1st Among Equals? The Instrument for Stability and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the EU’s new financial perspective

Simone Görtz and Andrew Sherriff

Executive summary

Since it became operational in 2007 the Instrument for Stability (IFS) has become a valuable, useful and unique instrument furthering EU external action goals in a vastly superior way than its predecessor, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). Drawing on recent evaluations and studies ECDPM seeks to provide evidence based insight to be taken into account when negotiating the future regulations in relation to the IFS specifically and Global Europe “Heading IV” more generally.

The IFS is an exceptional instrument under the EU's multi-annual financial framework’s Heading IV. Its very nature is that “assistance under [the IFS] (...) shall be provided only to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under those [other] instruments [of Heading IV]” (EC:2011a, EU:2006).

This is the main reason why in the current negotiation stakeholders – that is the European Parliament and the Council of the EU that react to the European Commission’s (EC) proposal - need to pay utmost attention to the link between the IFS and the other external instruments. The IFS is not the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding instrument alone. The endeavour of addressing the root causes of conflict and furthering conflict prevention and peacebuilding needs to be supported by the EU’s long-term instruments in the first place. EU stakeholders involved with the finalisation of the new instruments’ regulations would be well advised to ensure an appropriate place for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in all of Heading IV’s regulations and pay attention to coherence among them.

Broadly the regulation as proposed by the European Commission for the IFS seeks to build on its strength. It would be wise if a renewed IFS regulation would reinforce the strengths of the current IFS, decrease its shortcomings and adapt the IFS to the context the EU is likely to face until 2020.

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1 This Briefing Note was produced in the context of an ECDPM intervention at the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on 8 May 2012. It contains certain amendments and additions to the original version circulated at this meeting.
2 The authors are grateful for research support provided by Ulrika Kilnes and editorial support from Anna Knoll. The views expressed herein are those of the authors only and should not be attributed to any other person or institution.
3 Some of which ECDPM has had a direct role in (such as ECDM/Particip: 2011 or ADE (with input from ECDPM): 2011).
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Rationale and background of the IfS

The EU’s overall budget – termed multiannual financial framework (MFF) – spans over seven years. Like any national budget the MFF mirrors political priorities in financial terms as it focuses resources on particular themes over others. It covers all areas of EU action (internal and external). The current MFF period started in 2007 and will end in 2013. The new MFF will start in 2014 and end in 2020.

Heading IV, “Global Europe”, of the planned MFF covers the external relations instruments. In the EC’s proposal the Instrument for Stability (IFS) makes up for 3.59% of this Heading, which is 12.86% less than in the current financial framework. The IFS thus represents a relatively small share compared to Heading IV’s bigger instruments like the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (29.42%) or the European Neighbourhood Instrument (23%). In line with article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union, the IFS is designed to finance a global contribution to “preserving peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security and assisting populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters” (EC:2011a).

![Figure 2: Instruments falling under Heading IV (committed shares in percentages) (EC:2011b)](image-url)
Unlike the geographic instruments under Heading IV such as the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument or the Partnership Instrument that cover certain regions of the world, the IfS is a horizontal instrument that has a global coverage with a clear focus on (re-) establishing “the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Union's development and cooperation policies” (ibid.).

Also, the IfS is an exceptional instrument among Heading IV. Its very nature is that “assistance under [the IfS] (...) shall be provided only to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under those [other] instruments [of Heading IV]” (EC:2011a, EU:2006). It is meant to swiftly react to unforeseen crisis and works “complementary to humanitarian aid” (ibid.) and in coherence with the EU’s other external assistance. That is one of the reasons why the duration of actions taken under the IfS is limited in time.

The current IfS contains a short-term and a long-term component. The new IfS proposal foresees one short-term and two-long term components.

The IfS was created in 2006 after intense negotiations and in recognition of the fact that due to administrative restrictions the then existing EU architecture could not respond to crisis rapidly despite having a “Rapid Reaction Mechanism”. In a post-Lisbon context it is mainly the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) in cooperation with the EC (DG DEVCO), with at times a key role for the EU Delegations, that are responsible for the planning and implementation of this instrument’s activities.

**Added value of the current IfS**

The current IfS has clearly added a dimension to EU external action since its inception in 2007. It stands out as a tool that fills an important strategic, funding and capacity gap in EU external action (ADE:2011; ECDPM/Particip:2011). The current IfS allows the EU to support a broad range of critical crisis prevention and response initiatives, as well as capacity building for crisis preparedness (ADE:2011) that might not have been possible otherwise.

A recent evaluation on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (ADE:2011) found that in some cases the very existence of the IfS was the catalyst that enabled EU Delegations to start supporting conflict prevention and peacebuilding actions in the first place. The coming into existence of the IfS seems to have stimulated reflection on programming priorities with a view on how conflicts can be prevented. Moreover, having the IfS at their disposal was found (ibid.) to have led EU stakeholders to analyse why certain activities were not planned under the regular cooperation. On top of this, the IfS contributed to an improved exchange of information on conflict prevention and peacebuilding between EU headquarters and Delegations as well as among different Directorate Generals of the European Commission (ibid.).

Stakeholders who made use of the IfS in a conflict-affected country mainly appreciate its swiftness (ADE 2011:39) compared to other EU instruments. While most funds were used in response to short-term crises, some IfS funds were used to fund longer-term activities. Other IfS activities were identified to have laid the basis for long-term EU action that were handed over and continued to receive support from long-term instruments like the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) or the DCI (ADE:2011:18).

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7 The coming into force of the IfS repealed a number of EC regulations. Yet, the IfS’ most relevant predecessor that was replaced is the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which existed from 26 February 2001 to 31 December 2006. Unlike the IfS the RRM was not a financial instrument in its own right, its actions were limited to a duration of 6 months and it had far less financial resources.

8 Examples of such are EUMM and EUSR activities in Georgia or a coca leaf study in Bolivia (ADE:2011).
Shortcomings of the current IfS

While from conception to implementation the IfS is quicker than any of the other EU external instruments, the IfS is still not quick enough. Inherent to the administrative requirements is a situation that slows down to a minimum time span of two to six (ADE:2011) months before the start of an intervention once a need is identified. This is generally slower than the time span from decision to action of certain specific conflict and stability related instruments of other donors (ibid.).

In some cases the time span was found to be so much longer severely undermining the utility of the instrument. Nine to eleven months passed on average (ibid.) until contracts were signed despite the best efforts of officials. In the Kyrgyz republic, for example, the IfS support to the judiciary reform programme was delayed by a year and a half (ibid.). Moreover, if IfS support to those fleeing armed conflict takes six months, as witnessed during the Georgian war (ibid.), the time-span is far too long for the support to be as effective as it might be. In a number of other cases (ibid.) the swiftness of the instrument was hampered by various other factors as well.

In addition, the duration of the instrument seems to limit its utility. Since IfS projects currently cannot last any longer than 24 months, some projects with longer-term conflict prevention objectives could not be completed and in other cases long-term stabilisation could not be ensured (ibid.).

Despite the IfS’ positive effect of raising awareness for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, serious shortcomings regarding the capacity within the EU headquarter and at Delegations were identified (ibid.) and gave raise to concern in the past. The number of staff that has a background in conflict prevention and peacebuilding was found insufficient to handle the tasks at hand (ibid.) and even more so to mainstream its objectives to the policy level. Also, information-sharing between Delegations implementing IfS programmes in the same region (ibid.), which are likely to affect one another, seems to be rather the exception. While within the FPI, EEAS and DEVCO there are now administrative units that have responsibility for the IfS, given the other duties of these units (particularly EEAS and DEVCO), there is still a need to build the EU institutions’ capacity including the EU Delegations to administer the IfS affectively while not allowing IfS associated duties to add further burden or dominate already stretched resources on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

In general, the current IfS was found to be used mainly in reaction to a crisis or for post-conflict reconstruction and far less for preventive measures. This is in line with the overall rationale of the instrument. Yet, officials interviewed in the context of the ADE evaluation of EC conflict prevention and peace building found it hard to justify using the IfS for conflict prevention when a situation in a country was still calm. This points to a blind spot in the EU’s architecture regarding preventive action. Good preventive action is characterised by a sound investment of EU resources and should be in line with the EU’s own policy commitments and best practice in this area.

Sine qua non: Links to other instruments and frameworks

As seen above, the IfS’ main purpose it to fill the void before the EU’s long-term external instruments can take effect. Thus the link between the IfS and the long-term instruments and frameworks is crucial. The link ensures that relevant actions taken under the IfS do not exist in a vacuum, but are carried on in the long run under a different framework.

Empirical evidence (ADE:2011) shows that using the IfS for longer term prevention is largely driven by the convenience that IfS funds can be mobilised more rapidly than those of most other instruments and frameworks (ibid.). Yet, once the maximum duration over which the IfS can be used is exhausted, stakeholders are confronted with problems regarding the sustainability of these actions (ibid.).

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9 Examples of such can for instance be found in the country case studies of Bolivia or the Kyrgyz Republic (ADE:2011).
10 The ADE evaluation (2011) found only one focal point for the policy aspects of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the responsible unit in pre-Lisbon’s DG RELEX, for instance.
11 The maximum duration of IfS activities is 18-24 months under the current regulation and 18-30 months in the EC’s proposal. It has to be kept in mind that 18 months is the basic long-term duration and that while extending the time...
Still, apart from using the IFS, the EC was able to also use the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and other instruments for short-term actions in an ad-hoc manner in the past.

**Box 1: For short-term interventions aiming at conflict prevention and peacebuilding the EC mostly used**

| 1. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism/ Instrument for Stability |
| 2. The European Instrument on Human Rights and Democracy |
| 3. The budget line supporting NGOs and NSAs |
| 4. Other thematic budget lines |

Again, the choice for these instruments here was based on their ability to release funds swiftly rather than the short-term nature of activities supported. More often than not the activities supported by the use of short-term instruments had long-term perspectives and objectives (ADE:2011).

On the other hand, there are a number of instances when actions initially taken up by the IFS were carried on by other instruments afterwards. In Lebanon and Georgia the mobilisation of the IFS was followed by ENPI interventions; in Pakistan and Kyrgyz Republic the Development Cooperation Instrument continued some of the IFS’ actions and in Nigeria and Timor-Leste later EDF activities were based on previous IFS actions too (ibid.). Nevertheless, since the existence of the IFS, past interventions were usually designed in response to a crisis (ibid.) with a weak or non-existing link to the longer-term instruments.

Taking a look at the spending on conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities over the 2001-2010 timeframe it becomes clear that other instruments also play a decisive role in EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding (ibid.). Indeed, this is entirely in line with overarching EU policy commitments to mainstream this issue.

This is why the majority of the IFS action should focus on swiftly agreed short-term actions like crisis response as proposed in Article 3 of the EC’s IFS proposal (EC:2011a). In the current EC proposal (ibid.) the IFS is divided in one short-term (Art.3) and two long-term (Art. 4, Art.5) components. Article 4 and Annex II on conflict-prevention and peacebuilding are new features. They seem to have come back in from the last IFS negotiations. In the 2004-2006 negotiations references to peace-keeping and peace-support were removed from the IFS proposal. This removal was agreed in the final trilateral negotiations, though it did raise some criticism from certain sections of the European Commission and European Parliament (ECDPM/Particip:2011).

Yet, the focus of the IFS remains on short-term measures. According to Article 13 of the proposal at least 65% of the overall financial envelope should be dedicated to short-term measures falling under Article 3. This threshold reflects the intention of the legislators that the IFS “should primarily be an instrument for crisis response, and that long-term measures under this instrument should not be a substitute for those that could be more effectively delivered under country or regional strategies funded from the instruments for geographic cooperation” (Bartlett:2008).

Taking a look at the EC’s proposals for Heading IV, it has to be acknowledged that lessons learned regarding the lack of flexibility of their funds seem to have been integrated more widely. In line with Article 2 of the proposal for common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for external action (EC:2011c) the current EC proposals (see box 2) for the first time foresee to keep some of their funds unallocated in order to disburse them promptly in case of rapid change of situations and unforeseen need.

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frame is an opportunity this is possible only under the condition “that the financial amount of the measure does not increase” (Art. 7 (2)) beyond what would otherwise be spent in 18 months.

12 Officials interviewed in the context of an evaluation (ADE:2011) stressed that the IFS and the EIDHR enabled them to finance actions even without official alignment to the national counterparts.

13 In the past there were some rare exceptions of actions that could only be funded via the IFS due to the nature of the activity. In Birma, for instance, it was not possible to use the EIDHR, so the IFS stepped in and made police training possible (ADE:2011).
Institutions involved in administering the IfS. It should also take on the views and consult all relevant stakeholders.

Learning than the “performance indicators” that are components of the IfS have been evaluated until now these provide a better basis for accountability and learning than the “performance indicators” that are proposed in articles 3,4, and 5 (EC:2011a) will be able to. Any overarching evaluation should be external and not directly managed by the Units and Divisions involved in administering the IfS. It should also take on the views and consult all relevant stakeholders (EU institutions – including the Parliament, EU member-states – civil society, implementing partners and

Overall it will be important to enhance learning and accountability of the actions taken under the IfS and to ensure that EU public funds are well spent by monitoring and evaluating the impacts of the regulation overall and the specific actions supported. In this regard it is alerting that the articles referring to conducting an evaluation of the current regulation (Articles 21 and 25) is lacking in the current regulation. Though only components of the IfS have been evaluated until now these provide a better basis for accountability and learning than the “performance indicators” that are proposed in articles 3,4, and 5 (EC:2011a) will be able to. Any overarching evaluation should be external and not directly managed by the Units and Divisions involved in administering the IfS. It should also take on the views and consult all relevant stakeholders (EU institutions – including the Parliament, EU member-states – civil society, implementing partners and

A similar, though more diffident, development is visible when it comes to references to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the new proposals. There are several instances in four of the long-term external instruments (see box 3) that do refer to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Yet, references to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the regulations of the long-term instruments could be even stronger. The European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission would be well advised to reinforce existing references to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in all external financial instruments. This is in line with goals of these instruments, existing EU policy commitments in this area, latest thinking regarding furthering these objectives, and the interests stated by intended beneficiaries themselves.

Previously, EU stakeholders tended to see conflict as an issue of political stability and thus deemed it less relevant for long-term instruments (ADE:2011). Yet, these illustrations prove more synergies and a closer fulfilment of the EU’s commitment to “preserving peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security” (TEU, Art. 21 (c)) could be realised if conflict sensitivity was part of programming of the longer-term instruments and frameworks too. This is not yet the case in the majority of instances (ADE:2011).

Moreover, conflict analysis and sensitivity are non-existent or downplayed in the current implementation of the long-term instruments (ADE:2011). Efforts currently underway in the EEAS and DEVCO to change this should be actively encouraged and supported as they are an essential compliment to the effective functioning of the instrument for Stability.

The EC’s IfS proposal (cf. Art. 2) points out the need for coherence and complementarity of the EU’s external assistance. A study on the external instruments under Heading IV (cf. ECDPM/Particip:2011), however, identifies a lack of complementarity among the instruments. Most of the IfS’s supported actions are significantly undermined if they are not somewhat linked appropriately to support under the longer-term instruments. Therefore the current negotiations offer a window of opportunity to ensure better linkages between Heading IV’s external instruments.

Overall it will be important to enhance learning and accountability of the actions taken under the IfS and to ensure that EU public funds are well spent by monitoring and evaluating the impacts of the regulation overall and the specific actions supported. In this regard it is alerting that the articles referring to conducting an evaluation of the current regulation (Articles 21 and 25) is lacking in the current regulation. Though only components of the IfS have been evaluated until now these provide a better basis for accountability and learning than the “performance indicators” that are proposed in articles 3,4, and 5 (EC:2011a) will be able to. Any overarching evaluation should be external and not directly managed by the Units and Divisions involved in administering the IfS. It should also take on the views and consult all relevant stakeholders (EU institutions – including the Parliament, EU member-states – civil society, implementing partners and

14 As spelled out in the EC proposals of the instruments.
15 ibid.
17 For an overview of the parameters of DCI and EDF programming of the new MFF see Görätz/Keijzer:2012.
18 These are rather vague as illustrated by this example “The performance indicator for the assistance shall be the degree to which recipients’ capacities to prevent conflicts address pre- and post- conflict situations and build peace have been strengthened” (EC 2011a: Art.4).
intended beneficiaries) designed to provide an evidence base both for the mid-term review and any future regulation.19

Conclusions

The negotiations for the new MFF represent a unique opportunity to improve the Instrument for Stability's ability to contribute positively to conflict prevention and peacebuilding outcomes. The Instrument for Stability maybe first among equals in terms of the EU's response to conflict in terms of swiftness yet it alone has to be complimented by a more comprehensive approach to addressing the structural and proximate causes of conflict that would involve utilising all the EU’s instruments. The IfS’s very nature is that “assistance under [the IfS] (...) shall be provided only to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under those [other] instruments [of Heading IV]” (EC:2011a, EU:2006). The current proposals of the Commission do generally well to further this unique role. Yet there is room for improvements based on existing knowledge. It would be wise for a renewed IfS to reinforce the strengths of the current IfS, decrease its shortcomings along the lines of the suggestions made in this briefing note if it is to rise to the challenges facing the EU and the world from 2014 to 2020.

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19 Generally the development of new regulations have not used an extensive impartial evidence base in informing their design and this is a structural weakness, see (Keijzer, 2011).

20 These elements already exist in the European Development Fund (under Article 11 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement) which falls outside the EU budget, for example. Still they do not have a sufficient enough effect on conflict prevention and peacebuilding yet.

21 Keep in mind that following the last negotiations the IfS was not built on Art. 308 TEC as proposed by the EC. This would have allowed more flexibility but less democratic oversight. Instead it was built on Arts. 179 (1) and 181 (a).
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Bibliography


Keijzer, N. 2011. *New instruments proposed for EU external action – do we know enough about what worked with the old ones?* ECDPM Talking Points. Maastricht: ECDPM.


Further information

The EC’s proposals for Heading IV’s long-term instruments can be found at [www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/mff/financial_framework_news_en.htm](http://www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/mff/financial_framework_news_en.htm)
List of acronyms

AFET  Committee for Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament
DCI  Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO  DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid of the EC
EC  European Commission
ECDPM  European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF  European Development Fund
EEAS  European External Action Service
EIDHR  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENPI  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
IFS  Instrument for Stability
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA  Non-State Actor
TEU  Treaty of the EU

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