Abstract

EU’s relations with Africa still need to be guided by high level political ambitions expressed in a revitalised political statement — the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) — agreed by heads of state and government and EU and AU leadership in 2007. The JAES is also a multi-dimensional cooperation partnership. Despite its bureaucratic shortfalls, politically aware and motivated stakeholders actually managed to use it effectively in conducive environments. Yet, the partnership has lost its political traction because of serious divergences on trade, international justice, governance and cultural cooperation. Refreshing the partnership is now necessary to rebuild trust and commitment. This will only be effective if the following conditions are met: clearly identified and sustainable political leadership and steering from both sides; alignment on African and European long-term continental and global strategies; clarification of the relevant and appropriate level of intervention (continental, regional, national) of JAES implementation according to the subsidiarity principle; available funds (including the Pan-African Programme) programmed according to the mindset of the joint strategy; functional and direct linkages with existing international, African and European decision making structures; available space for informal multi-stakeholder dialogue paving the ground for mutual understanding and coalitions of the willing; stronger monitoring and oversight mechanisms on JAES implementation by parliaments, civil society and other relevant bodies.
The implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding confidence and commitments

This study was requested by the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Development (DEVE) committees

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LINGUISTIC VERSION

Original: EN

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Editorial closing date: 26 February 2014.
© European Union, 2014
Printed in Belgium
ISBN:
Doi:
The Information Note is available on the Internet at
If you are unable to download the information you require, please request a paper copy by e-mail: poldep-expo@europarl.europa.eu

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<td>ACHPR</td>
<td>African Commission on Human and People’s Rights</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
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<td>AGA</td>
<td>African Governance Architecture</td>
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<td>AIDA</td>
<td>Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa</td>
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<td>Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>Africa Mining Division</td>
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<td>African Network of basin organisations</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Action Plan</td>
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<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>BRAGMA</td>
<td>Bridging Actions for GMES and Africa</td>
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<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program</td>
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<td>CARIC</td>
<td>Capacity for immediate response to crises</td>
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<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CLSG Interconnection</td>
<td>Interconnection Côte d’Ivoire – Liberia – Sierra Leone – Guinée</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common market of East and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>Democratic Governance and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Stand-by Force Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>Economic, Social and Cultural Council</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Instrument</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument</td>
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<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Mission</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>ERM</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>ETTG</td>
<td>European Think Tank Group</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>European Union Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>EUEI</td>
<td>European Union Energy Initiative</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
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<td>GMES</td>
<td>Global Monitoring for Environment and Security</td>
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<td>GNSS</td>
<td>Global Navigation Satellite Systems</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Rights Council</td>
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<td>HRD</td>
<td>Human Rights Dialogue</td>
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<td>ICA</td>
<td>International Consortium for Infrastructure</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Contact Group</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority of Development</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Agency</td>
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<td>ISP</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>Infrastructure Trust Fund</td>
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<td>IWRM</td>
<td>Integrated Water Resources Management</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-European Union Strategy</td>
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<td>JEG</td>
<td>Joint Experts Group</td>
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<td>JSM</td>
<td>Joint Africa European Union Strategy Support Mechanism</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multi-annual Financial Framework</td>
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<td>MICOPAX</td>
<td>Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>African Minimum Integration Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MME</td>
<td>Migration, Mobility and Employment</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>North Africa Regional Capability</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>PAMNET</td>
<td>Pan-African Media Network</td>
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<td>PANAF</td>
<td>Pan-African Programme</td>
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<td>PAPS</td>
<td>Support Programme for Peace and Security</td>
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<td>PPRD</td>
<td>Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>PIDA</td>
<td>Programme for Infrastructure for Africa</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Department</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBO</td>
<td>River Basin Organisation</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SBAS</td>
<td>Satellite-based Augmentation System</td>
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<td>SHaSA</td>
<td>Strategy on the Harmonisation of statistics in Africa</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phytosanitary standard</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TAXUD</td>
<td>Taxation and Customs Union</td>
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<td>TDCA</td>
<td>Trade, Development, Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organisation</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The implementation of the JAES through the Africa-Europe partnership shows that the initial ambitious vision that drove it is still very much needed: a continent to continent political relation and joint action in all sectors beyond aid, as the main engine of and reference for any type of Africa-Europe dialogue. The JAES as a political declaration and statement of intent remains an essential component of Africa-Europe relations, especially after three years without any ministerial meeting between the two continents. The quality and political atmosphere of the upcoming Africa-Europe summit is of primary importance to ensure genuine buy-in from all participating member states. Both parties will need to agree on clear timeframe for their partnership. Current practice is to hold summits approximately every 3 years. With the Cotonou agreement and the EU Multiannual Financial Framework coming to an end in 2020, that year will be relevant to hold a summit closing a new 7-year cycle of partnership.

The implementation of the JAES partnership unfolded into a variety of dialogue and policy processes, each evolving at their own pace and according to the existence of mutual interests between the parties. Some frameworks de facto became split, merged or dormant to match real cooperation and dialogue processes happening elsewhere.

Where the stakeholders of each of the 8 Partnerships (on both sides) have been flexible and imaginative they have moved ahead (eg. Infrastructure, Democracy HR and Culture after some time) and found the JAES a useful supportive framework. Nevertheless, where they have not been willing to enter into the spirit of the JAES, cooperation and dialogue have been blocked. The big example of the latter is of course is the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) but also major security crises or positions on the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The most notable and tangible outcomes of the partnerships can be found in a number of areas. In peace and security and infrastructure, pre-existing funding facilities allowed the partnership to develop often outside or beyond JAES structures. In trade and economic integration, despite the disconnect between EPAs negotiations and the JAES framework, more engagement from thematic DGs of the European Commission with Africa was achieved. On governance, human rights and cultural cooperation, dialogue proved tough and it happened that some contentious issues polluted other joint agendas. Yet innovative solutions were found and new ways of joint action on human rights (in connection with UN processes in Geneva) and on culture (focusing on issues of mutual interest) have been identified and experimented. The intensification of cooperation on space and research (although focusing on GMES) has also been remarkable.

The JAES implementation framework is almost unanimously criticised for being too bureaucratic and cumbersome, but its use and its transformation by politically aware and motivated stakeholders became effective and possible in conducive environments.

The fragmentation of existing initiatives in a variety of heterogeneous formats is not a risk in itself as long as it effectively serves a joint African-European coherent political purpose. As a matter of fact, the legal basis of the Pan-African Programme (PANAF) contradicts the principle of a genuinely joint strategy. The EU can at best consult with African partners and member, which means that the quality of the ongoing policy and political dialogue during the consultation phase related to the use of PANAF will be a key for success. For this to happen, more political leadership and steering will need to be ensured from both sides.

The main avenue for the future of the JAES is to invest on what is functioning and to take stock of what is deemed effective and successful so as to replicate it in the next seven year-period leading to 2020.
The European Parliament could, in its messages to heads of state and government, emphasise a number of priorities for the upcoming Africa-EU summit of April 2014 and future implementation of the Africa-EU partnership:

At the political level and in political declarations:

- Clearly identify sustainable political leadership and steering from both sides, exerted at Commissions and member states levels, formalised in regular high-level ministerial meetings with follow-up mechanisms.
- Renew commitment to ensure co-financed initiatives and joint decision-making on the use of existing and new (PANAF) financial architecture.
- Confirm alignment on African and European long-term continental and global strategies. This was done in a number of policy areas (Infrastructure/PIDA, agriculture/CAADP, etc.).
- Clarify relevant and appropriate levels of intervention (continental, regional, national) of JAES implementation according to the subsidiarity principle.

Regarding the financing of Africa-EU partnerships:

- Provide available funds. This was possible through thematic “African facilities”, trust funds or co-financing, but also technical support mechanisms, ensuring strong buy-in and ownership of both sides. The creation of PANAF is a step forward for the JAES implementation and offers new opportunities but also raises new challenges related to ownership and the joint character of the partnership.

As per dialogue and implementation frameworks:

- Ensure functional and direct linkages with existing international, African and European decision making structures.
- Create available space for informal multi-stakeholder dialogue paving the ground for mutual understanding and coalitions of the willing. This was ensured by some of the iJEGs and perhaps even more so by flexible ad hoc technical and experts consultation meetings in a variety of appropriate formats maturing and evolving over time according to stakeholders’ needs and interests.

Monitoring and oversight:

- Strengthen monitoring and oversight mechanisms on JAES implementation, defining the role of parliaments, civil society and other relevant bodies.
Introduction

A few weeks ahead of the next Africa-Europe summit taking place in Brussels in April 2014 with the theme ‘Investing in People, Prosperity, and Peace’, all stakeholders from Europe as well as Africa are starting to make their own assessment of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and its implementation framework, the Africa-Europe Strategic Partnership\(^1\). Conclusions will vary according to each stakeholder’s experience, perspective and interests.

The starting point of this study is the acknowledgement by most stakeholders that the political rationale of enhancing continent to continent relations between Africa and Europe is still relevant and should not be questioned per se. The second principle followed here is pragmatism: because Africa-Europe relations are so diverse and resourceful, each existing JAES thematic partnership needs to be looked at and presented in a tailored fashion: as a specific experience in its own timeframe, but also as part of the broader strategic context both of Africa’s international relations and EU’s external action.

Rather than assessing the implementation of initiatives under each priority area defined by the latest action plans 2007-2013, this study looks at the implementation of the overall Partnership using the following criteria: 1) The strategic focus: the degree of ambition of the common agenda and the capacity to find and deliver win-win initiatives, solutions, and approaches to common problems; 2) Quality of the dialogue: depth of dialogue, comprehensiveness of the relationship, empowerment of key stakeholders; 3) The institutional arrangements: frequency of meetings and involvement of the co-chairs of the partnership, joint identification of a common agenda, time dedicated to each priority action; 4) The links (or absence thereof) with pre-existing legal, political and developmental frameworks.

This report focuses primarily on three of the eight partnerships: a) peace and security, b) governance and human rights and c) trade, economic integration and infrastructure. It provides a very brief stocktaking from other partnerships. It then looks at recent trends in implementation ahead of the April 2014 summit, sketches out avenues for future Africa-Europe relations before highlighting areas for further attention by the European Parliament, as far as implementation and political leadership are concerned.

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\(^1\) The Africa-Europe Strategic Partnership, JAES partnership(s) or partnerships are use interchangeably in this report.
1. **DRIVING THE JAES: THE PARTNERSHIP MINDSET**

1.1 Historical, political and economic background and drivers for the adoption of the JAES and its implementation.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted by the EU and Africa’s leaders at the Lisbon summit in 2007, is an overarching consultation but, importantly, not legally binding policy framework for Africa-EU relations which aims to enhance the strategic and political partnership between the two continents while expanding also the scope of their cooperation:

a. beyond development aid and trade, to include issues of political concern;

b. beyond Africa, to address not only African matters but global issues;

c. beyond institutions, to ensure the participation of the people and the strengthening of the civil society.

d. beyond a fragmented approach to Africa, to find regional and continental responses\(^2\).

**A heavy (but only consultative) functioning structure** has been put in place to implement the JAES, which is centred on a biannual Joint Task Force bringing together representatives of the EC and EEAS, the AUC, member states and experts. During the year the work is carried out, on a voluntary basis, by thematic Joint Experts Groups (JEGs), one per each of the eight thematic partnership (see Annex 11), which are co-chaired by a European partner and an African one\(^3\).

Since its creation, this framework has not really been owned by the African side. While it was of course formally adopted by the Heads of State in both continents, the rather heavy institutional framework seems to be a European creation that is not adapted to the current African institutions and capacities (Joint Task Force meetings which are quite formal and bureaucratic, overload of meetings, lack of coordination between African representatives in Brussels and Addis and the respective capitals, etc)\(^4\).

The JAES is the first EU framework which aims to ‘treat Africa as one’, as opposed to other frameworks that still regulate EU relations with the African countries dividing between countries north and south of the Sahara, namely the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000-2020) with the African, Caribbean, Pacific group of state, the so-called Barcelona Process, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (now European Neighbourhood Policy) with North African states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), as well as the Union of the Mediterranean (UfM). The relationship with South Africa does not fall under either framework, being instead regulated by the Trade, Development, Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 1999 and the Strategic Partnership first agreed in 2006.

**Table 1. Objectives of the JAES\(^5\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Reinforce and elevate the <strong>Africa-EU political partnership</strong> to address issues of common concern. This includes strengthening of institutional ties and addressing common challenges, in particular peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment. To this end, both sides will <strong>treat Africa as one and upgrade the Africa-EU the political dialogue</strong> to enable a strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership with the AU and the EU at the centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) European Commission (2011a).

\(^3\) AUC & EC (2011b).

\(^4\) ECDPM internal sources.

and continental integration in Africa, to ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 2015.

3. To jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong representative and legitimate institutions, and the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns [...].

4. To facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centered partnership, Africa and the EU will empower non-state actors and create conditions to enable them to play an active role in development, democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction processes. Both sides will also promote holistic approaches to development processes, and make this Joint Strategy a permanent platform for information, participation, and mobilisation of a broad spectrum of civil society actors in the EU, Africa and beyond. Ongoing dialogue with the civil society, the private sector and local stakeholders on issues covered by this Joint Strategy will be a key component to ensure its implementation.

In the early 2000s five elements drove the African and EU leaders to develop this ambitious partnership.

The first driver was the need for more political relationship on an equal footing both bilaterally and on the global scene. For Europeans, that would allow for discussions on governance, democracy and human rights and enhanced leverage internationally. For Africans, it was at last the recognition of their new role in global politics as well as their emerging economic transformation. In the late 90s ACP states opposed discussions beyond trade and aid, judging them as interfering with state sovereignty: a reset was needed.

An initial attempt to develop a continent-to-continent relationship was made at the 2000 Africa-EU summit with the Cairo declaration, a broad document covering several issues from debt and development to security.

Secondly, the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2002 created fertile ground for a continent-to-continent relationship.

Third, the EU’s efforts came also as a response to the growing importance of other players in Africa. The 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing was widely attended by African leaders while India finalised its own Africa-India framework for cooperation in 2008.

Fourth, international momentum around Africa consolidated, pushed also by the MDGs agenda. More agency on African side was noticeable, with the creation of NEPAD in 2001 followed by other Pan-African initiatives, the establishment of the UK’s Commission for Africa and the ‘Year of Africa’ in 2005. From depicting Africa as a continent in need, the narrative started to describe it as a land of opportunities. The EU responded to the evolving context with its 2005 Strategy for Africa which was however criticised for its unilateral nature and the two sides agreed to develop a joint strategy.

Fifth, Portugal’s presidency of the EU, eager to have a deliverable for its 2007 Africa-EU summit in Lisbon, provided the political drive for the consultations. The JAES saw the light of day.

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6 Sherriff & Kotsopoulos (2013).
7 Sherriff & Kotsopoulos (2013).
9 Sherriff & Kotsopoulos (2013).
10 Sherriff & Kotsopoulos (2013).
after a series of negotiation meetings between EU and African partners held in Brussels and Addis Ababa in the first six months of 2007. The adoption of the JAES risked to be overshadowed by the controversy over the participation of Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe\textsuperscript{13}.

Finally, from an EU perspective, the JAES was a way to promote a common European approach to African matters.

1.2 What has changed in the relationship?

A first reality-check for the ambitions of the JAES was the disappointing Tripoli Summit 2010. Ahead of the summit, the progress report of the Joint Task Force noted that the Partnerships were progressing at different speed - the Peace and Security one being the most advanced - while remarking several challenges, notably the limited ownership of member states and other stakeholders on both sides\textsuperscript{14}.

In Tripoli, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma noted that the partnership had little to show in terms of tangible implementation of the joint commitments of Cairo and Lisbon\textsuperscript{15}. A longstanding issue was that the Partnership had started on the wrong footing in terms of expectations: the African side was surprised by the lack of dedicated funding for the activities in the Action Plan. A deeper challenge was the lack of political buy-in of the Partnership on both sides of the Mediterranean which prompted suggestions on how to revive the interest of member states and enhance the high-level participation in the JAES\textsuperscript{16}.

The Tripoli summit adopted the 2nd Action Plan but did not present a way forward to address those challenges\textsuperscript{17}. However, the Action Plan consisted of numerous objectives and expected achievements – often process rather than outcome-oriented - to be fulfilled by the parties. Since 2010 several developments in the two continents have had an impact on the Africa-EU relations.

1.2.1 The EU: in doubt and in need

On the EU side, the reform of external action (with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS, operational since January 2011) has not eliminated old coherence and leadership challenges in policies towards Africa. With regard to Africa, the EU delegation to the African Union had already been established in 2008 in Addis Ababa and a unit for the Africa-EU Partnership had been created inside the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation-EuropeAid.

However the economic, financial and political crisis in the EU has led to a perception of a continent less strong in the Partnership by Africans\textsuperscript{18}. European economies need new partners, new markets. European societies, especially in Southern Europe, need new cohesion and hope in the future. The EU has not been in such need since its creation. Against this background, Europe may see Africa as a continent of new opportunities. A signal of a trend reversal is Portuguese youth moving to Angola and Mozambique to look for better job opportunities and increased interest for Africa from Germany\textsuperscript{19}. The outcome of the EU budget negotiations in 2013 led to a reduced EU development budget in comparison to the

\textsuperscript{13} Traynor (2007).
\textsuperscript{14} European Commission (2009).
\textsuperscript{15} Sherriff & Kotsopoulos (2013).
\textsuperscript{16} Bossuyt and Sherriff (2010).
\textsuperscript{17} European Union @ United Nations (2010).
\textsuperscript{18} ETTG (2013).
\textsuperscript{19} Ash (2011) & Konrad Adenauer Foundation roundtable on Africa-Europe relations (4 February 2014, Brussels).
Commission’s original proposal, contributing to this perception\textsuperscript{20}. Furthermore, several actors still note a \textit{plurality of voices coming from Europe} and some \textit{member states enjoy more visibility and influence than the EU}, which makes it difficult for Africans to understand and work within the JAES relationship. \textsuperscript{21}

All of the above had an \textbf{impact on the implementation} of some components of the second Action Plan within which little buy-in was felt.

1.2.2 Africa: self-confidence and ambitions

On the other side of the Partnership, \textbf{economic growth of Africa is leading to a more assertive position of the African stakeholders vis-a-vis the West}. African trade is shifting away from the EU and US as African countries are diversifying their trading relations, especially with China and India. The share of Europe and North American trade on Africa’s global trade has decreased from 2007 to 2011 while in the same period the weight of Asia and China has grown\textsuperscript{22}.

The \textbf{arrival of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma to the post of AUC Chairperson in 2012\textsuperscript{23}} has led to a review of the existing strategic partnerships of the AU, in response to critical voices suggesting that AU programmes are driven by its partners\textsuperscript{24}. An ad-hoc subcommittee has been created to examine these partnerships but it is unclear to what extent it will have an impact on the existing relations with the EU\textsuperscript{25}. Some discrepancy remains between on the one hand the heavy financial contribution of the EU to the AU work, and on the other the neglecting way the EU is treated by the AUC: the management of the JAES partnership is centralised within the Economic affairs department of the AUC, despite repeated requests by the EU to embed it at the top level of the AUC\textsuperscript{26}.

In fact \textbf{the management of relations with the EU seems fragmented}: parts of it are in the deputy chairpersons (related to financial management etc.) including for the JAES and since recently under the chairperson’s office although economic affairs still plays an important role. Although the new AU narrative is about Africa’s pride, AU structures have their own inconsistencies, some showing a lack of willingness to break aid dependence. The AUC departments in charge of the JAES have in the past often understaffed and lacked capacity. As a consequence, time dedicated to the implementation of the JAES may have been limited especially when only one or two individuals managed a given thematic partnership.

The \textbf{Africa-EU partnership takes place in a more competitive context, marked by increased engagement of the AU and African countries with partners such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea\textsuperscript{27}}. In March 2013 the AU attended its first BRICS summit, on the topic of the “Partnerships for Development, Integration, and Industrialisation”\textsuperscript{28}.

\textbf{A more assertive AU asks that EU cooperation be geared towards supporting the African priorities}, as they are spelled out in the AU strategic plan 2014-2017, in the African Agenda 2063 and in the African common position on the post-2015 development agenda\textsuperscript{29}.

\textbf{African stakeholders have the perception of a double standards approach of the EU}. A

\textsuperscript{20} EurActiv (2013).
\textsuperscript{21} Interviews in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 2013.
\textsuperscript{22} Helly (2013).
\textsuperscript{23} AUC (2012).
\textsuperscript{24} Mackie, Rosengren, de Roquefeuil & Tissi (2012).
\textsuperscript{25} Elowson & Norlund (2013).
\textsuperscript{26} Interviews in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 2013 and Brussels, 31 January 2014.
\textsuperscript{27} See more at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Partnerships.pdf
\textsuperscript{29} ECDPM internal source
frequent complaint is that the EU speaks of values (democracy, governance) but political realism still dominates Africa-EU relations when security and economic interests are at stake. The EU is thus perceived by some Africans as an incoherent - even schizophrenic - player. The Arab spring in North Africa is a case in point since in the years preceding the revolts the EU’s human rights discourse was not matched by actions as autocratic regimes were de facto uncontested to maintain stability in the region.

Last but not least, turmoil in Northern Africa affected the capacity of African co-chairs (Egypt, Libya in particular) to follow-up the implementation of their partnership under the second Action Plan.

In a nutshell, new paradigms influence the relations between the two continents on the eve of the 4th Africa-EU Brussels summit of April 2014. Economic meltdown, coherence and leadership issues on the European side affect the way Africa looks at Brussels. At the same time, Europeans are increasingly seeing Africa as a continent of opportunities. African actors display more confidence in putting forward their requests and are vocal on the perception of incoherence or double standards approach by the EU.

2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JAES PARTNERSHIPS: MANY VISIONS, LITTLE MONEY

2.1 Partnership 1 - Peace & Security: the mouth, the money, boots on the ground

The Peace and Security Partnership is often cited as the most successful of the eight partnerships by European and African stakeholders, noting for instance the constant and sustainable EU support to African-led peace-support operations. This partnership has been allocated with over EUR 1.1 billion since 2004 through the African Peace Facility, of which 600 million were allocated from the 10th EDF for the period 2008-2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Partnership 1: Peace and Security. Overall objectives / Priority Actions of the 2nd Action Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Dialogue:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) To jointly contribute to the global security related governance in Africa, Europe and worldwide,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and make the dialogue more effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Address crises and challenges to peace, security and stability in Africa, Europe and elsewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and capitalise on commonalities of positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Operationalisation of APSA:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture to address peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>challenges in Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 FES & ECDPM (2013).
31 Cathelin (2011).
32 Helly (2010).
34 Bello (2010).
36 Hendrickson, Ball, Ononisakin, Morillon & Cadji (2013).
37 AUC & EC (2011b).
3. Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) undertaken by the AU or under its authority:
Make available adequate resources (financial, material, human resources, etc) to plan, equip, deploy, and support, African led peace support operations.

Rather than assessing the implementation of initiatives under each priority area (Table 2), whose state of play is presented in Annex 3, this paper’s assessment of the implementation of the Partnership is based on the following criteria.

2.1.1 Strategic focus

Stakeholders on both continents have shared interests on peace and security, a key element of the success of the Partnership. The Partnership remains relevant as new trends of insecurity, crisis and violence recurrently emerge: insurgent and separatist groups, terrorism, ‘bumpy’ democritisation processes, more frequent coups, and increasing electoral violence, as shown by Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan to name but a few.

This does not necessarily imply that there is unity and convergence of views in all crisis situations. In fact the West’s military response to the crisis in Libya in 2011 caused a major rift between the African and the EU. Western powers largely ignored the AU’s efforts, whose response was instead centered on roadmap to make Gaddafi step down. The British, French and US military intervention was not widely backed in Africa: South African president Jacob Zuma stated that the March 2011 resolution of the UNSC was “largely abused in some specific respects”. Still, South Africa had originally voted in favour of the resolution. Indeed the chosen approach damaged Africa, unable to present a united position backing the proposed AU roadmap for a negotiated transition with the necessary diplomatic, financial and military resources.

The cases of Mali in 2012 and Central African Republic in 2013 instead demonstrated that a European rapid intervention can be supported by African actors in the absence of capacities for an immediate African-led or African-owned response to a common security threat.

More recent discussions on the creation of an AU rapid intervention force, the CARIC, also show strategic convergence between both sides.

2.1.2 Quality of the dialogue

The success to develop a common approach is linked to the quality of dialogue. It is widely recognised that dialogue has increasingly progressed at senior level and technical level. Still, it was also acknowledged that an effective “chain of command” between consultative iJEGs and decision making bodies has been lacking.

The EU delegation to the AU has developed daily dialogue and cooperation with AU bodies, in particular the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU Commission, on crises and PSOs. Representatives from the EU delegation take part in the International Contact Groups (ICGs), which provide fora for AU, EU and other stakeholders to work together in crisis situations.

38 Interviews with EC officials and former EC officials, Brussels, January 2014.
39 Bello (2010).
41 De Waal (2013).
42 De Waal (2013).
43 De Waal (2012).
44 Helly & Rocca (2013).
45 Costa Pereira (2013).
For instance the ICG for the Madagascar crisis of 2009 proved crucial to gather international support for the AU and SADC mediation efforts\textsuperscript{46}.

At political level, regular joint meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee (EU PSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) take place annually since 2008 to enhance coordination\textsuperscript{47}. The dialogue focuses on conflict situations and crises. Linkages between EU CSDP crisis management operations and African crisis management work are discussed in this forum. Yet, analysts agree that it is quite formalised and lacks depth because of its overloaded agendas. From this angle not much has changed from the 1st Action Plan\textsuperscript{48}/\textsuperscript{49}. As an example the 6th Joint Consultative Meeting had a long list of items on the agenda, from Mali to the campaign against the Lord’s Resistance Army\textsuperscript{50}. Similar issues are noted for the Joint Expert Group (JEG), which meets also twice a year, and is more a forum for information sharing than straightforward discussion\textsuperscript{51}.

High-level mutual commitments to political dialogue from EU and AU institutions leaders remain limited outside usual diplomatic opportunities. On the contrary, some EU member states’ strive to deepen dialogue, notably France’s, whose 2013 Elysée Summit for Peace and Security was widely attended by high-level representatives of 53 African states, including EU and AU institutions leaders\textsuperscript{52}.

Since the start of the so-called Akosombo process in 2009\textsuperscript{53}, progress has been made in made in dialogue between the AU and the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), supported by the EU. All RECs/RMs have now signed the memorandum of understanding with the AU and the AU/RECs/RMs roadmap\textsuperscript{54} for APSA defines their respective roles in the operationalisation of APSA while serving also as the reference document for the EU support to APSA. All RECs/RMs (with the exception of CEN-SAD) have opened liaison offices to the AU, funded by the EU via the APF\textsuperscript{55}. Furthermore, the EU’s Regional Indicative programmes (RIPs) should now include peace and security components under the 10th EDF\textsuperscript{56} in addition to existing regional programmes in this field\textsuperscript{57}. Yet a remaining challenge is that each RIP is programmed on its own and the involvement of the APF team of DEVCO is limited in the inter-service consultations\textsuperscript{58}. Whether more consistency will be achieved in the future remains to be seen.

\textbf{Table 3. Components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)}

\textsuperscript{46} Muellmann & Tavolato (2013).
\textsuperscript{47} AUC & EC (2013b).
\textsuperscript{48} AUC & EC (2011b).
\textsuperscript{49} Schaefer (2012).
\textsuperscript{50} AU PSC & EU PSC (2013).
\textsuperscript{51} Schaefer (2012).
\textsuperscript{52} Déclaration finale du Sommet de l’Elysée pour la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique (2013).
\textsuperscript{53} AUC, RECs & RMs (2009).
\textsuperscript{54} APSA roadmap (2011).
\textsuperscript{55} Schaefer (2012).
\textsuperscript{56} European Commission (2011a).
\textsuperscript{57} Through the regional envelope of the EDF various capacity building for peace and security efforts have been supported in the RECs by the Commission. These have not been part of a central plan directed from the Peace and Security Department at the AUC and indeed some predate the APSA, but efforts have been made by both the RECs and the EC to align these with the emerging framework of the APSA. ECDPM internal sources.
\textsuperscript{58} Schaefer (2012).
The second priority action of the Partnership is the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is composed by:

- **AU Peace and Security Council (PSC):** the central decision-making body.
- **Eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs):** Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the South African Development Community (SADC);
- **Two Regional Mechanisms (RMs):** Eastern Africa Stand-by Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).
- ‘**Panel of the Wise**:’ mandated in conflict prevention and resolution.
- **African Standby Force (ASF).**
- **African Peace Fund:** promotes the work of the AU Commission’s Peace and Security Department (PSD).
- **Continental Early Warning System (CEWS):** supports PSC decision-making and guides the deployment of ASF.

The EU, which supports APSA with a 40 million Euro program for three years (see Annex 3), has been the primary and most generous and regular funder. Concrete progress can be noted while at the same time challenges remain, for instance:

- The staffing of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) has now been increased to 240 people and includes a Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD).
- Absorption capacity was often noted as a problem for the AU and RECs but a lot of progress has been made by the AU PSD and by the RECs/RMs departments of peace and security.
- The five standby-by brigades of the African Standby Force (ASF) show diverging degrees of readiness and are very much work in progress. The case of Mali shows that the continent still lacks the operational capabilities to operate in an emergency situation since the preparation of the forces was delayed due to logistical and financial constraints. The willingness to deploy ECOWAS forces is not matched by capacities and systems - for instance the strategic transport capabilities are lacking.

Notwithstanding the progress achieved, the question of primacy and subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs and RMs is far from resolved. Not all RECs were established with peace and security mandates (being organisations for regional economic integration) but gradually acquired them in absence of a clear primacy of the AU, to the point that some of them, in particular ECOWAS, have gained more legitimacy to intervene than the AU itself. The lack of a shared understanding of a hierarchical relationship between the AU and the RECs often creates a competition for resources in peace and security (funding of Peace Support Operations but also

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59 Adapted from Hendrickson, Ball, Olonisakin, Morillon & Cadji (2013).
60 Poulton, Trillo and Kukuk (2012).
61 Vines (2013).
62 Elowson & Norlund (2013). In 2008 the PSOD had only around 10 staff and stakeholders estimated that it needed around 200 people. See more in Elowson (2009).
64 Hendrickson, Ball, Olonisakin, Morillon & Cadji (2013).
65 Aboagye (2012).
66 See more in AU (2013).
68 RECs were not born with peace and security mandates (being organisations for regional economic integration) but gradually acquired them in absence of a clear primacy of the AU, to the point that some of them, in particular ECOWAS, have gained more legitimacy to intervene than the AU. The lack of a shared understanding of a hierarchical relationship between the AU and the RECs creates a competition for resources (for missions) and confusion to identify the organisation responsible to intervene in a crisis. See more in Schaefer (2012).
capacity building) and confusion to identify the organisation responsible to intervene in a crisis. Difficulties to decide who takes the lead appeared for instance in the case of Mali, where ECOWAS suspended Mali’s membership ahead of the AU, and in the mediation in Madagascar and in the approach to the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, where the AU took over activities from SADC and ECOWAS during those protracted political crises. The issue is also linked to the capacity and empowerment of the RECs by their own member states. It is recognised that the political willingness of members to empower RECs and invest resources in them is primarily determined by national state interests and agendas. For instance the role of regional hegemons such as Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC can be a source of tensions.

The civil society's participation in the partnership remains limited since invitations to take part in the JEGs and JTFs are not regular, while CSOs do participate in EU Implementation Team meetings which are however understood to be information sharing platforms. However the AU PSC has developed its own modality of interacting with the civil society by adopting in 2008 the ‘Livingstone Formula’. Organisations such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) have been very active in engaging with the PSC.

2.1.3 Institutional arrangements and relation with other frameworks.

The African Peace Facility (APF), the EU’s main instrument to fund the Partnership (see Table 4), predates the existence of the JAES, having been created in 2004. Some observers note that the success of the Partnership could be conferred to the presence of such dedicated source of funding. The APF is seen as having enabled collective African solutions to crisis, marking a departure from past European interventionist policies in the continent. EU MS can also contribute to AU Peace Support Operations: for instance eight MS contributed to AMIS, the mission to Sudan, while Belgium made a voluntary contribution to the MICOPAX mission to the Central African Republic (600,000 Euro).

In many ways the APF allows the Partnership to go beyond what is written in the Action Plan. A part of the APF funds are allocated to Early Response Mechanism (ERM) to fund mediation efforts, such as the African Union mission to Kenya led by Kofi Annan in 2008 to find a solution to post-electoral violence, which is acknowledged as case of successful mediation. Similarly the EU supported the AU High-Level Panel for Darfur, later transformed in the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. The panel’s efforts in 2009 and 2010 are widely recognised as crucial to ensure the peaceful implementation of the accords and the referendum leading to the independence of

69 Vines (2013).
70 Vines (2013).
71 Sherriff (2013).
72 Miranda (2012).
73 This protocol sets out regulations for CSOs wanting to engage with the PSC as well as interaction processes, such as the participation in formal and informal PSC meetings. See more in Murithi (2013).
74 Funding can be drawn by other sources (see Annex 1). A recurring problem is that the APF is limited in its capacity to fund the operationalisation of APSA; around 90% of its funds have been spent on missions while less than 10% is allocated to capacity building. Other EU instruments, which could support capacity building, have not been used for peace and security or have not been engaged at continental level. See Hendrickson, Ball, Olonisakin, Morillon &Cadji (2013).
77 Hendrickson, Ball, Olonisakin, Morillon &Cadji (2013).
79 Hendrickson, Ball, Olonisakin, Morillon &Cadji (2013).
80 See more in Lindenmayer & Kaye (2009).
81 See more in EEAS (2012a).
82 See more in Van der Zwan (2011).
South Sudan.

Table 4. African Peace Facility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Operations (PSO):</td>
<td>€825 million (88.5% of contracted amounts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building and operationalisation of APSA:</td>
<td>€92 million (9.9% of contracted amounts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Response Mechanism (ERM):</td>
<td>€15 million (1.6% of contracted amounts)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Challenges remain, in particular the predictability and sustainability of funding, the third priority of the Partnership, has yet to be achieved. Since its inception, the APF had to be replenished five times under the 9th EDF, from funds of the Intra-ACP Regional Programme for a total of around 190 million Euros, and once under the 10th EDF, using unallocated and residual funds for a total of 126 million Euros. Africa remains dependent on variable European resources for its peace-security operations. African stakeholders are aware that the partnership cannot be equal if African resources are not used and are increasingly calling for more African ownership of the APSA. The Report of the African Union–United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations (the so-called Prodi panel report) proposed in 2008 to establish a fund to pool contributions from African countries and the EU, but the initiative has yet be implemented.

2.2 Partnership 2 - Democratic Governance and Human Rights: sensitive but essential

2.2.1 Introduction

Partnership 2 on Democratic Governance and Human Rights (DGHR) had from the first day an ambiguous title: It merged two overlapping policy domains (Democratic Governance and Human Rights) and ignored a third one (culture) which actually turned out to be a the main topic flagged out in this component of Africa-Europe dialogue.

Its importance keeps being emphasised by the European and African side as an issue of common concern and part of both the EU’s and AU’s core values. Both sides also affirm

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84 Mackie, El Fassi, Rocca & Grosse-Puppendahl (2013).
85 UN (2008).
86 AUC & EU (2011b).
that democratic governance and human rights are key for sustainable development and for Africa-Europe cooperation.

The three priorities stated in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Action Plan (AP) of Partnership 2 DGHR remain largely the same as in the 1\textsuperscript{st} Action Plan 2008-2010. However, there has been an evolution in the expected outcomes (Annex 4) in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} AP these are more broadly oriented towards dialogue and cooperation. Priorities are generally formulated more vaguely as opposed to the 1\textsuperscript{st} Action Plan where they promote support to more concrete initiatives that the JAES per se did not really manage to support in a distinct fashion\textsuperscript{89}.

2.2.2 Strategic focus

The degree of ambition to actually deliver results, engage the political level and make an impact for citizens in Europe and Africa has remained high for the Portuguese co-chairmanship but confronted with tough circumstances. The increased frequency of dialogue (for example among co-chairs, institutions and commissions) and meetings (working groups etc.) in the area of DGHR therefore cannot be seen as an indicator for success. Yet, continued engagement and search for potential areas of cooperation led to the launch of initiatives presented by their stakeholders as mutually beneficial (see below).

The definition of a common agenda proved initially challenging but lately resulted in the de facto split of the partnership into three frameworks for dialogue on Human Rights, Governance, and Cultural Cooperation. During the 15\textsuperscript{th} Africa-EU Joint Task Force (JTF) Meeting (held on 4-15 February 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia),\textsuperscript{90} participants agreed to hold separate annual informal Joint Expert Group (iJEG) meetings on each of the three priorities of this partnership area. For several years, the issue of return of cultural goods to Africa was raised continuously by the African side - mainly by the Egyptian co-chairmanship - and inadequately addressed by the European one, eventually blocking the other areas covered by the partnership. The solution to this stalemate was found with the establishment of specific spaces for human rights dialogue, separated from the democratic governance and cultural cooperation cluster and connected to global negotiations in Geneva-based UN fora in 2012. The EU-Africa human rights dialogue, which takes place annually- outside of the JAES structures - is however still seen by experts as the main functioning framework in this field\textsuperscript{91}.

On governance, the strategic ambition of a common agenda lost traction in a complex political context marked by instability in Northern Africa and tensions over sensitivities issues such as the crisis in Libya and the stance of the International Criminal Court in a number of African cases such as Kenya and Sudan (see annexes on Africa-EU relations and the ICC). To a large extent, the JAES led both sides to “agree to disagree” while keeping the doors open\textsuperscript{92}.

The cultural file interestingly was revived in 2013 and led to the constructive initiative of a

\textsuperscript{89} Priority one of the 1\textsuperscript{st} AP is “Enhance dialogue at global level and international fora”, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Action plan emphasizes ‘cooperation’ in addition to dialogue). Objective two of the 1\textsuperscript{st} AP was to “promote the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (formulated more vaguely in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Action Plan with “Cooperate on Governance Initiatives”). Objective three of the 1\textsuperscript{st} AP was to strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods (in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Action Plan is broadened by the addendum of “and other areas of cultural cooperation” what on the one hand broadens the scope of cooperation on the other hand takes the focus of the aspect of (illegally acquired) cultural goods that is a contentious issue.

\textsuperscript{90} http://europafrika.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/joint-strategy-action-plan-on-governance.pdf

\textsuperscript{91} ECDPM internal sources.

\textsuperscript{92} Helly (2013).
workshop on illegal trafficking of cultural goods on 9 January 2014.

2.2.3 Quality of the dialogue

The dialogue on human rights has grown in size and now gathers a variety of actors from member states, EU institutions, civil society and youth. The option of holding dialogues in Geneva seems to be bearing fruit and to counterbalance criticism of overlapping with other formats of human rights dialogue. In June 2012 a "Workshop on Racism: fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" took place in Geneva back-to-back to the Human Rights Council (HRC) session. If such workshops continue being organised closely to the HRC sessions, they could enhance indeed EU and African initiatives in the regular HRC sessions93. Suggestions to enhance EU-AU cooperation in this field included enhancing cooperation through joint meetings of EU-African Ambassadors, ministerial dialogues or meetings between AU and EU coalitions of the willing94.

The availability of resources from the JAES support mechanism has also contributed to increase the magnitude of participation in the human rights dimension of the partnership. Yet, some questions remained about the ability of the JAES to actually connect expert dialogue with higher decision making levels in Africa and Europe, casting doubts about the likelihood of concrete outcomes.

Tangible cooperation on the African Governance Architecture (AGA – see annex 8 for background) within the JAES framework is still work in progress. Some EU observers view AGA still as a vision “on paper” with very little opportunities to achieve concrete results at the continental level. In order to allow EU support to the AGA, clarity and concrete action plans and mutual consent on how to best proceed are needed. It remains to be seen, on the basis of on-going studies, including the on-going feasibility study that was commissioned by the JAES support mechanism, whether EU funding will be made available to cooperation on AGA in the EU new (PANAF) Pan-African programme.

On the other hand, there is movement and real action on electoral observation, but outside JAES structures. The EU continues to be involved in monitoring missions (Mali, Madagascar, Guinea) on the African continent. AU observers have also been trained in EU Election Observation Missions (EOMs) or have monitored elections of the European Parliament, in Sweden95 and in Germany96. The EU delegation to the African Union is also active in this respect.

African member states have notably accepted and decided to be reviewed by their peers on democratic and socio-economic governance through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is a good example of African ownership. The EU financially supported it through a small contribution to a trust fund managed by UNDP. Since the EU essentially funded the APRM secretariat rather than projects, concrete results are difficult to see98. Yet, the APRM assessment phase proved fruitful for instance by providing analysis also used later by the EU

93 In June 2012 a "Workshop on Racism: fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" took place in Geneva back-to-back to the Human Rights Council (HRC) session. If such workshops continue being organised closely to the HRC sessions, they could indeed in the future enhance EU and African initiatives in the regular HRC sessions.
94 AUC & EC (2012).
95 The cultural component of the partnership is quite focused. The AU was not favourable to the inclusion of cultural rights, which could open the JAES to the sensitive issues of religious, language, minority rights. The inclusion of cultural goods resulted from the interest of the former Egyptian government which wanted to ensure that Africa had a say on African cultural goods held in Europe-based cultural institutions. See Open Society Foundations (2011).
96 Africa-EU Joint Task Force (2010b).
97 Africa-EU Joint Task Force (2010b).
98 ECDPM internal information.
notably in the Governance Profiles of countries that have already completed their peer review process (i.e. Ghana, Kenya). The implementation of APRM recommendations remains a challenge for a variety of reasons related to the mechanism’s very ambitious scope, limited capacities or willingness of some countries to actually follow up.

The EU’s contribution to embedding principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights at continental and national levels\(^\text{99}\) has therefore been indirect. As the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance entered into force in 2012, the EU expressed however its readiness to support the implementation of the principles set out in the Charter\(^\text{100}\).

The challenge of the cooperation in the area of cultural goods and other areas of cultural cooperation is that the inclusion of ‘cultural goods’ in the partnership is a result of a compromise reached between the EU and the AU\(^\text{101}\)\(^\text{102}\). Cooperation in that area has been extremely slow because the issue of the return of cultural goods blocked the work of the partnership. As stressed by interviewees, an important and successful turning point that finally produced tangible results and deliverables was the Africa-EU Workshop on the Fight Against Illegal Trafficking of Cultural Goods that took place in Casablanca in January 2014. The meeting pushed ahead on relevant activities within the framework of the Africa-EU Partnership\(^\text{103}\). They include improved and digitalised inventories that have already been advanced by several prestigious institutions and capacity-building programmes. Last year, the AUC had already requested a study in this area to be launched and financed from JAES–related allocations\(^\text{104}\). The study is still being prepared but demonstrates that the partnership is finally starting to bear fruit and does not only resume itself in the organisation of joint exhibitions.

Despite this encouraging growing maturity over time which led to unexpected but pragmatic late reforms, the partnership on DGHR is often a cause of frustration for many European stakeholders, some of whom already suggest it should be dramatically refreshed. These options are looked at in more details in the final section of this report.

2.3 Partnership 3 - Regional Economic Integration, Trade and Infrastructure

The main focus of the JAES in this area was based on the premise that strong links between trade and regional integration would result in strong economic development in Africa\(^\text{105}\). In 2007, tensions between both sides around the issue of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) had already created a “potentially explosive situation in the summit”\(^\text{106}\). The 2010 EU-Africa summit recognised the important dimension of regional integration for growth and development and Heads of States and Governments committed to conclude (EPAs)\(^\text{107}\). Additionally, the summit recognised the need to share experiences in regional integration and enhance the capacity of Africa. The 2011-2013 action plan also underlined the need to develop infrastructure in Africa as

\(^{99}\) EEAS (2012b).

\(^{100}\) EEAS (2012b).

\(^{101}\) Open Society Foundations (2011).

\(^{102}\) The EU did not want to include the issue of cultural rights in the partnership. The at the time Egyptian government insisted however on its interest in ensuring that African cultural goods do not continue to be held by museums and cultural institutions based in Europe without the possibility for African partners to enjoy them or have a say in the way they are managed.

\(^{103}\) AUC & EU (2013).


\(^{105}\) AUC & EU (2011b).

\(^{106}\) Statement made by an African representative at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s roundtable on Africa-Europe relations, Brussels, 4 February 2014.

\(^{107}\) Tripoli Declaration (2010). “We recognize the equally important dimension of regional integration for growth and development and commit to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that support socio-economic development, regional integration and the integration of Africa into the global economy.”
one important component to enhance regional integration in Africa\textsuperscript{108}. The regional economic integration, trade and infrastructure part of the JAES aims to enhance continental integration in Africa. In practice, the partnership was divided into various components respectively covering trade and regional integration on the one hand, and infrastructure on the other. It has to be noted that the EU’s strategic ambitions on trade lay mostly in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) negotiation process led by the DG Trade of the European Commission. \textit{Despite repeated requests and attempts by African representatives to deal with EPAs in the framework of the JAES, the two processes were kept separated. This considerably hampered the depth of the dialogue, the partnership mindset of the JAES and trust between both sides.} The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Action Plan (2011-2013) mentions dialogue as a priority area, including on “the development dimension and impact on the African economies of existing (EU-MED, TDCA, African regional economic agreements) and up-coming (EPAs) trade agreements to which African States are parties”\textsuperscript{109}.

On the European side, DEVCO, rather than DG Trade, co-chaired the partnership and coordinated with other EU institutions and Member states. Critics refer to the lack of political dialogue in the JAES for addressing challenges interconnected with EPAs, which have been negotiated for over 10 years with the different regional economic organisations of the ACP group but only one has been signed so far, with CARIFORUM in 2009\textsuperscript{110}. More recently in January 2014 the EU and ECOWAS reached a major breakthrough in the negotiations though the deal needs to be still sealed and the coherence of regional integration at the pan-African level remains an issue\textsuperscript{111}/\textsuperscript{112}. Some also indicated the lack of interest from DG Trade to engage in the JAES.

In capacity terms, one DEVCO official was in charge of the partnership and dedicating on average 10\% of his time, with other colleagues being de facto in charge of the infrastructure component. On the AUC side, similarly limited capacities were available. This reduced considerably the depth of dialogue on regional integration and trade.

The gathering of experts groups from both sides became an objective and an achievement in itself because of capacity shortage. Workshops and trainings on the theme of regional integration (aligned on the goals identified in the African Minimum Integration Agenda –MIP–), quality standards for African industries and customs union and information sharing on EU’s experience in market integration initiatives were organised\textsuperscript{113}. \textit{The most noticeable result of this partnership has been to gather a variety of stakeholders under the umbrella of the JAES and to actually boost the interest of some DGs (ENT, TAXUD, MARKT) of the European Commission for African issues and opportunities of cooperation with the AUC.} Interlocutors in Brussels also claim that the real added value of the JAES is its role in facilitating the sharing of values and experiences.

Still, the participation of African states and regional organisations in the JEGs was always limited, in various occasions as the result of rational choices given limited resources available. Never more than 2 RECs at the same time attended iJEG meetings, usually sending their representatives in Addis or Brussels, which limited the scope and depth of dialogue.

The JAES, building on existing initiatives and awareness, also aimed at supporting regional and

\textsuperscript{108} AUC & EU (2011b).
\textsuperscript{109} AUC & EU (2011b).
\textsuperscript{110} See http://www.africaeu2014.blogspot.nl/2013/12/what-went-wrong-with-epas.html
\textsuperscript{111} See http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/economic-partnership-agreements-west-africa-seals-deal-at-11th-hour/
\textsuperscript{112} In all African regions countries have different levels of development, so have different incentives to sign an EPA. LDCs in particular seem to have the least interest in concluding an EPA. This risks undermining the process of regional integration which is still in the making. See Ramdoo, I. & S. Bilal (2013).
\textsuperscript{113} Interview with EU official, January 2014.
continental level infrastructure for increased connectivity. In this area, it was acknowledged that despite the JAES cumbersome procedures, actual dialogue did take place between both sides, more particularly within innovative frameworks such as a wide cross-partnership infrastructure reference group including the EC, AUC, chairs and co-chairs of the different partnerships, Germany, Mauritius, Tunisia, Finland.

**Key achievements in this thematic area include the setting up of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust fund (AITF) – already in gestation before the JAES – in which both the European Commission and EU member states contribute. The AITF (see Annex 1) brings together grants and loans to enhance to support to infrastructure development in Africa. The partnership is aligned with the Program for Infrastructure for Africa (PIDA) and other wider international initiatives such as the International Consortium for Infrastructure in Africa (ICA). Stakeholders thus stress the need to coordinate the various partnership initiatives focusing on infrastructure** (transport, energy, ICT, water sectors).

### 2.4 Brief examples and lessons from other partnerships

In 2007 Heads of State endorsed a very ambitious agenda for the JAES partnership with eight thematic clusters. Some common lessons can be drawn from their implementation.

Political steering makes the difference in giving traction to implementation. **When partnerships’ co-chairs, member states or other stakeholders were keen to push a political and technical agenda, they managed to obtain some results.** This is not only true for partnership 2 on human rights but also for the partnership on research and energy in which the line DGs of the European Commission pursued their agenda, in partnership with their African counterparts. Clear connections between technical and political levels were found, as indicated for instance by messages conveyed by the High level meeting on energy to the Africa-Europe April 2014 Summit.

**Flexibility in dialogue and cooperation formats gave more room for manoeuvre to JAES implementation.** When some partnerships were blocked by contentious issues or by lack of buy-in from stakeholders, alternative avenues for cooperation were identified and used. This happened in the case of energy: the partnership was supported by a secretariat embedded in the existing EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility.

**Alignment on existing European and African long-term strategies.** Examples of such practice can be found in the realm of space cooperation with the GMES-focused BRAGMA programme funded by DG research and used to implement parts of Partnership 8 of the JAES.

**An example of joint financing from Africa and Europe is the ERAfrica (European Research Area Network for Africa).** This project, financed by the 7th Framework Programme, and falling under the Partnership 8, encourages joint calls for research proposals to **promote long-term cooperation between EU Member States and/or associated countries and African countries.** The first joint call for proposals was made in January 2013 with a budget of 10 million euros financed out of a common fund pooled by the participating countries. The European Commission acting as catalyst provided funding of 2 million euros under the 7th Framework Programme for Research for 2007-2013 (see Annex 1). The five African countries alone contributed almost half of the total funds. The call finances three types of cooperative activities - research, innovation and capacity building - in three thematic fields (renewable

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114 See the official website of the initiative at: http://www.aeep-conference.org/
115 See the official website of the initiative at: http://www.euei-pdf.org/
116 See the official website of the initiative at: http://www.bragma.eu/home/default.asp?page=gmesafrica
117 States that joined so far are: Austria, Belgium, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Kenya, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, Burkina Faso, the Côte d’Ivoire, Norway, and the Netherlands.
energies, interfacing challenges -challenges of common interest- and “new ideas”). Each project had to involve at least four countries, two European and two African.

Another interesting case is food security. This theme features under the MDG JAES Partnership, and it does not seem to have produced anything concrete there. However, the relevant long term continental AU strategy, CAADP, is an important reference framework also for the EU who is supporting it at the continental, regional and national levels, and also chairing the continental level donors working group (for 2013 and 2014). The EC alone committed 20m $ to the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund in 2008. During the period 2007 – 2013, the EU has also provided assistance through the Food Security Thematic Programme (over €140m per year between 2008 and 2012 for Africa). There are still opportunities ahead in the future for the JAES to benefit from the relatively good cooperation between AU and EU in the framework of food security\(^\text{118}\). The year 2014 is going to be particularly interesting, since it was declared the AU Year of Food Security, and bold efforts will be made to make CAADP more result-oriented. In this context, the EU-AU Heads of State Summit could cover food and nutrition security, but not in terms of European donors supporting African beneficiaries, rather having EU and AU committing to act together for the food and nutrition security of both continents (e.g. attract the much needed investments to African agriculture while using the potential of bio-diverse systems to address climate change and resource scarcity problems

2.5 Where do we stand one month before the summit? The impact of JAES implementation on the broader Africa-Europe relations:

The cancellation in 2010 of the last joint EU-Africa JAES ministerial meeting had a negative impact on the implementation of the partnership, which in many respect lost traction. Crosscutting and sensitive issues must be regularly addressed at political level. When this was not done in an appropriate way, Africa and Europe failed to find a common ground. This has been the case for governance crises, issues around decisions of the International Criminal Court, the Economic Partnership Agreements, conflicts and crises requiring international response (Libya), migration tragedies.

While preparations for the summit started to be on the agenda of institutions in late 2012, both sides have not yet managed to conduct a formal negotiation process till mid-February 2014. African stakeholders often have the impression that the EU imposes its agenda on them, and this nurtures mistrust.

On the African side, a brainstorming meeting took place in Zanzibar in July 2013 and issued a preliminary position document on a number of points related to the JAES implementation. Apart from exchanges of documents and informal talks at senior official level (Commissioner for development, Managing director for Africa, Directors General and Deputy DGs, EU special envoy for the summit), formal preparation meetings have been delayed for several months.

On the EU side, a number of negotiation documents were discussed and agreed before being shared with African counterparts. They comprise a draft political declaration, a joint way forward document (supposed to follow up on existing action plans) and a technical document presenting key data summarising the economic, trade and social magnitude of Africa-Europe relations. In addition, a consultation document on the PANAF has also been circulated, while strategic dialogue between the European Commission and the European Parliament (DEVE Committee) on programming is ongoing.

CSOs play a role in identifying strategic priorities, implementing and monitoring the initiatives of

\(^{118}\) Rampa (2013).
the JAES. Their participation takes place in JAES structures such as the iJEGs\textsuperscript{119} and the JTF\textsuperscript{120}/\textsuperscript{121} and was made possible through the setting up of two CSO steering committees, with the support of the Commissions of the African and European Unions\textsuperscript{122}. From the outset, the JAES has taken into account the active participation of the civil society, however CSOs do not feel sufficiently included in the process\textsuperscript{123}. CSOs regularly formulate clear requirements\textsuperscript{124} that they consider necessary to fulfil if the JAES is to make a difference\textsuperscript{125}.

In the last year, interests for and requests to the JAES Support Mechanism by stakeholders from civil society, youth and some member states from both sides have increased, indicating some forms of revival of implementation efforts. Whether this latest trend is only related to the preparation process of the 2014 summit remains unclear. In October 2013, African and European civil societies gathered at the Second Africa-EU Civil Society Forum in Brussels to debate their involvement in the JAES and agreed on a joint declaration expressing their concern on the limited potential for CSO participation in the future\textsuperscript{126}. Think tanks, NGOs and foundations have also started to become more active in organising numerous debates and conferences on the summit and the future of the JAES.

In a number of partnerships, the pace of dialogue and cooperation has actually intensified for instance this is the case for infrastructure, satellite cooperation (GMES) and research cooperation. In other areas like cultural cooperation it has been revitalised.

Potentially contentious issues threatening the summit have been addressed in a quite systematic manner and tensions mitigation efforts will probably continue up to and during the summit itself: disagreements over the role of the International Criminal Court, African requests to discuss EPAs at political level, sensitive invitations of controversial heads of state (Zimbabwe), and sensitive governance and human rights situations.

There seems to be a consensus on the creation of the PANAF, but little common ground on the way the JAES implementation should be reformed. In early February 2014, EU sources underlined that there was no common official African position on this matter. It was reported to the authors of this report that the position of African ambassadors in Addis did not always reflect that of their capitals. It is also not clear how official the positions taken by the African brainstorming group gathered in Zanzibar in July 2013 are (particularly on the need to institutionalise and formalise further the iJEGs to, inter alia, ensure the participation of AU member states)\textsuperscript{127}. Formal negotiations between high-level representatives from both sides started in the second week of February 2014 in Addis Ababa. Among the issues to be discussed were: the main political priorities of the JAES; the question of invitations to African heads of states with which Cotonou agreement’s article 96 were in application, or to those under

\textsuperscript{119} which gather sectoral expertise and institutional representatives

\textsuperscript{120} where the EU and AU Commissions convene and where civil society participates when invited.

\textsuperscript{121} Martinelli (2014).

\textsuperscript{122} Chilengi & Karshausen (2013).

\textsuperscript{123} In October 2013, representatives from 32 African and 36 European CSOs met at the Second Africa-EU Civil Society Forum in Brussels in order to develop ideas for reforming the JAES in the perspective of the upcoming Summit. Participants of the Forum have observed with particular concern that the current reform proposals limit the potential for CSO participation.

\textsuperscript{124} Martinelli (2014).

\textsuperscript{125} Suggestions include the setting up civil society working groups whose representatives would also sit in decision making fora, the creation of a permanent secretariat or an intercontinental women’s forum. Through the CSO Brussels Declaration on the JAES, specific recommendations were given pertaining to all partnerships including DGHR.

\textsuperscript{126} See more at: http://www.concordeurope.org/282-eu-africa-civil-society-forum-october-2013#sthash.KCUf3BL1.dpuf


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indictment from the International Criminal Court; the inclusion of EPAs on the agenda of the summit; priorities for the Pan-African Programme; the future structure for JAES implementation, including the number of reshuffled thematic clusters (partnerships) and above all their content.

More developments are to be expected in the weeks leading to the April 2014 summit.
3. THE FUTURE OF THE JAES AND AFRICA-EUROPE RELATIONS: JUST A LEADERSHIP ISSUE?

3.1 Reforming and refreshing the JAES to match new African and European realities

The JAES, as a political document, offers a very ambitious vision of relations between two continents. As a political statement and a reference, it is global in its scope and inclusive in its composition: in practice it can only lead to a multiplication of implementation options, channels and mechanisms gathering states, institutions and societies.

Each JAES partnerships’ implementation has evolved according to the specificities of the policy areas it covered and went through adjustments, reviews and reform in the last seven years, mirroring some of the realities of Africa-Europe relations: de facto separation or merge of certain dialogues on specific issues (infrastructure, human rights); realisation that certain partnerships lost relevance (MDGs)\(^\text{128}\); primacy of alternative frameworks (peace and security); adaptation and transformation into existing cooperation and dialogue initiatives (space).

There is a clear convergence of views amongst stakeholders that the JAES implementation architecture as it was imagined in 2007 was not a bad idea (it actually favoured many informal exchanges and helped boosting several partnerships or individual initiatives) but was not adequate as a one-size-fits all method. In that sense, assessments made in 2010 are still fully relevant\(^\text{129}\).

Secondly, it is now being acknowledged that the JAES partnership is by nature an evolving framework virtually and potentially encompassing any intercontinental initiative between Africans and Europeans.

Thirdly, whatever implementation architecture is decided in April 2014, the JAES partnership will remain one option amongst others to foster dialogue and cooperation between Africa and Europe.

Fourthly, there is still a lot of confusion amongst stakeholders on the appropriate level (continental, regional, national) at which JAES implementation should preferably take place and this requires clarification during the upcoming summit.

Against this background, options for the rationalisation of the existing technical organisation can certainly be envisaged and are without doubt worth considering, but they will by no means suffice to overcome deeper political challenges and dilemmas remaining in Africa Europe relations (see box below). Both parties will need to agree on clear timeframe for their partnership. Current practice is to hold summits approximately every 3 years. With the Cotonou agreement and the EU Multiannual Financial Framework coming to an end in 2020, that year will be relevant to hold a summit closing a new 7-year cycle of partnership.

\(^{128}\) Mostly because it was deemed that the national level was more appropriate.

\(^{129}\) Bossuyt and Sherriff (2010).
Table 5. The JAES partnership: paradoxes and dilemmas

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradoxes</th>
<th>Dilemmas</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Leadership inconsistencies on both sides. The JAES aims to provide an</td>
<td>1. Addressing leadership issues highly sensitive on both sides. Compromise to be found on</td>
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<td>overarching single framework for Africa-EU relations. However, the internal</td>
<td>joint criteria identifying relevant leadership on both sides.</td>
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<td>coherence of leadership on each side (individual role of Member States,</td>
<td>2. Compromise to be found between efficiency, flexibility and use of</td>
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<td>RECs, EU and AU institutions and bodies) is questionable.</td>
<td>agreed structures</td>
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<td>2. Cumbersome implementation structures. The JAES institutional structures</td>
<td>3. Compromise to be found between the need to address asymmetry in</td>
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<td>have a consultative nature and are not linked to decision-making bodies</td>
<td>capacities the objective of progress in implementation. Compromise to</td>
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<td>with a clear ‘chain of command’. Partnerships seem to have achieved the</td>
<td>be found on the way to ensure that planning is done jointly in the spirit</td>
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<td>most when left to function according to their own devices and building on</td>
<td>of the partnership.</td>
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<td>existing structures.</td>
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<td>3. Asymmetries in capacities. The JAES is to be jointly implemented, but</td>
<td>4. Compromise to be found on co-financing and working jointly through</td>
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<td>there is no joint decision-making. Asymmetrical capacities of the</td>
<td>existing and new (PANAF in particular) financial architecture.</td>
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<td>EU and EU member states compared to the AU and African states. The asym-</td>
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<td>metry affects the implementation of the partnership.</td>
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<td>4. Asymmetries in financing. The JAES aims to create a partnership</td>
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<td>between equals, yet the funding is mostly coming unilaterally from EU</td>
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<td>and EU member states. Challenge to ensure the principle of equal footing</td>
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<td>is respected when implementing the partnership.</td>
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A number of options have already started to emerge or to be suggested in the last few years with the view to refreshing and reforming the implementation of the JAES. The European Parliament could build on them in its messages to heads of state and government:

a) The reconfirmation at the political level of the JAES spirit and vision for the next seven years, giving political traction to all subsequent implementation efforts. This would in particular reflect changes in the way Europe and Africa view their respective strategic partnerships in the world and where the JAES fits in this broader picture.

b) The holding of regular dialogue at political level along a jointly agreed political roadmap, with a clear identification of where political leadership (in the AU and the EU) will come from. With the changes of leadership in the EU after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, clarification is needed about who in the EU should lead JAES-related dialogue. This would also help clarify the role of the new chairmanship of the AUC in dealing with the implementation of the JAES (still managed by the AUCs Department of Economic Affairs).

c) The alignment of the partnerships on the African and European continental and global agendas. Progress has been made in this realm in the last JAES implementation phase and appreciated by both sides. The lesson learnt is that it should be done more systematically.

d) The definition of mixed short, mid- and long-term objectives for implementation and clarification of the level of intervention (continent, region, states, etc.). In areas
where the partnerships were aligned with long-term plans, this option became obvious. Yet, the focus on “quick-wins” of certain partnerships remains and would deserve more attention.

e) **The allocation of JAES-related funds for JAES-related implementation.** The innovation of the PANAF is a clear indication of rationalisation of the implementation approach. The main challenge is to ensure ownership of its use.

f) **The identification of resources required for each component of implementation initiatives.** This principle, if applied, would help avoiding the “Christmas tree approach” criticised by stakeholders.

g) **The use of existing institutional decision-making frameworks on each side instead of JAES consultative experts groups.** This has been already suggested on the EU side, for instance through an increased use of the Council’s working groups to discuss relevant Africa-related issues. On the contrary, the African side has expressed its interest in formalising further the existing implementation system of JEGs.

h) **The clarification of the participation and role of civil society and private sector.** While the holding of consultative experts meetings potentially gave space to CSOs, there is a risk to lose it if the JAES becomes implemented only in existing institutions.

i) **The creation of clear “chains of command” between consultative bodies and decision-making bodies.**

### 3.2 Improving implementation and financing the JAES: prospects and debates

The financing of the JAES was the subject of several exchanges between the African Union Commission (AUC) and the European Commission (EC) and has been a contentious issue from the start\(^{130}\).

#### 3.2.1 The Pan-African Programme (PANAF): treating Africa as one, but on whose terms?

The EC proposed in its Communication, « A budget for Europe 2020»\(^{131}\), the establishment of a €1 billion Pan-African Programme, under the development cooperation instrument (DCI 2014-2020)\(^{132}\). The PANAF (Annex 2) will hence be one of the instruments in support of the Strategy. It is derived directly from the conclusions of the Lisbon and Tripoli Summits\(^{133} \ 134\) and will not replace but complement other actions within the JAES. Those that are better addressed at geographic level (by the 11\(^{th}\) EDF national, regional and intra-ACP programmes, ENPI) or thematic level (thematic instruments and external dimension of other budget lines, e.g. Horizon 2020) will continue to be funded and programmed as foreseen by the respective programmes.

The DCI regulation envisages that the newly created PANAF will support the implementation of the Joint-Africa EU Strategy and its successive action plans, covering a wide range of issues from peace and security, trade and regional integration to the MDGs and democratic governance and human rights. In particular, financial support will focus on cross regional, continental or global activities, as well as on joint Africa-EU initiatives in the global arena. It is furthermore specified

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\(^{130}\) ECDPM internal source.

\(^{131}\) European Commission (2011b).


\(^{133}\) There Africa and the EU took the commitment at the highest political level to implement the JAES through an ambitious and far-reaching operational agenda.

that the multiannual indicative programme should be based on the reviewed JAES and its new work programme, supposed to be adopted at the EU-Africa Summit of April 2014.\(^{135}\)

The creation of the PANAF is seen by many interviewees as an encouraging step forward and made possible thanks to new EU regulation allowing for the creation of a dedicated financial envelope for the JAES. Until now, the partnership was instead funded through a variety of instruments with no clear streamlining. The Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) covering the period 2014-2020 now allocates some 845 million to the PANAF.\(^{136}\) Within the EU institutions, strategic discussions around the forthcoming programming of the PANAF have taken place all along 2013 while consultations with African and European stakeholders (institutions, member states, regional and international organisations such as the AfDB for instance) are still being undertaken.\(^{137}\) A consultation paper for programming 2014-2017 on the PANAF is being circulated. DEVCO has now entered an intense programming schedule expected to lead to the final adoption of the programmed PANAF by the EU College of Commissioners in July 2014. This will be followed by the usual programming cycle. First contracts for implementation are expected to start late in 2014 or perhaps early 2015.

Apart from its usual programming procedure, the very existence of the PANAF seems to create relative consensus within the EU institutions. Its main priorities are aligned on the last College to College meeting conclusions of April 2014 and on existing pan-African agendas: PIDA for infrastructure, CAADP for agriculture, AGA for governance. Some work is being done about the possibility to create an envelope for civil society engagement, migration issues and climate-related activities.

What is less clear at this stage is the way European and African Member States will be associated to the programming and follow-up of the PANAF. As a matter of fact, the legal basis of the PANAF contradicts the principle of a genuinely joint strategy. The EU can at best consult with African partners and member, which means that the quality of the on-going policy and political dialogue during the consultation phase related to the use of PANAF will be a key for success.

As for EU member states, only five or six of them are effectively engaged in the support of pan-African initiatives directly with the AUC. This creates opportunities (though limited) for joint programming in this area. The rest of the member states will intervene in the programming process through comitology procedures. How the PANAF process will be articulated with the rest of the to-be-reorganised JAES implementation set-up remains to be seen in practice.

3.2.2 Resource mobilisation and allocation

The JAES outlines that financing is a shared responsibility that goes far beyond the European Commission and that African and European partners agreed to work closely together to secure appropriate funding. The Partnership Document states: *Where possible [EU] instruments will be complemented by further contribution by EU Members States. Moreover, whenever possible, African financial instruments and AU Member States shall contribute to this process and an involvement of African financial institutions such as the African Development Bank will be ensured as appropriate.*\(^{39}\)

In order to improve implementation of the JAES in the sense of the partnership, interviewees

\(^{135}\) CONCORD (2013).

\(^{136}\) Mackie, E; Fassi, R; Rocca & Grosse-Puppendahl (2013).

\(^{137}\) The European Commission has provided the EP with a document ahead of the strategic dialogue.


\(^{139}\) Joint Africa – EU Strategy (2007).
have made clear that it is crucial to cooperate on the issue of financing and adjust tools to new realities. **Funding for the JAES is however still mainly coming from the EC.** On the one hand financial resources are disbursed through existing financial instruments within the EU budget that are external to the JAES. Among the EC funding instruments are the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Instrument for Stability, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights or the EU Food Facility (see Annex 1). The EU delegation to the AU also manages several pan-African projects. **The African Union Support Programmes** for example provide institutional support to the AU and its organs with funds from ninth and tenth EDF (€55M and €33 respectively). Specific implementation support mechanisms have also been created for the Migration, Mobility, & Employment and Energy partnerships. The EU also supports regional programmes carried out by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) with EDF funds, thereby contributing to African integration, but outside of the very framework of the JAES partnerships. Other activities also support initiatives across the entire continent, involving studies, workshops and deployment of Technical Assistance. The funding comes both from EU budget lines as well as from the EDF, notably the Intra-ACP envelope. On the other hand, funds are also directed from other instruments, from non-EU bodies or from collective EU & Member States' assistance (ODA) to Africa. The European Investment Bank finances for example several types of projects, with a strategic focus on infrastructure (energy, water, transport, telecoms) and financial sectors (SMEs, microfinance), while climate action is a crosscutting priority. Available instruments are notably the Africa EU Infrastructure Trust Fund (see Annex 1) and the Investment Facility for ACP countries, funded by the EDF and Member States contributions. The latter, mandated to support the development of the private sector in ACP countries, is a revolving fund where loan amortisations are reinvested in new operations. The EIB can also invest its own resources to finance public sector investments and private sector projects covered by a third party guarantee. Funds are also provided through AU Member States and African instruments and institutions such as the African Development Bank. In general it is extremely difficult to differentiate between the initiatives that are funded due to and within the JAES and those instruments that provide financial support in areas that incidentally contributing to the objectives of the JAES.

The achievements of the **JAES Support Mechanism (JSM)**, introduced for specific needs and technical support were generally acknowledged by both sides (such as by the 16th JTF that took place in October 2013 in Brussels). The JSM has facilitated several events and produced a series of studies and other initiatives since its creation after the Tripoli Summit in 2010. It has also encouraged communication within institutions that are informed about and need to agree on activities proposed for example by the iJEGs. The budget of the JAES support mechanism was

141 See more at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african_union/eu_african_union/development_cooperation/index_en.htm
143 See more at http://www.eu-africa-infrastructure-tf.net/about/index.htm
144 See more at http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/eib_in_acp_and_oct_en.pdf
147 See more at http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/about-us/financing-partnership
EUR 10 Mio from the 10th EDF Intra-ACP envelope\textsuperscript{149}. With new financial resources being made available on the EU side, the ability of the JAES to deliver will depend on the effective use of dedicated mechanisms designed for its implementation. In addition, as emphasised by a number of interviewees, it will also depend on co-financing from the African side if the joint character of the JAES is to be respected and a renewed slide into a traditional donor-recipient relationship avoided. The willingness to work jointly on co-financed initiatives and the efficiency of the new financial architecture (including but also beyond the PANAF) will ultimately depend on the political ambitions set by heads of state at the forthcoming summit.

4. CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER ATTENTION

4.1 Summary of issues and overall assessment

The JAES is both a political declaration and a joint work plan, the Africa-Europe Strategic Partnership, composed of a variety of cooperation initiatives.

The implementation of the JAES shows that the initial ambitious vision that drove it is still very much needed: a continent to continent political relation and joint action in all sectors beyond aid, as the main engine of and reference for any type of Africa-Europe dialogue. The JAES as a political declaration and statement of intent remains an essential component of Africa-Europe relations, especially after three years without any ministerial meeting between the two continents. The quality and political atmosphere of the upcoming Africa-Europe summit is of primary importance to ensure genuine buy-in from all participating member states.

Two options are on the table for the summit in April 2014: 1) to lower the political ambition of the JAES and make it more an implementation focused agreement or 2) to mobilise political leadership by making it more interesting to the political level on both sides.

The success of the April 2014 summit cannot be taken for granted. Despite recent progress in addressing some of them, a number of hurdles still lie on the road, even if they don’t block it anymore: the absence of clear European leadership dealing with Africa (and vice-versa), the Economic Partnership Agreements, the European and African stance on the International Criminal Court, the question of invitations to heads of state whose countries are under restrictive measures by the EU or other international organisations.

The implementation of the JAES partnership unfolded into a variety of dialogue and policy processes, each evolving at their own pace and according to the existence of mutual interests between the parties. Some frameworks de facto became split, merged or dormant to match real cooperation and dialogue processes happening elsewhere.

Where the stakeholders of each of the 8 Partnerships (on both sides) have been flexible and imaginative they have moved ahead (eg. Infrastructure, Democracy HR and Culture after some time) and found the JAES a useful supportive framework. Nevertheless, where they have not been willing to enter into the spirit of the JAES, cooperation and dialogue have blocked. The big example of the latter is of course is the EPAs but also major security crises or positions on the role of the ICC.

The most notable and tangible outcomes of the partnerships can be found in a number of areas. In peace and security and infrastructure, pre-existing funding facilities allowed the

partnership to develop often outside or beyond JAES structures. In trade and economic integration, though EPAs negotiations were kept out of the JAES framework, more engagement from thematic DGs of the European Commission with Africa was achieved. On governance, human rights and cultural cooperation, dialogue proved tough and it happened that some contentious issues polluted other joint agendas. Yet innovative solutions were found and new ways of joint action on human rights (in connection with UN processes in Geneva) and on culture (focusing on issues of mutual interest) have been identified and experimented. The intensification of cooperation on space and research (focusing on GMES) has also been remarkable.

The JAES implementation framework is almost unanimously criticised for being too bureaucratic and cumbersome, but its use and its transformation by politically aware and motivated stakeholders became effective and possible in conducive environments.

The fragmentation of existing initiatives in a variety of heterogeneous formats is not a risk in itself as long as it effectively serves a joint African-European coherent political purpose. For this to happen, more political leadership and steering will need to be ensured from both sides.

4.2 Areas for further attention

The main avenue for the future of the JAES is to invest on what is functioning and to take stock of what is deemed effective and successful so as to replicate it in the next seven year-period leading to 2020. Against this background, the European Parliament could, in its message to heads of state and government, emphasise a number of priorities for the upcoming Africa-EU summit of April 2014 and future implementation of the Africa-EU partnership:

At the political level and in political declarations:

- Clearly identify sustainable political leadership and steering from both sides, exerted at Commissions and member states levels, formalised in regular high-level ministerial meetings with follow-up mechanisms.
- Renew commitment to ensure co-financed initiatives and joint decision-making on the use of existing and new (PANAF) financial architecture.
- Confirm alignment on African and European long-term continental and global strategies. This was done in a number of policy areas (Infrastructure/PIDA, agriculture/CAADP, etc.).
- Clarify relevant and appropriate levels of intervention (continental, regional, national) of JAES implementation according to the subsidiarity principle.

Regarding the financing of Africa-EU partnerships:

- Provide available funds. This was possible through thematic “African facilities”, trust funds or co-financing, but also technical support mechanisms, ensuring strong buy-in and ownership of both sides. The creation of PANAF is a step forward for the JAES implementation and offers new opportunities but also raises new challenges related to ownership and the joint character of the partnership.

As per dialogue and implementation frameworks:

- Ensure functional and direct linkages with existing international, African and European decision-making structures.
- Create available space for informal multi-stakeholder dialogue paving the ground for mutual understanding and coalitions of the willing. This was ensured by some of the iJEGs and perhaps even more so by flexible ad hoc technical and experts consultation meetings in a variety of appropriate formats maturing and evolving over time according to stakeholders’ needs and interests.
Monitoring and oversight:
- **Strengthen** monitoring and oversight mechanisms on JAES implementation, **defining the role of parliaments, civil society** and other relevant bodies.

There is a **need to get back to the essence of the joint strategy and ask again fundamental questions ahead of the summit. Parliaments could play an instrumental role**, ensuring that African and European stakeholders address a number of fundamental questions:

**In political dialogue and declarations:**
- Both sides will need to identify more precisely in which concrete areas their mutual interests lie.
- The summit would benefit from **singling out the few big flagship initiatives of next seven years.**
- The EU side could **sketch out more clearly its key strategic interests** (EU institutions, member states, civil society and private sector) in its relation with Africa.
- The African side could be clearer on **about the added value of the JAES for African stakeholders** (from the AU, the RECs, the member states, civil society and private sector) in comparison to other global partnerships.
- More candidness on **whom in Africa wants (or not) Africa to be treated as one** would clarify the Africa-EU relation.
- Ultimately the parties will have to decide how they want to **structure their relations after 2020 once the EU-ACP Cotonou agreement comes to an end.** More clarity on the future of the ACP group will be needed and the stakeholders of the JAES still have time to agree on a common position on this issue.

**Monitoring, oversight and people-centred relations:**
- More work needs to be done on **the creation of relevant space and role to civil society and private sector in the partnership.**
- Similarly, the **role for parliaments in monitoring and oversight** of the JAES has to be clarified.

**Implementation and financing:**
- Both parties will need **constant political guidance** to continuously translate the principle of “equal footing” in the partnership into practice while asymmetries in capacity remain.
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Annex 1: Financial resources for cooperation with Africa

Initiatives under the JAES can be financed through all existing financial resources at disposal of the EU for cooperation with African countries and organisations. This includes European Commission's resources as well as EU Member States’ contributions and bilateral programs. For instance under the 9th EDF eight MS contributed, via the African Peace Facility (APF) to AMIS, the mission to Sudan, while under the 10th EDF Belgium made a voluntary contribution to the MICOPAX mission to the Central African Republic (600 million Euro). The following instruments have been at the disposal of the EC for the period 2007-2013. The beneficiaries are not exclusively African actors, therefore the amount of resources is only an indication of available funding, not of funding allocated or disbursed to the benefit of Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Available resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Development Fund (EDF), is the main instrument for the EU's cooperation with 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (including 48 countries from sub-Saharan Africa).</td>
<td>€ 22.7 billion between 2007-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), covering the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which include five North African countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt.</td>
<td>€ 11,181 billion between 2007-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), funding EU’s cooperation with South Africa, as well as thematic programmes that benefit all developing countries. These thematic programmes cover social sectors such as education and health; environment and natural resources; non-state actors and local authorities; food security; and migration and asylum.</td>
<td>€ 10,057 billion between 2007-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a thematic instrument providing support to civil society and intergovernmental organisations for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries.</td>
<td>€ 1.104 billion between 2007-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Instrument for Stability (IfS) is a thematic tool providing a rapid response mechanism to address global security issues.</td>
<td>€ 2.062 billion for 2007-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU Food Facility is a thematic line responding to problems caused by soaring food prices in developing countries.</td>
<td>€ 1 billion between 2008-2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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153 Hendrickson, Ball, Olonisakin, Morillon & Cadji (2013).
156 The EDF funds the ACP Investment Facility, which receives also funding from Member States, managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB). See more at http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/eib_in_acp_financing_conditions_and_instruments_en.pdf.
157 Around 90% of the ENPI is devoted to bilateral actions while the remaining 10% is allocated to cross-border actions and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), which finances capital-intensive infrastructure projects in the countries covered by the ENP. The NIF brings together grants from the EC and the EU Member States with loans from European public finance institutions, as well as own contributions from the partner countries. See more at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/irc/investment_en.htm.
Some of these instruments have undergone changes with the adoption of the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020:

- the ENPI is now called European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI);
- the IfS is now called Instrument for Stability and Peace (ISP);
- the DCI has taken the name of Instrument for Development Cooperation and features a dedicated envelope, the Pan-African Programme (PANAF) which will finance continent-wide African initiatives (see Annex 2).


In addition, some partnerships have dedicated sources of funding, such as:

- The African Peace Facility (APF) funds peace operations and capacity building to operationalise APSA. Since 2004 the APF received more than € 1.1 billion, of which, € 932 million have been contracted and € 764.98 million have been spent in 2004-2012. Funded operations include AU missions in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and the ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX)155.

- The Africa-EU Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) supports infrastructure projects in energy, water, transport and ICT with a regional or transnational dimension in Sub-Saharan Africa. The ITF blends grants from the European Commission and some EU Member States, with long-term loan finance made available by eligible financiers. Since its inception in 2007 the ITF has provided grants for more than € 378 million with an estimated leverage effect of 12.8 per Euro invested156.

Partnerships can also be funded from the international components of EU budget lines financing activities in EU member states and abroad, such as the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) for 2007-2013 which funded activities under Partnership 8. Through this instrument, the EU has contributed with around €140 million to some 400 cooperative research projects with Africa and Europe, with almost 1000 participants from 42 African countries. The African partners co-funded € 44 million. In addition, by February 2013, 265 African fellows received Marie Curie Fellowships at European institutions and 125 European fellows have received Marie Curie Fellowships at research institutions in 11 African countries.157 In the new MFF for 2014-2020, African institutions could be beneficiaries of the Horizon 2020 program.

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155 Hendrickson, Ball, Olonisakin, Morillon & Cadji (2013).
156 Africa-EU Infrastructure Trust Fund (2013).
Annex 2: Pan-african programme (panaf)

Background

The Pan-African Programme will be one of the instruments in support of the Strategy. It is derived directly from the conclusions of the Lisbon and Tripoli Summits, where Africa and the EU took the commitment at the highest political level to implement the JAES through an ambitious and far-reaching operational agenda. Both sides decided to expand their cooperation, including in promising new areas not covered by their traditional development cooperation, and to jointly address global challenges.

Since 2009, the European and the Pan-African Parliaments have called in several Resolutions for the creation of a dedicated financial instrument to support the Joint Strategy. The creation of the Pan-African Programme in the DCI (MFF 2014-2020) provides the EU with the necessary financial means for the implementation of the agreed political priorities, covering the range of issues addressed under the Africa-EU Partnership.

A major innovation from the Pan-African Programme comes from the fact that it addresses Africa as a whole and allows the EU for linking up its cooperation with North and South Africa with sub-Saharan Africa. The programme will be the visible and concrete tool for the EU to follow through on its commitment to "Treat Africa as One". It will underpin our strategic partnership with an operational engine, which will in return strengthen our political and policy dialogue. It will demonstrate that the EU remains Africa's privileged partner, and will distinguish the EU from other established or new interlocutors of Africa.

It is important to underline that the Pan-African Programme will not replace but complement other actions within the Africa-EU Partnership that are better addressed at another geographic (11th EDF national, regional and intra-ACP programmes, ENI) or thematic level (thematic instruments and external dimension of other budget lines, e.g. Horizon 2020 or Home Affairs).

Features

The Pan-African Programme has the following specific features:

1. Pan African added value: The programme shall focus on activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature in and with Africa (Northern Africa and South Africa included), and support joint Africa-EU initiatives in the global arena. It will be used where a Pan-African approach provides an added value.

2. Shared African and EU interests, mutually beneficial cooperation: initiatives financed through the Pan-African Programme will reflect the key objectives, priorities and principles of the Partnership, including shared interest and mutually beneficial cooperation. They should also translate future political orientations. All activities will be conceived so as to achieve the highest degree of coherence between the policies and strategies and the development objectives of both the EU and Africa.

3. Complementarity: initiatives under the Pan-African Programme shall complement and promote synergies with other instruments (the 11th EDF and geographic and thematic instruments funded on the EU budget). In particular synergies and mutually reinforcing actions should be envisaged with the ENI and South Africa to address questions of shared interest between countries at regional and sub-regional level. The Pan-African Programme will be used in close coordination with the other funding sources, in particular from the EU, from Member States and from the African Union.
Policy areas

All policy areas and sectors proposed fall under the scope of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the overall EU-Africa cooperation and are consistent with the European Agenda for Change; and the EU's overall objectives for external action of promoting democracy, peace, solidarity, stability, prosperity and poverty reduction and helping safeguard global public goods.

The programme shall in particular provide support in the following areas of the partnership:

- Peace and security,
- Democratic governance and human rights,
- Trade, regional integration and infrastructure (including raw materials),
- MDGs and post 2015 internationally agreed new development targets,
- Energy,
- Climate change and environment,
- Migration, mobility and employment,
- Science, information society and space,
- Crosscutting issues.
ANNEX 3: PARTNERSHIP 1 – PEACE AND SECURITY

N.B. This table has no claim to provide an exhaustive list of initiatives implemented under the Partnership 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Area</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Concrete action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Dialogue</td>
<td><strong>Initiative 1)</strong> Completion and implementation of the political dialogue framework by establishing systematic and structural linkages between EU COPS-AU PSC, EU and AU Chiefs of Staff, and between the new EU (EEAS) structures, the AUC and RECs Peace and Security Departments. The objective is to increase the involvement at this political level in reviewing actions already undertaken, and on providing increased political guidance for the future.</td>
<td>Annual meetings between the EU COPS and AU PSC have been organised since 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Dialogue</td>
<td><strong>Initiative 2)</strong> Consultations between the Africa Group and the EU will be established in New York on the basis of major global challenges discussed in UNSC and UNGA (e.g. conflicts, terrorism, CBRN proliferation and conventional disarmament). Programmes and agenda for such consultations will be established on a yearly basis and be reviewed every six months in order to allow adequate preparation of the meetings at Headquarters levels.</td>
<td>The two PSCs are also engaging in dialogue in the areas of maritime safety and security and transnational security threats, especially in the Sahel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Dialogue</td>
<td><strong>Initiative 3)</strong> Exert coordinated and concerted efforts to combat piracy, including in the framework of the UN; and consider the elaboration of legal instruments which may be deemed appropriate to enhance cooperation on all piracy related issues.</td>
<td>The EU supports the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The total committed APF contribution to AMISOM amounted to €411.4 million at the end of 2012, and it covered costs such as troop allowances, salaries for police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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158 Due to the sensitivity of the issues and processes which are still ongoing, it was not possible to complete the table for all items. It is worth noting that initiatives and political and policy dialogue is ongoing at various levels, including through “the first-rate work of the Peace and Security Sector of the EU Delegation to the Africa Union. Its role in advising, informing and coordinating input in Peace and Security matters from the international community present in the Ethiopian capital deserves to be publicly acknowledged”. See Costa Pereira (2013).

159 AU PSC & EU PSC (2013).

160 Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).
1. Political Dialogue

**Initiative 4)** In addressing crises and challenges to P&S in Africa, Europe and elsewhere, specific Africa-EU ad hoc thematic teams will be established in order to ensure coordination and cooperation. To this effect, the added value of these teams might be particularly beneficial for tackling post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction and development, and strengthening the role of women in all stages, to consolidate the progress made in resolving conflicts in Africa and take advantage of the experience and capabilities of Europe. These teams will involve the International Community stakeholders as appropriate, and will optimize the follow-up to the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). In this regard, the African Union will complete a study on the establishment of a Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre.  

No information publicly available.

1. Political Dialogue

**Initiative 5)** Thematic cluster sessions with experts from AU/RECs/RMs/MS/EU will be created on operational objectives in areas such as climate change and security, AU border programme, including exchange of experience, capacity building, cross-border co-operation, development of legal instruments, and disarmament issues (including Explosive Remnants of War), or focusing on geographical areas. These initiatives could lead to the organisation of Europe-Africa conferences on these themes.  

No information publicly available.

1. Political Dialogue

**Initiative 6)** Informal consultations between the AU, EU and UN, to follow-up the recommendations of the AU/UN Report chaired by Mr. Romano Prodi, and the UN Secretary General Report of September 2009, should enable the three organisations Discussions are ongoing on both sides. The AU and EU have engaged discussions with non traditional donors (China, Turkey, League of Arab States).  

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The implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding confidence and commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Political Dialogue</th>
<th>Initiative 7) Building on the AU Border Programme, as well as on the rich experience of the EU in this field, we will programme activities to be undertaken together, including exchange of experience, capacity building, cross-border co-operation and development of legal instruments. This initiative could also be extended, through the support of EU Member States, to exchanges of experience on delimitation and demarcation of borders.</th>
<th>The EU supports African border initiatives through national and regional indicative programmes. It is open to consider providing support to the AUBP strategic plan.163</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Dialogue</td>
<td>Initiative 8) In pursuit of the reinforcement of the Preventive, Peace Building and Post Conflict policies and measures of the APSA at continental and regional levels, plans of action will be drawn up and implemented so as to deal with thematic issues such as: SSR, DDR, AU Border programmes, Early Warning systems, Women Peace and Security, Mediation-Negotiation capacity, and Counter-terrorism.</td>
<td>An AU policy framework on SSR was developed. An AU action plan for the AU Border Programmes was developed and discussed at a RECs meeting hosted by ECOWAS in October 2013.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Dialogue</td>
<td>Initiative 9) The ongoing co-operation to combat the illicit trafficking of SALW will be reinforced through a comprehensive and concrete Plan of Action in support of the implementation of the AU SALW Strategy, in coordination with the IC. Similarly, an Action Plan will be drawn up to support the</td>
<td>An Action Plan for the AU SALW Strategy was developed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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165 ECOWAS (2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Operationalisation of APSA</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| **Initiative 1)** As a follow-up to the first action plan and of different evaluations regarding African training needs and capacities for ASF, implement operational and concrete AU/RECs/EU agreed measures to improve the required capacities and capabilities of African training centres. | The APSA Support Programme was launched in 2011 and represents a continuation of former capacity building programmes in support of the AU Commission (AUC) and the RECs/RMs. This new programme is financed under the current three-year Action Programme 2011-2013 with a total amount of to EUR 40 million\(^{167}\).

The "Joint Financing Arrangement on Support to the Employment of AUC Personnel working in the Peace and Security Programme" (JFA Salaries), launched in 2010, was extended until 31 March 2013. Overall, the EC has contributed an amount of €10 million for the two and half years and, thus, has provided predictable funding for the personnel of the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) and its various divisions\(^{168}\).

The contribution agreement for the ERM was signed on 16 June 2009 with an allocation of €15 million (€2 million are earmarked as a reserve in the Three-Year Action Programme 2011-2013). In 2012 initiatives included: the support to AU’s efforts to coordinate action against the Lord’s Resistance Army; the AU/SADC Liaison Office in Madagascar; IGAD support for pre-election engagement in Kenya\(^{169}\).

The EU has earmarked more than €940 million (€400 million under the 9th EDF and €540.6 million under the 10th EDF) for Peace and Security Operations (PSOs). In 2012 the EU... |

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\(^{167}\) European Commission (2012).

\(^{168}\) European Commission (2012).

\(^{169}\) European Commission (2012).
supported AMISOM and MICOPAX and in 2013 AFISMA was also supported\textsuperscript{170}.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the ERM has been mobilised to implement the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the settlement of the crisis\textsuperscript{171}.

In Sudan, the ERM provided EUR 1.23 million to support the African Union High Level Implementation Panel and its plan of action decided by the AU in support of the Sudan mediation process\textsuperscript{172}.

2. Operationalisation of APSA

Initiative 2) Adoption of an APSA AU-RECs Strategic Roadmap consisting of an articulated long-term perspective of the APSA goals and processes through which to achieve them. This AU roadmap, which the EU will support/ensure coherent, coordinated and concerted decisions and priorities between the regional and continental levels of the APSA and EU's continental, regional and country instruments. A strengthened framework for a follow-up assessment of the interaction between the different components of the APSA and respective responsibilities will be made available and will give clear indications for further operational support.

The AU-RECs-RMs APSA Roadmap was finalised in 2011 and is under implementation, with EU support. The roadmap is coming to an end in December 2013, and a review will be conducted to develop a follow-up Roadmap. The EU is keen to support the process\textsuperscript{173}.

Another programme under a Joint Financing Arrangement is the "Support to the African Union Liaison Offices in post-conflict countries." With a contribution of €3.6 million for a period of twelve months (January to December 2012) this programme supported the establishment of AU Liaison Offices in countries affected by, or emerging from, crisis and/or conflict. The Liaison Offices provide a vehicle for monitoring fragile situations and contributing to the AU's decision-making bodies and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and as such feed into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)\textsuperscript{174}.

Support to SADC Regional Political Cooperation (EUR 18

\textsuperscript{170} European Commission (2012).
\textsuperscript{171} Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).
\textsuperscript{172} Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).
\textsuperscript{173} Africa – EU Joint Task Force (2013a).
\textsuperscript{174} Africa – EU Joint Task Force (2013a).
| 2. Operationalisation of APSA | **Initiative 3) Identify and set priorities and strict timelines for the short-term implementation phase (three-years) of the AU-RECs Roadmap.** This short term phase, which covers the period of the second action plan, will build on the conclusions of the APSA needs assessment, lessons learned from the AMANI Africa training cycle, including regional training exercises, and the draft of the AU African Standby Force 3rd roadmap, and will address the APSA policies (captured in the AU-RECs MoU on APSA). The prioritised activities and the sequencing of the steps required to achieve the operational objectives will be assessed on a regular basis to ensure a functional APSA consisting of components that interact in a coordinated way. This plan will become the trilateral AU-RECs-EU APSA Roadmap detailing EU support for envisaged activities. | In 2012 AMANI II entered the initial planning phase. On the basis of recommendations from AMANI I, the AU has been focusing on enhancing the capacity of the police and civilian components of the ASF. In the period from 8 May 2012 to 31 April 2015, the EU has committed to contribute an amount of €5.2 million to cover: training and planning activities, other preparatory activities, deployment of headquarters during the field training exercise, post-exercise activities, and human resources. |

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175 Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).
176 Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).
177 Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Operationalisation of APSA</th>
<th>Initiative 4) Further develop and endorse concepts, doctrines and procedures related to ASF in general (including rapid deployment capabilities, logistics, and maritime components), to APSA (functional connections between Early Warning and Planning Elements at regional and continental level and decision making bodies, training, mediation) and to other security issues (SSR, DDR, SALW, counter-terrorism.),</th>
<th>The African Training Centres in Peace and Security for which an amount of €11.4 million has been allocated started in February 2012 and will last until 31 January 2014. The programme addresses the issue of training at three different levels: continental (AU), regional (RECs) and training centres. This process is a first step towards the implementation of a sustainable demand-driven AU training policy.179</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Operationalisation of APSA</td>
<td>Initiative 5) Develop human rights and gender training programmes for peace keeping missions in Africa, as requested by the EU-AU human rights dialogue agenda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Operationalisation of APSA</td>
<td>Initiative 6) Organise a second training cycle of the APSA structures, according to the AU-set main objectives for the short term (three years) and taking into account lessons learned from the first AMANI AFRICA cycle.</td>
<td>In 2012 AMANI II entered the initial planning phase. On the basis of recommendations from AMANI I, the AU has been focusing on enhancing the capacity of the police and civilian components of the ASF. In the period from 8 May 2012 to 31 April 2015, the EU has committed to contribute an amount of €5.2 million to cover: training and planning activities, other preparatory activities, deployment of headquarters during the field training exercise, post-exercise activities, and human resources.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Predictable funding of Peace-Security Operations (PSOs)</td>
<td>Initiative 1) The issue of predictable funding for Africa-led PSOs will also be integrated under the relevant initiatives in the first and second priority areas of this Action Plan. In this context and in view of the elaboration and adoption of a programme under the APF 3, a dedicated political and technical forum on the AU Peace Fund will need to connect African political and financial decisions in this area with EU engagements.</td>
<td>No information publicly available.</td>
</tr>
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| Initiative 2) Launch a dedicated, albeit informal, UN-AU-EU dialogue within the UN framework to propose practical steps forward to the Prodi Panel and UNSG Reports. | Discussions are ongoing. The AU and EU have engaged discussions with non traditional donors (China, Turkey, League of Arab States).[181] |
| Initiative 3) Based on the AU-RECs-EU operational Plan for the APSA operationalisation and on the African Peace and Security Agenda and on the progress under Initiative 1, the EU, AU and RECs will work together in defining the 3rd APF programme. | No information publicly available. |

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## ANNEX 4: PARTNERSHIP 2 – DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. COMPARISON OF THE JAES’ FIRST AND SECOND ACTION PLANS

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priority 1: Enhanced dialogue and cooperation at the global level and in international fora</strong></td>
<td><strong>Priority 1: Enhanced dialogue at global level and in international fora</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities/Expected outcomes</td>
<td>Activities/Expected outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) The Africa-EU DGHR Platform for Dialogue will act as an open and inclusive forum on governance with a view to promoting dialogue and contributing to the formulation of shared governance agendas and recommendations that can feed the political dialogue between Africa and the European Union and deepening their partnership</td>
<td>1) Ratification and implementation of the international and continental legislative framework (UN conventions, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ILO Conventions, Financial Action Task Force recommendations);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Exchange views and best practices on matters of joint interest within international fora, including NY, Geneva, Vienna and Paris, in particular on UPR, rights of the child, rights of persons with disabilities, economic and social rights and combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and incitement to hatred and other areas of mutual interest.</td>
<td>2) Progress in the compliance with international obligations in the field of democratic governance and human rights;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Continue a dedicated AU-EU Political Human Rights Dialogue in Troika format, flanked by the Africa-EU Civil Society Human Rights Seminars</td>
<td>3) Enhanced influence through coordinated positions of the EU and AU in the Human Rights Council;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Cooperate with other thematic partnerships to promote sectoral governance and strengthen synergies to cover cross-thematic issues</td>
<td>4) Enhanced cooperation in the fight against corruption;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Progress in the areas of prevention of ill-treatment and torture, promotion of international justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities/Expected outcomes</td>
<td>Priority 1: Cooperative Governance Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priority 2: Cooperation in the area of Governance Initiatives</strong></td>
<td><strong>Priority 2: Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities/Expected outcomes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activities/Expected outcomes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Strengthen and increase intra-African dialogue on AU principles and issues of shared values.</td>
<td>1) More efficient African governance architecture through enhanced support for the implementation of the outcomes of the APRM process and the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Step up and coordinate support to the African Governance Architecture, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in line with Africa’s priorities</td>
<td>2) Strengthened capacities to combat corruption;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Strengthen the dialogue on the APRM process and the cooperation on the implementation of its recommendations</td>
<td>3) More effective and efficient public services and administration in Africa;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Strengthen cooperation with and among Parliaments, local authorities, civil society and the private sector</td>
<td>4) Enhanced awareness of the APRM processes in African countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Strengthen capacities of the AU, regional, national institutions and public authorities in the field of election organisation/observation and of civil society and media in election observation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Support the role of public and private media to foster democratic governance</td>
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</table>

JAES Second Action Plan 2011-2013

JAES First Action Plan 2008-2010
### Priority 3: Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods and other areas of cultural cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities/Expected outcomes</th>
<th>Activities/Expected outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Finalize and validate the outcomes of the inventory of cooperation in the area of cultural goods and identify consequent priority actions of cooperation between African and the EU.</td>
<td>1) Common positions on policies, strategies and cooperation in the area of cultural goods;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Conduct an effective dialogue and cooperation in the area of the fight against illicit trafficking of cultural goods in line with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and other relevant international conventions, including the exchange of experiences on the return of illegally exported or acquired goods to their countries of origin and encouraging setting up relevant mechanism for sharing best practices including on addressing archives issues.</td>
<td>2) Enhanced cooperation and exchanges between European and African cultural actors, such as museums, artists, experts, research institutes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Facilitate the access to information on important African cultural goods in EU and African countries,</td>
<td>3) Progress in the implementation of relevant international instruments to facilitate the protection and promotion of cultural goods, and to combat illicit trade of cultural goods;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Identify pilot Museums and cultural institutions in Africa and EU and facilitate the establishment of cooperation, twinning and capacity building agreements on cultural goods including inventory systems, security and safety systems, sites management</td>
<td>4) Progress towards the return of illegally acquired cultural goods to their countries of origins in line with relevant international conventions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Extend and institutionalize joint cultural events and cultural exchange programmes between Africa and EU, such as the Africa-EU Cultural week</td>
<td>5) Enhanced cooperation to facilitate the protection and promotion of cultural expressions and cultural diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Develop and launch joint advocacy and communication campaign for the ratification and implementation of cultural goods related international instruments and conventions in Africa and in Europe, as well as the introduction of these commitments within national legislations.</td>
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</table>
ANNEX 5: PARTNERSHIP 2 – DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

EU-AU formal Human Rights Dialogue (HRD) has been maintained since 2008. These dialogues are attended by senior officials such as AUC Commissioners and representatives from various AUC departments, ECOSOCC, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, EU Representatives for Human Rights, EU Delegations to the AU and other AU or EU staff. HRD takes place almost every six months and enables regular updates between the two institutions on regional initiatives, the discussion of sensitive issues and the possible identification of joint activities. The fact that HRD is accompanied by a series of meetings, allows European and African experts to discuss issues of common concern—such as racism, rights of migrants, freedom of expression or freedom of association. The HRD took place for the 10th time in 2013. Discussions have however turned around general statements and the EU pledging support to African initiatives. Solutions or even approaches to tackle common problems fall short here. In the light of Lampedusa for example, both sides could not avoid to at least stress the rights of migrants but so far they have only welcomed previous proposals to include migration in the agenda of the forthcoming EU-AU Summit in April 2014. It remains to be seen whether this will be realised and political traction of common actions demonstrated.

To live up to the full potential of these formal dialogues however, it is important to seize this chance to promote specific human rights at the regional and global level. For the time being the HRD are at least - as stated in a memorandum by Human Rights Watch - “an important opportunity to highlight crucial human rights developments in both Africa and Europe.” Nevertheless, AU and EU representatives should be more explicit and demanding in addressing ongoing human rights violations and urge member states to implement recommendations formulated during the HRD. Initiatives such as the following are a step into the right direction. In 2011 the AU-EU HRD resulted in a joint statement against the use of child soldiers and agreement to strengthen efforts in the fight against impunity to their recruitment and use.

182 In 2012 the HRD was led by AUC Commissioner for Political Affairs, Dr. Aisha L. Abdullahi and EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis. Other participants included the President of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights, Justice Sophia A.B. Akuffo, the Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Dr. Benyam Mezmur, as well as representatives from the various departments for the AUC. From the EU side, EUSR/Head of EU Delegation to the AU, Ambassador Gary Quince and other EU staff were also present.
183 AUC & EC (2013c).
184 AUC & EC (2013c).
186 AU & EU (2011).
## ANNEX 6: PARTNERSHIP 2 – DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. DELIVERABLES

N.B. This table has no claim to provide an exhaustive list of initiatives implemented under the Partnership 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Concrete Action/Outcomes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa-EU Platform for Dialogue on Governance and Human Rights</strong></td>
<td>Open space for key stakeholders, institutions, governments and civil society contributes to the enhancement of democratic governance policies and respect for human rights on both continents.</td>
<td>• Measures were proposed with respect to conflict prevention and management, financial transparency, the respect for human rights and the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicle for promoting democratic change</td>
<td>• conclusions were presented to the Africa-EU Democratic Governance and Human Rights partnership Joint Expert Group (JEG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working Group on Governance of Natural Resources</strong> Including in conflict and post-conflict situations</td>
<td>Working Group on the Freedom of Expression, including media, as a vehicle for promoting democratic change</td>
<td>• and to the Africa-EU High Level Conference on Raw Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• private sector related recommendations will be shared with the EU-Africa Business Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Audiovisual material (interviews with experts) was also produced for awareness raising on the governance of natural resources.(^{187})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In line with the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, notably on the Advisory Board on Corruption, the **EU committed to reinforce its efforts in the fight for more transparency of European extractive and forestry industries active in Africa.**

- EC adopted legislative proposals for the **Transparency and Accounting Directives**, requiring the disclosure of payments to governments on a country and project basis by companies with activities in these sectors.

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\(^{187}\) Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).
| Africa-EU cooperation on international fora | Workshop on Racism: fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in June 2012 in Geneva back-to-back to the Human Rights Council (HRC) session. | • EC presented in 2011 a **package of measures to support entrepreneurship and responsible business**, including the Social Business Initiative and a new strategy for corporate social responsibility.  

• Freedom of expression was reaffirmed as a critical element of democratic culture in Africa and Europe.  

• Group explored avenues for further work in the remit of the Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights, notably the need to assess the role of private actors such as media corporations and internet service providers to structure approaches to regulatory frameworks.  

• The Group recommended that the AU and EU consider supporting the Pan-African Media Network (PAMNET).  

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| AU-EU Human Rights | 10th AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue, Brussels (November | • Informal space for discussion; exchange of best practices and local, national and regional levels  

• Identified potential areas and **some means to enhance EU-AU cooperation, not only on racism but also on other human rights issues**  

• Concluded that enhanced cooperation would begin with a joint meeting of EU-African Ambassadors, with a view to discuss ways of enhancing EU and African initiatives in the regular sessions of the HRC and joint events in the margins  

• In light of the tragedy of Lampedusa, rights of migrants  

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188 Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).  
189 Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).

It was led by the AUC Commissioner for Political Affairs, Dr. Aisha L. Abdullahi and EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis.

- Committed themselves to organising a joint seminar based on the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights and Business involving the private sector, civil society and other actors in 2014.
- Focused on issues including racism, the right to development, the death penalty, rights of migrants, and implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
- The two parties welcomed and took note of the recommendations presented by African and European CSOs on the right to housing and on elections and committed themselves to look for ways to implementing some of the recommendations. In particular both organisations welcomed the entering into force of the Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in February 2012 and called for its effective implementation.

In 2011, the AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue yielded a **joint statement against the use of child soldiers**, following-up on the AU-EU agreement to strengthen efforts to protect children.

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190 AUC & EC (2013c).
from the effects of war.
- The AU and the EU also supported the campaign launched in May 2010 by the Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict in cooperation with other partners with the purpose of achieving universal ratification of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict by 2012, and call for all countries to ratify the Optional Protocol.
- Agreed on importance of AU-EU co-operation in UN and that they would in future issue more joint declarations on issues of mutual interest.
- First ever working group of the EU-AU Platform on Governance took place: The topic was Governance of Natural Resources\(^{192}\).

- need for AU and EU Member States to harmonise legal and administrative processes for evacuation and asylum and to allow freer movement of civil society representatives.  
This seminar came out with a series of recommendations, including support to the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights in torture prevention in Africa. |
| Election Observation Missions (EOMs) | Ongoing: Mali, Madagascar, Guinea 2013: Kenya |

\(^{192}\) AUC & EC (2011c).
The implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding confidence and commitments

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012: <strong>Algeria, Libya, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Timor-Leste</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2011: <strong>South Sudan, Zambia, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Chad, Tunisia and the Democratic Republic of Congo</strong> 193</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Aim of the meeting was to develop ideas for reforming the JAES in the perspective of the upcoming Summit of Heads of State of 2014.

Participants deliberated proposals of the EU and AU Commissions on reforming the JAES thematic priorities, institutional mechanisms and funding instruments. They also proceeded to evaluate past experiences and future opportunities in the framework of the JAES.

Participants observed with particular concern that the current reform proposals limit the potential for CSO participation.

They underscored the importance of a people-centred and multi-stakeholder partnership as defined at the launch of the JAES in 2007. Participants agreed that clear links should exist between the role of JAES and current major international frameworks such as Post 2015 Development Agenda in order to ensure the ongoing relevance of the strategy.

Recommendations: focusing on greater civil society involvement in all areas. Recognising that gender equality is a prominent objective for both Unions, gender specific recommendations were issued in each working groups. Structural reforms and proposals for funding these reforms 194.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU support to the African Peer Review Mechanism</th>
<th>Second component of the GI, consisted of a € 2 million contribution to the UNDP-managed APRM Trust Fund. A</th>
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<tr>
<td>194 Africa-EU Civil Society Forum (2013).</td>
<td>Some improvements have been recorded, namely the increasing number of participating countries, the revision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (APRM) | contribution agreement was signed to that end between the Commission and the UNDP in December 2008. of the questionnaire and the improved capacity of African countries to advance APRM implementation. Nevertheless, the absorption capacity of the Trust Fund remains weak. **The contribution agreement was extended twice, expiring in December 2012.**  
- EU provides EUR 2 million to support the APRM and its Secretariat until the end of 2012. |
| --- | --- |
| **Cooperation in the cultural area** | Workshop [13]: “the Fight against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods” Casablanca, Morocco, f 9 – 11 January 2014 (with the support of the Joint Africa EU Strategy Support Mechanism.) Based on practical cases, discussions contributed to sensitise stakeholders and experts on the relevance of the protection of cultural goods against plundering, theft and illicit trafficking within a perspective of stability, security and sustainable development. Specifically the meeting pushed ahead on the four relevant activities done within the framework of the Africa-EU Partnership:  
1. Increased understanding of situations, trends and dynamics of inventories;  
2. Improved and digitalized inventories  
3. Improved cooperation between customs and customs in heritage management;  
Operationally the experts recommended to pursue:  
1. Establishment of a central databank and of a Pan-African institution dedicated to the monitoring of illicit trade of cultural goods ;  
2. Systematic establishment of inventories of cultural goods at national level;  
3. Capacity-building and networking with stakeholders involved in the protection of cultural goods with a view |
<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to facilitating information sharing;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Increasing the role and participation of local populations in the fight against looting, theft and illicit trafficking of cultural goods;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Review and strengthening of national legislation promoting the protection of cultural goods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Terms of Reference for the inventory of ongoing activities between EU and Africa with respect to cultural goods have been formally agreed at the 2nd IJEG meeting in Lisbon.

It has been recommended that the experts shall be jointly selected by the two Commissions. The tender will be launched by the African Commission and the results are expected before the EU-Africa Summit of November 2010. (3rd IJEG meeting).

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the independence of 19 African countries at the occasion of the third Africa-EU Summit, the European Commission, in collaboration with the African Union and BOZAR Brussels, launched a multi-disciplinary and itinerary cultural project titled 'Visionary Africa: Art at Work'. From Ouagadougou in 2011, the project is travelling through cities around Africa until 2013.

A joint EU-AU photo contest was organised by the AU Commission and the EU as a way to raise awareness of the institutions’ partnership. Finally, in partnership with the AU Commission, the EU supported the trans-African photography project “The Invisible Borders”. The exhibition was also promoted through the African Union Border Programme. The project closed in 2013 with a final publication ‘Atlas Manifesto’.

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196 AUC & EC (2010).
and a possible return of the pavilion, transformed by its itinerance, on the occasion of the next EU-Africa Summit.
ANNEX 7: PARTNERSHIP 3 – TRADE, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

N.B. This table has no claim to provide an exhaustive list of initiatives implemented under the Partnership 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority areas</th>
<th>Activities and initiatives</th>
<th>Concrete action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A. Regional Integration             | 1) Exchange of information between the EU, AU and RECs on integration processes.  
2) The development dimension and impact on the African economies of existing (EU-MED, TDCA, African regional economic agreements) and upcoming (EPAs) trade agreements to which African States are parties.  
3) The impact of the implemented agreements on the African overall integration agenda.  
4) The EU experience of developing and implementing common institutions and policies.  
5) Cooperation on liberalisation of Trade and services.  
6) The findings of the all-ACP study on regional integration monitoring and the AUC study on the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) and follow-up to be given. | Joint experience sharing workshops addressing issues related to the challenges of integrating several sovereign states economies into a common market reaching out to related issues such as technical standards and norms, competition laws and enforcement, and public procurement have been organised.  
The EC/DG Enterprise confirmed the holding of a conference on industrial cooperation in Africa in principle in the second semester of 2012 and the continuation of the policy dialogue on SME, in cooperation with AUC and UNIDO.  
A staff exchange between EC, DG MARKT and a senior AUC, a senior DG Markt official was seconded to the AUC in September-December 2011, and a senior AUC official spent 3 months in DG Markt in 2012. |
| B. Trade                            | 1) Facilitate cooperation between EU and African customs administrations on customs reforms to conform to internationally agreed standards, in particular in the context of supply chain security as well as on the current African process for development of common Transit procedures, on training and capacity building, including the organisation of Customs | Resources for technical assistance to Africa in the area of customs cooperation and trade facilitation are made available identified through the Joint Africa- EU Strategic Partnership and also made available under the umbrella of EU Aid for Trade continental or regional activities.  
A first AU-EU forum on customs and trade facilitation took |

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197 AUC & EU (2013).  
199 Key Deliverables of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2012).  
200 AUC & EU (2013).
**Policy Department DG External Policies**

2) Exchange of information with a view to support the interconnectivity of computerized Customs systems within Africa, taking into account existing customs computer projects, e.g. UNCTAD Asycuda.  

203 AUC & EU (2013).  
204 AUC & EU (2013).  
| --- |
| 1) Support the implementation of the Accelerated Industrial Development Plan of Action to facilitate, among others, the upgrading of productive and trade capacities.  
2) Discussion on the African Agribusiness and Agro-industry place in 2012, identifying concrete measures towards the customs reforms required for the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area. A mining and taxation workshop was co-organised by the AUC and EC (DG DEVCO, ENTR, TAXUD) Addis, in December 2011.  

A reference framework and guidelines for harmonisation of the management of food hygiene was adopted in January 2011 by the Summit of African Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa. The framework is currently being domesticated and applied by African Regional Economic Communities. Key areas in this regard are integrated pest management, soil and water conservation methods, agro-ecological approaches and agro-forestry. In March 2013, the EU launched a €15m programme to strengthen African capacities in rules, standards and quality control, with the aim of improving competitiveness and diversification of African agriculture and industry. The EU is also contributing - € 15 million by 2012 - to a multi-donor trust fund for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), an AU/NEPAD initiative. | 1) As far as agriculture and agro-industry is concerned, enhance the capacity of administrations, producers and exporters at all levels to meet the regulatory requirements of export markets within Africa and the EU and strengthen harmonisation of SPS frameworks within Africa.  
2) As far as industry is concerned, enhance the capacity of administrations, producers and exporters at all levels to meet the regulatory requirements of export markets within Africa and the EU and support development of quality infrastructure in Africa.  
3) Enhance competitiveness of African agriculture and agri-food industry through particular attention to Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS).  
4) Follow up to the 2010 pre feasibility study on TBT. |
### RECs and other institutions:

Development initiative (3ADI) and explore possible avenues for cooperation.

3) Discuss a policy framework on an enabling environment for promotion of industrial SMEs and explore possible avenues for cooperation.

### Priority 5: Raw materials

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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Details</th>
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| 1) On governance:                                                      | - Promoting natural resources governance including increasing revenue transparency (e.g. implementation of EITI and AMV), applying appropriate fiscal regimes and involving relevant stakeholders including the civil society;  
- Promote and provide training on best practices to negotiate mineral contracts;  
- Assist in developing policy scenarios for promoting trade and the sustainable development of the mining sector; |
| 2) On investment:                                                      | - Help develop analytical tools for mapping mining development corridors for investment promotion, consistently with any general investment promotion strategy in place;  
- Cooperate to assess opportunities for increasing local content and value-added through local processing of African mineral resources, particularly by SMEs;  
- Assist in improving mineral policy and related regulatory frameworks including on land use planning for minerals and authorisation process in order to promote the investment climate; |

A High Level Conference on raw materials in Africa was organised by the EC, DG Enterprise, in January 2012 in Brussels. Recommendations were adopted toward a reinforced cooperation, including in governance, infrastructure and geological services.  

The EC/DG MARKET made a presentation on the EU legislative proposal on country-by-country reporting at the meeting of Senior Officials in December 2011 in Addis, in preparation for the Meeting of African Ministers in charge of Natural Resources.

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| Priority 6: Improve the investment climate | 1. Facilitate the exchange of best practices in the area of regional investment codes with a view to supporting harmonisation, as foreseen in the Africa Action plan.  
2. Strengthen the African regional and continental private sector and Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) networks, such as AfrIPAnet, and create links with European partners building on solid business data and tools.  
3. Strengthen the Africa-EU business forum as a platform to promote business between Africa and Europe. |
2. Strengthening the AUC capacity in statistics, notably transforming the Statistics Unit into a Division as decided by the AU Executive Council.  
A joint publication of the AU-EU Statistical Yearbook developed in collaboration with AUC and EC. |

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208 AUC & EU (2013).
### C. Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority No 1: Support to AFUR and African Power Pools</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Institutional reinforcement and capacity building (training, exchange programs) in energy market trading and management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Transmission grid development, including grid connections in Africa and between Africa and EU.</td>
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<td>- Environment and social assessments,</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Project packaging and financing and governance (policies, codes and standards).</td>
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</table>

The **Africa-EU Infrastructure trust** fund, a fund which has been established to support infrastructure development in Africa. It blends grants from the EU with loans from other investors for projects in the area infrastructure. The AITF has awarded over 80 grants to infrastructure projects that represent a total value of over € 6.5 billion in the investment phase. Recent examples include the Geothermal Risk Mitigation Facility in Central and East Africa, the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the CLSG Power Interconnector in Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea as well as the Kampala bypass in Uganda. Moreover, in the field of transport, Africa and the EU pursue interconnectivity across regions by promoting safe trans-boundary transport corridors and harmonised transport policies.209

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority No 2: Support to Air Transport Sector and Satellite Navigation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Harmonisation of aviation policies and regulations,</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Support for aviation safety and security, surveillance and certification of air traffic management (ATM) activities and single sky for Africa and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technical assistance for implementation of new satellite based technologies for communication, navigation and surveillance and associated ATM procedures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- For SBAS, setup and activity of Working Groups, staffing of African GNSS programme management entity, training of African experts, preliminary backbone infrastructure development and initial operations.</td>
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</table>

The EU makes its satellite technology available to support the air transport sector in Africa. More than € 18 million have been committed towards the extension of the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) to Africa. EGNOS Sisa Satellite System that increases the accuracy of the GPS signal. Its services will unlock rural areas by opening small rural airports to safe navigation, and have many potentialities in other sectors such as rail and inland water transport, cartography, cadastre, tracking of containers, energy and mining.210

Support to transport sector development* (€4Mio) to contribute to Africa wide capacity to regulate, organise, promote and finance improved inter regional and continental transport infrastructure and services through interconnectivity across

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209 AUC & EU (2013).
210 AUC & EU (2013).
| Priority No 3: Maritime Transport Sector: enhancement of Maritime administration and Safety | In West African region:  
- Strengthening port state control regimes and coast guard service capability and sub-regional maritime educational institutions and  
- Enhancing vessel traffic monitoring and information.  
In Horn of Africa region:  
- Support to implementation of maritime projects comprising capacity building, technical assistance and resource strategic planning and coordination,  
- Implementation of plan of action, establishment of coast guard network and institutional strengthening. | regions by promoting safe trans-boundary transport corridors and harmonised transport policies\textsuperscript{211}. |}

| Priority No 4: Transport Sector Development | Selection and appointment of TAH Corridor Coordinators and support team at AUC, strengthening of institutional coordination structures and capacity building with African actors, including RECs;  
- Support to transport policy development and related studies, including trade facilitation  
- Technical support for project preparation and monitoring, training activities to project stakeholders (AUC, RECs, specialised organisations and national bodies, where appropriate).  
- Coordination with PIDA programme and support for | The EU provides assistance to the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)\textsuperscript{212}. |

\textsuperscript{211} AUC & EU (2013).  
\textsuperscript{212} AUC & EU (2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority No 5: Establishment of a geo-database</th>
<th>Steering Committee of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiate and coordinate the establishment of a database with other stakeholders, notably ECA, RECs, and Specialised Institutions, and with respect to actions planned under PIDA.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

| Priority No 6: Support to Improving water governance for transboundary water resources in Africa through promoting Integrated Water Resource Management. | Institutional reinforcement and capacity development of ANBO and RBOs, information and knowledge management, Development and implementation of IWRM plans linked to national and regional development plans, resources mobilisation. |

| Priority No 7: Support of PIDA programme | Assignment ongoing; Sector studies, validation workshops and sector regional meetings. |

| Priority No 8: Strengthening of institutional coordination structures and capacity building with African actors including RECs | Review of institutional arrangements and recommendations for coordination and dialogue mechanisms, Communication, consultations and workshops with the different stakeholders to assign roles and functions on a consensual and participative basis and Preparation of the terms of reference for the rest of the process Creation of an enabling platform for planning, implementation and delivery of PIDA; Building capacity for programme planning, implementation, monitoring and delivery; Setting clear mechanisms and platforms for technical cooperation and resource mobilisation with a focus on |
| Priority No 9: Improving regional connectivity and basic access to infrastructure services through the implementation in Energy, Water, Transport and ICT sectors of the EDF and other instruments and institutions: National Indicative Programmes, Regional Indicative Programmes, EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, Port Moresby and Energy and Water Facilities; as part of the integrated strategic framework under this Partnership. | N/A |
ANNEX 8: AFRICAN GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE (AGA)213

The African Governance Architecture is the overall continental framework for promoting, nurturing, strengthening and consolidating democracy and governance in Africa.

The 18th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union (AU) endorsed the strengthening of the African Governance Architecture, through the launch of the African Governance Platform.

The rationale for the AGA derives from the little synergies, coordination and harmonisation among several governance instruments, frameworks and institutions at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.

The AGA seeks to complement and support the efforts and commitments of AU Member States in the realm of governance by ensuring greater coordination, promoting closer cooperation between AU organs / institutions and other stakeholders, establishing a coordinating mechanism (African Governance Platform), enhancing the capacity of AU organs and institutions in the promotion, evaluation and monitoring of governance trends.

The AGA is composed of three principal pillars:

Pillar 1: a vision/agenda/norms. It projects the governance vision for the continent embodied in principles, standards, practices to which the AU member states have collectively and individually committed to. These include (not an exhaustive list):

- Constitutive Act of the African Union
- The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;
- The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights;
- Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government;
- The Lomé Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government;
- The OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa;
- Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
- African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption;
- African Union Post Conflict and Reconstruction Policy Framework;
- African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention);
- Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa;

Pillar 2: organs and institutions:

- AU Commission;
- African Court on Human and People’s Right;
- African Commission on Human and People’s Right;
- Pan-African Parliament;
- Secretariat of the African Peer Review Mechanism;
- The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
- The AU Advisory Board on Corruption

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- Regional Economic Communities.

**Pillar 3: mechanisms and processes** of interactions between organs, institutions and stakeholders, namely the *African Governance Platform*. The platform is intended to be an informal, flexible and dynamic mechanism - not a new AU structure - with the following objectives:

- Foster a systematic exchange of information on governance across the continent.
- Improve dialogue between African governance actors.
- Facilitate the elaboration of shared governance agendas.
- Strengthen the capacity of the African continent to speak with one voice on governance matters in international fora and dialogue processes with partners.
- Enhance effectiveness, efficiency, and impact, of governance efforts.
ANNEX 9: JAES INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Institutional architecture of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

*The meetings of the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika have not taken place since 2010.*
ANNEX 10: AFRICA-EU RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)

- The ICC’s prosecutorial interventions are currently focusing exclusively on African cases as a result of both self-initiated interventions by the ICC’s First Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, two UN Security Council referrals, and the submission by individual African governments (specifically, CAR, DRC and Uganda). The ‘Afro-centric’ focus of the ICC has created distorted perceptions.  

- A more vocal Africa is criticising the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is perceived to be biased as it focuses on (black) African leaders while forgetting cases in other continents, especially when Western leadership is concerned.  

- While African countries were initially supportive of the ICC, the relationship degenerated in 2008 when President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan was indicted by the Court. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) requested the UN Security Council to exercise its powers under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer the indictment and arrest of Al Bashir.  

- Following the Sudan case, the AU called for its member states to implement a policy of non-cooperation with the ICC – and this remains the stated position of the continental body. On 29 and 30 January 2012, the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of AU Heads of State stipulated that all AU states had to abide by this decision and that failure to do so would invite sanctions from the AU (in particular, AU states should comply with the AU Assembly Decisions on the warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against President Al Bashir).  

- In 2013 Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto were indicted for their responsibility for the riots after disputed elections at the end of 2007 which left hundreds dead.

- The International Criminal Court (ICC) has scrapped the plans to start the trial of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta on February 5th, 2014, after prosecutors asked for more time to strengthen their case. ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said she needed time to reconsider her case. However the trial of the deputy president William Ruto and of journalist and radio personality Joshua arap Sang is ongoing since September 2013.  

- Kenya’s parliament voted in September 2013 to quit the ICC’s jurisdiction, and Nairobi discussed with its neighbors and other governments a broad rejection by Africa of the ICC. This taps into African anger that the ICC has so far only prosecuted African accused - warlords, politicians and leaders - while ignoring alleged war crimes by global powers. The move is supported by Kenya’s neighbours, notably Tanzania, Rwanda, Ethiopia,  

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216 See Tim Murithi. The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship?.
217 See Tim Murithi. The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship?.
Uganda. However officials from Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and South Africa, four of the Africa Union's biggest member states, said their governments had no plans so far to leave the ICC.

- The AU put forward a resolution to the UN Security Council, demanding that the case against Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, be deferred. However in November a vote on a resolution by the African Union attracted only seven "yes" votes in the 15-member council. The AU also advised Kenyatta not to appear before the ICC.

- "It is clear the ICC needs to explore ways and means to fix its relationship with Africa, its biggest block of membership, otherwise many African states may follow the Kenyan move," AU Political Commissioner Aisha Abdullahi said.

On 31 January 2014 the 22nd Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Summit expressed its disappointment that the request by Kenya supported by AU, to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to defer the proceedings against the President and Deputy President has not yielded the positive result; and that the request by the Union to the UN Security Council to defer the proceedings initiated against the President of the Republic of The Sudan has not been acted upon to date. The 22nd Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Summit also reiterated that African states should comply with African Union Decisions on the ICC.

- Africa does have a judicial organ of its own with the nominal task of protecting human rights - the African Court on Human and People's Rights which sits in Arusha - but it is not a criminal tribunal.

- The European Union has been publicly silent on the matter so far, with no statement by the EU HR/VP Ashton. The EU is however a strong supporter of the ICC. Even though it does not fund the ICC, its member states do (and The Netherlands hosts the court). Furthermore, EU member states in the UN Security Council (FR, UK) are key players, given the fact that the UNSC can defer cases. The AU request to defer the cases of Kenya’s president and deputy did not pass in November 2013 (FR, UK abstained, there were no vetoes).

- EU Member states have the obligation to cooperate with the ICC to arrest individual figures indicted by the Court. This makes it problematic for them to invite indicted heads of state of government to international summits held in Europe.

- The EU has a common position on the ICC (Council Decision on 2010) supported by an Action Plan (2011) The EU is committed to encourage the widest possible participation in the Rome Statute. The EU address the issue of the ICC particular during its regular human rights dialogues with some 40 countries, through systematic demarche campaigns worldwide, through the organization of dedicated local or regional seminars, through the systematic inclusion of an ICC clause into agreements with third countries, or

221 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-warcrimes-africa-insight-idUSBRE98F0P920130916
224 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-warcrimes-africa-insight-idUSBRE98F0P920130916
225 See the Conclusions of the 22nd Ordinary African Union Assembly of January 2014.
226 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-warcrimes-africa-insight-idUSBRE98F0P920130916
228
through financial support to civil society organizations lobbying for the universality of the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{228}

- European NGO ‘No Peace Without Justice’ has urged the European Union to be more proactive and exert pressure on Kenya to extend all possible cooperation to the ICC and to take all possible steps to guarantee fair, smooth and effective proceedings, including to ensure proper protection for victims, witnesses and anyone else connected in any way with ICC proceedings as well as their full participation in the justice process.

\textsuperscript{228} See the webpage of the EEAS on the ICC at http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/icc/index_en.htm
## ANNEX 11: THE EIGHT PARTNERSHIPS AND THEIR OBJECTIVES FROM THE 2ND ACTION PLAN 2011-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Overall objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Partnership 1: Peace and Security** | 1. Political Dialogue:  
1) To jointly contribute to the global security related governance in Africa, Europe and world-wide, and make the dialogue more effective.  
2) Address crises and challenges to peace, security and stability in Africa, Europe and elsewhere and capitalize on commonalities of positions.  
2. Operationalization of APSA:  
Effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture to address peace and security challenges in Africa.  
3. Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority:  
Make available adequate resources (financial, material, human resources, etc) to plan, equip, deploy, and support, African led peace support operations. |
| **Partnership 2: Democratic Governance and Human Rights** | • To strengthen the open and inclusive Africa-EU dialogue on democratic governance and human rights. This shall also contribute to enhancing the joint influence of Africa and the European Union in international fora and at global level in these fields.  
• To contribute to the establishment and strengthening of the African Governance Architecture with coordinated EU support.  
• To strengthen the close cooperation between Africa and the EU in the area of cultural goods and other cultural activities.  
• To strengthen synergies and linkages between human rights and democratic governance in its political, economic and social dimension and other areas of the Africa/EU partnership. |
2. Support to the AUC, RECs and African States efforts for rationalising and harmonizing trade and investment laws, regulatory frameworks and procedures with a view to improving the investment climate.  
3. With respect to Infrastructure:  
Pursue priority regional and continental-level infrastructure (transport, energy, ICT, water sectors) for increased interconnectivity through continued project development, reinforced coordination and advocacy for backbone infrastructure. |
Promote safe and efficient transport services through application of modern technology and support for harmonisation and enforcement of policies and regulations, notably in air and maritime sectors.

Support institutional reinforcement and capacity building in continental and regional-level institutions.

Promote digital infrastructures as multi-purpose platforms for safe and efficient regional service delivery including appropriate interconnections and support coordination with capacity development on innovative technologies and applications implemented in sectors such as health, environment or education.

**Partnership 4: Millennium Development Goals**

1. Increased commitment among EU and African Member States to meeting the MDGs.
2. Take forward concrete activities, initially in the areas of health, gender, education, agriculture, water and sanitation and disability.

**Partnership 5: Climate Change and Environment**

- To strengthen African capacities for climate change adaptation and mitigation including for reducing disaster risk and for combating desertification and deforestation.
- To work towards reaffirming and reinforcing our common positions on climate change issues namely our attachment to the principles and priorities of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
- To reinforce coherence between the international climate change negotiations carried out under the aegis of UNFCCC and the Africa/EU partnership.

**Partnership 6: Energy**

- The overall objective of the AEEP is improved access to reliable, secure, affordable, cost-effective, climate friendly and sustainable energy services for both continents, with a special focus on achieving the MDGs in Africa.
- In order to achieve its Overall Objective, the AEEP will focus its efforts on concrete, realistic, visible targets, to be attained by 2020, as agreed by the Ministerial High Level Meeting held in Vienna on 14-15 September 2010. Action will contribute to the realisation of existing national, regional and continental energy objectives and strategies in Africa, and will take into account the necessary social and environmental standards.

**Partnership 7: Migration, Mobility and Employment**

The new Action Plan will further strengthen inter-regional, continental and inter-continental dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, mobility and employment among countries of origin, transit and destination. In addition, higher education appears as a more visible and integrated part of this partnership. Through this Action Plan Africa and the EU renew their commitment to the implementation of (a) the Declaration of the 2006 Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, (b) the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children, and (c) the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

The new action plan will have two main strands: (1) enhancing dialogue, and (2) identifying and implementing concrete actions, both of them...
The implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding confidence and commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership 8: Science, Information Society and Space</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This Partnership interlinks three Priorities for development policy, which singly and in conjunction with one another can leverage faster socio-economic development in Africa: science, information society and space applications. By strengthening their cooperation to produce knowledge-based societies and economies, Africa and the EU recognise that:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> the development of science, technology and innovation, as well as the spreading of the digital era to all sections of society are key motors of socio-economic growth and sustainable development;</td>
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<td><strong>•</strong> competitiveness in the world economy rests increasingly on knowledge and application of modern technologies and:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> attainment of the MDGs requires a general effort to raise S&amp;T capacities in Africa and enable widespread use of ICTs and related services.</td>
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<td>In that respect, this Partnership is cross-cutting in nature, contributing to the attainment of all other development objectives. For optimal effectiveness, there should therefore be close coordination with other JAES Partnerships (particularly infrastructure, climate change Migration Mobility and Employment(MME) and MDGs); In addition, clear articulation with the formal institutional apparatus governing EU-Africa relations should be developed.</td>
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