The future of ACP-EU relations post-2020
An overview of relevant analysis by ECDPM
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Acronyms

ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific
AU   African Union
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy
CARIFORUM Forum of the Caribbean Group of ACP States
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CDE  Centre for the Development of Enterprise
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA  Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CTA  Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation
DCI  Development Cooperation Instrument
DG   Directorate General
DG DEVCO Directorate General Development and Cooperation
EAC  East African Community
EBA  Everything But Arms
EC   European Commission
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EDF  European Development Fund
EEAS European External Action Service
EIB  European Investment Bank
ENPI European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
EP   European Parliament
EPG  Eminent Persons Group
EPA  Economic Partnership Agreement
EU   European Union
EUD  European Union Delegation
FAO  Food and Agricultural Organisation
FTA  Free Trade Agreement
GSP  Generalised System of Preferences
JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JCEUS Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy
LDC  Least Developed Country
LIC  Low Income Country
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MFF  Multiannual Financial Framework
MFN  Most Favoured Nation
MS   Member State
MIP  Multiannual Indicative Programme
NIP  National Indicative Programme
OCT  European countries’ Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA  Official Development Assistance
PAP  Pan-African Programme
SADC Southern African Development Community
SOPAC Secretariat of the Pacific Community
TDCA Trade, development and cooperation agreement
REC  Regional Economic Community
RIP  Regional Indicative Programme
RO  Regional Organisation
UMIC Upper Middle Income Country
UN   United Nations
WTO  World Trade Organisation
The future of ACP-EU relations post-2020

An overview of relevant analysis by ECDPM

This guide brings together summaries of selected ECDPM resources relevant to the future of ACP-EU relations and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement post-2020. As discussions gather pace, this guide provides analytical ‘food for thought’ for policy makers, practitioners and anyone interested in ACP and EU countries on a variety of critical issues. This guide presents work produced by ECDPM and its partners over the years. It covers both cross-cutting aspects as well as some of the specific political, developmental and trade issues. In 2015 and beyond, ECDPM will continue to analyse the future of ACP-EU relations and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and future editions of this guide will reflect this. As this guide is a ‘work in progress’, ECDPM welcomes frank feedback on how to improve the quality and relevance of this analysis.

1. Introduction

Uniting over half of the world’s nation states, the partnership between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of states is the largest and on paper most sophisticated North-South partnership. The current partnership is governed by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) (2000-2020), a legal agreement building on twenty-five years of ACP-EU cooperation through a series of successive agreements. Combining principles of political dialogue with cooperation on trade and development finance, the agreement is based on shared principles, values and co-management through joint institutions.

In a rapidly changing global context, with major internal changes in the EU and the ACP Group, the various parties have begun to re-examine the future of this longstanding partnership, and that of the ACP Group itself. Preparations for future cooperation - a post-Cotonou agreement - are beginning in earnest as the end of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 draws closer. While the expiry of the Agreement serves as a rallying point for re-examining ACP-EU relations, the changing dynamics within each group as well as at the global level also heighten the urgency of this critical reflection. In the coming months and years, stakeholders will enter a crucial stage of internal debate and negotiations on possible future scenarios.

Both the EU and the ACP Group have started reflections on the future of the ACP Group itself and the future of the Cotonou ACP-EU Partnership post-2020. The ACP Group has been quite pro-active in the past years, launching several initiatives both at the political and technical levels.

- An Ambassadorial Working Group on future perspectives was established in November 2010 and has held several consultations with various actors and stakeholders, mainly at the level of the ACP and EU institutions in Brussels. It will report in December 2014.

- In December 2012 the 7th ACP Heads of State and Government Meeting in Equatorial Guinea adopted the Sipopo declaration on the future of the ACP Group.

- In March 2013 an ACP Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was launched to reflect on the future of the ACP Group. The EPG has hosted a series of regional consultations in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific to gather views on the future outlooks of the ACP Group and its relations with the European Union.
In addition in 2014 the ACP group commissioned a number of technical studies related to the groups past performance, added value and possible future.

The EU reflections on the future of the ACP-EU Partnership have also started but have been of a rather low profile nature until recently. An informal Commission-European External Action Service (EEAS) Working Group was established in 2011 to gradually start internal EU reflections on the future of ACP-EU relations’ post-Cotonou. A formal EU inter-service Group comprising the line Directorates General of the Commission and the EEAS also started its reflections in October 2013. Past EU Presidencies of Poland, Cyprus and Greece have also held informal debates in Brussels on the future of ACP-EU relations. A few EU member-states, as of 2014, also started their own internal reflection processes by having either ad hoc meetings, commissioning or encouraging research from think tanks, tasking officials or planning events - examples of these include Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

With the entry into service of the new European Commission on 1st November 2014, the newly appointed Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, has put the future of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement high on the agenda for 2015. Directed specifically by new European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, Mimica has identified the future of ACP-EU relations as one of his three key priorities in this legislative period of his mandate. Furthermore, in his hearing before the European Parliament, Mimica announced the launch of a broad consultation and dialogue process on the subject in 2015, stressing that “the question is not whether ACP countries are still important to the EU or not, but about how to best design our cooperation in the future”. The reflection process on how to move beyond the 2020 expiry date has gained momentum on both sides of the partnership.

1.1 Rationale and structure of this overview guide

ECDPM has often with its partners contributed to the debate on the future of ACP-EU relations post-2020 through a range of independent publications, studies commissioned by various stakeholders and by acting as a broker of knowledge in formal and informal dialogue processes. The rationale for this overview guide is that while the future of ACP-EU relations remains dynamic and we are committed to producing new knowledge; some of ECDPM’s work over the last 10 years still has useful insights for the current debates.

In the early years of the Cotonou Agreement, ECDPM published the ‘Cotonou Infokit’ focusing on key aspects of the, at the time, new Agreement. While this publication is over ten years old, it is still one of ECDPM’s most popular publications. ECDPM has continued to play a role in the reflection process on the future of the partnership and a major multi-stakeholder seminar organised mid-2011, resulted in the publication “Global Changes, Emerging Players and Evolving ACP-EU Relations: Towards a common agenda for action?".

• This guide provides a brief introduction to a selection of resources but readers are strongly urged to seek out ECDPM’s most recent publications and triangulate our analysis with those provided by other official and non-official sources. This guide is designed to provide ‘food for thought’, and is not a definitive overview of the multi-faceted nature of ACP-EU relations.
• In Section 2, this topic guide presents a selection of ECDPM resources that cover perspectives on the future of ACP-EU relations, the changes in the global world order that have impacted the ACP-EU relations and presents scenarios for the future of both ACP-EU relations and the ACP Group itself.
• Section 3 then present a selection of resources focusing on specific elements of the Cotonou Agreement as a basis for further analysis on whether and how these specific elements could be brought forward in future ACP-EU relations.
• In Section 4, some of ECDPM’s work on the complementary, competing or alternative structures is presented. These look at relations governing strategic partnerships between the individual ACP geographic areas and the EU, including the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy, and the EC Communication on a Pacific-EU partnership.
Section 5 presents a quick statistical overview of ACP countries and other relevant country groupings and indices in the form of tables.

Finally Sections 6 and 7 present other ECDPM overview resources and other non-ECDPM resources on the future of ACP-EU relations including studies and reports commissioned by the EU and the ACP Secretariat, other articles and a list of resources on the European Development Fund.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement in Brief

The central objective of the CPA is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty while contributing to sustainable development and to the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy.

Three key aspects of the CPA are 1) political dialogue 2) development and 3) trade.

The ACP Group of States is an organisation created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975. It is composed of African, Caribbean and Pacific States that are signatories to the Georgetown Agreement. The ACP Group consists of 79 Member States, all of them, save Cuba, signatories to the Cotonou Agreement. The 28 European Union Member States are signatories to the CPA.

The CPA jointly governs the European Development Fund (EDF) with the 11th EDF totalling €30.5 billion for ACP and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) for the period 2014-2020.

The Agreement contains a clause allowing it to be revised every five years, and while in 2005 and 2010 revisions were agreed upon, but whether or not the 2015 revision will happen is unclear. At the time of writing, 11 ACP countries and 5 EU countries had still not ratified the 2010 revision of the CPA.

For a comprehensive overview of the CPA, please see the ECDPM Cotonou Infokit on page 35— which is now over 10 years old.

1.2 Important institutions & organisations

Joint ACP-EU
ACP-EU Joint Council of Ministers
The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly
ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors
Centre for the Development of Enterprise (due to close 2016)
Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation

ACP
ACP Heads of State Summit
ACP Committee of Ambassadors
ACP Secretariat
ACP Member State Governments

EU
European Commission
Council of the European Union
European External Action Service
European Parliament
European Union Member States Governments
ACP Working Group
European Development Fund Committee

1.3 Selected key official documents

The 2010 revision of the Cotonou Agreement
The 2003 revision of the Georgetown Agreement
The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon “Amending the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community”
The 2012 Sipopo Declaration on “The future of the ACP Group in a Changing World: Challenges and Opportunities”
The 2014 Joint ACP-EU Declaration on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
The European Development Fund

- The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main instrument for delivering EU development assistance to the ACP and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).

- The EDF is subject to its own financial rules and procedures, and is managed by the European Commission (EC) and the European Investment Bank.

- The EDF is currently the only EU policy instrument is funded outside the EU budget by the EU Member States on the basis of financial payments related to specific contribution shares or “keys”, which reflect the comparative interests of individual member states. The history behind this anomaly dates back to the foundations of the European integration process.

- There have been successive proposals to place the EDF within the overall EU budget, so-called budgetisation yet this has not occurred. The issue of budgetisation will be on the agenda again for the post-2020 financing of the EU’s activities, and the EU has been adapting its procedures to further align the EDF to other ‘on budget’ instruments.

- The current EDF covers the period 2014-2020, a one-year extension compared to the 10th EDF allowing the end of the 11th EDF to coincide with the expiration of the CPA and the EU budget period. Including provisions for OCTs the total of the 11th EDF is €30.5 billion.

2. Perspectives on the future of ACP-EU relations

The changing global context, with institutional, political and socioeconomic developments in both the EU and the ACP raise the question of whether the current approach to cooperation has sufficiently delivered on its objectives, and what evolutions – or revolutions – may be necessary for future relations (Negre et al. 2013).

As Geert Laporte, ECDPM’s Deputy Director, commented in 2012: “Halfway through the Cotonou Agreement, the overall impression exists that there is a strong decline in common interests and trust between both parties. The ACP-EU partnership rests on weak political foundations on both sides” (ECDPM Briefing Note 34).

The question arises whether or not there remains enough common ground between and within the ACP Group and the EU to justify continuation of the partnership in its current form beyond 2020.

Challenges like climate change and environmental protection, the promotion of good political and economic governance, the fight against terrorism and organised crime and the management of global public goods may become increasingly important, but is the current ACP-EU framework fit to address these issues? Also, for many ACP countries the issues of poverty, inequality and fragility have not gone away.

Emerging economies provide a welcome alternative to the dominant weight of Europe as a former colonial power. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and other emerging economies provide significant value added and new opportunities for ACP countries in terms of trade, investment, aid and technical assistance. While the EU remains a very significant trading partner of the ACP Group of countries, the share taken by emerging powers has substantially increased in recent years.
2.1 Global drivers of change

The rise of the emerging players and changes in the global landscape come at a time when the influence of the EU in the world seems to be declining, including in parts of the ACP. Nonetheless, many still continue to see the EU as an important partner, defending sound values and principles, and globally the EU continues to be the champion of ‘soft power’. The EU seems to remain strongly interested in Africa but to a lesser extent in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. The EU clearly aims to reinforce relations with Africa through the African Union, covering the whole of Africa, rather than through the ACP. Within the EU, enlargement rounds have fundamentally changed the EU’s collective attitude towards the ACP Group, viewing it as a post-colonial concept. The most recent countries that joined the EU look East rather than South. The considerable loss of status of ACP-EU relations and the ACP Group within the EU is heightened by the absence of a reference to the ACP in the Lisbon Treaty. The lack of weight and focus given to ACP institutional arrangements in the EU External Action Service (EEAS) and Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) also attest to this.

Several of the new global players from the emerging economies have a fresh and pragmatic perspective on development in ACP countries and are perceived to deliver high-speed assistance and, contrary to the EU, have the ability by themselves to “speak with one voice”. In addition, emerging players are perceived to have a more positive and optimistic attitude towards the ACP. However, on the ACP side there is suspicion among some actors about the tendency for these new players to support undemocratic leadership and have an apparent lack of vision for sustainable development. Many ACP interlocutors remain suspicious about the future intentions of the EU, with increasing concerns about how the EU is treating them. The ACP Group is also increasingly frustrated with instances of the EU’s use of “double standards” in the treatment of different ACP states and leaders. The EU has become unpopular at times because of its unwillingness to reveal its genuine interests. A case in point is the challenges in agreeing the EPAs, which have done much to tarnish the EU’s reputation in the ACP.

The following ECDPM publications cover various perspectives on the future of EU-ACP cooperation, raising important and critical questions on the foundation of ACP-EU relations. They call for realistic reflections on the future and present examples of European and Caribbean perspectives on the future of their relations in an ACP-EU partnership.


- In recent years, various studies have reviewed ACP-EU relations focusing on the Brussels-based ACP and EU representatives that directly manage and shape cooperation. This paper presents the findings of a study that contrasts a detailed review of the literature with perceptions about the past, present and future of ACP-EU cooperation from a wide range of stakeholders in ten ACP countries.

- The perspectives for future ACP-EU cooperation include: (i) abandoning the CPA as a legal framework and regionalizing EU relations with each of the ACP regions (the likely consequence if no successor agreement to Cotonou is adopted); (ii) an upgrade of the CPA beyond 2020 through a revision to accommodate the changing international scene (a revamp of ACP-EU institutions to focus less on ODA); or (iii) the regionalization of the ACP’s ties with Europe, preserving as many elements of the CPA as possible, keeping the ACP to coordinate international fora and technical, developmental and trade matters.

- While European interlocutors seem to prefer to regionalize ACP-EU relations and turn the page on Cotonou, with the ACP views differ. ACP officials and ACP-country ambassadors in Brussels as well as other working within the current framework, indicate broad support for upgrading the Agreement. However, most stakeholders in ACP countries see no reason to maintain the ACP structure or the CPA: they opt for letting Cotonou expire, regionalizing
relations with the EU, and possibly maintaining a scaled-down ACP.

- A tacit understanding among Europeans is that the ball is in the ACP’s corner in terms of defining and determining their own future as a group and its relationship vis-à-vis the EU as such, while momentum needs to be built in which the EU also needs to set out its own desires and priorities in giving shape to the cooperation.

- European perceptions on the future of the Cotonou Agreement point to two sets of arguments; (i) reasons to do away with the ACP-EU partnership including weak evidence
of the development of an ACP identity or intra-ACP trade, decreasing relevance of ex-colonial ties, and a poor track record in shaping joint positions; and (ii) elements in the partnership deemed worth preserving including its legally binding nature and political dialogue, the strong performance of the EDF and the potential alliance for global public goods provision.

- While the EU’s declining strategic interest in the Caribbean and especially the Pacific is no secret, too rejectionist a stance toward the cooperation framework could seriously harm the promotion of the EU’s values and interests in Africa.
- The EU would currently seem most inclined to preserve key elements of the Cotonou Agreement by transferring these into separate EU regional strategies towards Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

2.2 Scenarios for the future of the ACP Group

Since 1975, the ACP Group has grown from 46 member states to 79 by 2014 (with South Sudan’s expected accession to the Group, it will rise to 80). Although there has been integration within the separate ACP sub-regions, the ACP Group as a whole has not further integrated nor established any serious relations beyond the EU. The ACP countries are becoming increasingly organised around regional organisations, with the African Union, the Pacific Islands Forum and CARIFORUM strengthening...
Global Changes, emerging players and evolving ACP-EU relations: towards a common agenda for action?

• The aim should be to assess the future of the ACP-EU partnership in light of the new global challenges, the growing role and impact of emerging economies and the ongoing change processes within both the ACP Group and the EU.

• The rapidly expanding global agenda and the shift in the global balance of power is turning the tables, with emerging players increasingly being perceived in ACP countries as a welcome alternative to the EU as the ACP’s traditional major economic partner and donor. In addition South-South cooperation is growing among ACP/African governments due to more pragmatic, practical and unconditional approaches to doing business in ACP countries.

• Some striking quotes from ECDPM’s Talking Points blog discussion on ‘The ACP and Europe; What future for a privileged relationship?’ reflect upon the global changes:

  ‘Europe cannot see the wind of change blowing over the ACP particular in Africa which is emerging as an economic powerhouse in the making’
  Boodhoo Narainduth, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mauritius

  ‘Both the EU and the ACP states have themselves invested little practical effort in clarifying the unique value of their partnership in a transformed development context, what value added and attractions it may or may not retain (...) and what remains in it for both sides.’
  Ola Bello, FRIDE, Spain

  ‘The EU side needs to urgently reflect on the role of emerging donors in the ACP and on its comparative advantage towards the ACP Group. The prospect of policy coherence for development and of joining forces with the ACP in international fora towards common objectives seems to represent two examples of EU added value’
  Frank de Wispelaere, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium

• Clearly the traditional relationship is now faced with a completely different context. The key question is what will the countries of the ACP decide on for their ACP Group?

• Reflections are due on cooperation with emerging players as this presents not only opportunities but also risks, and there also remain some concerns about the long-term
development impact. Although the EU is increasingly being challenged in ACP countries, it is becoming neither irrelevant nor unwanted.

- The EU has undergone significant changes, with considerable integration progress, and successive rounds of enlargement altering its nature and outlook. The Eastern European countries do not have a history of cooperation with most ACP states. The ACP Group has equally undergone change and grown in membership.
- The political environment surrounding the three focus areas of the Cotonou Agreement is changing with a growing number of alternative, and to some extent competing policy frameworks to address the common interests between the EU and countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, e.g. the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.
- In such a context there is a need to reassess common interests and clearly link them to the added value of the ACP-EU framework. Obviously the Cotonou Agreement will be in place and the contractual commitments will be observed until 2020, but what will come after that? For the partnership to be viable in the longer term, a persuasive vision on future common interests is what is needed. This will require fresh thinking, particularly by the ACP Group, who would tend to lose the most if the partnership were to disappear.

Global changes, emerging players and evolving ACP-EU relations:
Towards a common agenda for action?
James Mackie, Bruce Byiers, Sonia Niznik and Geert Laporte. 2011.

- Potentially common interests between the ACP and the EU that have been identified include: trade, raw materials, migration, climate change, energy, food security, innovative financing, the realisation of the MDGs and tourism.
- Scenarios for the future of the ACP Group:
  - A continuation of the ACP Group in its current form beyond 2020 without significant changes is unlikely to satisfy ACP members and the EU as a key partner.
  - A first scenario relates to engaging with new strategic partners beyond the EU to get more bargaining power and send a message to the EU to be taken seriously. The potential however looks slim, and questions such as whether new players would be interested in engaging with ACP as a group must be raised.
  - The second scenario is the ACP Group opening up to new members and seeking to reaffirm itself as the voice of the world’s least developed and the small and vulnerable economies. This would potentially involve duplication of roles such as the G77. Furthermore, this would require a definition of vulnerability and poses questions as to South Africa’s membership.
  - In a third scenario the ACP Group could be enlarged with the inclusion of North African countries. However this also potentially creates the duplication of roles with for instance the African Union. It must also be questioned which incentives these countries would have to join.
  - A fourth, regionalisation scenario would consider the ACP Group as an umbrella grouping based on regional A, C and P groupings, or on the six EPA configurations and RECs. But with the debacle of regional groupings as seen in the EPA negotiations raises the question why would this work now?
What future for the ACP and the Cotonou Agreement?
Geert Laporte. 2012.
ECDPM Briefing Note 34. pp. 1-8.

- The weak political foundations of the ACP-EU partnership confront those in favour of revitalising ACP-EU relations with the challenge of clearly defining a new set of common interests in order to give a stronger political basis to these relations in today’s world, as well as justifying the relevance of the ACP-EU framework as the most effective channel to deal with these common interests vis-à-vis competing policy frameworks that link the EU to various ACP regions.
- Both the ACP and the EU could be more strategic in identifying clearly where they could join forces in international fora on global issues of common concern. Theoretically, if there would be coherent positioning on both sides, an ACP-EU alliance could be a major force in the UN and other multilateral organisations.
- While development finance has been the glue that has kept the partnership alive, it has also created the typical ‘donor-recipient’ relationship of dependency. There is a perception that the ACP-EU Partnership has been dominated by the short-term vested interests of Lomé and Cotonou institutions and individuals that benefitted from quite generous EDF resources.
- In the past decades, economic and trade interests between both groupings have declined in a rather spectacular way. In a context of economic and financial crisis in the EU, and increasingly promising economic growth perspectives in several parts of the ACP, proponents of the ACP Group believe that new common economic interests could be built. A reality check of some initial scenarios for the future of the ACP group include:
  - Status quo which does not seem realistic and it is not likely to generate excitement with the EU
  - ACP engaging with new strategic global partners beyond the EU such as BRICS and the USA would provide more bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU however the potential looks grim because of the lack of internal coherence in the ACP Group.
  - ACP opening up to new members in North Africa or the LDCs raises questions of overlap with e.g. the AU or G77 and which incentives there would be for these countries to join. Furthermore the potential is hampered by the existing difficulty to ensure coherence among ACP member countries, questioning the possibility of cohesiveness of such new groups.
  - ACP becoming an umbrella for the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions as a scenario is only relevant if intra-ACP and South-South economic cooperation would be significantly strengthened and if ACP institutions can clearly demonstrate their added value.
  - The less ambitious option could be turning the ACP into a loose knowledge hub or a networking type of organization among countries that share a common history and similarities in their path to development. However one could question the real need for such an institutions and whether there would be drivers within the ACP Group for leadership and financial support.
3. The added value of separate components of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement – should they stay or should they go?

The Cotonou Agreement provides a legal framework for political dialogue, economic cooperation, trade and development cooperation between the EU and the ACP. To some degree the Cotonou Agreement is unique because of the breadth of cooperation under these three areas.

The partnership has created a special ACP Group-EU relationship that is based on comprehensive political dialogue and based on mutual value based conditionality. While the conditionality is reciprocal, the asymmetrical nature of the partnership does not permit the ACP to institute sanctions (e.g. suspend the EDF).

The trade component of the CPA marked a new phase in the two partners trade relations and the start of reciprocal free trade agreements, however, the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) dragged on and encountered great obstacles, despite recent progress.

Finally, the third pillar of the CPA, development cooperation is often seen as the glue that holds the partnership together. The European Development Fund (EDF) was continued from previous agreements in the CPA and is a significant and unique vehicle for ODA constituted outside of the formal EU budget (although talks of ‘budgetisation’ have been on-going for decades).

The following three sections present ECDPM analysis on these three main pillars of the CPA and provide food for thought on whether and how these elements of the partnership could be carried on in future ACP-EU relations or subsequent agreements.

3.1 Political dialogue

Compared to its predecessors, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement features deeper and wider political dialogue with political cooperation as one of the three pillars of the cooperative framework. The scope of political dialogue in the agreement was broadened compared to previous agreements to include issues of peace, security and terrorism and also strengthened those parts concerned with democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Furthermore the CPA required increased participation of civil society and the private sector. A major innovation is its inclusive approach with Article 2 of the treaty identifying “participation” as one of the fundamental principles underpinning ACP-EU cooperation.

Articles 8 and 96 of the CPA that deal with ‘political dialogue’, the ‘essential elements’ and, the ‘the consultation procedure and appropriate measures as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law’ are two vital provisions within the CPA around which debate continues. Other articles also touch on aspects around which a significant measure of ACP-EU political dialogue is based. Thus Article 11 on peace building policies, conflict prevention and resolution provides the basis of the Africa Peace Facility, and Article 13 on migration covers an area where there has been considerable dialogue between the ACP and the EU, and is an article which the ACP and the EU could not agree on a modification of during the second revision of the Agreement in 2010.

When flagrant violations of the essential elements of the CPA occur, a consultation procedure, as foreseen under Article 96 of the Agreement, can be initiated, aimed at finding a common solution to the political difficulties encountered by one of the parties. Article 96 is however sometimes perceived by the ACP to be negative, potentially punitive in nature, when unilaterally applied, and when applied incorrectly, is neither complementary to nor in conformity with the key objectives of the CPA.

The following papers present selected ECDPM analysis on the political dialogue of the Cotonou Agreement. Firstly a series of ECDPM-published papers written by different authors in 2005 highlight some of the difficult questions raised by the use of
Article 96. Following, a seminar report from 2008 presents the discussion of ACP-EU political dialogue leading up to the 2010 revision of the Cotonou Agreement. Finally, two selected publications take a closer look at the political dialogue concerning human rights under Article 8 and migration under Article 13.

The following publications form a series of ECDPM-published papers written by different authors on the difficult questions raised by the use of Article 96. The idea behind this series published in 2005 was to make information available on Article 96 and to encourage debate on whether Article 96 serves its intended purpose and how it can best be applied.

**When Agreement Breaks Down, What Next? The Cotonou Agreement’s Article 96 Consultation Procedure.**

James Mackie and Julia Zinke. 2005


- This discussion paper is intended as a basic introduction to Article 96 of the EU-ACP Partnership Agreement. It looks at the content and meaning of the article, as well as the consultation procedures for which the article provides when one of the signatory parties feels that the Agreement’s essential elements have been breached.
- Article 96, and its rarely used sister Article 97, are easily the most controversial articles in the CPA. They provide the legal basis for the suspension of the CPA in cases where one of the parties feels that the agreement’s essential and fundamental elements are not being respected. The articles are therefore inevitably linked to some form of disagreement or breakdown in relations between signatory parties.

**Suspension of Development Cooperation: An Instrument to Promote Human Rights and Democracy?**


ECDPM Discussion Paper 64B, pp. 1-16.

- The second paper in the series provides a more historical account of the background and origins of Article 96 and the use made of its predecessor, Article 366a from the Lomé Convention.
- It looks at the EU’s suspension of development cooperation and seeks to answer the following questions: under what conditions did the EU suspend development cooperation in response to violations between 1989 and 2001, and what factors have contributed to the success (increased respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles) or failure (continued violations) of this instrument?
- Whereas the EU tends to see Article 96 as an important and potentially positive instrument to enforce the “essential elements” of the Cotonou Agreement (namely, respect for human rights, the rule of law and democracy), the ACP side tends to view the use of the article as a “sanction” and “punishment” which is not conducive to overall relations between the two sides.
- The paper presents a systematic analysis of how the provisions were applied, in particular the consistency of their application, and concludes that there is little evidence to support one of the most frequent criticisms made of Article 96: that the EU tends to apply the article inconsistently.
- The article also offers explanations for why the provisions were or were not applied.
‘Recent’ cases of Article 96 Consultations.
ECDPM Discussion Paper 64C. pp. 1-17.

- This publication provides a concise description of three cases of the use of Article 96: in the Central African Republic, Togo and Guinea-Bissau.
- By examining the political context prevailing in each case, the response of the EU, of the ACP Group, of neighbouring countries and of other international actors, the paper describes the consultation procedure and the benchmarks defined therein as a basis for assessing the progress made by the country in fulfilling its commitments.
- The paper finds that the negative image of Article 96 that prevails in some ACP countries makes the EU reluctant to open consultations at an early stage, in situations of deteriorating respect for democracy and human rights.
- It is particularly interesting that the chosen cases show how Article 96 consultations can bring about positive outcomes. The value of involvement of other actors beyond the formal parties is also stressed. The paper points to the useful contributions made by such actors as the ACP Group and the African Union.
- The active involvement of neighbouring countries and the ACP Group during an Article 96 procedure clearly increases the positive results that can be drawn from it. However, inconsistencies in the reactions of the ACP Group, the African Union, and African regional organisations, as seen in the case of the Central African Republic, jeopardises the positive potential of ACP or African initiatives.

An ACP perspective and overview of article 96 cases.
ECDPM Discussion Paper 64D. pp. 1-16.

- The final contribution to the series on Article 96 consists of a short article and a table compiled listing details of all the cases in which Article 96 has been used since the CPA was signed.
- The article gives a basic overview of the debate (at the time) on Article 96 as it might be seen from an ACP point of view. The article is not however an official position of the ACP Group but represents the author’s personal assessment.
- Article 96 is perceived to be negative, potentially punitive in nature, unilaterally applied, and when applied incorrectly, neither complementary to nor in conformity with the key objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. It is within this context that the ACP Group, through the 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement, addressed these concerns by rendering political dialogue under Article 8 more systematic and formal.
- The additional annex from the 2005 revision entitled “Political dialogue as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law”, sets out detailed modalities for this structured dialogue, which should bring the eventual application of Article 96, when needed, in line with the key objectives of the CPA.
- The strengthened focus on political dialogue (Article 8) will invariably lead to an improved application of Article 96 consultations and indeed remove some of the negative connotations attached to the Article.

• This report presents discussions on ACP-EU political dialogue preceding the 2010 revision of the CPA.
• While political dialogue of the CPA was substantially strengthened in the 2005 revision, up to the 2010 revision not much experience had been gained in the implementation of Articles 8 and 96, due both to the fact that the 2005 revision was only ratified in 2008 but also because there was a lack of reliable information on the use of Article 8. There remained a feeling among ACP stakeholders that the use of Article 8 and 96 had not been very successful.
• The imbalance in the orientation of the debates going on within the ACP-EU in the political dialogue process was been raised as an issue. Why ACP Member States have been less proactive in initiating political dialogue is linked, in part, to the perception that the EU essentially uses Article 8 to raise critical and political points to do mainly with human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and security.
• The recommendations for ACP-EU Political Dialogue in the 2010 Revision included; 1) to promote independent analysis on the application of Article 8 and 96, 2) to increase awareness and understanding of the potential of Article 8 for political dialogue, 3) to improve quality and effectiveness of dialogue by determining the most suitable level for dialogue depending on the type of problems identified, 4) to stimulate mechanisms for intra-ACP and regional dialogue in relation to Articles 8 and 96, 5) to review the definition of Article 9 on governance, 6) to emphasize conflict prevention and peace building in Article 11, and 7) to revise and re-title Article 13 as on ‘Migration & Development’ so as to stress the potential of positive links between migration and development.

Political Dialogue on Human Rights under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement.
Jean Bossuyt, Camilla Rocca & Brecht Lein. 2014.

• Three guiding principles for an effective political dialogue on human rights proposed include (i) the need for realism, (ii) EU leverage and smart incentives, and (iii) transparency on EU’s interests. The EU is clear on its intention to promote human rights values in its external action, yet it tends to be conspicuously silent on its own (less altruistic) interests in partner countries.
• These guiding principles are meant to function as a reality check to help avoid unrealistic expectations in terms of improving human rights dialogues with partner countries in the ACP. When these limits are recognized, there is no shortage of areas where actual improvements are feasible.
• Recommendations for how to improve human rights-related political dialogue processes are (i) to adopt a more strategic and structured approach to political dialogue, (ii) to enhance the legitimacy of the human rights political dialogue through closer alignment

ECDPM Briefing Note 33. pp. 1-11.

- The ACP-EU dialogue on migration is an on-going process. Currently, the Commission does not have a mandate to negotiate future readmission agreements with an ACP country, and although they generally attempt to link readmission agreements with visa facilitation, many member states are of the opinion that readmission-relevant ACP states do not fully meet the criteria and/or standards that would allow linking readmission agreements with visas. A block agreement with all ACP countries is also viewed as unrealistic due to the capacity differences between countries.

- Article 13 of the CPA is limited to the readmission of nationals and does not cover third country nationals.

- EU concerns:
  - Out of the issues discussed in the ACP-EU dialogue on migration, readmission is the biggest priority for the Europeans.
  - The EU MS feel that the ACP are holding back on readmission and would like to see a higher level of agreement and cooperation.
  - EU Member States also argue that forced return has to work for voluntary return to become more attractive for migrants.

- ACP concerns:
  - ACP representatives stress that readmission cannot be addressed in isolation and is only one piece in a large chain of migration processes.
  - While expressing willingness to cooperate on readmission and acknowledging the obligation under international law, they note that the EU often forgets about what happens to the irregular migrant upon returning if there are not sufficient means for reintegration.

- Issues/questions to address in the future:
  a) what can ACP and EU concretely do to eliminate barriers to voluntary return?
  b) how might the EU give stronger guarantees on the proper implementation of its safeguards regarding international protection and human rights of migrants?
  c) how can the ACP improve their readmission procedures?
  d) how can the ACP and EU countries strengthen their cooperation to facilitate the reintegration of returnees in order to address poverty and avoid return to the EU, thereby linking readmission more closely with migration and development?

- It will be up to the EU and ACP representatives involved to seize the opportunity provided by the dialogue to strengthen mutually satisfactory cooperation on migration, in the spirit of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.
3.2 Development and financial issues

While the CPA was seen to be a move towards a less donor-recipient focused partnership, it is still criticised for being a partnership based predominantly on aid and financial resources and is generally deemed to remain constrained by a donor-recipient relationship. This is increasingly being brought into question, given the economic growth currently being experienced by many countries within the ACP.

However, many still consider the EDF, the main instrument for delivering EU development assistance to the ACP and OCTs, as a useful and important financial instrument because it allows stable and predictable funding – an important factor for the effective and efficient use of aid resources.

Differentiation in development cooperation means that the EU would focus its resources on countries it deems “most in need” and on countries where those resources can have the greatest impact. While recent EU Development Policies such as the 2012 Agenda for Change call for increased differentiation, the unilateral development of criteria has been criticised by the ACP Group.

The following publications look specifically at the ACP-EU development cooperation, the programming of the European Development Fund, the impact of EU budget negotiations on ACP-EU relations and the question of budgetising the EDF.

Differentiation in ACP-EU Cooperation: Implications of the EU’s Agenda for Change for the 11th EDF and beyond.
ECDPM Discussion Paper 134.

- The principle of differentiation is not new in the ACP-EU development cooperation. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement introduced needs and performance criteria to determine the allocation of funds from the EDF to countries and regions. With the Cotonou Agreement ‘differentiation’ became a fundamental principle of the ACP-EU partnership, a key change compared to the Lomé Conventions that determined allocation on an ‘entitlement’ basis.

- The 2012 EU Agenda for Change policy stresses the need to focus EU efforts on countries where greatest impact would be achieved and identifies three types of differentiation that the EU seeks to implement (i) differentiated mix of policies and instruments, (ii) differentiated levels of development assistance, and (iii) differentiated eligibility to development assistance. While the first two types of differentiation can be applied to the CPA, views differ as to whether the third type is applicable to the Cotonou Agreement, with the ACP Secretary General explicitly stating that graduation with respect to access to resources is not within the spirit of Cotonou.

- Differentiation will unmistakably affect ACP-EU development cooperation more so going forward than it has done in the past in terms of the mix of policies and instruments and allocated levels of ODA. Under the 11th EDF the EEAS considers proposing to enhance differentiation by reducing (but not ‘graduating’) bilateral assistance to ACP countries in middle- and higher income categories. A proportional reduction of country allocations for some ACP countries could prepare the ground for phasing out development cooperation to these countries after 2020, when the Cotonou Agreement expires.
• Though unlikely to occur in the current programming cycle, it may potentially lead to the graduation from bilateral assistance for some ACP countries after the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020. At the same time, the EU would be expected to strengthen cooperation in other areas than development assistance and step up the use of innovative sources of financing.

• A comparison made of the 9th and 10th EDF indicates that ACP states that belong to the group of LDCs or LICS received larger shares and increases in country allocations from the 9th to the 10th EDF than higher income ACP countries. One could expect this trend to continue under the 11th EDF and applied more strongly in view of the Agenda for Change.

• Both the ACP and the EU stand to benefit from operational and practical reflections and exchanges on the best ways to apply differentiation in ACP-EU cooperation — they should have a shared interest in applying differentiation in a way that ensures maximum impact on poverty reduction and optimal mutual benefits from their cooperation along all dimensions and in the spirit of Cotonou.

• Critical is defining on what basis to differentiate, and not if, but how other criteria beyond income, like vulnerability and fragility, can be taken sufficiently into account to respond to differing needs and ensure more effective tailor-made ACP-EU cooperation.

• Finally, concrete proposals and exchanges are needed from the EU and ACP on possible ‘destinations’ for graduation and corresponding tools, to move beyond aspirations of optimal ‘policy mixes’ or ‘innovative financing’.

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Improving ACP-EU Cooperation: Is ‘budgetising’ the EDF the answer?

• The European Commission launched a debate at the time (2004) arguing that budgetisation of the EDF would contribute to a number of political goals such as countering perceptions of political marginalization of the ACP, strengthening the democratic legitimacy of cooperation with the ACP, improving the effectiveness of EU aid to ACP countries, permitting a faster response to evolving needs and priorities and enhancing efficiency and harmonization of procedures and practices and reducing transaction costs of development aid.

• The varying actors and perspectives on budgetisation at the time (2004) including:
  o The European Parliament, a traditional supporter of budgetisation, remains firm in its view that if the EDF were budgetised it could protect the level of funding available for the ACP while increasing democratic legitimacy and control of ACP development expenditures.
  o The European Court of Auditors has in past debate been favourable towards keeping a separate EDF. However, the Court of Auditors has raised concerns about the negative impact of delayed ratification by EU member states on effective and efficient implementation of the EDF.
  o EU member states are divided, but at least one key supporter of the EDF has shifted its position to the budgetisation camp. Many EU member states have internal discussions between different ministries and different positions sometimes exist between these.
  o Opinions are also divided on the ACP side, with ACP representatives seeing both disadvantages and advantages in budgetisation.
• The various concern raised during debates can be grouped into four categories; i) democratic control and transparency, ii) aid delivery and quality of assistance, iii) security of aid and iv) coherence of EU external relations.

• While there is the obvious Hamlet’s choice “to budgetise or not to budgetise”, it does not need to be seen in such absolute terms. There are different ways of budgetising and even if the choice is made not to budgetise measures can be taken to respond to existing concerns regarding efficiency and effectiveness. Without complicating the choice unduly, three basic options can be considered: 1) keeping the EDF separate, 2) creating an ACP budget chapter under Heading 4 (external actions) of the EU budget as suggested by the Commission, or 3) making innovative and flexible use of the Financial Perspectives, probably through the creation of a new heading or sub-heading for development cooperation.


• In the Communication ‘A budget for Europe 2020’, the EC at the time (2012) underlined that it was not appropriate at the time to propose that the EDF be integrated into the EU budget. This was been interpreted by some as a move to avoid a reduction in the total amount of EU development cooperation.

• Keeping the EDF fenced means that it would be relatively protected from pressure by member states to reduce EU development cooperation funds either in relation to other components of heading 4 (Global Europe), in relation to other headings, or the budget altogether.

• While the EDF may be affected by overall discussions on the EU budget, it is also important to note that despite the declining interest among EU member states in ACP-EU cooperation, the EC deemed it opportune to keep Cotonou and EDF intact until 2020 and prepare for more radical changes after 2020.

• The commission proposes to further align MS contribution keys under the 11th EDF with the keys used for the EU budget, which may smooth the integration of funding to the ACP and OCT into the EU budget after 2020. The most significant change occurs for the EU12 member states (group of states that joined the EU in or since 2004), whose relative contributions increase between 27.86% (Hungary) and 107.73% (Slovakia).

• Even though the EU proposal would result in stronger alignment to the present EU budget’s keys, the 11th EDF contribution keys still differ substantially from the keys used for this budget, and thus also the size of member state contributions.

• One might expect purely from a financial logic that member states whose proposed relative contributions are larger than it would be under full alignment to the present EU budget to be in favour of budgetisation of the EDF, as full alignment to the budget would reduce their contributions share. In a similar vein, using a purely financial logic other MS could be expected to argue against budgetisation. This could particularly be the case for the EU12 MS, whose contribution would increase drastically under budgetisation.

• Key stakeholders in EU-ACP development cooperation, such as EU MS, DG DEVCO the EEAS, the EP, ACP governments and key non-state actors, stand to benefit from closely following the debates on the overall size and distribution of the EU’s budget as well as the EDF.

• The ACP should not neglect some EU12 members who although collectively are small players, have an increasing share, with Poland for example already exceeding Ireland’s and Portugal’s real contributions.
Member States’ positions on the proposed 2014-2020 EU Budget: An analysis of the statements made at the 26th of March General Affairs Council meeting with particular reference to External Action and the EDF.
Ulrika Kilnes and Andrew Sherriff. 2012.
ECDPM Briefing Note 37 pp. 1-10.

- The EU budget negotiations have important implications for developing countries and EU external relations more generally including ACP-EU relations.
- This Briefing Note analyses statements from a Council meeting in 2012 where each EU Member State was given an opportunity to publicly state its position. This note is meant to inform stakeholders from both developing and EU countries, particularly on positions relating to budgetary funding for EU external action and the EDF in 2012.
- The paper notes the individual Member States’ positions in 2012 on a number of questions relating to:
  - Positions on cross-cutting issues
  - Statements related to Heading 4 (Global Europe)
  - Statement related to the EDF
  - Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – relevant items under other headings with an external impact
- While in the Communication ‘A budget for Europe 2020’, the EC underlined that it was not appropriate at present time to propose integration of the EDF into the EU budget, a number of EU Member States have pushed for the EDF to be integrated into the budget.
- Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden gave direct statements for the budgetisation of the EDF, while Finland, France, Italy and the United Kingdom noted EDF budgetisation by implication, i.e. rather noted that all programmes outside the framework should be financed within the budget.
- EU Member States Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia wanted to keep the EDF outside the budget, while Luxembourg and Belgium wanted to keep it outside for now and called for budgetisation after 2020 respectively.
- During the Council meeting, the following countries stated their desire to contribute to the 11th EDF using the same contribution keys as used for the 10th EDF; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia.
- These are all EU12 Member States that contributed relatively less to the 10th EDF than they do to the EU budget. In reality the statements about contributions to the 11th EDF means that the listed countries would like to keep contributing less compared to EU15 Member States under the next EDF as well. It should be noted that all of these five Member States also belong to the group of net recipients of the EU budget.

From Purse to Policy to Practice: Six initiatives to future-proof EU development cooperation for 2014-2020 and beyond?
Florian Krätke. 2013.
ECDPM Briefing Note 51. pp. 1-12.

- Discussions of differentiation affect the negotiations of the allocation of funds from the EDF, with ACP countries maintaining that there is no legal basis for the differentiation policy in the Cotonou Agreement - they perceive it as a policy ‘imposed’ by the EU without prior consultation.
Regional Programming for the 11th European Development Fund.

Florian Krätke. 2014.

ECDPM Talking Points blog.

- Political issues continue to hamper the effective use of EU funds to promote regional integration. Regional organisations struggle to gain legitimacy and credibility from their member states, with domestic priorities of African countries tending to override commitments to regional integration. Complicated overlapping membership structures have not helped matters.

- The EU wants to promote regional programmes with funding through the European Development Fund, but doubts the capacity of regional organisations to manage regional funds and projects. In addition, European Commission administrative and financial procedures prove cumbersome, an issue highlighted by the European Court of Auditors.

- Regional programming for the 11th EDF has proven that the parties seem to have mutual appreciation of the issues at hand, but the key question is what will be done to ensure that Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) breathe new life into the promise of regional integration?

- Regional organisations either lead the programming process or are consulted on all aspects of programming. The 11th EDF RIPs contain 1) envelopes for individual member countries or regional organisations, 2) cross-cutting priorities, agreed jointly by the regional organisations and their member states, and managed partly by the ROs, and 3) financing infrastructure projects.

- The more prominent role of the ROs in driving the regional integration agenda alongside the EU means they will need to put on a show of strength of their coordinating and...
Alisa Herrero, Greta Galeazzi and Florian Krätke. 2013.

- Programming EU development aid for the period 2014-2020 involves allocation billions of euros through the two principal geographic funding instruments (the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the 11th European Development Fund (EDF)).
- The programming exercise for the 11th EDF and DCI 2014-2020 has been amended to reflect the new post-Lisbon framework, to simplify the process and to drive forward the EU’s Development Policy the Agenda for Change.
- Programming guidelines for the 11th EDF and the DCI have been standardised in one single set of instructions. This rationalisation has brought together two different programming cultures: the EDF’s being marked by the content and spirit of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement including multi-stakeholders dialogue and shared interest between partners; and the DCI’s culture wherein EU interests and priorities are defined prior to engaging in dialogue with partners in development cooperation.
- The programming exercise has coincided with the drawn out negotiation of the EU budget - the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2014-2020.
- Programming is a shared responsibility between the EEAS and DEVCO; whereas the EEAS is tasked to lead the majority of the process, neither can act without the consent of the other, and both have clear reporting requirements to the Commissioner for Development.
- The current arrangements between the EEAS and DEVCO in terms of lead responsibility work well, in the sense that EU delegations (EUDs) regularly make use of the flexibility foreseen in the working arrangements. Nevertheless, there remains a significant amount of confusion as to the EEAS’ role, particularly among partner countries. EEAS’ representatives’ presence in the programming process and meetings is seen as a multiplication of the number of interlocutors, whose interests are not immediately clear.
- Three scenarios for the EEAS-DEVCO interrelation were distinguished: 1) The EEAS has shown leadership and been effective at formulating priorities to shape a more politically savvy response, 2) The EEAS has been unable to fulfill its role due to capacity constraints, and 3) the EEAS has appeared detached from the programming process.
- Among EU institutions, the most contested new policy orientation for the current programming process is the principle of sector concentration. In practice, sector concentration has proven problematic, involving difficult choices in a context of competing interests and incentives.
- Overall, there is some concern that the programming process has not been sufficiently guided or informed by an understanding of local political dynamics, or by a sound analysis of the quality and credibility of national development plans. Furthermore, EU commitments to key development effectiveness principles such as country and democratic ownership (Accra, Busan), which are explicitly reflected in the EU’s updated development
policy, have not yet been clearly translated into the programming process. Reported instances of DEVCO HQ ‘prescribing’ priority sectors have compromised the partner country’s ownership over the priority areas as well as EUD leadership in facilitating the process.

- The question remains whether EUDs will be able to translate programming priorities into effective implementation strategies that contribute to country-led change if these are not sufficiently grounded on a sound understanding of country contexts, and if domestic accountability stakeholders are not meaningfully involved in programming.

3.3 Trade

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement was an important compromise between maintaining the ACP countries’ privileged access to the EU market and slowly bringing these positions in line with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. With the Agreement, the ACP Group and the EU entered into a phase in their trade relations marked by the start of negotiations on reciprocal free trade agreements between some of the world’s most developed and some of its poorest countries.

However, the resulting negotiations on the ‘development-focused’ Economic Partnership Agreements have been souring relations for years. It was expected to conclude in December 2007, yet negotiations dragged on and encountered many obstacles. In 2014 however, some progress has been made. The European Parliament, European Council and European Commission agreed in May 2013 to set the 1st of October 2014 as the deadline for completing the EPAs or ratifying those already signed. While this may have been the push for the conclusion of negotiations with West Africa, the South African Development Community-EPA group, the East African Community and the ratification of national EPAs by Cameroon, Fiji and Papua New Guinea - EPAs are not an end in themselves, and successful implementation will be a key part of the equation.

The following publications explain and analyse the EPA negotiations, and the October-November edition of ECDPM’s magazine, GREAT Insights, presents contributions from a range of stakeholders involved in the EPA negotiations. Following, two publications present analysis of two specific sectors of importance within the ACP regions - agro-food and tourism.

**Economic Partnership Agreements: Frequently Asked Questions**

**Isabelle Ramdoo & Sanoussi Bilal. 2014.**

**ECDPM dossier. pp. 1-12.**

- This FAQ provides an introduction to the EPAs, who they concern, why they are negotiated and the key milestones from the original unilateral preferences to the final agreements.
- It covers the 7 regional configurations of EPA negotiations and explains the EU EPA negotiations deadline of 1st October 2014.
- The FAQ gives an overview of who trades what in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC).
- The publication also gives a brief introduction to the key concerns in the debate over EPAs: the merits of EPAs and their impact on development; product coverage; WTO compatibility; policy space to industrialise; regional and continental integration; policy space to negotiate trade agreements with other developed or large developing countries; EU’s trade deals with third countries and EPA implementation.
Economic Partnership Agreements: Towards the finishing line.
Sanoussi Bilal. 2014.
ECDPM BN 64 for a public hearing on ACP countries and EPAs at the European Parliament. pp. 1-4.

- For many, EPAs have become ‘the price to pay’ to maintain (i) free market access to the EU on a few tariff lines of crucial importance, and/or (ii) the regional unity required to pursue their integration process.
- Addressing the remaining technical bottlenecks of the EPAs requires a broad geostrategic perspective and political leadership to preserve and strengthen the inter-continental relations.
- The ECOWAS-EU EPA struck in July 2014 was a significant achievement because (i) West Africa remained united despite threats to split because of the protracted negotiations, and (ii) the conclusion of an EPA deal was the result of good will from both parties with difficult concessions being made.
- Whether the EPA deal will foster development or not remains an open question. It is clear that the limited scope of the agreement reached suggests that West Africa did not really embrace the development rhetoric of the EU on the positive transformation dynamics that an EPA could bring.
- Viewed through a political lens, remaining stumbling blocks in EPA negotiations could be dealt with in a more accommodating way by trade diplomats.
- In a world that is changing rapidly, not least in Africa, the European attitude is often perceived as somewhat patronising and too directive, preaching a development discourse not necessarily in tune with new African dynamics and priorities, and inadequately hiding European self-interest and Eurocentric approaches.

ECDPM 2014 Thematic Focus: Economic Partnership Agreements and beyond.

- This issue of GREAT Insights brings together perspectives on EPAs, the broader trade and development agenda, from a range of high-level personalities, stakeholders and experts.
- A range of articles offer the European Commission’s and others perspective on the EPAs so far, highlight the key outcomes of the SADC-EU negotiations, offer contrasting insights in why and how EPAs can best contribute to development and why the EPAs can be seen as misleading development instruments, raise concerns about the EPA process and stress the role that the private sector should play in bringing the EPAs to life.
- Some articles also offer a broader perspective looking beyond EPAs to situate them in sub-Saharan Africa’s evolving trade landscape, the challenges ahead and the EU’s wider trade relations. These include reflections focusing on the Africa-US trade and investment relations and the outcomes of President Obama’s Africa Leaders Summit this summer, reflections on possible insights for EPAs from the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), as well as reflections on the evolving approach and rhetoric of the EU towards free trade policy.
- Finally, the magazine also presents some key facts and figures on the EPA process and outcomes, as a potential quick guide to the complex EPA issues.
State of Trade Regimes in Africa

Post Cotonou Trade Regimes (2008-2014)

New Trade Regimes, October 2014*

*As from October 2014 or when EPAs are implemented

**According to the new GSP 2014, Gabon will no longer benefit from preferences due to its upper-middle income status.
Supporting Structural Transformation in the ACP Agro-Food Sector: Redefining possible roles of the ACP post 2020.
Paul Goodison. 2014.

• The raison d’être of the ACP Group is the promotion of the gradual integration of ACP states into the world economy in ways that contribute to the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development.
• Agriculture is central to most ACP economies, and an increasingly stringent EU agricultural product quality policy together with the proliferation of both official and private product standards are currently worsening the ACP Group’s access to the EU market.
• Preventing the emergence of these new barriers to trade represents an important area of common interest for ACP Group members, and offers a potential rationale for future concentration as a group with the EU.
• Further issues that could form the base of continued ACP solidarity include cotton issues at the WTO and the penetration of non-traditional export markets.
• The 2003 revision of the Georgetown Agreement broadened the mandate of the ACP group to promote the development of “a fairer and more equitable new world order”, and a commitment to strengthening the political identity of the ACP Group and the coherence of the ACP group acting as a “political force in international bodies.”
• At the general level, the ACP Group needs to clearly identify the objective basis for ACP solidarity in the traditional areas of ACP Group activity and to establish clear priority areas for common action, which have an added value when undertaken at the all-ACP level. Priority areas where common action adds greater value should be identified and while initially focusing on the EU, should also reach beyond the EU to reflect the shifting focus of economic growth.
• In reaching beyond EU it will be essential to diversify sources of financial support to ACP Group activities, ideally with efforts in this direction being initiated before the ending of the current Cotonou Agreement, so as to lay the basis for a seamless transition.
• The diversification of financing for ACP group activities is an essential part of re-defining the ACP group’s political relationship with the EU and will require the elaboration of clear political strategies and the active engagement of political leaders across the ACP if it is to become effective.

Tourism and Development in Caribbean-EU Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Policy and Practice.
Quentin de Roquefeuil and Geert Laporte. 2011.

• The EU increasingly recognises the potential of the private sector and tourism in the achievement of development objectives. In practice however, both the EU and the Caribbean official institutions have problems in tapping the developmental potential of tourism.
• EU policies in the Caribbean region which focus on the role of the private sector include the green paper ‘EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development - increasing the impact of EU development policy’, the Joint Caribbean-EU
partnership strategy, the RIP for the Caribbean and the NIPs in individual Caribbean ACP countries.

- As the top contributor to the Caribbean region’s GDP, the tourism sector has direct impact on employment and development prospects in the region.
- The tourism sector provides a good opportunity to counter the effects of preference erosion on the competitiveness of traditional Caribbean agricultural goods exported to the European market. The Caribbean region can play on its unique natural endowments to tap into a relatively high value added industry and shift to a service based economy. However, the growth of the industry is not without its drawbacks: critics have pointed to its lack of links to the poorest segments of the population and the risk it presents to the environment.
- The EPA signed in 2008 represented a major shift in the way the Caribbean tourism sector interacts with the EU. Overall, the EPA provides significant opportunities to the Caribbean tourism sector, notably by allowing it to set up offices in the EU, by lowering the costs of various inputs from the EU, and by providing for rules on anti-competitive behaviour that are expected to work in favour of the regional tourism industry.
- However a number of gaps persist: (i) while a few EDF funded programmes targeting tourism do exist in the region, their number and scope do not reflect the strategic economic weight of the industry and its potential for development, (ii) on the EU side, several regulatory policies have seriously hampered the growth and development benefits that could be expected from the EPA (e.g. the package travel directive, visa procedures and requirements for tourism businessmen and UK air passenger duty). Without a change in domestic legislation, the ability of domestic tourism industry to protect itself from these practices is severely hampered. The leakage of profits from the region is likely to worsen if this situation is not remedied.
- What is needed to move forward includes: (1) more systematic stress on the importance of tourism as a policy priority for development in strategic policy documents such as the Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy is warranted (2) ensuring accessibility of EDF funds to the private sector is a clear area of future work (3) the EU should promote policy coherence and avoid taking back with the left hand what was given with the right (4) Caribbean governments should make sure that interests of the industry are reflected in their priorities by for example passing competition legislation domestically.

4. Complementary, competing and alternative regional structures

In considering the future of ACP-EU relations it is also appropriate to look at the alternative forms of cooperation that groupings from Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific have with the European Union. The European Union itself over the past 10 years has moved to an increased ‘regionalism’ in its management of international relations part in recognition of new realities such as the forming of the African Union and partly in pursuit of its own interests. This is evidenced by the concluding of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy. While an EC communication on a EU-Pacific Partnership exists, no formal Joint Partnership Strategy has been signed between the Pacific and the EU.

There are major overlaps between these agreements and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. The lack of coherence, coordination and complementarity has been criticised by both European and ACP stakeholders. Yet in considering the future of the ACP-EU relations it is also necessary to consider the effectiveness and success of these alternative methods of collaboration.
The Implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding Confidence and Commitments
Damien Helly, Essete Abebe Bekele, Sahra El Fassi and Greta Galeazzi. 2014

- The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) is a multi-dimensional cooperation partnership that unlike the Cotonou Partnership Agreement is not a legal agreement but a political document. Despite its bureaucratic shortfalls, politically aware and motivated stakeholders actually managed to use it effectively in conducive environments.
- The EU-Africa partnership has lost its political traction because of serious divergences on trade, international justice, governance and cultural cooperation.
- The JAES will only be effective if there is clearly identified and sustainable political leadership from both sides; alignment on African and European long-term continental and global strategies; clarification of the relevant and appropriate level of intervention (continental, regional, national) of JAES implementation according to the subsidiarity principle; available funds (including the Pan-African Programme) programmed according to the mind-set of the joint strategy; functional and direct linkages with existing international, African and European decision making structures; available space for informal multi-stakeholder dialogue paving he ground for mutual understanding and coalitions of the willing; stronger monitoring and oversight mechanisms on JAES implementation by parliaments, civil society and other relevant bodies.
- The implementation of the JAES through the Africa-Europe partnership shows that the initial ambitious vision that drove it is still very much needed: a continent to continent political relation and joint action in all sectors beyond aid, as the main engine of and reference for any type of Africa-Europe dialogue.
- The JAES as a political declaration and statement of intent remains an essential component of Africa-Europe relations.
- Where they have not been willing to enter into the spirit of the JAES, cooperation and dialogue have been blocked. For example, the EPAs but also major security crises or positions on the role of the International Criminal Court.
- The JAES implementation framework is almost unanimously criticised for being too bureaucratic and cumbersome.
- The main avenue for the future of the JAES is to invest on what is functioning and to take stock of what is deemed effective and successful so as to replicate it in the next seven-year period leading to 2020.

Jean Bossuyt and Andrew Sherriff. 2010.

- The Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) reflects both continuity and a major break with the past. It reconfirms existing principles of cooperation and continues several existing thematic partnerships that have been on the Africa-EU agenda for some time. Yet the
JAES foundations also include major innovations aimed at “overcoming the traditional donor-recipient relationship’ and fundamentally changing Africa-EU relations.

- In 2010 taking stock of the progress since the JAES was agreed, the analysis points to a major risk in the implementation process: the perceived gradual dilution of the political substance of the policy framework. The signs of this dilution include the lack of substantial improvement or expansion of political dialogue under the JAES, the difficulty to ensure a focus on pan-African initiatives, the uneasy co-existence with other policy frameworks such as the Cotonou Agreement and the European Neighbourhood Policy, the focus on “quick wins” and low levels of ownership and limited incentives to engage.

- Interrelated explanatory factors for the perceived political dilution process are formulated around questions such as: to what extent has the political leadership of the JAES implementation process been sufficient? To which degree are parties prepared to reconcile interests through political dialogue? Is inclusive partnership with “actors” or “experts”? What are the incentives for effective implementation? Do we invest in processes or projects? Are both parties open for real change in the ‘culture’ of cooperation? And where are the asymmetries in capacities between the two Unions adequately considered?

The paper presents three possible scenarios for the future of the JAES:

- **The status quo or introducing limited changes to the current set-up**: This scenario is premised on a rather positive diagnosis by both parties and seems feasible. Yet it carries the risks for integrity and credibility of the overall JAES vision. The observed structural weaknesses would remain unchanged.

- **Reforming with caution - with the risk of stopping halfway**: this scenario would start from the assumption that status quo is not an option as it may lead to a further dilution of a potentially valid policy framework. It implies a preparedness of both parties to address the structural and operational if not political shortcomings of the JAES. The problem with this scenario is that it remains unclear whether the parties are also prepared to address upfront the more fundamental political bottlenecks.

- **Back to basics or putting in place an enabling environment for the JAES to gradually fulfill its potential and added value**: This scenario would opt for a more systemic way out of the perceived crisis of the JAES in terms of delivering - fast enough to remain attractive - on its political objectives and related change in the nature of Africa-EU relations. This implies introducing immediate reforms yet launching at the same time a number of processes to address upfront the political challenges now affecting the JAES, and agreeing on a ‘political roadmap’ indicating the processes that need to be organised to put in place the structural conditions for an effective functioning JAES. This option may in the short term seem less feasible.

**Can the Pan-African Programme revitalise the JAES?**
**Faten Aggad-Clerx and Nicola Tissi. 2012.**
**ECDPM Briefing Note 42. pp. 1-10.**

- Funding has been a thorn in the flesh of the JAES since its inception. The creation of the Pan-African Programme (PAP) which in 2012 proposed to have a €1 billion envelope under the Development Cooperation Instrument, aims to support the implementation of the JAES.
The arguments advanced in to create this programme included:

- The JAES’ inability to show added value and political commitments to deliver as opposed to the well-endowed Cotonou Agreement (with structured EDF funding)
- The fact that existing funding had been allocated to fund national and regional initiatives through the EDF and European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, but limited resources were available for cross-regional and continental initiatives (North-Southern Africa) since the JAES did not have its dedicated funds.
- Limited resources were available for non-traditional areas of cooperation (i.e. continental governance initiatives)
- Attempts to mainstream the JAES into the EDF and ENPI on the occasion of the mid-term review of these instruments produced no results, due to lack of ownership and political guidance on both sides, and to narrow prioritisation of the objective of the specific instruments.

- Besides sending a strong political signal, establishing an envelope for JAES funding might contribute to addressing some of the weaknesses of the JAES and provide a clear added value from the Cotonou/ENPI framework whose focus remains largely national and regional.

- Lodging the Pan-African Programme under the Development Cooperation Instrument can also be seen as an opportunity to test for a likely budgetisation of the EDF after the expiry of Cotonou in 2020; address the ambition of the JAES to treat Africa as one and allow covering both North and sub-Saharan Africa; and provide the opportunity to expand participation to the European Parliament which has a committee jointly with the Pan-Africa Parliament.

The Joint Caribbean EU Strategy Reflections and Analysis. 
Annita Montoute, Quinelle Kangalee and Zahra Alleyne. 2011. 
ECDPM and Institute of International Relations (IRR) at the University of the West Indies Workshop Report. pp.1-6.

- The BRICS relations with the Caribbean have intensified, in particular with Brazil, India and China. Venezuela and Cuba are also important actors. The policy stance of non-interference by China is potentially attractive to the Caribbean because the latter’s wishes to preserve policy space.
- Despite this increasing presence, the EU continues to be a significant player in the Caribbean. In addition to the EU’s role as an important trading power, and source of funding and humanitarian assistance, the EU is important because it is an exemplar of and supports regional integration and promotes values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
- The EU’s presence in the region has significant geopolitical significance because it continues to serve as a counter weight to US power in the region, giving the Caribbean some degree of flexibility with respect to its dependence on the US.
- By contrast, the BRICS group is not a cohesive force that projects power overseas and export and investments in the Caribbean from the emerging players are still relatively low.
- The common interests for a Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy (JCUEUS) include the geographic location of the OCTS in the Caribbean, the island state members of the EU and the high impact development cooperation opportunities.
Regional integration was identified as the highest area of priority and other thematic areas were ranked in the following order: Reconstruction and institutional support to Haiti, climate change and natural disasters, crime and security, joint action in bi-regional and multilateral fora on global issues, fragmentation among Caribbean countries, inequality among Caribbean populations and technology transfer e.g. in climate change and dealing with environmental challenges.

Challenges for the implementation of the strategy include the risk of duplication of efforts in existing spaces (e.g. EPAs), the possible divergence of attention to non-traditional partners, the implementation deficit, the lack of political backing of the highest political levels and human and financial resource constraints.

Key for the way forward for the JCEUS is an assessment of existing structures and processes to define complementarity and added value of existing frameworks such as Cotonou, the EPA and Hemispheric frameworks to ascertain where the JCEUS can complement or where synergies may be created.

Other concrete actions to move forward with the strategy include developing a coherent regional strategy/vision in response to the changing global political economy, improving the implementation capacity of the Caribbean and finally appropriate political backing and public support and understanding must be sought for the success of the Strategy.

Reinventing Pacific-EU relations: with or without the ACP?
ECDPM Briefing Note 56. pp. 1-17.

The Pacific region of the ACP is experiencing unprecedented global attention. Both the emerging economies (BRICS) as well as the traditional global partners (USA, Japan, EU) are displaying renewed interest amidst multi-polarisation in the region.

Australia and New Zealand remain the key partners of the ACP Pacific countries, while players from the BRICS are stepping up, with India and Brazil focusing their presence in Vanuatu and Fiji, while Chinese influence in the region has significantly increased during the last decade, especially in terms of investment in the natural resources, fisheries and trade sector. South Korea and Indonesia are also expanding their relations with ACP Pacific countries. Russian presence in the region aims to challenge European and US geostrategic, military and economic interests.

The EU issued in 2012 the joint communication called ‘Towards a renewed EU-Pacific development partnership’. This communication clearly states that the Pacific is becoming an “emerging foreign policy priority” for the EU because of its growing geostrategic importance as well as the vulnerability of its states to climate change.

Key priorities for the EU-Pacific partnership include: climate change, trade, fisheries, regional integration as well as governance and human rights. Just one year in the lifetime of the EU Communication on the Pacific, the ambitions for enhanced partnership have yet to materialise.

The apparent limited interest of the EU in the Pacific region (that is mainly focused on fisheries) on the one hand, and the perceived limited added value of the EU on the other hand by Pacific actors, should not lead to unbalanced and hastily drawn conclusions that the EU is not interested in the Pacific and that it will withdraw from the region.
• In terms of geography, size and make-up of the economies, the Pacific region continues to emphasize that it is very “unique and diverse” and that it could well become more attractive to the EU.

In relation to the future of ACP-EU and Pacific-EU cooperation post 2020, the following scenarios have been mentioned:

• **Status quo:** At the Pacific consultation in Samoa, it was clear that the Pacific ACP countries and the region admit that ‘business as usual’ will not work in a post-2020 context.

• **EU Agreement with an Asia-Pacific Group of countries:** An Asia-Pacific association could be disadvantageous for the Pacific as the small Pacific islands would have to operate in a group of countries of a very different size (some of them BRICS), with much larger populations and very different levels of economic development. For many Pacific countries this will not lead to more coherence but rather to conflicting interests. Therefore the option of the Pacific being linked with the Asia region, which is sometimes informally raised in EU circles, does not seem to create a lot of excitement in the Pacific region.

• **A separate EU-Pacific Agreement:** Given the limited bargaining power of Pacific ACP states vis-à-vis the EU and the major capacity and institutional challenges involved, this could become an unbalanced partnership and overly ambitious. It could possibly work if the partnership was focused on a select number of key areas, e.g. a natural resource driven focus including fisheries, forests, climate change and energy.

• **Regional agreements between the EU and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific with an overarching ACP-EU framework:** Climate change is the topic “par excellence” around which common interests could be built in all three ACP regions. Other areas include natural resources, the agro-food sector, fisheries, extractive sectors and tourism.

5. Statistical overview of ACP countries and other country groupings*

The following section presents a quick and partial statistical overview of ACP countries and other country groupings. A set of tables have been prepared to give an overview of income levels, least developed countries, conflict and fragile situations, small island states, and landlocked developing states in the ACP. The Economic (United Nations) and Environmental (Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SOPAC)) Vulnerability Indices of ACP countries are also presented. While these statistical overviews can be interpreted in various ways and do not necessarily accurately present all ACP countries, they can contribute to understanding the variance between the ACP countries both as a group and individually. There are many ways to understand the realities and differences of the ACP countries statistically from various data sources and the following tables have been prepared to represent a few of them in an indicative way.

*The tables have been prepared based on data collected for 80 ACP countries including Cuba and South Sudan, which respectively are not signatory to the CPA or not yet formally acceded to the ACP Group.
### Tables 1 & 2: Income levels in ACP (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country count</th>
<th>Percentage of ACP countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>ACP population</th>
<th>Percentage of ACP total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>445.680.070</td>
<td>52,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle</td>
<td>304.024.481</td>
<td>35,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td>96.979.186</td>
<td>11,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3.103.867</td>
<td>0,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>32.382</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>849.819.986</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3: Least Developed Countries in ACP (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country count</th>
<th>Population in ACP LDCs</th>
<th>Percentage of ACP total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>473.651.163</td>
<td>55,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.413.211</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.602.516</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>485.667.380</strong></td>
<td><strong>57,1%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACP countries that are LDCs | 40,0%
ACP countries that are not LDCs | 60,0%

### Table 4: Conflict/Fragile Situations in ACP (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country count</th>
<th>Population in ACP conflict/fragile situations</th>
<th>Percentage of ACP total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>205,764,478</td>
<td>24,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,413,211</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,890,609</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>218,068,298</td>
<td>25,6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACP countries that have fragile/conflict situations: 31,0%
ACP countries that do not have fragile/conflict situations: 69,0%


### Table 5: Small Island States and Landlocked Developing Countries in ACP (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Small Island States</th>
<th>Landlocked developing countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACP countries that are small island states: 45,0%
ACP countries that are not small island states: 55,0%
ACP countries that are landlocked developing countries: 20,0%
ACP countries that are not landlocked developing countries: 80,0%


### Table 6: Economic Vulnerability Index of ACP countries by regions (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>67,8</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td>42,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>70,3</td>
<td>24,5</td>
<td>42,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>82,0</td>
<td>38,3</td>
<td>55,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>43,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Environmental Vulnerability Index in the ACP (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVI</th>
<th>Country Count</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage of ACP total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resilient</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68,413,407</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At risk</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>309,687,368</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>226,347,709</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly vulnerable</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>228,011,002</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely vulnerable</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,925,074</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12,435,426</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>849,819,986</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6. ECDPM Overview Resources

A personal history of ACP-EU relations

The European Union’s development policy: a personal view of 50 years of international cooperation.

- A personal and historical account of EU Development Policy and ACP-EU relations from the Treaty of Rome (1956), the foundation of the ACP group (1975) and the successive Lomé Conventions, up until Cotonou (1990+).
- Europe is solidly established in a policy field whose beginnings were very temporary and improvised. As it is not – and has no ambition to be – a military power, its relations with the developing world offered the EU a good opportunity to exercise its role as a ‘soft power’.
- It is useful to ask what fundamental objective our development cooperation is actually pursuing – a question that is often evaded. The only objective can be one of ensuring that all the inhabitants of our planet have the decent living conditions that they deserve; in modern parlance, we call that “eradicating poverty”.

34
The Cotonou Infokit


- The Infokit focusses on the key aspects of the Agreement, presenting basic information and explaining the main provisions and changes. It was not updated to reflect the 2005 and 2010 revisions.
- The Infokit is a set of fiches written in a plain and jargon-free manner, as far as possible, and the reader is introduced to the key elements and guided to further sources of information and advice.
- The resource introduces the Cotonou Agreement providing a historical overview and explaining the innovations in the Agreement. The Institutions, instruments and actors in the partnership are also explained.
- The Infokit then explains the trade and economic partnership from Lomé to Cotonou, private sector development, the politics of the partnership and how the partnership is managed.

The Cotonou Agreement: A user’s guide for non-state actors


- This guide produced 2003 aimed to inform civil society organisations, economic and social partners and the private sector in ACP countries on the most important features of the Cotonou Agreement and provide practical guidance on how all of these non-state actors can participate in ACP-EU cooperation.
- The guide gives an overview of the Cotonou Agreement, and the opportunities for participation in the legal framework of the agreement. It also gives examples of some experiences of participation in the trade and political dimensions of the partnership.
- The user’s guide presented from 2003 the main funding routes for non-state actors and information on the EDF and the EU budget lines.
- Finally the guide suggests four steps to promote the quality of participation and urges readers to start a discussion and sustain information flows and knowledge sharing.
7. Other Resources

Reports commissioned by the ACP Secretariat, Eminent Persons Group and the European Parliament


Other reports, studies and articles

On the EDF

  file:///Users/cg/Downloads/Brussels_Briefing_Papers_Budgetisation_E.pdf

The reports noted here do not provide an exhaustive list of all those relevant to the topics presented in this overview guide. Listing here does not imply a specific endorsement by ECDPM.

Upcoming ECDPM work

- In 2015 ECDPM will be conducting an in-depth political economy analysis of the future of ACP-EU relations looking a number of critical issues. It will focus on the political and economic interests and incentives that drive the key players in the partnership. This overview guide will be updated to reflect the outcomes of this study.

ECDPM welcomes feedback and questions on this overview guide and these can be directed to Head of EU External Action Programme - Andrew Sherriff: <as@ecdpm.org>, and Research Assistant Cecilia Gregersen: <cg@ecdpm.org> who compiled and edited this guide. Thanks also go to Geert Laporte, Rhys Williams and Yaseena van ‘t Hoff for their work on making this overview guide possible.

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La version française de cette publication sera disponible dès début 2015.
2000

Cotonou Partnership Agreement
Signed by the EU, 77 ACP and 77 ACP countries, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, a 20-year framework, is based on five pillars: enhanced political dialogue, increased participation of non-state actors, a more strategic approach to cooperation, new economic and trade partnerships and increased financial cooperation.

2004

EU Enlarged
The European Union expands with ten new Member States, bringing its total membership to 25.

2005

Cotonou Agreement
Ratified by the EU and the African Union, the Cotonou Agreement entered into force.

2007

Joint Africa-EU Strategy
This strategy aims to transform the partnership into a strategic partnership, putting Africa and the EU on equal footing and sharing responsibilities and decisions.

2009

Lisbon Treaty
The Treaty aims to create a stronger, more coherent and competitive Union that can better represent its citizens on the global stage.

2008

Cariforum Signs EPA
All CARIForum countries sign an EPA with the EU. The EU and CARIForum negotiate the removal of market access barriers.

2010

2nd Revision of the Cotonou Agreement
The EU and CARIForum agree to improve the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement.

2012

Agenda for Change
The European Union adopts the Agenda for Change, a comprehensive strategy to address its challenges.

2014

Evasions of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) take place.

2015

European Commission
The European Union adopts a new strategy for Africa, aiming to strengthen economic, political and social relations.

2016

New European Union
The European Union adopts a new strategy for Africa, aiming to strengthen economic, political and social relations.

2019

Justin Einstein
The European Union adopts a new strategy for Africa, aiming to strengthen economic, political and social relations.

2020

Expiration of the Cotonou Agreement
The Cotonou Agreement ends, and the EU and Africa negotiate a new partnership.

2021

New Partnership Agreement
The EU and Africa negotiate a new partnership agreement.

2022

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2023

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2024

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2025

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2026

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2027

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2028

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2029

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2030

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2031

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2032

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2033

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2034

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2035

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2036

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2037

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2038

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2039

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2040

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2041

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2042

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2043

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2044

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2045

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2046

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2047

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2048

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2049

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2050

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2051

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2052

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2053

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2054

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2055

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2056

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2057

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2058

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.

2059

New Partnership Agreement
The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and Africa enters into force.

2060

Further negotiations
The EU and Africa continue negotiations to finalize the new partnership agreement.
Bibliography


About ECDPM
ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM’s key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

Thematic priorities
ECDPM organises its work around four themes:

- Reconciling values and interests in the external action of the EU and other international players
- Promoting economic governance and trade for inclusive and sustainable growth
- Supporting societal dynamics of change related to democracy and governance in developing countries, particularly Africa
- Addressing food security as a global public good through information and support to regional integration, markets and agriculture

Approach
ECDPM is a “think and do tank”. It links policies and practice using a mix of roles and methods. ECDPM organises and facilitates policy dialogues, provides tailor-made analysis and advice, participates in South-North networks and does policy-oriented research with partners from the South.

ECDPM also assists with the implementation of policies and has a strong track record in evaluating policy impact. ECDPM’s activities are largely designed to support institutions in the developing world to define their own agendas. ECDPM brings a frank and independent perspective to its activities, entering partnerships with an open mind and a clear focus on results.

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