Evaluating Co-ordination, Complementarity and Coherence in EU development policy: a synthesis

In 2004, the group of Heads of the EU Member States' development cooperation evaluation services and the European Commission (EUHES) initiated a series of six joint evaluations to assess the role played by the Maastricht Treaty precepts of coordination, complementarity and coherence in the development cooperation policies and operations of the European Commission and the EU Member States. Focusing on a wide variety of topics and issues, the evaluations determined to what extent the 3Cs have been applied in practice and with what impact. This publication is the final version of the synthesis paper which sets out the main policy conclusions from this joint evaluation effort. This paper was drawn up by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDCPM) on invitation by the EUHES.

The six evaluations show evidence that enhanced cooperation on policy coherence for development and on complementarity and division of labour is being strengthened throughout the European Union. However, they also indicate that progress is tentative and hinges upon sustained political commitment at the highest level on the part of EU Institutions and Member States. To inspire further progress in terms of enhanced cooperation on development, the evaluations point out lessons learned and opportunities for further integration and learning, as well as specific shortcomings in the way EU Institutions and Member States work together in practice to operationalise their joint vision on development.
EVALUATING COORDINATION, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COHERENCE IN EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY: A SYNTHESIS
Evaluating Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence in EU development policy: a synthesis

Evaluating the role and application of the Maastricht Treaty requirements, coherence, coordination and complementarity in the European Union’s development co-operation policies and operations

The group of Heads of the EU Member States' development cooperation evaluation services and the European Commission (EUHES)

Studies in European Development Co-operation Evaluation No 8
European Union
November 2007
Colofon

Studies in European Development Co-operation Evaluation is a series of evaluations commissioned by the combined evaluation bureaus of the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union. They are published – on an irregular basis – to inform the interested European audience on results of Europe’s development co-operation. The content of these studies does not necessarily reflect the ideas of the European Commission or the governments of the Member States.

European Union
November 2007

ISSN: 1871-3424

Typesetting: BoekVorm, Amsterdam
Coverdesign: Haagsblauw, The Hague
Printed in The Netherlands.

Published in 2007 by Aksant Academic Publishers, Cruquiusweg 31, NL-1019 AT Amsterdam, www.aksant.nl
Foreword

The group of Heads of the EU Member States’ development cooperation evaluation services and the European Commission (EUHES) agreed to carry out a series of joint evaluation studies aimed at establishing the degree of application and impact in terms of development cooperation, of the principles of coordination, complementarity and coherence which are enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. An initial report was published in 2004. In 2005, a series of six evaluation studies was carried out, each dealing with a specific aspect of the potential impact of the 3Cs.¹

<table>
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<th>Evaluation study</th>
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<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy/Development – The use of Cotonou Partnership Agreement’s Article 96</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
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<td>Coordination of Trade Capacity Building in Partner Countries</td>
<td>European Commission – EuropeAid</td>
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<td>Coordination and complementarity in Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>European Commission – ECHO</td>
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<td>EU Mechanisms that promote Policy Coherence for Development</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Coordination and Complementarity of Country Strategy Papers with National Development Priorities</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Coordination and Complementarity of Assistance for Local Development</td>
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This joint evaluation effort between the European development cooperation evaluation services was a pioneering effort involving all interested Member States. Each study was led by a different Member State or by a European Commission DG, and supported by a steering group with between three and five members. As other Member States, including the new Member States that joined in 2004 and 2007, were interested observers throughout this process, this undertaking has been an important experience for this network of evaluation departments, each with varying budgets and priorities but, most of all, common goals.

The ultimate purpose of this evaluation effort is to contribute to improved aid effectiveness for EU development cooperation in line with the precepts established in the

² All the six final evaluation reports and their annexes are available at www.three-cs.net
Maastricht Treaty. Communication was thus an important issue. An initial workshop with policy-makers in 2003 helped focus the initiative. In so far as this is possible, evaluation results have been shared in the context of each individual study. In addition, the group has shared the results of the evaluations with the wider public through the website www.three-cs.net. The emerging results were discussed in two seminars organised in Brussels in 2006 and 2007. Both these seminars were hosted by the Joint Evaluation unit of the European Commission’s DGs for External Relations, Development and EuropeAid. The first seminar brought together the members of the EUHES and their immediate colleagues and focused on the initial results of the evaluations which had been completed at that time, while also taking into account the studies that were still in progress. The second seminar brought the EUHES members together with their colleagues from the relevant policy departments that focus on aid effectiveness. During this seminar, the participants discussed the results of the six reports, as well as the general policy implications that emerged from the studies. In preparation for this seminar, the EUHES invited the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) to draw up a synthesis paper presenting the results of the series of joint evaluations and on that basis highlight emerging key issues.

Following this last seminar, the EUHES Task Force concluded that in view of the 2005 European Consensus on Development and the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy that was agreed in November 2007 by the EU Council of Ministers, that the main findings and recommendations of this initiative should be brought to the attention of those at the highest level of political responsibility for EU Development Policies. The evaluations were subsequently brought to the attention of the Portuguese EU Presidency by the Chair of the EUHES, Mr. Jean-Louis Chomel.

On 10th September, the synthesis paper was presented to the EU Council Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) by the Chair of the Task Force and other members of the EU-HES. Following the presentation, the CODEV prepared conclusions which were endorsed by the General Affairs and External Relations Council at its meeting in November 2007.

This publication is the final version of the synthesis paper which sets out the main policy conclusions from this joint evaluation effort. We hope that the results of our evaluation efforts will be used for the benefit of improving the coordination, complementarity and coherence of European development policies and operations, and help the Union reach the goals which it has committed itself to in the context of the EU Consensus on Development, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals.

Eva Lithman, Chair of the EU-HES Task Force for the evaluation of the Three Cs

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3 The Council Conclusions on the 3Cs that were adopted during the General Affairs meeting of 19 November 2007 can be accessed here: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st14/st14084.en07.pdf
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<tr>
<td>2Cs</td>
<td>Coordination and Complementarity</td>
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<td>3Cs</td>
<td>Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
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<td>APG</td>
<td>Aid Partner Group</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign &amp; Security Policy</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cotonou Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>DG AIDCO</td>
<td>EuropeAid Cooperation Office, European Commission</td>
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<td>DG DEV</td>
<td>Directorate General for Development, European Commission</td>
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<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid, European Commission</td>
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<td>DG ENV</td>
<td>Directorate General for Environment, European Commission</td>
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<td>DG RELEX</td>
<td>Directorate General for External Relations, European Commission</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EU-HES</td>
<td>Heads of the EU Member States’ development cooperation evaluation services and the European Commission</td>
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<td>GoN</td>
<td>Government of Nicaragua</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarter</td>
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<td>IDC</td>
<td>International Development Cooperation unit, Government of South-Africa</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>The New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PAF</td>
<td>Poverty Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>PCD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary measures</td>
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<td>TCB</td>
<td>Trade Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Executive summary

In 2004, the group of Heads of the EU Member States’ development cooperation evaluation services and the European Commission (EUHES) initiated a series of six joint evaluations to assess the role played by the Maastricht Treaty precepts of coordination, complementarity and coherence in the development cooperation policies and operations of the European Commission and the EU Member States. Focusing on a wide variety of topics and issues, the evaluations determined to what extent the 3Cs have been applied in practice and with what impact.

In February 2007, the 3C Task Force Secretariat invited the ECDPM to make an initial attempt to synthesise the results of the six joint evaluations. The preparation of this paper was guided by the questions that feature in the overall Terms of Reference of the evaluation initiative, and was structured as an analytical approach comprising three central elements:

– A long term policy process approach towards identifying and analysing the efforts made to apply the 3Cs and their impact on development policy and operations;
– A close scrutiny of the complexity, timing and the different types of pressures that affect policy formulation and implementation within the EU;
– The recognition that policy coherence for development, alignment and complementarity are possible outcomes of some form of institutional coordination.

In view of the nature and objectives of this synthesis paper, it should be emphasised that this report is not meant to provide a ‘meta evaluation’. Guided by the aforementioned analytical framework described in section 2, this study presents a synthesis and evidence-based analysis of the main findings of the six joint evaluations and, on that basis, suggests a number of key policy issues which emerged from this analysis. As such, this report does not judge one evaluation’s findings compared with another, but acknowledges the diversity of the six studies.

The six evaluations were done at a relatively early moment in this EU-wide process, yet the results show evidence that enhanced cooperation on policy coherence for development and on complementarity and division of labour is being strengthened throughout the European Union. However, they also indicate that progress is still tentative and hinges upon sustained political commitment at the highest level on the part of EU
Institutions and Member States. To inspire further progress in terms of enhanced cooperation on development, the evaluations point out lessons learned and opportunities for further integration and learning, as well as specific shortcomings in the way EU Institutions and Member States work together in practice to operationalise their joint vision on development.

Main findings

1: EU Member States’ and Institutions’ efforts towards greater policy coherence for development (PCD)

- There is increasing recognition of the importance of achieving greater policy coherence for development (PCD). This has led to a new phase in the promotion of PCD that can be described as largely experimental. In close collaboration with the European Institutions, several consecutive EU Presidencies have kept the topic on the agenda which has resulted in EU level decisions to further the issue of PCD. A reservoir of practical experience has been created within the EU on how to tackle PCD in a context-sensitive way, to serve as ‘food for thought’ for Member States’ and EU institutions’ further consideration.

- Many Member States have taken a rather piecemeal approach in their measures to promote PCD. The evaluation findings indicate a lack of clarity on what type of impact is being sought by the mechanisms that were created to promote PCD, combined with little attention being given to result-oriented planning, monitoring and evaluation. The findings also show that a more systematic approach to promoting PCD, which combines mutually reinforcing mechanisms of different types, is currently missing in these Member States.

- Promoting PCD remains work-in-progress that requires continuing, broad-based (cross-party) political support within the European Institutions and the Member States to complete and ensure the long-term impact of the measures taken.

2: EU Member States’ and Institutions’ coordination for Trade Capacity Building and Humanitarian Assistance

- Coordination efforts regarding Trade Capacity Building among EU donors have increased at headquarters level, but the effects on complementarity and coherence have so far been disappointing. This is mostly due to a lack of consensus on the relevance of developing a common European approach that would take EU-level coordinating beyond information sharing. Sharing views and information alone has proven to be insufficient for moving towards greater complementarity between the Member States and the Commission, as well as to improve PCD.
Lack of coordination, complementarity and coherence in EU humanitarian aid has a negative impact on its efficiency and diminishes the impact of the EU in global humanitarian aid policy and operations. The evaluation which focused on this topic concluded that it appears that national priorities and the preference for national visibility are more important issues in international humanitarian aid than the effective and coordinated assistance of the EU as a whole.

Several institutional coordination mechanisms exist – such as committees, joint planning frameworks – which when more formally mandated and used offer a potential for moving EU-level coordination beyond information exchange.

3: EU Member States’ and Institutions’ coordination at partner country level: political consultation, strategic alignment and local development

So far, constraints seem to outnumber incentives in the quest for more EU coordination and complementarity at partner country and local levels (e.g. centralised procedures, unclear mandates, quality and timing of information exchange). Coordination mechanisms often lack an explicit, formal and operationally focused mandate and do not lead to joint assessment and decision-making that is binding on all the parties involved.

The evaluations signal a lack of agreement among the EU Member States and Institutions on what complementarity means and what it requires in practice. In the case of in-country and local coordination to achieve greater complementarity and alignment among EU donors, the over-emphasis on the mere exchange of information and views and a lack of decisions binding on all may also limit the results, but not the costs. Headquarters often does not allow its colleagues in the field sufficient flexibility and decision-making power to be able to work out complementarity-related issues with their partners.

Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) do not stimulate and may even obstruct progress on the 2Cs, since donor priorities can only be formally changed when new strategy papers are drawn up. This situation is improving now that different Member States and the Commission are involved in developing more flexible planning and joint-planning arrangements.

The evaluations, however, also provide various good examples of more flexible individual and joint arrangements, both EU and non-EU, which will enable coordination results to be attained. Examples include coordination within the framework of a PRSP; General Budget Support; Integrated Frameworks for Trade Capacity Building; the use of ‘Minimal Country Strategy Papers’ and Strategic Frameworks for managing development assistance which are used by some partner countries. These examples could be more widely shared to stimulate further development.
Two general conclusions emerge from these common findings of the three clusters of evaluation findings:

1. The findings indicate that inadequate EU coordination, complementarity and coherence reduces the impact of the European Union’s development and humanitarian aid efforts and leads to unnecessarily high demands being placed on developing countries human and financial resources.

2. The findings indicate a lack of practical consensus; incomplete efforts and the need for continued broad-based political support if progress is to be made on the application of the 3Cs.

Recommendations

To inspire further progress in terms of enhanced cooperation on development, the evaluations point out lessons learned and opportunities for further integration and learning, as well as the specific shortcomings in the way EU Institutions and Member States work together in practice to operationalise their joint vision on development. The results of the evaluations can therefore be used to provide a useful input into a further reflection on and operationalisation of the EU Consensus on Development and Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour. The following four complementary possible ways forward have been formulated with this objective in mind:

1: A major harmonisation drive to overcome day-to-day EU coordination challenges.
   a. Further specification of the rationale for and added value of EU level coordination vis-à-vis other, wider collaborative frameworks.
   b. Further specification of the operational consequences of EU level coordination:
      – In the light of PCD commitments and the Paris declaration on harmonisation and alignment.
      – In the light of added value + roles of the EC.

2: Political and operational guidance on the management of EU coordination in practice.
   a. Sustained broad-based political leadership and initiatives for promoting coordination are of great importance.
   b. Treaty obligations to be made operational at all levels; shared; implemented; monitored and evaluated.
   c. Obtaining real benefits from EU level coordination efforts; this depends, among other things, on:
      – Moving beyond information exchange to joint agenda setting, decision-making, task division, joint monitoring, evaluation and learning;
      – Developing clear frameworks and flexible protocols for enhanced cooperation, right of initiative and follow-up.
3: **Systematic sharing of good practices**, such as those described in the evaluations.
   a. Except General Budget Support, many experiences (e.g. Article 96, Integrated frameworks for Trade Capacity Building, minimal CSPs) are poorly documented and inadequately shared among EU Member States and Institutions.

4: **Strengthening of EU research and training facilities** to provide analytical and knowledge support to EU level coordination efforts:
   a. To further explore the incentives and disincentives of EU development actors to coordinate their actions can inform future dialogue and decision making.
   b. To develop, in particular, the joint diagnosis, monitoring, assessment and evaluative capacities of EU Member States, EU Institutions and partner countries, regarding the effectiveness of 3C application in practice.
   c. In particular, but certainly not exclusively, to support the newer Member States.
1 Introduction

1.1 The EU development policy context

The European Union is the largest provider of official development assistance (ODA). The European Union already contributes more than half of global ODA and has committed to almost double its contribution by 2015. Development cooperation is a shared competence between the European Community and the Member States.

The EU competence on development cooperation was established in law by the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Treaty created a constitutional basis for development cooperation policies, and formalised the existence of a European development policy functioning in liaison with those of Member States, while recognising their interdependence. To guide its practical implementation the Maastricht Treaty established three specific requirements: coordination, complementarity and coherence – the “three Cs”.

Coordination is defined as “activities of two or more development partners that are intended to mobilise aid resources or to harmonise their policies, programmes, procedures and practices so as to maximise the development effectiveness of aid resources”.

Complementarity is intended to ensure that Community development policy “…shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States”. It addresses the fact that development cooperation is a competence shared between the Community and the Member States. As a result both the Commission and the Member States may have competences and tasks at the same level.

Although the term coherence was not explicitly used in the Maastricht Treaty, it is commonly accepted that 130V marks the origin of this third component of the 3Cs, by referring to coherence with the following wording: “The Community shall take account

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2 Definitions of coordination, complementarity and coherence as included in the General Terms of Reference for the 3C evaluation studies.
of the objectives referred to in Article 130U in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.” Although there has been a lot of discussion following the signing of the treaty on the difference between consistency and coherence, the article has become commonly known as ‘the coherence article’. In more recent years, various policy statements started referring to this concept as Policy coherence for development (PCD).\(^4\)

1.2 The 3C initiative

In 2004, the Heads of Evaluation of the EU Member States and the European Commission agreed to carry out joint evaluations to assess the role played by the three Cs and to determine how far they have been applied in practice and with what impact on the European Union’s development cooperation policies and operations.

The 3C Task Force Evaluation Program is expected to produce evidence, lessons and recommendations to strengthen the quality and effectiveness of European development assistance. The outcomes of the study should inform awareness and learning between stakeholders in the EU Member States, the EU institutions and partner countries.

A first series of 6 studies was undertaken during the period 2005-2007 – see table below. All evaluations focus on coordination. Four address complementarity specifically and four, some others, also address policy coherence. All the final reports of the evaluation studies, as well as their annexes, are available at http://www.three-cs.net/

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<td>1.1</td>
<td>CFSP/Development – use of CPA Article 96</td>
<td>The Netherlands(^3)</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>Coordination of Trade Capacity Building Initiatives</td>
<td>EC – EuropeAid</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>Coordination and Complementarity in Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>EC – ECHO</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>EU Mechanisms that promote Policy Coherence</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>Evaluating 3cs of CSPs with National Development Priorities</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Coordination and Complementarity of Assistance for Local Development</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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\(^4\) One example of such a statement is the 2005 European Consensus on Development, in which the European Union reaffirms its “commitment to promoting policy coherence for development, based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives”.

\(^5\) Each of the evaluation studies was led by one Member State or the European Commission, in close collaboration with a Reference Group comprising several others.
1.3 This paper

This paper aims to synthesise and share some of the lessons and raise some of the main cross-cutting issues originating from this series of evaluation studies. It will not repeat the case-specific findings. Instead it cuts across the almost six hundred pages of material that have been produced, to identify common findings and policy recommendations.

In view of the synthesis objectives and nature of this paper, it should be emphasised that this report is not meant to provide a ‘meta evaluation’. Guided by an analytical framework as described in section 2, this study presents a synthesis and evidence-based analysis of the main findings of the six joint-evaluations and, on that basis, suggests a number of key policy issues which emerged from this analysis. As such, this report does not judge one evaluation’s findings compared with another, but acknowledges the diversity of the six studies.

Following this introduction, section 2 of this synthesis paper describes the key questions that feature in the Terms of Reference for the 3C evaluation initiative, presents an overview of the most important developments relating to the 3Cs in recent years, and introduces the main analytical framework and approach that was used to produce this synthesis paper. The main elements of this analytical approach, which was influenced by the approaches of the evaluation studies, are:

- A long term policy process approach towards identifying and analysing the efforts made to apply the 3Cs and their impact on development policy and operations;
- A close scrutiny of the complexity, timing and the different types of pressures that affect policy formulation and implementation within the EU;
- The recognition that policy coherence for development, alignment and complementarity are possible outcomes of some form of institutional coordination.

Section 3 of this report subsequently describes the main findings of the six evaluation reports on the following three key issues of the 3Cs:

- EU Member States’ and Institutions’ efforts towards greater policy coherence for development (PCD)
- EU Member States’ and Institutions’ coordination for Trade Capacity Building and Humanitarian Assistance
- EU Member States’ and Institutions’ coordination at the level of partner countries: political consultation, strategic alignment and local development

Following these three sections, which present the main findings of the six evaluations on the three key issues defined in relation to the analytical approach for this synthesis study, section 3.4 presents the common findings of the six evaluations.
The fourth and last section presents four recommendations resulting from the analysis of the common findings and subsequent discussion among EU evaluation officers and policy makers. These offer ways forward which aim to inform future policy making on EU development effectiveness.
2 Towards a synthesis: approach and key questions

2.1 A long term policy process approach

“\textit{In an ideal world, policy agendas would be developed rationally, problems would be prioritized, options would be carefully researched and weighed, and the best solutions would be implemented, monitored, and evaluated. But modern society is too complex to make such an ideal possible, and studies of policy routinely emphasize the scarcity of real organization. The result is that policy is often driven by compromise, opportunism, and unpredictable political pressures. This is certainly true of the EU, where the challenge is to identify and address the needs of more than 450 million people, who have their own ideas about their priorities and the best way of dealing with their problems}” (McCormick, 2005; [ ] adapted by the editor).

By addressing the requirements of coordination, complementarity and policy coherence within the European Union, the 3C evaluations connect to two on-going policy processes that have received much attention in recent years. Through the first, development policy actors aim to promote policy coherence for development, through the second, they strive for harmonisation and alignment between donors, in particular, at partner country level. The main driver behind both policy processes within the EU is the European Member States’ and Institutions’ wish to improve the effectiveness of EU Aid.

Considering that the Treaty of Maastricht defined three essential precepts for both policy processes as early as 1992, it may be concluded that until the late nineties ‘enhanced cooperation’ or ‘Europe à la carte’ prevailed in these major areas of development policy management. While the European Institutions were building up their capacity to deal with development issues, only partial and generally informal or ad hoc efforts at most were made to promote the implementation of the 3Cs. Member States adopted different elements of the Treaty in their own way.

During the late nineties, a number of EU Member States at first and then the European Commission, gradually started to adopt stronger measures to enhance policy coherence for development (PCD) within their own administrations. This more pro-active approach coincided with the international agenda arrived at within the UN – the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals – as well as within the OECD/DAC,
when the DAC eventually incorporated PCD in its peer review system. Since the year 2000, there has been a visibly greater increase in practical enhancement measures by EU Member States, followed by a formal EU-wide policy integration process led by six successive EU Presidencies between 2003 and 2005. Among other things, this has led to several EU Council Conclusions on PCD, including the 12 specific PCD commitments that were adopted in May 2005, and the rolling work programme that was adopted in March 2006. By 2006, a large majority of 25 EU Member States had defined PCD as a specific policy objective and more than half of them had made practical adjustments to their institutional architecture to ensure its implementation (see box 3 on page 29).

Regarding complementarity, it seems that the close involvement of some EU Member States and the European Commission in the process leading towards the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness triggered a more formal drive within the EU to start seeking complementarity and a division of labour between Member States and European Commission. The Paris Declaration resolves to improve aid effectiveness by further strengthening country ownership of cooperation programmes; by increasing alignment with partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures; by harmonising donor actions; and by ensuring better management and mutual accountability. Subsequent EU Presidencies have since taken the initiative, in close collaboration with the European Commission, to establish the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy, which was adopted in May 2007.

The EU impetus towards a more formal policy integration process is also reflected in the adoption by the European Council, the Commission and the European Parliament in November 2005 of the European Consensus on Development. It defines common objectives, values and principles for all EU Member States and Institutions, focusing their development efforts towards poverty eradication, ownership, and partnership, delivering more and better aid and promoting policy coherence for development. Development cooperation is also recognised in the Consensus as a key instrument in achieving long-term global peace and security. Interaction between development and other areas of external policy, such as foreign relations, peace and security, rehabilitation, migration, and trade are also clearly recognised. The implementation of the EU Consensus further underlines the integration of EU development efforts and alignment with national development priorities.

1 The Paris Declaration is available online at: http://www1.worldbank.org/harmonisation/Paris/FINALPARISDECLARATION.pdf (accessed 19 July)
3 For more information on the EU Consensus on Development, please visit: http://ec.europa.eu/development/Policies/9Interventionareas_en.cfm (accessed 19 July)
Box 1: 3C-related EU policy commitments since 2004, when the 3C evaluation initiative was launched

2) Several MDG 8 reports of EU member states and institutions (since 2005)
3) The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (February 2005)
4) The European Commission’s MDG package (May 2005)
5) Council Conclusions on PCD (May 2005; April 2006)
6) The European Consensus on Development (November 2005)
7) Nordic+ Group joint action plan on Harmonisation (March 2006)
8) EC Communication to the Council: EU Aid: Delivering more, better and faster (March 2006)
9) Council Conclusions related to PCD and Division of Labour (October 2006)
10) The Tanzanian Joint Assistance Strategy (November 2006)
11) Draft EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (February 2007)
12) Council Conclusions on the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (May 2007)
13) Council Conclusions relating to the 3cs and the first EU biennial report on PCD (November 2007)

2.2 Pressure for policy change

“The pressures that create and impact policies at the national level are many and complex, but at the level of the EU those complexities are compounded. Influences on the policy process are both internal and external to the EU institutions, formal and informal, predictable and unpredictable, anticipated and opportunistic, and structured and unstructured” (McCormick, 2005)

Within the European Union, the above efforts are placed within an extremely complex policy environment that directly affects the course of development policy management, implementation and impact. In line with McCormick (2005), we note at least nine types of influence on policy process that, due to their force or the lack of it, seem particularly relevant to the situations considered in this synthesis paper:

- Treaty obligations: treaties outline the general goals and principles of European integration, as well as some of the more specific tasks of the EU institutions; such broad and often ambiguous statements need to be turned into specific actions, often in the form of new national policies, laws, or regulations.
- Pressure to harmonise national laws and policies, in order to avoid undue economic or social differences between the member states.
- Pressure from EU institutions, the Council, the European Parliament or the European Commission, to enhance their role in development policy.
- Peer group pressure and/or requirements of international agreements and negotiations, within the UN system, International Financial Institutions, WTO, OECD/DAC, G8, etc.
- Initiatives by individual national leaders, groups of Member States.
- The pressure of public opinion, global and NGO initiatives.
- Pressure from partner countries, and multilateral partner country initiatives such as NEPAD.
- External pressure, caused by problems in other parts of the world, such as conflict, poverty, migration flows.
- Emergencies or crises, both internal and external.

Recognising that the implementation of policy in the European Union is complex, embedded in the continuously evolving political relationships between Member States in a recently enlarged community and hence, driven by multiple, often conflicting interests, this synthesis will assume a long-term perspective towards analysing the 3C efforts made and their impact on policy and operations. As we have seen above, the application of precepts of EU policy cannot be seen as a simple, linear and top-down process. Within the European Union, and in particular on issues where competencies have not been clearly defined from the start, ‘enhanced cooperation’, characterised by the European Commission and the Member States (or a group of Member States) taking the initiative, may precede a more formal EU-wide policy integration process.

### 2.3 Institutional coordination, a prerequisite

With the above, long term process-oriented perspective in mind, it is evident that moving towards the application of particular precepts of policy in such a complex environment requires some form of institutional coordination, formal or informal, between the relevant parties at different levels. Levels of coordination may be within the EU; with international partners, civil society or between donors in partner countries; or it may address a region, a sector or sub-sector. Coordination could also focus on different priorities, address different themes and be done with different degrees of intensity.

Typically, a coordination process directed towards improving aid effectiveness might start by sharing information and data and then, increasingly move towards identifying issues of common interest, setting a joint agenda, the exchange of good practices and joint decision-making. After that, it may move further towards joint evaluation and monitoring, joint learning, harmonisation of procedures and perhaps, the setting of new standards.4

Such an institutional coordination process needs to be managed; it doesn't generally occur spontaneously, even if mostly informal. It requires not only the political will of the participants to proceed, but also the institutional structures and mechanisms to carry it.

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through. It needs adequate financial and human resources to operate properly and knowledge and information systems to ensure adequate information availability, flows, and storage, as well as to ensure the integrity of the information used.\textsuperscript{5}

Therefore we may state that, similar to what was found during preparatory studies on promoting policy coherence within the European Union, institutional coordination needs at least two additional, mutually reinforcing efforts to be successful:\textsuperscript{6}

– Political commitment on the part of the relevant stakeholders; with leadership and clearly defined policy objectives, priorities and criteria for assessing progress.
– Adequate analytical capacity; effective systems for monitoring, evaluating impact; adequate capacity for generating, sharing and processing relevant information and for developing and implementing common standards.

Policy coherence and complementarity then become outcomes of good institutional coordination practices between EU policy actors. Given the nature of policy coherence as a compromise between often conflicting policy interests, a further distinction can be made between intended and unintended incoherence in policy-making or implementation. Intended incoherence is generally the result of a compromise in the context of a particularly complex political situation.

Besides, the notion of complementarity there is the question of direction. Contrary to what happens, for example, in EU agricultural or competition policy, the Community has no exclusive competence in the field of development cooperation.\textsuperscript{7} So, who has to be complementary to whom? Is it up to the Community to complement the activities of the Member States, or the other way around? Another related issue is the equal partnership between the Commission and Member States, and reciprocal involvement in the development of their respective policies.

2.4 Underlying questions and evidence available

Given the evolving nature of political relationships in the European Union and the complexities of policy processes within the European Union, it was clear from the start that the 3C evaluations would address relatively recent events whose impact could not be expected to have fully matured. Therefore, the 3C Task Force decided to turn the process by which the different policy actors are implementing the 3C requirements into part of the assessment.

\textsuperscript{5} Idem.
\textsuperscript{7} In this sense, complementarity is related to but differs from the concept of ‘subsidiarity’, which refers to allocation of competence and decision-making at the most appropriate level.
Therefore, while each of the evaluations was designed to meet the requirements of its particular subject and field of application, each also included a number of specific process-oriented questions:

- What steps did relevant actors take, individually or jointly, to improve coherence, complementarity and/or coordination?
- Which, if any, enabling mechanisms and/or frameworks were used or put into place? And for what purpose?
- What results were achieved, intentionally or unintentionally? Why, and why not?
- What constraints or opportunities did the actors encounter while implementing their actions/mechanisms? How did they deal with these?

With respect to policy coherence emphasis was given to the efforts made by governing bodies of individual EU Member States and Institutions to promote policy coherence for development (PCD), on the one hand, and coherence between the application of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Development Policy in the use of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, on the other.

The 3C Task Force decided to address complementarity at three different levels. How do EU Member States and Institutions work towards complementarity at the EU-wide level, at the partner country level, and at local level within one partner country? Chapter 3 lists the main overall findings (see table 2 below).

Section 3.1 presents and discusses the main findings of the study on The EU Institutions’ and Member States’ Mechanisms for Promoting Policy Coherence for Development, which assessed PCD in which institutional coordination is required at the level of individual Member States and European institutions.

Section 3.2 discusses the findings of the studies on Coordination of Trade Capacity Building, and on Coordination and Complementarity in Humanitarian Assistance. These studies were done to provide insight into institutional coordination processes to work towards achieving coordination and complementarity across EU Member States and Institutions at headquarter level, and, to a lesser degree, at the partner country level. Wherever possible these also addressed some aspects of EU policy coherence.

Section 3.3 presents the findings on coherence and complementarity at partner country level. Findings from the evaluation of Coordination on Trade Capacity Building were added to this level too. The Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement addresses coordination between EU Member States and the Commission and coherence between CFSP and development policies, in dealing with EU/partner country consultations that may lead to EU sanctions. The study Evaluating Coordination and Complementarity of Country Strategy Papers with National Development Priorities focuses on coordination
to achieve complementarity and alignment with partner countries’ development strategies.

**Table 2: Evaluating EU coordination at three levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ch</th>
<th>EU Coordination</th>
<th>Compl</th>
<th>Coherence</th>
<th>Title of evaluation study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Within MS or Inst.</td>
<td>Government/Institution</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Across MS and Inst.</td>
<td>HQ level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Across MS and Inst.</td>
<td>Partner country level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(†)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>A³</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 A number of elements related to coherence between Trade and Development policies and their implementation are covered in this study.

9 The type of coherence that this evaluation looked into is the coherence of Country Strategy Papers with national development plans, which is also referred to as ‘alignment’.
3 Main findings of the evaluation studies

3.1 EU Member States’ and Institutions’ efforts towards greater policy coherence for development (PCD)

One of the six evaluations focused exclusively on the efforts of the EU Member States and Institutions towards improving policy coherence for development. This evaluation was led by France, and supported by Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Europe-Aid. The study focused solely on what a preparatory Scoping Study had identified as ‘intra-governmental coherence’. This type of coherence refers to the process of creating coherence across all policies and actions at national level with the development policy of the government in question. In the context of this evaluation, this included not only mechanisms established by the EU Member States to promote PCD in their own policy, but also mechanisms that had been established within the EU Institutions.

The evaluation shows that institutional coordination efforts aimed at improving policy coherence for development (PCD) within the governments of EU Member States and Institutions are increasing. Some five years after signing the Maastricht Treaty, Member States tentatively began making official statements about putting the commitment on PCD into practice. From 1997 EU Member States and Institutions started adopting distinct policy statements on PCD and designing adjustments to their institutional infrastructure to effectively promote it. Triggered by initiatives by individual and groups of Member States, the European Commission, DAC Peer Reviews and, since 2003, led by successive EU Presidency initiatives, Member States have increased their efforts. “By 2006, 21 Member States had issued policy statements on PCD, while only 14 have begun to translate these statements into concrete actions”.

It is apparent that the Nordic+ Group – Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom – have been most active and score well above average in terms of well-defined policies and institutional measures taken. However, the steps taken by all governments and institutions in establishing operational PCD mechanisms have generally been pragmatic, fitting in with established ways of doing things in each particular governmental context. The range of different options chosen by governments is quite impressive, with mechanisms tailor-made to fit specific governance systems within the European Union. This pragmatism has led to different solutions to
similar problems, each of them seemingly well adapted to national circumstances. This has created a reservoir of practical experience within the European Union that could be used to accelerate progress.

However, a main conclusion of the study is that some 15 years after the Maastricht Treaty, progress remains slow and fairly tentative and that so far, only limited evidence could be found of clear positive results in terms of policy change and greater levels of policy coherence for development (two promising examples of impacts are given in the box below). This can be concluded from the fact that (1) working experience with many mechanisms is still relatively recent; (2) lack of clarity remains on what type of impact is sought through a particular mechanism in terms of promoting PCD; (3) there is often still a lack of clarity about the involvement and roles of different actors – ministries, civil society, private sector, parliaments, etc. – and the modus operandi of the mechanisms; (4) little attention is paid to monitoring and evaluation; and (5) as yet there is limited sense of longer term planning and continuity over time.

Box 2: Impacts of PCD mechanisms, two examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The German Programme of Action 2015:</th>
<th>The Finnish Development Policy Committee:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some examples of how the mechanism has contributed to the promotion of PCD include:</td>
<td>It was found that the DPC’s activities make an important contribution to the debate on coherence in government circles and the wider development sector in Helsinki and progress is certainly being made in this area. Members were able to point to policies in other sectors (e.g. trade, defence, migration) where input by the committee had brought about policy change. This was also confirmed by government officials in different departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) In 2001, the inter-departmental Committee on export guarantees adopted guidelines on the ecological, social and development issues in the allocation of government export credit insurance;</td>
<td>Some government officials felt the committee had a good sense of timing and chose the right topics, which clearly increased its effectiveness. The view was also expressed that the committee was open and transparent in its work and by organising seminars and meetings and publishing articles in the media was good at reaching a wider public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Successful campaign against protectionism on sugar which built on alliances at national and international levels;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) The campaign on fair trade was a successful collaboration between three ministries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another outcome is a staff exchange programme between different ministries in Germany. The exchange programme has helped to integrate the perception of all ministries involved and to find practical means of promoting coherence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Evaluation of EU Mechanisms promoting Policy Coherence for Development

Another main conclusion is that the promotion of PCD requires not just one or a few measures, but the installation of a range of complementary mechanisms that mutually reinforce one another. Such a ‘PCD system’ includes, besides unambiguous policy statements, adequate institutional and administrative coordination mechanisms within the government, and knowledge and assessment mechanisms that provide access to exter-
nal knowledge and information as well as help in identifying and analysing particular coherence dossiers. Furthermore, the study underlines the importance of informal links with the broader group of stakeholders and the influence of the political and social context in taking PCD forward.

Coordination efforts that aim at policy coherence for development seem to encounter ‘natural’ limits in the sense that each specific dossier and each specific case, are subject to a weighting of diverging political interests and policy concerns, either by individual departments within a Member State or EU Institution, or by individual Member States and Institutions within an EU stakeholder group. As a result, effective political leadership and continued broad political support are of the utmost importance to sustain the drive towards policy coherence, as is the integration of specific mechanisms to promote policy coherence for development in existing governance structures and procedures. Nevertheless, final decisions do not always reflect a predominant concern with development objectives, as in Policy Coherence for Development. Given the ‘shared

The data on explicit references to PCD is based on the official publication dates of policy statements by EU Member States and Institutions. The data on when PCD was operationalised and put into practice is based on information from officials for the Country Profiles, as well as on document research.
competence’ on development within the European Union this may tempt individual Member States to ‘step out of line’.

The evaluation study further concluded that in quite a lot of Member States, lack of consistency in the national programme for development commitment is an obstacle that still needs to be overcome before effective action towards promoting PCD can be made. This is why some of the mechanisms that were studied in detail during the evaluation actually prioritised improving ODA consistency above embarking on the road to further promote PCD.

The study also underlines that the sustainability of the drive for greater policy coherence for development still depends very much on the continued political commitment of EU Institutions and the governments of the EU Member States. It notes the importance of broad civil and cross-party political support to the long-term success of PCD. To ensure the creation and consolidation of such broad political support, the evaluation team stresses the need for strategies to strengthen and maintain political support for PCD through involving parliaments, civil society, academia and the media.

To conclude this section on Policy Coherence for Development, the findings can be summarised as follows:

- There is increasing recognition of the importance of achieving greater policy coherence for development (PCD). This has led to a new phase in the promotion of PCD that can be described as largely experimental. In close collaboration with the European Institutions, several consecutive EU Presidencies have kept the topic on the agenda which has resulted in EU level decisions to further the issue of PCD.

- A reservoir of practical experience has been created within the EU on how to tackle PCD in a context-sensitive manner, to provide ‘food for thought’ for further consideration by other Member States and EU institutions.³ A reservoir of practical experience is available on how PCD can be promoted in such a way that specific elements of the institutional architecture of the Member State or Institution in question are respected, thereby recognising the diversity and complexities of European integration.

- However, many Member States have taken a rather piecemeal approach in their practical measures to promote PCD. A more systematic approach, combining mutually reinforcing mechanisms of different types is needed together with a more strategic long-term approach to ensuring cross-party political support.

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² Linked to this point, it was noted in the evaluation that progress is increasingly being made on covering PCD in evaluations of development assistance. Examples include the evaluation of PCD in the EU Council, which was done by the Centre for European Policy Studies in 2006, as well as the evaluation of the Dutch Policy Coherence unit that was completed in 2005.

³ ‘Context-sensitive’ approach refers to the promotion of PCD in such a way that specific elements of the institutional architecture of the Member State or Institution in question are respected, thereby recognising diversity and complexities of European integration.
Promoting PCD remains a work-in-progress, requiring continuing political support at the highest possible level within the European Institutions’ and the Member States’ governing bodies, both to bring about and ensure the long-term impact of the measures taken. This effort needs to be backed by a strategy to maintain a broad-based and sufficient level of political support.

3.2 EU Member States’ and Institutions’ coordination for Trade Capacity Building and Humanitarian Assistance

Two of the six evaluation studies gathered new and important evidence relating to EU coordination efforts at the headquarter level, with a specific focus on the following two topics:

- **Support to Trade Capacity Building**: the evaluation of ‘Coordination of Trade Capacity Building in Partner Countries’, which was led by EuropeAid and supported by Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom;
- **EU Humanitarian Assistance**: the evaluation of DG ECHO, with input from France, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The evaluation on Trade Capacity Building (TCB) concluded that EU donors active in the provision of TCB have all put considerable effort into improving their internal coordination mechanisms and, in particular, the level of understanding and communication between trade and development specialists. As a result internal coordination of services dealing with trade-related issues in the Member States and Commission administrations has improved, but awareness of TCB issues, mutual understanding and the capacity to address their complexity remain limited.

Decisions made by most Member States on how to address TCB remain primarily in line with priorities established in their own headquarters. This results in diverging views between the Commission and several Member States on how the coordination of TCB should be organised at headquarter level. While a wide agreement exists on the overall emphasis on integration into world trade and regional integration, views on liberalisation differ with regard to specific dossiers (e.g. fisheries, sugar) and on the focus of interventions (i.e. growth versus poverty reduction).

Coordination efforts for TCB at headquarter level (i.e. in Brussels, in the Member State capitals and in the Member State and Commission representations in Geneva) involve formal and informal mechanisms. These have brought about improved sharing of information on ongoing activities, the exchange of ideas and pooling of opinions and have facilitated the introduction of new Member States into TCB issues. The results of these coordination efforts have, however, been limited or negligible in terms of transfer of information on planned activities, sharing of experience, development of com-
mon practices, distribution of responsibilities or preparation of procedures for EU participation in multilateral activities.

The TCB evaluation also argued that the trade capacity of a partner country or region requires a systematic approach to coordination. This systematic approach is needed as trade capacity building addresses a multiplicity of interrelated policies and activities that aim to support the goals of the strategy on reducing poverty and the mainstreaming of this strategy in the national development plan. For trade capacity assistance to be successful, actions need to be implemented simultaneously and in a balanced way in each of the four ‘pillars’: (1) trade policy, (2) trade-supportive institutional and regulatory frameworks, (3) capacity to negotiate profitable engagement in the Multilateral Trading System, and (4) development of a trade-oriented competitive productive base. The evaluation team argues that each of these four ‘pillars’ is an indispensable building block for trade capacity building, and that none will be sufficient if one of the others is missing.

In practice most active coordination takes place informally, without leading specifically to common positions, the numerous discussions and exchanges of views help gradually to build consensus on new directions and strengthen efforts that are eventually reflected in official positions. Such ‘enhanced cooperation’ seems generally in line with the Member States’ view of TCB-related coordination: an occasion to lobby for the adoption of Community policy positions that are as close as possible to their own. The European Commission holds a different view: it feels that intra-EU coordination needs to lead to the adoption of common approaches.

The effects of TCB-related coordination efforts are disappointing in terms of achieving greater coherence and complementarity. Misunderstandings between trade and development specialists continue to affect collaboration; coordination on complex issues such as Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary measures (SPS) remains imperfect; working groups on different sector or thematic areas related to development and trade often fail to coordinate. The main reason for this seems to be the absence of preliminary consensus on coordinating beyond information sharing. Another is that lack of formality and transparency of TCB coordination fora such as the Joint Expert Group negatively affects its potential for impact. In particular, Member States felt that the lack of formal written records limits the capacity of the Group to influence decisions and debates in other more formal mechanisms.

The evaluation also concludes that most coordination takes place at in-country and regional level, both levels are critical because of the necessary involvement of the partner. At these levels, procedures such as the Integrated Framework and newly developed funding methods, such as the adoption by the Commission of Contribution Agreements to fund regional institutions, can offer opportunities for improved internal and intra-EU coordination.
Box 4: The 3Cs and the European humanitarian tradition

The executive summary of the evaluation of DG ECHO prominently features the ‘specific legal basis’ of the Directorate General, which is ‘... subject to the principles of international humanitarian laws, namely that the aid is administered with impartiality, non-discrimination and neutrality’ (DG ECHO 2006: 2).

The DG ECHO evaluation report considers this practice to be consistent with the ‘European humanitarian tradition of needs driven implementation’, also with reference to the non-ratified constitutional treaty in which this is described (DG ECHO 2006: 4). The evaluation team concludes that this makes it difficult for the Directorate General to coordinate its actions with others, and to harmonise its actions with developing countries’ needs and strategies.

For example, in the context of the coordination with DG DEV, the report mentions that ‘... DG DEV activities are based on the EU/ACP agreement that delegates powers of decision to the ACP national governments, while DG ECHO acts independently and impartially. This in reality limits the possibilities of complementarity, because of the differing interests.”

Source: Coordination and Complementarity in Humanitarian Assistance (DG ECHO)

With respect to Humanitarian Assistance, the evaluation observes that DG ECHO has taken a number of initiatives to improve coordination and the exchange of information with Member States. A system of information on humanitarian aid spending has been developed – the 14-point system, as it is known. The Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC) has been created to ‘... discuss guidelines presented by the Commission for humanitarian aid.” This is the only formal activity at EU level that brings together the 25 EU Member States and the Commission in the field of humanitarian aid activities.

The evaluation study on Humanitarian Aid concludes that it is fragmented between 26 players and that coordination is limited to exchange of information only. It also underlines that with respect to humanitarian aid policy and operations, there is no formal coordination between the EU Member States and the Commission. Inside the Commission too, coordination on humanitarian aid is limited. The lack of coordination, cooperation and co-decision making was found to have a negative impact on the efficiency of humanitarian aid, and the evaluation team felt that this could suggest that national priorities and visibility were considered more important than effective and coordinated EU humanitarian assistance.

The evaluation further noted that EU Member State officials on humanitarian aid were fully satisfied with the work that DG ECHO does, and quoted one of them as saying that ‘We have to thank God that DG ECHO exists, because DG ECHO takes care of the forgotten crises in the world’ (DG ECHO 2006: 17). The evaluation team concluded that DG ECHO’s aid to ‘less visible and unattractive forgotten crises’ makes it possible for bilateral humanitarian assistance to work in the more visible and political crises that are in line with

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their political priorities. In other words, the evaluation observed a lack of interest or incentive between the different EU humanitarian actors to join forces to respond to humanitarian crises in the world.

It also states that coherence on humanitarian aid within the European Commission is in need of improvement. Currently, five Directorate-Generals deal with activities that may fall within the realm of humanitarian aid or impact on it – DG ECHO, DG DEV, DG AIDCO, DG RELEX, DG ENV. A scrutiny of coordination between them identifies undefined ‘grey zones’, as well as gaps in terms of complementarity and coherence.

In conclusion the main findings on EU coordination at headquarter level can be summarised as follows:

- Headquarter level coordination efforts on Trade Capacity Building among EU donors have been growing but the impact on coherence and complementarity has been disappointing so far. The main reason for this seems to be a lack of consensus on the relevance of developing a common European approach by taking EU-level coordinating beyond information sharing.
- Lack of coordination, complementarity and coherence in EU humanitarian aid has a negative impact on its efficiency and diminishes the impact of the EU in global humanitarian aid policy and operations. The study raises the point whether in this case ‘intended incoherence’ may be linked to the long-established ‘European humanitarian tradition of needs driven implementation’.
- Although institutional coordination aims not only at complementarity between different Member States and the European Commission but also at greater policy coherence between different policy areas or departments within one Member State or Institution, sharing views and information alone does not produce satisfactory results.
- Both studies indicated that there are various institutional coordination mechanisms, such as committees and joint planning frameworks which – if more formally mandated and used – offer a potential for moving EU-level coordination beyond mere information exchange.

3.3 EU Member States’ and Institutions’ coordination at partner country level: political consultation, strategic alignment and local development

Three of the six evaluations in this series gathered important and new evidence on EU coordination at the level of partner countries, on the following three issues:

- Political consultation: the study on the application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, led by the Netherlands and supported by France, Belgium and the United Kingdom;
– **Strategic alignment**: the study on coordination and complementarity of Country Strategy Papers with National Development Plans, led by the United Kingdom and supported by the European Commission, Belgium and Ireland;
– **Local development**: the study on coordination and complementarity of EU assistance to local development led by Sweden and supported by Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland and the Netherlands.

Besides comprehensive desk studies that covered a vast number of policy documents relating to these three issues, field studies collected further location-specific insights on EU ambitions and performance:
– **Political consultation**: Fiji, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau;
– **Strategic alignment**: Nicaragua, Zambia, Tanzania;
– **Local development**: Guatemala, Indonesia, Mozambique, South-Africa.

| Box 5: **Selected quotes on coordination and complementarity towards partner countries** |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| “Fundamentally, it comes down to this: it is essentially impossible to coordinate in the absence of a common goal.” | “For a Union, they certainly don’t approach us in a unified manner” |
| EU Head of Aid | Director of a donor coordination body in a recipient country |
| “When a donor finds another donor already doing a related project in an area where it wanted to work, it will withdraw from going further with its proposal instead of collaborating.” | “The combined efforts of all the EU donors could be much greater than the sum of the individual interventions. As it is, the combined efforts of EU donors are not recognized as having a critical mass sufficient enough to enable strategic transformation, only tactical interventions.” |
| Provincial Governor | Senior IFI representative |

Source: Coordination and Complementarity of Assistance for Local Development

To begin with the last issue, the key finding of the study on EU assistance to local development is that the EU has a “… remarkably low level of performance” when it comes to coordinating and working together. The study observed that coordination of EU (ODA) interests at the local level is not valued by the EU actors, even if the local government does value them. Where the Commission and/or Member States seek to coordinate, they tend to favour non-EU frameworks for guiding joint efforts. Similar conclusions were drawn in both the Country Strategy Paper and the Trade Capacity Building evaluation. In the case of the latter study, it was concluded that, at the partner country level, no particular benefits were expected from specific EU coordination on TCB, as opposed to the already established multi-lateral fora.

Coordination in all of the aforementioned fora is further impaired by the fact that many Member States and the Commission continue to adhere to centralised decision-making processes with respect to in-country planning and programming. Consequently,
coordination procedures and systems in use between EU actors are mostly geared towards information exchange rather than making joint decisions and a systematic framing of follow-up action. The following box provides an example of some of the gaps observed between ambitions and practice, gaps which mainly result from a lack of decision-making authority at local level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6: Coordinated efforts: a gap between ambition and practice?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“EU donors and/or the GoN [Government of Nicaragua] have not created coordination management instruments and systems, in spite of the important value of donor funding provided to Nicaragua. Some Member States observed that there was a notable absence of such mechanisms when there was an urgent need to better manage the combined programmes in order to be more effective. They cited many causes for this absence but mostly referred to unclear or confusing objectives at the EU level, their lack of delegated authority and the importance of (some of) their headquarters in overall management decision making.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Coordination and Complementarity of Assistance for Local Development, Annexes: 152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the main findings of the Country Strategy Paper evaluation is that the strategy documents do not encourage and can even obstruct progress on the 2Cs. CSPs often run over long periods of time and donor priorities can only be formally changed when new ones are drawn up. Headquarters often do not allow sufficient flexibility to their field colleagues to work out complementarity-related issues with their partners. The South African case study for the Local Development evaluation also found that donors generally do not see their CPS as a collaborative effort where other donors actively participate in their development.\(^5\) Besides the lack of authority to decide at the local level, or perhaps partly as a result of this, complementarity is often regarded in a narrow way, as avoiding duplication and dividing country districts between donors. This narrow understanding of complementarity was also systematically found in the Local Development evaluation.

Where in-country coordination between EU donors and alignment with partner country development objectives is aimed at, current management systems and practices are judged as mostly inadequate. Coordination efforts rarely go beyond the sharing of views and information and, sometimes, best practices. In-country, EU-level coordination management hardly ever includes joint decision-making, planning, implementation and evaluation of joint programming frameworks. Information is also exchanged in a rather raw form; many do not take responsibility for improving the quality and efficiency of their communication. Although information is exchanged between EU Member States, this often happens within smaller groups of Member States. As the data in the following box shows, some donors may not be very well informed about what their EU colleagues are doing. Furthermore, due to the many sectors in which

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\(^5\) Although not addressed by this study, it should be noted that in more recent years, some changes have taken place that have slightly improved the flexibility of CSPs. Similarly, EC devolution has also better equipped its administration to respond to local needs.
the EU Member States and the Commission are commonly engaged in, there may only be a very limited number of donor representatives at the partner country level with a complete overview and grasp of the full set of EU aid interventions.

**Box 7: Do EU Member States really know what their colleagues are doing?**

The Nicaragua field study report identified that not all EU Member States have ‘full knowledge’ when it comes to the CSPs of their fellow Member States. The report concluded that EU Member States coordinate “… primarily with donors with whom they have successfully cooperated in the past, or with whom there are good relations at the personal and political level.”

As people tend to specialise and participate in coordination at the sector or sub-sector level, only a tiny minority of EU officials working in a developing country have an overview of current coordination practices. The rest may often not be informed at all. This was illustrated in the case of Spain: “With the exception of the EC, Spain has not been consulted in connection with the formulation of other donors’ CSPs. Occasionally the AECI team receives other donors’ CSPs – but not all – for information. As a consequence, it has little idea of what some of the other donors, even European, are doing.”

Furthermore, the report observed that the information which is shared between EU Member States is often exchanged ‘ex-post’, that is, after formal decisions have already taken place.


Both the Local Development and the Country Strategy Paper evaluation studies furthermore concluded that through this poor performance of EU coordination at partner country levels, substantial benefits and opportunities to increase the effectiveness of aid are left unexploited. It is at this level that most of the direct dialogue between donors and the partner country take place; where the relevance and appropriateness of aid can be guaranteed; where conditions for ownership can be realised; where partnerships can be formed and shaped through regular policy dialogue; and where ‘antennas’ are most sensitive and can help to identify needs and changed priorities in time. The evaluation of the application of Article 96 led to similar findings, resulting in the conclusion that the “… point of gravity in the decision-making has been in Brussels and the EU capitals, which is unjustified, given that the capacity to assess the feasibility of using Article 96 to affect the situation is strongest at the local level.”

The following box presents a clear example from Zambia of the positive effects of entrusting more power and decision-making to the local level, and further argues why the local level would be the most appropriate and effective domain for decisions relating to EU complementarity and alignment to be taken. Besides the Zambian case illustrated here, the Tanzanian field study for the CSP evaluation – which describes how the Tanzanian government takes the lead in coordinating donors in the context of the Joint Assistance Strategy – describes a variety of donor responses to this new situation: while some EU donors feel that Country Strategy Papers are no longer required in such a
situation, others rather feel that the purpose of these documents will evolve in line with the changing context.

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**Box 8: Partner countries can facilitate further progress on EU complementarity**

“The present JASZ [Zambian Joint Assistance Strategy] process is the most promising attempt to date to promote – among other things – complementarity. It seems that without Government being in a position to take a leading role, the avenue towards significantly more complementarity will be full of ‘pot-holes’. Only a strong partner country government, GRZ [Government of Zambia], that can enforce its own priorities and effectively direct the donor funds to where it will be most effective in the overall picture, will have a chance to improve complementarity. Any individual donor, or the group of donors, tends to have too strong individual interests to take this role.”


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Furthermore, the Country Strategy Paper evaluation shows that enhanced cooperation between EU Member States, the Commission and the partner countries has been emerging in the context of the increased use of General and Sector Budget Support (see also box 9 below). The increased use of this form of aid has led to the establishment of Aid Partner Groups (APGs) and Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) processes in various developing countries.

Some of the studies however also showed that the capacity of partner countries needs to be further developed before such effective leadership can be taken. The Local Development report quoted the director of a central planning agency, who reported: “The donors may have their own priorities, but we have not been very good at getting them to coordinate their efforts around our priorities either.” The field report of the Indonesian case mentioned that donors find it difficult to know where to go for direction and policy, and they do not have a clear picture as to who is really leading the nation’s response in terms of development assistance. In contrast, the South African government’s National Treasury has put in place the International Development Co-operation (IDC) unit to provide a focus for cooperation efforts with donors. However, on a more operational level, no mechanisms have yet been put in place by the South-African government or the development partners to move from information exchange and formal exchanges around documents and decisions made, to joint-decision making.
The enhanced cooperation between donors and partner countries that was observed in the CSP evaluation was also underlined in the joint evaluation of General Budget Support, which was finalised in May 2006.

The evaluation concluded that in all the seven case study countries, General Budget Support had contributed to greater policy alignment of aid. Furthermore, in all cases it was found that GBS has had a positive effect on donor harmonisation. The study also made note of an ‘integrative effect’ of the use of GBS, as the coordination forums and mechanisms employed around budget support also ‘... engage other donors and help to ensure complementarity among different modalities.’ (final report, 41 - 43).


A clear contrast with the conclusions from the three evaluations referred to in this section is provided by the findings of the evaluation of the application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. In the case of the dialogue and consultation processes relating to this agreement, there are relatively clear regulations about the necessary steps to be taken in close consultation with those Member States that have interests in the ACP country under scrutiny, under the coordinating role of the European Commission. In the study, several factors were identified that explained the generally good performance that was reported on in the case studies, including:

- A clear joint action framework that explains which steps will be taken when, and by whom;
- Good leadership by the European Commission, which also ensured that information was made available to all involved European actors to inform shared decisions;
- Good cooperation with partner country diplomats in many cases;
- Consistent use of Article 96, particularly in cases of a coup d’état;
- Different and relatively unambiguous roles of the Commission, Council and Member States;
- The political role of the Commission, which will be hesitant to issue a proposal if Member States are divided on the appropriateness of using Article 96 in a particular case.

However, the evaluation study also put forward different examples of EU Member States which, despite the relative clarity and structure of this process:

- Decided to bypass the EU by endorsing decisions made in other multilateral fora;
- Increased bilateral ODA when EDF was frozen, thus compromising the effect of the measures that had been agreed;
- Inability to broker consensus on the appropriateness of using the Article between headquarters and in-country representatives;

6 The seven case studies were Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam.
The following conclusions emerge from this section on coordination towards partner countries:

- So far, constraints seem to outnumber incentives in the quest for more EU coordination and complementarity at partner country and local levels. Coordination mechanisms often lack an explicit, formal and operationally focused mandate; are often limited to an exchange of views, knowledge and information between relevant parties rather than to joint assessment and decision-making that is binding on all the parties involved.

- The evaluations underline that there is no agreement among the EU Member States and Institutions on what complementarity means and even less on what it requires in practice. This is partly related to the lack of decision-making power by EU actors at the partner country level.

- In the case of in-country and local coordination to achieve greater complementarity and alignment among EU donors, over-emphasis on just the exchange of information and views and a lack of decisions which are binding on all, may make coordination efforts rather costly and yet fail to deliver on results. Headquarters often do not allow sufficient flexibility to their colleagues in the field to be able to work out complementarity-related issues with their partners.

- Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) do not stimulate and may even obstruct progress on the 2Cs, since donor priorities can only be formally changed when new strategy papers are drawn up. This situation is improving now that different Member States and the Commission are involved in developing more flexible planning and joint-planning arrangements.

- The evaluations, however, identified various good examples of more flexible individual and joint arrangements, both EU and non-EU, that provide sufficient flexibility for coordination results to be attained. These examples – which include coordination within the framework of a PRSP; General Budget Support; Integrated Frameworks for Trade Capacity Building; the use of ‘Minimal Country Strategy Papers’ by some Member States and Strategic Frameworks for managing development assistance in use by some partner countries – are currently known to all EU development actors and partner countries. These elements of good practice could thus be more widely shared to inspire further positive changes.

### 3.4 Common findings from the six studies on EU coordination

A number of common elements seem to stand out in all the studies:

The importance of **strong and sustained political leadership** at the highest level; the evaluation studies illustrate that achieving institutional coordination for improving policy coherence and complementarity is a long-term political process that requires from all parties involved a basic consensus and the political will to move forward. In the case of
policy coherence for development in particular, broad cross-party support at national level seems to be of the utmost importance in sustaining the process over time.

All the studies identify specific mechanisms that have been earmarked or set up specifically to improve institutional coordination inside the European Union, either directed at increased policy coherence or more complementarity, or both. Generally, these mechanisms have been observed to improve the exchange of ideas; the sharing of information on activities, and the introduction of less informed political actors to new, complex dossiers. It has also contributed to a – mostly informal – exchange of opinions between EU Institutions and Member States which may have contributed to a greater awareness and understanding of views on key development issues between different EU policy actors.

However, institutional coordination on development-related issues within the European Union rarely moves beyond the sharing of views and information. Most studies also indicated that institutional coordination without identifying issues of common interest, setting joint agendas, exchanging good practices, and without moving towards joint decision-making, task division, joint monitoring and evaluation, and harmonising procedures, generally produce limited benefits in terms of policy coherence and complementarity.

The reasons put forward for not moving beyond information exchange seem to be of two kinds:

– The first is that there is often a lack of consensus that coordination at European Union level around development-related dossiers adds value to what is already done within the donor community as a whole, both among European Institutions and Member States, and between different policy departments within the relevant ministries or DGs;

– The second is that Member States continue to favour their own priorities and policies when taking a position on specific development-related dossiers. The precise reasoning and impact of these positions, of course, differs from one dossier to another, but it could be argued that this attitude is generally favoured by the fact that development cooperation is a shared competence between the Community and the Member States.

Mechanisms intended to improve institutional coordination generally address coordination at different levels simultaneously – multilateral level; EU level between EU Institutions and Member States; and national level, within a Member State or within a partner country. Depending on the level, actual coordination processes involve different stakeholders, different objectives, different mechanisms and instruments and, different degrees of complexity. This makes institutional coordination within the European Union complex and time-consuming. Communication for coordination at different
levels is also often not adequately organised, creating barriers to the use of context-specific information in making coordinated decisions.

The evaluation studies point out that, given the relatively recent installation of many of the institutional coordination mechanisms that were studied, specific outcomes of coordination efforts were difficult to establish. Often the operation and short-term effects on inter-institutional coordination could be traced, but not as yet the expected longer term impact in terms of greater EU policy coherence and complementarity. However, the available evidence suggests that, in general, the effectiveness and sustainability of coordination initiatives very much depend on the political commitment of the different policy actors involved; on a well-defined, formal mandate; and on keeping a close watch to identify and monitor the expected benefits from coordination.

With some notable exceptions, monitoring and evaluating the impact of inter-institutional coordination on policy coherence and complementarity does not yet receive a high priority from the EU Institutions and Member States. This lack of attention to measuring impact compounds the lack of visibility of results, while at the same time the results of monitoring and evaluating this performance could inform further action and improvements and emphasise the added value of increasing the complementarity of EU aid and PCD. It further underscores the importance and the potential impact of promoting the exchange of good practices between EU Member States and Institutions.

Areas for improvement which emerge from the main findings of the evaluations

The evaluations point out a number of recurring challenges for improving institutional coordination, at each level and for each purpose:

- The need to develop a basic consensus on the expected benefits and added value of EU level institutional coordination vis-à-vis other levels of international donor coordination – multi-lateral, international or alliances within the EU; AND on the relationship between the two.
- The need to strengthen partner country capacity and South-South learning on the management of ODA, and to strengthen existing fora for EU-partner country policy dialogue;
- The need to strengthen EU institutional capacity for harmonisation and alignment, including administrative and procedural reforms that allow for sufficient delegation of responsibility and flexibility at the partner country level;
- The need for a more systematic approach towards enhancing coordination, complementarity and coherence at each level and a more strategic approach towards ensuring cross-party political support.
- The need to develop and make more systematic use of joint implementation, monitoring and evaluation frameworks;
At the same time, the evaluations point out that in each of these areas some Member States and/or the European Commission have gained significant experience within either EU or non-EU frameworks; these areas could provide the backbone for the accelerated exchange of good practices on institutional coordination among EU Member States and Institutions.

Two general conclusions emerge from the common findings of the three clusters of evaluation findings presented in this section with regard to EU development policies and operations:

– Firstly, the findings indicate that inadequate EU coordination, complementarity and coherence reduces the impact of the European Union’s development and humanitarian aid efforts and places unnecessarily high demands on developing countries’ human and financial resources.

– Secondly, the findings point out a lack of practical consensus; incomplete efforts and the need for continued broad-based political support to move forward on the application of the 3Cs.

In the following section, four ‘possible ways forward’ are presented resulting from the ECDPM synthesis analysis and a subsequent discussion among EU evaluation officers and policy makers at the June 14 seminar in Brussels. These ways forward are intended to inform future policy making on EU development effectiveness.
4 Recommendations

The key policy challenges that emerge from the 3C evaluations fall in line with the process of development policy integration that has been gaining momentum in Europe – as exemplified by the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the European Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (2007). The evaluations were done at a relatively early moment in this EU-wide process, yet the results show evidence that enhanced cooperation on policy coherence for development and on complementarity and division of labour is being strengthened throughout the European Union. However, they also indicate that progress is still tentative and hinges upon sustained political commitment at the highest level on the part of EU Institutions and Member States.

To inspire further progress regarding enhanced cooperation on development, the evaluations point out lessons learned and opportunities for further integration and learning, as well as specific shortcomings in the way EU Institutions and Member States work together in practice to operationalise their joint vision on development. The results of the evaluations can therefore be used to provide useful input for a further reflection on and operationalisation of the EU Consensus on Development and Code of Conduct. The following four complementary possible ways forward have been formulated with this objective in mind:

**Recommendation 1:**

A major harmonisation drive to overcome day-to-day EU coordination challenges.

- Further specification of the rationale and added value of EU level coordination vis-à-vis other, wider collaborative frameworks.

- Further specification of the operational consequences of EU level coordination:
  - In the light of PCD commitments and Paris declaration on harmonisation and alignment.
  - In the light of added value + roles of the EC.

A general constraint on EU level coordinated action on the 3Cs seems to be institutional fragmentation within the EU. While diversity as such is a strong feature in EU cooperation, the fragmentation of EU Member States and Institutions’ planning, implementation and
evaluation instruments and procedures is extreme; the degree of administrative decentralisation and devolution of powers to country offices differs significantly and practical understanding of ‘country ownership’ for example, varies widely. EU level coordination therefore requires a major harmonisation drive in order to overcome the day-to-day challenges with respect to EU level cooperation on development. This is particularly valid for the required EU contribution to the application of the Paris Declaration commitments on Harmonisation and Alignment.

The rationale for coordinating within an EU framework in order to improve coherence and complementarity is not self-evident to everyone. Its practical relevance is influenced by the existence of other, wider collaborative frameworks as agreed upon internationally, within the UN, with International Financial Institutions, within the OECD/DAC or sub-groups of EU Member States. While the EU Consensus on Development reiterated commitments to further improving the 3Cs in EU development policy and operations, the results of the six evaluation studies suggest the need to further specify the rationale for coordination in the light of recent changes in the global (foreign, security, migration, development) policy landscape. Developing a shared understanding of the added value and distinct roles of the European Commission should be part of any such re-examination.

A number of non-EU collaborative frameworks – i.e. Poverty Reduction Strategies, Integrated Framework and the Paris Declaration – have been designed and applied with varying levels of success. They reflect a shared commitment by EU and non-EU members of the development community to further improve development cooperation standards. The EU is called upon to ensure consistency between these processes and its own coordination frameworks. The evaluations also show that the Member States and European Institutions have experimented with designing more flexible planning frameworks which permit higher degrees of integration with EU or international standards. Such experiments seem to underline the feasibility of this way forward.

Recommendation 2:

Political and operational guidance on the management of EU coordination in practice.
- Sustained broad-based political leadership and initiatives for promoting coordination are of great importance.
- Treaty obligations to be made operational at all levels; shared; implemented and evaluated.
- Obtaining real benefits from EU level coordination efforts depends, among other things, on:
  - Moving beyond information exchange to joint agenda setting, decision-making, task division, joint evaluation and learning;
  - Developing clear frameworks and flexible protocols for enhanced cooperation, right of initiative and follow-up.
Pro-active leadership and initiatives for promoting change within the European Union seem to have been of great importance for successful implementation of the 3Cs. Success on complex processes such as the implementation of specific measures to implement the policy coherence or a division of labour within the EU takes time. Clearly, Treaty obligations are not enough, they have to be made operational at the Institutional, EU and Member States level; shared; followed-up and evaluated. External pressure exerted by non-EU policy integration processes in which EU Members and Institutions participate may add to the momentum – such as the process towards the Millennium Declaration and the OECD/DAC Peer Reviews. However, a sustained formal policy integration drive led by the EU Presidency and Institutions – such as on PCD, the EU Consensus for Development and more recently the EU Code of Conduct – appears to be an even more important enabling condition for agreeing upon and integrating specific policy and practical measures into the ‘acquis communautaire’.

The need for sustained broad, cross-party political support to enhance coordination within the European Union has been pointed out in the evaluation studies. This is particularly the case in relation to policy coherence for development, as it requires a political consensus on development at national level. However, all forms of enhanced cooperation within the European Union exhibit strong political overtones. So far, it is a generally accepted practice that Member States continue to pursue mostly their national development priorities in Trade Capacity Building, local and national in-country development, and even at times in the application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This re-confirms the importance of further strengthening political dialogue on development-related policies at partner country level but certainly also within the EU, at the level of individual Member States and EU Institutions.

In order to obtain real benefits from EU-level or broader institutional and policy coordination efforts, a particularly important issue seems to be to move coordination beyond the mere exchange of ideas and information, towards sharing lessons and good practices, joint agenda setting and decisions on a division of tasks, and developing common standards. Such a process requires institutional capacity on the part of the participants including, where relevant, the partner country, and needs to be supported with adequate management systems. The evaluation studies indicate that such a stepping up of efforts is needed in order to achieve the real benefits expected from coordination in terms of coherence and complementarity.

The evaluation of the use of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership agreement illustrates the importance of being able to use agreed upon frameworks and protocols for EU coordination – in this case as laid down in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This framework in which, for example, the Commission has a clear and political role in taking the initiative and providing sufficient information to the Member States, has in
most cases led to good coordination practice around and during the consultation processes. It adds that Article 8, on political dialogue, should be used more effectively.

**Recommendation 3:**

**Systematic sharing of good practices,** such as those described in the evaluations.  
— Examples include: PRSP coordination; Article 96 consultation processes; General Budget Support; Integrated Frameworks for Trade Capacity Building; the use of ‘Minimal Country Strategy Papers’; and Partner Country mechanisms (e.g. Tanzania Joint Assistance Strategy).  
— Except General Budget Support, many of these practices are poorly documented and inadequately shared among EU Member States and Institutions.

It is apparent from the evaluation studies that the European Union has accumulated a reservoir of practical experience and lessons learned on development policy integration that is insufficiently shared among its Institutions and Member States. The evaluation studies indicate insufficient attention to active monitoring and evaluation of the process, drivers, effects and impact of EU-level institutional coordination with respect to policy coherence and complementarity. As a result, insight into the actual development impact and long-term sustainability of the measures taken to promote coherence and complementarity is generally lacking and, the exchange of good practices and learning between EU policy actors is very limited. This confirms the need to further develop the evaluative capacity of the EU Member States, Institutions and partner countries (e.g. the Independent Monitoring Group in Tanzania) on development-related policy issues.

A further key issue seems to be the role of partner countries in driving 3C agendas. The evaluations suggest – in the cases and at the levels studied – that the partner countries are hardly ever in the driving seat. Yet a number of extremely formative experiences have been gained where they are (i.e. Tanzania, Zambia, India, South Africa). EU donors played an important role in these processes. How can the EU learn from such positive experiences and use the lessons to improve its own?

**Recommendation 4:**

**Strengthening of EU monitoring, research and training facilities** to provide analytical and knowledge support to EU level coordination efforts:  
— To further explore the incentives and disincentives to EU development actors to coordinate their actions can inform future dialogue and decision making.  
— To develop, in particular, the joint diagnosis, monitoring, assessment and evaluative capacities of EU Member States, EU Institutions and partner countries on the effectiveness of 3C application in practice.  
— In particular, but certainly not exclusively, to support the newer MS.
The evaluation studies point out that *EU Member States and EU Institutions themselves still have a lot of homework to do to be able to actively participate in coordinated action at partner country level*. The evaluations indicate a lack of awareness on approaches to coordination; the lack of adequate institutional capacity and/or formal coordination to deal with complex coherence dossiers; the need for administrative reforms, including decentralisation; further improving the internal consistency of their aid; adopting a more systematic approach towards coordination management and mutual adjustment; adjusting financial regulations and modifying identification, planning, implementation and evaluation protocols. The strengthening of EU research and training facilities to support these processes may be necessary, in particular, but certainly not only, in support of the newer Member States.

Another issue that could be explored further is *the convergence of interests that leads to successful application of the 3Cs* or, vice versa, the diverging interests that consistently seem to stand in its way. In the evaluations we have seen ex-colonial powers step out of line; subgroups of EU members act against EU level coordination; EU members deny the need for local level coordination, etc. The evaluations certainly do not provide clear cut answers but they do suggest that a further exploration of these positions may be worthwhile.
Evaluating Co-ordination, Complementarity and Coherence in EU development policy: a synthesis

In 2004, the group of Heads of the EU Member States’ development cooperation evaluation services and the European Commission (EUHES) initiated a series of six joint evaluations to assess the role played by the Maastricht Treaty precepts of coordination, complementarity and coherence in the development cooperation policies and operations of the European Commission and the EU Member States. Focusing on a wide variety of topics and issues, the evaluations determined to what extent the 3Cs have been applied in practice and with what impact. This publication is the final version of the synthesis paper which sets out the main policy conclusions from this joint evaluation effort. This paper was drawn up by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) on invitation by the EUHES.

The six evaluations show evidence that enhanced cooperation on policy coherence for development and on complementarity and division of labour is being strengthened throughout the European Union. However, they also indicate that progress is tentative and hinges upon sustained political commitment at the highest level on the part of EU Institutions and Member States. To inspire further progress in terms of enhanced cooperation on development, the evaluations point out lessons learned and opportunities for further integration and learning, as well as specific shortcomings in the way EU Institutions and Member States work together in practice to operationalise their joint vision on development.