutually reinforcing imperatives (Wachira, 2014). This was reiterated at the AGA Platform’s recent Third High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in Senegal (African Union, 2014d).

The AGA has made substantial progress in creating horizontal linkages with other frameworks, most notably the APSA, at the initiative of the AU Department of Political Affairs (Box 7). These efforts have culminated in the Central African Republic Initiative in which the AU is working jointly with the UN in a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction intervention. AGA assessments have also been carried out in eight further countries: Somalia, Guinea Bissau, South Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, though it remains to be seen how these will be used in practice.

It is hoped the July 2015 AU Summit may finalise reporting guidelines for monitoring AU member states’ compliance with the instruments of its ‘Shared Values’ pillar. With these in place, the Union would be better positioned to assess progress in governance and to pre-empt the eruption of conflicts. Political will and commitment will be needed for further organisational integration between the APSA and AGA structures to strengthen the untapped potential of governance and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Peace and security is also a joint priority of the EU-Africa Summit Roadmap. Nonetheless, the outbreak of multiple conflicts in late 2013 and early 2014 suggest that Europe and Africa must consider ways to further strengthen their partnership’s commitment to peacebuilding and inclusive political processes. A more bottom up and sustainable response to conflicts on the continent is certainly needed. In this respect, another area in need of reconsideration is the EU’s current lack of attention for peacebuilding elements in its new statebuilding contracts, a form of budget support to help recipient governments transition to sustainable recovery. Closer coordination on promoting the approach of the New Deal can be an avenue to explore (Box 8).

An explicit goal in the 2014–2017 Roadmap is to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in particular, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in particular, the
Flows, will endorse a hospitality tax and a levy on airline tickets to finance the continent’s development have produced recommendations on how to help women and children in areas affected by armed conflict (Institute of Security Studies, 2014).

At the Summit, the AU’s Panel of the Wise, a central element of the APSA, is expected to present a report to the AU Assembly with forward-looking vision to be implemented through five consecutive 10-year action plans, sets out Africa’s priorities for its own economic transformation, with a strong recognition of the role of the private sector and innovative development finance.

A number of challenges remain, not least, maintaining credible consultation, aligning funding with priorities, strengthening capacity, coordinating donor involvement and implementing monitoring and evaluation. Moreover, intensified efforts will be needed to improve Africa’s planning framework, in order to effectively translate continental development aspirations into results. Much of Agenda 2063’s focus and energy will likely be geared towards critical infrastructure for energy, science, technology, transport, ICT, irrigation, ports, agriculture and food security. Agenda 2063 will, furthermore, need to prove its relevance to gain the buy-in of Africa’s regional economic communities and AU member states, which were invited to provide inputs before the end of 2014. However, the most likely hurdle to the successful implementation of Agenda 2063 will be financing. So far, no agreement has been reach on the modalities of financing. So far, no agreement has been reach on the modalities of financing. The AU will launch its Agenda 2063 in 2015 (see Box 3). This 50-year, forward-looking vision to be implemented through five consecutive 10-year action plans, sets out Africa’s priorities for its own economic transformation, with a strong recognition of the role of the private sector and innovative development finance.

The AU Summit in January 2015 – under the themes of the “Year of Women’s Empowerment and Development towards Africa’s Agenda 2063” – will further inform the African agenda throughout 2015. At the Summit, the AU’s Panel of the Wise, a central element of the APSA, is expected to present a report to the AU Assembly with recommendations on how to help women and children in areas affected by armed conflict (Institute of Security Studies, 2014).

Financing the African Union

Recent reflections on how African states and financial institutions can finance the continent’s development have produced several studies, most notably by the AU’s NEPAD Planning and Implementation Agency (NPCA), UNECA and the African Development Bank. High-level panels convened by the AU have also helped propel discussions on financing and development. It is expected the AU Assembly in January 2015, after consulting with both the High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union and the Mbeki High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, will endorse a hospitality tax and a levy on airline tickets to provide resources for the AU. To date, however, no solution has been found for their implementation.

A number of proposals made by the Mbeki Panel to bring illicit financial flows above board and increase domestic resource mobilisation are gaining traction. With sustained interest, partnerships in these efforts, including with the EU, are likely to become more prominent in 2015. Stronger cooperation between Europe and Africa will be needed in order to effectively tackle illicit financial flows. Denouncing illicit financial flows is not just a moral imperative. It is a good starting point for transformative policies and a major source of support to strengthening national domestic tax revenue. Yet, it is an issue that can only be adequately addressed if developed countries agree to themselves take serious action including global tax and banking reform, mandatory country-by-country financial reporting, tackling trade mis-invoicing and actively combating tax evasion.


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The European Union starts 2015 with new leadership in place, and the African Union with a new Agenda for its own future, ready to confront a challenging year for international cooperation. With key international deals to be struck on financing for development, sustainable development goals, climate change and trade for development the year is charged. The global strategic choices likely to be made in 2015 will have a major impact on both continents, as well as on the relationship between them. Both Unions will be called on to think and act with long-term vision, looking beyond immediate crises and short-term interests. The global agreements reached this year will frame our ability to thrive in transforming our world and the context for international cooperation for years to come. They should push the EU to rethink what universal goals imply for its own development, prompt a review of EU international cooperation policy and they should underpin the AU’s ability to achieve its Agenda 2063. Inevitably they will also set the scene for the post-Cotonou debate on the EU’s future relations with African countries as well as those in the Caribbean and Pacific.

Key areas of cooperation will affect both European and African citizens in very real, immediate and meaningful ways. Migration is one example. This topic is very much on Europe’s doorstep, yet it affects many African countries as well. While the JAEs provides a framework for dialogue on migration, sufficient political will and leadership are still needed on both continents to address the issue in such a way as to achieve better results for the people of Europe and Africa.

At the global level, some fundamental questions need to be answered. Are global leaders ready to reach wide-ranging agreements for a post-2015 world? Can the AU speak with one voice and work to make the SDGs a useful stepping-stone for its own ambitious Agenda 2063? Can the EU move beyond traditional donor-recipient aid relationships and really see them in terms of international cooperation partnerships? Are development partners ready for cooperation that leaves no one behind? Are both developed and developing countries prepared to take action to ensure necessary and equitable growth, without irreversible damage to our climate for future generations? Now, more than ever, EU-Africa problems need global solutions that emerge from a new European action. But equally Africa’s problems need global solutions and African action. The coming year, 2015, will be a pivotal one for both the EU and the AU to step forward and demonstrate that their partnership strengthens their respective positions as global players in international cooperation.

Conclusion

Bibliography


Africa. 2013. “AU’s ability to achieve its Agenda 2063. Inevitably they will also set the scene for the post-Cotonou debate on the EU’s future relations with African countries as well as those in the Caribbean and Pacific.”


Part 1

Finishing the Job and Building Bridges to the Future
Amina Mohammed, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on Post-2015 Development Planning, shares her perspectives on the challenges for sustainable development in 2015 – and beyond to 2063. She argues that through the Common African Position and Agenda 2063, African leaders underscore vital principles for development and the post-2015 agenda provides a unique opportunity for advancing social justice, well being, resilience, and human dignity. For the United Nations, the universal pursuit of human rights, justice, prosperity and sustainable development is at the core of our global mission to promote human dignity for all. These are the underlying principles for the post-2015 development agenda.

Part 2

Leaving No One Behind
Tony German, Executive Director of Development Initiatives, argues that the acid test of whether the post-2015 development goals have been worth all the talk is whether the poorest 20% are better off, better fed, better educated, with better health and greater opportunity. To use all resources (government, private sector, civil society and official aid) efficiently and accountably, we need better data on how money is spent to determine if action on poverty is working. Investing in measuring this, and using information to empower at every level, means all resources are harnessed to achieve the goals and to end extreme poverty and inequity by 2030.

Part 3

What Europe Can and Should do for Global Development
Linda McAvan MEP, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Development, shares her perspectives, and argues that in 2015 major decisions will be made at the global level where the EU can and should play a major role. A new European parliamentary term and Commission team come at a crucial time for international cooperation for development. The Sustainable Development Goals must be more than just words on paper, but practical and achievable targets and ambitions. The targets must lead to real progress and improvements in people’s livelihoods; encourage policies that will credibly tackle climate change and inspire better stewardship of the world’s natural resources. If the EU can help achieve this in 2015, backing up words with actions and getting things done, it will do much to enhance its role in the global community.